the earth doth not alwaies find gold 4. In a cause not sufficient of it self as he is not alwaies learned that is industrious nor that ground alwaies fertil that is well tilled because to both these more is required The latter part of this Canon hath three limitations 1. In a cause by accident as he that doth not dig into the earth may find a treasure 2. In a cause that may but is not as a building may stand though the Architect be dead 3. As oft as the effect may be produced by diverse causes as Socrateâ— may die though he doth not drink poyson 2. The effect being granted the cause is also granted and the effect being taken away the cause is taken away also The first part of this Canon hath three limitations 1. In an effect by accident as a treasure may be found though the earth be not digged 2. In an effect that doth remain after the cause as the house may remain though the builder be dead 3. In an effect that may be produced by diverse causes as a man may die though not by poyson The latter part hath also three limitations 1. In an effect by accident as a man may dig in the earth and not find a treasure 2. In an effect which was but is not as a building may be destroyed though the builder be living 3. In an effect produced by a free agent as there may be a Physician although he doth not cure any disease 3. Such as the cause is such is the effect and the contrary as if the tree be good the fruit will be good and the contrary both parts of this Canon have two limitations 1. In aequivocal causes and effects as the draught may be beautiful though the painter be deformed 2. In a material cause for some thing that is extrinsecal as ice is not fluid because water is so 4. That for which any thing is such is much more such it self as the air being hot by reason of fire doth argue that fire is much hotter than air This rule faileth 1. Where both are not such as wine which maketh a man drunk is not it self more drunk because drunkenness cannot be said to be in wine 2. Where it doth not receive more and less as a father is not more a man than a son although he be the cause why the son is a man for humanity doth not receive more and less 3. In a cause not sufficient of it self as a Master which maketh his schollar learned is not alwaies more learned than his schollar for by his ingenuity and industry it sometimes so comes to pass that the schollar is more learned than the master 5. The cause is in nature before the effect as reason before risibility and this never faileth for a final cause in which it only seems to fail although it be in act and execution after the effect yet it is before it in the intention of the agent for which only reason it is the cause CHAP. XII Of the Topicks from the Subject and the Accident WE do not here take the subject for substance in which the accident is inherent or accident for that which doth precisely and adequately adhere to the substance but subject is here taken for all that to which any thing not belonging to its essence is attributed An accident is here taken for every such attribute as number is the subject of equality that is it is an accident of an accident An accident may be divided many ways and so may a subject for an accident is 1. either proper or common 2. Separable or inseparable 3. Inherent or internal and adherent or external 4. And chiefly it is either accidental as weariness doth accompany a feaver a pale Moon rain and all prognosticating signs Concomitant as an Eclipse of the Full-Moon and consequent as a day to the twilight signs and circumstances do also belong to this Topick The Canons or Rules are five 1. The subject being granted the proper accident is also granted and being taken away the proper accident is taken away also and the contrary as if he be a man he is risible and the contrary and if he be not a man he is not risible nor the contrary This rule never faileth by reason of the reciprocation of the subject and the proper accident 2. The subject being granted the common accident is also granted but not the contrary as if it be snow it is white but if it be white it is not therefore snow The first part of â—his rule faileth in separable accidents as if â—t be water it is not therefore cold And the â—atter part faileth 1. In a proper accident â—he first way as if there be knowledge there â—s a man 2. In an individual accident as â—f there be this whiteness there is snow because an accident doth not change its subâ—ect 3. A common accident being taken away â—he subject is taken away but not the contraâ—y as if it be not white it is not snow but yet there may be white though there be no snow The first part faileth in a separable accident the latter in a proper accident the first way and in an individual accident and subject as in the former rule 4. The thing being granted the circumstance of time and place is granted and the circumstance being taken away the thing is taken away as if Milo did kill Clodius then Milo was living and present if he was neither living nor present he did not kill him This rule never faileth in any requisite circumstance necessarily 5. The antecedent concomitant consequent being granted the consequent concomitant and antecedent for every exigence is also granted to wit a concomitant in being an antecedent in being or that hath been a consequent in being or that will be and being taken away the other is taken away also as if there be an Eclipse there is a full Moon if there be a birth there was a conception if there be a twilight the Sun will rise This rule faileth 1. In a thing not cohering necessarily as he which is a Philosopher must not of necessity be therefore poor and if there be a Comet it doth not follow there must be war 2. In things cohering necessarily if there be not a mutual necessity for though it be true that if there be an Eclipse there is a Full Moon yet it doth not follow that if there be a Full Moon there must always be an Eclipse yet these things not necessary are of great force to beget belief especially if many of them shall be joined together in one Hence Astrologers Physiognomers and Orators do highly value this Topick in questions of fact especially CHAP. XIII Of the Topicks from Dissentany and Comparison DIssentanies are either Opposites or Disparates as a Horse and a Bull. There are four kinds of Opposites of which Book I. Chap. 13. Comparisons are either in respect of quality as like and unlike or in respect of quantity or also of
