consequent and contracted necessity But our inclination to evil is accidental Therefore it is not a necessary sin in respect of a consequent and contracted necessity The second Syllogism Every thing that is necessary in respect of a consequent and contracted necessity is intrinsecal and essential But inclination to evil is not intrinsecal and essential Therefore it is not necessary in regard of a consequent and contracted necessity The major in both Syllogisms is evidently false as will appear when you attempt the proof of them and I am very confident you never will own them if you can any other way shift off my objections In the next place we have a strange Paradox of yours which I understand not I shall propound it and briefly consider it Dr. Taylor If it be in our nature it must be naturally inseparable it must be at first it must be in all persons that have our nature Jeanes I shall not peremptorily charge this Proposition with falshood until I know how you explicate it and yet I will tell you what reason I have to suspect it to be very false divers accidents are in our nature properly and strictly inherent in our nature which yet are naturally separable from our nature which were not at first which are not now in all persons that have our nature I might instance in several acquired habits and immanent acts of the rational soul which are neither adequate unto nor coeval with nor naturally inseparable from it But I look for some strange Ellipsis a Rhetorical Scheme it seems you are much delighted with but if you use it too often it will prove rather a Weed then a Flower in your Rhetorick you expect it seems I should pay such reverence unto your Writings as great Criticks do unto the Ancients in whose words when they cannot make sense they suppose some Chasma to fill up with which they torture their brains but I have something else to do then to trouble my self with Divinations at your meaning when you vouchsafe to acquaint us what it is I shall then examine it But having seen how ill you have sped in new shaping your conclusion let us see next whether your success be better in the qualification of your second reason for it Dr. Taylor And this is my meaning and that you may not be troubled at the word Essential I mean it not in the strict Physical but in the moral sense that which is not after our nature but together with it in real being and explicate it by extrinsecal and I oppose it to accidental in this reason and to superinduc'd in the next Jeanes But first pray who could tell that you thus meant it until you now tell me Is this a usual and received sense of the word and if it be direct me unto those moral Philosophers and Divines that thus take it if it be not my ignorance of it is purae negationis not pravae dispositionis not privative and blameable Analogum per se positum stat pro famosiori Analogato and therefore I appeal unto your own ingenuity whether I have injured you by supposing that you took Essential in the accustomed acception thereof 2. I shall beseech you to set down the difference that you make betwixt natural in your conclusion and essential in your second reason for it and when you have done this I am very confident to make it appear that your Argument is either a meer tautology or an utter impertinency but of this before Next you refer me unto your former Letter unto Mr. C. Dr. Taylor Sir I did give an account unto Mr. C. in a Letter to him which I know was sufficient and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jeanes The vanity of this brag you will soon acknowledge when you shall compare that Letter with this unto me for in this you apply the second reason unto the latter cause as a congruent proof it it is an effect or condition of nature but no sin properly And this you point out to be your meaning and say That I could easily have understood it But in your Letter to Mr. C. you aver that this second reason is appliable onely unto the first clause That every man is inclined to evil some more some less c. and not at all unto the second nay that it is not appliable unto it without a mistake of not onely the second but the four other reasons also and of this too you say that it must be your meaning and that 't is clear enough and easie in the expression and you wonder that Mr. Jeanes if he be the man that he would be thought could mistake it Here you propound inconsistent and contrary meanings and it seems you intend to tie me unto such hard meat as that I must finde out each to be your meaning but this is a task that my understanding cannot perform and therefore I shall beg assistance from the light and learning of yours and until you afford this I shall offer unto your consideration this common rule in Logick That contrary propositions cannot be both true but one of them must needs be false But these two propositions this second reason is referred unto the second clause as a competent proof and this second reason is not referred unto the second clause are contrary propositions the opposition betwixt singular propositions being as Scheiblâ—r well sheweth de prop cap. 11. num 18. most aptly reducible unto contrariety and yet both these propositions are yours the first in this letter the latter