consequently become Opacous or Visible or it may by the same Causes become Rarer and be turn'd into Fire Also being Divisible it may have parts of which one must be without the other that is it must be Impenetrable as to its own parts and thence be able to protrude another Material being and be Solid too in his Sense of that Word which is the same with Impenetrable Moreover since it must be Divisible it must be Quantitative or Extended and this not Infinitely but Finitely that is it must be Terminated wherefore Termination of Quantity being the Notion of Figure it may have Figure too In a Word if it may possibly be Material there is no Property of Body but may agree to the Soul and therefore the Soul tho' Spiritual may be Corporeal and so the Nature of Body and Spirit may be one and the same But what needs more than meerly his ascribing Materiality to it at least permitting it to belong to it Our Notion of Matter is taken from Body and from nothing else and therefore can be nothing but Body consider'd as not what it actually is but as 't is Alterable Changeable or apt to be another Thing that is as 't is Corruptible which I am sure Mr. L. will not say or think of our Soul Perhaps he may say that he only means that it may have Matter annex'd to its Spirituality But then he must grant that since this Materiality did not as an Accident accrue to the Soul afterwards she had it from her Nature and therefore it must be Intrinsecal to her and help to constitute her peculiar Nature and if this be so then when this Material kind of Compart is dissolv'd or corrupted for if Material it may be Alter'd wrought upon and Corrupted as other Material Compounds may the Complex or Compound it self is dissolv'd and so no longer the same but perish'd Besides what should the Soul do with two Material Comparts one Organical the other Inorganical Especially since there are as subtil Parts in this Visible Body of ours with which as the Form of the Body she is united viz. the Spirits as any perhaps Mr. Locke can conceive to be annex'd to her 4. To proceed He does but think it possible for any thing he knows that the Soul may have some Materiality but he positively judges that Brutes have Reason nay that 't is as Evident to him as that they have Sense Now if they have Reason they must know how to draw Consequences this being Essential to the Notion of Reason or rather the same Thing in other Words Again If they can Reason they can compare what 's meant by our Terms and have the Sense of those Sayings we call Propositions in their Knowing Power And since that Reason is not given them for nothing but for their Preservation they can compare Agreeable and Disagreeable Objects and pursue out of that Reason that which is most Agreeable that is they can Will Chuse and Act freely which are naturally consequent to their gathering by their Reason what is better or worse for them and thence Determining themselves to it accordingly I say themselves for if they have Reason then Reason is part of Themselves and not a Distinct Thing from them Out of which Two Things follow One That the Nature of Man and Brute are Confounded since all those Chief Operations Proper to Man are Communicable to Brutes Secondly That Mr. Locke will be at a loss to get an Idea of the Spirituality of his Soul or of other Spiritual Beings by reflecting on the Operations of his Mind since the same may possibly be found in such Beings as are meerly Corporeal Wherefore to conclude this Discourse all our Natural Notions of Body and Spirit and of all their Operations must be jumbled together in a kind of Indifferency to either and therefore those two Natures must be Confounded if either the Soul which is Spiritual may have Materiality Annex'd to her or Brutes which are material Entities may have Thought Knowledge and Reason Annex'd to them And since Mr. Locke affirms very rationally that one of his Ideas is not Another I cannot but think he becomes the more oblig'd to shew out of the Natures of those two Things liquidly and precisely how those two Natures are distinguish'd or else his way of Ideas will be conceiv'd to be meerly Phantastick and Unphilosophical being most unlike the Ideas in the Divine Understanding the Original Ground of all Truth which do not confound Natures but establish them in a most perfect Distinction to be what they are and no other I press not here how no Discourse at all in Philosophy can be Conclusive unless the Nature of Body and Spirit be perfectly and clearly contradistinguish'd nor repeat what I have shewn Reflex 9. § 7. that our Natural Notions teach us to distinguish perfectly between Body and Spirit which his Ideas do not but confound them and thence deprave our Natural Knowledge of Things I know he says but proves not that the having General Ideas puts a perfect Difference between Brutes and us to which I have spoken formerly I add that 't is a thousand times easier to have General Ideas they being but Imperfect Perceptions of the Thing than to have Reason as is easie to be demonstrated and has been manifested above 5. As for making something out of Nothing or Creating after we have prov'd that Existence is Essential to God and not Accidental to him which Mr. L. clearly demonstrates it follows thence and out of the Commonest Notion of Causality that it is not a matter of Wonderment or hard to believe that he should Create but that if he pleases to operate ad extra this is his Peculiar Action since nothing is more Evident than that Every Thing acts as it is Whence if God's Essence and his very Nature be Existence or Actual Being 't is demonstrable that it is not onely as peculiar to him to cause Actual Being or Create as it is for Fire to heat or Light to enlighten but moreover that this is the onely Effect that can immediately or without the intervention of Second Causes proceed from him 6. I much fear that it may seem something to weaken the true Argument for the Possibility of Creation to bring the Instance of our Thought moving our Body whence he concludes that Gods Power to do a Thing is not to be deny'd because we cannot comprehend its Operation For 1. Mr. Locke thinks he experiences this viz. that the Soul moves the Body whereas we do not experience that God Created any thing 2. As Mr. Locke has shown very ingeniously that onely the Man is Free So I affirm 't is the Man that wrought upon himself moves his Body and not his Thought onely And that as when we gaind our First Notions the Man was acted upon both according to his Corporeal and Spiritual Part so every New Act he had afterwards that proceeded from him as he was
the Ideists behaved themselves as to this Point 6. How far the Author engages to clear this Difficulty 7. The First Cause carries on the Course of Second Causes by Immediate Dispositions 8. And therefore he affists Nature if dispos'd when it cannot reach 9. Therefore if the Matter can be dispos'd for a Rational Soul God will give it 10. There can be such a Disposition in Matter 11. Therefore some Material Part by which immediately the Soul has Notions from the Objects 12. Therefore Effluviums are sent from Bodies to that Part. 13. Therefore Man is truly One Thing which is Corporeo-Spiritual 14. Therefore some Chief Part in him which is primarily Corporeo-Spiritual or has both those Natures in it 15. VVhich is affected according to both those Natures because of their Identification in that part 16. The peculiar Temper of that Part consists in Indifferency 17. That Part very tender and Sensible yet not Tenacious § 18. That Part the most Noble of all Material Nature 19. Perhaps 't is Reflexive of Light or Lucid. 20. The Effluviums have in them the Nature of the Bodies whence they are sent 21. They affect that Part as Things Distinct from the Man 22. VVhy they Imprint Abstract Notions 23. The peculiar Nature of our Soul renders those Notions perfectly Distinct and Indivisible 24. VVhence Complex Notions come 25. The Soul cannot alone produce any new Act in her self 26. But by the Phantasms exciting her a-new 27. How Reminiscence is made 28. Memory and Reminiscence Inexplicable unless Phantasms remain in the Brain The Manner how Reminiscence is made in Brutes 29. How Reflexion is connaturally made 30. Direct Notions are Common to all Mankind and their Words Proper Reflex ones Improper and their Words Metaphorical 31. Whence we come to have Negative Notions 32. But those Negative Notions do not abstract from the Subject 33. How we come to have a Notion of Nothing 34. Hence great Care to be had lest we take Non-Entities or Nothings for Things 35. Logical Notions are Real ones 36. The Test to try Artificial Notions Hence all Philosophy is Real Knowledge 37. How our Soul comes to have Phantastick Notions or as we call them Fancies How to avoid being deluded by them 38. How we may discourse evidently of those Natures of which we have no Proper Notions § 39. We can have no Proper Notion of God 's Essence 40. The Author speaks not here of Comparing Notions or of Judgments 41. The Author's Apology for this Discourse and what can be the onely Way to go about to confute it Preliminary Fifth § 1. THE Design of the Author here § 2. The Meaning of the Word Existence 3. The Extream Danger of Misconceiving it 4. The Meaning of Ens or Thing 5. The Meaning of Entity or Essence 6. The Meaning of Matter and Form or of Power and Act. 7. What is meant literally by the common Saying that Matter and Form compound Body 8. The Literal Meaning of Substantial or Essential Forms The Reason why some Moderns oppose Substantial or Essential Forms The Meaning of Metaphysical Composition and Divisibility 9. What is the Principle of Individuation 10. The Meaning of the Word Substance The Word Improper 11. That the Word Supporting and Inhering taken Metaphorically may be allow'd and ought not to be Ridicul'd 12. The Meaning of Suppositum or Hypostasis 13. The Meaning of Suppositality 14. The Meaning of the Word Individuum 15. The Meaning of Substantia Prima and Substantia Secunda 16. The Word Accidents is Improper § 17. The Word Modes more Proper 18. The Word Quantity is very Proper 19. The Word Extension very Improper 20. The Meaning of Divisibility Impenetrability Space and Measurability 21. A short Explication what Quantity Quality and Relation are 22. What Transcendents are 23. The Five Sorts of Transcendents 24. Great Care to be had that Transcendent Words be not held Univocal 25. What great Errours spring thence shewn in the Univocal Acception of the Transcendent Word Compounded 26. The Cartesians Unadvised in going ultra Crepidam Reflexion First § 1. THE Excellent Wit and Unbyass'd Ingenuity of the Author of the Essay acknowledg'd 2. 'T is probable he has taken a Prejudice against Metaphysicks 3. The Incomparable Excellency of the Science of Metaphysicks shewn from the Objects it treats of 4. And from the Manner by which it handles them 5. The Knowledge of these High Objects Attainable by Natural Reason 6. Mr. Locke's Tenet of no Innate Ideas Solidly Grounded and Unanswerable Reflexion Second § 1. IN what the Author agrees and disagrees with Mr. Locke 2. We may have Notions without perceiving we have them § 3. VVe may think without being Conscious that we think 4. 'T is impossible to be Conscious or know we know without a new Act of Reflexion 5. 'T is impossible to be Conscious of or know our present Reflex Act but by a new Reflex one Hence we can never come to know our Last Reflexion 6. 'T is utterly deny'd that Consciousness causes Individuation The Unreasonableness of the Opinion that Men do always think Reflexion Third § 1. NO Notion Simple but that of Existence The Order of our Notions is to be taken from Nature 2. The word Solidity arbitrarily and abusively taken by Mr. Locke 3. His Solidity not at all Essential to Body 4. Space without Body or Vacuum is a meer Groundless Fancy 5. The Contrary to that Tenet demonstrated 6. Therefore 't is impossible there should be any True Experiment to prove a Vacuum Reflexion Fourth § 1. MR. Locke's First Chapter commendable § 2. Privative Notions connotate the Subject 3. Meer Motions made upon the Senses Insufficient to give us Knowledge of the Objects 4. Sensible Qualities are the same in the Objects as in the Mind § 5. The Pretence of God's Voluntary Annexing Improper Causes to Effects is Unphilosophical 6. The Power in the Object to cause Sensation and Knowledge is improperly such Reflexion Fifth § 1. IDeas or Notions are not Actual Perceptions but the Object perceiv'd and durably remaining It destroys the Nature of Memory to make it consist in the Reviving Ideas The Mind cannot revive Perceptions 2. Ideas in the Fancy may fade but Notions are never blotted out of the Soul Reflexion Sixth § 1. IF Brutes can know they may have General Notions and Abstract and Compare too 2. The Distinguishing our Notions guides our Reason and Judgment right 3. All Complex Ideas or Notions must consist of Simpler ones united in the Thing 4. Otherwise they are Groundless Fancies 5. The Manner how all Complex Ideas or Notions are made elaborately explain'd 6. How the Doctrine of Cartesius Mr. Locke and J. S. differ as to this Point Reflection Seventh § 1. EXtension not well Explicated Immensity worse 2. Place well Explicated 3. Body and Extension not the same Notion § 4. Space cannot be without Extension 5. Extension and Space differ onely Formally or in some nice respect 6. The Common Explication of Extension defended 7.
