God Hence Platonists argue the World is eternall its soul being such and not capable of being without a body that also must be from eternity as likewise the motion of the Heavens because the Soul cannot be without moving Sect. VII THe antient Ethnick Theologians who cast Poeticall vails over the face of their mysteries expresse these three natures by other names Coelum they call God himself he produc'd the first Mind Saturn Saturn the Soul of the World Iupiter Coelum imples Priority and excellence as in the Firmament the first Heaven Saturn signifies Intellectuall nature wholly imploy'd in contemplation Iupiter active life consisting in moving and governing all subordinate to it The properties of the two latter agree with their Planets Saturn makes Men Contemplative Iupiter Imperious The Speculative busied about things above them the Practick beneath them Sect. VIII WHich three names are promiscuously used upon these grounds In God we understand first his Excellence which as Cause he hath above all his effects for this he is called Coelus Secondly the production of those effects which denotes conversion towards inferiours in this respect he is sometimes called Iupiter but with an addition Optimus Maximus The first Angelick nature hath more names as more diversity Every creature consists of Power and Act the first Plato in Philebo calls Infinite the second Finite all imperfections in the Mind are by reason of the first all perfections from the latter Her operations are threefold About Superiours the contemplation of God about the knowledge of herself about inferiours the production and care of this sensible World these three proceed from Act. By Power she descends to make inferiour things but in either respect is firm within her self In the two first because contemplative she is called Saturn in the third Iupiter a name principally applyed to her power as that part from whence is derived the act of Production of things For the same reason is the soul of the World as she contemplates her self or superiours termed Saturn as she is imployed in ordering worldly things Iupiter and since the government of the World belongs properly to her the contemplation to the Mind therefore is the one absolutely called Iupiter the other Saturn Sect. IX THis World therefore as all other creatures consisteth of a Soul and Body the Body is all that we behold compounded of the four Elements These have their casuall being in the Heavens which consist not of them as sublunary things for then it would follow that these inferiour parts were made before the Celestiall the Elements in themselves being simple by concourse causing such things as are compounded of them Their formal being from the Moon down to the Earth Their participate and imperfect under the Earth evident in the Fire Air and Water experience daily finds there evinc'd by naturall Philosophers to which the antient Theologians aenigmatically allude by their four infernall Rivers Acheron Cocytus Styx and Phlegeton We may divide the body of the World into three parts Celestiall Mundane Infernall The ground why the Poets â—eign the Kingdom of Saturn to be shar'd betwixt his three Sons Iupiter Neptune and Pluto implying only the three-fold variation of this corporeall World which as long as it remains under Saturn that is in its Ideal Intellectual being is one and undivided and so more firm and potent but falling into the hands of his Sons that is chang'd to this material Being and by them divided into three parts according to the triple existence of bodies is more infirm and lesse potent degenerating from a spiritual to a corporeal estate The first part the heavenly they attribute to Iupiter the last and lowest to Pluto the middle to Neptune And because in this principality is all generation and corruption the Theologians express it by the Ocean ebbing or flowing continually by Neptune understanding the Power or deity that presides over Generation Yet we must not imagine these to be different souls distinctly informing these three parts the World her self being one can have but one Soul which as it animates the subterraneall parts is called Pluto the sublunary Neptune the celestiall Iupiter Thus Plato in Philebo averrs by Jove is understood a regall soul meaning the principall part of the World which governs the other This opinion though only my owâ—â— I suppose is more true then the expositions of the Grecians Sect. X. NExt that of the World Platonists assign many other rational souls The eight principall are those of the heavenly Spheres which according to their opinion exceeded not that number consisting of the seven Planets and the starry Orb. These are the nine Muses of the Poets Calliope the universall soul of the World is first the other eight are distributed to their severall Spheres Sect. XI PLato asserts That the Author of the World made the mundane and all other rationall souls in one Cup and of the same Elements the universall soul being most perfect ours least whose parts we may observe by this division Man the chain that ties the World together is placed in the midst and as all mediums participate of their extreams his parts correspond with the whole World thence called Microcosmus In the World is first Corporeall Nature eternall in the Heavens corruptible in the Elements and their compounds as Stones Mettals c. Then Plants The third degree is of Beasts The fourth rationall souls The fifth Angelicall minds Above these is God their origine In man are likewise two bodies one eternall the Platonists Vehiculum coeleste immediately inform'd by the rational soul The other corruptible subject to sight consisting of the Elements Then the vegetative faculty by which generated and nourished The third part is Sensitive and motive The fourth Rational by the Latine Peripateticks believ'd the last and most noble part of the Soul yet above that is the Intellectuall and Angelick the most excellent part whereof we call the Souls Union immediately joyning it to God in a manner resembling him as in the other Angels Beasts and Plants About thâ—se Platonists differ Proâ—lus and Porphyrius only allow the rationall part to be Immortall Zenocrates and Speusippus the sensitive also Numenius and Plotinus the whole Soul Sect. XII IDeas have their casuall being in God their formall in the first Minde their participated in the rationall Soul In God they are not but produced by him in the Angelick nature through this communicated to the Soul by whom illuminated when she reflects on her intellectuall parts she receives the true formes of things Ideas Thus differ the Souls of Men from the Celestiall these in their bodily functions recede not from the Intellectuall at once contemplating and governing Bodies ascend to them they descend not Those employ'd in corporeall office are depriv'd of contemplation borrowing science from sence to this wholly enclin'd full of errors Their only means of release from this bondage is the amatory life which by sensible beauties exciting in the soul a remembrance
for the Stoiâ—ks take away intellectuall substances affirming all things that are to be comprehended by sense onely differences are not subsistent A solid body according to Apollodorus is divisible three waies into length breadth and depth A superficies is the terme of a body or that which hath onely length and breadth but no depth thus Possidonius A line is the terme of a Superficies or a length without breadth that which hath length only A point is the terme of a line or thâ— least mark A body is divisible into infinite yet it consisteth not of infinite bodies CHAP. III. Of Principles THe place concerning bodies is divided into two degrees into those which produce and those which are produced the first Principles the second Elements â—Principles and Elements differ Principles are ingenerate incorruptible Elements shall perish by conflagration Moreover Principles are bodies and void of form Elements have forme There are two principles of all things the Agent and the Patient The Patient is a substance void of quality called Matter the Agent is the reason which is 〈◊〉 the Matter God Matter is sluggish a thing ready for all things but will cease if none move it The Causâ— that is the Reason â—formeth mâ—tter and moldeth it which way he pleaseth out of which he produceth various woâ—ks There must therefore be something out of which a thing is made and also by which it â—s made This is the Cause that Matter The Cause or active Reason is God In the Agent there is power in the Patient a certain matter or capacity and in both both for matter it selfe could not 〈◊〉 if it were not kept together by a power nor that power without some matter for there is nothing which is not compelled to be somewhere Both 〈◊〉 God and the World the Artist and his work they compâ—ehend within this terme Nature as if nature were God mixed through the World Sometimes they call that naturâ— which containeth the World sometimes that which generateth and produceth things upon the earth The Agent is as we said called the Cause A Cause according to Zeno is that by which there is an effect which is not a Cause 30 or as 〈◊〉 the reason of the effect or as Pâ—ssâ—donius the first Author of a thing A Cause is a body a not Cause a Categorem It is impossible that the cause being assigned the effect should not be present which is to be understood thus The Soule is the â—ause through which we live Prudence the Cause by which we are wise It is impossible that he who hath a Soule should not live or he who hath Prudence should not be wise CHAP. IV. Of Matter THe substance of all qualitative beings is first Matter according to Zeno and â—hrysippuâ— in his first of Physicks Matter is that of which every thing is made it hath two names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Substance and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Matter Substance is of all things in generall Matter of particulars Universall matter is according to Zeno wholly eternall not admitting as Chrysippus saith encâ—â—ase or deâ—rease Particular matter admitteth augmentation and diminution for it remaineth not alwaies the same but is separated and mixed so that according to Chrysippus its parts perish by separation and exist by mutuall mistion But those who call fire aire water and earth Matter assert not a thing void of forme but of a body Matter is a body and finite Possidonius saith that the substance and matter of the Universe is void of quality and form in as much as it hath not a certain figure and quality in it selfe but it is alwaies seen in some figure and quality But the substantiall nature of the Universe differs from matter intentionally only Matter is passible for if it were immutable things could not be generated of it Hence it followeth that it is divisible into infinite yet it selfe as Chrysippus saith it not infinite for nothing that is divisible is infinite but matter is continuous Through this matter Zeno affirmeth that the reason of the World which some call Fate is diffused as feed CHAP. V. Of the World OF this matter was made the World The World hath severall appellations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the World 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the â—ll 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Whole 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 World is taken three waies First for God himselfe who is properly qualified with all Essence incorruptible and ingenerate who framed the Universe after a certain period of time who resolved all nature into himselfe and again generated it out of himselfe Secondly for the starry Ornament and thirdly that which consists of both The All 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is one way taken as Apollodorus saith for the World and another way for the System of the World and the vacuity beyond it The World is finito the vâ—â—uity infinite Thus likewise they distinguish betwixt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 includeth also an infinite vacuity in which the world is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies the world without that vacuity which neither is increased nor diminished but its parts are sometimes extended sometimes contracted It began from the earth as its center for the center is the beginning of a Circle The world is that which is properly qualited with the essence of all things or as Chrysippus and ` Possidonius define it a System of Heaven and Earth and of the natures therein contained or a System of God and Men and of all things that were made for them The world was made by God for if saith Chrysippus there be any thing which produceth such things as Man though indued with reason cannot produce that doubtlesse is greater and stronger and wiser then man But a Man cannot make the Celestiall things therefore that which made them transcendeth man in Art Counsell Prudence and Power and what can that be but God The World was made for those animate â—ssences which have the use of Reason these are the Gods and men then whom nothing is better All things of which it consisteth and which it produceth within it selfe are accommodated to the use of Man The World was made in this manner God in the beginning being alone by himself converted all substance which according to Zeno was fire first into air then into Water And as in the Plant the seed is contained so God who is the prolisick reason of the World left such a â—eed in the humidity as might afford easie and apt matter for the generation of those things that were to be produced Zeno addeth that one part tending downward was condensed into Earth another part remained partly water and partly being exhal'd air of a particle of which air flashed out fire Cleanthes describeth it in this
