THE PREROGATIVE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT A Politicall Discourse in two Books The former Containing the first Praeliminary of Oceana inlarged interpreted and vindicated from all such mistakes or slanders as have been alledged against it under the Notion of Objections The Second Concerning Ordination against Dr. H. Hamond Dr. L. Seaman And the Authors they follow In which two Books is contained the whole Commonwealth of the Hebrews or of Israel Senate People and Magistracy both as it stood in the Institution by Moses and as it came to be formed after the Captivity As also the different Policies introduced into the Church of Christ during the time of the Apostles By JAMES HARRINGTON Without counsell purposes are disappointed but in the multitude of Counsellors they are established Solomon La multitudine è piu Savia è piu costante ch'vn Principe Machiavil LONDON Printed for Tho. Brewster at the three Bibles at the West end of Pauls Church-yard 1658. The Epistle Dedicatory I Dedicate my Book to the Mirth and Discourse of the Vniversity Wits or good Companies upon condition that they laugh not alwaies in the wrong place for if a Man who can tell what he would have be ridiculous what are such as would have they know not what Policy is an Art Art is the Observation or Imitation of Nature Nature is the Providence of God in the Government of the world whence he that proceeds according unto Principles acknowledgeth Government unto God and he that proceeds in defiance of Principles attributes Government unto Chance which denying the true God or introducing a false One is the highest point of Atheisme or Superstition Nullum numen abest si sit Prudentia sed te Nos facimus Fortuna Deam Coeloque locamus I neither do nor ever did refuse Obedience unto any Government I never was nor am of any party I go not about as some that would impose their own impertinence or absurdities upon me endeavour to insinuate to settle a Commonwealth an 't please you which belongs not to me but I undertake as any man may do to vindicate the reason of Popular government In which Controversie let him that will buckle with me I will give him a fall or he shall give me one nor care I whether because who ever get the fall the good Companies and the good people too of this Nation will get arise in that knowledge which if we be not like them that dwell upon the Cataracts of Nylus among all this noice we have bad and are like to have of Axes and Hammers is the most seasonable and necessary But the University Wits or good Companies are good at two Things at diminishing a Commonwealth and at Multiplying a Louse An Answer to three Objections against Popular government that were given me after these two Books were Printed Object 1. MOnarchical government is more Natural because wee see even in Commonwealths that they have recourse unto this as Lacedemon in her Kings Rome both in her Consuls and Dictators and Venice in her Dukes Answer Government whether Popular or Monarchical is equally artificial wherefore to know which is the more natural we must consider what piece of Art cometh nearest unto Nature as for example whether a Ship or an House be the more natural and then it will be easie to resolve that a Ship is the more natural at Sea and an House at Land In like manner where one man or a few men are the Landlords Monarchy must doubtlesly be the more natural and where the whole people are the Landlords a Commonwealth for how can we understand that it should be natural unto a people that can live of themselves to give away the means of their livelyhood to one or a few men that they may serve or obey Each government is equally artificial in effect or in it self and equally natural in the cause or the matter upon which it is founded A Commonwealth consists of the Senate proposing the People resolving and the Magistracy executing so the power of the Magistrates whether Kings as in Lacedemon Consuls as in Rome or Dukes as in Venice is but barely executive but to a Monarch belongs both the Result and Execution too wherefore that there have been Dukes Consuls or Kings in Common wealths which were quite of another nature is no Argument that Monarchical government is for this cause the more natural And if a man shall instance in a mixed government as King and Parliament to say that the King in this was more natural then the Parliament must be a strange Affirmation To argue from the Roman Dictator an imperfection which ruin'd that Commonwealth and was not to be found in any other that all Common-wealths have had the like recourse in exigences unto the like remedy is quite contrary to the universal testimony of Prudence or Story A man who considers that the Commonwealth of Venice hath stood one thousand years which never any Monarchy did and yet shall affirm that Monarchical government is more natural then Popular must affirm that a thing which is less natural may be more durable and permanent then a thing that is more natural Whether is a government of Laws less natural then a government of Men or is it more natural unto a Prince to govern by Laws or by Will Compare the violences and bloody rapes perpetually made upon the Crown or Royal dignity in the Monarchies of the Hebrews and the Romans with the State of the government under either Commonwealth and tell me which was less violent or whether that which is more violent must therefore be more natural Object 2. The government of Heaven is a Monarchy so is the government of Hell Answer In this saith Machiavel Princes lose themselvesand their Empire that they neither know how to be perfectly good nor intirely wicked He might as well have said that a Prince is always subject to error and misgovernment because he is a Man and not a God nor a Divel A shepherd unto his flock a plough-man to his team is a better Nature and so not only an absolute Prince but as it were a God The government of a better or of a superior Nature is to a worse or inferior as the government of God The Creator is another and a better nature then the creature the government in Heaven is of the Creator over his creatures that have their whole dependence upon him and subsistence in him Where the Prince or the Few have the whole Lands there is some what of dependence resembling this so the government there must of necessity be Monarchical or Aristocratical But where the people have no such dependence the causes of that Government which is in Heaven are not in Earth for neither is the Prince a distinct or better Nature then the people nor have they their subsistence by him and therefore there can be no such effect If a man were good as God there is no question but he would be not only a Prince but
able to give Law without them For to think that he succeeds unto the Senate or that the power of the Senate may serve his Turn is a presumption will fail him The Senate as such hath no power at all but meer Authority of proposing unto the people who are the Makers of their own Laws whence the Decrees of the Senate of Rome are never Laws nor so called but Senatusconsulta It is true that a King comming in the Senate as there it did to his aid and advantage may remain so they propose not as formerly unto the People but now unto him who comes not in upon the right of the Senate but upon that of the People whence saith Justinian Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem quum lege Regia quae de ejus imperio lata est Populus ei in eum omnes imperium suum potestatem concedat Thus the Senatusconsultum Macedonicum with the rest that had place allowed by Justinian in the compilement of the Roman laws were not Laws in that they were Senatusconsulta or proposed by the Senate but in that they were allowed by Justiman or the Prince in whom was now the right of the People Wherefore the Zelot for Monarchy hath made a pas de clerc or foul step in his procession where he argues thus out of Cujacius It was soon agreed that the distinct decrees of the Senate and People should be extended to the nature of laws therefore the distinct decrees of the Senate are laws whether it be so a greed by the people or by the Prince or no. For thus he hath no sooner made his Prince then he kicks him heels over head Seeing where the Decrees of the Senate are Laws without the King that same is as much a King as the Praevaricator a Politician A law is that which was passed by the power of the people or of the King But out of the Light In this place he takes a Welsh bait and looking back makes a Muster of his Victories like the busling Guascon who to shew what he had thrown out of the Windows in his debauchery made a formal repetition of the whole Inventary of the House CHAP. VII Whether the Ten Commandements were proposed by God or Moses and voted by the People of Israel ONe would think the Guascon had done well Is he satisfied No he will now throw the House out of the Windows The principal stones being already taken from the Foundation He hath a bag of certain windes wherewithall to reverse the super structures The first wind he lets go is but a Puff where he tells me that I bring Switz and Holland into the enumeration of the Heathen Commonwealths which if I had done their Liberties in many parts and places being more Antient then the Christian Religion in those Countries as is plain by Tacitus where he speaks of Civilis and of the Customs of the Germans I had neither wronged them nor my self but I doe no such matter for having enumerated the Heathen Commonwealths I add that the proceedings of Holland and Switz though after a more obscure manner are of the like nature The next is a Storm while reproaching me of rudeness he brings in Doctor Ferne and the Clergy by the head and the shoulders who till they undertake the quarrel of Monarchy to the confusion of the Common-wealth of Israel at least so far forth that there be no weight or obligation in such an Example are posted As if for a Christian Commonwealth to make so much use of Israel as the Roman did of Athens whose Laws she transcribed