Point elucidated by Abstract and Concrete Words Hence Space without Body or Vacuum is a Contradiction The State of the Question Aristotle neglects to shew particularly how Knowledge was made Later Philosophers were at a great puzzle about it How the Schools explicated this Point How the Ideists behav'd themselves as to this Point How far the Author engages to clear this Difficulty The First Cause carries on the Course of Second Causes by Immediate Dispositions And therefore he assists Nature if Dispos'd when it cannot reach Therefore if the Matter can be Dispos'd for a Rational Soul GOD will give it There can be such a Disposition in Matter Therefore some Material Part by which immediately the Soul has Notions from the Object Therefore Effluviums are sent from Bodies to that Part. Therefore Man is truly One Thing which is Corporeo-Spiritual Therefore some Chief Part in him which is primarily Corporeo-Spiritual or has both those Natures in it Which is affected according to both those Natures because of their Identification in that Part. The Peculiar Temper of that Part consists in Indifferency That Part very Tender and Sensible yet not Tenacious That part the most Noble of all Material Nature Perhaps 't is Reflexive of Light or Lucid. The Effluviums have in them the Naturee of the Bodies whence they are sent They affect that Part as Things Distinct from the Man Why they imprint Abstract Notions The Peculiar Nature of our Soul renders those Notions perfectly distinct and Indivisible Whence Complex Notions come * Method to Science Book 1. Less 3. § 2. The Soul cannot Alone produce any New Act in her self But by the Phantasms exciting her anew How Reminiscence is made Memory and Reminiscence inexplicable unless Phantasms remain in the Brain The manner how Reminiscence is made in Brutes How Reflexion is connaturally made Direct Notions common to all Mankind and their Words Proper Reflex ones Improper and their Words Metaphorical Whence we come to have Negative Notions But Negative Notions as they are Negative do not abstract from the Subject How we come to have a Notion of Nothing Hence great Care is to be had lest we take Non-Entities or Nothings for Things Logical Notions are Real ones The Test to try Artificial Notions * See Method to Science B. 1. L. 7. §. 13 14. Hence all Philosophy is Real Knowledge How our Soul comes to have Phantastick Notions or as we call them Fancies How to avoid being deluded by them How we may discourse evidently of those Natures of which we have no Proper Notions We can have no Proper Notion of GOD's Essence The Author speaks not here of Comparing Notions or of Judgments The Author's Apology for this Discourse and what can be the only way to go about to confute it The Design of the Author here * Book 1. Less 11. The Meaning of the word Existence * Method 1. B. 1. L. 2. § 14. The Extreme Danger of Misconceiving it The meaning of Ens or Thing * B. 3. L. 7. * Ibid. The Meaning of Entity or Essence The Meaning of Matter and Form or of Power and Act. What 's meant literally by the common saying that Matter and Form compound Body The Literal Meaning of Substantial or Essential Forms The Reason why some Moderns oppose Substantial or Essential Forms The Meaning of Metaphysical Composition and Divisibility What is the Principle of Individuation The Meaning of the word Substance The word Improper That the words Supporting and Inhering taken metaphorically may be allow'd and ought not to be Ridicul'd The meaning of Suppositum or Hypostasis The Meaning of Suppositality The Meaning of the word Individuum The Meaning of Substantia Prima and SubstantiaSecunda The VVord Accidents is improper The Word Mode more proper The VVord Quantity is very Proper The VVord Extension very improper The Meaning of Divisibility Impenetrability Space and Measurability A Short Explication what Quantity Quality and Relation are VVhat Transcendents are The Five Sorts of Transcendents Great Care to be had that Transcendent VVords be not held Univocal VVhat great Errors spring thence shown in the Univocal Acception of the Transcendent word Compounded The Cartesians unadvis'd in going ultra Crepidam The Excellent Wit and Unbyassed Ingenuity of the Author of the Essay acknowledged 'T is Probable he has taken a Prejudice against Metaphysicks The Incomparable Excellency of the Science of Metaphysicks shewn from the Objects it treats of And from the Manner by which it handles them The Knowledge of these high Objects attainable by Natural Reason Mr. Locke's Tenet of no Innate Ideas Solidly Grounded and Unanswerable In what the Author agrees and disagrees with Mr. Locke We may have Notions without perceiving we have them We may Think without being Conscious that we Think 'T is impossible to be Conscious or know we know without a new Act of Reflexion 'T is impossible to be Conscious of or know our present Reflex Act but by a new Reflex one Hence we can never come to know our last Reflexion 'T is utterly deny'd that Consciousness causes Individuation The Unreasonableness of the Opinion that Men do always think No Notion Simple but that of Existence The Order of our Notions is to be taken from Nature The Word Solidity arbitrarily and abusively taken by M. L. His Solidity not at all Essential to Body Space without Body or Vacuum is a meer Groundless Fancy The Contrary to that Tenet Demonstrated Therefore 't is impossible there should be any True Experiment to prove a Vacuum * Method to Science B. 1. L. 2. §. 14. Mr. Locke's First Chapter commendable Privative Notions must Connotate the Subject * See Prelim. 3. §. 9 10 11. Meer Motions made upon the Senses Insufficient to give us Knowledge of the Objects * Prelim. 4. §. 26 27 28 c. Sensible Qualities are the same in the Objects as in the Mind The Pretence of GOD's Voluntary Annexing Improper Causes to Effects is Unphilosophical The Power in the Object to cause Sensation and Knowledge is Improperly such * B. 1. L. 7. §. 9 10 11. Ideas or Notions are not Actual Perceptions but the Object perceiv'd and durably remaining It destroys the Nature of Memory to make it consist in the Reviving Ideas The Mind cannot revive Perceptions * Prelim. 4. § 26 27 28. Ideas in the Fancy may fade but Notions are never blotted out of the Soul If Brutes can know they may have General Notions and Abstract and Compare too The distinguishing our Notions guides our Reason and Judgment right All Complex Ideas or Notions must consist of simpler ones united in the Thing Otherwise they are Groundless Fancies The Manner how all Complex Ideas or Notions are made elaborately explain'd How the Doctrine of Cartesius Mr. Locke and J. S. differ as to this point Extension not well Explicated Immensity worse Place well explicated Body and Extension not the same Notion Space cannot be without Extension Extension and Space differ only Formally or in some
could it have this Power to alter the Natures of things or turn them from Corporeal into Spiritual when as yet it had no Knowledge at all in it as before those Species were refined and fitted to be received in it it had none Lastly Are those Species they put when purify'd perfectly like the Thing or imperfectly If perfectly like then they are the same with it as our Notions are and so the Thing it self is in the Soul and then those Species of theirs are to no purpose for the Thing being there in Person as it were there can need no Proxy of Species to stand for it nor can it bear any Sense to call the Thing a Species of it self If they be imperfectly like the Thing they are no more but Resemblances of it and then 't is already abundantly demonstrated that the Thing can never be known by them So that they could make nothing cohere how our first Rudiments or Materials of Knowledge could get into the Soul or how the Thing could come to be known by them 5. The Ideists on this Occasion have taken two ways and both of them very short ones which is to skip over all those Difficulties at one Leap The Cartesians tell us in one Word That God gave the Soul her Ideas or as some of them say some of them at the same time he gave her her Being and that by having those Ideas in her she comes to know and so by making this quick work the Question is at an End This is soon said but not so easily proved Some Rubs I have put in the way of this Pretence to hinder its Currency in the Preface to my Method and in the Book it self as Occasion presented and shall add many more in case their Opposition shall invite me to it But what needs any more since Mr. Locke has already Confuted that Position beyond possibility of any Rational Reply Other Ideists there are who think it their best Play to abstract totally from that hard Question and finding by Experience that they have Ideas and Resemblances in their Head when they know they content themselves with That without proceeding to examin distinctly what they are or how they bring us to the Knowledge of the Things in Nature These Men do certainly act more prudently than the former for 't is much more wise and safe in order to the Common Good of Learning to wave an obscure Point totally than by advancing false Positions in a matter of universal Concern in Philosophy to affirm what cannot be maintain'd Tho' I must declare that I cannot see but that such a Fundamental Point which influences the whole Body of Science ought not to be pretermitted For which reason I have thought fit to lay the Grounds for it in the two first Lessons of my Method reserving a more particular Account of it till further Occasion should be presented which seems to offer it self at present 6. Yet I do not judge this Opportunity so pressing or proper as to oblige me to treat such a large Point fully or to set my self to demonstrate and smooth every Step I take in this untrodden and rugged way This of right belongs to that part of Metaphysicks that treats of the Nature of the Soul and particularly as it is the Form of such an Animal Body which may not improperly be called Physicks or Animasticks Besides it were too great a Boldness to pretend to pursue such an abstruse Point quite thorough with Evident Demonstration Yet I think I may promise my Readers that the Positions I shall lay down orderly to clear it will have that Coherence amongst themselves and be so Agreeable to the Natures of Things and to the Maxims of divers other Sciences that it will be hard in just Reason to find any considerable Flaw in it I take my Rise from the remotest Principles that can concern that Point and these are my Thoughts 7. It belongs to the Divine Wisdom to carry on the Ordinary Course of his World by Causes and Effects and on the Matter 's side by Dispositions to further Productions Thus Wood is heated by Degrees e're it becomes Fire and breaks out into a Flame and in the Generation of every thing in Nature there are are many Previous Alterations of the Matter ere it acquires Another Form or becomes Another Thing 8. Wherefore it belongs also to the same Wisdom and Goodness of God as he is the First Cause that if in the Ordinary Course of the World the Subject be dispos'd for something that cannot be compassed by the Power of Second Causes to step in to Nature's Assistance and help her immediately by his own Hand Thus when the Individuality is compleated that is when the Potentiality of the Matter is Ultimately Determin'd and Particulariz'd by Second Causes so that it is become distinct from all other Entities or apt to be This and so fitted for Existence which Existence Second Causes cannot give God whose Generous Bounty stands ever ready to bestow unenviously on his Creatures all the Good they are capable of does give them Existence immediately by himself 9. Therefore if there can be such a Disposition in the Brain of an Embryo that grown riper it is apt as far as is on the Matters side to act Comparatively which is the Disposition for Rationality And that this cannot be done but by having a Form in it of a Superior or Spiritual Nature which Second Causes cannot produce it is certain God will by himself assist it by infusing such a Form 10. There can be such a Disposition in the Brain of an Embryo to work Comparatively that is to Judge and Discourse since we experience that we do this actually now in part by the means of the Brain or something that 's near it or belongs to it 11. Wherefore since this cannot be done without having those Materials in us of which Compounded or Compared we are to Judge and Discourse which we call Simple Apprehensions or Notions it follows that there must be such a Disposition in some Bodily Part as to convey into the Soul such Notions 12. Wherefore since Bodies in their whole Quantity or Bulk cannot be convey'd by the Senses into the Brain the Author of Nature has order'd that all Bodies upon the least Motion of Natural Causes Internal or External which is never wanting should send out Effluviums or most minute and imperceptible Particles which may pass through the Pores of those Peruious Organs called the Senses and so be carried to the Brain 13. This Natural Compound called Man is truly One Thing and not aggregated of more Things Actually Distinct since the Form called the Soul did tho' not so Naturally yet as necessarily follow out of the Disposition of the Matter taking it as Seconded and its Exigency and Deficiency supply'd by the First Cause as the Form of Fire or of any other Body in Nature does out of the
be prov'd that what we maintain is Agreeable to the Course of Natural Causes e'er we ought to think or imagin that God will have any hand in it And if we can prove this we need no Immediate or particular Recourse to God's favouring us by doing This or That to make good our Argument 4. I must deny too consequently to my former Doctrine that Sensible Qualities are nothing in the Objects but Powers to produce various Sensations in us unless it be meant that they have Powers to send out such Effluviums into the Brain by the Senses as imprint their very Natures in our Mind and not barely to produce Motions in our Nerves Nor can I conceive why the Ideas of the Secondary Qualities should have nothing like them existing in the Bodies themselves nor be Resemblances of them If this be true why are they call'd Ideas which either signifies Resemblances or Nothing Again since the Bodies are put to cause them how can we think they are nothing like them Can any Man think the Effect is nothing like the Cause when every Effect can be nothing but a Participation of the Cause or something coming into the Subject from the Efficient which was in it some way or other before Lastly If these Secondary Qualities be compounded of the Primary ones viz. of Solidity Extension Figure and Mobility in our Understanding why should not those Primary Qualities in re as well compound those Secondary ones in the Thing or out of our Understanding And if they do as 't is evident they must since they are all there then why are not those Secondary Ideas full as like those Secondary or Compounded Qualities found in the Thing as the Primary Ideas were like the Primary Qualities in the same Thing and consequently resemble them as well as the others did their proper Originals I much doubt that the Author rather consulted his Fancy in this particular than his good Reason And because those Effluviums or the Figures of Parts which cause our Sensations are too Subtile and Indiscernable to cause Distinct Phantasms of themselves as the Primary ones did but are of a Confus'd Uniformness in Appearance he judges hence they are Nothing like the others Whereas Reason will inform Reflecters that since Colour is nothing but the Surface of a Body as 't is apt to reflect Light the manner of Reflexion found in the Surface of a White Thing which is apt to reflect much Light is to our Reason and in our Notion such as it was in the Thing imprinting it and consequently every