Say not ought is juster then thy Parents Procure not friends in hast nor procur'd part with in hast By learning to obey you shall know how to command What forfeiture you impose on others undergoe your selfe Advise not Citizens what is most pleasant but what is best Be not arrogant Converse not with wicked persons Consult the Gods Cherish thy friend Reverence thy Parents Make reason thy guid What thou seest speak not What thou knowest conceal Be mild to those that belong to thee Conjecture hidden things from apparent His particular sentence according to Didymus and Laertius was Nothing too much according to Ausonius Know thy selfe who ascribes these also to him Him I dare happy call whose end I see Match with thy like unequalls not agree By fortune guided none to honour raise A friend in private chide in publick praise Honours atchiev'd created far exceed If fates be sure what helps it to take heed And if unsure there is of fear lesse need Of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Laertius mentions these Of every man be carefull lest he hear A sword conceald within his breast a cleer Aspect a double tongue a mind severe CHAP. X. How be opposed Pisistratus and reprehended Thespis DUring the absence of Solon the former dissention broke forth again in the City Lycurgus was head of the country men Megacleâ— of the Maritimes Pisistratus of the Townsmen who were most violent against the rich Solon's lawes were still observed in the City but the people aimed at novelty and change not as thinking it most just but in hopes to be Masters of other mens goods and to suppresse the adverse party Solon whilst things stood thus returned to Athens where he was much reverenced and honoured by all but could not speak or act in publick through the weaknesse of his body and spirits yet privately taking every one of the Commanders apart he endeavoured to reconcile their differences wherein Pisistratus seemed the most ready to be perswaded with whom he had a very antient friendship grounded aswell upon their kindred as upon the good qualities of Pisistratus then whom as Solon used to say there could not be a person of more worth if he were cured of his ambition About this time according to Plutarch which was in the fiftieth Olympiad Thespis began to present Tragedies which Suidas erroneously accounts ten Olympiads latter as is observed by Meursius the people were much taken with the novelty of the thing for as yet there were no contentions therein Solon naturally desirous to hear and learn and by reason of his age indulging more to ease and pleasure feasting and musick went to see Thespis himself act as was then the manner the Play ended he went to Thespis and asked him if he were not ashamed to speak so many lies before so great an auditory Thespis answered it was no shame to act or say such things in jest Solon striking the ground hard with his staffe replyed but in a short time we who approve this kind of jest shall use it in earnest in our contracts and transactions In fine he absolutely forbad him to teach or act tragedies conceiving their falsity unprofitable whereto he dissimulated the deceit of Pisistratus who soon after having wounded himselfe came into the Forum in a Chariot pretending to have been so used by his enemies in the behalfe of the common-wealth and inflamed the people with much rage Solon comming near to him son of Hippocraâ—es saith he you act Homers Vlysses ill in using the same means to deceive the Citizens wherewith he whipping himself deluded the enemie Immediately the people flocked in to defend Pisistratus Aristo mov'd he might be allowed a standing guard of fiftie men Solon rose up to oppose it using speeches the effect whereof he afterwards thus exprest in verse If evill your impieties befall Gods not the Author of those mischiefs call Your selves the causes have given power to those Who in requitall servitude impose Lion whom the footsteps of the fox pursue Whose souls deceit and Vanity endue The mans smooth tongue and speech you only heed But never penetrate into the deed He also foretold them the aimes of Piâ—istratus in an elegy to this effect Vapours condens ' dingender hail and snow And thunder doth from radiant lightning flow The sea is troubled by the raging wind When not disturb'd by that nothing more kind A Citty by great persons is orethrown And taught beneath a Monarchy to groan But seeing the poorer sort much addicted to Pisistratus and tumultuous the richer afraid consulting their safetie by flight he retired saying Athenians I am wiser then some valianter then others wiser then those who understand not the deceit of Pisistratus valianter then those who understand it yet hold their peace through fear The Senate being of the same faction with Pisâ—stratus said he was mad whereto he answered A little time will to the people cleer My madnesse when ' th ' midst truth shall appear The people having granted Pisistratus his request concerning a guard question'd not the number of them but conniv'd so long at his pressing and maintaining as many souldiers as he pleased that at last he possest himselfe of the Tower whereupon the Citty being in a tumult Megacles with the rest of the Alcmaeonidae fled Solon now very old and destitute of those that might back him went into the Forum armed with a spear and shield and made an oration to the people partly accusing them of folly and cowardise partly inciting them not to forsake their libertie using this celebrious speech It had been far easier to have supprest this tyranny in the grouth but much more noble to cut it off now it is at the height No man daring to hear him he went home and taking his armes set them in the street before his door Laertius saith before the Magazâ—n saying I have helped my Country and the Law as much as lay in me or as Laertius O Country I have assisted thee both in word and deed Plutarch addes that from that time he lived retired addicted to his study and told by many the Tyrant would put him to death and demanded wherein the confided so much he answered in his age but Laertius affirmes which seemes truer that assoon as he had laid down his armes he forsook the Country and Agellius that in the raign of Scovius Tullius Pisistâ—atus was Tyrant of Athens Solon going first away into voluntary exile CHAP. XI How he travelled to Lydia and Cilicia SOlon at his departure from Athens received invitations from many by Thales desired to come to Miletus by Bias to Priene by Epimenides to Creet by Cleobulus to Lindus as is evident from their severall letters to that effect even Pisistratus pressed him to return home by this Epistle Pisistratus to Solon Neither am I the only person of the Greeks nor am I without right to the Kingdome I possesse as being descended from Codrus that
in a Wildernesse abstain from any thing that is evill but that the very deformity and dishonesty thereof deterrs them Nothing therefore is more clear then that honest things are expetible in themselves and dishonest things avoidable in themselves Hence it followeth that what is honest is more estimable then those mean things which accrue by it And when we say that folly temerity injustice and intemperance are avoidable in respect of those things which are consequent to them it contradicts not the former assertion that what is dishonest only is ill because they relate not to the hurt of the body but to dishonest actions which proceed from vice All good is equall and every good is highly expetible and admits neither increase nor decrease Here commeth in a great controversy betwixt the Stoicks and the Peripateticks which though Carneades affirm to be only verball Cicero holdeth to be more in things then words The Peripateticks hold that all goods are requisite to happy life the Stoicks that whatsoever is worthy estimation compreâ—iendeth happy life Those holding pain to be an ill it followes that a wise man cannot be happy upon the rack These who account not pains among the ills hold that a wise man continueth happy in the midst of torments For if some bear those pains with greater courage for their Country or some lighter cause opinion not nature increaseth or diminisheth the power of the pain Again the Peripateticks asserting three kinds of good affirm a man to be so much the more happy the fuller he is of externall corporeall goods or in the Stoicks expression he who hath most corporeall estimables is most happy for as much as by them Beatitude is compleated On the contrary the Stoicks hold that those goods which they call of nature make not by their frequency a life more happy or are more expetible or more estimable For then wisdome being expetible and health expetible both together would be more expetible then wisdome alone whereas either being worthy estimation both are not more worthy of estimation then wisdome alone For the Stoicks who hold health to be estimable but place it not amongst the goods hold likewise that no estimation is to be preferred before vertue From this the Peripateticks dissent asserting that an honest action without pain is more expetible then the same action with pain the Stoicks otherwise For as a Taper is darkened by the light of the Sun and as a drop of water is lost in the vastnesse of the Aegean Sea and as in the riches of Croesus the accession of one farthing and one step in the way between this and India so in that end of all good which the Stoicks assert all the estimation of corporeall things must necessarily be obscured overwhelmed and perish by the splendour and magnitude of vertue And as opportunity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not made any thing greater by production of time for whatsoever is opportune hath its measure so right affection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the good it selfe placed in it that it be conformable to nature admitteth no accession of encrease For as that opportunity to those of which we speak are not made greater by production of time for which reason the Stoicks conceive that a happy life is not more to be desired if it be long then if it be short and they use this simile As it is the praise of a shoe to fit the foot neither are many shoes preferred before two nor the greater before the lesse So in those things whose good is confined to opportunity and convenience neither are the more to be preferred before the fewer nor the longer before the shorter Nor do they argue acutely who say if long health be more to be esteemed then short then likewise a long use of wisdome more then a short they understand not that the estimation of health is judged by space that of vertue by opportunity as if they should say likewise a good death or a good labour to a woman in travell is better long then short So that they see not that some things are more esteemed for their shortnesse others for their length CHAP. VI. Of Eupathies AS soon as any object is presented to us which seemeth good Nature as we said drives us on to the acquisition thereof which being done constantly and prudently is called Will imprudently and excessively Desire Moreover while we are so moved that we are in some good that happeneth also two waies when the Soul is moved quietly and constantly according to reason this is called Joy when vainly and excessively Pleasure In like manner as we desire good things by nature so by nature we decline the ill This declination if done according to reason is called Caution if without reason Fear Caution is only in a wise man of fear he is not capable Hence it appeareth that there are three kinds of good affections of the minde called Eupathies or Constancies Ioy Caution Will. 1. Ioy is contrary to pleasure as being a rationall elevation of the minde 2. Caution is contrary to fear as being a rationall declination of ill 3. Will is contrary to desire as being a rationall appetite These are the primarie Eupathies and as under the primary passions are comprehended many subordinate passions so are there secondary Eupathies subordinate to those Under Ioy are 1. Delectation 2. Cheerfulnesse 3. Aequanimity Under Caution 1. Respect 2. Cleernesse Under Will are 1. Benevolence 2. Salutation 3. Charity Notwithstanding that Eupathies and passions are contrary yet are there but three Eupathies though there are foure passions for there is no Eupathie contrary to Grief CHAP. VII Of Passions FRom falsities proceedeth a perversitie of Intellect hence spring up severall passions and causes of disorder Zeno defineth passion a praeternaturall motion of the Soul or as Cicero renders it a commotion of the Soul aâ—erse from right reason against Nature Others more briefly a more vehement appetite More vehement they call that which recedeth from the constancy of Nature and is contrary to nature wherefore all passion is an excessive stupide desire The kinds of passion arise from two opinionated goods and two opinionated evils so they are four From the good desire and pleasure pleasure from present good desire from future from the ill fear and grief fear from the future grief from the present for these things whose coming we fear when they do come grieve us Pleasure and desire arise from an opinion of good things desire is fervently transported to that which seemeth good pleasure rejoyceth when wee have obtained what we desire Thus desire and fear go formost that to apparent good this to apparent ill pleasure and grief follows pleasure when we attain what wee desire griefe when wee incurre what wee fear All passions arise from Iudgement and Opinion whence they are more strictly defined that it may appear not
