or inducement to make vs beleeue things we know not but it must be the report of such an one as we know cannot be deceiued nor will not deceiue It must therefore be evident to euery one that firmely and without doubting beleeueth things not knowne vnto him vpon the report of another that he that reporteth them vnto him neither is deceiued nor can deceiue Whence it followeth necessarily that things are as he reporteth These things presupposed I demaund of this Treatiser whether he and his consorts assent to the Articles of the Christian Faith induced so to doe by the evidence of the things in thēselues or by the report of another That they assent not vnto thē induced so to do by the evidence of the things in thēselues they all professe but by the report of another I demand therefore who that other is whether God or man if man then haue they nothing but anhumane perswasion very weakly grounded wherein they may be deceiued for euery man is a lyar If God let them tel me whether it be evident in it self that God deliuereth these things vnto thē pronounceth them to be as they beleeue or not If not but beleeued only then as before by reasō of authority that either of God or man Not of God for it is not evident in it self that God deliuereth any thing vnto thē not of men for their report is not of such credit asthat we may certainly vndoubtedly stay vpon it seeing they may be deceiued deceiue other They answere therefore that it is no way evident vnto them in it selfe that God deliuereth the things they beleeue but that they perswade themselues hee deliuered such things vpōthe report of men but such men as are infallibly led into all truth See then if they doe not runne round in a circle finding no stay They beleeue the resurrection of the dead and the like things because God revealed it they beleeue that God revealed it because it is so contained in the Scripture and the Scripture because it is the Word of God and that it is the Word of God because the Church so delivereth and the Church because it is a multitude of men infallibly led into all truth and that there is a Church infallibly led into all truth because it is so contained in Scripture and the Scripture because it is the word of God and so round without euer finding any end Out of this circle they cannot get vnles they either groūd their Faith vpon the meere report of men as men humane probabilities or confesse that it is evident vnto them in it selfe that God speaketh in the Scripture and revealeth those things which they beleeue which if they doe it must bee in respect either of the manner matter there vttered or consequent effects In respect of the manner there being a certaine diuine vertue force and majesty in the very forme of the words of him that speaketh in the Scripture in respect of the matter which being suggested and proposed to vs findeth approbation of reason inlightned by the light of grace in respect of the consequent effects in that we finde a strange and wonderful change wrought in vs assuring vs the doctrine is of God that hath such effects which is that we say which they condemne in vs. The Treatiser would make vs beleeue that there are two opinions amongst them touching this point whereof the one is as he telleth vs that wee beleeue the Church because the Scripture teacheth vs that shee is to be beleeued the Scripture because the Church deliuereth it to vs to be the word of God And the other that by the assistance of God together with the concurrence of our naturall vnderstanding we produce an act of supernaturall Faith by which wee firmely beleeue the Articles of Christian Faith not for any humane inducements but for that they are revealed by Almighty God without seeking any further which if it be so it must be evident in it self to thē that follow this opiniō that God hath revealed deliuered the things they beleeue that by one of the 3 waies before mētioned thē they fal into our opiniō for if it be not evidēt to thē in it self that God speakes in the scriptures reveales the things they are to beleeue they must go further to be assured that he doth so speake and reueale the things that are to bee beleeued either to proofe of reason or authority For no man perswadeth himselfe of any thing but vpon some inducements Proofe of reason demonstratiue I thinke they will not seeke and probable inducements they may not rest in therefore they must proceede to some proofeby authority which can bee no other but that of the Church and then they ioyne with them that follow the other opinion and beleeue the articles of Christian faith conteyned in Scripture because God hath reuealed them and that God hath reuealed them because the Church telleth them so and the Church because the Scripture testifieth of it that it is led into all trueth which is a very grosse sophisticall circulation This the Treatiser did well perceiue and therefore to helpe the matter he distinguisheth the cause of beleeuing and the condition necessarily requisite that the cause may haue her working in shew making the Diuine Reuelation the reason or cause that we beleeue and the Churches proposing to vs the things to be beleeued a condition only and not a cause in sort as the fire alone is the cause of the burning of the wood but the putting of one of them to another is a necessary condition without which that cause can produce no such effect but this shift will not serue the turne For it is the fire onely that burneth the wood though it cannot burne vnlesse it be put vnto it so that in like sort if the comparison hold the Diuine Reuelation must of and by it selfe alone moue induce and incline vs to beleeue the things proposed by the Church as being euident vnto vs to be a Deuine Reuelation though without the Churches proposing we could take no notice of it Euen as in naturall knowledge it is the euidence of trueth appearing vnto vs originally found in the first principles and secondarily in the conclusions from thence deduced that is the sole and onely cause or reason of our assent to such principles and conclusions though without the helpe of some men of knowledge proposing them to vs and leading vs from the apprehension of one of them to another happily we should not at all attaine such knowledge But this euidence of the Diuine Reuelation in it selfe the Treatiser will not admit For it is no way euident in it selfe to him that God hath reuealed any of the things he beleeueth but the onely proofe besides humane motiues or reasons which are too weake to bee the ground of Fayth that he hath is the authority of the Church So that the Ministery of the Church is