in your former letter and therefore one of them must needs be false you are not then so much 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 extra teli factum out of Gun-shot but that my poor trifling Logick is able to reach you if you should deny the matter of Fact that both these propositions are yours your letters will convince you of untruth and I shall need no more then to transcribe your own words The first Proposition you have in these words of this Letter To be inclined to evil is an effect or condition of nature but no sin properly viz. of nature c. a sin natural and necessary now that it is not this I do suppose that reason which you so misconstrued is competent c. The second in several passages of your former Letter as for the other clause it is an effect or condition of nature but no sin properly that was the less principal part of the Proposition and to it onely the first reason was apportioned and again afterward none of the other reasons the first onely excepted relate to the latter part of the Proposition But let us hear your reason for the sufficiency of your Letter unto Mr. C. Dr. Taylor For cujus est loqui ejus est interpretari Jeanes I shall willingly grant you all fair liberty of interpreting your self so you do it logically and rationally but that which you expect is rather a licentiousness then a true liberty of interpretation
First You would have a license of transportation to carry your words where you please you would have the second reason placed betwixt the two Propositions and before the first Reason thus in your Letter to Mr. C. Next You usurp the license of interposition to put in what you please as when in this Letter you adde the Epithets of natural and necessary to sin And thirdly You take up a strange license in exposition of your Terms for if you cannot justifie what you say if such a term in your words be taken in the common and usual sense Then you impose upon me an unusual that I say not a new and unheard of signification thereof Thus you deal with the word Essential And lastly You assume a license of contradiction to contradict your self to say and unsay one while to make this your meaning and another time to make that which is contrary your meaning and you think that I am obliged to take these contrary meanings to be both your meanings Surely Sir if you can get a Patent for these four Licenses you will for matter of Disputation be shot-free and invulnerable your Opponents may throw their caps at you but not an Argument of theirs can touch you Dr. Taylor I told you perfectly what is my meaning it is very plain by the whole design of that that it must be my meaning it is also clear enough and very plain and very easie in the expression and therefore I now appeal to your ingenuity whether you ought to have made such Tragedies with that which common sense would have made plain unto you unless you had received a prejudice Jeanes As for this triumphant appeal which you make in the close here to my ingenuity I need say nothing but refer unto the premises onely I cannot but give one Advertisement unto your Disciples that you sometimes triumph when you have not conquered Dr. Tayler And now Sir to your two Syllogisms be pleased to the subject of the two Majors adde but this qualification natural and try if those horrid consequents will follow which you affixed to your own 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jeanes I have already considered with how little sobriety you have added this Qualification of natural and I believe the impartial Reader will conclude with me that you have foisted it in upon second thoughts onely to avoid those horrid consequents unto which your words in themselves are liable Dr. Taylor But I shall for this once consider the particulars 1. You charge it with non sense but with your favor you prove it most pitisully Your reason is that to say Essential is predicated of sin in either of the two ways dicendi per se is such puâ—ful and prodigious non-sense that you think it not worthy of any serious râ—sutation So that this is your Argument To say that sin is Essential is prodigious and pitiful non-sense therefore it is prodigious and pitiful non-sense Surely a good Argument or thus that which is such non-sense that you think not worthy of refutation is certainly non-sense But to say that sin is Essential is such non-sense that you think not worthy of refutation therefore it is non-sense I do not say your Argument is non-sense but I am sure it is no Argument unless a bold affirmative be a sufficient proof in your Logick But to the thing That sin is Essential is indeed false to say but to say so is not non-sense And whereas you will suppose me to say so you are uncharitable and something unreasonable in it for I was to prove That inclination to sin was not a sin of our nature as was pretended because what was natural is iâ—â—rinsecal and essential as Docâ—bility to a man which because to be inclined to sin is not therefore it is not a sin viz. of nature Jeanes First Here is a gross and egregious falsification of my words and that without any advantage to your cause Your reason is say you That to say Essential is predicated of sin in either of the two ways