force of Bodies therefore is not in the Bodies which move since this power of Motion is nothing else but the Will of God Thus Bodies have no Action and when a Bowl which is moved by meeting it moves another yet it communicates nothing of its own for in it self it hath not the Impression that it communicates to the other Yet a Bowl is the Natural Cause of the motion which it communicates A Natural Cause then is not a real and true Cause but only an occasional one and which determined the Author of Nature to act after such and such a manner in such and such an Occurrence It is certain that 't is by the Motion of visible or invisible Bodies that all things are produced For Experience teaches us that Bodies whose parts are in greatest Motion always act more than others and produce the greatest Change in the World All the Powers of Nature then proceed from the Will of God He has created the World because he willed it Dixit facta sunt He moves all things and so produces all the Effects that we see happen because he has also willed certain Laws according to which Bodies communicate their Motions in their Rencounter and because these Laws are Efficacious they act and Bodies cannot act There is therefore no Force Power or true Cause in the Material and Sensible World nor must we admit of Forms Facilities and real Qualities to produce Effects that Bodies cannot and to divide with God the Force and Power which is Essential to him Not only Bodies cannot be the true Causes of any thing the most noble Spirits also are under a like Impotence They can know nothing it God does not enlighten them nor can they have any Sensation if he does not modifie them They are capable of willing nothing if God moves them not towards him I confess they can determine the Impression that God gives them towards him to other Objects but I know not whether that can called a Power If the Capability of Sinning is a Power it would be a Power which the Almighty has not St. Austin says in some of his Works It Men had in themselves the Power of loving Good we might say they had some Power But can only Love because God Wills they should Love and because his Will is Efficacious They Love only because God continually inclines them to Good in General that is towards himself For God has created them only for himself he never preserves them without turning them towards and inclining them to himself They have no Motion towards Good in general 't is God who moves them they only follow by an entire free Choice this Impression according to the Law of God or determine it towards a false Good after the Law of the Flesh They can only be determined by a Prospect of Good For being able to do only what God makes them they can love nothing but Good But if we should suppose what is true in one Sense that Spirits have in themselves the Power of knowing Truth and loving Good if their Thoughts and Wills produced nothing External we might always say they were able to do nothing Now it appears most certain to me that the Will of Spirits is not capable of moving the least Body in the World For 't is evident there is no necessary Connexion between the Will we have of moving our Arms and the Motion of them It is true they are moved when we please and by that means we are the Natural Cause of their Motion But Natural Causes are not true Causes they are only Occasional ones which act meerly through the Power and Efficacy of God as I have already explained For how can we move our Arms To move them we must have Animal Spirits and convey them by certain Nerves into such and such Muscles to swell and contract them For by this means the Arms move or according to the Opinion of some we know not yet how 't is performed And we see that Men who do not so much as know they have Spirits Nerves and Muscles to move their Arms yet move them with as much Art and Facility as those that understand Anatomy best 'T is then granted that Men Will the Motion of their Arms but 't is only God that can and knows how to remove them If a Man cannot throw down a Tower at least he knows well what must be done in order to it But there is no Man that knows so much as what he must do to move one of his Fingers by the help of his Animal Spirits How then can Men move their Arms These things appear evident to me and to all those that will think of them though perhaps they may be incomprehensible to such as will not consider them But Men only are not the True Causes of the Motions produced in their Bodies it seems even a Contradiction that they should be so A True Cause is such an one as the Mind perceives a necessary Connexion between it and its Effect 't is that I mean Now there is only the Infinitely Perfect Being whose Mind can perceive a necessary Connexion between his Will and the Effects of it 'T is only God then who is the True Cause and who has really the Power of moving Bodies I say moreover 't is not probable that God should communicate either to Men or Angels this Power he has of moving Bodies and those who pretend the Power we have of moving our Arms is a true Power must confess that God can also give to Spirits the Power of creating annihilating and performing all possible things In a word That he can make them Almighty as I shall further shew God has no need of any Instrument to act it is sufficient if he Wills a thing for it to be because it is a Contradiction to suppose he Wills it and that it should not be His Power then is his Will and the communicating of his Power is a Communication of his Will But to communicate his Will to a Man or an Angel can signifie nothing else but Willing some body for instance should be effectively moved when 't is Will'd by a Man or an Angel Now in this case I see two Wills which concur when an Angel would move a Body that of God and that of the Angel and to know which of the two will be the true Cause of the Motion of this Body we must know which it is that is Efficacious There is a necessary Connexion between the Will of God and what he Wills God Wills in this case that a Body should move when it is willed by an Angel There is a necessary Connexion therefore between the. Will of God and the Motion of this Body and consequently 't is God who is the true cause of the Motion of the Body and the Will of the Angel only an occasional one But to shew it yet more clearly let us suppose that God Wills it should happen quite contrary to what some
freezes the Water in Rivers We must say that the Air dryes the Earth because it agitates and sucks up the Water which is tempered with it And that the Air or subtle Matter freezes Rivers in Winter because it does not then communicate motion enough to the parts of which the Water is composed In a word we must if we can give the Natural and Particular Cause of the Effects produced But as the action of these Causes consist only in the Moving Power which acts them and that this Moving Power is nothing else but the Will of God who creates them or successively preserves them in different places we must not say that they have in themselves a Strength or Power to produce any Effects And when in Reasoning we are at last come to a general Effect whose Cause we seek 't would be a very ill way of Philosophizing to imagine any other besides the general one And to feign a Certain Nature a First Moveable an Vniversal Soul or some such like Chimera of which we have no clear and distinct Idea would be to argue like the Heathen Philosophers For instance When we are ask't whence it comes that some Bodies are in Motion or how the Air when agitated communicates its Motion to the Water or rather from whence it proceeds that Bodies impell one another As Motion and its communication is a general Effect whereupon all others depend it is necessary I dont say to be a good Christian but to be a Philosopher to recur to God who is the Universal Cause since 't is his Will which is the Moving Power of Bodies and which also regulates the communication of their Motions If he had Will'd there should be no new production in the World he would not have put the parts of it in Motion And if he should hereafter Will the incorruptibility of any of the Beings he has Created he would cease to Will certain communications of Motions in respect to these Beings The Third Proof All Labour would be useless 't would be un necessary to water and to give certain preparatory dispositions to Bodies to fit them for what we desire of them For God has no need of preparing the subjects upon which he acts ANSWER Suarez in the same place To which I Reply That God can absolutely do what he pleases without finding any dispositions in the subjects he works upon But he cannot do it without a Miracle or by Natural wayes that is according to the general Laws of the communication of the Motions he has established and according to which he generally acts God never multiplies his Wills without Reason but alwayes acts by the most simple wayes and therefore he makes use of the meeting of Bodies in giving them Motion not as their shock is absolutely necessary to move them as our Senses tell us but because that being the occasion of the communication of Motion there needs only a few Natural Laws to produce all the admirable Effects that we see For by this means we can reduce all the Laws of the communication of Motion to one only which is That Bodies which shock each other being look'd upon but as one in the moment of their contact or shock the Moving Power is at their separation divided between them according to the proportion of their magnitude But as concuring Bodies are incompassed with an infinite number of other Bodies which act upon them by vertue and efficacy of this Law how constant and uniform soever it may be it produces an infinite number of different communications because it acts upon infinite Bodies which all relate to one another See the last Chap. of the Search after Truth It is necessary to water a Plant to make it grow because according to the Laws of the communication of Motions there is scarce any other but watery Particles which by their Motion and Figure can insinuate themselves and enter the Fibres of the Plants and by various uniting themselves together take the Figure necessary for their Nourishment The subtle matter which the Sun continually diffuses may by agitating the Water draw it up into the Plants but it has not Motion enough to raise gross Particles of Earth However the Earth and even the Air are necessary to the growth of Plants The Earth to preserve the Water at their Root and the Air to excite a moderate fermentation in the same Water But the action of the Sun Air and Water consist only in the Motion of their parts and to speak properly none but God can act For as I have just said there is only he who by the efficacy of his Will and infinite extent of his Knowledge can produce and regulate the infinite communications or Motions which are made every moment and according to an infinite exact and regular proportion The Fourth Proof Can God oppose or resist himself Bodies meet shock and resist one another therefore God acts not in them except by his concurrence For if he only produced and preserved Motion in Bodies he would divert them before their meeting since he knows very well that they are impenetrable Why should Bodies be impelled to be thrown back again or made to advance that they may recoil Or wherefore are useless Motions produced and preserved Is it not extravagant to say that God fights against himself and destroys his own works when a Bull opposes a Lion or a Wolf devours a Sheep and a Sheep eats the Grass which he gave growth to Therefore there are Second Causes ANSWER Then Second Causes do every thing and God does nothing at all For God cannot act against himself and to concur is to act Concurring to contrary actions is giving contrary concourses and consequently a performing contrary actions To concur with the action of the Creatures which resist one another is to act against himself and to concur to useless Motions is to act unusefully Now God does nothing in vain he performs no actions contrary to one another Therefore he concurs not in the action of the Creatures who often destroy one another and make useless actions and motions Hither 't is that this Proof of Second Causes conducts us but let us examine what Reason teaches us about it God does all in every thing and nothing resists him He performs all things since 't is by his Wills that all Motions are produced and regulated and nothing resists him because whatever he wills is effected And thus it ought to be conceived He having resolved to produce by the most simple wayes as the most conformable to order this infinite variety of Creatures that we admire he determined Bodies to move in a right line because this line is the most simple But Bodies being impenetrable and their Motions inclining to opposite lines or such as intersect they must necessarily meet one another and consequently cease to move in the same manner God foresaw this and nevertheless positively willed the meeting or opposition of Bodies not because he was pleased
enough to confound the most evident things and in these Questions where 't is necessary to remove the Equivocation they see nothing to distinguish If we consider that the greatest Part of the Questions of Philosophers and Physicians include some equivocal Terms like those we have spoken of we cannot doubt but that these learned Men who have not been able to define them have delivered nothing Solid in all the great Volumes they have composed and what I have said may suffice to overthrow almost all the Opinions of the Ancients But for Descartes he perfectly knew how to distinguish these things He resolved no Question by Sensible Idea's and if we take the Pains to read him we shall see he explained every thing after a more clear and evident Manner and almost always demonstrated them only by the distinct Idea's of Extension Figure and Motion The other kind of equivocal Terms which Philosophers make use of comprehend all these general Terms of Logick by which it is easie to explain things without having any Knowledge of them Aristotle has made the most use of them all his Books are full of them and some are a mere Logick He proposes and resolves all things by these Specious Words Genus Species Power Nature Form Faculty Quality Causa per se Causa per accidens His Followers have had no small Trouble to apprehend the meaning of these Words which signifie nothing at all nor are they more learned than before when they have heard say that Fire dissolves Metals because it has a Faculty of dissolving them and that a Man digests not because he has a weak Stomach or that his Faculty of Concocting does not perform its Functions well It is true those who have made use of these Terms and general Idea's to explain all things by do not commonly fall into so great a Number of Errors as those who only make use of them to stir up the confused Ideas of the Senses The Philosophers of the Schools are not so subject to Error as certain Dogmatical decisive Physicians who form Systems upon some Experiments which they know not the reason of because they speak so generally that they run no great Hazzard The Fire warms dries hardens and softens because it has such Faculties as produce these Effects Senna purges by its Purgative Quality Bread nourishes by its Nutritive Quality These Proportions are not subject to Error for a Quality is that which denotes a thing by such a Name and we cannot deny it to Aristotle for indeed this Definition is indisputable Such or the like manner of speaking are not false but only in Effect they signifie nothing These indetermined Idea's ingage us not in Error but they are wholy useless in the Discovery of Truth For although we know there is a substantial Form in Fire accompanied with a thousand Faculties like to those of heating dilating melting Gold Silver and all Metals of clearing burning and baking If this Difficulty be proposed to me to be resolved viz. whether Fire can harden Dirt and soften Wax The Idea's of Substantial Form and of those Faculties that produce Heat Ratification Fluidity c. would be of no use to me in resolving the Question for there being no Connexion betwen the Idea's of the Hardness of Dirt and Softness of Wax and those of the Substantial Form of Fire and the Qualities of producing Rarification Fluidity c. It is the same with all general Idea's so they are wholly useless for the Ends designed But if we know that Fire is nothing else but the Parts of Wood put into continal Motion and that 't is only by this Agitation that it excites the Sensation of Heat in us If we knew at the same Time that the Softness of Dirt consists only in a Mixture of Earth and Water as these Idea's are not confused and general but distinct and particular It would not be difficult to see that the Heat of Fire must harden Dirt because one Body can move another being it self in Motion We likewise easily discover that since Heat which is felt near the Fire is caused by the Motion of the invisible Parts of the Wood which strike against the Hands if we expose Dirt to the Heat of the Fire the Watery Parts which are joyned to the Earth being more lose and consequently sooner agitated by the Shock of the little Bodies which go out from the Fire than the gross Particles of the Earth they must separate and leave it dry and hard It would also evidently apppear that Fire cannot harden Wax if we knew that the Particles which compose it are branched and very near of the same Bigness Thus particular Idea's are very useful in an Enquiry after Truth And indeterminate Idea's are hot only useless but on the contrary insensibly lead us into Error These Philosophers content not themselves with making use of general Terms and indetermined Idea's that answer nothing But they will have those Terms signifie certain particular Beings They pretend that there is some Substance distinct from Matter which is the Form of Matter and an infinite Company of little Beings really distinct from Matter and Form of which they suppose as many of them as they have different Sensations of Bodies and they think these Bodies produce different Effects Yet it is plain to any Man that is capable of Attention that all these little Beings distinct from Fire for instance and which we suppose to be contained therein for the Production of Heat Light Hardness Fluidity c are only Fictions of the Imagination which are contrary to Reason For Reason hath no particular Idea which represents these little Beings If we ask the Philosophers what Sort of Entity that Faculty in the Fire is which gives Light they will only answer that 't is a Being which is the Cause why Fire is capable of producing Light So that the Idea they have of the Faculty of Light is not different from the general Idea of the Cause and confused Idea of the Effect which we see They have therefore no clear Idea of what they say when they admit these particular Beings Thus they say what they conceive not and what indeed is impossible to be conceived CHAP. III. Of the most dangerous Error in Philosophy Of the Ancients PHilosophers have not only spoke what they did not conceive when they explained the Effects of Nature by certain Beings which they have no particular Idea of but even establish a Principle from whence may directly be drawn most false and dangerous Consequences For if according to their Opinion we suppose that in Bodies there are some Beings distinct from Matter and not having any distinct Idea of these Entities we might easily imagine that they are the true or principal Causes of the Effects which we see produced 'T is even the common Sentiment of most Philosophers For 't is chiefly to explain these Effects that they make use of Substantial Forms Real Qualities and other the like Entities
Spirits desire as we may think of Devils or some other Spirits who merit this Punishment we cannot say in this case that God communicates his Power to them since they can do nothing that they would do Yet the Wills of these Spirits would be the Natural Causes of whatever Effects should be produced as such Bodies should be moved to the Right Hand because these Spirits would have them moved to the Left and the desire of these Spirits would determine the Will of God to act as our Wills to move the parts of our Bodies determine the first Cause to move them So that the Wills of Spirits are only occasional Causes Yet if after all these Reasons we will still maintain that the Will of an Angel which moves any body should be a true Cause and not an occasional one it is plain that this same Angel might be the true Cause of the Creation and Annihilation of all things For God could as well communicate to him his Prower of Creating and Destroying Bodies as that of moving them if he will'd that things should be created and annihilated In a word If he will'd that all things should happen as the Angel wishes them even as he Wills Bodies should move as the Angel pleases If it be said that an Angel or a Man would be the true movers because God moves Bodies when they wish it it may also be said that a Man and an Angel may be true Creators since God can create Beings when they will it Nay perhaps it might be said that the molt Vile Animals or Matter of it self should be the effective Cause of the Creation of any Substance if we supposed as the Philosophers do that God produces substantial Forms whenever the Disposition of Matter requires it In fine Because God has resolved from all Eternity in certain times to create such or such things we might also say that these times should be the Causes of the Creation of these Beings as reasonably as to pretend that a Bowl which meets another is the true cause of the motion it communicates to it Because God has determined by his general Will which constituted the Order of Nature that when two Bodies should meet there should be such and such a Communication of Motion There is then but one only true God and he the one only true Cause And we must not imagine that which precedes an Effect to be the true Cause of it God cannot even communicate his Power to the Creatures if we follow the Light of Reason he cannot make them true Causes because he cannot make them Gods Bodies Spirits pure Intelligences can all do nothing 'T is he who hath made these Spirits that illuminates and acts them 'T is he who has created the Heavens and the Earth which regulates the Motions thereof In short 't is the Author of our Being that executes our Wills semel jussit semper paret He even moves our Arms when we make use of them against his Orders for he complains by his Prophets that we make him serve our unjust and criminal Desires All these little Heathen Divinities and all these particular Causes of the Philosophers are only Chymera's that the wicked Spirit endeavours to establish to ruin the Worship of the true God It is not the Philosophy they have received from Adam which teaches these things 't is that they have received from the Serpent for since the Fall the Mind of Man is perfectly Heathenish 'T is this Philosophy which joyned to the Errors of the Senses has made them adore the Sun and which is fall at this Day the universal Cause of the Irregularity of the Mind and Corruption of the Heart of Man By their Actions and sometimes by their Words why say they should we not love the Body since the Body is capable of affording us all Pleasures And why do we laugh at the Israelites which regretted the Loss of the Garlick and Onyons of Egypt since in Effect they were unhappy by being deprived of what in some Measure could make them happy But the new Philosophy which they represent as a dismal thing to affrighten weak Minds that is despised and condemned without being understood The new Philosophy I say since they are pleased to call it so destroys all the Arguments of the Libertines by the Establishment of the chiefest of its Principles which perfectly agrees with the * Haec est Religio Christiana fratres mei quae praedicatur per universum mundum horrentibus inimieis ubi vincuntur murmurantibus ubi praevalent saevientibus haec est Religie Christiana ut Colatur unus Deus non Dii qui facit Animam Beatum nisi unus Deus Aug. tr 23. in Joan. first Principle of the Christian Religion that we must love and fear but one God since there is only one God who can make us happy For if Religion teaches us that there is but one true God this Philosophy shews us there is but one true Cause If Religion informs us that all the Divinities of the Heathens are only Stones and Metals without Life and Motion This Philosophy discovers to us also that all second Causes or all the Divinities of their Philosophy are only Matter and inefficacious Wills In short if Religion teaches us that we must not bow our Knees to false Gods This Philosophy also tells us that our Imaginations and Minds ought not to be prostituted to the Imaginary Greatness and Power of Causes which are not true Causes That we must neither love nor fear them nor busie our selves about them but think upon God only see him adore him fear and love him in all things But this agrees not with the Inclination of some Philosophers They will neither see nor think upon God For since the Fall there is a secret Opposition between God and Man Men take Pleasure in erecting Gods after their own Fancy they voluntarily love and fear the Fictions of their own Imagination as they Heathens did the Works of their own Hands They are like Children who tremble at their Companions after they have daubed their Faces Or if they will have a more Noble Comparison although perhaps it be not so just they resemble those famous Romans who had some Fear and Respect for the Fictions of their own Minds and foolishly adored their Emperors after they had let loose the Eagle when they deified them CHAP. IV. An Explanation of the Second Part of the general Rule That Philosophers neglect it but Mr. Descartes has very exactly observed it WE have already shewed unto what Errors we are subject when we reason upon the false and confused Idea's of the Senses and upon the rambling and indeterminate Idea's of pure Logick We have sufficiently discovered that to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions it is absolutely necessary exactly to observe the Rule that we have prescribed if our Idea's are clear and distinct and then to reason according to these Idea's In this same general Rule which respects the Subject
of our Studies there is yet this Circumstance to be well considered Namely that we must always begin with the most simple and easie things and continue a long Time upon them before we undertake more compounded and difficult ones For if we must only reason upon distinct Idea's always to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions it is plain that we must never proceed to an Enquiry after compounded things before we have very carefully examined and made those simple ones on which they depend familiar to us Since the Idea's of compounded things neither are nor can be clear when we have only a confused and imperfect Knowledge of the more simple which compose them We know things imperfectly when we are not assured that we have considered all their Parts And we have a confused Knowledge of them when they are not familiar to the Mind although we are certain we have examined them in all their Parts When we know them but imperfectly we only reason upon Probabilities when we perceive them confusedly there is neither Order nor Understanding in out Deductions We often know neither where we are nor where we go But when we know them imperfectly and confusedly together which happens most commonly we have neither a clear Knowledge of what we enquire after nor the means of attaining it So that it 's absolutely necessary to keep strictly to this Order in our Studies To begin always with the most simple things examine all their Parts and make them familiar to us before we pass to the more compounded on which they depend But this Rule agrees not with Mens Inclinations they naturally have a Contempt for whatever appears easie and their Mind which was not made for a limited Object that may be easily comprehend cannot stop long in considering these simple Idea's which have no Character of Infinity for which they are made On the contrary and for the same Reason they have much Respect and Inclination for great things which include something of Infinity and such things as are obscure and mysterious 'T is not because they love Darkness but 't is that in this Darkness they hope to find a Good and a Truth capable of satisfying them Vanity also inclines the Mind immediately to imploy it self about great and extraordinary things and gives it a Foolish Hope of accomplishing whatever it undertakes Experience shews us That the most exact Knowledge of common things gives no Reputation in the World and that the Knowledge of such things as are uncommon how confused and imperfect soever it may be always gains Esteem and Respect to those who freely express some high Idea of what they understand not And this Experience determines all those who are more sensibly touched with Vanity than Truth who are certainly in the greatest Number to make a blind Enquiry after a specious and imaginary Knowledge of whatever is great rare and obscure How many Men reject the Philosophy of Descartes for this pleasant Reason that his Principles are too simple and easie There are no obscure and mysterious Terms in this Philosophy Women and Persons who know neither Greek nor Latin are capable of apprehending it It must therefore be of very small Consequence and it would not be reasonable for great Genii to apply themselves to it They imagine Principles so clear and simple are not extensive enough to explain the Effects of Nature which they suppose obscure and perplexed They do not immediately see the Benefit of these Principles which are too easie and simple to stop their Attention so long as it is necessary to discover the Use and Extent of them They rather choose to explain those Effects whose Causes they do not comprehend by Principles they conceive not and which it is absolutely impossible to conceive than by such as are both simple and intelligible For these Philosophers explain obscure things by Principles which are not only obscure but also intirely incomprehensible When any Persons undertake to explain things extreamly perplexed by clear and known Principles it is easie to see whether or no they accomplish it because if we conceive well what they say we can discover whether or no they speak true So the fasly Learned would not find their Expectation nor make themselves admired as they wish to be if they made use of intelligible Principles because it would evidently be discovered that they say nothing But when they make use of unknown Principles and speak of very compounded things as if they exactly knew all their Relations they are admired because what they say is not conceived and we naturally have a Respect for what passes our Understandings Now as obscure and incomprehensible things seem to be better connected than such as are clear and intelligible Incomprehensible Principles are of a greater Use than intelligible ones in the most compounded Questions There is nothing so difficult but Philosophers and Physicians give some brief Reason of it from their Principles For their Principles being yet more incomprehensible than all the Questions that can be put to them if they be once taken for granted there is no Difficulty but will soon be solved For instance they boldly and without any Hesitation answer these obscure and indetermined Questions Why is it that the Sun attracts Vapours That the Jesuits Powder cures the Quartan Feaver That Ruburb purges Choler Chymical Salt Flegm And other like Questions And the Generality of Mankind are satisfied with their Answers because obscure and incomprehensible agrees with both But unintelligible Principles do not well agree with Questions that are clearly proposed and easily resolved because it is evidently discovered that they signifie nothing These Philosophers cannot by their Principles explain how Horses draw a Chariot how Dust stops a Watch how Trepoly cleanses Metals and a Brush out Cloaths For they would make themselves ridiculous to all the World if they supposed a Notion of Attraction and attractive Faculties to explain the Reason why Chariots follow the Horses which are fastned to them and a detersive Faculty in Brushes for cleaning Cloaths and so of other Questions Therefore their great Principles are useless except in obscure Questions because they are incomprehensible We must not therefore stop at any of all these Principles which we have not an evident and clear Knowledge of and which we may think some Nations receive not We must attentively consider the Idea's we have of Extension Figure Local Motion and the Relation these things have amongst themselves If we conceive these Idea's distinctly and find them so clear that we are perswaded that all Nations have always received them we must rest here and examine all their Relations But if we find them obscure we must seek after others For if to reason without Fear of deceiving our selves it is always necessary to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions we must only reason upon clear Idea's and their Relations distinctly known In order to consider the Properties of Extension we must with M. Descartes begin with the