that should bee in the will but is not when it faileth to bring forth that action that in duty it is bound to doe But some man will say this must not be granted for if wee admitte not the distinction of that which is formall that which is materiall in the sin of commission the difformity the substance of the act that the one is positiue and the other priuatiue God hauing a true efficiency in respect of the substance of the act that which is positiue in it we must acknowledg that he hath a true efficiency in respect of the whole euen the difformity aswell as the substance consequently make him the author of sin They who make this objection seeme to say some thing but indeed they say nothing for this distinction will not cleere the doubt they moue touching Gods efficiency working in the sinful actions of men Whensoeuer sayth Durandus two things are inseperably ioyned together whosoeuer knowing them both that they are so inseperably ioyned together chooseth the one chooseth the other also because though happily he would not choose it absolutly as being evill yet in that it is ioyned to that which he doth will neither can be seperated frō it it is of necessity that he must will both As it appeareth in those voluntary actions that are mixt as when a man casteth into the sea those rich commodities which he hath dearly bought brought from a farre to saue his owne life which he would not doe but in such a case Hence it followeth that the act of hating God sinfull difformity being so inseperably ioyned together that the one cannot bee diuided from the other for a man cannot hate God but he must sin damnably if God doth will the one he doth will the other also This of Durand is confirmed by Suarez who saith he shall neuer satisfie any man that doubteth how God may be cleared from being author of sin if hee haue an efficiency in the sinfull actions of men that shall answere that all that is sayd touching Gods efficiency concurrence is true in respect of the euill motions actions of mens wills materially considered not formally in that they are evill sinfull For the one of these is consequent vpon another For a free and deliberate act of a created will about such an obiect with such circumstances cannot be produced but it must haue difformity annexed to it There are some operations or actions saith Cumel that are intrinsecally euill so that in them we cannot separate that which is materiall from that which is formall wherein the sinfulnes of sin consisteth as it appeareth in the hate of God in this act when a man shall say resolue I will do euill So that it implyeth a contradiction that God should effectually worke our will to bring forth such actions in respect of that which is materiall in them not in respect of that which is formall And this seemeth yet more impossible if wee admit their opinion who think that the formall nature being of the sin of commission consisteth in some thing that is positiue as in the manner of working freely so as to repugne to the rule of reason law of God So that it is cleare in the iudgment of these great diuines that if God haue a true reall efficiency in respect of the substance of these sinful actiōs he must in a sort produce the difformity or that which is formall in thē Wherefore for the clearing of this point we must obserue that there are 3 opiniōs touching Gods cōcurrence with 2d causes in producing their effects The 1st that God hath no immediate influence but mediate only in respect of volūtary agēts And according to this opiniō it is casie to cleare God frō the imputatiō of being author of sin yet to acknowledg his cōcurrence with 2d causes in producing their defectiue effects If the will of the creature saith Scotus were the totall and immediate cause of her action that God had no immediate efficiency but mediate only in respect thereof as some think it were easie according to that opinion to shew how God may bee freed from the imputation of being author of sin and yet to acknowledge his concurrence with second causes for the producing of their effects For whether we speake of that which is materiall or formall in sinne the will onely should be the totall cause of it and God should no way be a cause of it but mediatly in that hee caused and produced such a will that might at her pleasure doe what shee would Durandus seemeth to incline to this opinion supposing that 2d causes do bring forth their actions operations by of themselues that God no otherwise concurreth actiuely to the production of the same but in that he preserueth the 2d causes in that being power of working which at first he gaue them But they that are of sounder judgment resolue that as the light enlightneth the aire with the aire all other inferior things so god not only giueth being power of working to the 2d causes preserueth them in the same but together with them hath an immediate influence into the things that are to be effected by the God saith Caietan being the first cause worketh produceth the effects of all 2d causes immediatly tum immediatione virtutis tum immediatione suppositi that is not onely so as that the vertue power of God the first agent immediatly sheweth it self in the production of the effect but so also that he is an immediate agent between whom the effect produced no secondary agent intercedeth Yet are we not to conceiue that he is an immediate agent immediatione suppositi as he is immediatione virtutis for hee produceth immediatly euery effect of euery 2◠cause in respect of all that is found in any such effect immediatly immediatione virtutis that is so as that his vertue and power more immediatly effectually sheweth it self in the production of euery such effect then the power and vertue of the 2d cause but hee produceth euery effect of euery 2d cause immediatly immediatione suppositi that is as an immediate agent betweene whom and the effect no secondary agent intercedeth not in respect of all that is found in such an effect but of some things only as existence and the last perfection of actuall being For to giue being is proper to God as to make fire is proper to fire So that between God the supreme agent and being communicated to the effects of 2d causes there is nothing that commeth betweene that by force and power of it owne can produce any such effect So that God as an immediate agent bringeth forth such effects and all 2 causes in respect thereof are but instruments only But in respect of those things found in the same effects into which the 2d causes haue an influence by
vertue of their owne proper for me Caietan confesseth that God doth not so produce them as an immediat agent but that the 2d causes doe mediate between him and them as secondary principal agents bring forth their effects Yet are not these that is the first the 2d causes partiall but totall causes of all those effects which they produce For the cleering whereof we must obserue that a cause may bee said to be totall either totalitate effectus that is because it bringeth forth the whole effect though some other cause haue such efficiencie also in respect of the same that without the helpe of it it cannot bring forth any such effect as when 2 men draw a ship either of them produceth the whole effect and moueth the whole ship but yet not so wholly but that either hath need of the others helpe and concurrence Or secondly a cause may bee said to bee totall totalitate causoe and that in 2 sorts either so as to produce the whole effect without any concurrence of any other cause in which sense neither God nor the creature neither the first nor the 2d cause must be said to be a totall cause or so as that though some other do concurre yet the being power of working and actuall cooperation of it is wholy from the agent with which it doth concurre and so God is a totall cause of all those effects that he produceth by and together with the 2d causes So that the opinion of them who thinke that God hath no immediat influence into the effects of 2d causes nor immediate concurrence with such causes in producing their effects is to be exploded out of all Christian schools Churches as profane heathnish Wherfore there are who finding that this first opiniō is