thing Acting as it is such as came from it Whence those who by Reflex Thoughts and using their Reason do go about to explain or define the Nature or Notion of Whiteness do make it consist in such a Reflexion of Light bringing Effluviums with it from a Surface so advantagiously Figur'd And so the Notion of Whiteness is the same in the Thing and in the Understanding viz. those Effluviums thus Figur'd or Modified however the Appearance of it in the Fancy reaches not the true Nature of the Thing as 't is White which indeed Fancy never does 5. The Reason why the Pain which we feel is not in the Thing that Caus'd it and Sensible Qualities are so is because these last are Proper Univocal and Immediate Effects of Bodies sending out Effluviums of their own Natures but Pain being an Affection of the Soul springing from a Perception that its dear Compart is hurt and disorder'd is an Improper Remoter and Equivocal Production The Altering Disordering or Spoiling the Temperature or Continuity of the Bodily Parts due to their Nature is as was shewn the Immediate and Proper Effect of those Offensive Agents but 't is Accidental to their manner of Operating that they cause Pain or Pleasure even remotely and it lights only that sometimes they do this because the Subject or the Body in which they produce these their proper Effects haps to be Identified with a Knowing Nature only which is properly capable to Grieve or be Delighted when a Harmful or Pleasing Impression is made on the Body which is Part of the Man and in some sort himself The like is to be said of Manna and other such Instances The Alterations or Disorder made in the Guts and Stomach are Natural Proper and Immediate Effects of it but the Pain ensuing thence which is a Spiritual Disposition of the Mind is a Remote Accidental and Improper Effect of it 6. By this Time Mr. Locke sees that I agree with him that the Bodies in Nature have a Power in them to cause our several Sensations and that this Power is that which we call such a Quality of it But I disagree with him that they are only Powers to cause such a Motion and affirm it is a Power when duly Circumstanced with other Requisites as with Light to convey Visible Qualities Moisture Gustable ones c. to send out Effluviums of their own Nature to the Brain which therefore are Inherent in and Proper Parts of those Objects whether they cause Actual Sensation or no. The Sun sends out his Beams which scatter'd thinly at this remote distance from the Fountain are therefore one of Mr. Locke's Secondary Qualities which we call Light yet contracted by a Burning-Glass they perform the Proper Effect of Fire Burning whence we ought to conclude they are of the Nature of Fire Can we then deny or doubt but that the Body of the Sun which communicates or sends them out is it self Fire or that being such those Rays and the Sun have no Similitude with one another Or that when they strike the Eye they stop there and are not carry'd into the Brain Hippocrates tells us that Omnes partes corporis sunt permeabiles meaning that they are pervious to the Humours which are gross Things in comparison of the Sun-Beams How can it then be doubted but that they reach the Fancy and thence the Soul and imprint their Notions or Natures there And tho' some may deny they are the same in the Mind as they are in Nature yet can it with any Shew of Reason be deny'd they are at all like the Cause that produced them The like Discourse holds in all other Sensible Qualities to what Sense soever they belong 7. To close this Discourse I am apt to think that Mr. Locke intended to oppose those who hold that the Sensible Qualities are a little kind of Distinct Entities Next I declare that tho' the Thing has accidentally a Power in it to make it self perceiv'd yet taking the Thing as an Object as he does it is but Improperly called a Power and not Properly as are our Powers or Faculties of Seeing Hearing Knowing c. are For the Act being the End for which the Power was given the Faculties or Powers are better'd and perfected by being reduced to Act and so there is a real Ground for their being Related to the Object Whereas neither the Object or Thing nor
Will and consequently of its Acts of Love is an Appearing Good and the Lively Appearance of that Good is that which makes the Will prompt to act effectually whence since that which breeds Pleasure in us must needs appear Lively to be a Good to us there needs no more but to chuse wisely what is most Pleasant or most Agreeable to our True Nature Reason such as the best Spiritual Goods are and we may be sure by such a well-made Choice to arrive at that Best Greatest and Purest Pleasure Eternal Glory REFLEXION Twelfth ON The 21th CHAPTER 1. IN this Chapter of Power I find more to admire than confute The Author always Ingenious even when he errs has here much out done his former self Particularly his Explication of Freewill is generally speaking both Solid and Acute and his Doctrine that Liberty is consistent with a perfect Determination to Goodness and Virtue is both Learned and Pious Yet I am forced to disagree with him in some particulars In giving my Thoughts of which I will imitate Mr. Locke's laudable Method in making my Discourses Subservient and in shewing them to be Agreeable to Christian Principles 2. 'T is an excellent Thought that The Clearest Idea of Active Power is had from Spirit For Bodies can act no otherwise than as they are acted on themselves nor can the first mov'd Body that moves the rest push others forwards farther than it self is moved by something that is not Body or by some Spiritual Agent which therefore has the truest Notion of Agency in it without any Mixture of Patiency because the Body mov'd cannot react upon it Tho' therefore we may have by our Senses the Idea of Action and Passion from the Effects we see daily wrought by Natural Causes on fit Subjects yet the Clearest Idea of Action is given us by our Reason finding out that the Beginner of Corporeal Action is a Separated Spirit or pure Act and therefore not at all Passive from any other Creature nor from the Body it operates on by Reaction as is found in Corporeal Agents And our Reason gives us this Idea as it does many other Reflex ones by seeing clearly that neither can there possibly be Processus in infinitum amongst Corporeal Agents nor can they of themselves alone begin to move themselves nor move one another Circularly and therefore the First Corporeal Motion must necessarily be Originiz'd from some Pure Spirit or Angel Now Mr. Locke conceives that the Soul according to her Faculty call'd Will moving the Body gives him this clearest Idea of Active Power which Tenet I have in diverse places disprov'd formerly and shown that the Soul by reason of her Potential State here cannot principiate any Bodily Action nor the Man neither unless wrought upon by some External or Internal Agent which is in act it self 3. He Judges with good reason that the Vulgar mistake of Philosophers in making every Faculty or Power a Distinct Entity has caus'd much Obscurity and Uncertainty in Philosophy which humour of Multiplying Entities I am so far from abetting that perhaps he will think me to err on the other hand in making the Understanding and Will to be one and the same Power and affirming that they only differ formally in Degree He shows clearly how in proper Speech the Will is not Free but the Man unless it be signified with a Reduplication that by the Word Will is meant Man according to that Power in him call'd the Will For Powers as he discourses well belong only to Agents and are Attributes only of Substances and not of the Powers themselves Perhaps this reason of his will abet my position that the Understanding and Will are the same Power Those who make them two do this because they find in the Notion of Will only a Power of Acting and not of knowing and in the Notion of Understanding only a Power of knowing and not of Acting But the same Men make the Understanding direct the Will which they call a Blind Power by which they make one of those Powers formally as such to work upon the other as if the former were an Agent and the latter a Patient I add moreover that they do this with the worst Grace that is possible for what avails it the Will to be directed by the Understanding if it does not know how the Understanding directs it And to make the Will to know is to make it a knowing Power which is to make the Will tho' they never meant it to be the Understanding Not reflecting in the mean time when our Understanding is full of any Apparent Good the Man pursues it and so becomes or has in him a Principle or Power of Acting which is what we call Will. 4. Perhaps a Philosophical Discourse beginning from the Principles in this affair if exprest Literally and pursu'd home by Immediate Consequences may set this whole business in a Clearer Light and show us very evidently how Man determins himself to Action and therefore is Free as also how he is Predetermin'd to determin himself than any particular Reflexions on our own Interiour Which tho' they may oftentimes have some Truth in them yet not beginning from the bottom-Truths that concern the point in hand they can never be steady but are now and then liable to some Errours 5. Beginning then with the Animal part in Man and considering him barely as an Animal and wrought upon as other Animals are I discourse thus Particles agreeable to the Nature of the Animal being by the Senses convey'd into the Brain do if they be but Few lightly affect it and work no other effect but a kind of small Liking of it If more they make it as we say begin to Fancy it But if they be very many and sent from an Object very Agreeable or Good to such a Nature they will in proportion to their Multitude and Strength cause naturally a Tendency towards it and powerfully excite the Spirits so as to make the Animal pursue it that is they will become such a Principle of Action which in meer Animals we call Appetite To which Action that meer Animal is not carry'd thro' Choice or Freely but is naturally and necessarily Determin'd to Act for the Attainment of that Good in the same manner as Iron follows the Load-stone But if we consider this Animal as having now a Rational and Knowing Compart join'd to it things will be order'd after another manner For those Impressions are carry'd farther than the Region of the Brain even into the Soul it self which is endow'd with a Faculty of Reflecting upon those her Notions whence she gains exacter Knowledge of those Bodies that imprinted them Nor only so but she can reflect upon her own Operations too and know that she knows them by which means she comes acquainted with her own Nature and comes to see that Knowledge and Reason is that Nature of hers which she finds is a Nobler part of the
means to dim the Appearance those Objects would otherwise make lest if it be too Lively they should overcome the Motive Force of those Objects which are Spiritual But it is to be noted that the multiplying or frequently repeating those Reflex Impressions are not so necessary to every Person nor always the best For a Wise Judicious Christian who out of a Clear Sight of Spiritual Motives has by a thorow-Penetration of their Excellency and Preferribleness his Speculative Thoughts so Lively that they fix his Interior Practical Judgment to work steadily for the Attainment of Eternal Happiness is a far more Manly and Strong Christian than those who arrive at a high Pitch by the frequent Dints of Praying or other good Exercises almost hourly continued For those Well-knit Thoughts and Rational Judgments are as it were an Impenetrable Phalanx and being Connatural to our Reason no Assault can shock or break their Ranks Yet even in those firmest Souls Christian Discipline and Vigilance must be observ'd lest not having those strong Thoughts or Judgments still in readiness they be surprized by their Ghostly Enemy which I take to have been King David's Case when he first sinn'd 11. Secondly It is seen hence that Man determines himself to Action or is Free For 't is evident both to Reason and Experience that all those Thoughts Discourses Judgments and Affections he had in him before naturally or supernaturally are the Causes of the Determination of his Will Wherefore all these being Modes or Accidents belonging to him and Modes not being Distinct Entities from the Thing to which they belong but the Thing it self or the Man thus modify'd it follows that Man determines himself to Action or is a Free Agent 12. Thirdly Since Man has neither his Being his Powers his Actions nor consequently the Circumstances by which he came to be imbu'd with his good Thoughts from whence he has the Proposals of his true Good and of those incomparable Motives to pursue it from Himself but had all these from the Maker and Orderer of the World And since this Series of Internal and External Causes called in Christian Language God's Grace did produce this Determination of himself 't is manifest that he was Predetermin'd by God the First Cause thus to Determine himself as far as there was Entity or Goodness in his Action 13. Fourthly Since all our Powers are by the Intent of Nature ordain'd to perfect us and that Power called Freedom does not perfect any Man while he determines himself to that which will bring him to Eternal Misery it follows that the more he is Determin'd to Virtue and true Goodness the more Free he is Again Since a Man is Free when he acts according to the true Inclination of his Nature and the true natural Inclination of a Man is to act according to Right Reason that is Virtuously it follows that Freedom is then most truly such and the Man most truly Free when he is Determin'd to Virtuous Actions Whence Irrationality or Sin is by the Holy Ghost called Slavery which is opposite to Freedom From which Slavery the Mercy of God meerly and solely through the Merits of his Son our Redeemer has freed us 14. Fifthly We Experience that the Lively Proposal of Temporal and Eternal Goods when it arrives to that pitch that there is hic nunc such a Plenitude ex parte Subjecti of such Objects or Motives that it hinders the Co-appearance Co-existence and much more the Competition of the Contrary Motives does always carry the Will or the Man along with it For the Object of the Will being an Appearing Good and no other Good in that Juncture at least Considerably appearing because the Mind is full of the other it follows that the Inclination of the Will to Good in Common which Man is naturally determin'd to must needs carry the Soul no other as was said then Appearing Whence Mr. Locke's Position that Uneasiness alone is present and his Deduction thence that therefore nothing but Uneasiness determines the Will to act is shewn to be Groundless For an Appearing Good cannot but be always Present to the Soul otherwise it could not appear or be an Appearing Good 15. Sixthly Hence wrong Judgments arise either thro' Want of Information as when Men are not imbu'd with sufficient Knowledge of Eternal Goods or else thro' Want of Consideration whence by not perfectly weighing and comparing both they come to prefer Temporal Goods before Eternal ones 16. Lastly 't is to be noted that Sin does not always spring from False Speculative Judgments but from their being Disproportionate For 't is a Truth that Temporal Goods are in some sort Agreeable to us nor would they hurt us for loving them as far as they merit to be lov'd provided we did but love Eternal Goods as much as they deserve to be loved too Sin therefore is hence occasion'd that thro' too close and frequent a Converse with them we too much conceit and make vast Judgments of these Temporal Goods in proportion of what we make of Eternal ones And were not this so no Sin would remain in a bad Soul when separate or in a Devil nor consequently the proper Punishment of Sin Damnation because they know all Truths Speculatively Wherefore their Inordinate Practical Judgments in which Sin consists springs hence that they do not conceit or as we say lay to heart the Goodness of True Felicity because they over-conceit or make too-great Judgments of the Goodness found in some False Last End which they had chosen Yet these Disproportionate Judgments tho' Speculatively True are apt to beget wrong Practical Judgments and wrong Discourses or Paralogisms in the Soul of a Sinner to the prejudice of his Reason as has been shown in my METHOD Book 3 Less 10. § 18. 17. Mr. Locke's Discourse about Uneasiness lies so cross to some part of this Doctrine that it obliges me to examin it He endeavours to shew that Uneasiness alone and not Good or the Greater Good determines the Will to Act. His Position tho' new and Paradoxical is very plausible and taking it in one Sense viz. that there is always some Uneasiness when the Will is Alter'd in order to Action has much Truth in it and it seems to have much Weight also by his pursuing it so ingeniously Yet there is something wanting to render his Discourse Conclusive For 18. First If we look into Grounds and Principles they will tell us that 't is the Object of any Power which actuates or determines it and the Object of the Will cannot be Uneasiness All Uneasiness being evidently a Consequence following either from the not yet attaining the Good we desire and hope for or from the Fear of Losing it And if we should ask whether Uneasiness does affect the Will otherwise than sub ratione mali or because it is a Harm to the Man and Ease otherwise affect it than sub ratione Boni that