particular Enumeration but these that follow are the chief of them Sometimes we enquire after the unknown Causes of some known Effects and sometimes seek unknown Effects by their known Causes The Fire burns and dissipates the Wood we seek the Cause of it Fire consists in a very great Motion of the Fiery Particles we would know what Effects this Motion is capable of producing if it can harden Dirt and melt Iron c. We seek sometimes the Nature of a thing by its Properties and sometimes knowing the Nature we seek the Properties of things We know or at least suppose that Light is transmitted in an instant that yet it is re-united and reflected by the means of a concave Mirror in such sort that it penetrates the most Solid Bodies and we would make use of these Properties to discover the Nature of it On the contrary We know that all the Spaces which are betwixt Earth and Heaven are full of little Spherical Bodies extreamly agitated and which continually fly from the Sun And we would know if these little Bodies can transmit themselves in an instant or if being reflected by a Concave Mirror can re-unite and dissipate or penetrate the most Solid Bodies Sometimes we seek all the Parts from the whole and sometimes a whole by its Parts We seek all the unknown Parts of a whole that is known when we seek all the Alliquot parts of a Number all the Roots of an Equation all the right Angles which a Figure contains c. And we seek an unknown whole whose Parts are known when we seek the Sum of many Numbers the Area of many Figures the Capacity of different Vessels or we seek a whole which has one of its parts known and the others although unknown include some known Relation with what is unknown As when we enquire what that Number is whereof we have 15 a known part and the other which composes it is the half or third of the unknown Number Or when we seek an unknown Number which is equal to 15 and to twice the Root of the unknown Number In fine We sometimes enquire if certain things are equal or like to others or how far they are unequal or different As when we would know if Saturn is greater than Jupiter or how near their Magnitudes are alike If the Air at Rome is hotter than that at Marseilles or what difference between them What is general in all Questions is that we form them only to know some Truths and because all Truths are but Relations we may say generally that in all Questions we seek only the Knowledge of some Relations whether Relations between things Relations between Idea's or Relations between things and their Idea's There are Relations of many Kinds there are some between the Nature of things between their Magnitudes their Parts their Attributes Qualities Effects Causes c. But we may reduce them all to two viz. the Relations of Magnitude and Relations of Quality by calling all those Relations of Magnitude which are between things considered as capable of More or Less and all others Relations of Qualities Thus we may say that all Questions tend to the Discovery of some Relations of Magnitude or Quality The first and chief of all Rules is to know most distinctly the State of the Question proposed to be resolved and to have very clear Idea's of its Terms to be able to compare and by this means discover the unknown Relations We must therefore first perceive very clearly the unknown Relation that we seek for it is evident that if we had no certain Mark to discover this unknown Relation when we look for it or when we would find it it would be in vain for us to enquire after it Secondly as much as possible we must render those Idea's distinct which answer to the Terms of the Question by taking away all Equivocal Terms and make them clear by considering them with all possible Attention For if these Idea's are so confused or obscure that we cannot make the Comparisons necessary for discovering the Relations we seek we are not yet in a Condition of resolving the Question In the third place we must consider with great Attention the Conditions exprest in a Question if there is any because without that we have only a confused Notion of the State of the Question Besides the Conditons generally shew the Way for resolving it So that having once well conceived the State of the Question and Conditions of it we know what we seek and sometimes the Way that we must take to discover it It is true there is not always some Conditions exprest in Questions but then these Questions are indetermined and we may resolve them many Ways as if a Square Number or Triangle is required c. without specifying any more or else 't is because he that proposes them knows not the means of resolving them or else hides them with a Design to perplex the Question As if it is required to find two mean Proportionals between two Lines without adding by the Intersection of the Circle and Parabola or Circle and Elipsis c. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the Character by which we know what we seek should be very distinct and not Equivocal and specifie only what we seek otherwise we can never be certain of having resolved the Question proposed We must likewise take care to retrench from the Question whatever Conditions may perplex it and without which it is compleat For they unnecessarily divide the Capacity of the Mind Nay we cannot be said to know the State of a Question when the Conditions which accompany it are useless For instance if a Question were proposed in these Terms whether a Man being sprinkled with some Liquors and covered with a Garland of Flowers can be able to rest although he see nothing that can agitate him We must know whether the Word Man is not Metaphorical or the Word Rest Equivocal if it is not taken in Relation to Local Motion or in Relation to the Passions as these Words although he see nothing that is able to agitate him seem to note We must know if the Conditions being sprinkled with some Liquors and crowned with a Garland of Flowers are Essential Afterwards the State of this Ridiculous and Indetermined Question being clearly known we may easily resolve it by saying that we only need put a Man into a Ship according to the Conditions exprest in the Question The Artifice of those that propose such like Questions is to joyn Conditions to them which seem to be necessary although they are not to divert the Mind of those they propose them towards things unuseful to be resolved As in that Question that Servants commonly offer to Children I have seen say they unto them Hunters or Fishers carry away with them what they could not take and cast into the Water what they took The Mind being prejudiced with the Idea of Fishermen angling for Fish it cannot conceive what
only try to know a Relation which is sufficiently rambling and indetermined It is plain 1. That to resolve Questions of the first Kind and perfectly to know all the exact Relations of Magnitude and Quality that is between two or many things we must have distinct Idea's which perfectly represent them and compare these things all possible ways We may for instance resolve all Questions which tend to discover the exact Relations which are between 2 and 8 because 2 and 8 being exactly known we may compare them together in all necessary manners to discover their exact Relations of Magnitude or Quality We may know that 8 is Quadruple of 2 that 8 and 2 are even Numbers and that 8 and 2 are not Squares It is clear in the second place That to resolve Questions of the second Kind and exactly to discover any Relation of Magnitude or Quality which is between two or many things it is necessary and it will be sufficient to know very distinctly the Superficies of them according to which we must compare them to discover the Relation we seek For instance To resolve any Question which tends to the discovering some exact Relation between 4 and 16 as that 4 and 16 are even Numbers and Squares it is sufficient to know exactly that 4 and 16 may be divided into half without a Fraction and that both are the Product of a Number multiplied by it self and it is useless to examine what their true Magnitude is For 't is evident To know the exact Relation of Quality which is between things it is sufficient to have a very distinct Idea of their Quality without thinking any thing of their Magnitude and that to know their exact Relations of Magnitude it sufficies to know exactly their Magnitude without enquiring after their true Quality It is plain in the third place That to resolve Questions of the third Kind and to know any Relation that is almost exact between two or more things it is sufficient to know pretty near the Superficies or sides thereof according to which we must compare them to discover the approaching Relation that we seek whether it be of Magnitude or Quality For instance I can evidently know that √ 8 is greater than 2 because I can know very near the true Magnitude of the √ 8. But I cannot know how much the √ 8 exceeds 2 because I cannot exactly know the true Magnitude of √ 8. Lastly It is plain That to resolve Questions of the fourth kind and discover their trifling and undetermined Relations it suffices to know things after a manner proportionate to the need we have of comparing them to discover the Relations we seek So that to resolve all sorts of Questions 't is not always necessary to have very distinct Idea's of their Terms or to know perfectly the things their Terms signifie But it is requisire to know them so much the more exactly as the Relations we endeavour to discover are more exact and in greater Number For as we have already shewed in imperfect Questions it is enough to have imperfect Idea's of the things that we consider to resolve these Questions perfectly or according to what they contain And we likewise resolve Questions very well although we have no distinct Idea of the Terms which express them for when it is demanded if Fire is capable of melting Salt hardening Dirt and evaporating Lead and a thousand other like things we understand these Questions perfectly and can very well resolve them although we have no distinct Idea of Fire Salt Dirt c. because those who make these demands would only know if we have had any sensible Experience that Fire has produced these Effects Wherefore according to the Discoveries we have made by our Senses we can answer them in such a manner as may be capable of satisfying them CHAP. VIII An Application of the other Rules to particular Questions THere are Questions of two sorts Simple and Compound The Resolution of the first depends alone upon the Attention of the Mind to the clear Idea's of the Terms which express them The others cannot be resolved but by the Comparison of a third or many other Idea's we cannot discover the unknown Relations which are expressed by the Terms of the Question by immediately comparing the Idea's of these Terms for they cannot be joyned or compared We must therefore have one or many mean Idea's to be able to make necessary Comparisons to discover these Relations and exactly observe that these mean Idea's are clear and distinct in proportion as the Relations we endeavour to discover are more exact and in greater Number This Rule is only a Consequence of the first and is of equal Importance For if it is necessary to know exactly the Relations we compare to have clear and distinctly Idea's of them For the same reason it is necessary to know well the mean Idea's by which we pretend to make these Comparisons since we must distinctly know the Relation of Measure with each of the things that we measure to discover the Relations of them For instance When we suffer a little light Vessel to swim freely with a Loadstone in it if we turn towards the North Pole of this Loadstone another Loadstone that we hold in our Hands we shall immediately see the first Loadstone retire as if it were compelled by some violent Wind. And if we desire to know the Cause of this Effect It is plain That to give a Reason for the Motion of this Loadstone it is not enough to know the Relations it has with the other for although we should even perfectly know all we could not comprehend how these two Bodies could thrust one another without meeting We must therefore examine what things we know distinctly to be capable according to the Order of Nature of moving Bodies since the Question is to discover the Natural Cause of the Motion of the Loadstone which is certainly a Body To that end we must not have recourse to any Quality Form or Entity or even of any Intelligence that we do not clearly know to be capable of moving Bodies For we cannot certainly know that Intelligences are the common Causes of the Natural Motions of Bodies nor even whether or no they can produce Motion We know evidently That 't is a Law of Nature that Bodies should move each other when they meet We must then endeavour to explain the Motion of the Loadstone by the means of any body which meets it It is true that it may be something else besides a Body which moves it but if we have no distinct Idea of this thing we must not make use of it as a fit Mean to discover what we seek nor to explain it to others For 't is not giving a Reason of an Effect to ascribe something as a Cause of it which no body conceives clearly We must not then trouble our selves too much whether there is any other Natural Cause of the Motion of Bodies than their
Fermentation or Dilatation of the Liquors probably is not enough known to all that shall read this Book to pretend to have shewn an Effect when we have in general discovered that its Cause is Fermentation but we must not resolve all particular Questions by going back unto the first Causes It is not because we cannot by this demonstrate and discover the true System upon which all particular Effects depend provided we stop only at clear Idea's But that this manner of Philosophizing is neither the most exact nor shortest To explain what I mean we must know there are Questions of two Sorts In the first we try to discover the Nature and Properties of something In the others we only desire to know if such a thing hath or hath not such a Propriety or if we know it has such a Propriety we would only know the Cause of it To resolve Questions of the first Kind we must consider things in their Original and always conceive them produced by the most Simple and most Natural Ways To resolve the rest a very different manner must be taken They must be done by Suppositions and we must examine whether these Suppositions make us guilty of any Absurdity or if they conduce to any Truth clearly known For Instance we would discover what are the Properties of the Cycloid or of some of the Conick Sections These Lines must be considered in their Generation and formed according to the most Simple and least perplext Ways for 't is the best and shortest Method to discover the Nature and Properties of them We easily see that the Subtense of the Cycloid is equal to the Circle which forms it and if we do not easily discover many Properties by this means 't is because the Circular Line which serves to form it is not sufficiently known But for these Lines purely Mathematical or such whose Relations we can know more exactly as Conick Sections we may discover a great Number of their Properties by considering them in their Generation We must only observe that as they may be generated by a Regular Motion several Ways so all Sorts of Generations are not equally proper to enlighten the Mind but the most Simple are the best and that it often happens that certain particular Methods are more proper than others to demonstrate some particular Properties But if the Question is not in general to discover the Properties of a thing but to know if a thing has such a Property Then it must be supposed that it hath it effectively and examine attentively what must follow this Supposition whether it leads to a manifest Absurdity or else to some undoubted Truth which may serve as a means to discover what we enquire after And 't is that Method Geometricians make use of to resolve their Problems They suppose as done what they seek for and examine what must happen from thence and attentively consider the Relations which result from their Suppositions They represent all these Relations which include the Condition of the Problem by Equations and afterwards reduce these Equations according to their Rules so that what is unknown they find equal to one or many things perfectly known If the Question then is in general to discover the Nature of Fire and the different Fermentations which are the most universal Causes of Natural Effects I say that the shortest and most secure Way is to examine it in its Original We must consider the Formation of the most agitated Body the Motion of which is dispersed into those that ferment By clear Idea's and the most Simple Way we must examine what Motion is capable of producing in Matter And because Fire and different Fermentations are very general things and which consequently depend upon few Causes it will not be requisite long to consider what Matter is capable of when it is animated by Motion to discover the Nature of Fermentation is its Principle and at the same time we shall learn many other things absolutely necessary to the Knowledge of Physicks Whereas if in this Question we would reason by Suppositions we should go back to the first Causes to the Laws of Nature according to which all things are formed and suppose many false things which would be of no Use We might soon discover that the Cause of Fermentation is the Motion of an Invisible Matter which communicates its self to the Parts of that which acts it for we know plain enought that Fire and the different Fermentation of Bodies consist in their Agitation and that by the Laws of Nature Bodies immediately receive their Motion only by their meeting with some others more agitated Thus we may discover that there is an Invisible Matter whose Agitation is communicated to Visible Bodies But it would be Morally impossible by way of Supposition to discover how it is done And it is not near so difficult to discover when we examine the Formation of the Elements or some Bodies whereof there 's a great Number of the same Nature as is evident by Mr. Descartes's System The third Part of the Question which is of Convulsive Motions will not be very difficult to resolve provided we suppose in Bodies Animal Spirits capable of some Fermentation and of Humours sufficiently penetrating to insinuate themselves into the Pores of the Nerves by which the Spirits disperse themselves through the Muscles provided also we do not pretend to determine what the true Disposition of the Invisible Parts is which contribute to these Convulsive Motions When we have separated a Muscle from the rest of the Body and hold it by the Extremities we Sensibly perceive that it makes all its Effort to contract it self when we prick it in the Middle It is very probable that this depends upon the Construction of the Imperceptible Parts that compose it which like so many Springs are determined to certain Motions by this Pricking But who can affirm they have found the true Disposition of the Parts which serve to produce this Motion or who can give an undoubted Demonstration of it Certainly it would appear impossible although it may be through the Power of Thought we can imagine a Construction of the Muscles fit to perform all the Motions we see them capable of Yet must we not think to determine what is the true Construction of the Muscles But because we cannot reasonably doubt that there are Spirits Susceptible of some Fermentation by the Mixture of some Subtle Matter and that the sharp and pungent Humours may insinuate themselves into the Nerves we may suppose it To resolve the Question proposed we must first examine how many Sorts of Convulsive Motions there are and because the Number of them appears indetermined we may keep to the chief whose Causes seem to be different We must consider the Parts wherein they are performed the Diseases which precede and follow them If they are produced with or without Pain and particularly how quick and violent they are for some of them are performed very quick
Wills of Spirits For First According to the General Laws of the Communication of Motions the invisible Bodies which surround the visible ones by their divers Motions produce all these various Effects the Cause of which does not appear to us Secondly According to the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body when Bodies which are about us Act upon ours they produce in our Souls an infinite variety of Sensations Ideas and Passions Thirdly Our Mind produces by its Wills a great many different Ideas in it self For it is our Wills which apply and modifie our Minds as Natural Causes whose Efficacy nevertheless proceeds from the Laws which God has Established Lastly When our Mind Acts upon our Body many Changes are therein produced by vertue of the Laws of its Union with it And by the means of our Body it also produces in those about it a great Number of Changes by vertue of the Laws of the Communication of Motions Thus all Natural Effects have no other Natural or Occasional Cause than the Motions of Bodies and Wills of Spirits which will easily be granted by any who will use but a little application supposing he is not already prepossessed by such as know not what they say who instantly imagine Beings which they have no clear Idea of and pretend to explain Things they understand not by what is absolutely incomprehensible So that God executing by his Concourse or rather by his Efficacious Will whatever the Motions of Bodies or Determinations of Spirits perform as Natural or Occasional Causes it 's plain God does every Thing by the same Action of the Creature Not that Creatures of themselves have any Efficacious Action but because the Power of God is in some sort communicated to them by the Natural Laws which God has Established in their favour This is all that I can say to reconcile my Thoughts with the Opinion of those Divines who maintain the necessity of immediate Concourse and that God does All in all Things by the same Action as that of the Creatures For as to the rest of the Divines I believe their Opinions are indesensible every way and chiefly that of Durandus See Durand in 2. Dist 1. Qu. 5. Dist 37. de Genesi ad Litteram l. 5. c. 20. and some Ancients whom St. Austin refutes who absolutely denyed the necessity of Concourse and would have Second Causes do every Thing by a Power which God had given them at the Creation For although this Opinion be less perplexed than that of the other Divines yet it appears to me so opposite to Scripture and conformable to Prejudices to say no more that I believe it cannot be maintained I confess that the Schoolmen In 4. Sent. Dist 1. q. De aliaco ibid. who say the immediate Concourse of God is the same Action as that of the Creatures do not absolutely understand it according to my Explanation And except Biel and Cardinal D' Ailly all those I have read think that the Efficacy which produces Effects proceeds from the Second Cause as well as the First But as I determined with my self not to say any thing but what I conceive clearly and always take that Side which best agrees with Religion I believe it will not be taken amiss if I forsake an Opinion which to many persons appears so much the more intricate as they endeavour more assiduously to apprehend it And since I have established another which agrees perfectly not only with Reason but also with the Holiness of Religion and Christian Morality 'T is a Truth I have already proved in the Chapter upon which I make these Reflection but it will be very proper for me to offer yet something more fully to Justifie what I have already said upon the present Question Reason and Religion convinces us than God would be loved and rever'd by his Creatures Loved as good and Rever'd as powerful Which is a Truth we cannot doubt of without impiety and folly To love God as he requires and deserves to be loved we must according to the First Command both of the Law and Gospel and even of Reason as I have elsewhere shown do it with all our strength or according to the utmost Capacity we have of Loving It is not enough to prefer him to all Things but we must also love him in all Things Else is not our Love so perfect as it ought to be l. 4. ch 1. nor do we give to God all the Love he has impressed upon us and that only for himself since all his Actions center in himself Likewise to render to God all the Reverence due to him it is not enough to adore him as the Soveraign Power and fear him more than any of his Creatures We must also fear and adore him in all his Creatures and all our Actions must tend towards him for Honour and Glory are due only to him Which is what God has commanded us in these Words Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo ex tota anima tua Deut. 6. ex tota fortitudine tua And in these Dominum Deum tuum timebis illi soli servies Thus the Philosophy which teaches us That the Efficacy of Second Causes is a Fiction of the Mind that the Nature of Aristotle and some other Philosophers is a Chimera that God only is strong and powerful enough not only to Act in our Souls but also to give the least Motion to Matter This Philosophy I say agrees perfectly with Religion the design of which is to unite us to God after the strictest manner We commonly love such Things only as are capable of doing us some good This Philosophy therefore only Authorises the Love of God and absolutely condemns the Love of every Thing else We ought to fear Nothing but what is able to do us some Evil This Philosophy therefore only permits us to fear God and positively forbids our fearing any Thing else So that it Justifies all the Motions of the Soul which are Just and Reasonable and condemns all those that are contrary to Reason and Religion For this Philosophy will never Justifie the Love of Riches the Desire of Greatness nor the Extravagance of Debauchery since the Love of the Body appears mad and ridiculous to the Principles established by this Philosophy 'T is an Undoubted Truth a Natural Opinion and even a common Notion that we ought to love the Cause of our Pleasure and love it in proportion to the Felicity it does or can make us enjoy It is not only Just but it is also very Necessary that the Cause of our Happiness should be the Object of our Love Thus following the Principles of this Philosophy we ought only to love God for it tells us that He alone is the True Cause of our Happiness that the Bodies which are about us cannot Act upon that which we Animate consequently much less upon our Minds 'T is not the Sun which enlightens us
the execution of his designs Therefore 't will not be useless for me to prove and explain this Truth for 't is of the greatest consequence not only for the knowledge of Nature but much more for the knowledge of Religion and Morality By the word God we understand a Being infinitely Perfect whose Wisdom and Knowledge have no limits and who consequently knows all the means whereby he can execute his designs This being granted I say God acts alwayes by the shortest means and most simple wayes That I may be the better understood I 'll make use of a sensible Example I suppole that God wills the Body A should strike the Body B. Since God knows every thing he perfectly knows that A. can go to strike B. by an infinite number of Curve-Lines and but by one Right-Line only Now God only wills the shock of B. by A. and we suppose that he only wills the transferring of A. to B. to effect this shock Therefore A. must be transferred to B. by the shortest way or by a Right-Line For if the Body A. were transported to B. by a Curve Line that would show either that the Transporter knew no other way or else that he not only will'd the concurrence of these Bodies but also the means to produce it which is against the supposition There 's as much more action requisite to transfer a Body A. to B. by a Curve-Line than by a Right-Line as the Curve is greater than the Right If God therefore should transfer A. to B. by a Curve-Line which is double to a Right half the Action of God would be wholly useless consequently produced without design or end as well as without effect Moreover Action in God is Will therefore there must be more Will in God to cause A. to be transported circularly than directly Now we have already supposed that God had no Will in respect to the motion of A but only as it relates to the shock Therefore there is not Will enough in God to move A. by a Curve-Line And consequently this motion of A. to B. is a contradiction Thus 't is a contradiction that God should not act by the most simple wayes except we suppose that God in the choice of wayes he makes use of to execute his designs has something else in view besides these designs which is a contradiction in our supposition When I say there is more Will in God to transfer a Body from A. to B. by a Curve than by a Right Line we must from thence conclude nothing against the simplicity of the Being and Action of God For it must be confessed that it cannot be comprehended either how the simplicity of an Infinite Being includes all the different Perfections of Finite Beings nor how his Will continuing alwayes the same and alwayes conformable to Order changes with reference to the different Beings it produces and preserves I speak only according to our manner of conceiving It seems to me now that we clearly conceive when God Wills and for instance creates a Cubic Foot of Matter he Wills another thing than if he creates two For 't is evident that God could not create two different things nor know whether he had created one or two feet of Matter or if he conveyed a Body circularly or directly if there was not some difference in his Wills in respect to Matter or to its Motion since God sees only in himself and in his Wills the variety of his Creatures Now whatever that Action is in God which relates to the different Beings he produces or preserves I call it the differences augmentations and diminutions of Wills in God And according to this manner of conceiving things I say God cannot imploy more Will than is necessary to execute his designs So that God alwayes acts by the most simple wayes in reference to them I don't deny however but God may have a great number of wayes equally simple to produce the same effects or that he may produce them by different means but he alwayes produces them by the most simple provided they are all of the same kind for 't is a contradiction that a Being infinitely Wise should have useless and irregular Wills If we would apply this Principle to Morality we shall see that those secure their Salvation who so prepare themselves for Grace by Self-denyal Repentance and an exact Obedience to the Commands of our Saviour that God acting in them by the most simple wayes I mean by giving them but few New Graces operates very much in them For although God would have all Men be saved he will only save those that can be saved by the most simple means which have relation to the great design he has of Sanctifying through JESVS CHRIST a certain number of the Elect and he will multiply the Children of Eve till that number be fulfilled for 't is because God is willing to sanctifie us through the most simple means that after Sin it was necessary for him to multiply the Children of Men to compleat the number of his Elect since there are many persons who cause their own Damnation by withdrawing themselves from the Order of God Now as God acts not as a particular Cause we must not imagine that he has like us particular Wills for every thing he produces for if it were so it appears evident to me that the generation of Monsters would be impossible and that it would never happen that one work should destroy another As God cannot have contrary Wills we should have recourse to a Principle of Evil as the Manichses had for instance to freeze the Fruits produced by God This being so we are methinks obliged to suppose that there are some general Rules according to which God predestinates and sanctifies the Elect and that those Laws are what we call the Order of Grace as his general Wills whereby God produces and preserves whatever is in the World are the Order of Nature I don't know whether I am not mistaken but methinks from this Principle a great many Consequences may be drawn which perhaps would resolve some Difficulties about which there has been much Controversie some years since but I don't think my self obliged to deduce them every one may do it according to his own Capacity 'T is more convenient to be silent than to say such things as are not necessary to be known and which perhaps will one day be more easily agreed upon than they would now I would only have it known that the most simple ways of our Sanctification are Self-denyal and Repentance or that at least we should continually reflect that our Blessed LORD distinctly knowing the Laws of the Order of Grace we run perpetual dangers when we don't follow the wayes that he has showed us not only by his Words but also by his Actions But as in the course of our Lives there happens particular Occurrances wherein we don't know which way to determine our selves because of the contrary Reasons that may be