not to be admitted flie to a 2d little better then the former For they acknowledge that God hath an immediate influence into the effects of all 2d causes but they think it to be general indefinit to be ◅ted determined by the different concurse of 2d causes It is true indeed that God worketh all things as an vniversall cause but this may bee vnderstood wayes For first a cause may be sayd to be vniuersall in the vniuersality of predication as opposit to speciall or particular as an artificer in respect of this that speciall kinde of artificers is generall and is an vniuersall cause of all workes of arte and they of such speciall workes as are incident to their seuerall kinds Secondly a cause may bee sayd to bee vniversall in that it extendeth it selfe to effects of all sorts in respect of something common to them all and not in respect of that which is proper to each of them vnlesse the working of it bee limited and directed by something else The fire warmeth the water with which poison is mingled in the same sorte that it doth any other water and without any difference of it own action And the actions of the sun fire are such as that men make vse of thē to vvhat purposes they please accordingly as their vvorking is differently applied bring forth differēt effects Thirdly a cause may be sayd to be vniversall because the efficiencie and vvorking of it extendeth it selfe to many things according to the seuerall differences of them without being limited and determined by any other thing These men suppose that God is an vniversall cause in the second sense and that his concurrence influence is indefinit generall and such as may be taken and applied by second causes in what sort they will So that the actions of free vvill the actions of euery other second cause haue from the freedome of the wil the particular quality of the second causes that they are of this or that sort good or bad not from the concurse or influence of the first cause which is finde◅init as is the concurse influence of the sun vvith other inferiour causes and as one man may make offer of his helpe concurrence to whatsoeuer another vvill make vse of it So they suppose that God offereth his concurse to second causes to be vsed by them to what purpose in what sort they will According to this conceipt they suppose they can easily cleere the doubt and free God from all imputation of being authour of sin though he concurre immediatly with second causes in to the producing of those actions that are sinfull For say they his concurse influence is indefinit and is by them applied in ill sorte to ill purposes But first this conceipt cleereth not God from being authour of sin And secondly it cannot stand with the grounds of Philosophie or diuinity That it cleereth not God from being authour of sin but rather layeth this imputation on him it is euident For if the concurse of God be generall indefinit indifferent and to be determined by the creature to the producing of good or euill it followeth that when the will of the creature determineth it selfe to the specificall act of sin God also determinately concurreth with it in particular to the producing of such an acte in kinde That this consequence is good it is evident because whosoeuer shall offer his help concurrence cooperation to another indifferently for the producing of good or euill the actes of sin or vertue as it shall please him he concurreth in trueth indeede to the producing of the acte of sin in particular as it is such an act if by the will of the other his concurrence cooperation bee determined to such an acte in particular Wherefore if God for his part offer onely a generall concurse such as is indifferent to the producing of actes of vertue or sinne accordingly as the will of the second cause shall determine it it will follow that God concurreth determinately or in particular to the producing of the acte of sin as being determined to the producing of such an act in particular by the will of the creature before he come to actuall cooperation or concurrence Secondly this conceipt cannot stand with the grounds of true Philosophie or diuinitie For if Gods concurse were onely generall and indefinit to bee determined by the will of the creature the will of the creature should bee before the will of God in respect of the particularity of things yea in respect of some reall acte as an acte it should be simply the first agent For according to this fancie because the creature inclineth to such an acte to put a thing in being therefore God cooperateth Whence it will follow that there are 2 beings of things that God is not simply the first cause of all those things that haue being 2ly It pertaineth to diuine prouidence determinately to will aforehand to appoint what afterwards shall be to moue second causes to certaine and determinate effects so to dispose all things that they may attaine the ends for which they were created But this could
not be if his concurse were indefinite generall only 3ly If it were as these men imagine the determination of the will of the creature should not bee within the compasse of things ordered by diuine prouidence and so God should not haue particular prouidence of euery particular thing That this is consequent vpon the fancie of indefinite concurse it is euident For if Gods concurse bee indefinite and in generall only then doth hee not truly and efficiently worke that the will of the creature shall in particular encline to and bring forth such an indiuiduall actiō And if he be not the cause that it so enclineth worketh his prouidence extēdeth not to such working seing his prouidence extēdeth to those things only wherein he hath a working So that if these things were soe as these men imagine Gods prouidence should extend it selfe to contingent things in a generality only in that he hath giuen to intellectual creatures a freedome to what whē how it pleaseth thē in particular in respect ofthings of this nature hee should haue a presidence onely and no prouidence Neither doth that which is alleaged by these men touching the indifferēt cōcurse of the Sunne or that of a man offering his concurrence in a generality only proue that Gods concurse is such For the Sunne is a finite and limited thing hauing something in act somthing in possibility so is man likewise therefore they may be determined to produce such such indiuiduall acts by the concurse of some other cause But God is a cause of infinite perfection and a pure act hauing nothing admixt of possibility so that his action and will cannot bee determined limited by any other Wherefore the resolution of the best diuines is that Gods concurse influence is not into the effects of 2d causes only but into the 2d causes thēselues So that he doth not only by an immediate concurse influence concurre with the 2d causes for the bringing forth of such effects as they determine themselues vnto but he hath an influence into the 2d causes thēselues mouing working thē to bring forth effects such effects as he thinketh good to worke thē vnto This is proued by sundry reasons First as we see 2d causes do not only produce some certaine effects operations as within some certaine kind but they giue vnto thē their last actuall perfection to bee But this they cānot giue vnlesse they be made cōpleate in vertue actiue by the first agent because an agent must be no lesse actuall then the effect or operation