dicâ—ndi per se is such pitiful and prodigious nonsense that you think it not worthy of any serious refutation Whether these words be justifiable or no I need not inquire for there are no such words in my Paper neither can you with all your wit and learning infer any such matter therefrom Secondly To make sport for your followers you mis-represent my Argument and first clap it into a single Enthymeme and then into one Syllogism both of your own forging in both which you leave out two mediums that are in my Argument which reduced unto form will make up two Syllogisms To convince you of this unfair injurious and dis-ingenuous dealing I shall insert my words at large To say as the Doctor doth by consequence that sin is essential to the nature of man is an assertion guilty of nonsense a thing may be said to be essential to another à priori and then it is predicated of it in primo modo dâ—cendi per se or else à posteriori and then it is predicated of it in secundo modo dicendâ— per se And to say that sin is either of these ways essential to the nature of man is such pitiful and prodigious non-sense as that I cannot think it worthy of any serious refutation The learned Reader will soon perceive how little alliance your Enthymeme and Syllogâ—sm have with my Argument and to him I appeal to judge of the unworthy and unscholarly in jury that you have herein done me but yet for the eternal stopping of your mouth I shall Analyze this my Argument My conclusion was that to say as you do by consequence that sin is essential unto the nature of man is an assertion guilty of nonsense this I prove from a distribution of essential whatsoever is essential is such either à priori or à posteriori But to say that sinne is essential either à priori or à posteriori is non-sense Therefore to say that sin is essential to man is nonsense This Syllogism is grounded upon a known and received Maxime Negatis cunctis partibus subjectis totius universalis de aliquo subjecto negatur ipsum to um universale negatis cunctis membris dividenâ—ibus negatur ipsum divisum The major I presumed none would deny and as for the minor that I proved from a description of both ways of being essential That which is essential to a thing à priori is predicated of it in primo modo dicendi per se that which is essential to a thing à posteriori is predicated of it in secundo modo dicendi per se Now to say that sin is predicated of man in either primo or secundo modo dicendi per se is nonsense Therefore to say that sin is essential to man either à priori or à posteriori is nonsense The major I thought undenyable and as for the minor here indeed I stopped too in the proof thereof as thinking
superiori agente ad unum oppositum potest potentia propinqua exire in aliud oppositum Concedo ergo quod infert quod Michael beatus sit peccabilis in sensu divisionis loquendo de potentiâ remotâ Dr. Taylor But Sir what think you of Mortality is that essential or of the nature of man I suppose you will not deny it But yet I also believe you will confess that though we are sown a corruptible body yet we shall be raised an incorruptible and the mortal shall put on immortality Ieanes For answer I shall propound a distinction of mortality that is very obvious and ordinary A thing may be said to be mortal either respectu potentiae remotae or respectu potentiae propinquae 1. In respect of a remote power of dying which hath in it the remote cause of dissolution an elementary matter 2. In regard of a near power of dying arising from the actual conflict and corruptive influence of the Elements and their contrary qualities The latter Mortality is separable but then it is not essential As for the former Mortality which alone is essential I think very few doubt but that 't is also inseparable from the nature of a mans body for the immortality and incorruption of the bodies of the Saints in the resurrection will not be by taking away out of their bodies the remote causes of corruption the Elements and their contrary qualities for then their bodies would not be mixt and so not for substance the same that they were but by an hinderance or prevention of the corruptive influence of the Elements and their contrary qualities That I am not singular in this I shall manifest by transcribing the Testimonies of some few School-men who though they differ one from another in assigning the cause and reason of the impassibility and incorruptibility of glorified Bodies yet they all agree with Durand in this That glorified Bodies are not impassible per privationem potentiae passivae sed per aliquod praestans impedimentum actualis passionis nè fiat The first shall be of Scotus lib. 4. dist 49. quaest 13. Dico ergo quod causa impassibilitatis est voluntas divina non coagens causae secundae corruptivae per hoc est illud impassibile non potentia remota sed propinqua non à causâ intrinsecá sed extrinsecâ impediente sicut dictum est de impeccabiliuate supra c. exemplum hujus de igne in camino qui non egit ad consumptionem trium puerorum non quidem per aliquam impassibilitatem intrinsecam pueris nec ex carentrâ potentiae passivae nee ex contrario intrinseco impediente sed quia Deus ex voluntate suá non cooperabatur ad illam actionem The