were against the Interest of the Clergy which it seems is so hostile unto Popular power that to say the Laws of Nature though they be the fountains of all Civil Law are not the Civil Law till they be the Civil Law Or thus that thou shalt not kill thou shalt not steal though they be in natural Equity yet were not the Laws of Israel or of England till voted by the People of Israel or the Parliament of England is to assert the People into the Mighty liberty of being free from the whole Moral Law and inasmuch as to be the adviser or perswader of a thing is lesse then to be the Author or Commander of it to put an indignity upon God himself In which fopperies the Praevaricator boasting of principles but minding none first confounds Authority and Command or Power and nextforgets that the dignity of the Legislator or which is all one of the Senate succeeding unto his Office as the Sanhedrim unto Moses is the greatest dignity in a Common-wealth and yet that the Laws or Orders of a Common-wealth derive no otherwise whether from the Legislator as Moses Lycurgus Solon c. or the Senate as those of Israel Lacedemon or Athens then from their Authority received and confirmed by the Vote or Command of the People It is true that with Almighty God it is otherwise then with a Mortal Legislator but through another Nature which unto him is peculiar from whom as he is the cause of being or the Creator of Mankind Omnipotent power is inseparable yet so equal is the goodnesse of this Nature unto the greatnesse thereof that as he is the Cause of welbeing by way of Election for Example in his chosen people Israel or of Redemption as in the Christian Church Himself hath prefer'd before his Empire his Authority or Proposition What else is the meaning of these words or of this proceeding of his Now therefore if ye will obey my voice indeed and keep my Covenant ye shall be unto me a Kingdom or I will be your King which Proposition being Voted by the People in the Affirmative God proceeds to propose unto them the Ten Commandements in so dreadful a manner that the People being exceedingly affrighted say unto Moses speak thou with us and we will hear thee that is be thou henceforth our Legislator or Proposer and we will resolve accordingly but let not God speak with us lest we die From whenceforth God proposeth unto the People no otherwise then by Moses whom he instructeth in this manner These are the judgements which thou shalt propose or set before them Wherefore it is said of the book of Deuteronomy containing the Covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the children of Israel in the Land of Moab beside the Covenant which he made with them in Horeb Haec est lex quam Moses proposuit this is the law which Moses set before the children of Israel Neither did God in this case make use of his Omnipotent power nor Christ in the like who also is King after the same manner in his Church and would have been in Israel where when to this end he might have muster'd up Legions of Angels been victorious with such Armies or Argyraspides as never Prince could shew the like saies no more then O Jerusalem Jerusalem how often
or less as they phansie To which I answer by a like question What security will he give me that the People of any Commonwealth shall not cast themselves into the Sea A Prince may be mad and doe so but the people is naturally incapable of such madnesse If men will boast of their knowledge in principles and yet talk of nothing but effects why may not a Man fly as well as a Bird but if causes may be regarded let him once shew how the Will seeing it is not free nor moved without some Object should move the people in such a manner or for what they having all the Liberty and all the Power that can be had should strive Well that is soon done for the Land may come into the hands of Five thousand and so the Booty may be great and the resistance small Good The Romans being the wisest of all people went no farther towards the Remedy of their grievances then to strive for the introduction of an Agrarian in which they fainted too even to the Destruction of that Government Except these none have been so wise and if there be any such thing familiar with the Nature of the people why appeared it but once and then vanished without effect why did not the people for Example under the late Monarchy when the Dominion or Freehold of the Nation by greater shares was in a smaller party and they had not onely Riches but Liverty and Power too to whet them on ever so much as think of levelling Three hundred Men for the Nobility and Clergy in whom was the ballance were no more If it be reply'd that the people were not armed by whom did the Barons make War with the Kings If that they were not trusted with a Vote what was that of the House of Commons Let Dominion or Freehold stand upon what ballance you will unequal or equal from the beginning of the world you shall never find a people turning Levellers And as Reason is Experience in the root so Experience is Reason in the branch which might therefore be sufficient in the Case Nevertheless for clearer satisfaction in a point of such Concernment I shall endeaver to dig up and discover the Root of this branch or the reason of this Experience That which in Beasts is instinct whereof they can give no Account is in it self that wisdome of God whereby he provideth for them so is it with the People they are not Levellers nor know they why and yet it is because to be levellers were to destroy themselves For seeing I must repeat to repeat briefly There is no Territory of any Extent and Populousnesse where the Revenue of Industry is not twice as much as the dry Rent This hath been demonstrated in Oceana The revenue of industry is in those that work that is the People Wherefore the Revenne of the People where their industry is not obstructed is twofold unto that of the Nobility holding the whole Territory in Freehold But where their Industry is obstructed their Revenue is nothing Civil war being of all other the greatest obstruction of Industry the People in taking Arms must venter all they have for that which if they obtain they lose two for one and if they obtain not all for nothing Wherefore a People never will nor ever can never did or ever shall take Arms for Levelling But they are instructed with a Vote and therefore taking away the Lands of the five Thousand or diminishing the Agrarian by way of Counsel they need not obstruct their industry but preserving the Revenue of that may bring themselves into the possession of the Land too This will they this can they lesse do because being in Counsel they must propose something for the advantage of the Commonwealth or of themselves as their End in such an Action But the Land coming to be in the possession of five Thousand falleth not into a Number that is within the compass of the few or such an One as can be Princes either in regard of their number or of their estates but unto such an One as cannot consent to abolish the Agrarian because that were to consent to rob one another nor can have any Party among them or against their Common interest strong enough to force them or to break it which remaining the five thousand neither be nor can be any more then a Popular State and the ballance remaineth every whit as equal as if the Land were in never so many more hands Wherefore the Commonwealth being not to be bettered by this means the People by Counsel can never go about to level nor diminish the Agrarian for the good of the Commonwealth Nor can they undertake it for the enrichment of themselves because the Land of Oceana as hath been demonstrated being levell'd or divided equally among the Fathers of Families only cometh not to above Ten pounds a year unto each of them whereas every Footman costeth his Master Twenty pounds a year and there is not a Cottager having a Cow upon the Common but with his own labour at one shilling a day gets Twenty pounds a years which the Land being levell'd were impossible because there would be no body able to set a Labourer on work or to keep a Servant wherefore neither would nor could the People by Counsel go about any such businesse So there being no possible cause of disagreement between the Few and the Many the Senate and the People there can be no such effect whence this is the government which being perfectly equall hath such a Libration in the frame of it that no man in or under it can contract such Interest or Power as should be able to disturb the Commonwealth with Sedition Yet after all this the Praevaricator will only tell Mr. Harrington for to deny the Conclusion is a fair way of disputing that this Libration is of the same Nature with a perpetual motion in the Mechannicks But let me tell him that in the Politicks there is nothing Mechannick or like it This is but an Ideotism of some Mathematician resembling his who imagined the Stream of a River to be like that of his Spiggot Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis at ille labitur labetur in omne volubilia aevum The silly Swain upon a river stood In hope the Rolling bottome of the flood Would once unwind it self whose liquid clue The silver thread for ever shall renew The Mathematician must not take God to be such an One as he is Is that of the Sun of the Stars of a River a perpetual Motion even so One generation goeth and another cometh Nature saith Gallen hath a tendency to make her Creature immortal if it were in the Capacity of the Matter on which she hath to work but the People never dieth This Motion of theirs is from the hand of a perpetual Mover even God himself in whom we live and move and have our being and to this Current the Politician addeth nothing but