it bringeth forth But euery created agent is mixed compounded of actuall being possibility is not so actuall as an execution that is a 2d act therefore before it can bring forth any execution or effect it must be made cōpleate in vertue operatiue by the actuall motion of the first agent 2ly To bee is a most vniuersall act the proper effect of God onely therefore if wee will speak formally properly 2d causes in that they giue being to their own effects are but instruments of God whence it will follow that they must be moved by him in nature before they giue being to any of their effects For an instrument doth nothing towards the producing of the effect of the principall agent vnlesse it be actually moued by the principall agent 3ly Euery such thing as is somtimes an agent in act sometimes but potentially only must be moued by some mouer that is a pure act hath nothing mingled with it of possibility before it eā bring forth any actiō But the will of the creature is somtimes actually in actiō somtimes but potētially only therefore it must be moued by the first act before it can bring forth any action Which must bee granted for that otherwise the will of the creature in respect of some actions should bee the first mouer of it selfe and the first determiner That which is wrought by God in and vpon the second causes to make them actually to bee in action is a thing that hath a kinde of incompleate beeing in such sort as colours haue a being in the aire and the power of the act in the instrument of the artificer and so often as 2◠causes whether of naturall or supernaturall order haue in respect of the forme inherent in them a sufficient actiue power in the nature of the first act to bring forth their effects the helpe or precedent motion of God whereby he moueth and applyeth the same actiue powers to operate is not a qualitie but is more properly named a powerfull motion whereby the first and most vniversall agent so worketh vpon them that the 2d causes are actually in action euery one in sort fitting to the nature condition of it And to this purpose it is that Tho Aquinas hath that habituall grace is a quality but the actuall help whereby God moueth vs to will a thing is not a quality but a certain motion of the mind And surely it will easily appeare that there is a great difference between these For the habite doth perfit the power of the soule as a forme or first act implying possibility in respect of actuall operation because the habite doth not determine the power actually to worke but fitteth it only for action inclineth it thereunto But this actuall helpe mouing putting forth the 2d causes into their actions doth not perfit the power of working but makes thē actually to be in action Lastly the habit in respect of the nature of it may be the cause of diuerse actions but that actuall help mouing whereof we speak determineth the will to one individuall action yet taketh not from it a power of dissenting and doing otherwise Alvarez a great learned Archbishop that hath lately written with good allowance of the Church of Rome layeth downe these propositions First that God by an effectuall will predetermined all such acts of men and Angels as are good and all such as are not euill ex obiecto though in individuo they be euill sins ex malâ circumstantiâ Which he proueth out of the 10th of Esay where Almighty God saith Assur is the rod of my wroth he is my staffe I will send him to a deceiptfull nation against the people of my fury will I giue him a command a litle after Shall the axe boast against him that cutteth with it or shall the saw bee lifted vp against him that draweth it as if a rod should be lifted vp against him that lifteth it the staff which is but wood Here it is evident that Assur sinned ex malâ circumstantiâ in subduing the nations and yet it is cleere that God predetermined that he should waste and destroy the nations that he sent him to that purpose and moued him so to doe His 2d proposition is this that whatsoeuer is positiue of being in an act of sin though intrinsecally
not onely a condition but a cause of that perswasion of fayth which they haue yea the authority of the Church is the formall cause of all that faith seduced Papists haue And therefore the distinction of a cause and condition helpeth them not It is true indeed that the Ministerie of the Church proposing to men thinges to bee beleeued is onely a condition requisite to the producing of a supernaturall act of fayth in respect of them that haue some other thing to perswade them that that is true which the Church proposeth besides the authority of the Church but in respect of such as haue no other proofe of the trueth thereof it is a formall cause Now this is the condition of all Papists For let them tell Mee whether they beleeue the Scripture to be the Word of God without any motiue at all or not and if they doe not as it is most certaine they doe not whether besides such as are humane they haue any other then the authority of the Church if they haue not as doubtlesse they haue not they make the authority of the Church the formall cause of their faith and fall into that sophisticall circulation they are charged with For they beleeue the articles of religion because reuealed and that they were reuealed because it is so contayned in the Scripture and the Scripture because it is the Word of God that it is the Word of God because the Church telleth them it is and the Church because it is guided by the spirit and that it is so guided because it is so contayned in the Scripture this is such a maze as no wise man will willingly enter into and yet the Treatiser commendeth the treading of these intricate pathes and telleth vs that two causes may bee causes one of another That the cause may bee proued by the effect and the effect by the cause and that such a kinde of argumentation is not a circulation but a demonstratiue regresse that two causes may be causes either of other in diuerse respects we make no question For the end of each thing as it is desired setteth the efficient cause a worke and the efficient causeth the same to bee actually enjoyed Likewise we doubt not but that the cause may be proued by the effect and the effect by the cause in a demonstratiue regresse For the effect as better known vnto vs then the cause may make vs know the cause and the cause being found out by vs may make vs more perfitly and in a better sort to knowe the effect then before not onely that and what it is but why it is also So the death of little infants proueth them sinners and their being sinners proueth them mortall The bignesse of the footstep in the dust or sand sheweth the bignesse of his foote that made that impression And the bignesse of his foote will shew how bigge the impression is that he maketh but this maketh nothing for the justifying of the Romish circulations For heere the effect being knowne in a sort in itselfe maketh vs know the cause and the cause being found out and knowne maketh vs more perfectly to knowe the effect then at first wee did but the case is otherwise with the Papists for with them the Scripture which in it selfe hath no credit with them but such onely as it is to receiue from the Church giueth the Church credit and the Church which hath no credit but such as it is to receiue from the Scripture giueth the Scripture credit by her testimony And they endeauour to proue the