the presence of a thing in a fit subject but privation is the absence thereof as sight is a habit blindness privation The Canons or Rules are three 1. Habit and privation are abâ—ut the same subject And hence privation cannot properly be but in that subject which is capable of the Habit a man therefore may be said to be blind but a stone cannot 2. Privative opposition requires determination of a certain time neither can privation be spoken of a subject but after the time that by its nature and fitness it might receive the habit as none can be said to be bald until the time that according to nature they should have hair 3. From privation to habit there is no regress naturally the privation being perfect that is such as doth take away the act and next beginnings of habit and leaveth nothing in the subject but the remote beginnings thereof thus he that is once quite blind cannot ordinarily and by natural means ever see again 13. Contradictory opposition is between contradictory terms And those things are said to be contradictory which are expresly contrary as affirmation and negation as a thing and not a thing a man and not a man The Canons or Rules are two 1. Contradiction is the first of all oppositions and so the measure of all the rest for in every opposition there is virtually included a contradiction and the opposition is to be thought so much the greater by how much it cometh nearer to a contradiction 2. Between contradictory things there is no medium neither of abnegation or of the subject and therefore one of the contradictory things is affirmed of a thing and not a thing nor of participation or of the form CHAP. XV. Of Order and of that which is said to be together before or after ORder is that according to which some thing is said to be before or after another thing or together with it 2. A thing may be said to be before or after another five several waies 1. In time 2. In nature 3. In disposition or order 4. In honour 5. In Causality 3. That is said to be first in time that is the most ancient thus Romulus was before Cato and the City Pergamus before that of Rome 4. That is said to be first in nature which cannot be reciprocally affirmed in consecution of existence as there is a man therefore there is a living creature but it doth not follow there is a living creature therefore there is a man a living creature therefore is in nature before a man and every Genus before its species 5. That is said to be first in order or disposition which is nearest the beginning Thus the Exordium in an oration is said to be before the proposition the proposition before the narration the narration before the confirmation the confirmation before the refutation the refutation before the conclusion and in every science or discipline that is first which is put in the first place and thus letters are before syllables 6. That is said to be first in honour or dignity that is the most worthy thus a King is before his Subjects a Father before his Son a Master before his Servant Gold before Silver and Vertue before Gold 7. That is said to be first in Causality which is any way the cause of another's existence thus the Sun is before Light 8. So many waies as a thing may be said to be before another it may also be said to be after 9. So many waies as a thing may be said to be before another it may be also said to be together with another but two of the waies are more usual than the rest together in time and together in nature 10. They are said to be together in time that are existent at the same time 11. Things may be said to be together two waies primarily and secundarily 12. They are said to be primarily together in time which begin to be at the same time and they are said to be secundarily together in time when the one begins to be before the other doth cease to be thus Aristotle and Plato are said to be cotemporaneous or together in time though Plato was born before Aristotle and did also die before him 13. Things may be said to be together in nature two ways first simply and absolutely and then in respect of some third 14. Things are said to be together simply and absolutely which are reciprocally together according to the consecution of existence but so that the one is not the cause of the others existence Thus the relate and correlate are together in nature and two effects depending upon the same next cause as risibility and docibility in man 15. Things are said to be together in respect of some third thing which under the same Genus are in division opposed to one another thus a man and a beast are said to be together in nature not simply and absolutely in respect of themselves but in respect of a living creature for a living creature is predicated of them both together and not of one first and another after In this a Synonymous Genus is distinguished from a homonymous or aequivocal Genus because this is not predicated of its several species together but of one first and another after CHAP. XVI Of Motion COncerning Motion four things are to be considered 1. The Praecognita 2. The Definition 3. The several kinds 4. The Rules belonging to it 2. The Praecognita are either such as concern the definition or such as concern the division thereof 3. The Praecognita concerning the definition of motion are three 1. The subject in which it is 2. The two terms from which and to what 3. The measure or instant time and from these three every motion must be defined 4. The Praecognita concerning the division of motion or the several kinds of it are also three 1. Motion is taken two waies viz. either generally for any mutation whether it be in time or in an instant and thus it comprehendeth Generation and Corruption or specially for some mutation which is made and measured by time thus it comprehendeth these four species augmentation diminution alteration and location and not Generation Corruption 2. Motion as it is divided here is motion generally taken and as it comprehendeth all these mutations 3. Motion although it be put as a post-predicament yet it is also in a predicament but in a diverse manner it is in the predicament of position as it is in its own nature but here as it is taken in reference to its terms from which and to what 5. Motion in the general is thus defined Motion is a mutation made in the subject viz. either in the first matter or in the body from one term to another either in time or in an instant 6. Motion is twofold instantaneous or successive 7. Instantaneous motion is that which is made in an instant and this is Generation or Corruption 8. Generation is an