and consequently if the Relation be new or such a one as before was not there must be some Novelty in the Thing it self to ground it Whence follows that if there be such a Real Ground on the one side only and no Real Ground on the other there will be a Real Relation on the one side and no Real Relation on the other but only a Verbal one or an Extrinsecal Denominatien Answering or as it were Chiming Grammatically to the Term which is really Relative v. g. Our Powers of Seeing or Understanding any thing have a Real Relation to their proper Objects both because such Objects Specifie the Power or make it such a Power that is give it its peculiar or distinct Essence as also because the Power is by the Object actuated and determin'd to act that is the Power is intrinsecally Chang'd or otherwise than it was by means of the Object but the Object suffers no kind of Change nor is it at all Alter'd or otherwise than it was by being known or seen Whence the Intellective or Visive Powers are really Related to the Object but the Objects for want of a Real Ground are not really Related back to the Powers however the Words Understood or seen do Verbally answer to the Acts of Understanding and Seeing which is therefore call'd by the Schools in their barbarous Language Relatio dedici or an Extrinsecal Denomination For farther Light in this very necessary Particular I refer my Reader to my Method Book 1. Less 7. where if I flatter not my self he will find the Notion of Relation treated of very fully and clearly Especially I recommend to his Perusal the 9th 10th 11th and 12th Section where I discourse of that Unmutual Relation of the Measure to the Thing measured the exact Knowledge of which is far more useful than any other piece of this Subject however it lay out of Mr. Locke's Road to take notice of such Speculations as regard or not regard the Thing as their Ground 3. Reviewing his 26th Chapter of Cause and Effect c. I found that he acquaints us very exactly how we gain the Ideas of them by our Senses but he proceeds not to show us which yet he often does in other occasions in what the nature of Causality consists which is of the Chiefest use in Philosophy For what is the Learned part of the World the better for having those rudest Draughts or as Mr. L. well calls them materials of Knowledge Ideas or Notions or for knowing how we come by them in which he very frequently terminates his Enquiries if we do not by Reflexion and Reason polish and refine them and thence attain to true Knowledge of the Things from which we glean'd them or by what virtue they come to be Causes of such Effects What I conceive of Causality is that 't is the Power of Participating or Communicating some Thing or some mode of Thing to the Patient which was before some way or other in the Thing that caus'd it On which point I have no occasion to to dilate here particularly Only which concerns our present purpose I am to note that that which is thus communicated is the Real Ground on which the Real Relation of the Effect to its Cause is founded Whence follows that the Cause also when it has some Real Change by being reduced from the Imperfecter State of meer Power to the Perfecter one of Act or as we say gets something by producing such an Effect will have a Real Ground and Consequently a Real Relation to the Effect and not otherwise And hence it is that God our Creatour has no Real Relation to his Creatures tho' they have many to him because he is no otherwise nor better in the least by Creating them than he had been in Case he had not Created any thing at all and therefore there is no Ground in Him of a Real Correlation to them 4. The 27th Chapter of Identity and Diversity requires a deeper Consideration In order to which I know no more Compendious way to clear the Point in dispute between us than to fetch my Discourse from those Principles that concern it The Subject does indeed properly belong to Metaphysicks but I will endeavour to do what I can to avoid those Abstracted Mediums which are made use of in that Supreme Science And first as the Ground work of my Discourse I am to settle the Principle of Individuation or how a particular Thing or Substance comes to be what it is for this done it will be easily seen whence we are to take our Measures to judge when it continues the same and when it is to be another or a Different Thing from its former self I discourse thus nor will it be Tedious I hope to repeat often what is so Useful to be remember'd as being the sure Ground of all our Knowledge 5. All our Conceptions by which only we can discourse of Things are either of Res or Modus rei that is they are either the Notions of Substance or Thing precisely or else the Notions of Accidents Of these the Word Thing has a very Abstracted Notion and is perfectly Indifferent and Indeterminate to all Particulars Wherefore the Notion of such a Species or sort of Thing being as was said above more Determinate must have something superadded to it to determin it and compound or constitute it of such a Species which can be nothing but such a Complexion of Accidents or Modes there being as was said nothing else imaginable that can be added to the Notion of Thing Now Philosophers agreeing to call that which determins the common Notion of thing and so constitutes such and such Species or Kinds of Things A Substantial or Essential Form hence the Substantial Form of all the Sorts Kinds or Species of Natural Bodies can be nothing else but such a Complexion of Accidents as fit the Thing for such a kind of Operation in Nature And hitherto if I mistake not Mr. Locke and I may agree in the main however we may differ in the manner of Explicating our selves 6. Descending then to the Individuals it is evident that a Greater Complexion of Accidents is necessary to determine and constitute the several Individuums than would serve to constitute the Species for the Species or Kinds of Things are but few but the Individuums under those Kinds are Innumerable and therefore more goes to distinguish these from one another than was needful to distinguish or determine the other Whence it comes that we can never comprehend or reach all that belongs to the Suppositum or Individuum Wherefore it being a certain Maxim that what distinguishes does constitute this Medly of Innumerable Accidents which differences or distinguishes each Individuum from all the rest does also intrinsecally constitute those Individuums or is the Intrinsecal or Formal Principle of Individuation Moreover since nothing in Common or not ultimately determin'd to be This or That is capable of Existing
that Supposition there would have been no Motion For Motion of Material Entities is perform'd by the Intervening of the Parts of the one between the Parts of the other and so Dividing it which is impossible unless the one had been Rarer or more yielding the other Denser or less yielding But this once settled 't is evident from the very Terms that there are Proper Causes both on the Agent 's and Patient's Side for the one's Dividing and the other's being Divided For the Rare being more Divisible than the Dense 't is demonstrable that the Dense being impell'd against the Rare by Motion which comes from a Superior Agent the Rare being more Divisible will give way and be divided by the Dense which is clearly impossible in the Corpuscularian Hypothesis which puts all Parts of their Matter to be equally Rare or Dense or rather as the Cartesians do neither Rare nor Dense all Qualities according to them being made by mingling their three Elements which Elements are themselves made by and presuppose the Motion of their First Matter Whereas yet it is impossible to conceive but those Parts of that Matter must be either Rare or else Dense at least to some Degree And as denying the Rarity and Density in the First Bodies does by making Motion impossible put the Course of Nature out of Frame both in its Beginning and Progress so it utterly destroys all Demonstration in Physicks which is grounded on Mediums from Proper Causes and Proper Effects 16. Passing over many Immediate Steps which shew how those Four Principal Qualities Heat Cold Moisture and Driness are made of Rarity and Density acted upon by the common Causes in Nature we come to shew how these two Primary Qualities do constitute many Secondary ones and how these last are refunded into the other as their Proper Causes and therefore are Demonstrable by them as by their Proper Mediums A few Instances may serve as Hints to explicate others That great Pellucidity in the Air is necessarily and properly refunded into its extream Divisibility or Rarity by which it becomes easily penetrable in all its Parts by those Spicula Ignea the Rays of the Sun and Opacity for the same Reason is the Proper Effect of Density which hinders its Subject from being penetrated or Divided by them whence also it is a Proper Cause of Repelling or Reflecting them Again Who sees not that Liquidity which makes its Subject easily yielding to be flatted evenly as we see in Ponds or driven to run into Cavities by the common Motion of Gravitation is a proper Effect of Rarity as Consistency is of Density Spissitude is a Constipation of Dense Parts or the Want of Pores to admit the Ingress of other Bodies Grossitude is clearly nothing but Density in a bigger Quantity of its Parts Friability is refunded into great Dense Parts and very large Rare ones Whence those Rare Parts which were they less would better cement those Parts together being now very large and withal very Divisible are easily divided and consequently the Body is soon shatter'd As we find in Dry Clods out of which while they were yet Wet Dirt those Parts which were Watry being drawn by Heat large Cavities are left which the Air now possesses On the other side Ductility and Malleability are the Effects of the very smallest Rare Parts finely compacted with the minutest Dense ones Those Small Dense Parts so closely woven and in a manner Contiguous keep the Rare from evaporating and the Rare by being such and interwoven with the Dense all over make the Compound yield to Expansion without Breaking being very small are not easily separable and yet tho' rarify'd farther by the subtilest Agent Fire they render it Fusible 17. Were these Principles which I rawly and briefly touch on here pursu'd by Learned Men with Immediate Consequences which true Logick assisting is far from impossible the Nature of those first-mixt Qualities and by their means of many others would not be very hard to explicate But if Men are resolv'd to neglect all Natural Principles and the Intrinsecal Constitution of the First Bodies in Nature and will needs run upon nothing but Mathematical Notions which pre-suppose those Principles nor could be found in Nature unless the other be first admitted or Division made Possible for neither Parts nor consequently Figures of Parts could be made without Division nor Division unless some Bodies were naturally apt to divide others to be divided that is unless some were Rare others Dense or if instead of demonstrating their Natural Principles by the Superiour Science they will needs have recourse to Voluntary Suppositions and violate the Nature of Causality and of the Deity it self by making him whose Proper Effect he being Essentially Self-existence is to give Existence or create to be the Proper and Immediate Cause of Motion and go about to prove Ignotum per Ignotissimum by supposing as they sometimes do that God wills this or that which is for the Interest of their Tenet and too hard to prove If I say Men are resolv'd to follow such Untoward Methods 't is no Wonder Science does not advance but the World is detain'd in Ignorance of many things which otherwise it might know Did Learned Men set themselves to carry forwards the Grounds of Nature in Euclides Physicus where they will find Demonstrations enow to farther Conclusions with the same Zeal as they do the Mathematicks I doubt not but the Evident Truths which would by Degrees disclose themselves would both encourage and enable them to make a farther Progress in Knowledge nor would the Science of Second Qualities about which Physical Demonstrations ought in great part be employ'd be held so Desperate But to leave these Discourses and apply my self to Mr. L. I cannot but wonder that amongst all his Ideas of Qualities he not so much as once mentions as far as I remember those two Chiefest ones of Rarity and Density tho' nothing is more obvious in the whole Course of Nature than these are Which with many other Reasons makes me think he had not seen or at least well weigh'd the true Aristotelian System which he might have seen in Sir Kenelm Digby's Treatise of Bodies and its Latin Preface as also in Institutiones Peripateticae but took it as represented by the Modern Schools For my self I must declare I verily judge that the Grounds I here insist on are the only true ones that a Natural Philosopher can have that they are Demonstrable and I do offer my self to maintain them to be such if it shall please any Learned Objector to attempt to show these Principles Faulty or that we build on any Supposition at all and not on what 's either Self-evident or easily and immediately Reducible to Self-evidence Which I believe no other Sect of Philosophers did ever so much as pretend to 18. To come to those Qualities which are the Formal Object of our Senses called by Mr. Locke Secondary Qualities I