infallibility of the Churches judgment out of the Scripture and the trueth of the Scripture out of the determination and judgement of the Church Much like as if when question is made touching the quality condition of two men vtterly vnknowne a man to commend them to such as doubt of them should bring no other testimony of their good and honest disposition but the testimony of each of them of the other It is true then which I haue said that to a man admitting the Old Testament and doubting of the New a man may vrge the authority of the Old and to a man doubting of the Old and admitting the New the authority of the New but to him that doubteth of both a man must alledge neither of them but must bring some other authority or proofe so likewise to him that admitteth the Scripture and doubteth of the Church a man may vrge the authority of the Scripture but to him that doubteth of both as all doe when they begin to beleeue a man must alledge some other proofe or else hee shall cause him to runne round in a Circle for euer and neuer to finde any way out Wherefore to conclude this poynt let our Aduersaries know that wee admitte and require humane motiues and inducements and amongst them a good opinion of them that teach vs as preparing fitting vs to fayth Secondly that wee require a supernaturall ayde light and habit for the producing of an act of faith Thirdly that we require some diuine motiue inducement Fourthly that this cannot be the authority of the Church seeing the authority of the Church is one of the things wee are to bee induced to beleeue Fiftly that wee require the ministery of the Church as a propounder of all heauenly trueth though her authority can be no proofe in generall of all such truth Sixtly that the Church though not as it includeth onely the beleeuers that are in the world at one time yet as it comprehendeth all that are or haue beene is an infallible propounder of heauenly truth and so acknowledged to bee by such as are assured of the trueth of the doctrine of Christianity in generall Seauenthly that the authority of this Church is a sufficient proofe of the trueth of particular things proposed by her to such as already are by other diuine motiues assured of her infallibility §. 7. FRom the authority of the Scripture which he would faine make to bee wholy dependant on the Church the Treatiser passeth to the fulnesse and sufficiency of it seeking amongst other his discourses to weaken those proofes which are brought by Mee for confirmation thereof Affirming that though I make shew as if it were a plaine matter that the Euangelists in their Gospels Saint Luke in the Actes of the Apostles and Saint Iohn in the Apocalyps meant to deliuer a perfect summe of Christian doctrine and direction of faith yet I bring no reason of any moment to proue it Whereas yet in the place cited by him I haue these wordes contayning in them as I suppose a strong proofe of the thing questioned Who seeth not that the Evangelists writing the history of CHRISTS life and death St Luke in the booke of the Acts of the Apostles describing the comming of the Holy Ghost the admirable gifts and graces powred vpon the Apostles and the churches founded and ordered by them and Saint Iohn writing the Revelations
omission are become euill such actions as are euill There are saith Cameracensis who hold that God hath an efficiencie and is a cause producing the action that is sinfull and that he may and doth cause will that which is sin as Ockam Bradwardine and sundry other renowned Doctors And elsewhere he saith that according to the opiniō of the master of the sentences God only permitteth those euils which are sinne that he neither willeth their being or not being For if he did will their being hee should be the cause of them which he thinketh must not bee graunted and if hee did will their not being they should not be But Bradwardine and others hold that God willeth those euils that are sinnes that in respect of euery thing he hath an act of will either that it shal be or not be and not a meere negation of such act If wee speake saith Ockam of the sinne of commission wee must not thinke that the will of the creature hath an efficiencie and is so the cause of that act but that God also who as immediately produceth euery act of the creature as the creature doth it selfe hath his efficiencie and is a cause also euen of the difformity that is found in such an act aswell as of the substance of the act Seeing as we haue already shewed the difformity in an act of commission is nothing else but the very act it selfe that is done contrary to the precept Yet doth not God originally moue the creature to doe any such euill act but contrarywise so made it and would haue so continued it if the fault had not beene in it selfe that it should neuer haue done any euill act But finding it by it owne fault averse and turned from him notwithstanding all the gracious meanes he vsed to retain it hee goeth on mouing carrying it forward with restles motions and produceth in and with it thus averse actions fitting to such an estate and such as it must needes bring forth if it bring forth any at all that is such as are euill Thus he doth without all fault of his who must not cease to doe his worke of mouing and carrying forward all things with restlesse motions though by their owne fault being put out of due course they doe not attaine their wished good but runne themselues into endlesse euills Thus then God did onely by substraction and denyall of that grace without which hee saw the creature would not be wonne to continue in that state of good wherein it was to be created decree purpose the entrance of the sinne of omission and auersion but presupposing this purpose and foreseeing that which would follow vpon it by his consequent conditiouall will he positiuely decreed the other which is of commission For seeing man must needes seeke an infinite good loue it infinitly if he seek it not in God must seeke it elsewhere God did decree that man not continuing to adhere to him should seeke his chiefe good in him selfe so consequently fall into selfeloue pride all other euils of that kind This is the opinion of many worthy diuines in the Romane Church and this is that Zuinglius Caluin Beza the rest meant if any where they affirmed that God doth effectually moue impell and incline sinfull creatures to do such things as are euill namely that God hath setled such a course in things that they that wil not do what they should shall do that they should not that hee will not suffer them that fall from him to doe nothing but will effectually moue them to will desire do that which is fitting to the estate into which they put themselues so long as they continue in the same will not be reclaimed wonne to returne to him againe And this is agreable to that of S. Augustine that God enclineth or moueth no man to euill but that hee enclineth such as are euill to this or that euill With whom Anselm writing vpon the epistle to the Romans agreeth where he saith that God may be said to deliuer men vp to their owne harts desires when being prone to euill he stayeth them not addeth that it is also manifest that God doth work in the harts of men to incline their wills whither soeuer he pleaseth either to choose things that are good out of his mercy or to choose things that are euill according to their deserts the reasons of his iudgement