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A59810 A defence of Dr. Sherlock's notion of a Trinity in unity in answer to the animadversions upon his vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever Blessed Trinity : with a post-script relating to the calm discourse of a Trinity in the Godhead : in a letter to a friend. Sherlock, William, 1641?-1707. 1694 (1694) Wing S3282; ESTC R33885 67,085 115

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from all other Persons but he will not allow Self-consciousness to be the formal Reason of Personality which the Dean no where says it is and as for Mutual-consciousness he allows the Three Divine Persons to be thus mutually-conscious and that this Mutual-Consciousness may suppose an Union of Nature the Dean would have said Unity of Nature though an Union of Persons for Unity is Oneness Union is a Conjunction of more than One and therefore there can be no Union of Nature unless there be a number of Natures united into One but there is an Union of Persons in the Unity of Nature and that Mutual-consciousness may result from this Union and upon the same account may infer and prove it but it can never give or cause it for their Essence and Personality what but One Personality as One Essence in Three must still go before their Mutual-consciousness since the Three Persons must be really One in Nature before they can know themselves to be so To be so How is that To be One That they must be One before they can know themselves to be One What is that to the purpose Can they be One before they are Mutually-conscious even in the order of conceiving it Can they be One before they are in one another Or is there any other mutual In-being of Minds but Mutual-consciousness But what confounded work does this make with the pure simple uncompounded eternal Nature of God to prove a Priority or Posteriority of Being or Causality in the Divine Nature from the order of our Conceptions When we certainly know that the Divine Nature is eternal and therefore has nothing before nor after in it that it has no Parts or Composition and therefore nothing in order of Nature before or after nothing that can be conceived as a Cause or Effect is it not demonstrable that all such Conceptions reduced into such exact Order and Method are false because there is nothing in the Divine nature that answers to them And though the imperfection of our Knowledge makes it necessary to distinguish the Divine Nature into different Conceptions as far as we can know any thing of God and can form distinct Notions which we can view by Parts Is this a Reason to frame Ideas of Priority and Posteriority of Causes and Effects of formal Reasons and essential Properties when we know there is no such thing in God and can form no distinct Conceptions of them Is it not a wise Dispute whether Essence Subsistence Personality the distinction of Persons or the Unity of Nature Self-consciousness and Mutual-consciousness be first or last which is the Cause and which the Effect when we know that the Divine Nature did eternally subsist in Three Self-conscious and mutually-conscious Persons and have no other Conception of their Distinction and Unity But let those distinguish and methodize their Conceptions into unconceivable Confusion that please if Self-consciousness necessarily results from and infers and proves a distinction of Persons and Mutual-consciousness supposes results from infers and proves the Union of the Divine Persons in the essential Unity of the Godhead it will satisfie the Dean without disputing the formal Reasons of Personality and Union For this proves a Trinity in Unity and gives us as intelligible a Notion of it as we have of Three distinct Self-conscious Persons which are mutually conscious to each other which either makes or proves an essential Distinction and Unity and to dispute about the Cause of Self-consciousness or Mutual-consciousness is to dispute about the naked Essences or essential Properties of things which the Dean rejected from the beginning as without the Compass of Humane Knowledge 4. His fourth and last Argument discards the Notion of Self-consciousness and Mutual-consciousness not only as new and suspicious but as wholly needless in this Subject Why so Pray what hurt have these seemingly innocent Words done Are they not English Do they signifie nothing Or can't he understand them The last is the truth of the Case and it is a hard case that the Dean must be bound at the peril of having a great scolding Book writ against him to furnish the Animadverter with Understanding if he venture upon any Terms which he can't find in some Orthodox Schoolmen for Peter Lombard will not pass muster with him But the Sum of all is That nothing can be signified by these Words Self-consciousness and Mutual consciousness which is not fully clearly and abundantly signified by that one plain Word and known Attribute the Divine Omniscience Now suppose this Why may not that One Comprehensive Attribute of Omniscience very properly receive different Names according to its different Objects as the several Arts and Sciences do If as he says by this Omniscience every Divine Person knows himself and the same Person by the very same Omniscience knows all