above of the Word Ideas that we can build no Degree of Certainty nor Improvement of Knowledge upon it especially since Mr. Locke himself according to his usual Candour and Modesty declares here he does but think it true But which is the hardest Case of all to embrace this Principle we must be oblig'd to quit all our Self-evident Maxims as of little Use upon which our selves and all the Learned part of the World have proceeded hitherto 12. 'T is a great Truth that it is a right Method of advancing Knowledge to Consider our Abstract Notions But if these be not the Things nor as Mr. Locke's Complex Ideas are so much as like them I see not but that let us Consider them as much as we will we shall be never the nearer attaining any Real Knowledge by such a Consideration I add that it is also as necessary to find out Middle Terms that are Proper without which no Science can be had of any New Conclusion nor consequently can we without this advance one Step in Exact Knowledge 'T is a certain Truth also that Morality is capable of Demonstration tho' I do not remember that any Author but Mr. Locke and my self have been so bold as openly to profess it The Current of Slight Speculaters having long endeavour'd to make it pass for a kind of Maxim that there is no perfect Certainty to be had but only in Lines and Numbers Whereas the Principles of Morality are as Evident and the Notions belonging to such Subjects as Clear as those in Natural Philosophy perhaps Clearer as this worthy Author has shewn most manifestly 'T is also True that Knowledge may be better'd by Experience But if he means Scientifical Knowledge which is the Effect of Demonstration I must deny it unless Common Principles of Nature do guide Experience and give it Light of the True and Proper Causes of what Experience inform'd our Senses for without their Assistance as I have shewn in the Preface to my my Method Experimental Knowledge can never produce any one Scientifical Conclusion I add that True Science would be a Thousand times more advanc'd did Learned Men bend their Endeavours to begin with the Primary Affections of Body and thence proceed gradually to Secondary or more Compounded ones For this Method would furnish Studious Men with good Store of Proper Middle Terms to deduce their Demonstrations Lastly 'T is true that we must beware of Hypotheses and Wrong Principles But where shall we find any Sect. of Philosophers who for want of Exact Skill in Logick and Metaphysicks are not forc'd to build upon Hypotheses and those generally False ones too but our Anti-Ideists whom I take to be true Followers of Aristotle in his main Principles and the only true Understanders of his Doctrine It being indeed scarce possible that those who are not well qualify'd with those two Sciences should be capable to Comprehend his True Sense 13. Mr. Locke judges that a Man may pore long enough on those Maxims us'd by Euclid without seeing one jot the more of Mathematical Truths Self-evident Truths need not be por'd upon at all nor were they ever meant for the attaining New Knowledges by poring on those Propositions singly consider'd Yet these Maxims must be pre-supposed to be True and admitted or the Arguments would very often want their best Cement that gives them an evident and necessary Coherence They are prefix'd by Euclid at first both because they may often come in play afterwards as also because it would throw off the Tenour of the Discourse to mention them still expresly every time there needs Recourse to them Whence it was judg'd fit by him and others like him to premise them at first and then refer to them Let Men but observe how and in what Occasions Euclid makes use of them and it will then be best seen what they are good for But if they are good for nothing at all I am sure it must be concluded that both Euclid himself and such Writers and Users of Maxims were all of them a Company of vain idle Fops to amuse their Readers by proposing so solemnly such Ridiculous Trifles and dubbing those Insignificant Baubles with the Honourable Titles of Maxims and Principles To fix which Dis-repute upon him and his Imitaters will I doubt much Scandalize every True Member of the Commonwealth of Learning REFLEXION 21th ON The Fourteenth Fifteenth and Sixteenth CHAPTERS 1. I Am sorry I must declare that in Mr. Locke's 14th Chapter which treats Of Judgment there is scarce one Line that I can yield to I discourse thus Judgment does most evidently import the Fixure of our Understanding in its Assent to the Truth or Falshood of any Proposition For to say I judge a thing to be so is the same as to say I am fully and firmly persuaded it is so Now this Fixure of the Mind may arise from two Causes Reason and Passion Under the Word Reason taken at large I comprehend all kind of Evident Knowledge whatever that can belong to a Rational Creature To Passion belongs all Precipitancy of Assent from what Motive or Cause soever it springs The Former makes us adhere to what we judge upon such Motives as by their Evidence do determine the Understanding to Assent and fix it in that Assent which Motives therefore can be only such as are purely Intellectual or such as by our Proceeding upon them we see clearly the Thing must be so or not so as we apprehend The Later springs from the Will corrupted and byassed by some Interest or Pleasure which inveigles our Understanding to adhere to it as a Truth because the Will would have it so Again there are two sorts of Objects Man as having two Natures in him may be employ'd about viz. Outward Action and Inward Assent The former does generally concern the External Conveniences or Necessities of our Temporal Life here the Later the Interiour and Natural Perfection of our Soul which is the Adhering to Truth and rejecting of Errour In the Former of these we can have no Clear Evidence or very seldom both because Outward Actions are employ'd about Particulars of which we can have no Science as also because those Particulars about which we are to Act are surrounded with almost Innumerable Circumstances which we cannot Comprehend and way-laid by the Undiscoverable Ambushes of Fortune so that we can seldom or never with absolute Certainty know whether they may or may not prove Successful Notwithstanding which Dangers when there is Necessity or great Conveniency to Act Outwardly we may without disparaging our Reason fall to acting upon a Probability the Necessity obliging us to do so and the Impossibility of perfect Assurance acquitting us of Imprudence But of Assenting or of Judging Inwardly that a Proposition is True or False there can be no Necessity unless Evidence forces us to it in regard God's Goodness has furnish'd us with a Faculty of Suspending our Judgment in such Cases lest we
he may hap to represent every Point of Faith so untowardly that it may have Twenty Contradictions in it 'T is therefore the Duty of every Ingenuous Man to distinguish such Explications from the Point it self and not to pronounce too hastily of it till it appears it cannot possibly bear any other Rational Explication and such a one as is Agreeable and not Contradictory to the true Principles of Reason and Nature Which I the rather Note because I have observed that scarce any one point of Faith that is Controverted has escap'd this Misfortune nay more that Metaphorical Expressions have often I may say generally been mistaken for Literal ones In a word let but the Grounds for GOD's Revealing Christian Faith be held and shown Absolutely Certain and the Motives lay'd by GOD to that end cannot but be such and the Divine Authority thus Evidently Engaged and closely Apply'd to our Mind ought to subdue our Understanding to assent notwithstanding our seeming-Rational Dissatisfactions I say Seeming For to put the Grounds and Motives we have to know God revealed it to be thus Certain and yet that there is Clear Evidence against the Point reveal'd is to put a perfect Contradiction or Impossibility Which makes me something apprehensive that those Authors who put such a Case however their meaning may be good and pious and they see not the Consequence of it do deem that the Grounds we Christians have for GOD's Revealing our Faith are not altogether Certain but Probable onely which leaves all our Faith in a Possibility of being False for any thing any man living knows that is of being perhaps not True 10. Hence I think 't is but a very sleight deference to Divine Revelation to affirm that in Matters where Reason cannot judge or but probably Revelation is to be hearken'd to But that in Matters where Reason can afford certain Knowledge Reason is to be hearken'd to For tho' it were so that Reason can do this yet Experience tells us that Reason does not actually and this very often what it can do or all that lies within the Compass of that power but that we may often presume we have certain Knowledge when we have none Especially since of the two it is far more likely our Reason may discourse wrong of the Points that are Reveal'd than of the Motives which God has lay'd for Mankind to know they are so the later being within its Sphere the other oft-times not 11. The 19th Chapter treats of Wrong Assent or Errour This Learned Author seems here not to speak constantly of the same Point To Assent to any Proposition is to say interiourly It is True or that the Thing is so as the Proposition exhibits it Now these Propositions may be of two Sorts The one is express'd thus The Thing is so or is True The other thus The Thing is Probable Hitherto and in some places here he speaks of the Former or of Assenting to the Truth of the Thing or of taking the Probable Proposition to be True In other places here he seems to speak of the Latter as when § 6. he complains that Probable Doctrines are not always receiv'd with an Assent proportionable to the Reasons which are to be had for their Probability Which clearly makes the Object of Assent to be the Probability of the Thing or as it stands under such Motives as make it to a higher Degree Probable or which is perfectly Equivalent that Propositions to such a Degree Probable are to be assented to as to such a Degree Probable Now this is an Evident Proposition and the Assent to it most Rational For since we call that Probable that stands under Probable Motives it is as perfect a Truth and as firmly to be assented to as 't is to assent that what 's Probable is Probable or what 's Probable to such a Degree is Probable to such a Degree Both which Propositions being evident nay the Terms of it as closely connected as they are in this Proposition What is is we not onely may but are forced to assent to them as being both of them Self-evident But I much fear this is not Mr. Locke's meaning but that he means we must assent to a Thing as True or that the Thing is upon a Proof which of its own peculiar Nature and as it is distinguish'd from Evidence is so far from Concluding it is that it permits and allows it may not be or be False In which case to assent is both against Clearest Reason and even as was shewn above against a First Principle of our Understanding 12. What confirms me in this Apprehension is his making way to his ensuing Discourse with these Words If Assent be grounded on Likelihood and if the Proper Object and Motive of our Assent be Probability c. Now both those Hypothetical Ifs I must Categorically declare against and positively affirm and maintain that Likely Motives can onely in true Reason make us assent the Thing is Likely and that Motives but Probable cannot without highly wronging our Reason cause us to assent the Thing is more than Probable Lastly That may be or may not be cannot be a good Argument that the Thing is I affirm farther that this Position of mine is clearly Demonstrable For all Motives or Proofs affecting the Conclusion and our Assent to it according to their Different Nature and Force therefore as Evident Motives make the Thing Evident so Likely Motives can onely prove the Thing to be Likely and Probable Motives can onely prove the Thing to be Probable and that the Proof being the Cause of the Conclusion and those Proofs being Proper and adjusted to those respective Effects 't is as perfect a Demonstration drawn from the Proper Cause to its Proper Effect that they can make the Conclusion no more than Probable and consequently our Assent to it if Rational no more than that it is onely Probable as it is that an Agent which is Hot but to such a Degree can onely cause Heat to such a Degree and this is as Evident as that no Cause can act beyond its Power to act or can do what it cannot do which is an Identical Proposition and Self-evident 13. 'T is in vain then to start this Question How Men come to give their Assent contrary to Probability till this Question be first satisfy'd Why Men should assent at all upon meer Probability But this being supposed without any Proof and it being allow'd by me that Men may assent contrary to Probability all the Ways he assigns I am not to pursue that Point any farther because it is quite besides my Aim which is to concern my self onely with what promotes true Science with which Probability as being both Uncertain and Inevident has nothing at all to do but to Injure it if it meets with Rash Concluders by Ill-grounded Assents But casting my Eye on the Title of this Chapter which is Of Wrong Assent or Errour I observe that
from dumb Animals Besides when a Cat or Dog is hungry and hunts about for Meat how can Mr. L. imagin they long only for one particular sort of Meat and not any sort of Meat in common that is agreeable to their nature I am sure their indifferency to any such Food in case they know at all gives us as good ground to think they have a General Idea of such a sort kind or species of Food as it does for any Knowledge they have of particulars Hence is shown that Mr. L's Criterion or distinctive Mark to know them from Men viz. the having General Idea's quite failing we ought to esteem Horses and other Cattle to be Four-footed Men or else Men must be two-legg'd Beasts Moreover since he grants here § 5. they can compare those Ideas they have tho' imperfectly and but in some circumstances and all Judging and Discoursing must by his Doctrine consist in the comparing Ideas he must think there are some of them who are very judicious Gentlemen and use natural Logick and tho' not very artificially make Syllogisms too In a word if we have no pecular Faculties Intrinsecal to our Nature nor any Primary Operation belonging to it and it only to distinguish us from Brutes but Extrinsecal shape only all Beasts might be Men and Men Beasts And then we ought in duty to consider how to correct our Carriage towards our dear Brethren in Nature Brutes which will bring in the Turkish Charity to Dogs and twenty other Fooleries And 't is an excellent Argument to prove the Identity of our Natures that Mr. L. brings of some Gentlemen he was acquainted with who deny'd themselves to be Men and I wonder he would civilly give them the Lye by passing upon them the Complement that they were notwithstanding very Rational Men for were it possible any Man could be a Beast 't is most certain these Men were such But I wonder not all at such extravagant Conceits for as Reason grounded on our Natural Notions of the Thing is reduced if pursued home to First and Self-evident Principles so Fancy if follow'd close advances at length to pure Folly and ends finally in perfect Madness 8. As for us Men we can certainly affirm that we do truly perceive or know because we know certainly by experience or rather by Reflexion that we do know but we do not thus know that Brutes know and whoever thinks he can gather it by Reason ought I conceive er'e he goes about it to study exactly two previous points First he ought to consider very attentively how or upon what Grounds he can imagin Particles of Matter tho' never so subtil and artificially laid together can be capable of Perception or Knowledge or how this Suits with the Nature of meer Body We can only gather this from Local Motions proceeding from Brutes with some kind of Regularity Now an exact Watch in proportion to its few parts does by vertue of a Spring within which is part of its self afford the same argument to one that is not aware of its contrivance For it shews us and regularly too the Minutes Quarters Half-hours Hours Days of the Month and tells us the time aloud by Striking the Bell Nay a Repeating-Clock does without Missing or Mistake answer the Question as it were which by pulling the String you ask it and tho' you are never so importune in repeating your question often yet it still answers