being sometimes manifest sometimes hid but alwaies iust For because men haue run into some sins they afterwards fall into many God that long expecteth the sinner looking that hee should returne when he findeth that he returneth not but cōtemneth both his iustice mercy he casteth some thing in his way at which hee may stumble fall yet worse then before Inter primum peccatū apostasiae vltimam poenā ignis media quae sunt peccata sunt poenae peccati Whatsoeuer sins do come between the first sin of apostasie the last punishment which is that of eternall fire they are both sins punnishmēnts therefore God may iustly deliuer vp such as fall from him by the first sin of apostasie depart from him vnto their owne harts desires for the committing of such things as are not seemly Thus then we may resolue touching the entrance of sinne First God purposed eternally to make man a rationall and intellectuall creature indued with knowledge of all things and faculty and power to make choise of what hee would Secondly Man could not be thus made and bee naturally free from possibility and danger of making an euill choise disposing amisse of himselfe offending against the lawes of his righteous Creator Thirdly God wanted not gracious meanes whereby to hold him inseperably to himselfe and to preserue him infallibly from falling away though hee were not nor could not be naturally free from possibility of falling Fourthly God foresaw that if man were so created and left to himselfe as afterwards hee was hee would sinfully depart from him Fifthly hee saw that it was best to create and leaue him so and that if sinne should enter hee could take an occasion thereby of the manifestation of greater good then the world otherwise could ever know Sixtly seeing the determination of mans will that if he should be thus created and left hee would auert from him and sinne would enter hee determined soe to create him and leaue him and to giue way that sinne might enter Thus then wee doe not say that God did absolutely without all prescience of the determination of mans will determine and decree that sinne should enter but that foreseing what would be the determinatiō of his will if he were so created and left to himselfe as in his diuine wisedome he saw it to be fittest he determined so to create and leaue him and purposed by subtraction of grace to giue way vnto the sinne of auersion
velle perficere pro boná voluntate Soe that God doth not stirre and moue the will and soe stay to see whether it will consent or nor but worketh moueth and inclineth us to consent The good vse of grace proceedeth not from the meere liberty of our will but from God working by the effectuall helpe of preoperating grace and causing a man freely to consent and cooperate If not God were not the totall cause which as the first roote bringeth forth all that which discerneth the righteous from the sinner Quis te discernit Our consent and effect of predestination The will doth not first begin her determination and consent The influx of free will into a good action or the good vse of grace exciting is supernaturall as being about a supernaturall obiect therefore it must proceede from a supernaturall cause c God is a cause and the first eause in that a cause he hath reference to the effect in that the first to the second when therefore by his helping grace he worketh together with vs to will and performe his operation hath a double respect first to our will which it effectually moueth to worke this and secondly to our act of willing which it produceth together with our will for our will hath no operation but in one respect only that is of the act it bringeth forth but it hath no influence upon it selfe antecedently to the production of the act So then God is the first determiner of our will for iâ—… the created will originally begin her owne determination it will follow that it is the first free the first roote and the first cause of her owne determination which must not be granted for seeing a created thing that is free is free by participation it must of necessity be reduced to a first free as to a former cause otherwise duo prima principia Soe that God by his effectuall grace not onely morally but truly efficiently moueth and inclineth the will to the loue and liking of what hee will in such sort that it cannot but turne nor cannot dissent in sensu composito though it may in sensu diuiso The meaning of this is that the effectuall motion of Gods grace and an actuall dissenting resisting or not yeelding cannot stand together but the efficacy of Gods grace and a power of disenting do stand together For the efficacie of grace doth not take away the power but soe directeth the will as infallibly in such liberty to bring forth that he pleaseth Est simultas potentiae ad opposita non autem potentia simultatis ad opposita simul habenda there is in some created thing at the same time a possibility of hauing or doing things opposite as to sitte or walke but there is no possibility of hauing these together Soe there is in free will moued by effectuall grace a power to doe or not to do in sensu diuiso because the efficacy of grace and power of dissenting may stand together but not in sensu composito that is that the motion of grace and actuall dissenting should stand together This is the opinion of Aluarez and many other opposing the Iesuites neither had Caluin or Luther any other apprehension of these things So that the necessity efficacy power and working of Gods grace is rightly deliuered by sundry in the Roman Church euen till this day It is not to be maruelled therefore if it be sayd that the Church wherein our Fathers liued and died beleeued and taught as we now do Aloisius Lippomannus in catenâ ad lectorem hath these words Illud te admonitum esse volumus vt si in toto hoc opere Chrysostomum aliquando legeris dicentem homini quoties is sua attulerit conatum omnem fecerit abundè postea à Deo gratiam suppeditari caute prudenter pium doctorem legas ne in errorem illum decidas vt credas gratiam Dei dari propter merita nostra nam si ex meritis non est gratia cum nec istud ipsum sua afferre conatum omnem facere sine praeueniente Dei gratiâ possit esse juxta illud Psalmi misericordia ejus praeueniet me itemque misericordia ejus subsequetur me in omnibus diebus vitae meae ac illud sanctae Ecclesiae tua nos quaesumus domine gratia semper praeueniat sequatur cui nos quoque scrupulo prouidè occurrentes in duobus fortassis aut tribus locis paucula quaedam in Chrysostomum apposuimus Gocchianus de libertate christianâ l. 2. c. 23. Maria salutatur gratia plena vt quic quid in eâ per eam diuina dispositione fieri conspicitur totum ex dono dei nullis praecedentibus meritis designetur c. habes qualiter in exordio humanae reparationis praesumpsio humanae facultatis dejicitur In eo quod Maria plena gratiâ nunciatur praedicatur in eaplenitudo gratiae ut nihil proprii meriti sed totum quod in ea est gratia esse designetur August in enchirid Quid humana natura in homine Christo meruit ut in unitate personae unici filii Dei singulariter esset Quae bona voluntas cuius boni propositi studium quae bona praecesserunt quibus mereretur iste homo ut una fieret persona cum Deo nempè ex quo homo esse caepit non aliud caepit esse quam Dei filius idemque hominis filius c. Magna hic sola Dei gratia ostenditur ut intelligant homines per eandem gratiam eius se iustificari a