are also of two kinds As first the Reasons why a Government of Citizens where the Commonwealth is equal is hardest to be conquer'd are that the Invader of such a Society must not only trust unto his own strength in as much as the Commonwealth being equal he must needs find them united but in regard that such Citizens being all Souldiers or trained up unto their Arms which they use not for the defence of Slavery but of Liberty a Condition not in this world to be better'd they have more especially upon this occasion the highest Soul of Courage and if their Territory be of any Extent the vastest Body of a well disciplin'd Militia that is possible in Nature wherefore an Example of such an One overcome by the Arms of a Monarch is not to be found in the World And if some small City of this Frame have happen'd to be vanquisht by a potent Commonwealth this is her Prerogative her Towers are her Funeral Pile and she expireth in her own Flame leaving nothing unto Conquest but her Ashes as Sagâ—ntum overwhelmed by Carthage and Numantia by Rome The Reasons why a Government of Citizens where the Commonwealth is unequal is next the former the hardest to be conquer'd are the same with this difference that albeit her Peace be not perfect within her Condition is not to be better'd by any thing that is without Wherefore Rome in all her strife never call'd in an Enemy and if an Enemy upon occasion of her strife and hopes of advantage by it came without calling he presented her with her most Soveraign Cure who had no leisure to destroy her self till having no Enemy to find her work she became her own Nondum tibi defuit hostis In te verte manus Nor is there any Example that a Government of this kind was ever subdued by the Arms of a Monarch though some indeed may be found that have called or suffer'd Forraign Princes or Force to come in as Holland by Marriages of their Princes and Genoa through her Factions as those of the Fiesci and Adorni To conclude this part for the Reasons why a Government of Citizens so acquir'd or possest as through Marriage or faction is the hardest to be held there needs no more then that Men accustomed unto their Arms and their Libertys will never endure the yoak Wherefore the Spaniard though a mighty King no sooner began in Holland a small Commonwealth to innovate or break her Orders then she threw him off with such Courage and Disdain as is Admirable unto the World And somewhat of the like kind did Genoa by the help of her Doria in the vindication of her liberty from France To come by this farthest way about as I think the nearest way home Arms are of two sorts Proper or Improper that is Native or Forraign Proper and Native Arms are according unto the triple nature of Government of three kinds Servants in Arms as the Helots in Lacedemon the Timariots and Janizaries in Turkey Subjects in Arms as the Horse in France and the Sea-guards or Forces in Venice or Citizens in Arms as those upon the Lexiarcha in Athens of the Morae in Lacedemon and the Legions in Rome Improper or Forraign Arms are of two Sorts Auxiliaries or Mercenaries Auxiliaries are such as are supply'd by vertue of some League as were those of the Latines and Italians unto the Romans and those of the Cantons of Suisse except Zurick unto the King of France or they may be such as are occasionally lent freely or let forth for money by one State unto another the later whereof differ not much from Mercenaries Mercenaries are Souldiers of Fortune that have no other Trade then their Arms and let out themselves for money of such consisted the greatest part of the Carthaginian strength such is the land Force of Venice and notwithstanding the Antient League of France with those Nations such at this day are the Suisse and Scottish Guards and sometimes a good part of the Foot in France Machiavil discourseth upon these particulars in his Art of War unto Admiration by whom I shall therefore steer Where the Arms in bulk are proper and consisting of Citizens they have other Trades and therefore are no Souldiers of Fortune and yet because the Commonwealth hath Arms for her Trade in regard she is a Magistrate given for the good of Mankind and beareth not her Sword in vain they are all educated as well in Military as Civil discipline taking their turns in service of either Nature according unto the Occasion and the Orders of the Commonwealth as in Israel Athens Lacedemon and Rome which had if their Territories permitted and sometimes as I may say whether their Territories permitted or no as in Israel the vastest the highest temper'd the best disciplin'd Militia that is to be found in the whole compass of Story Some Armies of Israel have consisted of three or four hundred thousand Men Rome upon the rumour of a Gallick tumult armed in Italy only without Forraign aid seventy thousand Horse and seven hundred thousand Foot things in our days when the Turk can hardly Arm half so many not to be credited Hence that a Commonwealth which had not first broken her self or been broken by some other Common-wealth should not be found to have been conquer'd by the Armes of any Monarch is not miraculous but a natural effect of an apparent Cause In this place or upon this text Divines whom I would desire not to be Enemies of Popular power but to give Machiavil his due shall if they please hear him make a goodly Sermon in these words If Antient Commonwealths and Governments used diligence in any other Order to make their people Lovers of peace faithfully unto their Countrey and having the fear of God before their eyes they doubled it in this of their Militia for of whom should your Countrey expect greater faith then of such as have offer'd themselves to die for her whom should she endeavour to make greater Lovers of peace then them who only can enslave her by force In whom should there be greater Fear of God then in such as carry their lives in their hands This when Lawgivers and Captains rightly considered was the Cause why Souldiers were esteemed honour'd followed and imitated above all men in the world whereas since such Orders are broken and Custome is altogether deviated from the course of Antient prudence men are come to detest the iniquity of the Campe and fly the conversation of such as are in Arms as the Pestilence Where the Arms in bulk are proper but consist of Subjects they are the best next and but the best next as appears by all Examples Antient or Modern The Arms with which Pyrrhus Prince of Epyrus invaded the Romans were of Subjects yet that Prince though he were not vanquished by the Romans confessed their advantage and gave them over The Spaniard being a far more potent King then was Pyrrhus hath
would I have gathered thee and thy Children as an Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings and ye would not where it is plain that the Jews rejecting Christ that he should not reign over them the Law of the Gospel came not to be the Law of the Jews and so if the Ten Commandements came to be the Law of Israel it was not onely because God proposed them seeing Christ also proposed his Law which neverthelese came not to be the Law of the Jews but because the people received the One and rejected the Other It is not in the Nature of Religion that it should be thought a profane saying that if the Bible be in England or in any other Government the Law or Religion of the Land it is not onely because God hath proposed it but also because the People or Magistrate hath received it or resolved upon it Otherwise we must set lighter by a Nation or Government then by a private person who can have no part nor portion in this Law unless he Vote it unto himself in his own Conscience without which he remains in the Condition he was before and as the Heathen who are a Law unto themselves Thus whereas in a Covenant there must be two parties the Old and New Testament being in summe the Old and New Covenant These are that Authority and Proposition of God and Christ to which they that refuse their Vote or result may be under the Empire of a Clergy but are none of his Commonwealth Nor seeing I am gone so far doth this at all imply free-will but as is admirably observ'd by Mr. Hobbs the freedome of that which naturally precedes will namely Deliberation or Debate in which as the Scale by the weight of Reason or Passion comes to be turned one way or other the Will is caused and being caused necessitated When God commeth thus in upon the Soul of Man he gives both the Will and the Deed from which like Office of the Senate in a Commonwealth that is from the Excellency of their Deliberation and Debate which prudently and faithfully unfolded unto the People doth also frequently cause and necessitate both the Will and the Deed God himself hath said of the Senate that they are Gods an expression though divine yet not unknown to the Heathens Homo homini Deus one Man for the Excellency of his aid may be a God unto another but let the praevaricator look to it for he that leadeth the blind out of his way is his Divel For the things I have of this kind as also for what I have said upon the words Chirotonia and Ecclesia the Praevaricator is delighted to make me beholding underhand unto Mr. Hobbs Notwithstanding the open enmity which he saith I profess to his Politicks As if Josephus upon that of Samuel they have not rejected Thee but they have rejected me that I should not reign over them had not said of the People 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that they unchirotonized or unvoted God of the Kingdome Now if they unchirotonized or unvoted God of the Kingdome then they had chirotonized or voted him to the Kingdome and so not only the Doctrine that God was King in Israel by Compact or Covenant but the use of the word Chirotonia also in the sense I understand it is more Antient then Mr. Hobbs I might add that of Capellus Deus Populi Judaici Rex erat veluti Politicus Civilis Legislator God was as Political King and Civil Legislator of the Jews And for the use I have made of the word Ecclesia as no Man can read such as have written of the Grecian Commonwealths and misse it so I do not remember that Mr. Hobbs hath spoken of it To these things fuller satisfaction will be given in the second Book which nevertheless I do not speak to the end I might wave Obligation to so excellent an Author in his way It is true I have opposed the Politicks