truth with more steady exactness than Banks his Horse could by seeing the Motion of his Masters Eye Yet if any Man had drawn thence a Conclusion that those Engins had perciev'd or known we are satisfied that he had been perfectly mistaken An Italian here had an Engine which would both a wake one at the hour he designed to rise and also strike fire and light his Candle for him which I believe is more than the most docil Brute could ever be taught to perform The Case had been still more difficult had this Watch or Engine which seemed self moving been put into all these Motions by Subtil and Indiscernable Agents as Iron is by the Effluuiums of a Loadstone or as Memnons Musical Statue was by the Rayes of the Sun for in that Case the Vulgar discerning no Material Cause that set it on work would presently have had recourse to some Knowing power in the Engine in the same manner as when they hear noises in a House and cannot find out what caused them they imediately conclude 't is a Spright Whence results this plain Rule that er'e we can with reason conclude or think any thing except our selves has Perception or Knowledge by our seeing it perform any Outward Action we ought first to be certain that we can comprehend all the Operations of Bodies and all the several Combinations and Contrivances of them and that we see that those Actions are impossible to be performed by Bodily parts laid together by an infinitely wise Artificer before we fall to imagin that any meerly Animal Body is more than a Natural Engin or that it does any more perceive think or know than does a Watch or Clock 9. The Second thing necessary to be done er'e we ought to think Brutes have any knowledge is to consider exactly the incredible variety of the several Organical parts found in the bodies of Animals which with the peculiar Uses of each and the Contexture of them with the other parts do swell so many Books of Anatomy already without any hopes or prospect of reaching them all And besides it is necessary also to weigh attentively the Chymical parts if I may be allowed to call them so of an Animal consisting of Blood the Humours in it and especially the Spirits which last are apt to be moved upon every occasion by the least touch of all the Bodies about it nay by the most minute particles of them lodged in the brain and excited there a fresh and are withall apt to be carried thence in convenient Vehicles throughout the whole to set on motion those parts which are more solid When he has done this let him Consider all these diverse-natured parts laid together by the All-wise Contriver of Nature in order to the Animal's pursuing what 's Agreeable to its nature and avoiding what 's Disagreeable to it When I say all these particulars are well weigh'd and duely reflected on I believe we shall be at a loss to pitch upon any outward Notion with such wise Contextures and the Complexion of such innumerable Material Causes may not naturally produce 10. To give some ease to our fancy startled at the Strangeness of many Actions we see done by Brutes let us reflect on what happens to Men walking in their Sleep when the passages to our Knowing Power are intercepted and our wonderment will to a great degree cease How regularly do the Phantasms at that time move our Brutal part the Body Many Authentick Examples of which I could recount worthy our highest admiration they
Philosophers think the Object being gone that Motion would quickly cease Nor could the same Motion be connaturally reviv'd but by the same Object which is seldom at hand to make it again as oft as we have occasion to remember as Experience shows us Much less could the Remembrance of Sounds or Tunes in Man or Birds be possibly explicated unless those repell'd Atoms lying in Order and striking afresh the Auditory Organ did repeat the same Impression they had formerly For to put Millions of Motions to continue perpetually playing in the Fancy and as they needs must interfering with one another would destroy all Harmony and breed a strange jarring Confusion Note that Reminiscence is oft-times made in us by using our Reason gathering or recollecting former Notions by others that orderly succeeded them in the same manner as we investigate Causes from their Effects Whereas in Brutes it is performed meerly by a new Appulse of the former Atoms to that part in which the Imagination consists which being the most supreme in the Animal has a Power to Agitate the Animal Spirits and move the Body agreeably to those Impressions as is found also in Man 29. The same Excitation of those particles thus imbu'd causes also Reflex Knowledge of our former Operations And indeed Reflexion on our past thoughts is the same as Remembrance of them for we can neither Reflect on a Thing without Remembring it nor Remember it without Reflecting on it But this Reflexion for the reason lately given must proceed from some Object or Cause Extraneous to the Soul that is from Effluviums in the Memory thus reexcited For it is to be noted that as Divines or rather Christian Faith tell us that Christ having two distinct Natures in the same Suppositum all his Operations proper to him as such were therefore Theanthropicae or such as were agreeable and belonging to both the Divine and Humane Natures So Man consisting of both a Corporeal and Spiritual Nature and thence being a Corporeo-Spiritual Thing all his Operations for the same Reason must be Corporeo-Spiritual Whence he has no Act purely Spiritual or uncompounded with the Co-operation of that Corporeal Part which receives those Effluviums call'd by us Fancy or without it's Concurrence Which gives us farther Light to see how our Soul cannot reflect on her own Operations but the Fancy must go along and by what 's said it will be easie to conclude from which of those parts the Operation must begin anew viz. from that part from which it did begin at first Hence came that Saying of the Schools That the Soul has Notions or knows Speculando Phantasmata which are pretty Fanciful Words and tho' they may perhaps have a good Meaning yet 't is very unphilosophically express'd For it makes the Soul to speculate which if it have any Sense at all signifies to know the Phantasms or Ideas in the Imagination when as yet she has no Knowledge in her at all All her Notions which are the first Elements of Knowledge being caus'd in her by those Effluviums previously to her Knowing either them or any thing else 13. From what 's said above 't is seen that those Direct Notions which are thus naturally imprinted are Common to all Mankind in the main however they may in each Man differ in some Degree and consequently the Words we agree on to express those Natural Notions are for the same reason Proper Words whereas those Notions made by meer Reflexion as are those of Spiritual Natures are therefore Improper as having no proper Phantasms to imprint them connaturally on the Mind whence also the Words that express them are such as are taken or Translated from Natural Objects and therefore they are Improper or Metaphorical 31. From this exact Distinctness of our Notions even to an Indivisible or from this that one of them is not another our Mind has an Appendage of a Negation tack'd to every Notion so that it becomes very familiar to her whence she can have a Negative Notion of every thing she conceives while the considers it as limited or reaching thus far and no farther or being This and no other Of which Nature are all the Modes of Ens they being limited Conceptions of it no Notion being perfectly Positive but that of Ens or Being 32. Hence the Soul can have also the Notions of Indivisibility Immortality Immensity and innumerable such like But it is very specially to be remark'd that we can have no Notions of those Negatives as taken abstractedly from the Thing or Subject for otherwise Non Entities formally as such might be the Object of the Understanding which is impossible for Nothing formally as such I add nor Vacuum can have no Effluviums sent from it to the Brain nor consequently any Intelligibility nor can any possible Notion be fram'd of it Wherefore Baldness signifies the Head quatenus having no Hair on it Blindness the Eye quatenus having no Sight Immensity the Thing quatenus not capable to be measured c. Hence 33. The Notion we have of Nothing or Non Ens is only that of Ens in it's whole Latitude with a Negation annexed to it in the same manner as in particular Entities Incorporeal signifies non Corpus or as Indivisible signifies Non-Quantum c. 24. Hence it is that we come to conceive and sometimes express Non Ens as an Ens as Grammarians do when they define a Noun to be the Name of a Thing and yet make Nihil which signifies Nothing a Noun Subjective and put Adjectives to it Whence Philosophers must take very great Care lest seduced by our manner of Conceiving Non-Ens as a Thing they come to fancy or judge it to be formally something as do the Asserters of Vacuum and too many others in like Occasions For then I beg their Pardon for my Plainness their Discourses upon it can be no wiser than are those Ingenious Verses made to shew how rare a Thing Nothing is nor indeed so wise For those Poets did this Ludicrously to shew their Wit but these do it Seriously and make account that in doing so they shew their Skill and Wisdom which I must think is meer Folly 35. The Notions of Genus Species Subject Predicate and generally of all Terms of Art which are not Fantastick but wisely conducing to clear and range our Notions in Order to gain Science are Nothing but several Abstract Notions of the Thing precisely considered according to some Manner of Being it has in our Understanding For Animal and Homo are evidently Abstract or Inadequate Notions of Peter taking him as he exists in Nature But when we call Animal a Genus or Homo a Species or when in this Proposition Petrus est Homo we say Petrus is the Subject and Homo the Predicate we speak of them precisely as they exist in the Understanding For in Nature or out of the Understanding there can be no Universals but only Individuals none
a Created Spiritual Nature but by a Negation of what 's Proper to Body so we can have no Notion of the Divine Nature but by Denying of him all that belongs properly to the Natures of such a Body and Spirit both and by acknowledging them infinitely short of resembling or even shadowing him Lastly We have no Notion or Expression that can sute with him no not even the most Metaphysical ones Ens includes Potentiality to Existence and all Potentiality signifying Imperfection must be utterly denied of him Existence seems to come nearer yet because it signifies a Formality supervening to Ens as 't is Existent and so is as it were a kind of Compart it cannot be Proper for his infinitely Simple Being And even Self-existence signifies a kind of Form or Mode of the Subject that Self-exists So that we have no kind of Notion or Expression that can perfectly agree to God's Infinite Essence but we are forc'd to content our selves to make use of sometimes one Attribute sometimes another that signifies some Perfection with Infinite annex'd to it which is not found in Creatures or which is denied of them or is Incommunicable to them Whence comes that Maxim of the Mysticks that God is better known by Negations or by affirming he is none of those Positive Perfections we find in Creatures than by applying any of our Positive Notions to him And this is all we can do in this State till Grace raising us up to Glory we come to know his Divine Essence as it is in its Self or as we phrase it See him Face to Face in contemplating which consists our Eternal Happiness 40. Thus much of our Notions which we call the First Operations of our Understanding and how they are caused in our Soul How our Judging and Discoursing which are the other two are made in it is shewn at large in the Second and Third Books of my Method to Science 41. If any Learned Man is dis-satisfied with this Discourse or has a mind to oppose it I think I have Right to require of him two Things First That he would not object his own Fancies or Dis-like of it or think that this is sufficient to invalidate it but that he would go to work like a Man of Reason and shew that This or That part of it does contradict Such and Such a Principle in Logick Physicks or Metaphysicks This is the only Solid Way of Objecting all other being but Empty Talk and Idle Cavil Next I think I have Right to demand since it is fundamentally necessary to Philosophy that this Point be clear'd that he would set himself to frame some Orderly and Coherent Discourse of his own built upon Evident Principles how or by what particular Means the first Knowledge of the Things without us comes into our Soul In doing which he will oblige the World very highly and my self very particularly And unless he does this he will be convinced to find fault with what himself cannot mend Which will manifest that he either wants true Knowledge or which is a far greater Defect Ingenuity PRELIMINARY Fifth Of the Proper and Genuine Signification of those Words which are of most use in Philosophy 1. THE main Hindrance of Science viz. The Mistake of Fancies for Realities or of meer Similitudes for Notions being provided against the other Grand Impediment to true Knowledge which is the taking Words us'd in Philosophy in an Ambiguous or wrong Sense is to be our next Care The Inconveniences which arise hence and the ways how to detect and avoid Equivocation are in my Method discours'd of in common and I have here in my Second Preliminary clear'd also in common the Signification of all Abstract Words and shewn that they mean the thing it self quatenus such or such or according to such or such a Consideration of it as is express'd by that Word My present Business to which my Circumstances oblige me is to clear in particular the Notion or Meaning of those most Important Words which being made use of by Learned Men and taken by them often-times in different Senses do so distract them in their Sentiments and by drawing their Intellectual Eye now to one side now to the other make them so frequently miss the Mark while they aim at true Science Not that my Intention in this Preliminary is to pursue the Mistakes of others but only to settle the True and Genuine Sense of such Words to be applied afterwards to the Mis-accepters of them as occasion requires tho' I may hint now and then some Abuses of them that so I may the better clear their proper Signification 2. I begin with Existence express'd by the Word is which is the Notion of the Thing precisely consider'd as it is Actually Being This is the most simple of all our Notions or rather indeed the only Simple Notion we have all the rest being but Respects to it For it has no kind of Composition in it not even that Metaphysical one of grounding divers Conceptions or Considerations of it as all others have Whence all Notions being by their Abstraction Distinct and Clear this most Abstracted Notion is so perfectly clear and self-evident that as it cannot need so it cannot admit any Explication They who go about to explain it show themselves Bunglers while they strive to approve themselves Artists For by telling us that 't is Esse contra Causas they put Esse which is the Notion defin'd in the Definition which is most absurd and against all Art and Common Sense Nay they make it more obscure than it was before by adding Extra Causas to it which are less clear than it self was By the Word Causes I suppose they mean Natural ones and so tho' it gives no Clearness to the Signification of the Word Esse yet it may at least consist with good Sense and may mean that the Thing was before or while it was not yet produced within the Power of those Causes or in the State of Potentiality and that Existence is that Formality or most formal Conception by which the Thing is put out of that imperfect State of having only A Power to be and is reduced to the perfecter State of Actuality or Actual Being 3. As it is impossible to misconceive this self-evident Notion so 't is equally impossible to mistake the meaning of the word Existence which properly expresses that Notion for if they take the word is to have any meaning relating any way to the Line of Ens or any Signification at all that is of its Nature purely Potential they quite destroy it's Notion And if they take it in any Sense for an Actuality not belonging to the Line of Ens they must necessarily take it to mean is not there being no Third or other such Notion to take it for in the same manner as if one takes not Ens to mean A Thing he must take it to mean Nothing Now tho' the Goodness