of the Mind from God and the uniting the Mind to something inferior to it like the Body since only this union can make it imperfect and unhappy Thus to be acquainted with Truth to know things that are the most agreeable or consonant to the Rules of Virtue is to know God himself The Mind is as it were placed between God and the Body Good and Evil between what instructs and blinds it regulates and disorders it what can make it perfect and happy and what can make it imperfect and miserable When it discovers any Truth or sees things as they are in themselves it sees them in the Idea's of God that is by a clear and distinct view of what it is in God that represents them For as I have before intimated the Mind of Man does not in it self include the Perfections or Idea's of all the Beings it is capable of considering 'T is not the Universal Being and therefore does not see in it self such things as are distinct from it by consulting it self it is neither capable of enlightening or instructing it self for 't is neither its own Perfection nor Light it stands in need of the immense Light of Truth by which it is united to and possesses God in some manner But we cannot only say that the Mind which is acquainted with Truth does in some manner know God who includes it but we may likewise add That in part it knows things as God himself knows them for the Mind knows their true Relations and God knows them also the Mind discovers them by viewing the Perfections of God who represents them God sees them likewise by the same means For in short God neither sees nor imagines but perceives in himself as he is the Intellectual World the Material and Sensible one which he has created It is the same with the Mind in its knowledge of Truth it perceives it not by Sensation and Imagination Sensations and Phantoms only represent false Relations to the Mind and whoever discovers the Truth can only see it in the Intellectual World to which 't is united and in which God himself sees it for this Material and Sensible World is not intelligible of it self The Mind then sees in the Light of God what e'er it sees clearly thô it sees them but imperfectly and in that respect very differently from what God sees them So that when the Mind discovers the Truth it is not only united to God but possesses and beholds him and in one sense sees the Truth as God himself does Likewise when our Love is regulated by Virtue we love God for when we love according to these Rules the impression of love that God continually produces in our hearts inclines us towards him and is neither diverted by Free-will nor changed into Self-love The Mind then does only with the greatest freedom follow this impression that God gives it and the Almighty never giving it any impression but what tends towards him since he only acts for himself It is evident that when we love according to the Rules of Virtue we love God But 't is not only to love God 't is also to love as God does who only loves himself and his Works because they relate to his Perfections and loves these Works proportionably to the relation they have to these Perfections And indeed 't is the same love whereby God loves himself and whatever he has created To love according to the Rules of Virtue is to love God only and to love God in every thing is to love every thing so far as it partakes of his Goodness and Perfection since that is to love them in proportion to their Amiableness In short 't is to love by the impression of the same love whereby God loves himself for 't is that love by which God loves himself and whatever relates to him which animates us when we love as we ought to do And therefore we then love as God loves It is then evident that the knowledge of Truth and regulated love of Virtue produces all our Perfections since they are commonly the consequences of our Union with God and even lead us to the enjoyment of him as much as we are capable in this life And on the contrary the blindness of our Minds and irregularity of our Inclinations are the cause of all our imperfections being the Natural effects of the union of our Mind with our Body as I have before proved in shewing that we never discover the Truth nor love the true Good when we follow the impressions of our Senses Imaginations and Passions Tho' these things are so evident yet Men who ardently desire to perfect their Being take very little pains to encrease their union with God but continually endeavour to strengthen and enlarge that they have with Sensible things The cause of this strange irregularity cannot be too fully explain'd The possession of Good must naturally produce these two effects in him that enjoys it it makes him more perfect and at the same time more happy Yet it does not always happen so I confess 't is impossible that the Mind shou'd actually possess any good and not be actually more perfect but it may actually enjoy a good without being made more happy by it Those who are best acquainted with the Truth and have the greatest love for the most amiable good are always actually more perfect than those that are still subjected to blindness and disorder yet are they not always actually more happy It is the same thing in respect to Evil it makes men both imperfect and unhappy at the same times yet tho' it always renders them more imperfect it does not always make them more unhappy or at least it does not make them unhappy in proportion to the imperfection it gives them Virtue is often unpleasant and bitter and Vice sweet and agreeable so that 't is chiefly through Faith and Hope that good Men are truly happy whilst the Wicked actually enjoy Pleasure and Delights It ought not to be thus 't is true but so it is Sin having caused this disorder as I have shew'd in the preceding Chapter and 't is this disorder that is the chief cause not only of all the irregularities of our Hearts but also of the blindness and ignorance of our Minds Our Imagination is by this disorder perswaded that the Body may be the good of the Mind for Pleasure as I have many times intimated is the Character or Sensible Mark of Good and the most sensible Earthly enjoyments are those which we imagine we receive from the Body Wherefore without much reflexion we judge that Bodies may be and even truly are our Good And 't is so difficult to oppose the Instinct of Nature and to resist the Proofs of Sensation that we never so much as think of it We reflect not upon the disorders that Sin has produced and consider not that Bodies can only act upon the Mind as occasional Causes That the Mind cannot immediately or of it self
to the carnal and most ignorant That he might instruct them by that which caused their blindness and encline them to love him and loose them from sensible Objects by the same things that had captivated them For when he had to do with Fools he made use of a kind of simplicity to make them wise so that the most Religious and Faithful have not always the greatest Understanding They may know God by Faith and love him through the assistance of his Grace without discerning him to be their All after the same manner as Philosophers do and without reflecting that the abstracted knowledge of Truth is a kind of union with him We must not therefore be surprized if there are but few Persons who endeavour to strengthen their Natural Union they have with God by seeking after the Truth since to this end it would be necessary constantly to oppose the impression of the Senses and Passions after a very different manner from that which is familiar to the most Virtuous Persons for most good Men are not always perswaded that the Senses and Passions deceive us after the manner we have explained in the precedent Books Those Sensations and Thoughts wherein the Body has any share are the true and immediate cause of our Passions because 't is only the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain that excites any particular emotion in the Animal Spirits so that only our Sensations can sensibly convince us that we depend on certain things which they excite us to love But we feel not the Natural Union we have with God when we discover the Truth nor so much as think upon him for he is within us and operates after such a secret and insensible manner that we perceive him not Our Natural Union with him therefore does not excite us to love him But our Union with Sensible Things is quite different All our Sensations declare this Union and Bodies present themselves to our Eyes when they act in us nor is any thing they do concealed Even our own Body is more present to us than our Mind and we consider it as the best part of our selves Thus the Union we have with our Body and through that with all sensible Objects excites a violent love in us which increases this Union and makes us depend upon things that are infinitely below us CHAP. VI. Of the most general Errors of the Passions Some particular Examples of them IT 's the part of Moral Philosophy to enquire into all the particular Errors wherein our Passions engage us concerning good to oppose the irregularities of Love to establish the sincerity of the Heart and regulate the Manners But our chief intent here is to give Rules for the Mind and to discover the causes of our Errors in respect of Truth so that we shall pursue no further those things already mentioned which relate only to the love of the true Good We will then proceed to the Mind but shall not pass by tne Heart because it has the greatest influence over the Mind We will enquire after the Truth in it self and without thinking on the relation it has to us only so far as this relation is the occasion that Self-love disguises and conceals it from us for we judging of all things according to our Passions deceive our selves in all things the Judgments of the Passions never agreeing with the Judgments of the Truth 'T is what we may learn from these admirable words of St. Bernard * Amor sicut nec odium veritatis judicium nescit Vis judicium veritatis audire Joan 5.30 Sicut audio sic judico Non sicut odi non sicut amo non sicut timeo Est judicium odii ut illud Nos legem habemus secundum legem Nostram debet mori Joan 19.7 Est timoris ut illud si dimittimus eum sic venient Romani tollent Nostrum locum gentem Joan 11.48 Judicium vero amoris ut David de filiô parricidâ Parcite inquit puero Absalom 2 Reg. 18.5 St. Bern. de grad humilitatis Neither love nor hatred says he know how to judge according to truth But if you will hear a true Judgment I judge according to what I hear not as I hate love or fear This is a Judgment of hatred We have a law and according to our law he ought to die This is a Judgment of fear If we let him alone the Romans will come and take away our Place and Nation This is a Judgment of love as David speaks of his parricide son Spare the young Man Absalom Our Love Hatred and Fear cause us to make false Judgments only and nothing but the pure Light of Truth can enlighten our Mind 'T is only the distinct Voice of our common Master that instructs us to make solid Judgments and he will infallibly do it provided we only judge of what he says and according to what he says Sicut audio sic judico As I hear I judge But let us see after what manner our Passions seduce us that we may the more easily resist them The Passions have so great a relation to the Senses that 't will not be difficult to discover after what manner they engage us in Error if we but remember what has been said in the First Book For the general Causes of the Errors of our Passions are entirely like those of the Errors of our Senses The most general cause of the Errors of our Senses is as we have shewn in the First Book our attributing to our Body or to External Objects those Sensations which belong to our Soul affixing Colours to the Surfaces of Bodies diffusing of Light Sounds Odours in the Air and assigning Pain and Pleasure to those parts of our Body which receive any change by the motion of other Bodies which meet them The same thing may be said of our Passions we imprudently attribute to those Objects which cause or seem to cause them all the dispositions of our Heart Goodness Meekness Malice Ill-nature and all the other Qualities of our Mind Whatever Object produces any Passion in us in some manner seems to include in it self what it stirs up in us when we think upon it Even as sensible Objects appear to us to include the Sensations their presence excites When we love any Person we are naturally inclined to believe they love us and 't would be difficult for us to imagine that they had either any design to hurt us or to oppose our desires But if hatred succeeds love we cannot believe that they design us any good we interpret all their actions in the worst sense and are always suspicious and upon our guard although perhaps they think not of us or else intend to do us some service In short we unjustly attribute all the dispositions of our Heart to those Persons who excite any Passion in us even as we imprudently ascribe all the qualities of our Mind to sensible Objects Moreover by the same
reason that we believe all Men receive the same Sensations of the same Objects as we do we think that all Men are acted with the same Passions as we are upon the same subjects provided we believe they are capable of being moved by them We imagine they love what we love or desire what we desire from whence proceed Jealousies and secret Aversions if the good we are in pursuit of cannot be wholly possessed by many but if several Persons can possess it without dividing it as they may the soveraign Good Science Vertue c. then 't is quite of another matter We likewise think they hate shun and fear the same things as we do and from thence comes Associations and secret Conspiracies according to the nature of the thing we hate by this means hoping to deliver our selves from our Miseries We attribute therefore the Emotions of our Passions to those Objects that produce them in us and believe that all other Men and even sometimes that Beasts are agitated like us besides we judge yet more rashly that the cause of our Passion which is often only imaginary is really in some Object When we have a Passionate Love for any one we think every thing is amiable in them His Grimaces are Charming his Ugliness is not displeasing his Irregular Motions and Unhandsom Gestures are Just or at least Natural If he never speaks 't is because he is Wise if he talks much he is very Witty if he speaks upon every thing his Knowledge is universal if he continually interrupts others it proceeds from his Quickness Vicacity and Fire In short if he would be chief in all Company 't is because he Merits it Thus our Passion after this manner hides or disguises the Defects of our Friends and on the contrary magnifies the least good Quality in them But if this Love is only founded upon the agitation of the Blood and Animal Spirits like the rest of the Passions in time it cools for want of heat or proper Spirits to maintain it and if interest or any other false relation change the disposition of the Brain hatred will succeed this love and will not fail to make us imagine in the Object of our Passion all the defects that can cause a just Aversion In the same Person we shall see such Qualities as are directly contrary to what we admired before and be ashamed that ever we loved them and the Predominant Passion will be sure to justifie it self and make that it succeeds ridiculous The power and injustice of the Passions are not limited to what we have already said they are infinitely farther extended Our Passions do not only disguise their principal Object but likewise whatever has any relation to it They not only make all the Qualities of our Friends agreeable but also the greatest part of the Qualities of our Friends Friends And even go farther in those that have a great and strong Imagination for their Passions have so vast a dominion and extension that it is impossible to determine their limits What I have already mentioned are such general and pregnant Principles of Errors Prejudices and Injustices that 't is impossible to remark all the Consequences of them Most of the Truths or rather Errors of certain Places Times Commonalties and Families have their rise from them What is approved in Spain is rejected in France what is Orthodox in Paris is condemned at Rome what the Dominicans espouse the Franciscans disapprove and what is undoubted to the one is erroneous to the other The Dominicans think it their Duty to follow Sr. Thomas and why because he was one of their Order and on the contrary the Franciscans embrace the Opinions of Scotus because he belonged to theirs There are also Truths and Errors peculiar to certain times The Earth moved about Two thousand years ago and from thence it has continued fix'd till our days and now begins to turn again Aristotle has been formerly burnt and a Provincial Council approved of by a Pope has wisely forbidden the teaching of his Physics ever since he has been admired and now begins again to be despised There are some Opinions now received in the Schools which have formerly been look'd upon as Heresies and those who maintained them have been Excommunicated as Hereticks by some of the Bishops Because Passions causing Factions these Factions produce such Truths or Errors as are as inconstant as the Cause which produces them For instance Men may be indifferent in respect to the stability of the Earth or the essence of Bodies but continue no longer so Concil Angl. per Spelman An. 1287. when they are maintained by such as they hate Thus Aversion upheld by a confused Sense of Piety produces an indifferent Zeal which kindles by little and little and at last causes such Events as appears so strange to every one a long time after they happen We can scarcely think that the Passions should go so far but 't is because we don't consider they extend to whatever can satisfie them Haman it may be would have done no harm to the Jews if Mordecai had saluted him but he being a Jew and refusing it the whole Nation must perish that his revenge might be the more magnificent When there is a dispute between two Persons who has a right to an Estate they ought only to bring their Titles and speak what relates to their Case or can best set it off yet they fail not to use all manner of reproaches one against another to contradict each other in every thing and to introduce a thousand unnecessary Accusations and perplex their Suit with an infinite number of Accessory Circumstances which confound the Cause And indeed all Passions extend as far as the prospect of their Mind who are moved with them since there is nothing that we take to have any relation with the Object of our Passions to which the motions of these Passions do not extend which is done as follows The Traces of Objects are really so connected one with another in the Brain that 't is impossible the course of the Spirits should violently stir up any of them without affecting the rest at the same time The chief Idea therefore of what we think of is necessarily accompanied with a great number of accessory Idea's which are so much the more increased as the impression of the Animal Spirits are more violent And this impression of the Spirits seldom fails to be violent in the Passions because the Passions continually and powerfully force into the Brain an abundance of these Spirits that are proper to preserve the Traces of the Idea's which represent their Object Thus the motion of Love or Hatred extend not only to the principal Object of the Passion but likewise to whatever we discover to have any relation to this Object because in the Passion the motion of the Soul follows the perception of the Mind even as the motion of the Animal Spirits in the Brain follow the Traces of
the Brain as well as those which excite the chief Idea of the Object of the Passion as those that relate to it We must not therefore wonder if Men carry their Hatred or Love so far and perform such Capricious and Surprizing Actions There is a particular Reason of all these Effects although we do not know them because their accessory Ideas are not always like ours we cannot discover them Thus there is always some cause or other for those actions which appear most ridiculous and extravagant CHAP. VII Of the Passions in particular and first of Admiration and its ill Effects WHatever I have hitherto said of the Passions is general but it will not be very difficult to draw particular Inferences from thence It is only requisite to make some reflexion upon what passes within our selves and the actions of others for us to discover more of these sort of Truths at one view than we could explain in a considerable time Yet there are so few Persons who think of retiring into themselves and make any endeavour to that end that to excite them to it and stir up their attention it will be necessary to descend to particulars When we hit or strike our selves it seems as if we were almost insensible but if we are only touched by others we receive Sensations lively enough to stir up our Attention In short we never tickle our selves or so much as think of it and it may be we could not do it if we had a mind to it 'T is almost for the same reason that the Soul neglects to enquire into and examine it self it is immediately displeased with this sort of enquiry and is commonly incapable of discovering or perceiving what belongs to it except when excited or stirred up by others Thus to assist some Persons in the knowing of themselves it is necessary to relate some of the particular Effects of the Passions that by affecting them therewith we may make them sensible of all the parts their Soul are composed of Those who will read what follows must nevertheless be advertized that they will not always be sensible that I touch them nor will they always find themselves subject to the Passions and Errors I shall speak of because all particular Passions are not always the same in all Men. 'T is true indeed all Men have the same Natural inclinations which have no relation to the Body when their Bodies are perfectly well disposed But the different temperaments of Bodies and their frequent changes cause a great deal of variety in particular Passions And if to the diversity of the Body's constitution we add that which proceeds from Objects which likewise makes very different impressions upon all those who have neither the same Employs nor manner of living it is evident that such a Person may feel himself strongly affected in some place of his Soul by certain things who will yet absolutely remain insensible of many others Thus we should often be deceived if we judged of what others feel by what passes in our selves I am not afraid of being mistaken when I affirm that all Men would be happy for I am absolutely assured that the Chinese and Tartars Angels Devils and even all Spirits whatever have an inclination for felicity I know likewise that God will never produce any Spirit without this desire Yet is it not experience that has taught it me I never saw either Chinese or Tartar nor is it the inward testimony of my Conscience for that only teaches me I would be happy my self But 't is God alone who can inwardly convince me that all other Men Angels and Devils have a desire to be happy and 't is he only who can assure me that he will never give a Being to any Spirit who will be indifferent in respect to it For who is there besides himself that can positively assure me of what he does and even of what he thinks And as he can never deceive me so I cannot doubt of what he teaches me I am therefore certain that all Men would be happy because this inclination is natural and depends not upon the Body But it is very different in particular Passions For though I should extreamly love Musick Dancing Hunting Sweetmeats or Luxurious Dishes c. I could conclude nothing certain from thence concerning the Passions of other Men. Pleasure doubtless is sweet and agreeable to all Men but every one does not find it in the same Object The love of pleasure is a Natural inclination depends not on the Body and is therefore general to all Men. But the inclination for Music Dancing and Hunting is not general because the disposition of the Body on which it depends being different in all Men whatsoever Passions depend upon it are not always the same General Passions as Desire Joy Sorrow c. keep the mean between Natural inclinations and particular Passions They are general as well as the Inclinations but not equally strong because that which produces and maintains them is not always it self equally active There is also a great deal of variety in the degrees whereby the Animal Spirits are agitated in their plenty and fineness and in the relation betwixt the Fibres of the Brain and these Spirits Thus it often happens that we don 't at all affect some Persons when we speak of particular Passions but if we chance to touch them they are violently moved But with general Passions and Inclinations it is quite contrary we are always affected when they are mentioned yet after such a weak and languishing manner that we scarcely perceive it I speak these things to prevent any Persons judging whether I am deceived by the Sensation only which he has received of what I have already or shall afterwards say for I would have every one judge by considering the Nature of the Passsions I treat of If I proposed the treating of every particular Passion or to distinguish them by all the Objects which excite them it 's plain I should never conclude and should only repeat the same thing The first is evident because the Objects of our Passions are infinite and the last also since we must always treat of the same Subject The particular Passions for Poetry History Mathematics Hunting and Dancing are only one and the same general Passion for for instance the Passions of Desire or Joy or for whatever pleases differ not although the peculiar Pleasures which excite them do We must not therefore multiply the number of the Passions according to the number of Objects which are infinite but only by the chief relations they may have in respect to us And after this manner we shall discover as will further appear upon our Explanation that Love and Hatred are the Mother Passions Which produce no other general Passions but Desire Joy and Sorrow and that particular Passions are composed only of these three first and are so much the more compounded as the chief Idea of Good or Evil which excites them
Prophets of Old affirm the Truth has spoken to them tho' it has not than to give Ear to the Truth it self For above this four thousand years the Pride of Man has without opposition put off lies and falshoods which have been respectfully received and even preserved as Holy and Divine Traditions It seems as if the God of Truth was no longer with them they neither consult nor meditate on him any longer but cover their idleness and neglect with the deceitful appearance of an holy Humility Indeed of our selves we cannot discover the Truth but we may all times do it by the assistance of him who enlightens us altho' we never can do it by the help of all the Men in the World Those even who are best acquainted with it cannot discover it to us if we do not our selves inquire of him who has inform'd them and if he answer not our attention as he has answered theirs We must not therefore receive any thing upon the credit of Man for they are all Liers but because he who cannot deceive us has spoken to us we ought continually to beg his Instruction We must not believe those who speaking to the Ear instruct only the Body or at most act upon the Imagination but we must attentively hearken and faithfully believe him who speaks to the Mind instructs the Reason and who penetrating into the most secret recesses of the inward Man is capable of enlightening and fortifying it against the outward and sensible Man which continually endeavours to seduce and abuse us I so often repeat these things because I think them most worthy of a serious reflexion 'T is God alone that we must Honour since there is none but ha who is able to give us knowledge or make us capable of Pleasure There is sometimes to be observed in the Animal Spirits and the rest of the Body a certain disposition which inclines us to Hunting Dancing Running and to all Exercises in general wherein the strength and agility of the Body are most conspicuous This disposition is commonly in Young men and chiefly in those whose Bodies are not perfectly form'd Children cannot stay long in one place but are always in action when they follow their humour For as their Muscles are not yet strong nor perfectly finish'd God the Author of Nature regulates the pleasures of the Soul in relation to the good of the Body so as to make them find pleasure in these Exercises which help to fortify and confirm the strength of their Bodies Thus whilst the Flesh and Fibres of the Nerves are still soft the little passages through which the Animal Spirits must necessarily flow to produce all sorts of motions are kept open and preserv'd the humours have no time to settle and all Obstructions and causes of Putrefaction are prevented The confused Sensation which Young men have of the disposition of their Bodies make them please themselves in the thoughts of their strength and activity They admire themselves when they know how to measure their motions or are able to make any uncommon ones and even wish to be in company of such persons as may behold and admire them Thus by little and little they strengthen their inclination for all bodily Exercises which is one of the chief causes of the Ignorance and Brutality of Men For besides the time that is lost in these Exercises the little use Men make of their Minds is the cause that the chief part of the Brain whose flexibility produces a strength and vivacity of Mind becomes wholly untractable and the Animal Spirits are not easily dispersed through the Brain after such a manner as to make them capable of thinking of whatever they please This is the reason that most part of the Nobility and such as are trained up to the War are incapable of applying themselves to any thing they argue upon things according to the Proverb A Word and a Blow And if we say any thing to them they have not a mind to hear instead of thinking what answer ought to be made their Animal Spirits insensibly flow into the Muscles by whose assistance they lift up their Arms and answer without any reflexion by a blow or some threatning gesture because their Spirits being agitated by the words they hear they are carried to those places which are most open through habit and exercise and the knowledge they have of the strength of their Bodies confirms them in these insolent behaviours And observing the respectful Air of those who hear them they are puft up with a foolish confidence which makes them utter many fierce and brutish impertinencies believing at the same time that they have spoke many fine things because the fear and prudence of others was favourable to them It is not possible to apply our selves to any Study or actually to make a profession of any Science without it we can be neither Authors nor Doctors without remembring what we are But this alone often naturally produces in the Mind of good men so many Defects that 't would be very advantageous for them if they were without those honourable Titles As they imagine them to be their chief Perfections they always think on them with Pleasure discover them to others with all possible Artifice and even pretend they have given them a right to judge of all things without examination If any Person has Courage enough to oppose them they soon Craftily and with a sweet and obliging Air insinuate what they are and the right they have to decide all things But if afterwards any is so bold as to resist them and they want an answer they will then openly say what they think of themselves and those who oppose them All inward Sensation of any advantage that we possess naturally encreases our Courage A Soldier well Armed and Mounted who wants neither Blood nor Spirits is ready to undertake any thing The disposition he finds himself in makes him bold and daring It is the same with a Learned Man when he believes himself so and when the vanity of his Heart has corrupted his Mind he becomes if we may say so bold and confident against the Truth Sometimes he rashly opposes it without knowing it and sometimes betrays it after he has discovered it and confiding in his false Learning he is always ready to maintain the Negative or Affirmative according as the Spirit of Contradiction possesses him It is very different with those who boast not of their Learning they are not decisive It is rare that they speak if they have not something to say Nay it often happens that they are silent when they ought to speak they have not that reputation nor those external marks of Learning which perswade them to speak they know not what These may safely hold their Tongues but Pretenders to Sciences are affraid to continue silent for they know well they shall be despised if they hold their Tongues although they have nothing material to say and on the contrary they
the greatness and perfection of my Being and therefore I have reason to admire it Others also ought to admire me if they would do me justice since I am something great through the relation I have to great things I in some measure possess them by the admiration I have for them and I feel the good by a foretaste that a kind of hope makes me enjoy Other Men would be happy as well as I if knowing my greatness they like me applied themselves to the Cause which produced it but they are blind and have no knowledge of either great or fine things and know not how either to raise or make themselves become consider able We may say the Mind naturally reasons after this manner without making any reflexion when it permits it self to be guided by the deceitful lights of its Passions These Arguments have some probability bus 'tis plain they have no solidity in them And this appearance or rather confused Sensation of it which attends these Natural Reasonings made without reflexion have so much power that if we don't take great care they will never fail of seducing us For instance when Poetry History Chimistry or any other Humane Science has struck the Imagination of a young Man with any Motions of Admiration if he don't carefully watch the efforts these Motions make upon his Mind If he does not throughly examine what the advantages of these Sciences are and compare the troubles he shall have in the learning with the profit he shall afterwards receive from them and in short if he is not as curious as is requisite to judge well there is a great deal of danger that his Admiration will not only shew him these Sciences with the fairest side outwards but seduce him also It is likewise very much to be feared that it will corrupt his Heart after such a manner that he shall not be able to destroy the illusion tho' he afterwards come to know it to be such because 't is impossible to efface such deep Traces out of his Brain as a continual Admiration shall have wrought there For that reason he must continually stir up the purity of his Imagination he must hinder these dangerous Traces from being formed which will corrupt the Mind and Heart I shall here prescribe a very useful way to prevent not only the excess of Admiration but also of all other Passions in general When the Motion of the Animal Spirits is violent enough to make such deep Traces in the Brain as corrupt the Imagination it is always attended with some emotion of the Soul Thus the Soul cannot be moved without being sensible of it it is sufficiently advertised to take care or it self and to examine whether it is advantageous that these Traces should be strengthned and made compleat But in the time of the emotion the Mind not being free enough to judge of the usefulness of these Traces because this emotion deceives and inclines it to favour them it must make its utmost endeavour to stop this emotion or else divert the motion of the Spirits which cause it and in the mean time it is absolutely necessary for it to suspend its Judgment Now it must not be imagined that the Soul can always barely by its own Will stop this course of Spirits which hinder it from making use of its Reason It s common powers are not sufficient to make such Motions cease which it has not excited So that it must make use of artifices to endeavour to deceive an Enemy that attacks it only by surprize As the motion of the Spirits stir up certain thoughts in the Soul so these Thoughts also excite certain motions in our Brain Thus when we would stop any motion of the Spirits which is stirred up in us it is not sufficient to will that it should cease for that is not always capable of stoping it We must make use of some Artifices and represent things contrary to those which excite and maintain this motion and this would cause a Revulsion But if we would only determine a motion of Spirits already excited to some other place we must not think of contrary things but only on such things as differ from those which produce it and this will undoubtedly divert them But because a Diversion and Revulsion will be great or little in proportion as our new thoughts shall be attended with a great or less motion of Spirits we must be very careful in observing well what those Thoughts are which agitate as most that in pressing occasions we may be able to represent them to our Imagination which seduces us and we must endeavour to form so strong an habit of resistance by this method that the motion which surprizes us may be no more excited in our Souls If we take care to make an intent application of the Idea of Eternity or any other serious Thoughts to these extraordinary motions which are excited in us those violent and great motions will never happen again without stirring up in us at the same time this Idea and which will consequently furnish us with the means to resist them Those things are proved both by Experience and the Reasons brought in the Chapter Of the Connection of Idea's So that we ought not to think it absolutely impossible by any Artifice to conquer the efforts of our Passions when our Wills are firmly determined to do it However we must not pretend that we can become Impeccable or shun all error by this manner of Resistance For first 't is difficult to acquire and preserve such an habit as that our extraordinary Motions shall stir up in us such Ideas as are proper to oppose them Secondly supposing we have acquired it these motions of the Spirits would directly excite those Ideas which we must oppose and but indirectly those which we must oppose to them So that the ill Idea's being the principal they will always have more power than those which are only accessary and it will be always necessary for the Will to assist the latter In the third place these motions of the Spirits may be so violent that they may fill the whole capacity of the Soul so that there remains no more room if we may be permitted so to speak to receive the accessary Idea that is fit to make a Revulsion in the Spirits or to receive it after such a manner as we may consider it with any attention In fine there are so many particulas circumstances which may make this remedy useless that we must not too much confide in it although on the other side we ought not to neglect it We must continually have recourse to Prayer that we may receive from Heaven those assistances as are necessary in the time of Temptations and also endeavour to present to the Mind some Truth that is so solid and strong that by this means we may conquer the most violent Passions For I must needs advertize by the way that several pious Persons often fall again