predication in every proposition the which is not in a circle 2. In the Matter for the matter of a circle or middle term is uniform in both the demonstrations seeing it is the next cause of the major extream proving why a thing is but in regress the effect doth first demonstrate that there is a cause then after consideration had about the cause the cause doth demonstrate why there is an effect 3. In the end for in a circle the same thing is both beginning and end seeing it proceeds from a cause distinctly known to a cause distinctly known and returns from this to that but in regress the end is a distinct knowledge of the effect and the first progress is from an effect confusedly known to a cause to be confusedly known but from a cause confusedly known consideration being had we come to the distinct knowledg of the cause and from that once habituated and radicated in the understanding we return to the distinct knowledge of the effect 3. Conversion of a demonstration into a definition is when from the terms of a demonstration the definition of a proper accident is framed by transposition And the definition of a proper accident is twofold 1. Partial and that is either Nominal which consists of a Genus and a subject as an Eclipse in the defect of light in the Moon Causal which is the middle term in the most perfect demonstration shewing why there is an effect as an Eclipse is the interposition of the Earth 2. Total which being made of the nominal and the causal both doth consist of a Genus a subject and the next cause as an Eclipse is the defect of llight in the Moon by reason of the interposition of the earth A nominal definition is the conclusion of the of the demonstration A causal is the beginning A total is an intire or whole demonstration differing in nothing from it but the placing of the terms for the thing defined is the greater extreme the lesser extreme the subject and the cause the middle term CHAP. X. Of a Topical Syllogism in the General HItherto we have spoken of a demonstrative Syllogism whose matter is necessary and the end a perfect knowledge come we now to a dialectical or topical Syllogism whose matter is probable and contingent and the end opinion 2. In a dialectical or topical Syllogism we are to consider of Problemes Propositions and the invention of arguments 3. A Probleme or Question is the thing of which it is probably discoursed and the conclusion of a Syllogism already made But that this Problem may be dialectical two conditions are required 1. That it be profitable either to life and then it is called a moral Probleme as whether pleasure be good or to knowledge and then it is called a Physical or a natural probleme as whether the world be eternal or to some thing that is subservient unto these and then it is called a Logical Probleme as whether division be a Syllogism 2. That it be doubtful in which either the common people do dissent from wise men as whether riches make men happy or the common people dissent among themselves as whether usury be lawful or the wise men dissent among themselves as whether the heart be the most noble part of man 4. The parts of a Probleme are the two terms of subject and predicate As concerning the subject I give no directions because a dialectical Syllogism is not restrained to any certain subject But the Predicates according to Aristotle are four Genus Definition Accident proper and common He adjoineth difference to Genus if it be more comprehensive than the species or to definition if it be reciprocated with the species if the species chanceth to be attributed in any Probleme it is reduced to Genus 5. Dialectical Propositions ought to be certain at least probable and not Paradoxes 6. That is said to be probable which not being absolutely true doth rather seem to be true than false There are five degrees of probability for that is said to be probable which seemeth to be true either to all to most men or unto wise men and that either to all of them or to the most or to the wisest of them 7. That is said to be a Paradox which is true though contrary to the vulgar opinion 8. For the invention of arguments we are to consider common places and rules 9. A place is a sense or commmon note by whose help an argument is found 10. A Rule or Canon is a proposition containing the reason of the consequence in a dialectical Syllogism 11. Arguments are of two sorts artificial and inartificial 12. Artificial arguments are such as from the consideration of the parts of the probleme are not found but by rules of art 13. Inartificial arguments are such as are found without any help of art and these are nothing but testimonies 14. Several men do reckon the order of these heads or places severally Aristotle reduceth all heads to the four predicates mentioned before some for the more plainness and distinction reckon up twenty and five and this number some contract to thirteen others to ten and perhaps they may without any inconvenience be reduced unto seven 1. The Cause and the Effect 2. The subject and the Accident 3. Dissentany and Comparison 4. Conjugates and Notation 5. The whole and its parts 6. Genus and Species 7. Definition and Division In every of these places I will in the proposed order shew you the Canons to be observed and the restrictions of them CHAP. XI Of the Topicks from the Cause and the Effect THere are four kinds of Causes efficient material formal and final there are several sub-divisions of them but these following are the most convenient to our purpose as 1. Into total as Gold is the cause of money the Sun of the day and partial as timber in the cause of a house nature of learning 2. Into a cause actually as a builder is the cause â—f an house and a cause potentially as an â—rchitect may build an house 3. Into a reâ—ote cause as a feast may be the cause of â—â—ckness and the next cause as crudity in â—he stomach is the cause of sickness 4. Into 〈◊〉 cause simply and by it self as the Sun is â—he cause of light and a cause by accident as â—he Sun of blindness The Canons or Rules of this Topick are â—hese 1. The cause being granted the effect cannot be denied and if the cause be taken away the effect is taken away also as if the Sun shine it must be day if the Sun doth not â—hine it is not day the former part of this Canon hath four limitations 1. In a remote cause as he that drinks wine is not alwaies made drunk 2. In a cause that is obstructed in its operation as heavy things do not alwaies descend because they may be hindered by some thing that holds them up 3. In a cause by accident as he that diggeth in