all likewise that is all Bodies or the whole Nature of Body that is the Entire Bulk of Body must be Continued And therefore 't is as great a Contradiction that some Bodies or some Parts of Body should not be Continued or which is the same that there should be a Vacuum as that Triangularity should be in some one Body and yet it should not be Triangular that Whiteness should be in a Wall and yet it should not be White or Unity in a Thing and yet it self should not be Unum This is my Way of Demonstrating against Vacuum within the World to prove and not suppose the World Full or Continued which I draw out of the Abstract Notion of Quantity or of Body consider'd as Quantitative and out of those Notions most Intimately and Essentially Connected with it Which why it should not be as Evident as any Demonstration in Mathematicks or why we cannot draw as clear a Demonstration from the Nature of Quantity in Common as we can from the Nature of such a Quantity I desire any Man who is so wise as to know that all Science and Demonstration do consist in the Connexion of Terms to inform me I say any such Man for if he knows not This it is Impossible he should know any Thing at all in Philosophy or even in Logick and so he is not worth discoursing with 6. Hence is seen that it is impossible that a Sucker in a Pump may draw up Water and yet the next Body not follow We may Fancy it if we please but our Fancy cannot change the Natures of Things It cannot make Continuity not to be Continuity Quantitative Unity not to be such an Unity nor Quantity not to be Quantity any more than his Solidity can be Non-Solidity or the Parts of Body penetrate one another Had Mr. Locke had a Notion of Space taken indifferently from Body and something that 's not Body as we have of Sensitiveness from Man and Brute he might in that Case have fram'd an Abstract Notion of it Common and Indifferent to Body and Vacuum for then it had been grounded on the Thing and had been a solid and true Notion but since he had the Idea or Notion of Space from Body only and therefore as was largely prov'd above it could be of nothing else but of Body thus Modified it must be confin'd to Body with which as all Modes are it is Identified and therefore the Idea or Notion of it can never be applicable to what is not a Body REFLEXION Fourth ON The Seventh and Eighth CHAPTERS 1. HAving already shewn that our only Simple Notion is that of Existence I have no Occasion to make any Remarks on his 7th Chapter but that 't is highly Commendable in the Author to reduce his Speculations to Piety and Contemplation This being not only our Duty but that Best End to which all Solid Speculation naturally leads us 2. As for his 8th Chapter I grant that all the Ideas or Notions we have are Positive in the Understanding at least in part but the Reason of it is because they do all of them include the Thing as 't is thus consider'd without which we could have no Ideas of Privations or Negations at all For Non-Ens formally as such or as totally Excluding Ens can have no Intelligibility nor consequently any Notion by which we can understand it And Privations differ from Negations only in this that they include in their Notion a Capacity of the Subjects having such or such a Mode annex'd to its not having it which Capacity clearly Connotates the Thing since there cannot be a Capacity without some Thing that is Capable or has that Capacity Add that I see not how Ideas being Resemblances an Idea consider'd by us as a Positive real Being can ever resemble or represent Privations they being of at least Subcontrary Natures What I hold is that when we conceive a Thing as having some Privation in it the Idea of it is partly Positive partly Privative and the Material Part of it is the Thing the Formal as Privative or as thus Modify'd For Ideas I mean Notions of Privations without including the Thing are Unconceivable and Impossible as whoever looks into their Definition will discern clearly Of this Nature in Common are all the Notions we have of the Modes or Accidents no Notion being truly or perfectly Positive but that of Ens or Thing I cannot grant that our Ideas or Notions or even Phantasms are caus'd in us by meer Motions continued from our Senses to the Brain or the Seat of Sensation but must judge for the Reasons alledg'd above that this is perform'd by those Imperceptible Bodies there spoken of or by the Effluviums themselves convey'd thither and afterwards lodged there In embracing which Opinion of our Knowledge being wrought by meer Motions made by the Objects his Excellent Wit suffers it self to be led astray by our Moderns His Reason which I conceive is also theirs is because it is not more impossible to conceive that God should annex such Ideas to such Motions than Pain to a piece of Steel dividing the Body with which that Idea has no Resemblance How unlike a Reason this is appears at first fight and I am sure this Parallel has no Resemblance at all with the Thing it is brought for I know of no Annexing the Idea of Pain to a piece of Steel but must think 't is a most highly extravagant Conceit The Business passes thus in Nature A piece of Steel being Denser and withall sharp is a proper Cause of Dividing the Body the Dividing of it is a proper Cause of its being disorder'd and render'd unable to assist the Soul or the Man in his necessary Operations This breeds naturally a Conception in the Soul or the Man that he is hurt which Naturally produces in the Knower who is highly concern'd in it Grief or Pain So that all is here carry'd on by a Train of proper Causes to proper Effects and needs no Annexing by God more than to conserve the Order of Second Causes which himself has establish'd On the other side there is no Natural Resemblance of such a Motion to such an Idea as is confess'd nor is the former a Proper Cause of the other which puts them to have recourse to this Voluntary Annexion to them by God Add that it is an odd kind of Argument to alledge that it is not impossible to conceive that God may do this or that without proving he has done it Nor is it at all allowable in Philosophy to bring in a Deus è Machinâ at every turn when our selves are at a loss to give a Reason for our Thesis Nor is it to be expected that God will alter the Nature of Things for the Interest of any Man's Tenet but since his Wisdom in his Ordinary Government of the World carries on the Course of it according to the Nature of Second Causes it must first
either Res or Modus Rei for we have no other Notions But Vacuum is neither therefore it is pure Nothing I believe Mr. Locke had the worst of the late School-men in his Eye when he gave this Answer who talking Metaphorically of Standing under and Inhering left their Readers in the dark as to what they meant Literally How God is Metaphorically called a Substance and how all our Notions and Words fall infinitely short of conceiving him as he is in himself or of expressing him Literally I have discoursed above 9. 'T is almost insuperably hard for those who are more vers'd in Mathematicks than in Metaphysicks to get above Fancy especially in this Particular of Vacuum or Imaginary Space because tho' plain Reason tells them that all Created Things are limited both in their own Natures and consequently in their Modes or Accidents yet because they can fancy something beyond Bodies they will needs conceit there is some Ultra-mundane kind of Thing existent out of the World tho' it costs them that highest Absurdity of putting Non-Ens to be Ens or Nothing to be Something And the same Fancy furnishes them with plausible Apprehensions which serve them for Arguments So Mr. Locke asks If God should place a Man at the Extremity of Corporeal Beings whether he could not stretch out his Hand beyond his Body I answer that in all Probability he could neither stretch out his Hand nor so much as live in a Region so remote from the Habitation of Mortals Nor did he live how knows he but the Outmost Surface of the World is insuperably Solid and Hard as 't is likely it is so to keep the World Compacted Close and Tight Next to put God at every turn with all Reverence to his Divine Majesty be it spoken to shew Tricks meerly for the Interest of Their Tenet as our Moderns use is very Unphilosophical He will say it is only a Supposition which even tho' impossible is sometimes allowable to put that we may clear a farther Point Nor do I look upon it to be any other but a Supposition only I judge it to be a very Extravagant one and Contrary to the Natures of Things God's Infinite Wisdom has so contriv'd the World * Omnia in sapientia fecisti Domine that Created Things should be the Ground of Truth therefore whatever Supposition or Position draws after it a Contradiction is as Impossible as that Two and Three should not make Five or that a Thing can be and not be at once And as it has been demonstrated that when the Sucker in a Pump is drawn up the Water must needs follow because otherwise it would violate the Natures or Essences of Things And therefore Vacuum within the World is impossible so no Force in Nature can make any Protuberancy in the World's Surface because it would induce a formal Effect viz. Distance and yet Nothing to make that Distance formally A Position as contradictory as 't is to say a Thing is round and yet no Mode or Accident of Roundness is in it which is the Formal Cause of it as 't is Round 'T is his Opinion that they who deny Vacuum must hold Body to be Infinite Whereas I hold it demonstrable that there is no Vacuum nor Infinity of the World neither nor can I see any Dependence one of those Tenets has upon the other 16. He conceives that no Man can in his Thoughts set any Bounds to Space more than to Duration I ask whether by his Thought he means his Judgment For 't is evident that he that can demonstrate that the Mode or Accident cannot exist where the Body or Thing of which it is a Mode is not or that both the Extent of the World has and its Duration will have an end can and must in his Judgment set Bounds to both of them however his Fancy rambles and roves beyond his Judgment Or if he means he cannot have a Notion of any thing so great but a greater may be still conceiv'd then I answer First That our Conception cannot make or prove that to be which is not Secondly That none can indeed possibly have such a Notion by his way of either of them but by our way very easily for by adding a Negation to Finite as 't is manifest we may we may have a Notion of Infinite which sets Bounds to all Imaginable Quantities since none can pretend to imagine any thing beyond Infinity The same way gives us the plain Notion of Immensity by joining a Negation to Measurableness Indeed the Notion of Eternity can be explicated neither way neither by repeating or adding Ideas nor by a Negation of Finite Time compounding an Infinite Time to which it may be conceiv'd Commensurable For to Endure is to be and tho' our Duration which is accompany'd with perpetual Alterations and Changes is therefore subject to Time and Commensurable to such and such Portions of it yet God's Duration is of a far more Sovereign Nature Let us reflect when we say God was from all Eternity what those Words can mean Infinite Time neither was nor can be and therefore to explicate Eternity by what neither was nor can be is to explicate it by an Impossibility which is to make it Inexplicable Time was not before the World in re nor in our Understanding for we were not yet nor in God's for he being Truth it self cannot know any thing to be actually when as yet it was not Wherefore since Eternity cannot be explicated by any Regard to possible Time it is left that it must be explicated by what the Word Duration imports viz. by Being and so it must consist in the highest Impossibility of Not Being which naturally follows from the Notion of Self-Existence Tho' I doubt not but those who are not got above Fancy are as hard put to it not to imagine a long Flux of Time before the World as they are not to imagine a vast Expansion of Empty Space beyond the World And so it must happen till Connexion of Terms in which only and not in the Fancy Truth is to be found comes to govern Men's Thoughts and establish their Judgments 11. But to leave these little Sallies and Inroads into Metaphysicks and return to to our Business The next Argument is drawn from God's Power to Annihilate a Part of Matter and keep the next Bodies from closing in which Case a Vacuum between them is unavoidable In Answer First I ask how he knows God would keep the next Bodies in that Case from Closing If it be against the Nature of Things he will not do it And if it be a plain Contradiction as we contend it is Mr. L. himself will not say he can do it Secondly I fear it would look like a wild Paradox and little less than Blasphemy if I should deny that God can annihilate and yet out of the profound and dutiful Reverence I bear to his Wisdom Goodness and Power I must declare it is