peccatis per quam factum est ut homo Christus nullum habere posset peccatum Eccehabes in Mediatore Christo gratiam commendatam qui cum esset unicus Dei filius non gratiâ sed naturâ ob hoc plenus veritatis factus est hominis filius ut esset etiam gratiae plenus verbum caro factum est Cùm in Christo in quo omnia instauranda tanquam in fonte vnde totius humani generis derivatur salvatio nihil aliud invenitur quam gratia unde alicui aliquid aliud de proprio potest provenire per quod potest salvari Miranda quidem imò potius miseranda humanae praesumptio facultatis quae cùm per humilitatem gratis salvari possit propriâ impediente superbiâ salvari non velit Omnes inquit Esaias sitientes venite ad aquas qui non habetis argentum aurum properate emite comedite emite absque ullâ commutatione vinum lac Idem spiritus movet hominis voluntatem ut bonum velit quod prius noluit bonam voluntatem adiuvat ut bonum volitum ad effectum perducat nullâ cooperatione propriae voluntatis facultatis sed sanatae renovatae Aug. de patientia Gratia non solùm adiuvat iustum verum etiam iustificat impium ideo etiam cùm adiuvat iustum videtur eius meritis reddi nec sic
according to the Translation they follow there is first a speech directed to the Church concerning Christ then an Apostrophe to Christ and then thirdly a returne unto the Church againe Secondly if that were graunted which he vrgeth touching the supposed Apostrophe it would not proue that there is no probabilitie in our Interpretation For this consequence will neuer be made good in the Schooles Christ is prophesied of in the words immediatly going before in these words God speaketh vnto him by way of Apostrophe therefore they cannot be vnderstood of deliuerance out of Babylonicall captivitie seeing it is certaine that Christ deliuered the Israelites out of all the miseries out of which they escaped But saith Bellarmine if wee admit this Interpretation in what bloud of the couenant may wee vnderstand the Iewes to haue beene deliuered out of Babylonicall captivitie Surely this question is soone answered For their deliuerance out of the hands of their enemies and all other benefites were bestowed on them by vertue of the couenant betweene God and them which was to be established in the bloud of Christ in figure whereof all holy things among the Iewes were sprinkled with bloud as the Booke of the Covenant the Altar the Sanctuary and People Wherefore seeing this place maketh nothing for the confirmation of the Popish errour touching Limbus let vs come to the last place brought for proofe thereof which is that of S. Peter concerning Christs going in spirit and preaching to the spirits in prison see whether from thence it may be proued any better S. Augustine vnderstandeth the words of the Apostle as I noted before of Christs preaching in the dayes of Noe in his eternall Spirit of Deity not of preaching in Hell in his humane Soule after death but this interpretation of S. Augustine first Bellarmine rejecteth as contrarie to the Fathers secondly endeauoureth to improue it by weakening the reasons brought to confirme it and by opposing certaine reasons against it The first of the Fathers that he alledgeth is Clemens Alexandrinus who indeede vnderstandeth the words of S. Peter not as S. Augustine doth but of Christ preaching in Hell after his death in his humane Soule but not conceiuing to what purpose preaching should serue in Hell if there were not intended a conversion sauing of some there he runneth into a most grosse dangerous error cōdemned rejected as well by Bellarm. his companions as by vs so that his authority as contrary to Augustines interpretation needed not to haue beene alledged nor would not haue beene if Bellarmine had meant sincerely For Clemens Alexandrinus affirmeth as hee well knoweth that so many Infidels as beleeued in Christ and listened to the wordes of his preaching when hee came into Hell were deliuered thence and made partakers of euerlasting saluation against which errour himselfe being Iudge Saint Augustine not without good cause disputeth in his Epistle to Euodius The second auncient Writer that hee produceth for proofe of Christs preaching in Hell after his death is Athanasius who indeed doth expound the wordes of Peter of Christs going in Soule to preach in Hell after his death but no way expresseth in what sort to whom to what purpose or with what successe he preached Epiphanius whom he produceth in the third place doth not so interprete the words of Peter himselfe but onely vpon another occasion citeth the epistle of Athanasius to Epictetus wherein hee doth so interprete them So that the authority of Epiphanius might haue beene spared Ruffinus in his explication of the Creede interpreteth the words of Peter as Athanasius doth Cyrill in the place cited by Bellarmine speaketh of Christs preaching to the spirits in Hell but saith nothing in particular of this place of Peter S. Ambrose doth not speake of this place but that other of preaching the Gospell to the dead So that there are no moe Ancient writers cited by Bellarmine that doe precisely interprete this place of Peter of Christs preaching in Hell in his humane soule after death but onely Clemens Athanasius Ruffinus and Oecumenius On the other side we haue S. Augustine Beda the authors of the Ordinarie and Interlincall Glosses Lyra Hugo Cardinalis and other interpreting the words as wee doe so that our Aduersaries haue no great aduantage in respect of the number of Interpreters and yet if they had it would not helpe them for confirmation of their supposed Limbus seing some of the Fathers cited by him as namely Clemens Alexandrinus speake directly of preaching in the lowest Hell for the conuersion of Infidels which they dislike as much as wee Wherefore let vs proceede to examine the reasons that are brought either of the one side or the other to confirme their seuerall interpretations of these words and let vs see how Bellarmine weakneth the reasons brought by S. Augustine and improueth his interpretation by reasons brought against it The first reason whereby S. Augustine confirmeth his interpretation is for that mortification in the flesh and viuification in the Spirit mentioned by the Apostle cannot be vnderstood of the body Soule of Christ as they that follow the other interpretation doe vnderstand them seeing Christ neuer dying in soule could not be said to be quickned in it Besides that the very phrase of the Scripture opposing flesh and Spirit in Christ doth euer import the infirmity of his humane nature and the power of his Deitie and in other men that part that is renued by the sanctification of the Spirit and that which is not yet so renued Against the former part of this reason of S. Augustine Bellarmine opposeth himselfe saying that it is not good seeing a thing may be sayd to be quickned that was neuer dead if it be preserued from dying kept aliue But he should know that onely those thinges may be said to be quickned in that they were preserued from dying which otherwise if they had not beene so preserued might haue beene killed or dyed of themselues Which cannot be verified of the Soule of Christ that could neither die of it selfe nor be killed by any other and therefore the Soule of Christ cannot be said to bee quickned in this sense The place in the seauenth of the Acts brought by Bellarmine to proue that those things may bee said to bee quickned that were neuer dead besides that it is nothing to the purpose is strangely wrested For S. Stephen in that place speaketh nothing of viuification or quickning in that sense we now speake of it but of multiplying increasing saying that After the death of Ioseph there rose vp another King in Egypt that knew not Ioseph who euill intreated our Fathers and made them cast out their infants and new borne children 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is that they should not increase multiplie and therefore Bellarmine should not in reason so haue pressed the Latine word of viuification vsed by the Vulgar translatour seeing the