or impossible thing S sheweth that that proposition in which it is sound must be converteâ— by simple conversion P noteth that the proposition must be converted by accident M noteth that the premisses must be transposed that is the Minor into the place of the Major and the Major into the place of the Minor C noteth that the Reduction must bâ— made by some absurd or impossible thing According to these disticks The letter S Simple conversion notes But P for Accident doth spend its votes The letter M doth Transposition use C notes that you th' apponent must abuse 9. Indirect reduction or reduction by bringing the adversary to some absurdity hath plaâ— only in these two Moods Baroco of the second figure and Bâ—cardo of the third and to reduce these two moods two things must be observed 1. If Baroco be to be reduced the Minor proposition must be contradictory to the Conclusion if Bocardo the Major proposition must be contradictory to the Conclusion 2. If Baroco be to be reduced the Major shall still be the same but if Bocardo the Minor according to these disticks The Major keep Baroco to reduce And keep the Minor for Bocardo's use CHAP. V. Of an imperfect Syllogism AN imperfect Syllogism is a Syllogism that hath some defect either in the number of the premisses in the disposing them or in the inference from them and is fourfold 1. Enthymem 2. Induction 3. Example 4. Sorites 1. An Enthymem is an imperfect Syllogism inferring the conclusion from some one proposition only as a man is a living creature therefore he hath a soul In which these three things are to be observed 1. In an Enthymem the first proposition is called the Antecedent the other the Consequent 2. If the Predicate be in the Antecedent and conclusion the Minor is wanting If the subject be in the antecedent and conclusion the Major is wanting 3. An Enthymem is a perfect Syllogism in respect of the firm proof and imperfect in respect of the evidence of the conclusion one of the premisses being understood but not expressed 2. An induction is an imperfect Syllogism in which from many singulars some universal conclusion is inferred as this man is a living creature and that man is a living creature and so of the rest therefore every man is a living creature In an Induction four things are to be observed 1. By singulars we are not only to understand Individuals but less universals Specials in respect of Generals and all integral parts in respect of the whole 2. If the enumeration of all the singulars be not full the conclusion will be false 3. Induction is the most convenient instrument to find out arts 4. An induction may be reduced to an Hypothetical Syllogism If Peter be rational If Socrates c. then every man is rational but Peter Socrates c. are rational therefore c. 3. Example is an imperfect Syllogism in which from one or more singulars we infer another particular as Catiline was punished for making sedition therefore this seditious fellow should be punished In an Examplary Syllogism four things are to be observed 1. An Examplary Syllogism is an imperfect induction 2. In every Examplary Syllogism there are four terms and therefore cannot be immediately reduced to a perfect Syllogism 3. An Examplary Syllogism is but of little force to prove a thing but of great force to perswade 4. In an examplary Syllogism this general rule is much observed in the inference that like doth agree with like 4. Sorites is an imperfect Syllogism in which from four or more premisses we infer a conclusion in which the first subject is joyned with the last predicate as Socrates is a man a man is a living creature a living creature is a body a body is a substance therefore Socrates is a substance And in this kind of Syllogism three things are to be observed 1. A Sorites conteineth as many Syllogisms as there are terms between the subject of the first proposition and the predicate of the last 2. A Sorites may be resolved into Syllogisms of the first figure 3. A Sorites is in use only in such terms as are necessarily subordinate in a causal or a predicamental subordination This way of arguing is grounded upon the first Antepredicamental rule And thus much concerning a Syllogism in the General and the several kinds or forms thereof CHAP. VI. Of the first Definition and Praecognita of Demonstration I Come now to speak of a special or Material Syllogism as it is restrained to certain conditions of matter 2. A Special or Material Syllogism is of three sorts Apodictical Dialectical and Sophistical 3. An Apodictical Syllogism otherwise called a Demonstration may be defined two ways either from the end or from the matter of demonstration 4. From the end of Demonstration an apodictical Syllogism may be defined Demonstration is a Syllogism begetting knowledge or making to know 5. Demonstration among Geometricians is a Delineation by Diagrams in which the truth of their propositions is exhibited unto the eye but amongst Logicians it is sometimes taken for every certain and clear proof and here it is strictly taken for a scientifical Syllogism 6. The Genus in this definition is Syllogism in which it agreeth with Dialectical Syllogism The difference is taken from the end which is Science 7. This word Science may be taken three ways largly strictly and most strictly 1. Largly for every cognition or true assent 2. Strictly for firm and infallible assent 3. Most strictly for the assent to such propositions as are known by causes and effects for firm and infallible cognition is either by sense and so we know that the sun doth shine at noon or by understanding as when the question is concerning universal propositions concerning the truth of which sense is not able to judge but the cognition of universal propositions is attained by or without a Syllogism 8. Cognition is begotten without a Syllogism when full assent is given to a proposition for the clearness of it in its self without any proof Thus we know that the whole is greater than any part thereof that God must be worshipped and such like This kind of Cognition Aristotle calls Intelligence and saith it is distinguished from Science by this that Science doth proceed from ratiocination but for as much as reason may be brought from several heads that cognition is here called by the name of Science which is begot either by the cause or by the effect And this is the most strict acception of Science and proper to this place 9. Or thus Science is a certain knowledge of conclusions to which we assent for our preceding knowledg of the premisses and the praecognita in every science are these three the subject the affection and the cause by which it is demonstrated that the affection is in the subject 10. The Question to be demonstrated is composed of the subject and the affection The premisses by which the Question