into the same Errors because they fill their Minds with a great number of such Truths as have more lustre than power and are fitter to dissipate and divide their Minds than to fortifie it against Temptation whereas unlearned and ignorant Persons are faithful in their Duty because they make some great and serious Truth familiar to them which fortifies and upholds them in all Occurrences CHAP. IX of Love and Aversion and of their principal kinds LOve and Aversion are the first Passions which succeed Admiration We do not long consider an object without discovering the Relations it has to us or to something that we Love The object that we Love and to which consequently we are united by Love being almost always present to us as well as that which we actually admire our Mind without any pain or great reflection makes the necessary Comparisons to discover the Relations they have to each other and to us or else it is naturally advertized of 'em by the preventing Sensations of Pleasure and Complacency And then the motion of Love we have for our selves and the object that we Love extends it self unto that we admire if the relation that it immediately has with us or with any thing we are united to appears advantagious to us either by Knowledge or Sensation Now this new motion of the Soul or rather motion of the Soul newly determined being joined to that of the Animal Spirits and followed with the Sensation which accompanies the new disposition that this new motion of Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion that we here call Love But if we feel by any Pain or discover by a clear and evident Knowledge that the union or relation of the object we admire is disadvantageous to us or to any thing we are united to Then the motion of Love that we have for our selves and for what is united to us is limited in us or carried towards it and follows not the sight of the Mind nor employs it self on the object of our Admiration But as the motion towards good in general which the Author of Nature continually imprints in the Soul carries us towards what we know and feel to be so because what is intelligible and sensible is good in it self We may say that the resistance which the Soul makes against this natural motion that draws it away is a kind of voluntary motion which terminates in Nothingness Now this voluntary motion of the Soul being joyned to that of the Spirits and Blood That we may not be mistaken in respect to what I here call voluntary Motion it is requisite to read the first explanation upon the first Chapter and followed with the Sensation which accompanies the new disposition that this motion of Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion that we here call Aversion This Passion is absolutely contrary to Love yet is never without Love It is wholly contrary because this separates I should only perplex the thought if I spoke whatever related to it to satisfie some difficult Persons and that unites The former has Nothingness for its object and the latter always some Being whereby 't is excited Aversion refists natural Motion and makes it of no effect whereas Love yields to it and makes it victorious But it is never separated from Love for if evil which is its object is taken for a privation of good to fly evil is to fly the privation of good that is to incline towards good and so that to hate the privation of good is to love good it self But if evil is taken for Pain and the aversion of Pain is not an aversion of the privation of Pleasure since Pain is as real a Sensation as Pleasure it is not therefore the privation of it but the aversion of Pain being the aversion to some inward Misery we should not have this aversion if we had not love Indeed evil may be taken for whatever causes Pain in us or deprives us of good and then aversion depends upon the love of our selves or of something to which we wish to be united Love and Hatred are then the two Mother Passions and opposite to each other but Love is the first chief and most Universal Being also since the Fall so far removed and separated from good as we are and looking upon our own being as the chief part of every thing we are united to we may in one Sense say that the motion of Love which we have to all things is only a consequence of Self-Love We love Honours because they raise us above others Riches because they defend and preserve us Our Relations Prince and Country because we are interested in their preservation The motion of love that we have for our selves extends to every thing that relates to us and to whatever we are united For 't is even this motion which unites and diffuses if I may so say our Being into those which encompass us in proportion as we discover by Reason or discern by Sensation that 't is advantageous to be united to them So that we must not think that since the Fall Self-Love is only the cause and rule of all other Loves but that most Loves are only kinds of Self-Love For when we say a Man loves a new object we must not think that a new motion of love is produced in this Man But rather that knowing that this object has some relation or union with him he loves himself in that object and by a motion of Love as old as himself For indeed without Grace there is only Self-Love in the Heart of Man For the love of Truth Justice and even of God himself and every other Love that has been in us from the first Inftitution of Nature is ever since the fall the Sacrifice of self-love We doubt not nevertheless but the most wicked and barbarous Men as Idolaters and even Atheists themselves are united to God by a Natural Love and of which consequently Self Love is not the cause By Love they are united to Truth Justice and Virtue They praise and esteem good Men and 't is not because they are Men that they love them but because they see good qualities in them which they cannot avoid loving since they cannot hinder themselves from admiring and judging them aimable Thus we love something else besides our selves but Self-Love is always predominant over all other loves Men abandon Truth and Justice for triffling Interests and if by their natural Powers they hazard their Lives and Fortunes to defend oppressed innocency or any other occasion They are induced by little else than Vanity and to make themselves considerable by the apparent possession of some Virtue which all the world reverences They love Virtue and Justice but never when 't is against themselves They may love them when they agree but never when they are opposite to their Interest for they can never without Grace gain the least conquest over Self-Love There are also many other natural
fortifie its emotions that the least suspicion frightens and disturbs the Reason False Zealors think they do God service when they submit to their Passions they blindly follow the secret motions of their Hatred as proceeding from the Internal Truth and stopping with satisfaction at such sensible proofs as justifie their excess they confirm themselves in their errors with an unconquerable obstinacy As for Ignorant and Weak Persons they create to themselves ridiculous and imaginary subjects of fear and like Children who walk in the dark without a guide they imagine frightful Bugbears are disturb'd and cry out as if they were undone light re-assures them if they are ignorant but if Men have weak Minds their imagination is always disturbed The least thing which relates to that frightful Object renews the traces and course of the Spirits which causes the symtom of their fear so that 't is absolutely impossible to cure or appease them for ever But when false Zeal meets with Hatred and Fear in a weak Mind it continually produces such unjust and violent Judgments in it that we cannot think on 'em without horror To change the Mind possessed with these Passions requires a greater Miracle than that which converted St. Paul and to cure it would be absolute impossible if we could set bounds to the Mercy and Power of God Those who walk in the dark rejoyce at the appearance of light but this Man cannot endure it since it hurts him because it resists his Passion His fear being in some manner voluntary because 't is produced by his hatred he loves to be affected by it since we love to be agitated by those Passions which have Evil for their Object when the Evil is imaginary or rather when we know as in Tragedies that the Evil can't hurt us The Phantoms that these form to themselves who walk in the dark vanish at the approach of light But this Man's Phantoms cannot be dissipated by the light of the truth for instead of dissipating the darkness of his Mind it only incenses his imagination so that whilst he applies himself to the Object of his Passion the light reflects and it seems to him as if these Phantoms had real Bodies since they reflect some weak rays of light which strike upon them But if we should suppose in these Persons a sufficient docility and reflection to make 'em listen to and apprehend such Reasons as are capable of dissipating their Errors yet their imagination being disordered through fear and their Hearts corrupted through hatred and false zeal these Reasons how solid soever they might be in themselves would not be able long to stop the impetuous motions of these violent Passions nor hinder them from speedily justifying themselves by sensible and convincing proofs For we must observe that there are some Passions which never return again whereas there are others that are constant and durable Those which are not maintained by the sight of the Mind but only produced and fortified by the sensible view of some Object and the fermentation of the Blood continue not but commonly die immediately after they are produced But those which are attended with the contemplation of the Mind are lasting for the Principle which causes them is not subject to change like the Blood and Humours So that Hatred Fear and all the rest of the Passions which are stirr'd up or preserved by the knowledge of the Mind and not by the sensible sight of some Evil must necessarily subsist long These Passions are therefore more durable violent and unjust but not more lively and sensible as has already been shown The perception of Good and Evil which excite the Passions is produced three several ways by the Senses Imagination and the Mind The perception of Good and Evil by the Senses or Sensation of Good and Evil produces the quickest and most sensible Passions Good and Evil perceived by the Imagination only excites them after a much weaker manner and the perception of Good and Evil by the Mind purely never produces true ones because it is always attended with some motion of the Animal Spirits The Passions are given us only for the good of the Body and by that to unite us to all sensible things for although sensible things can be neither good or bad in respect to the Mind they are so however in relation to the Body to which they are united Thus the Senses discovering much better the relation that sensible Objects have to the Body than the Mind it self can They must excite much more lively Passions than a clear and evident knowledge is able to do But because all our discoveries are attended with some motion of the Spirits a clear and evident knowledge of a great Good and great Evil which is not perceived by the Senses always excites some secret Passion Yet all our clear and evident discoveries of Good and Evil are not followed by some sensible Passion which we perceive and so on the other side all our Passions are not attended with some knowledge of the Mind For if we sometimes think of Good and Evil without feeling our selves moved we often find our selves moved with some Passions without knowing what they are nay sometimes without perceiving the cause of ' em One who breaths in a good Air feels a motion of Joy without knowing from whence it proceeds or what good 't is he possesses which causes this Joy And if there is any invisible Body which mingles with the Blood and hinders its fermentation it will produce sorrow and perhaps he will attribute the cause of his sorrow to any visible thing which occurs in that moment of his Passion Of all the Passions none are more sensible or more quick and consequently less attended with the knowledge of the Mind than horrour and antipathy agreeableness and sympathy It sometimes happens that a Man sleeping under a shady Tree would of a suddain and unexpectedly be waked at the sting of a Gnat or tickling of a Leaf even as if he were bitten with a Serpent The confused Sensation of something as terrible as death frights him without perceiving that he is agitated with a most powerful and violent Passion which is an aversion of desire On the contrary a Man in some necessity by chance discovers a small good the satisfaction of which surprizes him and he applies himself to this trifle as to the greatest good imaginable without making the least reflexion upon it The like also happens in the motions of sympathy and antipathy We sometimes see a certain Person whose habit and external appearance has some secret alliance with the present disposition of our Body we are forthwith touched with a vehement inclination for him and without any reflexion are induced to love and wish him well 'T is this I know not what which agitates us since Reason has no share in it And the contrary happens in respect to those whose Air and Manners excite disgust and horrour in us They have I know not
But when we come to consider attentively the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine For the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of Sovereign Divinity and the Idea of a Subordinate Power is the Idea of an inferiour but a true Divinity at least according to the Opinion of the Heathens if it be the Idea of a Power or true Cause We admit therefore something Divine in all Bodies which encompass us when we admit Forms Faculties Qualities Vertues and real Beings capable of producing certain Effects by the Power of their own Nature And thus they insensibly enter into the Opinions of the Heathens by the Respect they have for their Philosophy Faith indeed works it but it may perhaps be said that if we are Christians in our Hearts we are Heathens in our Minds Moreover it is difficult to perswade our selves that we ought neither to love or fear true Powers and Beings who can act upon us punish us with Pain or recompense us with Pleasure And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration 't is also difficult to perswade our selves that we ought not to adore them For whatever can act upon us as a real and true Cause is necessarily above us according to St. Austin and right Reason The same Father and the same Reason tells us 't is an immutable Law that Inferiour things should submit to superiour And from hence Ego enim ab animâ hoc corpus animari non puto nifi intentione facientis Nec ab isto quicquam illam pati Arbitror sed facere de illo in illo tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationi suae l. 6. mus c. 5. * this great Father concludes that the Body cannot act upon the Soul and that nothing can be above the Soul but God In the Holy Scriptures when God proves to the Israelites that they ought to adore him that is that they ought to fear and love him the chief Reasons he brings are taken from his Power to recompence and punish them He represents to them the Benefits they have received from him the Evils wherewith he hath chastised them and that he has still the same Power He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens because they have no Power over them and can do them neither Good nor Hurt He requires them to honour him only because he only is the true Cause of Good and Evil and that there happens none in their City according to the Prophet which he has not done for Natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Evil that appears to be done to us 'T is God alone that acts in them and 't is he only that we must fear and love Soli Deo Honor Gloria In short this Opinion that we ought to fear and love whatsoever is the true Cause of Good and Evil appears so natural and just that it is impossible to destroy it so that if we suppose this false Opinion of the Philosophers which we endeavour here to confute that Bodies which encompass us are the true Causes of the Pleasures and Evils which we feel Reason seems to justifie a Religion like to that of the Heathens and approves of the universal Irregularity of Manners It is true that Reason does not tell us that we must adore Onyons and Leeks as the Sovereign Divinity because they cannot make us intirely happy when we have of them or intirely unhappy when we want them Nor have the Heathens ever done to them so much Honour as to the great Jupiter upon whom all their Divinities depend or as to the Sun which our Senses represent to us as the universal Cause which gives Life and Motion to all things and which we cannot hinder our selves from regarding as a Sovereign Divinity if with the Heathen Philosophers we suppose it includes in its being the true Causes of whatever it seems to produce not only in our Bodies and Minds but likewise in all Beings which encompass us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Honour to Leeks and Onyons yet we may always render them some particular Adoration I mean we may think of and love them in some manner if it is true that in some sort they can make us happy we must honour them in Proportion to the Good they can do us And certainly Men who give Ear to the Reports of their Senses think that Pulse is capable of doing them good for else the Israelites for instance would not have regretted their Absence in the Defect nor considered it as a Misfortune to be deprived of them if they did not in some manner look upon themselves happy in the Enjoyment of them These are the Irregularities which our Reason engages us in when it is joyned to the Principles of the Heathen Philosophy and follows the Impressons of the Senses That we may longer doubt of the Falseness of this Miserable Philosphy and the Certainty of our Principles and Clearness of the Idea's we make use of It is necessary clearly to establish those Truths which are opposite to the Errors of the ancient Philosophy and to prove in short that there is only one true Cause because there is only one true God That Nature or the Power of every thing proceeds only from the Will of God That all Natural things are not true Causes but only occasional ones and some other Truths which will be the Consequences of these It is evident that all Bodies both great and small have no power of removing themselves A Mountain an House a Stone a grain of Sand and in short the least or biggest Bodies we can conceive have no power of removing themselves We have only two sorts of Idea's that of Bodies and that of Spirits whereas we ought to speak only of those things which we conceive we should reason according to these two Idea's Since therefore the Idea we have of all Bodies shows us that they cannot move themselves it must be concluded that they are moved by Spirits only But when we examine the Idea we have of all finite Minds we do not see the necessary Connexion between their Wills and the Motion of any Body whatsoever it be On the contrary we see that there is none nor can be any whence we ought to conclude if we will argue according to our Knowledge that as no body can be able to move it self so there is no created Spirit can be the true or principal cause of the Motion of any body whatever But when we think of the Idea of God viz. of a Being infinitely Perfect and consequently Almighty we know that there is such a Connexion between his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that 't is impossible to conceive he should Will the Motion of a Body that should not be moved We must then say that his Will only can move Bodies if we will speak things as we conceive them and not as we feel them The moving
Description of that the Centers of these Vortices are Stars which are as so many Suns That the Vortices encompass one another and are disposed after such a manner as to prejudice each others Motion as little as can be But things have not been able to come to that pass but the weakest Vortices have been drawn along and almost swallowed up by the strongest To apprehend which we need only reflect that the first Element which is in the Center of a Vortix may and continually does get out by the Spaces of the Balls towards the Circumference of the same Vortix and that at the Time that this Center or Star empties it self through its Equator the other first Element must re-enter by its Poles For neither the Star nor its Poles can be emptied on one side without being filled on the other since there is no Void in Extension But because an infinite Number of Causes can hinder much of the first Element from entring into this Star which we speak of It is requisite that the Parts of the first Element which are obliged to remain in it should be so disposed as to move the same Way 'T is that which makes them unite and joyn one with another and form Spots which condense into Crusts and by little and little cover the Center and make a solid and gross Matter of the most subtle and agitated of all Bodies 'T is this gross Matter that Mr. Descartes calls the third Element and it must be observed that as it proceeds from the first whose Figures are infinite it ought to be invested with an infinite Number of different Forms This Star thus covered with Spots and Crusts and become like the other Planets is no longer able to maintain and defend its Vortex against the continual Effort of those that environ it This Vortex therefore diminishes by little and little The Matter which composes it is dispersed on all sides and the strongest Vortex about it draws the greatest Part of it and at last swallows up the Planet which was the Center of it This Planet being encompassed with the Matter of the great Vortex it swims there to preserve it self with some little Matter of its own Vortex keeping the Circular Motion it had before And at last it takes a Situation there which puts it in Equilibrio with an equal Quantity of Matter in which it swims If it has but a little Solidity and Magnitude left it descends very near to the Center of the Vortex which swallowed it up because having some Power to continue its Motion in a right Line it must place it self in this Vortex in which an equal Quantity of the second Element has as much Power as it has to remove it self from the Center for it can be in Equilibrio only in this Place If this Planet is greater or more solid it will be in Equilibrio with a Place more distant from the Center of the Vortex And in short if in this Vortex there is any Place or equal Quantity of Matter that has as much Solidity as this Planet and consequently as much Power to continue its Motion in a right Line because this Planet will perhaps be very great and covered with very solid and thick Crusts it cannot stop in this Vortex since it cannot be put in Equilibrio with the Matter which composes it This Planet will pass then into some other Vortex and if it cannot be in Equilibrio it will not stay there neither So that we shall see it sometimes pass like Comets when they happen to be in our Vortex and near enough for us to discern them And we shall not see it again till a long time after when it is in other Vortices or in the Extremity of ours If we how think that one Vortix alone by its Magnitude Force and Advantagious Situation can by little and little undermine attract and swallow up many Vortices and such Vortices which before had swallowed some others it would be necessary that the Planets which are in the Centers of these Vortices being entered into the great Vortex which has swallowed them up should be there put in Equilibrio with an equal Quantity of Matter in which they swim So that if these Planets are unequal in Solidity they will be in an unequal Distance from the Center or the Vortex in which they swim And if it be found that two Planets have near the same Power to continue their Motion in a right Line or that one Planet draws into its little Vortex one or many other less Planets which according to our Manner of conceiving the Formation of things it has swallowed up then this little Planet shall turn about the great one while that turns upon its Center and all these Planets shall be carried along by the Motion of the great Vortex in almost an equal Distance from its Center We are obliged by the Light of Reason so to dispose the Parts which compose the World that we imagine to have been formed by the most simple Ways For all that we have said is grounded only upon the Idea we have of Extension the Parts of which we suppose to incline to the most simple Motion which is that of a right Line And when we examine by the Effects whether we are not deceived by endeavouring to explain things by their Causes we areas much surprized to see the Phenomena of Celestial Bodies so perfectly agree with what we have said For we see that all the Planets that are in the Middle of a little Vortex turn upon their own Center like the Sun that they swim all in the Vortex of the Sun and about the Sun that the smallest or least solid are nearest the Sun and the more solid are at the greatest Distance from it and that there is also some amongst them like Comets which cannot remain in the Vortex of the Sun In short there are many Planets which yet have many little ones that turn about them as the Moon does about the Earth Jupiter has four of them and Saturn three It may be also that Saturn has so great a Number of small ones that they form a continued Circle which seems to have no Thickness because of its great Distance These Planets being the greatest that we see we may consider them as having been engendered of Vortices large enough to have swallowed up others before they were involved in the Vortices we are in All these Planets turn upon their Center the. Earth in Twenty Four Hours Mars in Twenty Five or near Jupiter in Ten Hours or thereabouts c. They turn about the Sun Mercury which is the nearest in about Four Months Saturn which is the farthest off in Thirty Years near and those which are between both in more or less Time but not perfectly in the Proportion of their Distance For all the Matter in which they swim turns swifter when it is nearest the Sun because the Line of its Motion is then shorter When Mars is opposite
nearer to the Center of the Vortex that is they are so much the more weighty as they are the more solid But where gross Bodies are far distant from the Center of the Vortix the Circular Motion of the subtle Matter is then very great because it imploys almost all its Motion in turning about the Center of the Vortix as Bodies have so much the more Motion as they have more Solidity since they go with the same Swiftness as the subtle Matter they swim in and have more Power to continue their Motion in a right Line so that gross Bodies in a Distance from the Center of the Vortex are so much the lighter as they are more solid This agreed we may consider that the Earth is more Metallick towards the Center that it is not very Solid hear its Circumference That Water and Air must continue in the same Situation we see them in But that all these Bodies are heavy * That is they are impelled towards the Center of the Earth the Air is heavy as well as Gold and Quick-silver because they are more Solid and more Gross than the first and second Element This granted the Moon being a little too distant from the Center of the Vortex of the Earth is not heavy although it be solid That Mercury Venus the Earth Mars Jupiter and Saturn cannot fall into the Sun and that they are not solid enough to go out of this Vortex like Comets that they are in Equilibrio with the Matter they swim in and that if we could shoot a Musket or Cannon-bullet high enough these two Bodies would become little Planets or like little Comets which could no longer continue in Vortices having a compleat Solidity I do not pretend to have sufficiently explain'd whatever I have said or to have deduced from the Simple Principles of Extension Figure and Motion all that might be inferred I would only show the manner Descartes has taken to discover Natural things that we may compare his Idea's and Method with that of other Philosophers I had here no other design But I am not afraid to affirm that if we would cease to admire the Virtue of the Loadstone the regulated Motions of the Flux and Reflux of the Sea the Noise of Thunder and Generation of Meteors In short If we would instruct our selves in the Foundation of Physicks there is no better way to do it than by Reading and Meditating on his Works so we can make nothing of it if we follow not his Method I mean if we do not like him argue from clear Idea's beginning always with the most Simple 'T is not that this Author is Infallible nay I believe my self able to demonstrate that he is mistaken in many places of his Works But 't is more Advantagious to those that read him to believe that he is sometimes deceived than if they were perswaded whatever he says was true If we believed him Infallible we should read him without examining we should believe what he said without knowing it we should learn his Sentiments as we do Histories and should not inform our Minds by it He himself tells us that when we read his Works we ought to enquire if he is not deceived and must believe nothing he says except Evidence compels us to it For he is not like to those falsly Learned Men who usurp an unjust Dominion over the Minds of others requiring to be believed upon their word and who instead of making Men Disciples of Internal Truth by proposing only clear Idea's to them endeavour to submit them to the Authority of the Heathens and by Arguments they understand not make them receive Opinions they cannot comprehend The chief thing we have to say against Descartes's manner of producing the Sun Stars and the Earth and all Bodies which are about us is because it appears contrary to what the Holy Scripture tells us of the Creation of the World And if we believe this Author it seems that the Universe was form'd from it self such as we see it at this day To which many Answers may be given First Those who say Descartes is contrary to Moses it may be have not so much examined both the Holy Bible and Descartes as those who have shown by their publick Writings that the Creation of the World perfectly agrees with the Opinions of this Philosopher But the best Answer is Descartes never pretended things were made just as he described them for in the first Article of the fourth Part of his Principles which is That to find the true Causes of whatever is upon Earth we must keep the Hypothesis already received notwithstanding it should be false He positivesy says the contrary in these Terms Although I require not a Belief that Bodies which compose this visible World were ever produced in the same manner I have described them as I before intimated I am nevertheless obligēd to keep here the same Hypothesis to explain whatever is upon the Earth for if I evidently shew as I hope to do by this means the most intelligible and certain reasons for whatever we observe in it and that it cannot he done by any other Method I may thence reasonably conclude That although the World was not made after this manner in the Beginning but immediately created by God all things that it contains cease not to be now of the same Nature as if they had been so produced Descartes knew that to apprehend things well they must be considered in their Original That we must always begin with the most Simple things That we must not perplex our selves whether God had formed his Works by degrees or after the most simple ways or if he had produced them all at once But however God had made them to know them well we must first consider them in their Principles and only take care of the Consequence and then see how our Thought might agree with what God hath done He knew that the Laws of Nature by which God preserved all his Works in the Order and Situation they now are are the same Laws as those by which he formed and disposed them For 't is plain to all that consider things attentively that if God had made his whole Work all at once in the same Disposition he has placed it in time the whole Order of Nature would have been overturned since the Laws of Preservation would have been contrary to those of Creation If all the Universe continues in the order we see it 't is because the Laws of Motion which preserve it in this order were capable of producing it And if God had placed it in a different order from that it was put in by the Laws of Motion all things would be overturned and by the Force of those Laws be placed in the same order we see them now If a Man would discover the Nature of a Chicken he ought every day to open some of the Eggs that the Hen sits on and examine what grows and moves first