of Mr. Hobbs to shew him what he taught me with as much disdain as he opposed those of the greatest Authors in whose wholesome Fame and Doctrine the good of Mankind being concern'd my Conscience bears me witnesse that I have done my duty Nevertheless in most other things I firmly believe that Mr. Hobbs is and will in future Ages be accounted the best Writer at this day in the World And for his Treatises of Humane Nature and of Liberty and Necessity they are the greatest of New Lights and those which I have followed and shall follow CHAP. VIII Whether a Commonwealth comming up to the perfection of the kind come not up unto the perfection of Government and have no flaw in it WHat a Comonwealth comming up to the perfection of the kind is I have shewn both by the definition of an equal Commonwealth and the Exemplification in all the parts The Definition is contained in the first of my Preliminaries which because it is short I shall repeat An equall Commonwealth is a Government established upon an equall Agrarian arising into the super structures or three Orders The Senate debating and proposing the People resolving and the Magistracy executing by an equall Rotation or interchangeable election through the suffrage of the People given by the Ballot The Exemplification is the whole Commonwealth of Oceana Each of which by him who if his doctrine of pure and absolute Monarchy be observ'd can be no English man is called an Irish bog as in some sense it is seeing the Praevaricator hath set never a foot in it that will stand nor hath more to say then that where there is one ambitious poor man or one vicious rich man it is impossible there should be any such Government as can be secure from sedition Which first is rather to make all Governments alike then to object against any seeing that there should not be one ambitious Poor man or one vicious Rich man is equally if not more improbable in a Monarchy then in a Commonwealth Secondly That one Man alone whether he be rich or poor should without a party be able to disturbe a Commonwealth with sedition is an absurdity nor is such a party as may be able in some sort to disturbe the Peace by robbing upon the High-way or some such disorder always able to disturbe a Government with sedition Wherefore this feat goes not so much upon the ability of any one man Rich or Poor as the puissance of the Party he is able to make and this puissance of the party goes upon the Nature of the Government and the content or discontents thence deriving to the Few or the Many The discontents whether of the Few or the Many derive from that which is or by them is thought to be some bar unto their Interest and those Interests which are the causes of sedition are three the desire of Liberty the desire of Power and the desire of Riches nor be there any more for where the People through the want of bread
through violence offer'd unto their Women or Oppression rise up against their Governours it relates unto the desire of Liberty those also under the name of Religion make not a fourth but come unto One of the Three Now to speak in the first place of the Many and anon of the Few the people in an equal Commonwealth have none of these three Interests Not the desire of Liberty because the whole Frame of an equal Commonwealth is nothing else but such a Method whereby the liberty of the People is secured unto them Not of power because the power which otherwise they could not exercise is thus estated in them Nor of riches because where the rich are so bounded by an Agrarian that they cannot overballence and therefore neither Oppresse the People nor Exclude their industry or merit from attaining to the like estate power or honour the whole People have the whole riches of the Nation already equally divided among them for that the riches of a Commonwealth should not go according unto the difference of mens industry but be distributed by the Pole were unequal Wherefore the people in an equal Commonwealth having none of those interests which are the causes of sedition can be subject unto no such effect To affirm then with the Considerer that the whole of this Libration is reduced to the want of power to disturbe the Commonwealth must needs be mistaken seeing in the Commonwealth proposed the people have the power but can have no such interest and the people having no such interest no party can have any such power it being impossible that a party should come to overballance the People having their Arms in their own hands The whole matter being thus reduced unto the want of power to disturbe the Government this according to his own Argument will appear to be the Libration in which the power whereof the Governour is possessed so vastly exceeds the power remaining with those who are to obey which in case of contest must be so small a party that it would be desperately unreasonable for them to hope to maintain their Cause If the true Method then of attaining to perfection in Government be to make the Governour absolute and the people in an equal Commonwealth be absolute then there can be none in this Government that upon probable terms can dispute the power with the Governour and so this State by his own Argument must be free from Sedition Thus far upon occasion of the ambitious poor Man Objected I have spoken of the Many and in speaking of the Many implicitely of the Few for as in an unequal Commonwealth for Example England during the Peerage or Aristocracy the Many depended upon or were included in the Few So in an Equal Commonwealth the Few depend upon or are included in the Many as the Senate of Venice depends upon or is included in Great Council by which it is annually elected in the whole or in some part So what was said in an equal Commonwealth of the Many or the Poorer sort is also said of the Few or of the Richer who through the virtue of the Agrarian as in Oceana or of other Orders supplying the defect of an Agrarian as in Venice not able to overballance the people can never have any power to disturbe the Commonwealth in case they had such an interest nor can have any such interest in case they had such power For Example in Oceana putting the case that the Few were as powerful as it is possible they should be that is that the whole Land were fallen into five thousand hands The Five Thousand excluding the People could get no more Riches by it because they have the whole Land already no more Liberty by it because they were in perfect Liberty before nor any more power by it because through the equality of the ballance or of their Estates they can be no more by themselves then an equal Commonwealth and that they were with the people but would be much lesse the power or Commonwealth in which there be Five thousand Equalls being not greater but much less then the power or Commonwealth wherein the whole people are Equall because the power or effect of a greater People is proportionably greater then the power or effect of a lesser people and the Few by this means would get no more then to be the lesser people So the people being no bar unto the riches Liberty nor power of the Five Thousand and the desire of Liberty Riches and Power being the only causes of Sedition There could arise no Sedition in this Commonwealth by reason of the Nobility who have no such interest if they had the power nor have any such power if they had the interest the people being equally possessed of the Government of the Arms and far superior in Number In summe an equal Commonwealth consisteth but of one hereditary Order as the people which is by election divided into two Orders as the Senate and the Congregation in Lacedemon or the Senate and the Great Council in Venice for the Gentlemen of Venice as hath been often said are the people of Venice the rest are Subjects And an unequal Commonwealth consisteth of two Hereditary Orders as the Patritians and Plebeians in Rome whereof the former only had an hereditary capacity of the Senate whence it comes to passe that the Senate and the people in an equall Commonmealth having but one and the same interest never were nor can be at variance and that the Senate and the people in an unequall Commonwealth having two distinct interests never did nor can agree So an equall Common-wealth cannot be seditious and an unequall Commonwealth can be no other then Seditious If a Man be resolved as the Considerer is to huddle these things together there is no making any thing of this kind of Policy of which therefore it will be a folly to talk For example Lacedemon is either to be considered as not taking in the Helotes and then in her self she was an equall Commonwealth void of any sedition or cause of it how much soever she were troubled with the Helotes So the Objection made by him of her troubles by the Helotes is impertinently urged to shew that she was a Seditious Commonwealth Or if he will needs have it that she took in the Helots it is undeniable that she took them in unequally and so was unequall whence the troubles by the Helots must needs be impertinently urged against an equall Commonwealth Again when I alledge Venice from Piero Gradenigo that is for the space of about four hundred years from the present date at which time the Reformation yet in force began as an Example of an equall Commonwealth for him to instance in the times before when though the Common-wealth according to the intention were as Equal as now yet being not bound by sufficient Orders to give her self security of her Native Liberty her Dukes on the one side did what they pleased and the inraged