that is known by the other Two Persons and the other Two Persons by the same knows all that is known by him yet to know himself and to know whatever others know though it may belong to the same Omniscience is not the same Knowledge because it has not the same Object for Self and Others are as distinct Objects as Father Son and Holy Ghost are distinct Persons and therefore this Knowledge may be distinguished by different Names as it is by different Objects And since as he confesses the general Notion of Omniscience does not distinguish Persons as Self-consciousness does nor Unite them into One as Mutual-consciousness does these Terms were necessary to express something which Omniscience does not express viz. wherein these Divine Persons are distinguished and wherein they are One. But after all this is a Mistake for though Self-consciousness and Mutual consciousness may in some Sence be called Knowledge yet they are of a different Kind and Species from what we strictly call Knowledge that is they differ as Speculation and Sensation Self-Knowledge properly signifies to contemplate our own Natures in their Idea to draw our own Image and Picture as like the Original as we can and to view our selves in it But Self-consciousness is an intellectual Self-Sensation when we feel our selves and all the Thoughts Knowledge Volitions Passions of our Minds and know what is Self and what belongs to Self by feeling it He who knows not the difference between intellectual Sence and Knowledge is as unfit to meddle in this Controversie as a Blind-Man is to dispute of Colours Thus the Mutual-consciousness of Three Persons is not their mutual Knowledge of each other though they know each other as perfectly as they know themselves but their Mutual-Sensation and feeling each other in themselves which makes them naturally One An omniscient Being knows all things but feels himself and Omniscience as the Animadverter observes belongs to Nature but Mutual-consciousness to Persons which might have satisfied him That there is a great difference between Omniscience and Self-consciousness and Mutual-consciousness between knowing all things whether the Object be Self or any other
Master-piece of profound Reason and Judgment If Three distinct Self-consciousnesses formally constitute Three distinct Personalities then Three distinct Self-complacencies will constitute Three distinct Personalities too He might as well have added Self-Love and Self-Displeasure and Self-Condemnation and as many Selfs as he could think of only the Danger then was That the Personality should alter with the Judgment or Passion that the Person should not be the same when he is pleased and displeased when he applauds and acquits or condemns himself Had he added Self-conscious to all this as a Self-conscious complacency for then it is the same thing whether Self or any other Being be the object of the complacency a Self-conscious Love or Fear or Hatred or Desire every one of these Acts would prove a distinct Person because they are the Acts of Self-consciousness which distinguish one Person from another as every Act of Reason proves a reasonable Creature because it is the exercise of Rationality but yet no Man will say that it is every Act but the principle of Reason which makes a reasonable Creature and no more does any particular Act but the principle of Self-consciousness distinguish between Self-conscious Persons much less such Acts as may be separated from the Person as I doubt Self-complacency is from Damned Spirits or if he will not allow Souls to be Persons as it will be from Damned Men. He has drawn this Argument out to such a length and has so many pretty Remarks that I have much ado to keep my word with you but let him go like a wrangling Wit as he is and I 'll go on As Self-consciousness makes a Person one with it self and distinguishes it from all other Persons so the Dean apprehends That a natural Mutual-consciousness makes Three Persons as naturally One as it is possible for Three to be One and that is the Unity of the Godhead not the Unity of One Person but the Unity of Three or a Trinity in Unity And this is his next Attempt to prove That the Unity of Three Divine Persons in the Godhead can't consist in Mutual-consciousness He proceeds upon the same mistake and therefore the same Answer will serve By Self-consciousness he understood as you have seen the acts of Self-consciousness and then the act Supposing a Person could not be the formal Reason of Personality and thus by Mutual-consciousness he understands the Acts of Mutual-consciousness which supposes the Unity of Nature and therefore cannot be the cause or reason of it now though I know not of what use that Dispute is about the Priority of Being and the first Modes and Affections of it to any Act of Knowledge or any other Acts especially when we speak of the Divine Nature which we know has no Modes and Affections no Priority so much as in Conception if we conceive aright of him between his Being and a pure and simple Act yet I will not put the Animadverter out of his way when there is no need of it an easie obvious distinction between the Principle and the Act answers all A Self-conscious Principle without which we can't conceive a Mind makes a