is demonstrated are made first by joyning the cause with the effect and then by joyning the cause with the subject In all these two things are to be considered the precognitions which precede the demonstration and the conditions which are to be observed in the demonstration it self 11. The Precognitions are two 1. That the thing is 2. what it is 12. In these precognitions the things which are evident and obvious unto all are so in the understanding only but the things which are not so evident but that they may be unknown are expressed in the very beginning of sciences 13. And if being delivered the learner doth presently believe them they are properly called fuppositions but if the learner either doubt of them or be of another opinion they are called postulata or things to which an assent is requested 14. The first of these precognitions viz. the Quod sit That the thing is includeth two things 1. That the thing sougt hath a being or a true existence and this answereth to the Question Is there such a thing 2. That the thing sought is the true predicate in a subject 15. The other of these precognitions namely the Quid sit What it is doth also include two things 1. The name or what the signification of the name is 2. The nature of the thing that is called by that name so that from these two precognitions four questions do arise of which two are simple and two compounded 16. The simple questions are those which do equally agree to accidents and to substances The first is made concerning the essence or existence by asking An sit whether it be or not The second maketh inquiry concerning the nature of it and asketh Quid sit What it is 17. The compounded questions cheifly agree with accidents the first asketh whether the predicate be in the subject as whether man be risible The other asketh why the predicate is in the subject as why is man risible 18. Of these four questions the third hath such reference to the fourth as the first hath to the second for then in simple terms when we know they have being we ask what the things are and in propositions when we know they have a being we inquire why they are 19. After these precognitions and questions the three praecognita are next to be considered namely the subject affection and cause 20. The subject is a simple term or less extream in the demonstration concerning which some accident is demonstrated by its next cause as a man concerning whom we must both know that he is and what he is First that he is or otherwise we seek the knowledg of him in vain for there is no knowledge of a thing that is not and then we must also know what he is not only in respect of his name but also of his nature for that must be the medium of the demonstration and we must know the medium at least confusedly before we can infer the conclusion The precognition of the things existence is called the Hypothesis of its nature the Definition 21. Passion is a proper Accident which is demonstrated of the subject by the proper cause it is always the greater extream which is predicated in the conclusion as Risibility the which is necessary to be foreknown in respect of the name what it is though not in respect of its nature and that it be considered how it is inherent for seeing it supplies the place of the subject it is in some sort called a substance Arist lib. 1. post cap. 27. but it is not foreknown That it is for that is the thing inquired after and which we are to find by demonstration 22. A Cause is that by which the passion or affection is demonstrated of its subject and is always the Major proposition of the demonstration as Every rational animal is risible that being known the conclusion is vertually known also as being vertually conteined in it but yet it is not actually known till the Minor be assumed which being known the Conclusion though after in nature yet is known at the same time also What the cause is cannot be foreknown because it is a compounded proposition and what a thing is is only of uncompounded but it ought to be known That it is or hath a true existence or else the Conclusion cannot be inferred from it CHAP. VII Of the Conditions to be observed in a perfect Demonstration A Demonstration is to be considered either in the respect of the matter or in respect of the form 2. In respect of the matter one kind of Demonstration sheweth why the predicate is inherent in the subject and that 1. By an immediate intrinsecal cause and this is either the before demonstrated matter or form or affection of the subject 2. By an immediate extrinsecal cause and this is either final or efficient by some transient action 3. Another kind of Demonstration in respect of the matter sheweth that the predicate is inherent in the subject and that either by the effect or by some remote cause 4. A Demonstration in respect of the form is to be considered 1. In quantity and so it is universal or particular 2. In quality and so it is affirmative or negative 3. In the manner of the proof and so it is either an ostensive demonstration or a demonstration reducing to some impossible thing 5. In the first of these kinds of demonstration called the demonstration Cur sit why a thing is the conditions to be observed do partly belong to the question partly to the cause or medium of the demonstration and partly to the premisses 6. Every question doth not admit of the first and most perfect kind of demonstration called why a thing is but such a question only as is true and hath a certain and immutable cause of its own truth 7. The conditions to be observed in the premisses of a demonstration are absolute or relative 8. Those are said to be absolute conditions which are suitable to the premisses considered absolutely and in themselves and those are said to be relative conditions which are suitable to the premisses in reference to the conclusion 9. The absolute conditions are two the first is that the propositions be necessarily true and reciprocal The second is that they be immediate or first 10. Demonstrative propositions must be true for that which is false cannot be known â—nd they must be necessarily so for from â—ropositions not necessarily true no necessary â—nclusion can be inferred unless by chance or â—ccident and they must be necessarily true in the â—ighest degree that is they must be reciproâ—l For they contein the next cause of the â—â—edicate which is such as that it is reciprocaâ—d with its effect 11. A proposition is said to be immediate â—o waies 1. In respect of the subject â—hen there is no more immediate subject beâ—ween the predicate and the subject as a â—an is rational a man is risible 2. In reâ—ect of the cause when no