fish its claws Sense is an apprehension by the Sensitive Organ or a comprehension Sense is taken many waies For the faculty habit act phantasie whereby the sensible object is comprehended and the Hegemonick parts of the Soul are called Sense Again the Sensories are intelligent spirits diffused from the Hegemonick to the Organs The senses are Sight Hearing Smell â—ast Touch. Sight is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the Eies Sight is made by contraction of that light which is between the eye and the object into a Cone according to Chrysippus Apollodorus saith that part of the Air which is Conicall is next the sight the Base next the Object so as that which is seen is pointed out to by the Air as by a stick Colour is the first figuration or habit of matter Darknesse is visible for from the sight there issueth a splendor which passeth round about that darknesse Neither is the sight deceived for it truly sees that it is dark Chrysippus saith that we see according to the intention of the mediate air which is struck by the visuall spirit which passeth from the Hegemonick to the apple of the eye and after that blow falleth upon the ear next extending it self in a Conicall figure Again from the eye are emitted fiery raies not black or dusky and therefore darknesse is visible Hearing is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the Ears Hearing is made when the Air betwixt the speaker and hearer is verberated in a circulation and at last by agitation passeth in at the Ears as the circles that are made in a pond by casting in a stone Smelling is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the nostrils Tasting is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the Tongue Touching is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the superficies so that it perceiveth that which is obliged to it The sixt part of the Soul is the Generative which is a spirit from the Hegemonick to the Parastatae of this part see Laertius from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Pluâ—arch de Philosoph Plac. lib. 5. cap. 4 5 9 11 12 13 15 16 17 23. The seventh and last part of the Soul is that which Zeno calls vocall commonly called the Voice It is a spirit proceeding from the Hegemonick part to the throat tongue and other proper Instruments of speech Voice is Air not composed of little pieces but whole and continuous having no vacuity in it This Air being struck by the wind spreadeth into circles infinitely untill the Air round about it be filled like the Water in a pond by throwing in of a stone only the Water moves spherically the Air circularly Voice is a body for it acteth it striketh upon and leaveth an impression in our Ear as a seal in Wax Again whatsoever moveth and disturbeth some affection is a body Harmony moveth with delight discord disturbeth Again whatsoever is moved is a body but Voice is moved and reverberated from smooth places as a ball against a Wall So in the Aegyptian Pyramids one Voice is redoubled four or five times CHAP. XVII Of God HItherto of the Material principle and that which is produced of it we come now to the other principle the Agent God This question they divide into four parts first that there are Gods secondly what they are thirdly that they order the world fourthly that they take care of humane affairs Cleanthes saith that the notions of God are imprinted in the minds of men from four causes First from Divination for the Gods afford us signes of future things wherein if there be any mistake it is not from their part but from the errour of humane conjecture The second is from the multitude of good things wee receive by the temperature of Heaven the fertility of the Earth and abundance of other benefits The third from the Terrour of Thunder Tempest Rain Snow Hail Devastation Pestilence Earthquakes and somtimes groanings showers of stones and blood Portents Prodigies Comets and the like with which men are affrighted into a belief that there is a heavenly divine power The fourth and greatest cause is the aequability of the motion and revolution of Heaven the Sun Moon and starres their distinctions variety beauty order the very sight whereof declares that they were not made by chance That there are Gods Chrysippus proveth thus If there is something in Nature which the mind reason power and faculties of man could not make that which did make it is better then Man but Celestiall things and all those whose order is sempiternal could not be made by Man there is therefore somthing which made them which is better then Man and what is that but God For if there are no Gods what can there be in Nature better then Man for in him only is reason then which nothing is more excellent But for a man to think that there is nothing in the World better then himself is a foolish arrogance Therefore there is somthing better and consequently there is a God Zeno more concisely thus That which is rationall is better then that which is irrationall but nothing is better then the World therefore the World is rationall In like manner may be proved that the World is wise that it is happy that it is eternall for all these are better then the want of these But there is nothing better then the World whence it followeth that the World is God Again he argues thus No part of an insensible thing hath sense but the parts of the World have sense therefore the World hath sense He proceedeth to urge this more strictly Nothing saith he that is void of minde and reason can of it selfe generate that which is animate and rationall but the world generates animate and rationall creatures therefore the world is animate and rationall Likewise according to his custome he concludeth his argument with a similitude IF out of an Olive-tree should come harmonious Pipes that made Musick you would not doubt but that the science of Musick were in the Olive-tree What if a Plain-tree should bear Musicall instruments you would think there were musick in those Plain-trees Why then should we not judge the world to be animate and wise that produceth out of it selfe animate and wise creatures There is nothing besides the world which wanteth nothing and which is perfect and compleat in all its numbers and parts for as the cover saith Chrysippus was made for the shield's sake and the scabberd for the swords so besides the world all other things were made for the sake of something else Fruites of the earth were made for living creatures living irrationall creatures for the use of man horses for carriage oxen for tillage dogs for hunting and defence but man himselfe was made to contemplate and imitate the world Not that he is at all perfect but only a part of that
sicknesse For this agreeth not with the Author of Nature and Parent of all good things but he having generated many great things most apt and usefull other things also incommodious to those which he made were aggenerated together with them coherent to them made not by Nature but certain necessary consequence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 As saith he when Nature framed the bodies of Men more subtle reason the benefit of the World would have required that the head should have been made of the smallest and thin bones but this utility would have been followed by another extrinsecall inconvenience of greater consequence that the head would be too weakly defended and broken with the least blow Sicknesses therefore and diseases are engendred whilst health is engendred In like manner saith he whilst Vertue is begotten in Man by the counsell of Nature vices like wise are begotten by contrary affinity CHAP. XVIII Of Nature NExt Iupiter Possidonius placeth Nature By Nature they somtimes understand that which containeth the World somtimes that which produceth things upon Earth both which as we said is to be understood of God For that Nature which containeth and preserveth the World hath perfect sence and reason which power is the Soul of the World the mind and divine Wisdom Thus under the terme of Nature they comprehend both God and the World affirming that the one cannot be without the other as if Nature were God permeating through the World God the mind of the World the World the body of God This Chrysippus calleth Common-Nature in distinction from particular Nature Nature is defined by Zeno an artificial fire proceeding in the way of generation which is the fiery spirit the Artist of formes by others a habit receiving motion from it self according to prolifick reason and effecting and containing those things which subsist by it in certain definite times producing all things from which it self is distinct by Nature proposing to it self these two ends Utility and Pleasure as is manifest from the porduction of man CHAP. XIX Of Fate THe third from Iupiter according to Possidonius is Fate for Iupiter is first next Nature then Fate They call Fate a concatenation of Causes that is an order and connexion which cannot be transgressed Fate is a cause depending on Laws and ordering by Laws or a reason by which the World is ordered Fate is according to Zeno the motive power of matter disposing so and so not much diftering from Nature and Providence Panaetius assirmeth Fate to be God Chrysippus desineth Fate a spirituall power governing the World orderly or a sempiternall and indeclinable series and chain of things it self rolling and implicating it self by eternall orders of consequence of which it is adapted and connected or as Chrysippus again in his Book of Definitions hath it The reason of the World or Law of all things in the World governed by Providence or the reason why things past have been the present are the future shall be For Reason he useth Truth Cause Nature Necessity and other termes as attributed to the same thing in different respects Fate from the severall distributions thereof is called Clotho Lachesis and Atropos Lachesis as it dispenseth to every one as it were by lot Atropos as it is an immutable dispensation from all eternity Clotho in allusion to the resemblance it hath with spinning and twisting of Threads Necessity is a cause invincible most violent and inforcing all things Fortune is a Cause unknown and hidden to humane reason For some things come by Necessity others by Fate some by deliberate Counsel others by Fortune some by Casualty But Fate being a connexion of Causes interlaced and linked orderly compriseth also that cause proceedeth from us That all things are done by Fate is asserted by Zeno in his Book of Fate and Possidonius in his second Book of Fate and Boethus in his 11th of Fate Which Chrysippus proves thus If there is any motion without a cause then every axiom is not either true or false for that which hath not efficient causes will be neither true nor false but every axiom is either true or false therefore there is no motion without a cause And if so then all things that are done are done by precedent causes and if so all things are done by Fate That all axioms are either true or false Cicero saith he labour'd much to prove whereby he takes away Possibles indeterminates and other distinctions of the Academicks of which see Alcinous Chap. 26. In answer to the sluggish reason if it be your fate to die of this sicknesse you shall die whether you have a Physician or no and if it be your fate to recover you shall recover whether you have a Physitian or not Chrysippus saith that in things some are simple some conjunct Simple is thus Socrates shall die on such a day for whether he do any thing or not it is appointed he should die on such a day But if it be destin'd thus Laius shall have a son Oedipus it cannot be said whether he accompany with a woman or not for it is a conjunct thing and confatall as he termes it because it is destin'd that Laius shall lie with his wife and that he shall get Oedipus of her As if we should say Milo shall wrastle at the Olympick Games and another should infer then he shall wrastle whether he have an adversary or no he were mistaken for that he shall wrastle is a conjunct thing because there is no wrastling without an adversary Thus are refelled all sophismes of this kinde you shall recover whether you have a Physician or not for it is no lesse determined by fate that you shall have a Physician than that you shall recover They are confatall Thus there being two opinions of the old Philosophers one that all things are so done by Fate that Fate inferreth a power of Necessitie as Democritus Heraclitus Empedocles and Aristotle held the other that the motions of our souls were voluntary without any Fate Chrysippus as an honourable Arbitratour took the middle way betwixt these but inclining most to those who conceived the motions of our souls free from necessitie The Antients who held all things to be done by Fate said it was by a violence and necessitie those who were of the contrary opinion denyed that Fate had any thing to do with our assent and that there was no necessitie imposed upon assents They argued thus If all things are done by Fate all things are done by an antecedent cause and if appetite then likewise those things which follow appetite therefore assents also But if the cause of appetite is not in us neither is the appetite it selfe in our power and if so neither those things which are effected by appetite are in our power and consequently neither assents nor actions are in our power whence it followeth that neither praise can be