Mind one with it self and distinguishes it from all other Minds and by the Acts of Self-consciousness which suppose the Principle every Mind feels it self to be One and distinguished from all others And thus the natural Principle of Mutual-consciousness between Three Persons unites them inseparably in One Nature and the Acts of Mutual-consciousness are the Acts of Unity whereby they know and feel themselves to be essentially in each other and therefore to be essentially One Just as we consider Reason either as the Principle or as the Act the first constitutes a reasonable Nature the second is the actual exercise of Reason and thus all his Arguments vanish like Smoak rise in a dark Cloud but immediately disperse and are seen no more till they return as such Vapours use to do in Thunder and Lightning or some threatning Storm 1. His first Argument is this No Act of Knowledge can be the formal Reason of an Unity of Nature in the Persons of the blessed Trinity But an Act of Mutual-consciousness is an Act of Knowledge Ergo. Nothing will satisfie the Animadverter but formal Reasons whereas the Dean no where asserts That Mutual-consciousness is the formal Reason of this Unity but that Three Persons who are thus Mutually-conscious to each other must be essentially One nor does the Dean place this Unity in an Act of Mutual-consciousness which signifies the Principle as well as the Act and then Mutual-consciousness if it were no more than Knowledge of which presently must not be considered as an Act of Knowledge Arg. 2. If Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons be the Cause Reason or Principle of Mutual-consciousness in the said Persons then their Mutual-consciousness is not the Cause or Reason of the Unity of their Nature but the former is true and therefore the latter is so too If by this he means That these Divine Persons could not be thus Mutually conscious except they were essentially One it is true but nothing to the purpose for they may be thus essentially One by Mutual-consciousness or Mutual-consciousness may be essential to this Unity though they could not be thus actually conscious to each other unless they were thus united as to have and to feel each other in themselves If by the Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons he means the Sameness and Homoousiotes of Nature this I grant is a necessary Foundation for Mutual-consciousness without which they could not be One nor mutually conscious to each other but I deny that it is the immediate Cause Reason or Principle of Mutual-consciousness The ancient Fathers were very sensible That when the same Nature subsisted distinctly in Three distinct Persons the meer Sameness and Homoousiotes of Nature could not make this essential Unity and therefore they added their Perichoresis or the mutual In-being of these Divine Persons in each other which the Dean calls Mutual-consciousness which is the only natural Union and In-being of Minds He proves That Unity of Nature is the Cause and Principle of Mutual-consciousness because Mutual-consciousness is an essential Property equally belonging to all the Three Persons and therefore as all Properties and internal Attributes do must issue and result from the Essence and Nature and therefore can have no antecedent causal influx upon the same Nature so as to constitute either the Being or the Unity of it Now I grant That Mutual-consciousness does equally belong to all Three Persons for they are all mutually-conscious to each other and I grant that it is essential to the Divine Nature as to subsist in Three distinct Persons so in Three mutually-conscious Persons but yet Mutual-consciousness belongs not immediately to Nature but to Persons and is that intimate Union of Persons which consists in feeling each other in themselves The Dean will leave the Animadverter to Philosophize by himself concerning
LICENS'D ERRATA PAge 9. line 3. for usual r. unusual p. 21. l. 8. f. any r. an l. 24. f. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 22. Marg. l. 9. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 11. p. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A DEFENCE OF Dr. SHERLOCK's NOTION OF A Trinity in Unity In ANSWER to the ANIMADVERSIONS upon his Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever Blessed TRINITY With a POST-SCRIPT Relating to the Calm Discourse of a Trinity in the GODHEAD In A Letter to a Friend LONDON Printed for W. Rogers at the Sun over-against St. Dunstan's Church in Fleet-street MDCXCIV A DEFENCE OF Dr. SHERLOCK's NOTION OF A Trinity in Unity c. SIR I Had heard very often and very much of the Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock's Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity but I had also heard such a Character of it which both Friends and Foes agreed in that I could not perswade my self to read it For a Satyrical Wit is no diversion to a Wise Man except in a Play and where it hurts no Body and I could never think that true Divine Wisdom rests on an ill-natured and perverse Spirit But your late Letter awakened me for I could not but think that Book whatever other Faults it had must be worth reading which you could think worth answering and seem so impatiently to expect when