the banks to which end or none the same God hath halso created humane Prudence Wherefore there is not any thing that raiseth it self against God or right reason if I say that it is in humane prudence so to apply these banks that they may stand as long as the River runneth or let this Considerer consider again and tell me out of Scripture or Reason why not Mathematicians it is true pretend to be the Monopolists of demonstration but speak ingenuously have they as to the Politicks hitherto given any other demonstration then that there is difference between seeing and making of Spectacles Much more is that comparison of the Politicks going upon certain and demonstrable Principles unto Astrologers and Fortune-tellers who have none at all vain and Injurious For as in relation to what David hath said and Experience confirmed of the Age of Man that it is Threescore years and Ten I may say that if a Man lie bed-rid or die before Threescore years and Ten of any Natural infirmity or disease it was not through any imperfection of Mankind but of his particular Constitution So in relation unto the Principles and definition of an Equal Commonwealth yet unshaken nay untouched by this Praevaricator I may safely affirm that a Common-wealth is a Government which if it have been seditious it hath not been from any imperfection in the kind but in the particular Constitution which where the like hath hapned must have been unequal My retrait unto these Principles is called running into a bogg as if such as have no Principles were not boggs Informis limus Stygiaeque Paludes CHAP. IX Whether Monarchy comming up to the perfection of the kind come not short of the perfection of Government and have some flaw in it In which is also treated of the ballance of France of the Original of a landed Clergy of Arms and their kinds OF Monarchy I have said that whereas it is of two kinds the One by Arms the Other by a Nobility for that by Arms as to take the most perfect model in Turkey it is not in Art or Nature to cure it of this dangerous flaw that the Janizaries have frequent interest and perpetual power to raise Sedition or tear the Magistrate in Pieces For that by a Nobility as to take the most perfect Model of late in Oceana it was not in Art or Nature to cure it of that dangerous flaw that the Nobility had frequent interest and perpetual power by their Retainers and Tenants to Raise sedition and Levy war whence I conclude that Monarchy reaching the perfection of the kind reacheth not the perfection of Government but must still have some dangerous flaw in it This place though I did not intend by it to make work for a Tinker could not be of lesse concernment then it proves to the Prevaricator who as if he were obliged to Mend all falls first to patching with a Monarchy by Arms then with Monarchy by a Nobility at length dispairing throws away each and betakes himself with egregious confidence to make out of both a New Monarchy which is neither By observation of these three Flourishes the present Chapter may be brought into some Method The first blow of his Hammer or that whereby he intends the flaw or hole in Monarchy by Arms shal henceforth be mended and Tite is this That the Guards of the Kings person be not increased beyond Necessity of security that they be not suffered to stagnate at Court but be by a perpetual circulation drawn out upon service and chiefly that they consist not of one intire body united under the same head but be divided into distinct parties and Commands as we may see in France where though in proportion to the extent of their Dominions the Kings guards be more Numerous then those of the Roman or Turkish Emperours yet being divided into distinct bodies of French Scots and Switz under their several Colonels and Captains they have never been the Authors of any the least sedition And in Turkey of late years they begin to learn the Art of poizing the Janizaries by the Spahy's and so have frequently evaded the danger of their mutinies Which fine work at the first view goes upon this false ground that the Foundation of Monarchy by Arms is laid upon the Princes Guards or the Court Militia whereas Monarchy by Arms consisteth in no other ballance then the Princes being sole Landlord which where imperfect as it was in that of the Roman Emperors the Empire is the most troubled and where perfect as in Turkey the Empire is lesse seditions For that which he saith of France it relates to Monarchy by a Nobility and therefore is not to be confounded according to his method with this but refer'd unto the next branch As to Monarchy by Arms though it be true that the ballance of Dominion in any of the three kinds may be said to be Natural in regard of the Effect yet seeing God hath given the Earth unto the Sons of Men that of a sole Landlord as Turkey is not so Natural in the cause or foundation as the Timars and therefore requireth the Application of some kind of force as the Janizaries who are not the root of the Government that being planted in the Earth of the Timars or military Farmes and Colonies for that the Janizaries are not the Foundation of this Empire which was founded long before is plain in that this Order was not introduced till by Amurath the second but the Dragon that lyeth at that root and without which the fruit would fall into the Mouths of the Timariots by way of propriety as when the Knights fees granted first for life became afterwards hereditary in Oceana which would cause such a fall from Monarchy that it would become as we have seen the rise of Popular power the Lots in case this should happen of the Timariots little differing from those divided by Joshua unto the Children of Israel wherefore when this happens in the Turkish Monarchy it is at an end And that this doth not happen though there be diverse other concurrent Policies I would have any Man shew me how it could be but for the Janizaries Otherwise it is plain that the Janizaries being a flying Army on wing at all games and upon all occasions are not so much the guard of the Prince as of the Empire which ruin'd the Prey falls unto the Timariots as those that are in possession except these be ruin'd too who being all Horse and far greater in Number then the Janizaries that are Foot would in case the awe of the Prince and the policy of the Government which holds them divided were broken be invincible by the Janizaries who nevertheless by these aids can easily contain them Whence the sedition of the Janizaries like that of a Nobility may be dangerous to the Prince but never threatens the Throne whereas the sedition of the Timariots like that of a people would be more against the Throne
Those in England France and Spain introduced by the Gothes Vandals Saxons and Franks which were Aristocratical or such as produced the Government of King Lords and Commons Thirdly those in the East and Turkey introduced by Nimrod and Mahomet or Ottoman which were purely Monarchial Examples of the Ballance introduced by civil Vicissitude alienation or alteration of Propriety under Government are in Florence where the Medices attaining to excessive wealth the ballance altered from Popular to Monarchial In Greece where the Argives being Lovers of equality and liberty reduced the power of their Kings to so small a matter that there remained unto the Children and Successors of Cisus little more than the Title where the ballance altered from Monarchical to Popular In Rome about the time of Crassus the Nobility having eaten the People out of their Lands the ballance alter'd from Popular first unto Aristocratical as in the Triumvirs Caesar Pompey and Crassus and then to Monarchical as when Crassus being dead and Pompey conquer'd the whole came to Caesar In Tarentum not long after the Warre with the Medes the Nobility being wasted and overcome by Iapyâ—es the ballance and with that the Common wealth changed from Aristocratical to Popular the like of late hath discovered it self in Oceana When a ballance commeth so through civil Vicissitude to be changed that the change cannot be attributed unto humane Providence it is more peculiarly to be ascribed unto the hand of God and so when there happeneth to be an irresistible change of the ballance not the old Government which God hath repealed but the new Government which he dictateth as present Legislator is of Divine right This volubility of the ballance being apparant it belongs unto Legislators to have eyes and to occur with some prudential or legal remedy or prevention and the Lawes that are made in this Case are called Agrarian So an Agrarian is a Law fixing the ballance of a Government in such manner that it cannot alter This may be done divers wayes as by entailing the Lands upon certain Families without power of Alienation in any case as in Israel and Lacedemon or except with leave of the Magistrate as in Spain but this by making some Families too secure as those in possession and others too despairing as those not in possession may make the whole People lesse industrious Wherefore the other way which by the regulation of purchases ordains only that a Mans Land shall not exceed some certain proportion for example two thousand pounds a year or exceeding such a proportion shall divide in descending unto the Children so soon as being more than one they shall be capable of such division or sub-division till the greater share exceed not two thousand pounds a year in Land lying and being within the Native Territory is that which is received and established by the Common wealth of Oceana By Levelling they who use the word seem to understand when a People rising invades the Lands and Estates of the richer sort and divides them equally among themselves as for example No where in the World this being that both in the way and in the end which I have already demonstrated to be impossible Now the words of this Lexicon being thus interpreted Let us hearken what the Praevaricator will say and out it comes in this manner To him that makes propriety and that in Lands the foundation of Empire the establishing of an Agrarian is of absolute necessity that by it the power may be fixed in those hands to whom it was at first committed What need we then proceed any farther while he having no where disproved the ballance in these words gives the whole cause For as to that which he faith of money seeing neither the vast treasure of Henry the 7th altered the ballance of England nor the Revenue of the Indies alters that of Spain this retrait except in the cases excepted