second is of Durand lib. 4. dist 44. quaest 4. Restat ergò quod corpora gloriosa non erunt impassibilia simplicitèr absolutè per privationem principii passivi cùm natura corporum gloriosorum sit futura eadem quae prius sed erunt impassibilia pâ—r aliquid praestans impedimentum actualis passionis nè fiat Quid autem sit illud utrum sit aliqua forma inhaerens an solum virtus divina assistens duplex est opinio dicunt enim quidam quod talis impassibilitas erit per aliquam formam inexistentem c. Alius modus est quod impassibilitas corporum gloriosorum non erit per aliquam formam inhaerentem sed solum per virtutem divinam assistentem beatis ad nutum prohibentem actionem cujuscunque extriaseci inserentis passionem This latter way Durand takes himself and endeavoreth to confirm it by three Reasons The third shall be of Suarez in tertiam part Thom disp 48. p. 531. nam licet in corpore glorioso maneat eadem materia idemque temperamentum ex qualitatibus contrartis inde solum fit corpus illud in nudâ naturâ suâ consideratum esse corruptibile in beatitudine retinere quasi causam remotam seu naturalem radicem corruptionis nihilominus tamen secundum proximam dispositionem intrinsecam esse incorruptibile impassibile quia affectum est aliâ quadam perfectione quae ex se potest impdire nè illa naturalis corruptibilit as in actum reducatur Dr. Taylor Once more Is it natural to be a natural that will not be denyed But then remember that although to be natural is essential that is of the essence of the body yet the natural shall arise without its naturality it is sown a natural body it is raised a spiritual Jeanes 1. That that which is natural is natural will not be denyed as you say but 't is propositio identica nugax a most trifling Tautology and unto what purpose you propound a question concerning it I know not 2. Of things natural unto man some are natural powers some are naturall acts Natural first powers may be and are essential unto the body and so they are inseparable too our Bodies when they shall be raised shall not want so much as one such natural power But natural acts are accidental and in the resurrection there may be no place for the exercise of at least some of them viz Generation Nutrition and the like as touching such things we shall be like the angels in Heaven as it were spiritual 3. In the Apostle 1 Cor. 15.44 it is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a natural body but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an animal or souly body that is actuated and animated by the soul after a natural way and manner by the intervention of bodily helps such as eating drinking sleeping and the like And in all congruence of opposition hereunto a glorious body is said to be a spiritual in regard of an immediate supportance by the spirit without any corporeal means and without any use of the generative and nutritive faculties Dr. Taylor So that you see if I had said this which you charge upon me which is contrary to my thoughts and so against my purpose yet your Arguments could not have overthrown it Jeanes Whether you do not here boast and triumph without a victory I am very well contented to refer it unto the learned Reader Since my penning of my exceptions sent unto Mr. C. I have read the Metaphysicks of Dr. Robert Baro that learned Scot and in them I finde the like of these three last Arguments of mine urged against the error of Flaccius Illyricus that Original Sin is of the substance of man and essential to him after the fall a proposition subalternate unto that which I charge you with his words are as followeth Prima opinio damnanda à nostris Theologis a Pontificiis de naturâ peccati originalis est absurdissima haeresis Illyrici statuentis peccatum originale esse de substantia hominis seu esse quid homini essentiale post lapsum contra quam sententiam Bellarminus disputans varias affert rationes praecipuae hae sunt Primò si peccatum esset pars substantiae
humanae aut Deus erit author peccati quippe qui substantias omnes creavit aut si quis neget illam substantiam esse à Deo cogetur sateriâ—cam esse à Diabolo qui est author peccati necessarium enim est ut habeat aliquam causam at utrumque consequens est absurdum ergò antecedens Secundò aut Christus non assumpsit naturam humanam integram aut peccato non caruit quorum utrumque est absurdum Tertio Ad diem judicii natura hominis resurget aeternam vitam possidebit saltem quoad electos Peccatum verò tum nullum erit in glorificatis ergò peccatum non est quid esseatiale sed quid separabile est ab ipsâ naturd pag. 248 249. These reasons differ so little from mine as that you may think perhaps that I have borrowed mine from either Bellarmine or Baro which yet I assure you I did not The reason why now I recite these Reasons is to shew that my arguments are not such weak and pitifull things but that very Learned Men have made use of the like to disprove a proposition subordinate unto that which I goe about to refute Dr. Taylor It is good advice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if you had been pleased to have learned my meaning before you had published your dislike I should have esteemed my self obliged to you in a great acknowledgement Jeanes Your advice out of