things of the same kind and is not easily contained in its own Limits but in that of others Water is a cold and moist Element which gathers things together both of the same and of a different Nature which is hot easily contained within its own Bounds but in that of others And in fine the Earth cold and dry and therefore collects things of the same and of a different Nature which is not easily contained in its own Bounds and very difficultly in that of others Here the Elements are explained according to the Sentiment of Aristotle or according to the Definitions he has given of their chief Qualities and because if we will believe him the Elements are simple Bodies whereof all others are compounded the Knowledge of these Element and their Qualities must be most clear and distinct since all Physicks or the Knowledge of Sensible Bodies which are composed of them ought to be deduced from thence Let us see then what is defective in these Principles First Aristotle joyns no distinct Idea to the Word Quality We know not whether by Quality he means a real Being distinct from Matter or only the Modification of Matter It seems sometimes as if he meant it in one Sense and sometimes in another It is true in the Eighth Chapter of Categories he defines Quality to be that which causes a thing to have such or such a Name but that will not satisfie our Demands Secondly the Definitions he gives of his four first Qualities Heat Cold Moist and Dry are all false or useless This is his Definition of Heat Heat is that which assembles things of a like Nature First we do not see that this Definition perfectly explains the Nature of Heat although it should be true that Heat collects all things of the same Nature But secondly it is false for Heat does not collect all things of the same Nature Heat does not assemble the Parts of Water it rather dissipates them into a Vapour Nor does it assemble the Particles of Wine or those of all other Liquors or fluid Bodies whatever Nor even those of Quicksilver On the contrary it resolves and separates all solid Bodies and even Fluids although of a different Nature And if there are any whose Parts Fire cannot dissipate 't is not because they are of the same Nature but because some are too gross and too solid to be raised by the Motion of the Parts of Fire In the third place Heat indeed can neither assemble nor dissipate the Parts of any Body whether Homogeneous or Heterogeneous For to assemble to separate or dissipate the Parts of any Body it must move them Now Heat can move nothing or at least 't is not evident that Heat can move Bodies For although we consider Heat with all the Attention possible we can only discover that it may communicate to Bodies a Motion which it has not in it self Yet we see that Fire moves and separates the Parts of Bodies that are exposed to it It is true but it may be it is not from its Heat for even it is not evident that it has any at all 'T is rather by the Action of its Parts which are visibly in a continual Motion It is plain that the Parts of Fire which strike against any Body must communicate a Part of their Motion to it whether there is Heat in Fire or not If the Parts of this Body are but a little solid and gross the Fire cannot move them and make them slip one upon another In short if they are a Mixture of subtle and gross ones the Fire can only dissipate those that it can push strong enough to separate intirely from the rest Thus Fire can only separate them and if it assembles them 't is merely by Accident But Aristotle pretends quite the contrary Separation says he which some attribute to Fire is only a resembling of things of the same kind De gen corr l. 2. c. 2. for 't is only by Accident that Fire dissipates things of a different kind If Aristotle had at first distinguished the Sentiment of Heat from the Motion of the Particles whereof the Bodies we call Heat are composed and had afterwards defined Heat taken for the Motion of the Parts by saying Heat is that which agitates and separates the invisible Parts whereof visible Bodies are composed he would have given a tollerable Definition of Heat Nevertheless it would not perfectly have contented us because it would not precisely have discovered to us the Nature of the Motion of hot Bodies Aristotle defines Coldness to be that which assembles Bodies of the same or of a different Nature This Definition is good for nothing For 't is false that Cold assembles Bodies To assemble them it must move them but if we consult Reason 't is evident Cold can move nothing In Effect by Cold he means either what we feel when we are cold or that which causes the Sensation of Cold. Now it is plain that the Sensation of Cold can move nothing since it can push nothing What it is that causes Sensation we cannot doubt when we examine things by our Reason for 't is only Rest or a Cessation from Motion So Cold in Bodies being only a Cessation from this Sort of Motion which accompanies Heat it is evident that if Heat separates yet Cold does not Thus Cold assembles neither things that are of a like or different Nature for what can push nothing can assemble nothing In a Word as it does nothing it collects nothing Aristotle judging of things by the Senses imagines Cold is also positive as well as Heat because the Sensations of Heat and Cold are both real and positive And he also thinks that these two Qualities are active And indeed if we follow the Impression of our Senses we have Reason to believe that Cold is a very active Quality since cold Water congeals reassembles and in a Moment hardens melted Gold or Lead after a little is poured upon them although the Heat of these Metals is great enough to separate the Parts of any Body they touch It is evident by what we have said of the Errors of the Senses in the first Book that if we rely only upon the Senses to judge of the Qualities of Sensible Bodies it is impossible to discover any certain and undoubted Truth which can serve as a Principle to assist us in the Knowledge of Nature For by this Method only we cannot discover what things are hot and what cold For of many Persons who should touch Water that is luke-warm some of them would think it hot and others cold Those that are of a hot Constitution would think it cold and those that are of a cold would think it hot And if we supposed Fish capable of Sensation 't is very probable they would think it hot when all Men think it cold It is the same with the Air it seems hot or cold according to the different Dispositions of the Bodies that are exposed
We have in our selves the Idea's of Numbers and Extension whose Existence is undoubted and whose Nature is immutable which would eternally furnish our Thoughts if we would know all their Relations And it is necessary for us to begin to exercise our Minds upon these Idea's for Reasons that will not be unnecessary to remark whereof the chief are these three The first is That these Idea's are the most clear and evident of all For if to shun Error we ought always to preserve Evidence in our Reasonings it is plain that we ought rather to reason upon the Idea's of Numbers and Extension than upon the confused and compound Idea's of Physicks Morality Mechanicks Chymistry and all other Sciences The second is These Idea's are the most distinct and exact of all chiefly those of Numbers So that the Habit we gain in Arithmetick and Geometry of not contenting our selves without knowing precisely the Relations of things gives the Mind a certain Exactness that those have not who content themselves with the Probability that is to be met with in other Sciences The third and greatest of all is That these Idea's are the immutable Rules and common Measures of all other things that we know or can know Those who perfectly know the Relations of Numbers and Figures or rather the Art of making the Comparisons necessary for the knowing their Relations have a kind of universal Science and a most certain means to discover evidently and certainly whatsoever exceeds not the common limits of the Mind But those that have not this Art can never certainly discover any Truths if but a little compounded although they have very clear Idea's of those things whose compounded Relations they endeavour to know These or the like are the Reasons which induced the Ancients to make young Men study Arithmetick Algebra and Geometry Without doubt they knew that Arithmetick and Algebra gave a certain Penetration to the Mind that could not be acquired by other Studies and that Geometry so well regulates the Imagination that it is not easily confounded for this Faculty of the Soul so necessary for the Sciences acquires a certain just Extension by the use of Geometry which promotes and preserves the clear view of the Mind in the most perplexing Difficulties If we would then always preserve Evidence in our Perceptions and discover the pure Truth without any Obscurity or Mixture of Error we ought first to study Arithmetick Algebra and Geometry at least after having acquired some Knowledge of our selves and the Soveraign Being If we would have any Book which Facilitates these Sciences I would prefer Descartes's Meditations to know God and our selves and to learn Arithmetick and Algebra we may read the Mathematical Elements for common Geometry Tacquet's Elements and for Conick Sections and the Resolution of Geometrick Problems De la Here 's Conicks his Geometrick Places and Construction of Equations to which we may add Descartes's Geometry I would not advise to the reading of the Mathematical Elements for Arithmetick and Algebra if I knew of any Author that had clearly demonstrated these Sciences but the Truth obliges me to a thing which some Men will oppose Algebra and Arithmetick being absolutely necessary to discover compounded Truths I believe it a Duty to testifie some Esteem for a Book which directs very far in these Sciences and which according to the Opinion of some Learned Men explains them more clearly than any one has yet done When with Care and Application we have studied these general Sciences we shall evidently discover a great number of Truths that are for all exact and particular Sciences Afterwards we may study Physicks and Morality because these Sciences are very useful although they are not so fit to make the Mind exact and penetrating And if we would always preserve Evidence in our Perceptions we must be very careful that we are never prejudiced in favour of any Principle that is not evident and from which the Chinese for instance would not be supposed to dissent after having throughly weighed and considered it So for Physicks we must only admit the Notions common to all Men viz. The Axioms of Geometricians and clear Idea's of Extension Figure Motion and Rest or any others as clear as these It may perhaps be said That the Essence of Matter is not Extension but what signifies that It is enough that the World which we conceive to be formed of Extension appears like to that which we see if it be not of this matter which is useless and unintelligible although we make such a noise about it It is not absolutely necessary to examine whether there are indeed External Beings which answer to these Idea's for we reason not upon these Beings but upon their Idea's We ought only to take care that the Reasonings we make upon the Properties of things agree with the Sensations we have of them viz. That what we think perfectly agrees with Experience because we endeavour in Physicks to discover the Order and Connection of Effects with their Causes or in Bodies if they Exist or in the Sensations we have of them if they have no Being Indeed we cannot doubt whether there are actually any Bodies when we consider that God is no Deceiver or reflect upon the just Order which he hath instituted in our Sensations whether in Natural Occurrences or in those things only that happen to make us believe what we could not naturally comprehend But it is not necessary at first sight to make deep Reflections upon a thing which no body doubts of and which is not very useful in the Knowledge of Physicks if considered as a true Science Nor must we trouble our selves much to know whether there is or is not any other Qualities in those Bodies that surround us than such as we have clear Idea's of for we must reason only according to our Idea's And if there is any thing else of which we have not a dear distinct and particular Idea we can never know any thing of it nor reason justly upon it Whereas if we reason according to our Idea's we follow Nature and discover that it is not so hidden as we commonly imagine So those that have not studied the Properties of Numbers often imagine that 't is not possible to resolve certain Problems although most Simple and Easie and those that have not thought upon the Properties of Extension Figure and Motion are extreamly inclined to believe and maintain that Physical Questions are inexplicable We must not stop at the Opinion of those that have examined nothing or have examined nothing with a necessary Application For although there are few Truths concerning Natural Things which are fully demonstrated it is certain that there are some general ones of which it is not possible to doubt although it is very possible not to think of them be ignorant and deny them If we would meditate regularly and with all necessary Application we should discover many of these certain Truths that I speak
Mutual Concurrence but rather suppose that there is none and attentively consider what Body can meet and move this Loadstone We discover at first sight that 't is not the Loadstone we hold in our Hands since it does not touch that which is moved But because it is only moved at the approach of that which we hold in our Hands and is not moved of it self we ought to conclude That although it is not the Loadstone in our Hands which moves it it must be some little Bodies which proceed from it and which are past by it towards the other Loadstone To discover these little Bodies we must not open our Eyes and look near the Loadstone for the Senses would impose upon Reason and it may be we should judge that nothing proceeds from the Loadstone because we cannot see any thing go out from thence 'T is very probable we should forget that we do not see the most impetuous Winds nor many other Bodies which produce as extraordinary Effects We must keep firm to this clear and most intelligible Mean and carefully examine all the Effects of the Loadstone that we may discover how it can continually emit these little Bodies without being diminished For the Experiments that have been made shew that these little Bodies that go out on one side immediately enter in again at the other and they will serve to explain all Difficulties that can be brought against the manner of resolving this Question But it must be well observed That we ought not to abandon this Mean although even we could not answer some Difficulties proceeding from our Ignorance in several things If we have not a Mind to examine from whence it is that Loadstones are repelled when we oppose the same Poles to each other but rather the Reason why they approach and joyn to each other when we present the North Pole of the one to the South Pole of the other the Question would be more difficult and one way alone would not be sufficient to resolve it It is not enough to know exactly the Relations that are between the Poles of these two Loadstones nor to have recourse to the Means we have taken for the precedent Question for on the contrary this Method seems to hinder the Effect whose Cause we would seek Neither must we have recourse to any thing that we do not clearly know to be the natural and common Causes of Corporeal Motions nor deliver our selves from the Difficulty of the Question by a rambling and undeterminate Idea of an Occult Quality in Loadstones by which they attract each other for the Mind can conceive but one Body as having a sufficient Power to attract another The Impenetrability of Bodies makes us clearly conceive that Motion may be communicated by Impulsion and Experience proves plainly that it is communicated by this means But there is neither Reason nor Experience which clearly demonstrates the Motion of Attraction for in the Experiments which seem most proper to prove this kind of Motion we visibly perceive when we find the true and certain Cause that what appears to be done by Attraction is only perform'd by Impulsion So that we must not keep to any other Communication of Motion but that which is made by Impulsion Since this way is certain and undoubted and there is at least some Obscurity in the others which we cannot imagine But although we could demonstrate that in things purely Corporeal there are other Principles of Motion than the meeting of Bodies we could not reasonably reject this we ought even to keep to it before all others since it is the most clear and evident and appears so undoubted that we are not afraid to affirm it has been received by all People in all Ages Experience shews us that a Loadstone that swims freely upon the Water draws near to one which we hold in our Hands when we present different Poles we must then conclude that it is pushed towards it But as it is not the Loadstone we hold that pushes that which swims since that which swims draws nigh to that which we hold and nevertheless that which swims would not be moved if we did not present that to it which we hold in our Hands It is evident that at least we must recur to both Methods to explain this Questoin if we will resolve it by the received Principle of the Communication of Motion The Loadstone c draws near to the Loadstone C Therefore the Air which encompasses it pushes it since there is no other Body which can push it and that is the first way The Loadstone c approaches only at the presence of the Loadstone C therefore 't is necessary that the Loadstone C should determine the Air to push the Loadstone c and that is the second way It is evident that both these ways are absolutely necessary so that the Difficulty is now reduced to joyn them together which may be done two ways either in beginning with something known in the Air which encompasses the Loadstone c or by beginning with something known in the Loadstone C. If we would know that the parts of Air like those of all fluid bodies are in continual Agitation we cannot doubt but they still strike against the Loadstone c which they surround but because they strike it equally on all sides they do not push it more on one side that another whilst there is an equal quantity of Air on both sides Things being thus it is easie to judge that the Loadstone C prevents there being so much of this Air as we speak of towards a as towards b but that can be done only by dispersing some other bodies in the space which is between C and c. There must then some little bodies go out from the Loadstones to fill this space So these little bodies chasing away the Air near a the Loadstone c is less pushed on that side than the other and consequently must approach to the Loadstone C since all bodies move to the side where they are least pushed But if the Loadstone c had not many Pores about the Pole a fit to receive the little bodies which go out from the Pole B of the other Loadstone and too small to receive those of Air It is plain that these little bodies being more agitated than Air since they are to chase it from between the Loadstones they would push the Loadstone c and remove it from C. Thus since the Loadstone c approaches to or deviates from C when we present its different Poles it is necessary to conclude that the Poles a and b of the Loadstone c are filled with different Pores Otherwise the little bodies which are emitted from the Loadstone C would not freely pass without pushing the Loadstone c by the side a and would not be repulsed by the side b What I say of one of the Loadstones must also be understood of the other It is evident that we always learn something by this way of reasoning upon clear Idea's
in which let there be inserted the Tubes of two equal Bellows and only apply a Force 1600 Times greater than the other to the Mouth of the greater Bellows for then the Force of 1600 Times the less shall overcome the greater The Demonstration of it is clear from Mechanicks since the Powers are not exactly in Reciprocal Proportion with the Orifices and the Relation of the least Force to the least Orifice is greater than the Relation of greater Force to the greater Orifice But to resolve this Problem by a Machine which represents the Effect of the Muscles better than this Instance already mentioned Blow up a Foot-ball and let there be a great Stone of 5 or 6 Hundred Weight laid upon it when half filled with Wind or place the Ball upon a Table with a Board over it and a Stone over that or let some heavy Man sit upon it holding himself by something that he may be able to resist the swelling of the Foot-ball For if one blow in the Foot-ball once only with his Mouth it will raise up the Stone which presses it down or the Man who sits upon it provide a the Orifice by which the Wind enters the Foot-ball have a Sucker to hinder it from going out whilst the Person takes Breath The Reason of this is that the Orifice in the Ball is so small or ought to be supposed so small in Relation to the whole Ball which is compressed by the Stone that a small Force is capable to overpower a great one by this method If we consider also that ones Breath is capable of pushing a Ball of Lead very violently by the means of a long Tube because the Force of the Breath dissipates not but continually renews we may visibly discover that the necessary Proportion between the Orifice and Capacity of the Ball being supposed ones Breath only may easily overcome a very great Force If then we conceive that all the Muscles or each of the Fibres which compose them have like this Foot-ball a Capacity fit to receive the Animal Spirits that the Pores by which the Spirits insinuate themselves are still smaller in Proportion than the Neck of a Bladder or Orifice of a Ball that the Spirits are kept in and pushed forward in the Nerves like Air in Tubes and that the Spirits are more agitated than the Breath of the Lungs and pushed with more Force in the Muscles than in Balls We shall discover that the Motion of the Spirits which are dispersed through the Muscles can overcome the Force of the most weighty Burthens we can bear and that if we cannot carry the heaviest the Defect of the Power proceeds not so much from the Spirits as that of the Fibres and Membranes that compose the Muscles which would break if we made too great an Effort Besides if we observed that by the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body the Motions of these Spirits as to their Determinations depend upon the Will of Man we should plainly see that the Motions of the Arms must be voluntary It is true we remove our Arms with so much Quickness that at first it seems incredible that the Effusion of the Spirits in the Muscles which compose them should be quick enough to produce such a Motion But we must consider that these Spirits are extreamly agitated always ready to go from one Muscle to another and that there is not need of many to swell them up so little as is necessary to move them only or when we lift any thing that 's very light from the Ground for when we have any thing heavy to lift we cannot do it so speedily Burthens being heavy will much swell and stretch the Muscles To swell them up after this manner requires more Spirits than there is in the adjoyning or opposite Muscles There must therefore be some little Time to collect these Spirits in a Quantity sufficient to resist this Weight So that those which are laden cannot run and those that take any weighty thing from the Ground cannot do it with so much Haste as those who take up a Straw If we further reflect that those that have more Heat or a little Wine in their Heads are much quicker than others as amongst Animals those whose Spirits are more agitated as Birds move more swiftly than they that have their Blood cold like Frogs And that even amongst them there are some as the Camelion the Tortoise and other Infects whose Spirits are so little agitated that their Muscles fill not faster than a little Foot-ball which we should blow up If we well consider all these things it may be we might think the Explanation already given fit to be received But although this Part of the proposed Question which regards Voluntary Motions is sufficiently resolved We must not however affirm that it is wholly so and that there is nothing more in our Bodies which contributes to these Motions than what we have attributed to it for there is probably in our Muscles a thousand Springs which facilitate these Motions and will be eternally unknown to those even who make the strictest Scrutinies into the Works of God The second Part of the Question which must be examined respects Natural Motions or those sort of Motions which have nothing extraordinary as the Convulsive have but that are absolutely necessary to the Preservation of our Machine which consequently depend not entirely upon our Wills I consider then first with all the Attention I am capable what the Motions are which have these Conditions and if they are wholly alike but because I immediately discover that almost all of them differ one from another not to perplex my self with too many things I only insist upon the Motion of the Heart This Part is the most known and its Motions most sensible I then examine its Structure and amongst many others observe two things The first that 't is composed of Fibres like other Muscles the second that there is two very considerable Cavities in it I therefore judge that its Motions may be performed by the Animal Spirits because it is a Muscle and that the Blood there ferments and dilates its self since there are Cavities there The first of these Determinations is founded upon what I have already said and the second because the Heart is much hotter than all the other Parts of the Body as it is that which disperses Heat with the Blood into all our Members that these two Cavities could neither have been formed nor preferved but only by the Dilatation of the Blood and that thus they are serviceable to the Cause which produced them I can then give a sufficient Reason for the Motion of the Heart by the Spirits which agitate it and the Blood which dilates it when this Blood is fermented For although the Cause I bring for its Motion should not perhaps be true yet it appears certain to me that it is sufficient to produce it It 's true that the Principle of the
Princip Article 43. of the second Part. that each Body has truly a Power to continue in the State 't is in and that this Power is equal either in respect to Motion or Rest But that which makes the Parts of hard Bodies continue in Rest by one anotherd so that we are troubled to separate and move them is because we employ not Motion enough to conquer their Rest This is probable it is true but I seek a Certainty if it can be found and not only a Probability Articl 63. And how can I certainly and evidently know that each Body has this Power to continue in the Condition it is in and that this Power is equal in respect to Motion and Rest since on the contrary Matter appears indifferent to Motion and Rest and absolutely without any Power Let us have Recourse then with Mr. Descartes to the Will of the Creator which is it may be the Power that Bodies seem to have in themselves 't is the second thing that we before supposed was able to preserve the Parts of this little Link we speak of so strongly united Certainly 't is impossible that God may will each Body to continue in the Condition it is in and that his Will is the Power which unites the Parts one to another after the same manner as I have elsewhere considered his Will to be the moving Power which puts Bodies in Motion For since Matter cannot move of it self it seems to me that I must judge it to be a Spirit and even that 't is the Author of Nature who maintains it and puts it in Motion by successively preserving it in many Places by his Simple Will since a Being infinitely powerful acts not by Instruments and the Effects necessarily follow his Will I perceive then Descartes Art 33. of the 2d Part. Art 45. and in those which follow 't is possible that God should keep every thing in the Condition it is in whether it be in Rest or in Motion and that his Will is the Natural Power that Bodies have to continue in the State in which they have once been placed If it is so we must as Descartes has done measure this Power conclude what ought to be the Natural Effects of it and thus give Rules for the Power and Communication of Motions at the Concourse of different Bodies by the Proportion of Magnitude that is found between these Bodies since we have no other Way to discover this general and immurable Will of God who causes the different Powers that Bodies have to act upon and resist one another besides their different Magnitudes and Celerities Yet I have no certain Proof that by a positive Will God keeps Bodies in a State of Rest and it seems sufficient for him to will the Existence of Matter not only to cause it to exist but to remain in Rest It is not the same in respect to Motion because the Idea of Matter moved certainly includes two Powers to which it relates viz. That which created it and that which moves it But the Idea of Matter in Rest only includes the Idea of a Creating Power without a Necessity of one to keep it in Rest since if we simply conceive Matter without thinking of any Power we shall necessarily conceive it in Rest Thus 't is I determine things for I must judge of them according to my Idea's and according to them Rest is but a Privation of Motion For 't is sufficient for God to cease to will that a Body should he moved for its Motion to cease and cause it to remain in Rest But I remember I have heard many Ingenious Persons say that it appeared to them that Motion was as well the Privation of Rest as that Rest was a Privation of Motion Some even have assured me by Reasons I could not apprehend that it was more probable that Motion was rather a Privation than Rest I do not distinctly remember the Arguments they brought but it ought to make me suspect my Idea's to be false For although most Men speak what pleases them upon Matters that do not appear very Important Yet I have Reason to believe that the Persons I speak of took Pleasure in speaking what they conceived I must therefore still examine my Idea's very carefully 'T is a thing which appears undoubted to me and these Gentlemen I speak of grant it viz. That it is the Will of God which moves Bodies The Power then that a Bowl has which I see in Motion is the Will of God which causes it to move And what must God now do to cause it to stop Must he by a positive Will determine it to be in Rest I imagine here that there is only God my self and a Bowl or else is it sufficient that he ceases to will it should be moved It is evident that if God only ceases to will that this Bowl should be moved the Cessation of this Will of God will be the Cessation of the Motion of the Bowl for the Will of God which was the Power that moved the Bowl being no more this Power will continue no longer nor the Bowl therefore any more moved Thus a Cessation of the Power of Motion causes Rest Rest has therefore no Power which produces it 'T is then only a pure Privation which supposes not a positive Will in God so that it would be unreasonable and unnecessary to admit a positive Will in God to give Bodies any Power to continue in Rest But let us if possible overthrow this Argument suppose now a Bowl in Rest whereas we supposed it before in Motion what must God do to actuate it Will it be enough for him to cease to will it should be in Rest If it is so I have yet advanced nothing for Motion would as well be the Privation of Rest as Rest the Privation of Motion I suppose then that God ceases to will it should continue in Rest but if this be granted I do not see that the Bowl moves and if any one sees it moved I desire them to tell me after what Degree of Motion it is moved Certainly 't is impossible that it should move and not have some Degree of Motion and from our conceiving only that God ceases to will it should be in Rest it is impossible to conceive it to go with any Degree of Motion because it is not the same with Motion as Rest Motions are infinitely various they are capable of More or Less But Rest being nothing one cannot differ from another A Bowl even which goes twice as fast in one Time as in another has twice as much Power or Motion in one Time as in another but we cannot say that the same Bowl has twice as much Rest in one Time as in another Thefore it must be a positive Will from God to put a Bowl in Motion or to give a Bowl such a Power as to move it self and it is enough for him to cease willing its Motion for it to