is long since barricadoed But he is on and off and any thing to the contrary notwithstanding gives you this for certain The Examples of an Agrarian are so infrequent that Mr. Harrington is constrained to wave all but two Common-wealths and can finde in the whole extent of History only Israel and Lacedemon to fasten upon A man that hath read my Writings or is skilled in History cannot chuse but see how he slurs his Dice nevertheless to make this a little more apparent It hath seemed to some sayes Aristotle the main point of institution in Government to order riches right whence otherwise derives all Civil discord Vpon this ground Phaleas the Calcedonian Legislator made it his first work to introduce equality of goods and Plato in his Lawes allowes not increase unto a possession beyond certain bounds The Argives and the Messenians had each their Agrarian after the manner of Lacedemon If a man shall translate the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 virtus facultas civilis Political virtue or faculty where he findes them in Aristotles Politicks as I make bold and appeal unto the Reader whether too bold to do by the words Politicall ballance understood as I have stated the thing it will give such a light unto the Authour as will go neerer than any thing alleadged as before by this Praevaricator to deprive me of the honour of that invention For Example where Aristotle saith If one man or such a number of men as to the capacity of Government come within the compasse of the Few excel all the rest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in ballance or in such manner that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Political faculties or Estates of all the rest be not able to hold weight with him or them they will never condiscend to share equally with the rest in power whom they excell in ballance nor is it to any purpose to give them Lawes who will be as the Gods their own Lawes and answer the People as the Lions are said by Antisthenes to have answer'd the hares when they had concluded that every one ought to have an equall portion For this cause he adds Cities that live under popular power have instituted the Ostracism for the preservation of equality by which if a man increase in riches retinue or popularity above what is safe they can remove him without losse of honour or estate for a time If the Considerer think that I have strained courtesie with Aristotle who indeed is not alwayes of one minde further then is warrantable in relation to the ballance be it as he pleaseth I who must either have the more of Authority or the lesse of Competition in the point shall lose neither way However it is in this place enough that the Ostracism being of like nature was that which supplyde the defect in the Grecian Cities of an Agrarian To proceed then unto Rome that the People there by striving for an Agrarian strove to save their Liberty is apparent in that through the want of such a Law or the non-observance
the hereditary succession and dignity of the Princes of the Tribes and the Patriarchs and that the Senate was for life differs not from the former for as to the divers working up of the superstructures in divers Common-wealths according unto the diversity of occasions it comes unto no Accomptable difference and much I conceive of this carving or finishing in Israel which had it been extant would perhaps have shewn a greater resemblance is lost For the Senates as to their Numbers that of the 300 in Oceana considering the Bulk of the People exceedeth not that of the Seaventy in Israel the succession and dignity of the Princes of the Tribes and of the Patriarchs was Ordain'd for the preservation of the Pedegrees which Christ being born are not any more to be of like consequence And that the Senators were for life derived from a former Custome of such a Number of Elders exercising some Authority in Aegypt though not that of the Senate till it was instituted by God from the descent of the Patriarchs into that Land who being at their descent seâ—venty persons and governing their families by the right of Paternity as the people increased and they came to dye had their Successors appointed in such manner that the number of Seaventy in remembrance of those Patriarchs was diligently preserved And forasmuch as the Patriarchs governing their own Familied which at first were all in their own right were consequently for life this also pleased in the substitution of others These things rightly considered I have not varyed from the Authority of Israel in a tittle there being neither any such necessaty use of Pedigrees nor uninterrupted succession of Elders for life in Oceana and unlesse a Man will say That we ought to have the like Effect where there is not the like Cause which were absurd the Authority of a Common wealth holdeth no otherwise then from the cause to the effect Oceana I say cannot be wounded but by peircing the Authority of Israel with which she is armed Cap a pie It is true as the Praevaricator saith in another place that Law can oblige onely those to whom it was given and that the Laws of Israel were given as to the power or Obligation of them onely to the Children of Israel But the power as hath been shewn of a Common-wealth and her Authority are different things her power extends no farther than her own people but her Authority may govern others as that of Athens did Rome when the later writt her twelve Tables by the Copy of the former In this manner though a Man or a Common-wealth writing out of Antient governments have liberty to choose that which sutes best with the occasion out of any yet whether we consider the wisedome and Justice of the Legislator supremely good or the excellency of the Lawes the Prerogative of Authority where the nature of the thing admitts must needs belong unto Israel That this opinion should go sore with Divines is strange and yet if there be any feeling of their pulse by this their Advocate or Attorney as true For while he finds mee writing out of Venice he tells me I have wisely put my self under her Protection or Authority against whom he dares not make warre lest he should take part with the Turk But when he finds me writing out of Israel he tells me that he is not aware of any Prerogative of Authority belonging to the Israelitish more then any other Republick which is to take part with the Devill So much for Israel Now for Lacedemon but you will permitt me to shake a friend or two by the hand as I goe The first is Aristotle in these words Inequality is the source of all Sedition as when the riches of one or the few come to cause such an overballance as drawes the Common-wealth into Monarchy or Oligarchy for prevention whereof the Ostracism hath been of use in divers places as at Argos and Athens But it were better to provide in the beginning that there be no such Disease in the Common wealth then to come afterwards unto her Cure The second is Plutarch in these words Lycurgus judging that there ought to be no other inequality among Citizens of the same Common wealth than what derives from their vertues divided the Land so equally among the Lacedemonians that on a day beholding the Harvest of their lots lying by Cocks or Ricks in the field he laughing said that it seem'd unto him they were all Brothers The third should have been the Considerer but he is at fewd with us all The design of Lycurgus he professes was not so much to attain an equality in the frame of his Government as to drive into Exile riches and the effects of them Luxury and Debauchery Gentlemen What do you say you have the Judgement of three great Philosophers and may make your own choice Only except he that hath but one hundred pounds a year can have Wine and Women at as full Command and Retainers in as great plenty as he that hath ten thousand I should think these advantages accrued from inequality and that Lycurgus had skill enough in a Common-wealth to see as much No sayes the Praevaricator it appeares far otherwise in that he admitted of no money but old Iron a Cart-load of which was worth little Well but in Israel where Silver and Gold was worth enough my Gentleman would have it that One man in the Compasse of fifty years might purchase the whole Land though that Countrey was much larger then this and yet where if the People had used money they would have used Trade and using both such a thing through the straightness of the Territory might have happened he will not conceive the like to have been possible No though he have an example of it in Lysander who by the spoil of Athens ruined the Agrarian first by the over-ballance that a mans money came to hold unto his lot then by eating out the lots themselves and in those the equality of the Common wealth But these things he interpreteth pleasantly as if the vow of voluntary poverty so he calls it being broken the Common-wealth like a forsworn wretch had gone and hanged her self a Phancy too rank I doubt of the Cloyster to be good at this woyk But whereas Plutarch upon the narrowness of these lots which had they been larger must have made the Citizens fewer then thirty thousand and so unable to defend the Common wealth and upon the use of this same old and rusty Iron instead of money observes it came by this means to passe that there was neither fine Orator Fortune-teller Bawd nor Goldsmith to be found in Lacedemon Our Considerer professeth That it is to him as strange as any thing in History that Lycurgus should finde credit enough to settle a Government which carryed along with it so much want and hardship unto particular men that the totall absence of Government could scarce