of Socraâ—es but extended to such friends as conversed with him whereof him self gives these instances Charmides Son of Glauco going to exercise in the Nemean race as he was discoursing with Socrates was by him upon notice of the voice dissuaded from going to which he answered that perhaps the voice onely meant that he should not get the victory but said he however I shall advantage myself by exercising at this time which said he went to the Games where he met with some accident which though it be not related is acknowledg'd to have iustified the counsell given him by the Daemon Tymarchus and Philemon Son of Philemonides having plotted together to murther Nicias Son of Hircoscomander were at the same time drinking with Socrates Timarchus with intention to execute what they had determin'd offer'd to rise from the table saying to Socrates well Socrates drink you on I will but step a little way and return immediately Rise not said Socrates hearing the Daemon as soon as he spake for the Daemon hath given me the accustomed sign whereupon he sate stil presently after he offer'd again to be gone Socrates hearing the voice withheld him At last as Socrates was diverted by something and did not mind him he stole away and committed the murther for which being brought to execution his last words to his brother Glitomachus were that he was come to that untimely end for not obeying Socrates Another time seeing his friend Crito's eie ti'd up he asked him the reason who answering that as he walked in the field one pulling a bough it gave a jerk back and hit him in the eye Then you did not take my advise replies Socrates for I call'd you back making use as I have accustomed of divine presage That it had likewise a great influence upon the soules of those who conversed with him and liv'd with him he alledgeth as examples Aristides Son of Lysimachus and Thucydides Son of Melissus The first leaving Socrates to go to the wars lost with his company the habit of learning which he acknowledg'd to have gained not by any verball instructions of which he had none from him but by being neer him seeing him and sitting in the same room with him The second as easily by the same means attained the same habit And not only to particular persons but to generall affairs did these predictions extend He foretold some friends the defeat of the Athenian Army in Sicily as is attested by Plutarch and mentioned by himself in Plato where he gives another fair example or rather tryall of the truth of the Daemons predictions speaking of a businesse whereof the event was at that time doubtfull You will hear saith he from many in Sicily to whom it is known what I foretold concerning the destruction of the Army and we may now have an experiment if the Daemon speak true Samionus son of Calus is gone in an expedition the sign came to me he goes with Thrasylus to war against Ephesus and Jonia my opinion is that he will either be slain or at least in much danger I greatly fear the whole design These are his words in Plato delivered as before the event of that action which fell out according to his prediction for Thrasylus was repulsed and beaten by the Ephesians the Athenians put to flight with the losse of foure hundred men of which Victory the Ephesians erected two trophies this was in the twentie one year of the Peloponnesian war We have alledg'd the universall consent of Authors that Socrates had such a spirituall attendant yet is there some disagreement concerning the name more concerning the nature of it It is commonly named his Daemon by which title he himselfe owned it Plato sometimes calls it his Guardian Apuleius his God because saith Saint Augustine the name of Daemon at last grew odious But we must observe that he did not account it a God but sent from God and in that sence affirmed the signes to come from God to wit by mediation of this spirit This besides other places we may argue from his first Epistle where he speaks of the sign it selfe he useth the word Daemon when of the advise whereof that sign was the instrument he names God Thus are we to understand these and all other places of the same nature in Plato where Socrates speaking of the Daemon saith if it please God you shall learn much and the sign from God did not offer to stay me As for the signe or manner of the prediction some affirme it was by sneezing either of himselfe or others if any chanced to sneeze standing before him behind him or on his right hand he went immediately about that which he intended if on the left hand he refrained or desisted if he sneezed himselfe before the enterprise it was applausive if in the action disswasive There needs not much argument to prove this opinion If this sternutation proceeded either from chance or his naturall constitution it could not have that provident supernaturall effect if it proceeded from some more excellent outward cause we recurre to the Genius Others confine this prescience within the soule of Socrates himself that he said his Genius advised him they interpret it as we usually say his mind gave him or so inclined him In this sense indeed Daemon is not seldome taken but this is inconsistent with the description which Socrates gives of a voice and signes ab exteriore besides this knowledge is not above humane nature Plutarch having exploded the opinion of Terpsion concerning sneezing conjectured first that it might be some apparition but at last concludes that it was his observation of some inarâ—culate unaccustomed sound or voice conveighed to him by some extraordinary way as we see in dreams This avoids not the inconvenience of the former if Socrates did first of himselfe interpret this sound it is the same with the last opinion that his soule had a Prophetick inspiration if by any help it will come at last to the Genius Some conceive it to be one of those spirits which have the particular care of men which Maximus Tyrius and Apuleius describe in such manner that they want only the name of a good Angell But there want not those who give it that appellation Lactanius having proved that God sends Angells to guard mankind addes and Socrates affirmed that there was a Daemon constantly neer him which kept him company from a child by whose beck and instruction he guided his life Eusebius upon these words of the Psalmist He hath given his Angells charge over thee that they should keep thee in all thy waies We learn out of Scripture saith he that every man hath a Guardian appointed him from above and Plato doubteth not to write in this manner All soules having chosen a condition of living they proceed in order thereunto being moved by the Daemon which is proper to every one and is sent along with them
he is To things that are that which is not is not opposed as contrary for it neither existeth nor is participant of any essence nor can be understood So that if any man endeavour to expresse it in words or comprehend it by thought he is deceived because he putteth together things contrary and repugnant Yet that which is not as far as it is spoken is not a pure negation of that which is but implyeth a relation to another which in some manner is joined to Ens. So that unlesse we assume somthing from that which is to that which is not it cannot be distinguished from other things but thus as many kinds as they are of Ens so many are there of Non-Ens because that which is not an Ens is a Non-Ens Thus much may serve for an introduction into Plato's Philosophy Some things perhaps are said orderly others dispersedly or confusedly yet is all so laid down that by those which we have delivered the rest of his Assertions may be found out and contemplated After so serious a Discourse it will not be amisse to give the Reader a Poeticall entertainment upon the same Subject being A PLATONICK DISCOURSE Written in Italian by IOHN PICUS Earl of MIRANDULA In explication of a Sonnet by HIERONIMO BENIVIENI The first PART Sect. I. IT is a principle of the Platonists That every created thing hath a threefold being Causal Formal Participated In the Sun there is no heat that being but an elementary quality not of Celestiall nature yet is the Sun the cause and Fountain of all hear Fire is hot by nature and its proper form Wood is not hot of its self yet is capable of receiving that quality by Fire Thus hath heat its Causall being in the Sun its Formall in the Fire it s Participated in the Fuel The most noble and perfect of these is the Causal and therefore Platonists assert That all excellencies are in God after this manner of being That in God is nothing but from him all things That Intellect is not in him but that he is the original spring of every Intellect Such is Plotinus's meaning when he affirms God neither understands nor knows that is to say after a formall way As Dionysius Areopagita God is neither an Intellectuall nor Intelligent nature but unspeakably exalted above all Intellect and Knowledge Sect. II. PLatonists distinguish Creatures into three degrees The first comprehends the corporeall and visible as Heaven Elements and all compounded of them The last the invisible incorporeal absolutely free from bodies which properly are called Intellectual by Divines Angelicall Natures Betwixt these is a middle nature which though incorporeall invisible immortall yet moveth bodies as being obliged to that Office called the rationall Soul inferiour to Angells superiour to Bodies subject to those regent of these Above which is God himselfe author and principle of every Creature in whom Divinity hath a casuall being from whom proceeding to Angells it hath a formall being and thence is derived into the rationall Soul by participation of their lustre below which no nature can assume the Title of Divine Sect. III. THat the first of these three Natures cannot be multiplyed who is but one the principle and cause of all other Divinity is evidently proved by Platonists Peripateticks and our Divines About the second viz. The Angelick and Intellectuall Platonists disagree Some as Proclus Hermias Syrianus and many others betwixt God and the rationall Soul place a great number of creatures part of these they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Intelligible part intellectuall which termes Plato sometimes confoundeth as in his Phaedo Plotinus Porphyrius and generally the most refined Platonists betwixt God and the Soul of the World assigne only one Creature which they call the Son of God because immediately produced by him The first opinion complies most with Dionysius Areopagita and Christian Divines who assert the number of Angells to be in a manner infinite The second is the more Philosophick best suiting with Aristotle and Plato whose sense we only purpose to expresse and therefore will decline the first path though that only be the right to pursue the latter Sect. IV. VVE therefore according to the opinion of Plotinus confirmed not only by the best Platonists but even by Aristotle and all the Arabians especially Avicenna affirm That God from eternity produced a creature of incorporeall and intellectuall nature as perfect as is possible for a created being beyond which he produced nothing for of the most perfect cause the effect must be most perfect and the most perfect can be but one for of two or more it is not possible but one should be more or lesse perfect than the rest otherwise they would not be two but the same This reason for our opinion I rather choose then that which Avicen alledges founded upon this principle That from one cause as one can proceed but one effect We conclude therefore that no creature but this first minde proceeds immediately from God for of all other effects issuing from this minde and all other second causes God is only the mediate efficient This by Plato Hermes and Zoroaster is called the Daughter of God the Minde Wisdome Divine Reason by some interpreted the Word not meaning with our Divines the Son of God he not being a creature but one essence coequall with the Creator Sect. V. ALL understanding agents have in themselves the form of that which they design to effect as an Architect hath in his minde a figure of the building he undertakes which as his pattern he exactly strives to imitate This Platonists call the Idea or Exemplar believing it more perfect then that which is made after it and this manner of Being Ideal or Intelligible the other Materiall and Sensible So that when a Man builds a house they affirm there are two one Intellectuall in the Workmans mind the other sensible which he makes in Stone Wood or the like expressing in that matter the form he hath conceiv'd to this Dante alludes â—None any work can frame Unless himself become the same Hereupon they say though God produced only one creature yet he produced all because in it he produced the Ideas and forms of all and that in their most perfect being that is the Ideal for which reason they call this Mind the Intelligible World Sect. VI. AFter the pattern of that Mind they affirm this sensible World was made and the exemplar being the most perfect of all created things it must follow that this Image thereof be as perfect as its nature will bear And since animate things are more perfect then the inanimate and of those the rational then the irrationall we must grant this World hath a Soul perfect above all others This is the first rationall Soul which though incorporeall and immateriall is destin'd to the function of governing and moving corporeall Nature not free from the body as that mind whence from Eternity it was deriv'd as was the mind from