Agitation of this Matter by what I have said of Gunpowder It will not be difficult to see that 't is absotutely necessary that the Matters acting infinitely more upon the Surface of hard Bodies that it encompasses and compresses than within the same Bodies it must be the Cause of their Inflexibility or the Resistance we feel when we endeavour to break them Now as there is always many Particles of this Invisible Matter which passes through the Pores of hard Bodies they make them not only hard as we have already explained but further are the Cause that some are Springy and Elastick others stand bent and that others are fluid and liquid and in fine that they are not only the Cause of the Force that hard Bodies have to continue united together but also that fluid Bodies have to separate that is are the Cause that some Bodies are hard and others fluid But because 't is absolutely necessary to know distinctly the Physicks of Descartes the Figure of his Elements and Parts which compose particular Bodies to give a Reason why certain Bodies are stiff and some others pliable I shall not stay here to explain it Those who have read the Works of this Philosopher will easily enough imagine what may be the Cause thereof which I could not explain without great Difficulty and those who are unacquainted with this Author would but confusedly understand the Reason that I might bring for it Nor shall I also stop here to resolve a great Number of Difficulties that I foresee may be brought against what I have established Because if those that raise them have no Knowledge of true Physicks I should only tire and displease them instead of satisfying them But if they are learned Persons their Objections being stronger I could not answer them but by a great Number of Figures and long Discourses so that I believe I ought to desire those that find any Difficulty in what I have advanced very carefully to read this Chapter over again for I hope if they do so and meditate on it as much as is necessary all their Objections will vanish But if they find my Request incommodious they may omit it for there is no great Danger in being ignorant of the Cause of Bodies inflexibility I speak not here of Contiguity For 't is plain Contiguous things touch so little that there is always much Subtle Matter which passes between them and which endeavours to continue its Motion in a right Line to prevent their uniting For the Union that is observed between Marbles which have been polished one upon another I have explained it and 't is easie to see that although this Subtle Matter always passes between these two Parts how united soever they may be the Air cannot pass it and therefore 't is that which compresses and binds those two Pieces of Marble together and causes some Trouble to disunite them if we do not make them slide off one another It is plain from all this that the Continuity Contiguity and Union of two Marbles will only be the same thing in a Void neither have we different Idea's of them so that 't is as much as to say we do not understand them if we make them absolutely differ without any Relation to the Bodies which surround them Here now follows some Reflexions upon Descartes's Sentiment and the Original of his error I call his Opinion an Error because I find no Expedient to defend what he says of the Rules of Motion and Cause of the Hardness of Bodies in many Places at the End of the Second Part of his Principles and it seems to me that I have sufficiently proved the Truth of the contrary Opinion This great Man very distinctly conceived that Matter could not move of it self and that the Natural moving Power of all Bodies was nothing else but the general Will of the Author of Nature and that the Communications of the Motions of Bodies at their mutual Meeting could only proceed from this same Will If we take this for granted we can give no Rules for the different Communication of Motions but by the Proportion that is found between the different Magnitude of Bodies which beat against them since it is impossible to penetrate the Designs of God's Will And because he judges that every thing had Power to continue in the State it was in whether in Motion or Rest because that God by his Will determined this Power always to act after the same manner he concludes that Rest has as much Power to act as Motion So he measures the Effects of the Power of Rest by the Magnitude of Bodies which possessed it as those of the Power of Motion and hence he gave the Rules for the Communication of Motion that are in his Principles and the Cause of the Hardness of Bodies which I have endeavoured to refute It is difficult enough not to be of Descartes's Opinion when we look upon it as he did for once more since the Communication of Motions proceed only from the Will of the Author of Nature and that we see all Bodies continue in the State they are once placed in whether it be Motion or Rest It seems we ought to seek the Rules of the different Communication of Motions at the meeting of Bodies not in the Will of God which is unknown to us but in the Proportion there is between the Magnitudes of these Bodies I do not therefore wonder that Descartes had this Thought but I only wonder that he did not correct it when he had made a farther Advance in his Discoveries and found both Existence and the Effects of the Subtle Matter which environs all Bodies I am surprized that in the 132 Article of the 4th Part he attributes the Elastick Force that certain Bodies have to this subtle Matter and that in Articles 55 and 43 of the Second Part and in other Places he does not attribute it to their Hardness or the Resistance they make when we endeavour to bend or break them but to the rest of their Parts It appears evident to me that the Cause of the Elasticity and Stiffness of certain Bodies is the same with that which gives them the Power of Resistance when we would break them for indeed the Force that we use to break Steel differs but insensibly from that by which we bend it I will not here bring all the Reasons that might be urged to prove these things nor answer to any Difficulties that we might form from hard Bodies making no Sensible Resistance and yet we have some Trouble to bend them For it will be enough to make these Difficulties vanish to consider that the Subtle Matter cannot easily take a new course in Bodies which break when we bend them as in Glass and in tempered Steel and that it cannot more easily do it in Bodies that are composed of branchy Parts which are not brittle as in Gold and Lead And indeed there is no hard bodies which make not some
little Resistance It is difficult enough to perswade our selves that Descartes positively believed the Cause of Hardness was different from that of Elasticity And what appears most probable is that he has not sufficiently reflected upon the Matter When we meditate long upon any Subject and are satisfied in things we would know we often think no more of them We believe that the Thoughts that we have had are undoubted Truths and 't is useless to examine farther But in Men there are many things which disgust them against Application incine them to a rash Assent and make them subject to Error and although the Mind continues apparently satisfied it is not always because it is well informed of the Truth Descartes was a Man like us I confess we never saw more Solidity Exactness Extension and more Penetration of Mind than what appears in his Works yet he was not infallible So that it is probable he was so very strongly perswaded of his Opinion from not sufficiently reflecting that he asserted something elsewhere in nis Principles contrary to it He maintained it upon very specious and probable Reasons but such however as were not of sufficient Force to make us submit and therefore he might and ought to have suspended his Judgment It is not enough to examine in a hard Body what might be the Cause that made it so We ought also to think of the invisible bodies which might render them hard as he has done at the End of his Philosophical Principles when he attributes the Cause of Resistance to them He ought to have made an exact Division which comprised whatsoever might contribute to the Inflexibility of bodies It is not sufficient still to seek the Cause in God's Will he ought also to have thought of the Subtle Matter which environed them For although the Existence of this extreamly agitated Matter was not yet proved in that Place of his Principles where he speaks of Hardness it was not then rejected He ought then to have suspended his Judgment and to have remembered that what he had writ of the Cause of Hardness and Rules of Motion ought to have been reviewed anew which I believe he did not do carefully enough Or else he did not sufficiently consider the true Reason of a thing that is very easie to discover and which yet is of the utmost Consequence in Physicks I will explain it Descartes well knew that to maintain his System of the Truth which he could not reasonably doubt It was absolutely necessary that great bodies should always communicate their Motion to the lesser bodies they should meet and the less reflect at their meeting with the greater without a like Loss on their Side For without that the First Element would not have all the Motion that it is necessary it should have above the Second nor the Second above the Third and his whole System would be absolutely false as is sufficiently known to those that have but thought a little upon it But in supposing that Rest had Force enough to resist Motion and that a great Body in Rest could not be moved by another that is less than it although it strike it with a furious Agitation It is plain that great Bodies must have much less Motion than a like Mass of little Bodies since according to this Supposition they can always communicate what they have and cannot always receive from the lesser Thus this Supposition not being contrary to whatsoever Descartes has said in his Principles from the Beginning unto the Establishment of his Rules of Motion and agreeing very well with the Sequel of his Principles he believed that the Rules of Motions which he thought he had demonstrated in their Cause were also sufficiently confirmed by their Effects I agree with Descartes that great Bodies communicate their Motion much more easily than little Bodies do and therefore his First Element is much more agitated than the Second and the Second than the Third But the Cause of it is clear without having any Regard to his Supposition Little and fluid Bodies as Water Air c. can only communicate to great Bodies an uniform Motion which is common to all their Parts The Water in a River can only communicate to a Boat the Motion of Descent which is common to all the little Parts of which the Water is composed and every one of these Parts besides this common Motion has also an infinite Number of other Particulars Thus by this Reason 't is plain that a Boat for instance can never have so much Motion as an equal Bulk of Water since the Boat can only receive from the Water that Motion which is direct and common to all the Parts that compose it If Twenty Particles of a fluid Body push any other Body on the one Side and as many on the other it will continue immoveable and all the little Particles of the fluid Body in which it swims rebound up without losing any thing of their Motion Thus great Bodies whose Parts are united can only receive the Circular and Uniform Motion of the Vortex of the Subtle Matter which environs them This Reason seems sufficient to them to make it comprehended how great Bodies are not so much agitated as the lesser and that there is a Necessity for an Explanation of these things to suppose any Force in Rest to resist Motion The Certainty of Descartes's Principles cannot be a sufficient Proof to defend his Rules of Motion and we may believe that if Descartes himself had again without Prejudice examined his Principles and compared them with such Reasons as I have brought he would not have believed that the Effects of Nature had confirmed his Rules nor have fallen into a Contradiction by attributing the Hardness of Bodies only to the rest of their Parts and their Elasticity to the Force of a Subtle Matter Here follows now the Rules of the Communication of Motions in a Void which are only the Consequences of what I have established about the Nature of Rest Bodies not being hard in a Void since they are only hard by the Pressure of the Subtle Matter which surrounds them if Two Bodies meet they would flatten without rebounding we must therefore give these Rules Suppose them hard of themselves and not by the Pressure of this Subtle Matter Rest having no Power to resist Motion and many Bodies before being considered as one only in the moment of their meeting it is plain they ought not to rebound when they are equal in Magnitude and Velocity or that their Velocity supplies the Desect of their Magnitude or their Magnitude the Defect of their Velocity And it is easie from thence to conclude that in all other Cases they must always communicate their Motion A general Rule for the Communication of Motion so that they may afterwards proceed with an equal Swiftness So that to know what must happen in all the different Suppositions of Magnitude and Swiftness of Bodies which meet one another we need
those of which we actually think I suppose nevertheless that our Sensations do not fill all the capacity of our Mind for that we may be free with the liberty I speak of it is necessary not only that God should not invincibly impel us towards particular goods but also that we may make use of the impression we have towards good in general to love some other thing than that we actually love Now as we can love no Object but those we may think of nor actually think of any other but those that cause too quick Sensations in us it is evident that the dependance we have upon our Body lessens our liberty nay does on many occasions take away the use of it So our Sensations destroying out Ideas and the union we have with our Body by which we only see or rather feel our selves weakening that which we have with God by which all things are present to us the Mind must not suffer it self to be divided by confused Sensations if it be willing always to have the principle of its determinations to be free It appears from all this that God is not the Author of Sin and that Man does not give himself new Modifications God is not the Author of Sin since he continually imprints a motion to go farther on him who Sins or stops at a particular good and he gives him the power to think of other things and to apply himself to other goods than that which actually is the Object of his thought and of his love that he commands him not to love those things which he can forbear loving without being troubled by any remorses and he continually calls him to himself by the secret reproaches of his Reason Is is true Gob does in one sense impel the Sinner to love the Object of his Sin if this Object appears to be good to the Sinner for as most Divines say all that is positive in Sin or what there is of act or motion proceeds from God But it is only through a false judgment of our Mind that the Creatures appear good to us that is capable of acting in us and making us happy The Sin of a Man lies in this that he does not refer all the particular Goods to the Soveraign Good or rather in that he does not consider nor love the Severaign Good in the particular Goods and so does not regulate his Love according to the Will of God or according to the essential and necessary order of which all Men have a knowledge and which is so much the more perfect as they are more strictly united to God and are less sensible of the impressions of their Senses and Passions See the Explanations upon the Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book towards the end where I explain my thoughts more distinctly For our Senses diffuse our Souls through our whole Bodies and our Passions transport them if I may so say into those Objects which are about us they remove us from the light of God which enlightens us Neither does Man give himself new Modifications for the motions of love that God continually imprints upon us increases or diminishes not whether we actually love or not I mean although this natural motion of love be or be not determined by any Idea of our Mind This motion does not cease even by its acquiescence in the possession of Good as the motion of Bodies ceases by their rest 'T is probable that God always impels us with an equal force towards him for he inclines us towards good in general as much as we are capable of and we are at all times equally capable of it because our Will or Natural capacity of Willing is always equal in it self Thus the impression or Natural motion which carries us towards good neither increases or diminishes I confess we have no clear Idea nor even any internal Sensation of this equality of impression or natural motion towards Good But 't is because as I have elsewhere proved that we know not our selves by a clear Idea not are we conscious of our own Faculties whilst they don't actually operate we do not feel in our selves what is natural common and always the same as we are not sensible of the heat and motion of our Hearts We are not likewise sensible of our Habits and whether we are worthy of the Love or Wrath of God There is perhaps in us an infinite number of Faculties which are absolutely unknown to us for we have no internal Sensation of what we are but only of what we feel If we had never felt Pain nor a desire for particular Goods we could not by the internal Sensation we have of our selves discover whether we should be capable of feeling Pain or willing such Goods 'T is our Memory and not our internal Sensation that teaches us we are capable of feeling what we no longer feel or of being agitated by Passions which at present we feel no motions of Thus there is nothing which hinders us from believing that God always inclines us towards him with an equal force although after a very different manner He always preserves in our Souls an equal capacity of willing or one and the same will as in all matter he preserves an equal quantity of motion But although it were not certain I don't see how we can say that the encrease or diminution of the natural motion of our Souls depends upon us since we cannot be the cause of the extension of our own Will It is however certain by what I have said before that God produces and also preserves whatsoever is real and positive in the particular determinations of the motions of our Souls whether Ideas or Sensations For 't is he who determines our motions for a general Good towards particular Goods but not after an invincible manner since we have a tendency to go farther So that all we do when we sin is that we do not all that we are able to do by means of the impression we have towards him who includes all Goods For we can do nothing but by the power that we receive from our Union with him who does all things in us Now what chiefly makes us Sin is because we choose rather to enjoy than to examine because of the Pleasure we feel in enjoying and the Pain we find in examining We cease to make use of the motion that is given us to enquire after Good and examine it and we stop in the enjoyment of such things as we ought only to make use of But if we narrowly observe we shall see there is nothing real on our part but a defect and cessation from enquiry which if we may so say corrupts the action of God in us but which however cannot destroy it Thus What do we when we do not Sin We do then whatever God does in us for we limit not to a particular or rather to a false Good the love that God imprints on us for the true
God only because they freely and falsly judge that he is Evil For they cannot hate Good considered as such So that 't is by the same motion of love that God imprints on them to Good that they Hate him Now they judge that God is not Good because they make not that use as they ought of their liberty Not being convinced by an undoubted evidence that God is not Good they ought not to believe him Evil nor consequently Hate him We must distinguish two things in Hatred the Sensation of the Soul and motion of the Will The Sensation cannot be bad For 't is a modification of the Soul which Morally speaking has neither Good nor Ill in it For the motion it is not ill neither since it is not distinct from that of Love For external Evil being only a privation of Good it is evident that to fly Evil is to fly the privation of Good that is to incline towards Good So that whatever there is of real and positive in the Hatred even of God hath nothing bad in it And the Sinner cannot hate God but by making an abominable abuse of the action that God continually gives him to induce him to love himself God causes whatever we have that is real in the Sensations of Concupiscence This Explanation relates to the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search after Truth and yet he is not the Author of our Concupiscence As the difficulties that are raised about Concupiscence have much relation to those things I have explained it will be proper for me here to show that God is not the Author of Concupiscence altho' he performs all things in us and 't is only he who produces even sensible Pleasures in us It seems undoubted to me that we ought to grant for the Reasons I have given in the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search after Truth and elsewhere that following the Natural Laws of the union of the Soul and Body Man even before Sin was carried by a foresight of Pleasure to the use of sensible Goods and that every time that certain traces were formed in the chief part of his Brain certain thoughts were produced in his Mind Now these Laws were very just for the Reasons brought in the same Chapter This supposed as before the Fall all things were perfectly well regulated so Man had necessarily a power over his Body that he cou'd hinder the formation of these traces when he wou'd for order requires that the Mind shou'd govern the Body Now this power of Mans Mind over his Body consisted strictly in that according to his desires and different applicacations he could stop the communication of the Motions which were produced in his Body by those Objects that were about him over which his Will had not an immediate and direct power as it had over his own Body I dont see how we can conceive that after any other manner he coud hinder the traces from being formed in his Brain Thus the Will of God or general Law of Nature which is the true cause of the communication of Motion wou'd on certain occasions depend upon Adams Will for God had this respect for him that he produced not new Motions in his Body if he consented not to them or at least in the chief part of it to which the Soul is immediately united Such was the Institution of Nature before Sin Order requires it so and consequently he whose Will is ever conformable to Order Now this Will continuing always the same the Sin of the first Man has overturn'd the Order of Nature because the first Man having Sinned Order woud not permit him absolutely to rule over any thing In the Objection of the 7th Article of the Explanation of the 7th Cap. of the 2d l. I explain what I speak here in general of the loss that Man sustain'd as to the power he had over his Body It is not just that the Sinner shoud suspend the communication of Motions that the Will of God shou'd be accommodated to his and that in favour of him there shoud be exceptions in the Law of Nature So that Man is subject to Concupiscence his Mind depends upon his Body he feels in himself indeliberate Pleasures and involuntary and rebellious Motions in consequence of his most Just Law who united both parts of which he is composed Thus formal Concupiscence as well as formal Sin is nothing real It is in Man only the loss of that power he had of suspending the communication of Motions on certain occasions We must not admit in God a positive Will of producing it This loss that Man has sustained is not a Natural consequence of the Will of God which is ever conformable to order and always the same 't is a consequence of Sin which has made Man unworthy of an advantage due only to his Innocence and Justice So that we must say that God is not the cause of Concupiscence but only Sin Yet whatever is real and positive in the Sensations and Motions of Concupiscence is performed by God Aug. against the two Epistles of the Pel. l. 1. cap. 15 c. for God effects whatever is done but that is no Evil 'T is by the General Law of Nature 't is by the Will of God that sensible Objects produce certain Motions in the Body of Man and that these Motions excite certain Sensations in the Soul useful for the preservation of the Body or propagation of the Species who dares then say that these things are not good in themselves I know very well that we say Sin is the cause of certain Pleasures we say it but do we know it Can we think that Sin which is nothing shou'd actually produce something Can we conceive nothing to be a Cause However we say it but it may be the reason is because we will not take pains enough to think seriously upon what we say or else it is because we will begin an Explication which is contrary to what we have heard persons say who it may be spoke with more Gravity and Assurance than Reflexion and Understanding Sin is the cause of Concupiscence but it is not the cause of Pleasure as Free-will is the cause of Sin without being the cause of the Natural Motion of the Soul The pleasure of the Soul is good as well as its motion or love and there is nothing good that God does not The rebellion of the Body and malignity of Pleasure proceeds from Sin as the inclination of the Soul to or its acquiescence in a particular good comes from the Sinner But these are only privations and nothings that the Creature is capable of All Pleasure is good and even in some manner makes him happy that enjoys it at least whilest he enjoys it But we may say that Pleasure is Evil because instead of raising the Mind to him that causes it it happens through the errour of our Mind and corruption of our Heart that it
and to perform his Duty by pre-ingaging Pleasures seeing that the knowledge he had of his Good and the Joy which possessed him continually as a necessary consequence of the prospect of his happiness in uniting himself to God might suffice to engage him to perform his Duty and to make him Act with more merit than if he had been as it were determined by Pre-ingaging Pleasures TO apprehend all this distinctly it is necessary to understand that nothing but knowledge and pleasure determine Men to Act. For when we begin to love an Object it is either because we know by Reason that it is good or because we find by our selves that it is agreeable Now there is a great deal of difference between Knowledge and Pleasure Knowledge enlightens our Mind and makes us distinguish good without inducing us actually and forcibly to love it Pleasure on the contrary induces and determines us forcibly to love the Object which seems to occasion it Knowledge does not induce us of it self it only makes us freely and of our own accord incline our selves towards that Good which it offers us it leaves us wholly to our selves Pleasure on the contrary anticipates our Reason it hinders us from consulting it It does not leave us wholly to our selves and it weakens our liberty Therefore as Adam before the Fall had a time appointed to merit Eternal Happiness and in order thereunto a full and absolute Liberty and as his Knowledge was sufficient to keep him strictly united to God whom he already loved by the Natural motion or tendency of his Love he was not to be induced to his Duty by Pre-ingaging Pleasures which would have lessened his Merit in lessening his Liberty Adam would have had reason in some measure to complain of God had he hinder'd him from meriting his Reward Fortissimo quipped dimisit atque permisit facere quod vellet Aug. de corrupt grat cap. 12. as he ought to have merited it that is by Actions perfectly free God would have injured his free Will in some measure in giving him that kind of Grace which is now only necessary for us upon the account of the Pre-ingaging Pleasures of concupiscence Adam being endued with whatever was necessary for his perseverance to prevent him would have look'd like a diffidence of his Virtue and like a reproach of Infidelity He would have had some reason to magnifie himself had he not been sensible of the necessity he might be liable to and of the Weakness into which he was also subject to fall In fine that which is yet infinitely more considerable is that it would have rendered the Inclinations of Jesus Christ in relation to us Look upon the Fifth Dialogue of the Christian Conversations towards the latter end of the Impression of Brussels indifferent though it was certainly his first and greatest design who suffered Men to be involved in Sin in order to shew Mercy to them all in Jesus Christ to the end that he who glories should only glory in the Lord. Therefore it is evident to me that Adam felt no Pre-ingaging Pleasure in his Duty but I am of opinion that it is not altogether certain that he felt Joy though I suppose it in this place because I think it very probable But to explain my self There is this difference between Pre-ingaging Pleasure and the Pleasure of Joy that the first anticipates Reason and the latter follows it for Joy naturally results from the knowledge we have of our Happiness or of our Perfections since we can never look upon our selves as happy or perfect without being immediately joyful at it As we may be sensible of our Happiness by Pleasure or discover it by Reason so there are two sorts of Joy But I do not speak in this place of that which is purely sensible I speak of that which Adam could feel as a necessary consequence of the knowledge he had of his happiness in uniting himself to God And there is some reason to question whether he really had that Joy The chief is that this Joy might have taken up his Mind to that degree as to deprive him of his Liberty and would have united him to God after an invincible manner For we may believe that as this Joy must be proportionable to the happiness Adam possessed it must needs be excessive But I answer to this first That the Joy which is purely Intelectual leaves the Mind absolutely free and has but little influence over its capacity thinking therein it differs from sensible Joy which commonly disturbs our Reason and lessens our Liberty I answer in the second place That Adam's Happiness at the first instant of his Creation did not consist in a full and entire possession of soveraign Good he was liable to lose it and to become unhappy His Happiness chiefly consisted in that he felt no pain and that he was in his favour who was to make him perfectly happy had he persevered in his Innocence Therefore his Joy was not excessive moreover it was or ought to have been mix'd with a kind of fear for he had reason to be diffident of himself Finally I answer That Joy does not always apply the Mind to the real Cause which produced it As we feel Joy at the sight of our Perfections it is natural to believe that the said sight occasions it for when one thing always follows another we naturally look on it as one of its Effects So we look upon our selves as the Authors of our present Felicity We have a secret Complaisance in our Natural Perfections We love our selves We do not always think on him who operates in us after an Imperceptible manner It is certain that Adam knew more distinctly than the best Philosopher that ever was that God only was capable to act in him and to occasion that Sensation of Joy which he felt in himself at the sight of his Happiness and Perfections He knew that clearly by the light of Reason whenever he applied himself to it but he did not feel it He felt on the contrary that the said Joy was a Consequence of his Perfections and he always felt it without any application on his part Therefore that Sensation might induce him to consider his own Perfections and to delight in himself in case he forgot or any wise lost the sight of him whose Operations are not sensible So that Joy was so far from rendring him Impeccable as it is pretended that on the contrary his Joy perhaps proved the occasion of his Pride and Ruin And therefore I say in this Chapter that it behov'd Adam to take care not to suffer the Capacity of his Mind to be filld with a presumptuous Joy excited in his Soul upon the sight of his Natural Perfections AN EXPLANATION OF The Fifth Chapter Where I say That the Pre-ingaging Delectation is the Grace of Jesus Christ THough I say in this Chapter that the Pre-ingaging Delectation is the Grace which Jesus Christ has particularly
the Husband is her Head and Master We see that the Evangelists and even the Blessed Virgin calls Joseph the Father of Jesus Christ when she says unto her Son Thy Father and I have sought thee sorrowing Ecce pater tuus Ego dolentes quaerebamus Therefore since the Holy Scripture assures us that it is by the Woman we are all liable to Death and to Sin it is absolutely necessary to believe it Nor can it be thrown upon Man But though it assure us in other places that by Man Sin came into the World there is not the same necessity to believe it since that may be attributed to the Man which belongs to the Woman And if we were obliged by Faith to excuse either the Man or the Woman it would be mote reasonable to excuse the Man than the Woman However I am of opinion that the Passages I have quoted ought to be explained in the Literal sense and that we ought to conclude That both the Man and the Woman are the Real Causes of Sin each in their way The Woman because Sin is Communicated by her as it is by her that Man begets Children And Man because his Sin has occasion'd Concupiscence as his Action is the Cause of the Impregnation of the Woman or of the Communication which is between the Woman and her Child 'T is certain that it is the Man who impregnates the Woman and consequently he is the Cause of the Communication which is between her Body and the Childs since that Communication is the Principle of its Life The said Communication does not only give to the Bodies of Children the Dispositions of their Mothers it also gives to their Minds the Dispositions of her Mind Therefore we may say with St. Paul That By Man Sin was introduced into the World and nevertheless upon the account of that Communication we may also say that Sin proceeds from the Woman that it is by her we are all lyable to Death and that our Mother has conceived us in Iniquity as it is said in other places of the Scripture Perhaps it may be urged That though Man had not sinned the Woman would have had sinful Children for having sinned her self she had lost the Power God had given her over her Body And therefore though the Man had remained Just she would have Corrupted the Brain and consequently the Mind of her Child upon the account of the Communication she had with it Certainly this does not appear lively For Man whilst Righteous knowing what he does cannot give the Woman that miserable Fruitfulness of conceiving sinful Children If he remains Righteous he will have no Children but for God and sinful Children can never be acceptable to God for I do not suppose a Mediator in this place However I grant that in this case the Marriage might not have been dissolved and that the Man might have known his Wife But it is certain the Body of the Woman did belong to her Husband since it was taken out of his and was of the same Flesh Duo in carne una It is also certain that the Children belong as much to the Father as to the Mother This being granted we can never imagine that the Woman after her Sin would have lost the power she had over her Body unless her Husband had sinned as well as her self for had the Woman been deprived of that power her Husband remaining in Innocence there would have been this disorder in the Universe That a Just Man should have had a Corrupt Body and Sinful Children Now it is contrary to Order or rather it is contradictory that a Just God should punish the Man when he is in perfect Innocence Therefore Eve feels no Involuntary and Rebel Motions immediately after her Sin She is not as yet ashamed to see her self naked She does not hide her self On the contrary she draws near to her Husband though naked as well as her self Her Eyes are not as yet opened She is as before the absolute Mistress of her Body Order required that immediately after her sin her Soul should have been disturbed by the Rebellion of her Body and by the shame of her own and Husband's Nakedness For it was not reasonable that God should any longer suspend the Laws of the Communication of Motions in favour of her as I have said in the Seventh Article But whereas her Body belongs to her Husband and her Husband is still Innocent she is not punished in that Body That punishment is deferred until he has himself eaten of the Fruit which she presented to him Then it was they both felt the Rebellion of their Bodies they perceived they were naked and that shame obliged them to cover themselves with Fig-Leaves Therefore we must say That Adam is really the Cause of Original Sin and Concupiscence since it is his sin that has deprived his Wife as well as himself of the power they had over their Bodies and that it is for want of this power the Woman produces Traces in her Brain and in the Brain of her Child which corrupt the Soul from the very moment it is created OBJECTION Against the Twelfth Article Those speak by guess who say that the Communication of the Mothers Brain with that of her Child is necessary or useful towards the Conformation of the Foetus For there is no such Communication between the Brain of a Hen and her Chickens and yet the Chickens are perfectly well form'd ANSWER I Answer that in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Book I have sufficiently demonstrated that Communication by the use I make of it to Explain the Generation of Monsters and certain Marks and Natural Apprehensions For it is evident that a Man who falls into a swoon at the sight of a snake because his Mother was frightned by one while she bore him can only have this Weakness because the Traces were formerly form'd in his Brain like unto those which open themselves when he sees a snake and that the said Traces have been attended with the like accident Therefore I guess not for I do not presume to determine wherein the said Communication does precisely consist I might say it proceeds from the Fibres which the Foetus shoots into the Mothers Womb and by the Nerves with which that part is probably fill'd And yet I should no more guess in this than a Man who never having seen the Machines of the * Samaritan Fountain upon Pont Neuf in Paris should affirm that there are Wheels and Pumps in it to draw up the Water However I am of opinion it is sometimes lawful to guess provided we do not pretend to set up for Prophets or speak with too much assurance I fancy Men may be allowed to say what they think provided they do not aim at Infalibility or injustly impose upon Mens Minds with a discisive behaviour or by the help of some Terms of Art We do not alwayes guess in saying things that are not seen and are contrary