Wherefore neither doth the Agrarian proposed taking the ballance of Estates as she now finceth them make warre against but confirme the present Customes The onely Objection that can seem in this place to lye is that whereas it hath been the custome of Oceana that the Bulke of the Estate should descend unto the Eldest Sonne by the Agrarian he cannot in case he have more brothers inherit above two thousand pounds a year in Land or an equall share But neither doth this whether you regard the Parents or the Children make warre with custome For putting the case the Father have twenty thousand pounds a year in Land he goes not the lesse in his custome or way of life for the Agrarian because for this he hath no lesse and if he have more or fewer Sonnes to whom this Estate descends by equall or unequall portions neither do they go lesse in their wayes or customes of life for the Agrarian because they never had more But says Aristotle speaking of the Ostracism as it supplyes the defect of an Agrarian this course is as necessary unto Kings as unto Common wealths By this meanes the Monarchyes of Turky and of Spaine preserve their ballance through the neglect of this hath that of the Nobility of Oceana been broken and this is it which the Praevaricator in advising that the Nobility be no farther Levell'd than will serve to keep the people under requires of his Prince So that an Agrarian is necessary to Government be it what it will is on all hands concluded Chap. XII Whether Courses or Rotation be necessary unto a well-ordered Common-wealth In which is contained the courses or Pareâ—bole of Israel before the Captivivity together with the Epitome of Athens and Venice ONe bout more and we have done this as reason good will be upon wheeles or Rotation for As the Agrarian answereth unto the Equality of the Foundation or Root so doth Rotation unto the Equality of the Superstructures or branches of a Common-wealth Equall Rotation is equall Vicissitude in or Succession unto Magistracy confer'd for equal termes injoyning such equal vacations as cause the Government to take in the body of the People by parts succeeding others through free Election or suffrage of the whole The contrary whereunto is prolongation of Magistracy which trashing the wheel of Rotation destroyes the life or natural motion of a Common wealth The Praevaricator what ever he hath done for himself hath done this for me that it will be out of doubt whether my Principles be capable of greater Obligation or confirmation than by having Objections made against them Nor have I been altogether ingrateful or nice of my labour but gone farre much farther then I needed about that I might return with the more valuable Present unto him that sent me on the Errant I shall not be short of like proceeding upon the present Subject but rather over Rotation in a Common wealth is of the Magistracy of the Senate of the People of the Magistracy and the People of the Magistracy and the Senate or of the Magistracy of the Senate and of the People which in all come unto Six kinds For example of Rotation in the Magistracy you have the Judge of Israel called in Hebrew Shophet the like Magistracy after the Kings Ithobal and Baal came in use with the Tyrians from these with their Posterity the Carthaginians who also called their Supreme Magistrates being in Number two and for their Terme Annuall Shophetim which the Latines by a softer pronunciation render Suffetes The Shophet or Judge of Israel was a Magistrate not that I can finde obliged unto any certain Terme throughout the Book of Judges Nevertheless it is plain that his Election was occasional and but for a time after the manner of a Dictator True it is that Eli and Samuel ruled all their lives but upon this such impatience in the People followed through the corruption of their Sonnes as was the main cause of the succeeding Monarchy The Magistrates in Athens except the Areopagites being a Judicatory were all upon rotation The like for Lacedemon and Rome except the Kings in the former who were indeed hereditary but had no more power than the Duke in Venice where all the rest of the Magistrates except the Procuratori whose Magistracy is but meer Ornament are also upon Rotation For Rotation of the Senate you have Athens the Achaeans Aetolians Lyceans the Amphictionium and the Senate of Lacedemon reproved in that it was for life by Aristotle Modern Examples of like kind are the Diet of Switz but especially the Senate of Venice For the Rotation of the People you have first Israel where the Congregation which the Greeks call Ecclesia the Latines Comitia or Concio having a twofold capacity first that of an Army in which they were the constant Guard of the Countrey and secondly that of a Representative in which they gave the Vote of the People at the Creation of their Lawes or election of their Magistrates was monethly Now the Children of Israel after their Number to wit the chief Fathers and Captains of thousands and hundreds and their Officers that served the King in any matter of the courses which came in and went out moneth by moneth throughout all the moneths of the year every course were twenty and four thousand Such a multitude there was of military age that without inconvenience four and twenty thousand were every moneth in Arms whose Terme expiring others succeeded and so others by which meanes the Rotation of the whole People came about in the space of one year The Tribunes or Commanders of the Tribes in Arms or of the Prerogative for the moneth are named in the following part of the Chapter to the sixteenth Verse where begins the Enumeration of the Princes though God and Ashur for what reason I know not be omitted of the Tribes remaining in their Provinces where they judged the People and as they received Orders were to bring or send such farther enforcement or recruits as occasion required unto the Army after these some other Officers are mentioned There is no question to be made but this Rotation of the People together with their Prerogative or Congregation was preserved by the monethly Election of two thousand Deputies in each of the twelve Tribes which in all came to four and twenty thousand or let any man shew how otherwise it was likely to be done the Nature of their Office being to give the Vote of the People who therefore sure must have chosen them By these the Vote of the People was given to their Lawes and at Elections of their Magistrates Unto their Lawes as where David proposeth the reduction of the Ark. And David consulted with the Captains of thousands and hundreds and with every Leader And David said unto all the Congregation of Israel If it seem good unto you and it be of the Lord God let us send abroad to our Brethren every where the
Councill and the debate in the Senate so was it in Lacedemon A decree made by the Senate of Athens had the power of a Law for one yeare without the people at the end whereof the people might revoke it A decree of the Senate of Venice stands good without the great Councill unlesse these see reason to revoke it The Prytans were a Councill preparing businesse for the Senate So is the Collegio in Venice the Presidents of the Prytans were the Ten Proedri those of the Collegio are the three Provosts of the Saui. The Archons or Princes of Athens being Nine had a kind of Soveraigne inspection upon all the Orders of the Common-wealth so hath the Signiory of Venice consisting of Nine besides the Duke The Quarancys in Venice are Judicatoryes of the nature of the Heliaea in Athens and as the Thesmothetae heard and introduced the causes into that Judicatory so do the Avogadori and the Auditori into these The Consiglio de dieci in Venice is not of the body but an Appendix of the Common-wealth so was the Court of the Ephori in Lacedemon and as these had power to put a King a Magistrate or any Delinquent of what degree soever unto death so hath the Consiglio de dieci This again is wrought up with the Capi di dieci and the weekly Provost as were the Prytans with the Proedri and the weekly Epistata and the Ballot is lineally descended from the Beane yet is Venice in the whole and in every part a farre more exquisite policy than either Athens or Lacedemon A Politicall is like a naturall body Commonwealths resemble and differ as men resemble and differ among whom you shall not see two faces or two dispositions that are alike Peter and Thomas in all their parts are equally men and yet Peter and Thomas of all men may be the most unlike one may have his greater strength in his armes the other in his leggs one his greater beauty in his soule the other in his body one may be a fool the other wise one valiant the other cowardly These two which at a distance you will nor know one from the other when you looke nearer or come to be better acquainted with you will never mistake Our Considerer who in his Epistle would make you believe that Oceana is but a meer Transcription out of Venice hath Companions like himself and how near they look in matters of this nature is plain while one knoweth not Jethro from Moses and the other takes a state of Civill Warre to be the best modell of a Civill Government Let a man look near and the shall not finde any one Order in Oceana the Ballot only excepted that hath not as much difference from or resemblance unto any one order in Rome or Venice as any one Order in Rome or Venice hath from or to any one Order in Athens or Lacedemon Which different temper of the parts must of necessity in the whole yield a result a soul or Genius altogether new in the World as embracing the Arms of Rome and the Counsels of Venice and yet neither obnoxious unto the Turbulency of the one nor the Narrowness of the other But the sum of what hath been said of Venice as to the business in hand comes to no more then that the Senate and the Magistracy of this Common wealth are upon Rotation No more nay I am well if it come to so much For the Praevaricator catching me up where I say that for all this the greater Magistracies in Venice are continually wheeled through a few hands tells me that I have confessed it to be otherwise I have indeed confessed that albeit the Magistracies are all confes'd for certain termes yet those termes do not necessitate vacations that is the terme of a Magistracy being expired the party that bore it is capable upon a new Election of bearing it again without intervall or vacation which doth not