so interpreted by Origen and some Platonists expound the Ocean stil'd by Homer Father of Gods and Men this Angelick Minde Principle and Fountain of all other Creatures Gemistius Neptune as Commander of all Waters of all Mindes Angelicall and Humane This is that living Fountain whereof he that drinketh shall never thirst These are the Waters whereon David saith God hath founded the World Sect. XIV POrus the Affluence of Ideas proceeding from God is stiled by Plato the Son of Metis Counsell in Imitation of the Scripture whence our Saviour by Dionysius Areop is termed the Angel of Counsell that is the Messenger of God the Father so Avicen calls the first Cause conciliative the Minde not having Ideas from it selfe but from God by whose Counsell she receiveth Knowledge and Art to frame this visible World Sect. XV. LOve according to Plato is Youngest and Oldest of the Gods They as all other things have a two-fold Being Ideal and Naturall The first God in his Naturall Being was Love who dispenc'd theirs to all the rest the last in his Ideal Love was born in the Descent of the Ideas into the Angelick Minde which could not be perfect till they its Essence were made so by loves conversion to God The Angelick Minde owing its naturall being to Love the other Gods who succeeded this Minde necessarily are younger then He in their naturall Being though they precede him in their Ideal as not born till these Ideas though imperfectly were joyn'd to the inform'd Nature Sect. XVI THe Kingdome of Necessity is said to be before that of Love Every Creature consists of two Natures Materiall the imperfect which we here understand by Necessity and Formall the occasion of perfection That whereof it most partakes is said to be predominant and the Creature to be subject to it Hence is Necessity matter suppos'd to raigne when the Ideas were imperfect and all imperfections to happen during that time all perfections after Love began his reign for when the Minde was by him converted to God that which before was imperfect in her was perfected Sect. XVII VEnus is said to commend Fate The order and concatenation of causes and effects in this sensible World called Fate depends on the order of the Intelligible World Providence Hence Platonists place Providence the ordering of Ideas in the first Minde depending upon God its ultimate end to which it leads all other things Thus Venus being the order of those Ideas whereon Fate the Worlds order depends commands it Fate is divided into three parts Clotho Lachesis and Atropos That which is one in Providence indivisible in Eternity when it comes into Time and Fate is divisible into Past Present and Future Others apply Atropos to the fixed Sphear Clotho to the seven Planets Lachesis to sublunary things Temporall corporeall things only are subjected to Fate the Rationall Soul being incorporeall predominates over it but is subjected to Providence to serve which is true liberty By whom the Will obeying its Lawes is led to the Acquisition of her desired end And as often as she endeavours to loose her selfe from this Servitude of Free she becomes a Servant and Slave to Fate of whom before she was the Mistresse To deviate from the Laws of Providence is to forsake Reason to follow Sense and Irrationall Appetite which being corporeall are under Fate he that serves these is much more a servant then those he serves Sect. XVIII AS from God Ideas descend into the Angelick Mind by which the Love of Intellectuall Beauty is begot in her called Divine Love so the same Ideas descend from the Angelick Minde into the Rationall Soul so much the more imperfect in her as she wants of Angelicall Perfection From these springs Human Love Plato discourseth of the first Plotinus of the latter who by the same Argument whereby he proves Ideas not accidentall but substantiall in the Angelick Minde evinceth likewise the specificall Reasons the Ideas in the Soul to be substantiall terming the Soul Venus as having a specious splendid Love in respect of these specificall Reasons Sect. XIX VUlgar Love is the Appetite of sensible Beauty through corporeall sight The cause of this Beauty is the visible Heaven by its moving power As our motive faculty consists in Muscles and Nerves the Instruments of its Operation so the motive faculty of Heaven is fitted with a Body proper for circular sempiternall motion Through which Body the Soul as a Painter with his Pencill changeth this inferiour matter into various Forms Thus vulgar Venus the beauty of materiall forms hath her casuall being from the moving power of the Heavens her formall from colour enlightned by the visible Sun as Ideas by the invisible her participate in the Figure and just order of parts communicated to sight by mediation of light and colour by whose Interest only it procures love Sect. XX. AS when the Ideas descend into the Minde there ariseth a desire of enjoying that from whence this Ideall Beauty comes so when the species of sensible Beauty flow into the Eye there springs a two-fold Appetite of Union with that whence this Beauty is derived one Sensuall the other Rationall the principles of Bestiall and Human Love If We follow Sense We Judge the Body wherein We behold this Beauty to be its Fountain whence proceedes a desire of Coition the most intimate union with it This is the Love of irrationall Creatures But Reason knowes that the Body is so far from being its Originall that it is destructive to it and the more it is sever'd from the Body the more it enjoyes its own Nature and Dignity We must not fix with the species of Sense in the Body but refine that species from all reliques of corporeall infection And because Man may be understood by the Rationall Soul either considered apart or in its union to the Body in the first sence human Love is the Image of the Celestiall in the second Desire of sensible Beauty this being by the Soul abstracted from matter and as much as its nature will allow made Intellectuall The greater part of men reach no higher than this others more perfect remembring that more perfect Beauty which the Soul before immers'd in the Body beheld are inflam'd with an incredible desire of reviewing it in pursuit whereof they separate themselves as much as possible from the Body of which the Soul returning to its first dignity becomes absolute Mistresse This is the Image of Celestiall Love by which man ariseth from one perfection to another till his Soul wholly united to the Intellect is made an Angell Purged from materiall drosse and transformed into spirituall flame by this Divine Power he mounts up to the Intelligible Heaven and happily rests in his Fathers bosome Sect. XXI VUlgar Love is only in Souls immerst in Matter and overcome by it or at least hindred by perturbations and passions Angelick Love is in the Intellect eternall as it Yet but inferr'd the greater part turning
no part is significant by it selfe A Verb is a voice implying time whereof no part is significant by it selfe A Speech 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a voice signifying according to institution whose parts are significant separate Of Speech the enunciative only called proposition belongs to Philosophy the precatory and imperative to Rhetorick Poetry c. Propositions are divided foure waies into simple and complex into affirmative and negative into universall particular indefinite and singular into pure and modall the modall is either necessary possible contingent or impossible Propositions have three accidents opposition consectation conversion Opposition is either contradictory of a particular to an universall or contrary of an universall to an universall or subcontrary of a particular negative to a particular affirmative Consectation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or aequipollence is the consideration of those affections of a proposition in respect whereof two propositions signify together the same thing and are together true or false Conversion is a transposition of the termes preserving the affirmation negation and verity of the proposition it is either absolute which reserves the same quantity but alters the quality or partiall which reserves not the same quantity CHAP. IV. Of Syllogisme SYllogisme is a speech in which some things being laid down another necessarily followes Perfect Syllogisme is that which requireth no other to shew its power clearnesse and efficacy Imperfect requires another to that purpose by conversion or transposition of the propositions The matter of Syllogisme is three termes the form is the right disposition of the matter according to figure and mood Figure is an apt disposition of the medium with the extreams apt for concluding aright Mood is a disposition of propositions according to quantity and quality There are three figures The first when the medium is first subject then praedicate It hath nine moods 4. usefull 5. uselesse and illegitimate of the usefull two are universall two particular The first Every A is B. Every C is A. Therefore every C is B. The second No A is B. Every C is A. Therefore no C is B. The third Every A is B Some C is A. Therfore some C is B. The fourth No A is B. Some C is A. Therfore some C is B. In the second figure the medium is praedicated of both the extreams It hath 16 Moods 4 true 12 false and illegitimate Of the true two are universall two particular The first No M is N. Every O is N. Therfore no O is M. The second Every M is N. No O is N. Therfore no O is M. The third No M is N. Some O is N. Therefore some O is not M. The fourth Every M is N. Some O is not N. Therfore some O is not M. In the third figure the medium is subjected to both extreams It hath 16 Moods 10 false and illegitimate 6. legitimate which conclude particularly The first Every P is R. Every P is S. Therfore some S is R. The second No P is R. Every P is S. Therefore some S is not R. The third Some P is R. Every P is S. Therfore some S is R. The fourth Every P is R. Some P is S. Therfore some S is R. The fift Some P is not R. Every P is S. Therefore some S is not R. The sixt No P is R. Some P is S. Therfore some S is not R. Every Syllogisme ought to be framed in one of these three Figures but those of the second and third being imperfect ought to be reduced to the first which is the most absolute and perfect There are six other formes of argument Conversion of Termes Induction Example abduction Instance Enthymem All these have their effiâ—â—cy from the power of Syllogisme and are reducible to Syllogisme As concerning the invention power and conversion of Syllogisme he is exact and curious to admiration CHAP. V Of Apodeictick or demonstrative Syllogisme ALL discursive knowledge is made by a praenotion of the things themselves whereof we discourse for ratiocination is not concerning things unknown Demonstration is a discursive knowledge and therefore requireth three praecognitions First that the subject is and what it is in a rude confused manner Secondly what the praedicate is and what it signifieth Thirdly that the principles are true To know is to understand that a thing is that this is cause thereof and that it cannot be otherwise Demonstration is a scientifick Syllogisme Demonstrative Science is from true first immediate more known causes of the conclusion First as having none precedent and being adaequate to and convertible with the effect Immediate or consectaneous as having no terme betwixt to joyne them More known as being praensises to the conclusion not to be demonstrated by any thing Demonstrative Science is of a thing necessary whence the demonstration it selfe consists of necessary propositions which necessity requireth explication of that which is praedicated of all by it selfe and which is universall Of all is that which is attributed to every one and at all times as a living creature to man By it selfe as being of essence proper competible perse and competible to it selfe for it selfe An universall attribute is that which is in every one by it selfe in as much as it is it selfe Demonstration is of conclusions of eternall truth for they are universall propositions whence it followeth that neither demonstration nor Science are of perishable things neither are definitions of such which are the principles of demonstration That there is demonstration it is not necessary to have recourse to Plato's Idaeas separate from singulars it is enough that there are common natures which are in singulars and are praedicated of them It is one thing to know that a thing is so another to know why it is so Hence there are two kinds of demonstration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first is the true and most perfect of which hitherto The other kinde of demonstration viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is more imperfect it is made two waies in the same Science First when the cause is demonstrated by the effect thus Starres which do not twinkle are nearest to the earth but the Planets do not twinkle therefore they are nearest to the earth Secondly when the effect is proved by a cause remote and not reciprocall or by an effect of the remote cause as this Every thing that breatheth is a living creature but no Wall breaths therefore no Wall is a living creature To know 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is proper to subalternat principle Sciences as Geometry and Arithmetick which contemplate the first proper causes to know 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of the subalternate and inferiour as Optick and Musick Of all figures the first is most accommodate to knowledge for that only concludes with an universall affirmative and therefore in that only is a demonstrative 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