credit to the testimony of our Senses or of some Men who dare speak to us as our Masters Experience whatever Men may say does not countenance Prejudices For our Senses as well as our Masters according to the Flesh are only occasional causes of the instruction which the Eternal Wisdom gives us in the most secret part of our Reason But whereas that Wisdom teaches us by an operation which is no wise sensible we fancy that it is our Eyes or the Worlds of those who strike the Air at our Ears which produce that Light or pronounce that intelligible Voice which instructs us 'T is for that Reason as I have said elsewhere that Jesus Christ was not only satisfied with instructing us after an intelligible manner by his Divinity he thought fit also to instruct us after a sensible one by his Humanity He would show us that he was our Master in all things And because we cannot easily look within our selves to consult him as Eternal Truth Immutable Order and Intelligible Light he has made Truth sensible by his Words Order lovely by his Example Light visible by a Body which diminishes the splendour of it and yet we are still so ingrateful so injust so stupid and sensless as to look not only upon other Men as our Masters contrary to his express prohibition but perhaps even upon the most despicable and vile Bodies SECOND OBJECTION The Soul being more perfect than Bodies why should it not contain that in it self which represents them Why should not the Idea of Extension be one of its Modifications God only acts in it and modifies it We grant it But why should it see Bodies in God if it can see them in its own substance It is not material it is true But God though a pure Spirit sees Bodies in himself Why then should not the Soul see them in beholding it self though it be Spiritual ANSWER Do we not see that there is this difference between God and the Soul of Man that God is an Unlimited Universal and Infinite Being and that the Soul is a particular Species of Being 'T is one of the Properties of Infinity to be at once one and all things composed as it were of an Infinity of Perfections and so simple that every Perfection it possesses includes all others without any real distinction for as every Divine Perfection is Infinite it constitutes the whole Divine Being But the Soul being a Limited Being it cannot have Extension in it self without becoming Material Therefore God includes in himself all Bodies after an intelligible manner He sees their Essences or Ideas in his Wisdom and their Existence in his Love or in his Will It is necessary to say so since God made Bodies and knows what he has made even before any thing was made But the Soul cannot see that within it self which it does not include Moreover it cannot clearly see that which it does include it can only feel it confusedly But to explain this The Soul does not include intelligible Extension as one of its manners of Being because Extension is not a manner of Being it is really a Being We conceive Extension alone or without thinking on any thing else but we cannot conceive manners of Being without perceiving the Subject or Being whereof they are the manners We perceive that Extension without thinking on our Mind besides we cannot conceive Extension can be a Modification of ones Mind Extension being limited makes some figure and the limits of the Mind cannot be figured Extension having parts may be divided at least in some sense and we see nothing in the Soul that is divisible Therefore Extension which we see is not a manner pf the Minds Being and therefore cannot see it in it self How is it possible to see in one kind of Being all sorts of Beings and in one particular and finite Being a Triangle in general and an infinite number of Triangles For in fine the Soul perceives a Triangle or a Circle in general though it implyes a contradiction that the Soul could have a Modification in general The Sensations of Colour which the Soul ascribes to Figures make them particular because none of the Modifications of a particular Being can be general Certainly we may affirm what we conceive clearly We clearly conceive that Extension which we see is a thing distinct from us Therefore we may say that Extension is no Modification of our Being and it is really something that is distinct from us For we must observe that the Sun for instance which we see is not that which we behold The Sun and whatever is in the material World is not visible in it self I have proved it elsewhere The Soul cannot see the Sun to which it is immediately united Now we clearly see and plainly feel that the Sun is something distinct from us Therefore we speak against our Knowledge and our Conscience when we say that the Soul sees all Bodies which surround it in its own Modifications Pleasure Pain Taste Heat Colour all our Sensations and Passions are Modifications of our Soul But though they are so do we know them clearly Can we compare Heat with Taste Odour with Colour Can we distinguish the affinity there is between Red and Green and even between Green and Green It is not so with Figures we compare them one with another we exactly know their proportions we precisely perceive that the Square of the Diagonal of a Square is double to that Square What affinity can there be between those intelligible Figures which are very clear Ideas and the Modifications of our Soul which are only confused Sensations And why should we pretend that those intelligible Figures cannot be perceived by the Soul unless they are Modifications of it since the Soul knows nothing of what happens to it by clear Ideas but only by Conscience or Internal Sensation as I have proved elsewhere and shall prove it again in the following Explanation If we could only see the Figure of Bodies in our selves they would on the contrary be unintelligible to us for we know not our selves We are only darkness to our selves and must look out of our selves to see our selves and we shall never know what we are until we consider our selves in him who is our Light and in whom all things become Light For it is only in God that the most material Beings are perfectly intelligible but out of him the most Spiritual Substances become absolutely invisible The Idea of Extension which we see in God is very clear But as we do not see the Idea of our Soul in God we feel indeed that we are and what we actually have But it is impossible for us to discover what we are or any of the Modifications whereof we are capable THIRD OBJECTION There is nothing in God that is moveable there is nothing in him that is Figured if there be a Sun in the intelligible World that Sun is always equal to it self and the visible Sun appears
that are but a little enlightened may sometimes destroy our Soul as unexpert Physicians may our Body As I don 't throughly explain the Rules which might be given in respect of the choice and use that should be made of Guides and Physicians I desire my Sentiments may be equitably interpreted and that it may not be imagined that I would hinder any from seeking necessary assistance from others I know that a particular Blessing attends our submission to the Opinions of the Wise and Understanding and I am willing to believe this General Rule Let us dye according to the received Laws of Phisics to the generality of Men they are safer than any other that I could establish for the Preservation of Life But because it is alwayes profitable to examine our selves and consult the Gospel to hearken to Jesus Christ whether he speaks immediately to our Mind and Heart or by Faith declares himself to our Ears or Eyes I believe I might say what I have said for our Guides themselves deceive us when they speak contrary to what Faith and Reason teach us And as it is to give Honour to God by believing his Works to have that which is necessary for their preservation I thought I should make Men sensible that the Machine of their Body is contrived after so admirable a manner that of it self it discovers more easily what is necessary for its Preservation than by Science or even the Experience of the most able Physicians AN EXPLANATION OF THE Third Chapter of the Fifth Book That Love is different from Peasure and Joy THE Mind commonly confounds things which are very different when they happen at the same time and are not contrary to one another Of which I have given many Instances in this Work because 't is therein that our Errors chiefly consist in respect to what passes in our selves As we have no clear Idea of what constitutes the Nature or Essence of our Mind nor of the Modifications it is capable of it often happens that we confound things absolutely different if they happen within us but at the same time since we easily confound what we do not know by a clear and distinct Idea It is not only impossible clearly to discover wherein the difference of such things consists as pass within us but it is also difficult to discern whether there is any difference between them For to effect this we must look into our selves not to consider what is voluntarily done in reference to Good and Evil but to make an abstracted Reflection upon our selves which cannot be performed without much Distraction and Pains We easily conceive that the Roundness of a Body is different from its Motion And although we know by Experience that a Bowl upon a Plane cannot be pushed without being moved and then Roundness and Motion are found together however we don't confound them one with the other because we know both Motion and Figure by very distinct and clear Ideas But 't is not so with Pleasure and Love for we commonly confound them Our Mind if we may so say becomes movable by Pleasure as a Ball does by its Roundness and because it is never without an impression towards good it is immediately put in motion towards the Object which causes or seems to cause this Pleasure So that this motion of Love happening to the Soul at the same time it feels this Pleasure it is enough to make it confound its Pleasure with its Love because it has not so clear an Idea either of its Pleasure or its Love as it has of Figure and Motion Wherefore some Persons will believe that Pleasure and Love are not different and that I distinguish too many things in each of our Passions But to make it plainly appear that Pleasure and Love are very different I shall distinguish two sorts of Pleasures one of which precedes Reason as agreeable Sensations which we commonly call Pleasures of the Body and the other sort neither precede Reason nor the Senses and are generally called the Pleasures of the Soul Such as Joy which is excited in us in consequence of a clear Knowledge or a confused Sensation which we have that some good is or will happen to us For instance A Man tasting of a Fruit which he knows not finds some Pleasure in eating it if this Fruit be good for his Nourishment This is a preventing Pleasure for since he feels it before he knows whether this Fruit is good or nor it is evident that this Pleasure prevents his Reason An Huntsman when hungry expecting or actually finding something to eat actually feels Joy Now this Joy is a Pleasure which follows the knowledge he has of his present or future good It is perhaps evident by this distinction of Pleasure into that which follows and precedes Reason that there is neither of them but differs from Love For that Pleasure which precedes Reason certainly precedes Love since it precedes all knowledge which in some degree or other is always supposed by Love And on the contrary Joy or Pleasure which supposes Knowledge also supposes Love since Joy supposes the confused Sensation or clear Knowledge that we do or shall possess what we love and if we possessed a thing we had no love for we should receive no Joy by it Thus Pleasure is very different from Love since the Pleasure which precedes Reason precedes and causes Love and the Pleasure which follows Reason necessarily supposes Love as an Effect supposes the Cause Otherwise if Pleasure and Love were the same thing there would never be Pleasure without Love nor Love without Pleasure for a thing cannot be without it self Yet a Christian loves his Enemy and a Child well educated loves his Father how unreasonable and unkind soever he may be The sight of their Duty the fear of God and love of Order and Justice makes them love not only without Pleasure but even with a kind of Horrour such Persons as are not agreeable to them I confess they sometimes feel Pleasure or Joy when they think they do their Duty or when they hope to be recompensed according to their Merit But besides that this Pleasure visibly differs very much from the Love they have to their Father or Enemy although it be perhaps the Motive of it it often happens that 't is not even this Motive which makes them act it is sometimes only an abstracted view of Order or notion of Fear which preserves their Love We may even in one sense say they have a Love for these Persons at the time they think not of them For Love remains in us during the diversions of our thoughts and whilst we sleep but Pleasure seems to me to subsist no longer in the Soul than whilst it is sensible of it Thus Love or Charity remaining in us without Pleasure or Delight it cannot be maintained that Pleasure and Love is the same thing As Pleasure and Pain are two direct contraries If Pleasure were the same thing with Love
Pain would not differ from Hatred Now it is evident that Pain is different from Hatred since Pain often subsists without Hatred A Man for instance who is hurt without observing it suffers a real and cutting Pain but is free from Hatred for he does not so much as know the Cause of his Pain or Object of his Hatred or rather the Cause of his Pain not being worthy of Hatred it cannot excite it in him Thus he hates not this Cause of his Pain although his Pain inclines him to or disposes him to hate it It is true this Man hates his Pain for Pain deserves Hatred but the hatred of Pain is not Pain but only supposes it The hatred of Pain is not worthy of Hatred as Pain On the contrary 't is very agreeable for we please our selves in hating Pain as we are displeased in suffering it Pain therefore is not Hatred nor is Pleasure which is opposite to Pain Love which is opposite to Hatred Consequently the Pleasure which precedes Reason is not the same thing as Love And I likewise prove that the Joy or Pleasure which follows Reason is also distinct from Love As Joy and Sorrow are directly opposite If Joy was the same thing as Love Sorrow would not differ from Hatred But it is plain that Sorrow is different from Hatred for Sorrow sometimes subsists without Hatred For instance A Man finds himself by chance deprived of such things as he has need of This is enough to cause Sorrow but it cannot excite Hatred in him either because he knows not the Cause which deprived him of these necessaries or else that this Cause not being worthy of his Hatred it could not stir it up in him It is true this Man hates the privation or the good that he loves but it is plain that this kind of Hatred is properly Love For he hates the privation of good only because he loves the good And since to fly the privation of good is to incline towards good it is evident that the motion of this Mans Hatred differs not from that of his Love Thus his Hatred if he 's possest of any not being contrary to his Love and Sorrow being always opposite to Joy it is plain that his Sorrow is not his Hatred consequently Joy differs from Love In fine it is manifest when we are sorrowful 't is because of the presence of something we hate or rather the absence of something we love Thus Sorrow supposes Hatred or rather Love but is very different from both these things I very well know St. Austin affirms that Pain is an a version which the Soul conceives because the Body is not disposed after such a manner as it wishes and that he often confounds Delectation with Charity Pleasure with Joy Pain with Sorrow Pleasure and Joy with Love Pain and Sorrow with Aversion or Hatred But 't is very probable that this Holy Doctor spoke all this according to the general Language amongst the common sort of Men who confound the greatest part of those things which pass within them at the same time Or it may be he had not examined these things after a very exact and Philosophical manner However I believe I may and ought to say that it appear'd requisite to me exactly to distinguish these things if we would clearly and without equivocation explain many Questions which St. Austin has treated on For even those who have contrary Opinions amongst themselves have been accustomed to maintain them from the Authority of this great Man because of the different Sense his Expressions may be taken in which is not alwayes exact enough to reconcile such Persons who perhaps have more mind to dispute than agree A N EXPLANATION OF THE Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book Concerning the Efficacy attributed to Second Causes EVer since the Fall the Mind of Man is continually imployed upon External Objects he even forgets himself and him who penetrates and inlightens him and suffers himself after such a manner to be seduced by his own and the Bodies about him that he expects in them to find his Perfection and Happiness He who alone is capable of acting in it now hides himself from our Eyes nor are his Operations performed after a sensible manner and although he produces and preserves all Beings the Mind which eagerly seeks the Cause of all things finds much difficulty to discover him although it meets with him every moment Some Philosophers have chose rather to imagine a Nature and certain Faculties as the Causes of those Effects we call Natural than to give God all the Honour which is due to his Power And although they have no Proof nor so much as a clear Idea of this Nature and these Faculties as I hope I have shown they choose rather to speak without knowing what they say and to respect a Power purely imaginary than to make any endeavour to discover the hand of him who performs whatever is done in all things I cannot forbear believing that one of the most deplorable consequences of Original Sin is our having no more gust nor sensation for God or that we perceive him not or meet him but with a kind of horrour and fright We ought to acknowledge God in all things be sensible of his Strength and Power in all Natural Effects admire his Wisdom in the marvellous Order of the Creatures and in a word adore fear and love only him in all his Works But there is now a secret opposition between Man and God Man finding himself a Sinner hides himself flyes the Light is apprehensive of meeting God and chooses rather to imagine in the Bodies which are about him a Power or blind Nature which he can make familiar to himself than to meet there the terrible Power of a Holy and Just God who knows and performs all things I confess there are many persons who by a different Principle than that of the Heathen Philosophers pursue their Opinion about Nature and Second Causes But I hope we shall discover by the consequence of this Discourse that they are of this Opinion only through a received prejudice which it is almost impossible to deliver themselves from without the assistance that may be drawn from the Principles of a Philosophy which has not alwayes been sufficiently known For it is probably this which has hindered them from declaring in favour of an Opinion which I have thought my Duty to maintain There are many Reasons which keep me from ascribing to Second or Natural Causes a strength power or efficacy to produce any thing whatever but the chief is because I cannot even conceive this Opinion What endeavours soever I make to comprehend it I cannot find in my self an Idea which represents to me what this Strength or Power can be which they attribute to Creatures And I believe that I should not make a rash Judgment if I affirm that those who maintain that Creatures have in themselves this Strength and Power
advance what they do not clearly conceive For if the Heathen Philosophers had a clear conception that Second Causes have a true Power to act and produce their like being a Man as well as they and with them partaking of the soveraign Reason I might probably discover the Idea which represented the Power to them but what efforts soever I make I can find no Strength Efficacy or Power but in the Will of the infinitely perfect Being Moreover when I think of the different Opinions of Philosophers upon this Subject I cannot doubt of what I advance For if they clearly saw what this Power of the Creatures is or what there is in them that is really powerful they would not differ in their Opinion about it When persons cannot agree and having no interested Reason which hinders them from it 't is a certain mark they have no clear Idea of what they say and that they understand not one another chiefly if they dispute upon such Subjects as are not complext or difficult to be discust like this Question before us For we should find no hard matter to resolve it if persons had but a clear Idea of a Created Power These are therefore some of their Opinions whereby we may see how little they agree amongst themselves For the most extraordinary of these Opinions see Suarez Metaph Disp 18. Sect. 2. Assert 2 3. Scot. in 4. sent dist 12.1 D. 37.2 D. 17. Paludan in 4. sent D. 12. Q. 1. Art 1. Peter 8. Phys Ch. 3. Conimb upon Aristotles Phys and many others which Suarez cites Some Philosophers here affirmed that Second Causes act by their Matter Figure and Motion and these in one Sense are in the right Others by a substantial Form Many by Accidents or Qualities Some by Matter and Form Others by Form and Accidents And some again by certain Vertues or distinct Faculties from all this There are others amongst them who maintain that Substantial Forms produce Forms and Accidental Forms Accidents Others that Forms produce both Forms and Accidents And some again that Accidents alone are capable of producing Accidents and Forms too See the Metaph. of Fonseca qu. 13. sect 3. That of Socin and Javell upon the same Question But we must not imagine that those for instance who say that Accidents can produce Forms by vertue of what they have received from the Form they are joyn'd to mean the same thing Some of them will have it that these Accidents themselves are only the Power or Vertue of the Substantial Form Others that they receive into themselves the influence of the Form and so act only by vertue of it And in fine some of them will only have them to be Instrumental Causes But these last are not perfectly agreed amongst themselves either what must be understood by Instrumental Cause or what is the vertue they receive from the Principal Cause The Philosophers don't so much as agree upon the action whereby Second Causes produce their Effects Some amongst them pretend that Causality ought not to be produced since that produces it self Others will have it that they act truly by their own action but find great difficulties in explaining precisely what this action is and there are about this so many different Opinions that I shall omit the reciting them Here is a great variety of different Sentiments although I have not related those of the Antient Philosophers or of such as were born in very remote Countries But we have reason enough to judge that they are not perfectly agreed amongst themselves upon the Subject of Second Causes no more than those we have already mentioned Avicen for instance thought Corporeal Substances could produce nothing but Accidents And this is his Hypothesis as Ruvio relates it He supposed that God immediately produced a most perfect Spiritual Substance and that this produced another less perfect and that a third and so on to the last which produced all Corporeal Substances and these Corporeal Substances Accidents But Avicembrom who could not apprehend how Corporeal Substances Ruvio l. 2. ph tract 4. qu. 2. which cannot penetrate one another should be capable of Alteration would have it that there were Spirits which were capable of acting on Bodies because they only could penetrate them For these Gentlemen not admitting a Void nor the Atoms of Democritus and the Subtil Matter of D' Cartes was unknown to them they could not think with Gassendus and the Cartesians That there were Bodies small enough to enter into the Pores of those which appear'd the most Hard and Solid It seems to me that this diversity of Opinions gives us a Right to judge That Men often spoke such Things as they did not understand and that the Power of the Creatures being a pure Fiction of the Mind of which we have no Natural Idea each Person imagined it what he pleased It is true in all Ages this Power was acknowledged as Real and True by most Men But it is as certain it was without any Proof I do not say Demonstration but even without such a Proof as was able to make any impression upon an Attentive Mind For the Confused Arguments which are maintained only upon the deceitful Testimony of the Senses and Imagination ought not to be received by those who make use of their Reason Aristotle speaking of what they call Nature sayes It is ridiculous to endeavour to prove That Natural Bodies have an Inward Principle of their own Motion and Rest Because sayes he it is self-evident He doubts not also but a Bowl which hits another has power to put it in motion It appears so to the Eyes and that 's enough for him for he commonly follows the Testimony of the Senses and rarely that of Reason never troubling himself whether it be intelligible or not Those who oppose the Opinion of some Divines that have writ against Second Causes say with Aristotle That the Senses convince us of their Efficacy This is their First and Principal Proof It is evident say they See Fonseca Ruvio Suarez and the rest already cited that Fire burns the Sun shines Water cools and he must be a Fool that doubts it The Authours of the contrary Opinion says the Great Averrors had their Brains disturbed We must say almost all the Peripatetics use Sensible Proofs to convince those who deny this Efficacy and so oblige them to confess They may be moved and hurt by Second Causes It is the Judgment which Aristotle has already pronounced against them and it ought to be executed But this pretended Demonstration cannot but produce pitty L. of his Topi. ch 1. since it discovers the Weakness of the Humane Mind and that even Philosophers themselves are infinitely more Sensible than Rational It discovers that those who glory in the Enquiry after Truth do not themselves know who they ought to consult to learn any thing of it Whether 't is the Soveraign Reason which never deceives them but always speaks Things as they
are in themselves or the Body which speaks only out of interest and in relation either to the preservation or conveniency of Life For in fine What Prejudices will not be justified if we take the Senses for Judges to whom almost all Prejudices owe their birth As I have already shewn in the Search after Truth When I see one Bowle hit another my Eyes tell me or seem to tell me that it is truly the Cause of the Motion it impresses For the true Cause which moves Bodies does not appear to my Eyes Bur when I ask my Reason I see evidently that Bodies cannot move themselves and their Moving power depending only upon the Will of God which successively preserves them in different places they cannot communicate a power which they have not nor could communicate if they had it For 't is plain there is a Wisdom requisite and one that is infinite too to regulate the Communication of Motions with the exactness proportion and uniformity that we see A Body moved cannot know the infinite number of Bodies it meets at every moment It is farther clear That although we should even suppose knowledge in it it could not have enough to regulate in the instant of the Shock the distribution of the Moving power it self is carried with If I open but my Eyes it appears plain to me that the Sun is very gloriously bright and seems not only to be visible it self but makes all the World so too 'T is that which covers the Earth with Flowers and Fruits which gives Life to Animals and which by its Heat penetrates into the very Bowels of the Earth and produces Stones Marbles and Metals there But when I consult Reason I see nothing of all this and if I consult it faithfully I clearly discover that my Senses seduce me and that it is God who performs all in all Things For knowing that whatever changes happen in the Body they have no other principle but the different communication of Motion which occur in visible or invisible Bodies I see that it is God who does all Things since it is his Will which Causes and his Wisdom which Regulates all these Communications I suppose that Local Motion is the principle of Generations Corruptions Alterations and generally of all the Changes which happen in the Body which is an Opinion that is now sufficiently received amongst the Learned But whatever Opinion they have about it signifies little for it seems much more easie to conceive that a Body drives another when it meets it than to apprehend how Fire produces Heat and Light and draw from the power of Matter a Substance which was not there before And if it be necessary to acknowledge That God is the True Cause of the different Communications of Motions by a much stronger Reason we ought to conclude That none but he can Create and Annihilate Real Qualities and Substantial Forms I say Create and Annihilate because at least it seems as difficult to me to draw from Matter a Substance which was not in it or to cause it to re-enter again as to Create or Annihilate it But I shall not stand upon Terms I only make use of them because there is no other which I know of that clearly and without Equivocation express the Changes which the Philosophers suppose every Moment to happen through the power of Second Causes I had some difficulty here to relate the other Proofs which they commonly give for the Power and Efficacy of Natural Causes for they appear so weak to those who are able to resist Prejudices and prefer their Reason to their Senses that it does not seem likely that reasonable Men should be perswaded by them Yet I will produce and Answer them since there are many Philosophers who make use of them The first Proof If Second Causes do effect nothing we could not says Suarez In his Metaph. Disp 18. Sect. 1. Assert 1. In Metaph. Arist qu. 7. Sect. 2. Fonseca and some others distinguish Animate from Inanimate Things for neither of them would have an inward principle of their Actions ANSWER I Answer That Men would have the same Sensible Proofs that have convinced them of the distinction they put between Animate and Inanimate Things They would alwayes see Animals perform Certain Actions as Eating Growing Crying Running Leaping c. Nor would they observe any thing like this in Stones And it is this only which makes the common Philosophers believe that Beasts live and Stones do not for it must not be imagined that they know by a clear and distinct View of the Mind what the Life of a Dog is It is their Senses which regulate their Decisions upon this Question If it were necessary I could here prove That the Principal of a Dog's Life differs very little if at all from that of the Motion of a Watch. For the Life of Bodies whatever they be can only consist in the motion of their parts and it is not difficult to judge that the same Subtil Matter which in a Dog causes the Fermentation of the Blood and Animal Spirits and is the principle of his Life is not more perfect than that which gives Motion to the Springs of a Watch or causes Gravitation in the Weights of a Clock which is the principle of their Life or to speak as others do of their Motion The Peripatetics ought to give to those whom they stile Cartesians a clear Idea of what they call The Life of Beasts Corporeal Soul Body which perceives desires sees feels wills and afterwards we will clearly resolve their difficulties if they continue to propose them The Second Proof We could not discover the Differences nor Powers of the Elements So that Fire might cool as Water does and the Nature of nothing would be settled and fixed ANSWER I Answer That Nature continuing as it is that is whilst the Laws of the communication of Motions remain constantly the same it is a contradiction that Fire should not burn or not separate the parts of certain Bodies Fire cannot cool like Water except it becomes Water For Fire being only fewel whose parts have been agitated with a violent Motion by an invisible Matter which incompasses them as is easie to be demonstrated it is impossible these parts should not communicate some of their Motion to the Bodies which they meet Now as these Laws are constant the Nature of Fire its vertues and qualities cannot change But this Nature and these Vertues are only consequences of the general and efficacious Will of God who does all in all things as we learn from the Scripture So that the study of Nature is false and vain in every respect when we seek for any other true Causes than the Will of the ALMIGHTY I own we must not have recourse to God or the Universal Cause when we inquire into the reason of particular Effects For we should make our selves ridiculous if for instance we said that 't was God who dryes the wayes or