altogether trash the Rotation of the Common wealth though it render the same very imperfect This infirmity of Venice deriveth from a complication of causes none of which is incident unto a Common wealth consisting of the Many wherefore there lies no Obligation upon me to discover the reason in this place But on the contrary seeing let me shew things never so new they are slighted as old I have an Obligation in this place to try whether I may get esteem by concealing some thing What is said every body knew before this is not said who knowes it A Riddle Riddle me Riddle me what is this The Magistracies in Venice except such as are rather of Ornament then of power are all Annuall or at most Biennial No man whose terme is expired can hold his Magistracy longer but by a new Election The Elections are most of them made in the Great Council and all by the Ballot which is the most equall and impartial way of Suffrage And yet the greater Magistracies are perpetually wheeled through a few hands If I be worthy to give advice unto a man that would study the Politickes let him understand Venice he that understands Venice right shall go nearest to judge notwithstanding the difference that is in every Policy right of any Government in the world Now the assault of the Considerer deriving but from some Pique or Emulation which of us should be the abler Polititian It the Councill of State had the curiosity to know either that or who understands Venice this riddle would make the discovery For he that cannot easily unfold this Kiddle doth not understand her The sixth kinde of Rotation is when a Common-wealth goes upon it in all her Orders Senate People and Magistracy Such an one taking in the Many and being fixed upon the foot of a steady Agrarian hath attain'd unâ—o perfect Equality But of this Example there is none or you must accept of Oceana The Rotation of Oceana is of two parts the one of the Electors which is Annuall and the other of the Elected which is Trienniall Speaking of Electors in this sense I mean as the great Councill in Venice are Electors of all other Orders Councills or Magistrates But the Common-wealth of Oceana taking in the whole People cannot as doth the great Councill of Venice wherein they that have right are but a few attain unto this capacity at one step for which cause she taketh three steps One at the Parishes where every fifth Elder is annually elected by the whole people there is no doubt but there was some such Order in Israel whereby the Monethly Rotation of her Congregation or Perogative by election of two thousand in each Tribe was preserved The next step she takes is at the Hundred whereby Election of Officers and Magistrates the Troopes chosen at the Parishes are well near formed Her third step is at the Tribe where the whole body of her deputies are in exact forme discipline and function Headed by proper Officers and Magistrates these altogether consisting of One
call or assemble the Senate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now if these words be sometimes otherwise taken what words be there in any language that are not often used improperly but that understood politically they must of necessity be understood as I have shewn or will so intangle and disorder Government that no man shall either make head or foot of it is that which I make little question to evince in the surest way that is by opening the nature of the things whence they derive and whereof they are spoken by the best Authors And because the words though the things they signifie were much more antient derive all from Athens I shall begin by this constitution to shew the proper use of them Chirotonia in Athens as hath been shewn out of Suidas who speaking of Rome relates to this was Election of Magistrates or Enacting of Laws by the suffrage of the people which because they gave by holding up their hands came thence to be called Chirotonia which signifieth holding up of Hands The Legislative Assembly or Representative of the people called the Nomothetae upon occasion of repealing an old Law and Enacting a new one gave the Chirotonia of the people And yet saith the Athenian Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Let the Proedrigive or make the Chirotonia unto either Law The Proedri as was shown in the former book were the ten Presidents of the Prytans which Prytans upon this occasion were Presidents of the Nomothetae Again whereas it was the undoubted right and practice of the people to Elect their Magistrates by their Chirotonia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it is nevertheless shewn by Pollux to have been the peculiar Office of the Thesmothetae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to Chirotonize the Mágistrates For as the Proedri were presidents of the people in their Legislative capacity so were the Thesmothetae upon occasion of Elections thus the Chirotonia of the Proedri or of the Thesmothetae signifies nothing else but the Chirotonia of the people by which they Enacted all their Laws and elected all their Civil or Ecclesiastical Magistrates or Priests as the Rex Sacrificus and the Orgeones except some by the lot which ordination as is observ'd by Aristoile is equally popular This whether ignorantly or wilfully unregarded hath been as will be seen hereafter the cause of great absurdity for who seeth not that to put the Chirotonia or soveraign power of Athens upon the Proedri or the Thesmothetae is to make such a thing of that Government as can no wise be understood What the people had past by their Chirotonia was called Psephisma an Act or Law And because in the Nomothetae there were alwayes two Laws put together unto the Vote that is to say the Old one and that which was offered in the room of it they that were for the old Law were said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to pronounce in the Negative and they that were for the new 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to pronounce for the Affirmative These Laws these Propositions or this frame of Government having been proposed first by Solon and then ratified or established by the Chirotonia of the Athenian people Aristotle saith of him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he instituted or constituted the popular Government with constitution implyeth not any power in Solon who absolutely refused to be a King and therefore the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to him implies no more than authority I have shewed you the words in controversie and the things together in the Mint Now whether they that as to Athens introduced them both understood either I leave my Reader by comparing them to judge It is true that the things expressed by these words have been in some Common-wealths more in others less antient than the Greek Language but this hindreth not the Greeks to apply the words unto the like constitutions or things wherever they find them as by following Halicarnassaeus I shall exemplifie in Rome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Romulus when he had distributed the people into Tribes and into parishes proceeded to ordain the Senate in this manner the Tribes were three and the parishes Thirty out of every Tribe he elected three Senators and out of every parish three more all by the suffrage of the people These therefore came to ninety nine chosen by the Chirotonia unto which he added one more not chosen by the Chirotonia but by himself only Which Election we may therefore say was made by the Chirothesia for as in this Chapter I am shewing that the Chirotonia is Election by the Many so in the next I shall shew that the Chirothesia is Election by One or by the Few But to keep unto the matter in hand the Magistrate thus chosen by Romulus was praefectus urbi the Protector of the Common-wealth or he who when the King was out of the Nation or the City as upon occasion of War had the Exercise of Royal Power at home In like manner with the Civil Magistracy were the Priests created though some of them not so antiently for the Pontifex maximus the Rex Sacrificus and the Flamines were all ordained by the Suffrage of the people Pontifex Tributis Rex centuriâ—â—tis Flamines Curiatis the latter of which being no more than Parish Priests had no other Ordination than by their Parishes All the Laws and all the Magistrates in Rome even the Kings themselves were according unto the orders of this Common-wealth to be created by the Chirotonia of the people which nevertheless is by Appian sometimes called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Chirotonia of the Tribunes whether that these Magistrates were Presidents of the Assemblies of the people or Elected by them Sic Romani historici non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 untur conâ—ulem qui comitia habuerit creasse â—â—vos Magistratu non aliam ob causam nisi quia suffragia receperit populum moderatus est in eligendo What passed the Chirotonia of the people by the Greeks is called Psephisma 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when the Congregation of the people was to be dismissed Marcus standing up said your Psephisma that is your Act is exceeding good c. This policy for the greater part is that which Romulus as was shewn is said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to have instituted or ordained though it be plain that he ordain'd it no otherwise than by the Chirotonia of the people Thus you have another Example of the three words in controversie Chirotonia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psephisma still applyed in the same sense and to the same things Have I not also discovered already the Original right of Ordination whether in Civil or religious Orders This will be scandalous How derive Ordination as it is in the Church of Christ or asit was in the Church of the Jews from the Religion or rather superstition of the Heathens I meddle not with their Religion nor yet with their superstition but with their Ordination which was neither but a part of