the very same more peremptorily namely that Gregory by this saying and some other found in him doth vtterly ouerthow that Purgatory which hee is thought to teach And if hee will bee pleased to peruse the Schoole-men hee shall finde in Alexander of Ales that the best of them thought Gregorie to bee of opinion as they also were that all sinne in respect of the staine or fault is purged out in death some interpreting his wordes where hee speaketh of remission of sinnes after this life of that remission which is in the last instant of this life and the first of the next and â—…her â—…herwise And therefore Master Higgons might well haue spared his taxation of me and omitted his marginall note that many such tricks were found by the Bishoppe of Eureux in the writings of the Lord Plessis Mornay For in all that which I haue written touching this point there is not so much as the least shadow of any ill dealing and for that worthy Gentleman against whom that Bishoppe soâ—…ght aduantage by cauilling against some parts of his allegations it will bee found that hee hath more sincerely handled the controuersies of religion then euer any Romanist did That if any mistaking be found in him there are many moe and more materiall in farre lesse compasse in the writings of Cardinall Bellarmine himselfe and that in his anatomy of the Masse the booke excepted against by the Bishoppe of Eureux hee hath in such sort cutte in sunder the sinewes not onely of the Masse but of the whole masse of Romish religion that all the rabble of Romanists will neuer bee able orderly to answere that whole booke howsoeuer it is easie to cavill against some parts of any thing neuer so well written But to returne to the matter in hand whatsoeuer wee thinke of Gregory of whom I say onely that hee seemeth to agree vnto the opinion of those Diuines who thinke all sinnefulnesse to be purged out of the soules of men dying in the state of grace in the moment of dissolution it is certaine that exceeding many of best esteeme in the Romane Church informer times were of that opinion and the same is proued by vnanswerable reasons Whence it will follow ineuitably that there remaineth no punishment to bee suffered after death by men dying in the state of grace For they are propositions of Saint Bernard that all the world cannot except against that when all sinne shall bee wholly taken out of the way no effect of it shall remaine that the cause beeing altogether remoued the effect shall bee no more and that all punishment shall hee as farre from the outward man as all fault shall bee from the inward Now that all sinfulnesse is purged out in the very dissolution of soule and body is confirmed as I said by vnaunswerable reasons for seeing the remaines of naturall concupiscence the pronenesse to euill difficultie to doe good and contrarietie betweene the better and meaner faculties of the soule are wholly taken out of the soules of all them that die in the state of grace in the moment of dissolution euen in the iudgement of our aduersaries themselues there being nothing in the fault or staine of sinne but the acte desire purpose which cannot remaine where concupiscence the fountaine thereof is dried vp or the habituall liking and affecting of such things as were formerly desired purposed or done ill which cannot be found in a soule out of which all naturall concupiscence inclining to the desiring of things inordinately is wholly taken away and it selfe turned to the entire desiring of God alone and nothing but in and for him as is euery soule out of which concupiscence inclining to affect finite things inordinately is wholly taken away It is more then euident that all sinnefulnesse is wholly taken out of the soule of each good man in the very moment of his death dissolution and departure hence See then the absurditie of Romish Religion the soule of a good man in the moment of death is wholly freed from all sinnefulnesse there is nothing found in it that displeaseth God charitie and grace making those in whom it is acceptable to GOD is perfect in it and yet it must bee punished to satisfie the iustice of GOD because it was sometimes sinnefull Truely Ieuer thought whereas there are two things in sinne the fault deformity or staine and the punishment that Christ who is the Lambe of God that taketh away the sinnes of the world by the working of his sanctifying grace purgeth out the one and by vertue of his satisfactory sufferings freeth such as he purgeth from the impuritie of sinne from the punishment due vnto it and that in proportionable sort he purgeth out the one and by vertue of his satisfactory sufferings freeth vs from the other So that when sinne is onely so purged out that it is no more predominant there remaineth no condemnation but yet some punishment as in the case of Dauid and when it is wholly taken away there remaineth no punishment at all which whosoeuer contradicteth is iniurious to the sufferings of Christ the Iustice of God who will not require one debt to be twise paid For it is most certain that Christ suffered the punishments not only of those sins that men commit in the time of ignorance 〈◊〉 and the state of Nature before Baptisme and Regeneration but of all sinnes and that the reason why notwithstanding godlesse men are subiect to all kindes of punishments as before is because they doe not become one with CHRIST nor are made partakers of his sanctifying Spirit purging out the sinfulnesse that is in them that they might enjoy the benefite of his satisfaction as likewise the reason why good men such as Daâ—…id turning to God by repentance are still subject to some punishments in this life notwithstanding their vnion with CHRIST is because they are not so fully conjoyned to CHRIST and made partakers of his Spirit as to be purged from all sinne For if they were they should be freed from all punishment by his sufferings he hauing suffered for all them that become one with him all that the Iustice of God requireth This is that heresie of the Papists which I speake of namely that to satisfie Gods Iustice the soules of men dying in the state of grace must suffer punishments answereable to the sinnes they some-times committed though now pure from all sinne This conceipt neuer any of the Auncient had howsoeuer some of them supposed that sinfull men in hell may be eased or deliuered thence and some other as Augustine such as followed him in the Latine Church were doubtfull whether some impuritie might not remaine to be purged out of the soules of men dying in the state of grace by afflictions and chastisements after this life And therefore it is vntrue that M Higgons saith This imputation of heresie cleaueth as fast to the Fathers whom we pretend to honour and reuerence as to