more immediate â—â—use doth intervene between the predicate â—nd the subject as that which is rational is â—â—sible a man is rational 12. In a most perfect demonstration where â—â—e middle term is the material or formal inâ—rnal cause of the subject and efficient of the â—â—fect by emanation the major proposition 〈◊〉 immediate in respect of the cause but not â—f the subject as that which is rational is â—sible The conclusion is immediate in respect 〈◊〉 the subject but not of the cause as a â—an is risible The minor is immediate in reâ—â—ect of the cause and the subject both as a â—an is risible 13. In a most perfect demonstration wherâ— the middle term is not the internal cause of thâ— subject though both the major and conclusioâ— be immediate yet the minor is not immediate in respect of the cause This happen in every chief demonstration from the external cause as also where we proceed from one affection predemonstrated to the demonstration of another such as are all mathematical demonstrations for the most part aâ— Zab. de medio demonst c. 7. 14. The relative conditions to be observed in reference to the conclusion are three first that the premisses be the cause of the conclusion secondly that they be before thirdly that they be more known than the conclusion 15. The premisses may be said to be thâ— cause of the conclusion as the medium is thâ— cause why an affection is not only the cauâ—â— why the conclusion is known but the cauâ—â— why it is true and as the medium is before aâ— affection not in time but nature so the truâ—â— of the premisses is first in nature before thâ— truth of the conclusion Lastly as the medium is more known than an affection not bâ— a confused knowledge and in respect of us but by a distinct knowledge and accordinâ— to nature so are the premisses more knowâ— than the conclusion because we by reason 〈◊〉 the premisses receive the conclusion with full assent of mind we must needs assent to that more than to the premisses for according to Aristotle That for which another is such as it is must needs it self be more such Lib. 1. post cap. 2. 16. Premissâ—s are of two sorts Axiomes and Theses 17. An Axiome is a proposition of whose â—ruth no body can be ignorant the signification of the words being known 18. A Thesis is a proposition whose truth doth not sufficiently appear by knowing only the signification of the words but by the judgment of the senses or any other declaration and it â—s either a Definition or an Hypothesis 1. A Definition is that by which we shew what a thing is An Hypothesis is that by which we shew whether the thing be or not 20. The medium of a demonstration ought to be the next cause of the predicate and that either efficient or final and the efficient either internal or external 21. A cause may be said to be the next either absolutely or in his own kind here it is understood to be the next absolutely that it is such a cause as doth produce the effect and without which that effect cannot be For as much as there are four kinds of causes and in every kind some one the next of the four next causes there is but one that is the next absolutely 22. Moreover it is required that this next cause should be the cause of the predicate but it is necessary that it should be the cause of the subject also for the question is not whether there be a subject for this is supposed but whether there be a predicate or whether it be inherent in the subject 23. This next cause must be either the efficient or the final for when the predicate is an accident it hath neither matter not form properly so called The final cause is used in those things which are made for other such as are mediums and natural instruments actions also and habits if any such can be demonstrated The efficient cause is used in all the rest Sometimes it falls out that the next efficient cause is also the form oâ— matter of the subject and these kind of demonstrations are indeed the most excellent but do not make a different species of themselves but these things will be more clearly understood by the examples following 1. Every rational creature is capable 〈◊〉 knowledge Every man is a rational creature Therefore every man is capable of knowledge In this demonstration the medium rational is the internal efficient cause of the predicate and form of the subject 2. Every terrestial thing doth sink in water Ebene is terrestial Therefore Ebene doth sink in water Here the medium is the internal efficient cause and matter of the subject 3. Whatsoever doth consist of matter and form hath three dimensions Every body doth consist of matter and form Therefore every body hath three dimensions Here the medium is the internal efficient cause of the predicate and both the form and matter of the subject 4. That which hath three dimensions will not admit of another body in the same place with it self But every body hath three dimensions Therefore c. Here the medium is the internal efficient cause of the predicate and propriety of the subject 5. That which by the interposition of the earth cannot be enlightened by the Sun-beams doth suffer an Eclipse of the Sun-light But the Moon the earth being interposed cannot be enlightened by the Sun-beams Therefore the Moon c. Here the medium is the external efficient cause of the predicate 6. Whoso is made for the contemplation of Heavenly things ought to have his countenance lift up Man is made for the contemplation of Heavenly things Therefore c. Here the medium is the final cause of the predicate 24. Sometimes it so comes tO pass that one and the same question may be demonstrated both by the efficient and final cause so you may demonstrate that a living creature doth sleep either because the common â—ense is overcome by vapours and that the â—assage of the external senses are obstructâ—d and this is a demonstration from the â—ficient cause or that the animal spirits may be â—efreshed and strengthened and this is a demonstration from the final cause CHAP. VIII Of an Imperfect Demonstration or the Demonstration What. HAving hitherto spoken of the principal Demonstration or the Demonstration â—hy the next is the less principal or the â—emonstration What and which leaveth an â—mperfect knowledge and is twofold the â—ne is from the effect the other from a remote â—ause The first of these collecteth the cause from â—ome sensible effect for example Every thing that is risible is rational Every man is risible Therefore every man is rational Here the medium is the next effect and the predicate is the cause of the conclusion 2. The second of these demonstrations collecteth the effect from some remote cause for example That which hath not a sensitive soul doth not breath A Plant hath not a sensitive