adversary are Falsitie Paradox Soloecism and Tautologie Sophismes are solved either by distinction or negation Thus much may serve for a slight view of his Logick whereof we have but few Books left in respect of the many which he wrote upon that part of Philosophy THE SECOND PART CHAP. I. Of PHYSICK NOt to question the Method of Aristotle's Books of Physick much lesse their titles as some to make them better agree with Laertius's Catalogue have done and least of all their Authority with Patricius we shall take them in that order which is generally received according to which next Logick is placed Physick Physick is a science concerning that substance which hath the principle of motion and rest within it self The Physicall Books of Aristotle that are extant treat of these nine generall heads Of the principles of naturall things of the Common affections of naturall things of Heaven of Elements of the action and passion of Elements of Exhalation of Plants of Animals of the Soul CHAP. II. Of the Principles of Naturall Bodies THe Principles of naturall Bodies are not one as Parmenides and Melissus held nor Homoiomeria's as Anaxagoras nor Atomes as Leucippus and Democritus nor sensible Elements as Thales Anaximander Anaximenes Empedocles nor numbers or figures as the Pythagoreans nor Idaea's as Plato That the Principles of things are Contrary privately opposite was the joint opinion of the Ancients and is manifest in Reason For Principles are those which neither are mutually of one another nor of others but of them are all things Such are first contraries as being first they are not of any other as contrary not of another Hence it follows that being contrary they must be more then one but not infinite for then naturall things would not be comprensible by Reason yet more then two for of contraries only nothing would be produced but that they would rather destroy one another There are therefore three Principles of naturall bodies two contrary privation and form and one common subject of both Matter The constitutive Principles are matter and form of privation bodies consist not but accidentally as it is competent to Matter Things are made of that which is Ens potentially Materia prima not of that which is Ens actually nor of that which is non-ens potentially which is pure nothing Matter is neither generated nor corrupted It is the first insite subject of every thing whereof it is framed primarily in it self and not by accident and into which it at last resolveth To treat of forme in generall is proper to Metaphysicks CHAP. III. Of Nature and the Causes of Naturall bodies OF Beings some are by Nature as Plants others from other causes those have in themselves the principle of their motion these have not Nature is a Principle and Cause of the motion and rest of that thing wherein it is primarily by it self and not by accident Materiall substances have nature Natural properties are according to Nature Nature is twofold Matter and Form but Form is most Nature because it is in act Of Causes are four kinds the Material of which a thing is made the Formall by which a thing is made or reason of its essence The efficient whence is the first principle of its mutation or rest as a Father the Finall for which end it is made as health is to walking Causes are immediate or remote principall or accidentall actuall or potentiall particular or universall Fortune and Chance are Causes of many effects Fortune is an accidentall Cause in those things which are done by election for some end Chance is larger an accidentall cause in things which are done for some end at least that of Nature They are both efficient Nature acts for some end not temerariously or casually for those things which are done by nature are alwaies or for the most part done in the same manner yet somtimes she is frustrated of her end as in Monsters which she intends not Necessity is twofold absolute which is from Matter conditional which is from the end or form both kinds are in naturall things CHAP. IV. Of the affections of naturall Bodies Motion Place Time MOtion is of a thing which is not such but may be such the way or act by which it becommeth such as curing of a body which is not in health but may be in health is the way and act by which it is brought to health Neither is it absurd that the same thing should be both in act and power as to different respects for the thing moved as water in warming is in act as to the heat which it hath in power as to the greater heat which it is capable of Infinite is that which is pertransible without end such an infinite in act there is not not amongst simple bodies for the elements are confined to certain number and place neither amongst mixt bodies for they consist of the elements which are finite But there are things infinite potentially as in addition Number which may be augmented infinitely in division Magnitude which may be divided infinitely in time and continued succession of generation The properties of place are that it containes the thing placed that it is equall to and separable from the thing placed that the place and thing placed are together that it hath upwards or downwards and the like differences that every Physicall body tends naturally to its proper place and there resteth Place is the immediate immovable superficies of a continent body Those things which are contained by another body are in place but those which have not any other body above or beyond them are not properly in place Bodies rest in their naturall places because they tend thither as a part torn off from the whole Vacuum is place void of body such a vacuum there is not in nature for that would destroy all motion seeing that in vacuum there is neither upwards nor downwards backwards nor forwards Nor would there be any reason why motion should be to one part more then to another Moreover it would follow that it were impossible for one body to make another to recede if the triple dimension which bodies divide were vacuous Neither is the motion of rare bodies upwards caused by vacuity for that motion is as naturall to light bodies as to move downwards is to heavy Time is the number of motion by before and after Those two parts of time are conjoyned by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the present as the parts of a line are by a point Time is the measure of rest as well as of motion for the same measure which serves for the privation serves for the habit All motion and mutation is in time for in every motion there is a swiftnesse or slownesse which is defined by time The Heavens Earth Sea and other sensibles are in time for they are movable Time being a numerate number exists not without a numerant which
come mixt bodies differing according to the various proportion of the temperament and as they are compounded of the Elements so they resolve into the same All these mixt bodies consist of all the Elements of Earth for every things participates of the nature of that thing wherein it is produced of water because every mixt thing must be concrete and terminated which properties Water best affordeth to Earth of Air and Fire because every perfect mixt body is made by temperament of contraries such is Air to Earth Fire to Water Again the nature of all mixt bodies as well animate as inanimate as to mixture is the same but that the animate consist of all the Element is manifest in that they are nourished by them The causes and common principles of mixt bodies are three materiall fomall efficient The Materiall is the power to be and not to be by which elementary things are generated and corrupted The formall is the reason of the essence of every thing the universall efficient is the circular motion of Heaven not onely as being eternall continuall and before generation but chiefly because it bringeth nigh to us and carrieth far from us that which hath the generative power of all things that is the Sun and the other Stars which by their accession and recession are the causes of generation and corruption All these are so disposed according to the order of Nature that because no naturall being can be permanent in the same individuall state they may be at lest preserved by a continuall succession of many individuum's of the same species Whence the naturall cause of generation is onely conservation of the species CHAP. XI Of imperfect mixt bodies MIxt bodies are twofold imperfect and perfect Meteors are imperfect mixt bodies produced according to Nature but after a lesse orderly and constant manner The generall matter thereof are the Elements the efficient the celestiall bodies which act upon inferiours by a kind of coherence Heaven is highest next Heaven the Element of fire next fire air under air water and earth Clouds are not generated in the sphear of fire nor in the region of the air partly by reason of the heat which is there partly because of the motion of the Heavens which carrieth along with it the element of fire and the upper region of the air by which motion heat is produced in inferiour bodies for the air being carried along by the Heaven is heated by that motion and by the proximity of the Sunne and of the Element of fire Flames that appear in the upper part of the air are made thus The Sun by his warmth extracteth a kind of breath out of the Earth which if hot and dry is called exhalation and if hot and moist vapour Exhalation ascends higher as being higher and being got into the upper region of the air is there enkindled by the motion of the air and proximity of the fire Hence come those they call fire-brands goates falling-starres and the like Hence are also Phasmes such as are called gulses chasmes bloody colours and the like the exhalation being variously colour'd by reflection of the light but chiefly seeming purple which colour ariseth from the mixture of fire and white The efficient cause of Comets are the Sun and stars the materiall an exhalation hot dry condensed and combustible so as it burnes not much nor is soon extinguished It is called a Comet or airy starre when it is a like on every side a pogoneia or bearded starre when it hath a long train That it consists of fire is manifest because at the same time there is commonly great winde and drought It appears seldome and then single and beyond the Tropicks because starres especially the Sun dissipate the matter whereof it consists The Galaxie is not the light of many starrs together as Anaxagoras held but an exhalation hot and dry kindled by the motion of many great starrs which are in that part where the Galaxie appeareth We come next to those meteors which are in the middle and lower region of the air When the Sun and other Starres draw up vapours out of waterish places into the middle region of the air they are there kept so long untill they are condensed by the cold of that place into drops of water which if they come down very small are called misling if greater rain This thick vapour which is seen suspended in the aire and changeth from air to water is a Cloud Mist is the superfluity of a cloud condensed into water Vapour attracted by a small heat not much above the earth and descending more condensed by the nocturnall cold becometh either dew or frost Frost when it congealeth before it resolves into water Dew when it turnes into water so as the warmth cannot dry it up nor the cold freez it Snow is a congealed cloud rain dew frost and snow differ almost only in bignesse and smalnesse Haile though it be of the same nature as ice yet is seldome produced in winter as being caused by Antiperistasis As the air above the earth condensed becommeth vapour and vapour by cold becommeth water so doth it also in the caverns and receptacles of the earth by a continuall mutation first it turnes into little drops then those little into greater Hence comes all springs and heads of rivers abundantly flowing out at one part of the earth Hence great Rivers and Fountains commonly flow from great hills which have greatest caverns The parts of the earth are in continuall mutation sometimes humid sometimes dry sometimes fertile sometimes desert by new eruptions or defections of rivers or accesse or recesse of the sea according to certain periods of time Thus have the parts of the earth their youth and age as well as plants and living creatures by the heat and conversion of the Sun Time and the World are eternall but Nilus and Tanais were not alwaies for those places whence they first issued were once dry grounds The proper place of water is the concave superficies of the aire This place the Sea compassing the earth possesseth for the swift and more rare water is drawn upwards by the heat of the Sun the salt more thick and terrene setleth downwards For this reason all waters tend to the sea as to their proper place yet hereby the Sea is not enlarged for the sun draweth out of it by reason of its expansion as great a quantity of water as it receiveth from rivers The sea is as the world eternall the saltnesse thereof proceedeth from admixtion of some terrene adust exhalation From the top of the Sea is drawn up a fresh vapour from the bottom heated by the Sun an exhalation which passeth through the Sea and commeth up with the vapour but falling back into the Sea bringeth that saltnesse with it as water passed often through ashes Winds are produced by the Sun and Starrs of a hot dry