Aristophanes I like very well I am not conscious unto my self that I have towards you transgressed against it for before I uttered a syllable of dislike I used my best endeavor to finde out what was your meaning and to that purpose made use of that little Logick and Reason which I had and as for that meaning which I assix unto your words let the Reader determine whether I have violated any rule of Logick or Reason in imputing it unto you What I took to be your sense together with my Objections against it I sent unto Mr. C. to be transmitted speedily unto you exposing all unto the utmost severity of your examination and wherein I have here trespassed against charity or justice I would fain know Besides my distike I expressed onely in a private place before very few in private discourse and I have not hitherto published it from either Press or Pulpit Dr. Taylor Now you have said very much evil of me though I deserve it not Jeanes This I deny and flatly challenge you to prove what you aver Dr. Taylor For suppose I had not prosperously enough expressed my meaning yet you who are a man of wit and parts could easily have discerned my purpose and my design You could not but know and consider too that my great design was to say That sin could not be natural that it is so far from being essential that it is not so much as subjected in our common natures but in our persons onely Ieanes 1. Whether what you say of my wit and parts be not a seem I shall not trouble myself to inquire but leave it unto your conscience However I suppose you think your self far superior unto my poor self in wit and parts and I also readily acknowledge as much Now I wonder why you should think that I should so easily finde out what is your meaning seeing you whose abilities so far transcend mine be so unprosperous not onely in the expression but in the after interpretation of your meaning as that you dissent in a latter Letter from your self in a former Letter How can you reasonably expect that I who am not as one of your Profelites lately said worthy to be named the same day with you I shall not deny the truth of the comparison nor envy you the honor thereof should as the Pro verb is see further into a Mill-stone then you who are so Eagle and quick sighted Secondly Whereas you say That sin is not so much as subjected in our common nature but in our persons onely I doubt that I understand you not for to me it seems very evident that sin so far as a privation can be inherent is truly inherent in our natures for it hath all the Requisites of inherence that Aristotle layeth down Categor cap. 2. 1. It is in our nature 2. Not as a part of our nature 3. Neither can it exist sever'd and apart from our natures Sin is seated in all individuals of our nature whilest living here upon earth Christ his humanity alone excepted and therefore why may not we say that 't is subjected in our common nature Seeing those accidents are seated secundarily and mediately in second substances which are primarily and immediately placed in their respective first substances substantiae secundae substant accidentibus gratiâ primarum Yea but you will perhaps say it is subjected in our persons onely therefore not in our nature But this is a very sorry Objection ' For who knows not the distinction of subjectum in subjectum quo quod our persons onely are subjectum quod of fin our natures notwithstanding may be subjectum quo of it and we may say the same of other accidents I finde you pag. 494. quoting that usual Axiome actiones sunt suppositorum but if you had considered the limitations that are usually given thereof you would have spared the urging of it actio est suppositi saith Scotus ultimatè denominati ab actione sed non ut solius denominati ab ipsâ But you may have some deep meaning which I fathome not fair leave may you take to explain your self Dr. Taylor But besides this Sir I am a little to complain of you that when you had two words at your choice to explicate each other intrinsecal and essential you would take the hardest and the worst sense not the easiest and most ready Ieanes I have here given you not onely no cause but not so much as any shadow or colour for complaint 1. I gave a reason why I insisted on the word essential onely and passed by the term intrinsecal because you use intrinsecal as equivalent unto essential as is apparent by your opposing it unto accidental And have you said can you say any thing to the contrary 2. I would fain know why you should say that essential is a harder word then intrinsecal there is I am sure that equivocation in the word intrinsecal which is not in the word essential for that which is accidental may be intrinsecal there being intrinsecal as well as extrinsecal accidents interaum externum say Philofophers sumuntur vel ratione essentiae vel ratione loci subjecti Dr. Taylor For you cannot but know that essential is not always to be taken in the strictest sense of Philosophy for that which is constitutive of a nature but largely and for all sorts of properties and the universal accidents of nature Ieanes The distinction of essential into that which is such constitutivè as constituting the essence or that which is such consequentivè as necessarily