the Dean or some body for him should Answer it As for the Dean he has given Testimony to the World that he has not been Idle all this while but much better employed And to speak my Mind freely I don't see how he is obliged to Answer unless you think a Man bound to Answer Ballads and Lampoons for he is as little concerned in it as you are that had it not been for the Title Page and some particular Expressions which the Dean uses and the Animadverter furiously opposes without understanding them I could never have guessed against whom he had Writ I had a little before read over the Vindication and the Notions lay fresh and easie in my Mind but as soon as I dipt into the Animadversions they were all on a sudden confounded and put into disorder The Animadverter Disputes earnestly subtilly and triumphantly opens his whole Armory of Metaphysicks and because they are thin airy Weapons which do no great Execution he points them with Wit and Satyr to make them pierce the deeper It was the Saying of a very Witty Man that He who Writes lies down but it is to be supposed he forgot it when he made the Experiment himself But I must say this for the Animadverter That he is as fair an Adversary upon this account as one would desire as he spares not those who lie down before him so he very civilly takes his turn and lays himself as fairly open to Satyrical Wit if the Dean or any of his Friends would condescend to exercise it upon him When he ventures upon any thing like Wit he always makes himself a Jest and never so much insults and triumphs over an Enemy as where he is certainly himself in the Wrong I will not entertain you with particular Remarks of this Nature read over his Book again if you have the Patience and see if this be not true But Sir as well as I love you I 'm resolved to humble you for giving me the trouble of reading this Book not by giving a particular Answer to the whole which would be too unmerciful but by convincing you that it needed no Answer and to let you see what a trifling Author you have either admired or feared will prove some little Humiliation to you But I shall do it in short to save my self as much as I can the pains of Writing and you of Reading and therefore shall consider only the main Points of Dispute between the Animadverter and the Dean concerning Self-Consciousness Mutual-Consciousness and Three eternal and infinite Minds He rages furiously against the Dean according to his Custom in a whole long Chapter for discarding those good old Terms of Essence Substance Nature c. for his own new-invented Terms of Self-consciousness and Mutual-consciousness that any one who reads it would believe That the Dean would not allow GOD to be a real Substantial Being or to have any Nature or Essence whereas he no where denies That these are very good Words and not only useful but necessary in some cases but yet very apt to confound us with Material and Sensible Images when we go about to form a Notion and Idea of GOD. We know not the naked Substance or Essence of any Thing not of Matter much less of Spirit and much less of an infinite and eternal Spirit and therefore as we can form no other Idea of Matter but by its sensible Qualities so we can form no Idea of a Spirit but by such Attributes and Powers as are proper and essential to a Spirit which is so far from being a Novelty that it is to think and speak with all the considering part of Mankind but let this pass which the Dean is no more concerned in were his Words and Sence truly and candidly represented than the best Christian Writers both Ancient and Modern as were easily shewn did I not fear the Animadverter should he know it would rail at them all for his sake for there is not a more Capital Crime than to speak any thing well of the Dean or to say any thing that he says That which the Dean is more immediately concerned in is the Idea he has endeavour'd to give us of a Trinity in Unity and all that he positively asserts of it is That it is a possible and intelligible Notion and no other in Sence and Substance than what the ancient Fathers made use of to represent this great Mystery by though expressed in other Terms To prepare you to judge equally in this Cause you must remember That the Substance of the Article is not concerned in it here is no Dispute about a Trinity in Unity This the Dean asserts in as full and ample words as the Athanasian Creed it self which some Trinitarians themselves boggle at but without reason as he thinks for whoever will acknowledge Three Persons in the Godhead each of which distinctly considered is GOD and has all the Perfections of the Divine Nature and yet are all Three but one GOD must as he undertakes to prove own the Terms and Explications of that Creed He has been careful to preserve a Real not a meerly Nominal distinction of Persons and yet asserts the Unity of the Godhead in as high terms as ever the Schools did even a Natural Numerical Unity and there is no reason to suspect he dissembles his Sence for then he might have concealed it too having no other obligation to engage in this Cause but a Zeal for this truly Ancient Catholick and Apostolick Faith Since then here is no Innovation made in the Faith nor any alteration of the least term in it what is the