Sense is true phantasy often false Sense is only of things present phantasy of the absent likewise Phantasy is not Science or Intellect for that is alwaies of things true and reall phantasy often is of things false Phantasy is not opinion for opinion is follow'd by faith phantasy is not Phantasy is a motion in animals from sense in act by which motion they are variously affected and conceive things sometimes true and sometimes false The errour of phantasy ariseth from the errour of the senses Phantasy therefore is of neer affinity with sense for though it be not sense yet it exists not without sense or in things that have no sense It is derived 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from light for sight the most excellent of senses cannot act without light Many things are done by Animals according to phantasie either because they have not Intellect as Beasts or that intellect is obscured in them CHAP. XIX Of Memory and Reminiscence FRom Phantasy proceeds Memory which is of things past as sense is of the present opinion of the future Sense and Intellection are necessarily previous to memory Hence those Animals only which have sense of time remember as horses and dogs yet memory is not without phantasm even not that memory which is of Intelligible things for he that remembreth is sensible that he first saw heard or learn'd what he remembreth Memory therefore is reducible per se to phantasie as being of Phantasmes to intellect only by accident Hence in the same part of the Soul wherein Phantasie exists resideth likewise memory for if it were placed only in the intellectual faculty it would not be competent to Beasts which we see it is Memory is made by impression of some image by the sense upon the Soul Hence they who retain not the image and figure of sense either by continuall motion or excessive humidity as children or drought as old men remember not To memory therefore is required a moderate temperature of the brain yet more inclined to dry Reminiscence is not a resumption or assumption of memory but differs specifically from both these for Beasts have not Reminiscence though they have memory Reminiscence being made by discourse and diligent disquisition collecting one thing from another by a continued series and order untill at last we cal that to mind which we had forgotten CHAP. XX. Of Sleep and Waking TO Sense belongeth Sleep and Waking for those animate things which want sense neither sleep nor wake as Plants Sleep is an immobility and band as it were of sense waking is a solution and remission of sense The chief seat of sleep is the common sense which being bound up by sleep all the exteriour senses whereof this is the common Centre are bound up likewise and restrained for the rest and health of the Animal which is the end of waking also Every impotence of sense is not sleep but only that which is caused by evaporation of the Aliment Hence we are most subject to sleep after meat for then much humid vapour ascends which first maketh the head heavy by consistence there then descends and repells the heat whereby is induced sleep That sleep is made in this manner is evident from all soporiferous things as poppy which causeth heaviness in the head by sending up vapours Labour produceth sleep by dispersing the humours whence produceth vapour Drunken men Children are subject to sleep much melancholy persons little for they are so cold within that the vapour exhaleth not especially they being of a dry constitution Sleep therefore is a recession of the heat inward with a naturall kind of circumobsistence CHAP. XXI Of Dreams DReaming is an affection of the sensory part in as much as it is phantastick A Dream is an apparition or phantasme seen in sleep After the functions of the externall senses there remain their motions and similitudes induced by their objects into their Organs These occurring in sleep cause dreams but not at all times nor at every age for their species show not themselves but upon cessation of the humours Hence Dreams are not immediatly after sleep nor in infants soon after their birth for then there is too great commotion by reason of the alimentary heat As therefore in troubled water no image appeareth or if any much distorted but when it is calm the image is rendred clearly so when there is a tumult and agitation of the humours there are no images presented or those dreadfull such as are the Dreams of melancholly and sick persons but when the blood passeth smoothly and the humours are setled we have pure and pleasing Dreams A Dream therefore is a phantasm caused by motion of sensibles already perceived by sense occurring to Animals in sleep CHAP. XXII Of the Intellective Faculty THe third faculty of the Soul is the Intellective proper to man Intellect is that part of the Soul whereby it knoweth and understandeth It is twofold Patient and Agent Patient Intellect is that by which Intellect becometh all things for Intelâ—ection is like sense Sense is by passion from a sensible object intellect from an intellectuall The properties of patient Intellect are these it is void of corruptive passion it is apt for reception of species it is that species potentially it is not mixt with the body it hath no corporeall Organs it is the place of species That there is also an agent Intellect is manifest for in whatsoever kind there is somthing that is potentially all of that kind there is somthing likewise which is the efficient cause of all in that kind this is the agent Intellect a cognoscitive power which enlightneth phantasms and the patient Intellect The properties thereof are that it is separable from the body immortall and eternall that it is not mixt with the body that it is void of passion that it is ever in act but the patient Intellect is mortall which is the cause of Forgetfulness The action of the Intellect is twofold one Intellection of indivisibles in which is neither truth nor falshood as all simple apprehensions the other complex when we compound and unite notions by affirmation or negation This is alwaies either true or false the other neither The simple is precedent to the complex Intellect in act is either Practick or Theoretick As a sensible object reduceth the sensible faculty from power to act so doth an intellectuall object the intellectuall faculty and as the operation of sense is threefold simple apprehension judgment if it be good or ill and lastly appetition or aversion according to that perception So likewise is the operation of the practick intellect threefold First it is moved by phantaâ—mes as sense is by externall sensibles Secondly it judgeth the object to be good or ill by affirmation or negation Thirdly it moveth the will to pursue or shun it whence it is called practick This practick intellect is moved as well when the sensible object is absent as
proposition either affirms or denies therefore every proposition is either true or false between these there is no medium CHAP. III. Of Substance and Accident OF Ens in generall there are three divisions first by accident and per se secondly Potentiall and active thirdly intentionall and reall Of Ens by accident there is no Science for it is in a manner non-ens it hath no cause per se it is not generated or corrupted per se it is not alwaies nor for the most part not necessary whereas Science is of things contrary to these Ens per se is divided into ten Categories The first is substance and the first Ens and consequently the first Category for it is predicated in quids of the first subject whereas Accidents are predicated in quale or quantum Again substance only is Ens per se accidents are Ens as they are affections of substance Substance is the first Ens by Reason or definition because accidents are defined by Substance By knowledge because the knowledge of accidents depends on the knowledge of substance By time for there is some substance without accident as God and Intelligences but there is no accident without a substance Likewise material substances are precedent in Time at least to some accidents which arrive unto them after they have some time generated And lastly by Nature for the subject is by Nature before that which inhereth in it Hence this part of Physick treateth onely of substance Subject or substance is threefold matter form compositum The two latter are more Ens then matter though matter be truly substance as being the first and last subject which remaineth though all the affections of a body be taken away This is first matter which in it self is neither compleat substance nor quantitative nor in any other Category Neither is it first substance for that is separable and may exist by its own power without others That is likewise a determinate perfect singular substance but matter cannot be separated from form neither is it singular or determinable Form is that which the thing it selfe is said to be per se 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the being of a thing what it was the whole common nature and essence of a thing answerable to the definition Compound sensible substances have a proper definition but ens by accident consisting of subject and accident hath not though it may be by accident described and explained Even Categoricall accidents being one per se and of one nature have a quiddity and definition not simply as substances but after their owne manner Matter and form are not properly generated but the whole Compositum whereto Ideas separate substances confer nothing neither as efficient nor exemplary Causes The common substantiall or formall parts of the thing defined are to be put into the definition of the whole but the materiall parts of the Individuum it selfe must not CHAP. IV. Of Power and Act. NExt Substance we come to Power and Act. Power is either active or passive Active power is the principle of changing other things or acting on another in as much as it is another Passive power is in a manner the same with active for the motion of passion and action is really the same neither can one be without the other though simply they are diverse being in different subjects passive in the Patient active in the Agent Of powers some are void of Reason as the power of warming some rationall as Arts The rationall are of contraries as Medicine is of health and sick the irrationall of one only as heat produceth heat The power contrary to the Megarick Philosophers followers of Zeno remains althogh not reduced to act for we call a man Architect though he be not actually employed in building Again Animals have sense even when they are not in act Thirdly it were impossible any thing could be which were not actually Possible is that whose power if it were reduced to act would not imply any impossibility They are mistaken who think there is any thing possible which shall never actually be or that there are powers whose acts are impossible for hence it would follow that all things should be possible nothing impossible Possible is that which doth or may follow from some power if it never followeth or commeth out of that power it is impossible That which is possible therefore must at some time or other be in act Of powers there are three kinds some naturall as Senses some acquired by custome as playing on a Pipes some by discipline as Arts. The two last require previous operations the naturall do not Naturall and irrationall powers are necessarily reduced to act when the Agent and Patient are at a due distance and there is nothing betwixt to hinder them The rationall powers are not so for they are free to act or not to act as they please Act is when the thing that was in power is otherwise then when it was in power All act is before power and before all nature which is contained under power by reason â—ssence and time By reason because power is defined by act By time because though power be temporall before act in the same numericall object for a man may first be learned before he actually be such yet in different things of the same species act is ever before power in time for nothing can be made or reduced from power unlesse by an agent actually existent Lastly act is before power in essence first because it is later in generation for generation beginneth from the imperfect state of a thing and proceedeth to the perfect Now all generation proceedeth from power to act Secondly act is the end of power but the end as it is later in generation so is it more perfect by nature and first in intention CHAP. V. Of True and False THe first division of Ens is into intentionall and reall The intentionall is either true or false The intellect asserteth truly if its judgment be conformable to the thing falsely if not conformable for there is composition and division in the things themselves as well as in the intellect Whence if the intellect compound things by affirmation as they are really compounded or divide them by negation as they are really divided it asserteth truly otherwise falsely True and false are in the simple apprehension of things but simply not enunciatively so as that truth is nothing but a simple perception of the object falshood a non-perception or ignorance thereof though ignorance be not properly falsity Whence simple apprehension may be true in it selfe false it cannot be for falsity requireth composition Complex truth and falshood may be of the same separate substances He cannot be deceived in the knowledge of things immovable whosoever hath once conceived them immutable for either he will judge alwaies truth or alwaies erre because things immovable are alwaies in the same manner The vicissitude