soul Therefore a plant doth not breath 3. A Demonstration from the effect may be affirmative in Barbara and sometimes negative though seldome in Camestres 4. A demonstration from a remote cause iâ— negative very seldome affirmative and consequently is restrained to the third figure iâ— Camestres for example Every risible thing is an animal No Tree is an animal Therefore no Tree is risible 5. Demonstration from the effect 〈◊〉 more excellent than from a remote cause 1. In respect of the form the one being affirmative in Barbara the other negatiâ— in Camestres 2. In respect of the matter for in the one the propositions are most necessarily true and differeth nothing from the most perfect Demonstration but in placing of the terms and begetteth a perfect knowledge not simply but in its kind but the Demonstration from the remote cause is made of less necessary and not immediate propositions nor doth it beget a knowâ—edge that is perfect in its own kind and â—n which the mind may rest satisfied yet both of them are so perfect that they are either of them sufficientl to beget such a knowledge as to give us satisfaction of the being or not being of a thing CHAP. IX Of Demonstration in respect of thâ— form and of the Affections oâ— the most perfect Demonstration HItherto we have spoken of the twâ— kinds of demonstration in respect 〈◊〉 the matter we are now to speak of them iâ— respect of the form 2. The form of a demonstration is parâ—ly discerned from the quantity partly froâ— the quality and partly from the manner 〈◊〉 the proof 3. The form of a demonstration in respect of the quantity is universal or particâ—lar An universal demonstration is that iâ— which an affection is demonstrated of the fiâ— adaequate and universal subject by an immediaâ— cause as when we demonstrate risibility iâ— man by his rationality and all the most peâ—fect demonstrations are of this kind Wâ— a thing is so And a Demonstration provinâ— from the effect That a thing is is of thâ— kind also A Particular demonstration not so called â—s if the terms were particular is a demonâ—ration in which an affection is demonstrated â—om an inadequate and a less universal subject or â—om one part of the first subject only as when â—e demonstrate a man to be sensible by his â—nsible soul The form of demonstration in respect â—f quality is affirmative or negative An affirmative demonstration is that in â—hose conclusion the predicate is affirmed of â—e subject which happens in all demonstrations â—cept the particular which is sometimes neâ—tive A Negative Demonstration is that in whose â—nclusion the predicate is denied of the subject as Every thing that breatheth is an animal A wall is not an animal Therefore a wall doth not breath And this doth often come to pass in the â—emonstrate That from a remote cause it may â—so happen in all other demonstrations â—ough very seldome and that by conseâ—uence only for an affirmation is before neâ—ation both in reference to the thing and â—ur knowledge of it 5. The form of a demonstration in respect of the manner of the proof is either ostensive or by reduction to impossibility An Ostensive Demonstration is that in which the conclusion is evidently and directly inferred from former and more knâ—wn premisses c. Of which sort are all the before named kinds of demonstration A Demonstration by reduction to impossibility is when from granted premisses we prove thâ— conclusions to be therefore true because theiâ— contradictories are apparently false for example Every rational thing is risible Every man is rational Therefore every man is risible Here if the major be denied we may reduce the respondent to an absurdity bâ— taking the contradictory of the major thus No rational thing is risible Every man is rational Therefore no man is risible Which conclusion being manifestly false we infer that the major in the former syllogism 〈◊〉 well as the conclusion were both true or thâ— the two contradictories are together true or false and this kind of Demonstration is the meanest of them all But here we must observe that an universal contrary proposition is rather to be taken than a particular contradictory both because particular propositions have no place in demonstration as also because contrary propositions in necessary matter stand in the place of contradictory Zabarel lib. 1. post c. 22. sect 176. And thus having done with the kinds of demonstration I come in the next place to speak of the affections of the chiefest and most perfect demonstration and they are chiefly three Analysis Regressus and Conversion into a Definition 1. Analysis is the resolution of effects into their first causes to beget a perfect knowledge thereof for when there is a certain chain and subordination of efficients and effects although the latter may be demonstrated by the former yet the mind is not satisfied in that but inquireth further for the cause of that effect also and so forward to the first cause which is the form of the subject of which no cause can be given and in which alone the mind is satisfied as if Augmentation in all things living were demonstrated by nourishment and that again by the vegetative faculty and that by the soul 1. Regressus is the reciprocation of the cause and effect by demonstration which effect we do reciprocally demonstrate by that cause by which the said effect was it self demonstrated this affection or power is called Regressus because after our understanding hath proceeded from la kind of confused and experimental knowledge of the effect as nearer to sense to the â—ike confused knowledge of the cause and hath ripened that knowledge by often meditating on and comparing of the cause to the effect till it come from a confused to a distinct knowledge then it returns from that distinct knowledge of the cause to the like distinct knowledge of the effect Progress is therefore made by the demonstration That and by an after demonstration and hath respect unto the confused knowledge of the cause by the effect But regress is by the demonstration Why and by a former demonstration and hath respect unto the distinct knowledge of the effect by the cause and differs from that vitious demonstration which they call a circle in three things 1. In the form for a circle doth from the premisses demonstrate the conclusion and from the conclusion put into the place of the Major and the Minor simply converted it doth again demonstrate the Major then again from the same conclusion put into the place of the Minor and the Major simply converted in the place of that it doth demonstrate the Minor which any one that will may experiment by this instance Every rational thing is resible Every man is rational Therefore every man is risible But in regress we only demonstrate the minor from the major simply converted and the conclusion put into the place of the minor And so there will be a natural