Bodies although it appears incomprehensible how could we conceive that the Soul could move the Body The Arm for Instance is only moved by means of the dilatation or contraction of some of the Muscles which compose it And that the Motion which the Soul impresses on the Spirits that are in the Brain may be communicated to those in the Nerves and these to others which are in the Muscles of the Arms it 's requisite that the Determinations of the Soul should be multiplied or changed in proportion to the almost infinite Occurrences or Shocks which would be made by the little Bodies which constitute the Spirits But this cannot be conceived without admitting in the Soul an infinite number of Wills at the least Motion of the Body since to move it an infinite number of communications of Motions are necessary For the Soul being but a particular Cause and which cannot exactly know either the greatness or number of an infinite Variety of little Bodies which mutually strike each other when the Spirits are dispersed into the Muscles it could neither establish a general Law for the communication of the Motions of these Spirits nor exactly follow it if it were established So that it is plain the Soul could not move its Arm although it had the power of determining the Motion of the Animal Spirits These Things are too clear for us to stand any longer upon them It is the same thing with our Faculty of Thinking By inward sensation we know that we would think on something and make some effort to that end and that in the instant of our Desire and Endeavour the Idea of this Thing presents it self to the Mind But we do not discover by inward sensation that our Will or Endeavour produces our Idea nor does Reason tell us it can do it It is through Prejudice that we are perswaded that our Desires cause our Ideas whilst we prove an hundred times a day that the latter follows or attends the former As God and his Operations have nothing sensible in them and as we do not feel any thing else but our Desires which precede the presence of our Ideas we think there can be no other Cause of them But if we observe the Matter more closely we shall discover we have no power in our selves to produce them For neither Reason nor the inward sensation we have of our selves give us any information of it I do not think I am obliged to relate all the other Proofs that are made use of by these Defenders of the Efficacy of Second Causes because they appear so weak that it might be imagined I only intended to render them ridiculous and if I should answer them seriously I should become ridiculous my self An Author for Instance asserts very seriously in favour of his Opinion That Created Beings are True Material Formal Final Causes and why then should they not also be Efficient or Efficacious Causes I believe I should not very well satisfie the World if in Answer to the Demand of this Author I should stay to explain so gross an Equivocation and show the difference between an Efficacious Cause and that which some Philosophers have been pleased to call a Material one So that I shall omit some of the like Proofs to come to those they have taken from the Holy Scripture The Seventh Proof Those who maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes commonly bring the following passages to support their Opinion Let the Earth bring forth Grass Gen. 1. Let the Waters bring forth the moving Creatures that hath life and Fowl that may fly c. Therefore the Earth and the Water have from the Word of God received Power to produce Plants and Animals After which God commands the Fowls and the Fish to multiply Be fruitful and multiply and fill the Waters in the Seas and let Fowl multiply in the Earth Therefore he has given them Power to beget their like JESVS CHRIST in the Fourth Chapter of St. Mark sayes That the Seed which falls on good ground shall bring forth an hundred fold and that the Earth bringeth forth fruits of her self first the blade then the ear and afterwards the full corn Lastly it is also written in the Book of Wisdom That the Fire had as it were forgotten the Power it had of burning in favour of the People of God 'T is therefore confirmed by the Old and New Testament that Second Causes have a Power to act ANSWER I Answer That in the Holy Scripture there is also many passages which attribute to God the pretended Efficacy of Second Causes of which these are some Ego sum Dominus faciens OMNIA extendens Coelos SOLVS stabiliens terram NVLLVS mecum Isa 44.24 Manus tuae fecerunt me plasmaverunt me TOTVM in circuitu Job 10.8 Nescio qualiter in utero meo apparuistis singulorum membra NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI sed enim Mundi Creator qui hominis formavit nativitatem c. Mac. l. 2. c. 7.22 23. Cum ipse DEVS dat omnibus vitam inspirationem omnia Acts 17.25 Producens foenum jumentis herbam servituti hominum ut educas panem de terrâ Psal 103. 48. There is an infinite number of the like passages but these may suffice When an Author seems to contradict himself and Natural Equity or some stronger Reason obliges us to reconcile him to himself It seems to me that we have an infallible Rule to discover his true Opinion since we need but observe when he speaks according to his own Understanding and when in compliance with the common Opinion When a Man speaks like the rest of the World it is not alwayes a certain sign he is of their Opinion But when he speaks positively contrary to what we are accustomed to say although he should say it but once we have a great deal of Reason to believe 't is what he thinks provided we know he speaks seriously and having first well considered it For instance An Author speaking of the Properties of Animals if he should in an hundred places say that Beasts feel that Dogs know their Master love and fear him and should only in two or three places say Beasts are insensible and Dogs uncapable of knowing loving or fearing any thing How shall we reconcile this Author who appears to contradict himself Must we not collect all the passages for and against it and judge of his Opinion by the greatest number If so I don't believe there is any Man to whom for example we may attribute this Opinion that Animals have no Souls For the Cartesians themselves often say that a Dog feels when he is beaten and 't is very rarely that they deny him feeling And although I have incountered an infinite number of prejudices in this Book we may draw many passages from thence whereby if this Rule I have explained be received we may prove that I have established them all and even that I hold the Opinion of the Efficacy of
Second Causes which I have just now Refuted Or perhaps it might be concluded That The Search after Truth is a Book full of visible and gross Contradictions as some Persons do who it may be have not equity or penetration enough to make them fit Judges of the Works of others The Holy Scripture the Fathers and most good Men oftener speak of sensible Goods Riches and Honours according to the common Opinion than according to the true Ideas they have of them JESVS CHRIST introduces Abraham speaking to the wicked Rich Man Fili recepisti BONA in vita tua Thou hast received thy good things in thy life time that is Riches Honours What we through prejudice call good our good that is our Gold or our Silver is in an hundred places in the Scripture called our Maintenance or our Substance and even our Honesty or that which honours us Pawpertas honestas á Deo sunt But must this manner of speaking used by the Holy Scripture Eccl. 11.14 and most Pious Persons make us think they contradict themselves or that they look upon Riches and Honours as real goods and that therefore we ought to love and seek after them No without doubt because these wayes of speaking complying with prejudices signifie nothing And we see in other places JESVS CHRIST has compared Riches to Thorns has told us we must renounce them because they are deceitful and that whatsoever is great and alluring in this World is an abomination before God We must not therefore collect the passages of Scripture or of the Fathers to judge of their Opinion by the greatest number of them except we would continually attribute the most unreasonable prejudices to them This once supposed Matth. 6.28 29 30. we see that the Holy Scripture positively sayes That 't is God who has Created every thing even the grass of the field That 't is he who cloaths the Lillies with such ornaments as our SAVIOVR prefers before the Glory of Solomon There is not only two or three but an infinite number of passages which ascribe to God the pretended Efficacy of Second Causes and which destroy the Nature of the Peripatetics Besides we are carried by a kind of Natural Prejudice not to think on God in common Effects and to attribute Power and Efficacy to Natural Causes and seldom any thing but Miracles induce us to think on him as the Author of them And the sensible impression ingages us in favour of Second Causes Philosophers hold this Opinion because say they the Senses convince us of it and this is their strongest Proof Lastly This Opinion is received by all those who follow the Judgments of the Senses Our common Language is formed from this prejudice and we as generally say that Fire has a power to burn as we call Gold and Silver our good Therefore the passages drawn from the Holy Scriptures or the Fathers for the Efficacy of Second Causes prove no more than those that an Ambitious or Covetous Man shall choose to justifie his own Conduct But 't is quite different with those passages we may bring to prove that God does all things For this Opinion being contrary to Prejudice these passages must be understood in their utmost rigour for the same Reason that we ought to believe that 't is the Sentiments of the Cartesians that Beasts are insensible although they have said it but two or three times and continually say to the contrary in all familiar Discourses affirming they feel see and understand In the First Chapter of Genesis God commands the Earth to produce Plants and Animals and likewise the Waters to bring forth Fish And consequently sayes the Peripatetics Water and Earth have received a Power capable of producing these Effects I don't see the certainty of this Conclusion And although we were even obliged to explain this Chapter by it self without having any recourse to other passages of Scripture there would be no necessity to receive this consequence This way of explaining the Creation is accommodated to our conception of things therefore 't is not necessary to take it literally nor ought we to make use of it to maintain Prejudices As Animals and Plants are upon the Earth Fowls live in the Air and Fish in the Water so God to make us apprehend 't is by his Order they are in these places has produced them there 'T is from the Earth that he formed Animals and Plants not that the Earth was capable of generating them or that God to that end gave it a Power or Vertue which it still keeps for we all agree that the Earth does not produce Horses or Oxen but because from the Earth the Bodies of these Animals were formed as is declared in the following Chapter Formatis igitur Dominus Deus de humo cunctis animantibus Terrae Ver. 19. universis volatilibus Coeli Animals were formed out of the Earth formatis de humo and not produced by the Earth Also after Moses has related how Beasts and Fish were produced by vertue of the Command which God gave the Earth and Water to produce them he adds that 't was God himself who made them that we might not attribute their production to the Earth and Water CREAVIT quae DEVS cete grandia omnem animam viventem atque notabilem quam PRODVXERVNT aquae in species suas omne volatile secundùm genus suum And a little lower after having spoken of the formation of Animals he adds Et FECIT DEVS bestias terrae juxta species suas jumenta omne reptile terrae in genere suo We may observe by the by that where the Vulgar reads it Producant aquae reptile animae viventis volatile super terram the Hebrew has it Volatile VOLITET For as it clearly appears by the passage I related from the Second Chapter this word omitted shows that Fowls were not produced from the Water and that the design of Moses is not here to prove that the Waters had received a true Power to bring forth Fish and Fowl but only to denote the place design'd for each by the Order of God whether to live or be produced in And volatile VOLITET super terram For commonly when we say that the Earth produces Trees and Plants we only design to show that it supplyed them with the Water and Salt which is necessary for their Germination and Growth But I will stay no longer to explain the other passages of Scripture which literally taken favour Second Causes for we are not obliged Besides 't would be very dangerous to understand such expressions literally as are maintained upon common Opinions agreeably to which the Language is formed the Vulgar speaking every thing according to the impression of the Senses and prejudices of Infancy The same Reason which obliges us to take such passages of the Scripture in the Letter as are directly opposite to Prejudices still gives us just cause to believe that the Fathers never
designed either to maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes or the Nature of Aristotle For although they often spoke after such a manner as favoured Prejudices and the Judgments of the Senses Omnia quippe portenta contra Naturam dicimus esse sed non sunt quomodo enim est contra Naturam quod Dei fit voluntate Cum volantes tanti utique conditorio conditae rei cujusque Natura sit Portentum ergo fit non contra Naturam sed contra quam est nota Natura St. Aug. de Civitate Dei l. 21. c. 8. they sometimes so explained themselves as sufficiently discovered the disposition of their Mind and Heart St. Austin for instance believed the Will of God to be the Power or Nature of every thing as he declares when he speaks thus We are wont to say that Prodigies are against Nature but 't is not true For the Will of the Creator being the Nature of all Creatures how can what is performed by the Will of God be contrary to Nature Miracles or Prodigies therefore are not against Nature but only against what we know of Nature 'T is true St. Austin speaks in many places according to Prejudices But I affirm that proves nothing since we ought to explain literally only such passages as are opposite to Prejudices for the Reasons I have already given If St. Austin in all his Works had never said any thing against the Efficacy of Second Causes but had alwayes favoured this Opinion we might perhaps make use of his Authority to establish it Yet if it does not appear that he ever seriously examined this Question we should alwayes have had Reason to think that his Judgment was not determined upon this Subject and that 't was not impossible but he might be drawn by the impression of his Senses without Reflection to have believed a thing which appeared undoubted until it was carefully examined It is certain for instance that St. Austin alwayes spoke of Beasts as if they had a Soul I don't say a Corporeal one for that Holy Father too well knew the distinction between the Soul and Body to believe there were Corporeal Souls I say a Spiritual Soul for Matter is incapable of Sensation Yet I believe it more reasonable to make use of his Authority to prove that Beasts have no Souls than to prove they have any For from the Principles he has carefully examined and strongly establish'd it manifestly follows they have none Some of St. Austins Principles are these That what has not sinned can never suffer evil Now according to him Pain is the greatest evil and Beasts suffer it That the most noble cannot have the least noble for its end But with him the Soul of Beasts is Spiritual and more noble than the Body and yet has no other end than the Body That what is Spiritual is Immortal and the Soul of Beasts that 's Spiritual is subject to Death There are many such like Principles in the Works of St. Austin from whence it may be concluded that Beasts have no such Spiritual Soul as he admits in them See c. 22 23. de Anima ejus origine as is shown by Ambrose Victor in his Sixth Volume of Christian Philosophy But the Sentiment that Beasts have a Soul or feel Pain when they are beaten being agreeable to Prejudices for there 's no Child who does not believe it we have alwayes reason to think that St. Austin speaks upon this matter according to the general Opinion and never seriously examined the Question and that if he had but begun to doubt and make any reflection upon it he would not have said a thing which is so contrary to his Principles Thus although the Fathers should alwayes have favoured the Efficacy of Second Causes perhaps we should not have been obliged to have had any regard to their Opinion if it had appeared that they had not carefully examined the matter And that what they should have said had been only a Consequence of the Language which is formed and established upon Prejudice But 't is certainly the contrary For the Fathers the most Pious Persons and those who have been best instructed in Religion have commonly snown by some places of their Works what was the disposition of theis Mind and Heart in respect to this matter The most Learned and also the greatest number of Divines seeing on one side that the Holy Scripture was contrary to the Efficacy of Second Causes and on the other that the impression of the Causes publick Laws and chiefly the Philosophy of Aristotle established it For Aristotle thought that God did not concern himself in Sublunary Affairs because it was unworthy his grandeur And that Nature which he supposed in all Bodies was sufficient to produce what happened here below The Divines I say have found this Medium to reconcile Faith with the Heathen Philosophy and Reason with the Senses that Second Causes do nothing except God concurs with them But because this immediate concourse whereby God acts with Second Causes includes great difficulties some Philosophers have rejected it pretending that in order to their acting 't was enough if God preserved them with the same vertue he at first created them And because this Opinion is absolutely conformable to Prejudice and because the operation of God in Second Causes is not sensible it is therefore commonly received by the Vulgar and by those who apply themselves more to the Physicks of the Antients than to Divinity and the Meditation of the Truth The generality of the World believe that God at first Created all things and gave them all the necessary qualities or faculties for their preservation That he has for instance given the first Motions to Matter and afterwards left it to it self to produce by the Communication of its Motions this variety of admirable forms We commonly suppose that Bodies can move one another and even attribute this Opinion to Des Cartes although he expresly speaks against it in the 36th and 37th Articles of the Second Part of his Philosophical Principles Though Man cannot hinder himself from acknowledging that the Creatures depend upon God yet he lessens this dependence as much as possible either through a secret aversion to God or a wretched stupidity and insensibility in respect to his operation But as this Sentiment is chiefly received by those who have not much studied Religion and who often rather follow their Senses and the Authority of Aristotle than their Reason and that of the Holy Scriptures we have not so much reason to fear its establishment in the Minds of those who have any love for Truth and Religion For a little Application in the Examination of this Opinion will easily discover its falsity But that Notion of the immediate concourse of God to each action of Second Causes seems to agree with those passages of Scripture which often attribute the same effect both to God and the Creatures We must consider then that there are
places in Scripture where God is only said to act Ego sum Dominus sayes Isaiah faciens OMNIA extendens Coelos SOLVS stabiliens terram chap. 44.24 NVLLVS mecum A Mother animated with the Spirit of God sayes to her Children that it was not she who formed them Nescio qualiter in utero meo aparuistis singulorum membra NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI Mac. 7.22 23. sed Mundi Creator c. She does not say with Aristotle and the Peripatetic Schools that 't was she and the Sun who gave them birth but the Creator of the Vniverse Now this Opinion that 't is God only who works and forms Children in the Womb is neither conformable to Prejudices or the common Notions Therefore according to the Principle I have before established these passages must be explain'd literally But on the contrary the Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Causes being conformable to the common Notion and impression of the Senses Sol homo generant hominem Arist Phys ausc l. 2. c. 2. See St. Th. upon this Text. although we should find such passages as expresly tell us that Second Causes act of themselves alone they would be of no force when compared with these Concourse therefore is not sufficient to reconcile the different passages of the Scripture and all Force Power and Efficacy must be ascribed to God But although the immediate concourse of God with Second Causes should be proper to reconcile these different Texts I know not whether it ought to be admitted after all For the Sacred Books were not made for the Divines of these times but for the Jews So that if the Jews were not formerly sufficiently inlightened or subtle enough to imagine such a concourse as is admitted in our School-Divinity and to reconcile a thing that the most able Divines have had much trouble to explain it follows methinks that the Holy Scripture which attributed to God and to him only the production and preservation of all things would have thrown them into Error and that the Holy Penmen of these Books would have spoke to Men not only in an unknown but deceitful Language For by telling them that God does all things they would only have intended that God gives his concourse to all things and 't is probable the Jews never so much as thought of this concourse those amongst them that were not great Philosophers believing that God did all things and not that he concurred to all But that we may make a more certain Judgment about this Concourse it would be very proper carefully to explain the different Hypotheses of the Schools about it For besides the impenetrable obscurities which are common to all Opinions that we can explain or maintain only upon rambling and indeterminate terms there are upon this matter so great a variety of Opinions that it would not be very difficult to discover the cause of them But I will not ingage in a discussion which will be too tiresom both for my self and the greatest part of those who will read this Book I rather choose on the contrary to endeavour to show that my Opinions may in some respect be reconciled to the greatest number of the School Divines although I must not dissemble but confess their Language appears very equivocal and confused to me I will explain my self I believe as I have already said elsewhere that Bodies for instance have no power to move themselves and that their Moving Power is only the action of God Or to avoid a term which signifies nothing distinct their Moving Power is only the Will of God alwayes necessarily efficacious which successively preserves them in different places For I don't believe that God creates certain Beings to make them the Moving Power of Bodies Not only because I have no Idea of this kind of Being nor see how they could move Bodies but also since these Beings would themselves have need of some others to move them and so on ad infinitum For none but God is truly immovable and sole Mover together Which being supposed when a Body strikes and moves another I may say that it acts by the Concourse of God and that this Concourse is not distinct from its own action For a Body moves another which it meets only by its Action or Moving Power which at the bottom is nothing but the Will of God that successively preserves this Body in many places The transferring of a Body not being its Action or Moving Power but the effect of its Moving Power Most Divines likewise say That the Action of Second Causes differs not from the Action whereby God concurs with them For although they understand it variously they suppose that God acts in the Greatures in the same Action with the Creatures And they are it seems obliged to speak thus For if the Creatures acted by an Action which God did not produce in them their Action considered as such would as it appears to me be independant Now they believed as they ought that the Creatures depended immediately upon God not only as to their Being but also as to their Operation So in respect to Free Causes I believe that God continually gave the Mind an impression towards Good in general and that he also determined this impression towards particular Goods by the Ideas or Sensations he has given us as I have shewn in the First Explanation And 't is the same Thing with what the Divines believe when they say That God moves and prevents our Wills So that the power which puts our Minds in motion is the Will of God which animates and inclines us towards Good For God created not Beings to make them the Moving power of Minds for the same Reason that he did not create any to make them the Moving power of Bodies The Wills of God being Efficacious of themselves it is enough for him to Will a Thing to have it done And it is useless unnecessarily to multiply Beings Besides whatever is real in the determinations of our Motions likewise proceeds from the Action of God in us as is clear from the First Explanation Now we neither Act or produce any Thing but by our Wills I mean by the impression of the Will of God which is our Moving power For our Wills are Efficacious no farther than as they proceed from God even as Bodies put in motion impell not others but in as much as they have a Moving power which transfer them and this Moving power is only the Will of God which creates or successively preserves them in different places Then we Act only by the Concourse of God and our Action considered as Efficacious and capable of producing any Effect differs not from that of God's And is as most Divines say the very same Action Eadem numero Actio Now all the Changes which happen in the World See Suarez l. 1. de concursu Dei cum voluntate c. 1. have no other Natural Cause than the Motion of Bodies and
of But that we may the more easily discover them it is requisite to read Descartes's Principles carefully without receiving any thing he says except when the Force and Evidence of his Reasons permit us not to doubt of it As Morality is the most necessary of all Sciences we must also study it very carefully for 't is chiefly in that Science that 't is dangerous to follow the Opinions of Men But that we may not deceive our selves in it but preserve Evidence in our Perceptions we must only meditate upon undoubted Principles such as are confessed by all those whose Minds are not blinded with Pride for there is no undoubted Principle of Morality for Spirits of Flesh and Blood and such as aspire to the Quality of great Wits These sort of Men comprehend not the most simple Truths or if they comprehend them at least they always dispute them through a Spirit of Contradiction and to preserve such a Reputation Some of these most general Principles of Morality are That God having made all things for himself he has created our Minds to know and our Hearts to love him That being also as Just and Powerful as he is we cannot be Happy if we do not follow his Orders nor Unhappy if we do That our Nature is Corrupt that our Minds depend upon our Bodies our Reason upon our Senses and our Wills upon our Passions That we are uncapable to do what we see clearly to be our Duties and that we have need of a Saviour There are also many other Principles of Morality as That a retreat from the eager Pursuit of the World and Repentance are necessary to disunite us from Sensible Objects and to increase that which we have with intelligible and true Goods I mean those of the Mind That we cannot enjoy violent Pleasure without becoming Slaves to it That we must never undertake any thing through the Incitement of Passion Nor seek an Establishment in this Life c. But because these last Principles depend upon the precedent and on the Knowledge of Man they ought not immediately to pass for undoubted If we consider these Principles orderly and with as much Care and Application as the weight of the Subject requires and receive for true only the Conclusions consequently deduced from these Principles we shall have a certain Morality which perfectly agrees with that of the Gospel although it is not compleat and large It is true in Moral Reasonings it is not so easie to preserve Evidence and Exactness as in some other Sciences and the Knowledge of Man is absolutely necessary to those that would make any great Progress And this is the reason that the generality of Men do not succeed in it They will not consult themselves to know the Weakness of their own Nature They omit to enquire of the Master who inwardly teaches them his own Will which is the Immutable and Eternal Law and the true Principles of Morality They do not hear him with Pleasure who speaks not to their Senses who answers not according to their Desires nor Flatters their Secret Pride They have no respect for such words as do not dazle the Imagination which are pronounced without a Noise and are never clearly heard but in the Silence of the Creatures Yet with Pleasure and Deference they consult Aristotle Seneca and some new Philosophers who seduce them either by the Obscurity of their Words the Turn of their Expressions or Probability of their Reasons Since the Sin of Adam we esteem only what relates to the Preservation of the Body and Conveniency of Life And because we discover these sort of Goods only by the Means of our Senses we make use of them in all Occurrences The Eternal Wisdom who is our true Life and the only Light which can illuminate us often shines before the Blind and speaks only to the Deaf when it speaks in the Recesses of the Soul for we are almost always out of our selves As we continually interrogate all Creatures to learn some new Good which we enquire after it is requisite as I have already said that this Wisdom presents it self before us without our going out of our selves to teach us by sensible Words and convincing Examples the way to arrive at true Felicity God continually imprints a Natural Love in us for him that we may always Love him and by this same Motion of Love we continually Estrange our selves from him by running with all the Power he has given us after Sensible Goods which he has forbid us to do So that willing to be loved by us he renders himself Sensible and presents himself before us by the Delights of his Grace to fix all our Vain Agitatitions and to begin our Cure by Sensations or Delectations like to those which had been the Original of our Disease Therefore I do not pretend that Men may by the Power of their Minds so easily discover all the Rules of Morality which are necessary to Salvation and much less that they are able to act according to what they know for their Heart is yet more Corrupted than their Minds I only say that if they admit none but evident Principles and consequently reason upon these Principles they will discover even the very Truths that we learn in the Bible because 't is the same Wisdom which immediately speaks from it self to those who discover Truths from the Evidence of Reasoning and who speaks by the Holy Scriptures to those who learn it from their Senses We must then study Morality in the Gospel to spare our selves the Trouble of Meditation and Certainly to learn those Laws according to which we ought to regulate our Manners For those who are not contented with Certainty because it only convinces the Mind without enlightning it must carefully Meditate upon these Laws and deduce them from their Natural Principles that they may evidently discover by their Reason what they already know by Faith with an entire Certainty This way they will be convinced that the Gospel is the most Solid of all Books That JESVS CHRIST perfectly knew the Disorder and Distemper of Nature That he has procured a Remedy the most Useful for us and the most Worthy of himself But that the Light of Philosophers is only thick Darkness and their brightest Vertues only an insupportable Pride and in a word that Aristotle Seneca c. are only at best but Men to say no worse of them CHAP. VII Of the Vse of the first Rule which respects Particular Questions WE have sufficiently explained the General Rule for Method which chiefly regards the Subject of our Studies and to prove that Descartes has exactly followed it in his System of the World but that Aristotle and his Followers have not observed it It is now proper to descend to particular Rules which are necessary to resolve all sorts of Questions The Questions that may be formed upon all manner of Subjects are of diverse kinds of which it will not be easie to give a