and deception and true and false judgment is only in things contingent and mutable CHAP. VI. Of one the same and diverse ONe is an affection of Ens not a substance as Pythagoras and Plato affirmed but a Categoreme predicated of every thing as it is Ens. To one is opposite many by privative opposition and therefore one is manifested by many as indivisible by divisible the privation by the habit For divisible is more known to sense then indivisible and multitude then unity To one are referred the same equall like to many diâ—ers â—â—equall unlike Things are dâ—verse either by Genus or species by genus those which have not the same matter nor a mutuall generation or whereof one pertaines to corruptible substance the other to incorruptible By species those which have the same genus Genus is that wherein those things that are diverse are said to be the same according to substance CHAP. VII Of immortall eternall and immoveable substances SUbstance is threefold two kinds naturall whereof one is corruptible as Animal the other sempiternall as Heaven The third is immoveable That there is a perpetuall immoveable substance is proved thus Substances are first Ens therefore if all substances are corruptible all things likewise must be corruptible which is false for there is an eternall locall motion circular proper to Heaven which it is not possible should have had a beginning or shall have a dissolution no more then time If therefore Time be eternall as motion there must necessarily be some incorruptible and eternal substance not only that wherein that eternall motion exists the Heaven it self but one substance which so moveth that though it remain its self moveable yet it moveth others from eternity to eternity not having only the power of moving but being continually in the act of motion For Plato and the rest who conceived God to have done nothing for a great while erre because that power were frustraneous which were not reduced to act Besides motion would not have been eternall unlesse the moving substance were not only eternall and in perpetuall actuall motition but such likewise that it could not but it must move allwaies as being a pure act void of power Hence the substances which cause eternall motion are void of matter for they move from an eternall act and are void of all power In things that somtimes are somtimes are not power is precedent to act but simply and absolutely act is precedent to power For neither things naturall nor artificiall are reduced from power to act but by somthing that actually exists Now if the same thing alwaies return by a circular motion it necessarily followeth that there is somthing eternall which remaineth ever the same and operateth in the same manner Such an eternall first moving substance is the first Heaven The vicissitude of Generation and corruption is not caused by the first Heaven for that moveth alwaies in the same manner but by the inferiour Orbes especially the Sun which by his accession bringeth life by his recession death to all things mortall Thus is the first Heaven eternall for it is moved with eternall motion besides which there is somthing which alwaies moveth and is never moved it self and is eternall and substance and act CHAP. VIII Of Gods THis first mover moveth in the same manner as things appetible and intelligible that is it so moveth others as it self remaineth immoveable The motion of the first Agent as it is the first efficient cause consisteth in that influence thereof whereby it concurreth effectively with the inferiour Intelligences in moving its own orb Wherefore the efficience of the first mover is an application of the powers of the inferiour movers to their proper works wherein he concurreth with them actively and independently Thus the Intelligences move the Heavens not for the generation of inferiour things for the end must be more noble then the means but for that chief and amiable good whereunto they endeavour to be like as their ultimate end The first mover is void of mutation an ens wholly and simply necessary and consequently the principle of all Upon this first principle depend Heaven and nature because without him their ultimate end and first efficient nothing can be or be operated This first mover God enjoyeth the most perfect life perpetual and most pleasant which absolute felicity is proper to him for as much as he understandeth and contemplateth himself with infinite delight For as we are happy in contemplation that lasts but a little while so is God most happy in the infinite and most perfect contemplation of himself who is of all things most admirable God is an eternall living being the best of beings an immoveable substance separate from sensible things void of corporeall quantity without parts and indivisible for such must that principle or substance be which moveth in infinite time Nothing finite hath infinite power All magnitude must be either finite or infinite Finite magnitude cannot move in infinite time infinite magnitude there is not as we proved in the Physick God is impossible not subject to alteration the first locall motion which is the circular not being competible to God because he is immoveable it followeth that other motions that induce passion or alteration and are later then locall motion cannot likewise be competent to him CHAP. IX Of Intelligences BEsides this first Substance the mover of the first Heaven thâ—re must likewise be other substances separate from matter eternall and immoveable president over the motions of the inferiour orbes so that after what number and order those orbes are disposed according to the same are these eternall moving and immoveable substances ordered From the number of the motions may be collected the number of the Sphears and consequently of the substances moving which according to Aristotle are 47. Heaven is numerically one because the first mover is one It is an ancient Tradition that these first substances that move the Heavens are Gods This opinion is truly divine but what is added that they had the shape of men or some other Animal was only invented for perswasion of the common people for use of Laws and the convenience of Life Thus much may serve for a short view of his Metaphysicks THEOPHRASTVS CHAP. I. His Country Parents Masters THEOPHRASTUS succeeded Aristotle he was born at Erestus as Plutarch Laertius and others affirme a Sea-town of Lesâ—os seated upon a hill as Strabo describes it distant from Sigrium 18 Stadia His Father was named Melantes as Athenodorus affirmeth according to others Leo by profession a Fuller Theophrastus was first called Tyrtamus He heard Leucippus in his own Country afterwards went to Plato and lastly became an auditor of Aristotle who changing the roughnesse of his name called him as Suidas saith first Euphrastus afterwards Theophrastus from the divine eloquence of his speech wherein as Cicero Pliny Laertius Strabo and others aver he excelled all the
just nor dispraise nor honour nor punishment but this is false therefore all things are not done by Fate But Chrysippus not allowing this necessity yet maintaining that nothing happened without precedent causes distinguisheth thus Of Causes saith he some are perfect and principall others assistant and immediate When we say all things are done by Fate from antecedent causes we understand not the perfect and principall causes but the assistent and immediate He therefore answers the former objection thus If all things are done by Fate it followeth that all things be done by antecedent causes but not by the principall and perfect but by the assistent and immediate which though they be not in our power it followeth not that the appetite likewise is in our power This Argument therefore concludes well against those who joyne necessity with Fate but nothing against those who assert antecedent causes not perfect nor principall What assent is and how it commeth to be in our power we have already shewn in the Logick Hence it followeth that notwithstanding that all things are necessarily coacted and connected by Fate with a certain principall reason yet saith Chrysippus our mindes are so obnoxious to Fate as their property and quality is For if at the first by nature they were formed soundly and profitably all that power which commeth upon them extrinsecally from Fate they transmit easily and inoffensively but if they are harsh ignorant and rude not supported by any helps of good art although they are pressed by little or no conflict of fatall incommodity yet by their own unluckinesse and voluntary impulsion they rush into continuall sins and errours which thing maketh that this naturall and necessary consequence of things which is called Fate be by this reason For it is as it were fatall and consequent in its kinde that wicked minds should not be without sins and errours an instance whereof he bringeth not unapposite As saith he a rolling stone if you turn it down a steep place you first give it the cause and beginning of its precipitation but afterwards it rolleth headlong of it selfe not that you make it do so any longer but because its figure and the volubility of its form is such In like manner order and reason and necessitie moveth the beginnings of causes but the impetuousnesse of our thoughts and mindes and our own actions are guided by every mans private will and minde Thence continueth he the Pythagoreans say Men of their own accord their ills procure As conceiving that all ills proceed from themselves and according to their own appetites when they sin and offend and according to their own minde and signe For this reason he denyeth that we ought to suffer and hear such wicked or idle or noxious or impudent persons who being taken in some fault and wickednesse have recourse to the necessity of Fate as to a Sanctuary affirming that they have done wickedly is not to be attributed to their temerity but to Fate CHAP. XX. Of Not-Bodies or Incorporealls and first of Dicibles HItherto of Bodies we come next to the second place of Physick concerning Not-Bodies or Incorporealls Incorporeall is that which may be but is not contained in bodies Of those there are four kinds Dicibles Vacuum place and Time Dicible is that which consisteth according to rationall phantasy a mean betwixt notion and thing Of this already in the Logick CHAP. XXI of Vacuum and Place THe second incorporeall is Vacuum which is the solitude or vacuity of a body In the world there is no vacuum neither in the whole nor in any part Beyond it there is an infinite vacuity into which the world shall be resolved Of this already in the Chapter concerning the world Next is Place Place is that which is fully occupated by the body or as Chrysippus defines it that which is or may be occupated by one or more things Thus it differs from vacuity which hath no body and from space which is occupated but in part as a vessell halfe full of wine CHAP. XXII Of Time LAst of the Incorporealls is Time Time is according to many of the Stoicks the motion of it selfe not of heaven and had no beginning of generation Chrysippus saith that Time is the measure of slownesse or swiftnesse Zeno defined it the intervall of motion and measure of slownesse and swiftnesse according to which all things were and are Possidonius saith that some are wholly infinite as all Time some only in part as the past and future for they are joyned together by the present He defined Time the intervall of motion or the measure of swiftnesse and slownesse one part of it being present the other future the present connected to the future by something like a point It is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 attributed to the least part of Time that falleth under sense subsisting according to the difference of past and future Chrysippus saith that Time is the intervall of motion the measure of swiftnesse and slownesse a consequent intervall to the worlds motion according to which all things are and are moved unlosse rather there be a two-fold Time as the Earth and Sea and Vacuity and Universe have the same names with their parts And as vacuity is every way infinite so Time is both waies infinite for the present and future have no end He likewise asserts that no entire present is Time for continuous things being divided into infinite Time likewise admitteth of the same division so that no Time is properly present but so called after a lesse accurate manner The present only is subsistent unlesse it be understood as of Categorems as walking is attributed to him that walketh but not to him that sitteth or lyeth Thus much for the STOICALL PHILOSOPHY CLEANTHES CAP. I. His Life CLeanthes was of Assus an Aeolian City fortified as Stralo describes it both by Nature and Art sonne of Phanias He was first according to Antisthenes a wrastler and comeing to Athens having no more then four Drachms he apply'd himself first to Crates then to Zene whom he heard constantly and persevered in his Philosophy and Opinions He was much commended for his laboriousnesse in as much as being poor he went by night to the Gardens to draw water and in the day time studied Philosophy Hence he was called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The drawer of Water Being cited to the Court to give an account how he lived being so healthfull and lusty hee produced the Gardener under whom he drew water and a woman for whom he ground meal to witnesse how he subsisted The Areopagites wondring hereat allotted him 10. minae which Zeno would not suffer him to accept Antigonus gave him 3000. minae On a time leading some young men to a spectacle the wind blew back his Cloak and discovered that he had no Coat whereupon the Athenians much applauded him and as Demetrius the Magnesianâ—aith â—aith bestowed a Coat upon him Antigonus who was his Auditor asked