convertible with living creature because it is convertible with man These are solved by distinguishing that which agrees with any thing of it self from that which doth so by accident 2. A Fallacy from a thing spoken in some respect to a thing spoken simply and this is when from the mean term disposed with limitation or after a sort with both or either of the extremes a conclusion is inferred simply and absolutely true And this may be three waies 1. When the limitation added destroies the term to which it is added as Socrates is a dead man therefore he 's a man 2. When the limitation added doth signifie a part as a Blackamore hath white teeth therefore a Blackamore is white 3. When the limitation aded doth signifie some notable circumstance of time place person and the like as It is fit to cast the merchants goods into the Sea for the preservation of the men in the ship therefore it is fit to cast the merchants goods into the Sea These are solved by distinguishing that which is simply and absolutely so from that which is so in some respects only 3. A Fallacy from ignorance of the argument and this is when either the state of the question is quite turned or wrested or the adversaries conclusion is not directly opposite to our Thesis according to the Canons of lawful opposition This happeneth if the disputation 1. Be not to the same thing as Socrates is rich if he be compared with Codrus poor if compared with Craesus therefore Socrates is both poor and rich 2. If it be not so in reference to the same as no Blackamore is white every Blackamore is white in reference to his teeth therefore a Blackamore is and is not white 3. If it be not taken in the same manner as Socrates doth run freely Socrates doth not run freely therefore Socrates doth and doth not run 4. If it be not in reference to the same time as The faithful under the law did believe that Christ was to come The faithful under the Gospel do not believe that Christ is to come but that he is exhibited Therefore the faithful do and do not believe that Christ is to come All Fallacies may in some sort be reduced unto this of ignorance of the argument even as all opposition may be reduced to contradiction These are solved by shewing the defect of the contradiction in some of the four mentioned conditions 4. A Fallacy from that which is not the cause for the cause And this is when that is brought for the true cause which either is no cause or else a cause only by accident or not like unto the effect This happens 1. When that which is not the true cause is brought for the true as if one would prove such a war to be a cruel war because of the appearance of a Comet 2. When that which is the cause by accident is brought for the true as if one would prove that the use of wine is to be forbidden because it maketh men drunk These Fallacies are very useful in such Syllogisms which drive the respondent to something that is impossible and they are solved by denying the false cause and shewing the true 5. A Fallacy of the consequent and this is when that is inferred from the antecedent as the consequent which yet is not the consequent This happens as often as the rules of conversion or conditions of Syllogisms are not observed And these are solved by shewing the weakness of the inferences either from the rules or from some other inferences of the same form which are infirm 6. A Fallacy from begging the question and this is when that is used for the mean which is not granted or is different from that which is sought but as much unknown This happeneth many waies 1. When the thing sought is taken in the same terms as thus every man is rational every man is a man therefore every man is rational 2. When the thing sought is expressed in words Synonymous or equivalent as if one would prove that a shilling is the twentieth part of pound because twelve pence is so 3. When the question is proved by that which is as much or more unknown as Heaven is immoveable because the earth is moveable 4. When the propositions do mutually prove one another as if one would prove that fire is the hottest because the thinnest and then again that it is the thinnest because the hottest It is solved by shewing the vanity and folly of such arguing 7. A Fallacy of asking many questions and this is when many questions or conclusions are confounded in one This may be two waies 1. When the same predicate is sought from diverse subjects as is the Earth Sea or Heaven 2. When diverse predicates are sought from one and the same subject as is man a living creature and a stone These are solved not by answering in one answer to all the parts of the question together but distinctly to every one And thus much concerning a Sophistical Syllogism CHAP. XXII Of Method I Am now to speak of Order or Method which is the fourth and last Logical instrument And Method is the disposing of things belonging to the same matter or subject so us that they may be best understood and easiest remembred 2. That the limitations of this Definition may be observed such things must be premised which do conduce to the knowledge of those that follow or those things at least must be spoken of first which are more easie to be understood than the rest 3. Method is twofold Natural or Arbitrary 4. A natural Method is that in which the order of nature and our distinct knowledge is observed Some controversie there is here amongst writers whether in the writing of any subject it be fit to speak of those things first which are first in nature or those things with which we are best acquainted And I think that for the most part we are best acquainted with that which is first in nature but if any time it happens otherwise then I concur with Zabarel that those things are to be spoken of first which come first under our cognizance and not those that are first in their own nature 5. In a natural method all the parts ought to be Homogeneal We ought not in a natural method to mingle one science with another as Ethicks in a treatise of Geometry or Geometry in a treatise of Ethicks This must be strictly observed in all precepts which belong to the essence of any science but in the commentaries or expositions of any precepts we may make use of any other science as well as of that of which we write or speak as in writing of Physick we may repeat something of Logick or in writing of Ethicks we may make use of something in Physick 6. In a natural Method we must speak first of Generals and then of Particulars and as we proceed from one thing to another every part must have a dependence