is because it is Good to him I believe it is impossible with any Shew of Reason to deny it Now if this be so it will follow that 't is Good only which is the Formal Motive of the Will and Ease no otherwise than as it is Good 19. Secondly All that we naturally affect being only to be Happy or to be well it follows that Good only is that which our Rational Appetite the Will strives to attain or pursues and acts for 20. Thirdly Appearing Good being held by all to be the Object of the Will for none hold that Good will move it unless it appears such and the Greater Appearance of it having a greater and sometimes the Greatest Power to move it I observe that tho' Mr. Locke does now and then touch slightly at the Appearance of the Good proposed to the Understanding yet he no where gives the full Weight to the Influence the several Degrees of this Appearance have over the Understanding to make the Man will it but only denies that Good or the Greater Good in it self determines the Will Whereas even the Greatest Good â—dimly appearing such may not perhaps out-weigh the least Good if it be very Lively represented or Apply'd close to our view by a Full Appearance of it Hence his Argument that Everlasting Unspeakable Goods do not hold the Will whereas very great Uneasiness does has not the least Force because he still leaves out the Degree of their Appearing such to us For since especially in our Case eadem est ratio non entium non apparentium and no Cause works its Effect but as it is Apply'd he should either have put an Equal Appearance of the two Contesting Motives or nothing will follow 21. Fourthly This Equal Appearance put his Argument is not Conclusive but opposes himself For the prodigious Torments inflicted by the Heathen Persecuters upon the Primitive Martyrs were doubtlesly the Greatest present Uneasiness Flesh and Blood could undergo yet the Lively Appearance of their Eternal Happiness tho' Distant and Absent which their Well-grounded Faith and Erected Hope assur'd them of after those Short tho' most Penal Sufferings overcame all that Inconceivable Uneasiness they suffer'd at present 22. Lastly How can it be thought that the getting rid of Uneasiness or which is the same the Obtaining of Ease can be the Formal and Proper Object of the Will Powers are ordain'd to perfect the Subject to which they belong and the better the Object is which they are employ'd about so much in proportion the Man is the Perfecter who applies that Power to attain it It cannot then be doubted but True Happiness being the Ultimate Perfection Man can aim or arrive at which is only attainable by Acts of his Will that Power was naturally ordain'd to bring Man to his highest State of Perfection by such an Acquisition or by loving above all Things and pursuing that Object and consequently since this consists in obtaining his Summum Bonum 't is the Goodness of the Object apprehended and conceited such which determines the Will and therefore the Straining after Greater and even the Greatest Goods and being Determin'd to them is what by the Design of Nature his Will was given him for Now who can think that meerly to be at Ease is this Greatest Good or the Motive Object End or Determiner of the Will Ease without any farther Prospect seems rather to be the Object of an Idle Drone who cares not for perfecting himself at all but sits still satisfy'd with his Dull and Stupid Indolency It seems to destroy the Acquisition of all Virtue which is Arduous and not perform'd but by Contrasting with Ease and present Satisfactions It quite takes away the very Notion of the Heroick Virtue of Fortitude whose very Object is the Overcoming Ease and attempting such Things as are Difficult and Inconsistent with it I expect Mr. Locke will say that all these Candidates of Virtue had not acted had they not according to their present Thoughts found it Uneasie not to act as they did But I reply that Uneasiness was not their Sole Motive of Acting nor the only or Formal Determiner of their Will For in that case if meerly to be rid of Uneasiness had mov'd them to act meer Ease had satisfy'd them Whereas 't is Evident they aim'd at a Greater Good than meerly to be at Ease In a Word Ease bears in its Notion a Sluggish Unactive and most Imperfect Disposition It seems to sute only with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Insensibility of a Stoick Pleasure and Joy have some Briskness in their Signification Desire is Active and implies a Tendency to some Good we affect But the meer being at Ease denotes no more but a Stupid Indisturbance which Noble Souls hate as mean and are weary of it And if Ease be the proper Motive and Determiner of the Will and the Greatest Good the Will can have or wish is Eternal Glory it would follow that the Glory of the Saints and Angels in Heaven is nothing but being in the best manner at Ease which is far from Elevating the Soul to the highest Degree of Perfection as Glory or the Beatifying Sight of God does and only signifies she is when in Heaven securely out of Harm's way or free from being disturb'd ever after By which no great Good accrues to her but only a kind of Neutral State in which she shall receive no Hurt 23. The true Point then seems to me to stand thus The Object of the Will an Appearing Good works many Effects immediately consequent to one another First When the Appearance is but slight it begets a Liking of it when Lively a Love of it which determines the Will to it to which if Great follows an Effectual Tendency towards it called Desire of it Desire not satisfy'd troubles us or makes us Uneasie Uneasiness makes us strive to change our Condition to get Ease This makes us to cast about and Consider how to find Means to do it Means found we make use of them and actually go about to rid our selves of what was Uneasie to us Now tho' some of these are nearer to our Outward Action than others yet the Appearing Good in the Object is the Common Cause which produces all those Orderly Dispositions in virtue of which as the First Motive they do all Act Assist and Concurr to determine our Will to go about the Outward Action with Vigour 24. Ere I part with this Chapter of Power I am to observe that Mr. Locke has not any where so much as touch'd at the Power to be a Thing tho' Nature gives us as Clear a Notion of it as of any other Power whatever For as oft as we see one Thing made of Another which we know is not Created anew so often our Natural Reason forces us to acknowledge that somewhat of the former Thing could be made another Thing and this as evidently as when we see a Thing Act
all its parts Continued or Coherent as Duality does make a Stone and a Tree formally Two or Rotundity in a Body makes it Round or any other Formal Cause is engag'd by its very Essence to put its Formal Effect which would induce a Clear Contradiction if it should not 10. 'T is not in this Occasion only but in many others too that Great Scholars puzzle their Wits to find out Natural Causes for divers Effects the true Reason for which is only owing to Trans-natural ones or from these Altissimae Causae which only Metaphysicks give us and it happens also not seldom that Men beat their Brains to find out Efficients for that which depends only on Formal Causes whose most certain Causality depends on no Second Causes but only on the First Cause God's Creative Wisdom which establish'd their Essences to be what they are Let any one ask a Naturalist why Rotundity does formally make a Thing Round and you will see what a Plunge he will be put to not finding in all Nature a Proper Reason for it The same in other Terms is the Ground of Mr. Locke's Perplexity how Extended Parts do cohere to which the properest and most Satisfactory Answer is because there is Quantity in them which is Essentially Continued and so does Formally give Coherence of Parts to Body its Subject By the same means we have a Clear Reason afforded us why Bodies impell one another which Mr. Locke thinks is Inexplicable For putting one Body to be thrust against another the Body that is Passive must either be shov'd forwards or there must necessarily be Penetration of Parts unless perhaps at first the Impulsive Force be so slight and leisurely that it is able to cause only some Degree of Condensation Every thing therefore acting as it is if the Body or the Quantity of it be Extended or have one Part without the other and therefore it be impossible its Parts should be penetrated or be one within the other the Motion of the Passive Body must necessarily ensue 11. To proceed Mr. Locke makes account we have as clear a Knowledge of Spirits as we have of Bodies and then argues that we ought no more to deny the Existence of Those than of These Which I should like well did he maintain and prove first that the Nature of Bodily Substances is clearly Intelligible But to make those Notions which are most Essential and Proper to Bodies and most Obvious of all others viz. their Entity or Substance and their Extension to be Unintelligible and then to tell us that The Idea of Spiritual Natures are as Clear as that of Bodily Substance which he takes such pains to shew is not Clear at all is as I conceive no great Argument for their Clearness nor their Existence neither but rather a strong Argument against both The Parallel amounting to this that we know not what to make either of the one or of the other 12. As for the Knowledge we have of Spiritual Natures my Principles oblige me to discourse it thus We can have no Proper or Direct Notions of Spiritual Natures because they can make no Impressions on our Senses yet as was shewn above our Reflexion on the Operations and Modes which are in our Soul make us acknowledge those Modes are not Corporeal and therefore that the Immediate Subject of those Modes our Soul is not a Body but of another nature vastly different which we call Spiritual Our Reason assures us also by demonstrating that the first Motion of Bodies could neither proceed immediately from God nor from our Soul which presupposes both that and many other Motions to her Being that there must be another sort of Spiritual Nature distinct from our Soul from which that Motion proceeds which therefore being Active and so in Act it self is not a Compart but a Whole and Subsistent alone which we call Angels Their Operations prove they have Actual Being and therefore a fortiori they are capable to be or Things Whence we must correct our Negative Expressions of them by our Reason and hold they are Positive Things all Notions of Thing being Positive Farther we can as evidently discourse of those Beings or Things tho' Negatively express'd as we can of any Body v. g. if an Angel be Non-quantus we can demonstrate it is Non-extensus Non-locabilis c. and from its having no Matter or Power which is the Ground of all Potentiality and Change 't is hence collected that 't is a Pure Act and therefore that once Determin'd it is Immutable at least Naturally Lastly I affirm that this presupposed we can discourse far more clearly of Spirit than of Bodies For there are thousands of Accidents belonging intrinsecally or extrinsecally to every Individual Body whence all our Confusion and Ignorance of it comes whereas in a Pure Spirit there are only three or four Notions viz. Being Knowledge Will and Operation for us to Reflect on and Manage and therefore the Knowledge of them is as far as this Consideration carries more Clearly attainable than is the Knowledge of Bodies REFLEXION Fourteenth ON The 24th 25th 26th and 27th CHAPTERS 1. THE 24th Chapter Of the Collective Ideas of Substance gives me no Occasion to reflect Only when he lays as it were for his Ground that the Mind has a Power to compare or collect many Ideas into one I am to suppose he means that the Mind does not this of her self alone without the Joint-acting of the Body as has been often prov'd above for otherwise the whole or the Man cannot be said to be the Author of that Action 2. The 25th Chapter gives us the true Notion of Relation and very clearly express'd which he seconds with divers other Solid Truths viz. That some Terms which seem Absolute are Relatives that Relation can be only betwixt two Things and that All things are capable of Relation What I reflect on is that he gives us not the true Difference between Real and meerly Verbal Relations nor the true Reason why some Relative Terms have and others have not Correlates He thinks the Reasons why we call some of them ExtrinsecalDenominations which is the same with Verbal Relations proceed from Defect in our Language or because we want a Word to signifie them Whereas this matters not a Jot since we can have the Idea or Notion of Relation in our Minds if we have good Ground for it whether we have a Word to signifie it or no or rather if we have a Real Ground for it we shall quickly invent either some one Word or else some Circumlocution to express it Let us see then what our Principles in this Affair say to us 3. Relation is not here taken for our Act of Relating for then it would belong to another common Head of Notions call'd Action but for the Thing as it is referred by our Comparative Power to another Wherefore there must be some Ground in the Thing for our thus referring in
nor consequently in proper Speech a Thing it follows again that that Complexion of Acccidents which gave the Thing its Primigenial Constitution in the very first Instant it was thus ultimately Determin'd to be This or Different from all others of the same Kind did truly and properly Individuate it Note that this Discourse holds equally in Elementary Mix'd Living Vegetable and Animal Individuums allowing only for the smaller or greater Number of Accidents which goes to the constituting each of them respectively Why Mr. Locke who allows the Complexion of Accidents to constitute the Specifick Nature should not follow the same Principle in making a greater Complexion of the Modes Intrinsecally distinguish the Individuum from all others and so constitute It I cannot imagin it being so perfectly Consonant and necessarily Consequent to his own Doctrine and agreeable to Evident Principles 7. Applying then this Discourse to Man Since it is the constant Method of God's Wisdom as he is the Author of Nature to carry on the Course of it by Dispositions on the Matter 's side and therefore to adjust and fit that which Supervenes to what Pre-exists and especially to sute the Form to the Matter and since 't is evident that the Embrio pre-exists to the Infusion of the Soul as the peculiar Matter to its Form it follows that the Soul is adjusted to the Bodily or Animal Part and according to the Degree that part of it call'd the Fancy is better or worse fitted as far as is on its side to perform such Actions when it is ripe or more or less fit to work comparatively in which all Judging and Discoursing consists there will be infused a Soul apt to judge and discourse more perfectly or less perfectly according as the Matter requires And were it otherwise so that the Soul were apt to work more perfectly than the Body were able to go along with it first that greater Degree of Rationality in the Soul would be lost and in vain and next the Man God's Workmanship would be disproportion'd and in a manner Monstrous in his most Essential Parts Putting then those Parts orderly fitted to one another which can only be done as was shewn by suting the Supervening Part to that which pre-existed it follows necessarily that as the Bodily or meerly Animal Matter of Man the Embryo was in the Instant before the Soul was infused and the Man made individually different from all of the same Kind or from all other Embryo's and so was consequently just to such a Degree fit by the peculiar Disposition of its Brain as it s conjoin'd Instrument to act with the Soul comparatively so it is impossible the Soul being proportion'd to that Matter as its Form that any two Souls should be perfectly Alike or Equal in Rationality or rather that any Two Men should have a Capacity of Knowing or Reasoning to the self-same Degree For were they equally Rational those two Men would be but one and the same Man Essentially or under the Notion of such a Species in regard that tho' they might have many Accidental Differences yet they would have nothing in the Line of such a Rational Ens or Man to distinguish them Essentially or make and constitute them formally Two such Entities or Things as we call Men or Rational Animals 8. This premis'd I come to examin Mr. L's Discourses upon this Subject He imagins Existence is the Principle of Individuation which can consist with no show of Reason For since Thing in Common cannot exist and therefore what 's Ultimately determin'd to be this Thing or an Individuum can only be capable of Actual Being 't is evident that the Individual Thing must in priority of Nature or Reason be first constituted such ere it can be capable of Existence Wherefore 't is impossible that Existence consider it how we will can be in any manner the Principle of Individuation the constitution of the Individuum being presupposed to it Again since as has been shown above the Notion of a Thing or an Individuum speaking of Creatures is Capable to be 't is impossible that Actual Being or Existence should constitute the Potentiality or Capacity of Being any more then the meer Power of walking can constitute or denominate a Man Actually walking Besides both Logick and Metaphysicks demonstrate that Existence it being the immediate Effect of the first Cause who is Essentially an Infinitly-Pure Actuality of Being is therefore the most Actual of any Notion we have or can have Wherefore since whatever does difference or distinguish Another must necessarily be more Actual than the Notion Distinguish'd it follows that Existence is of its own Nature a most perfectly uniform and Undistinguishable Effect that is one and the same in all Creatures whatsoever as far as concerns its own precise Nature or Notion For Reflexion will inform us clearly that whatever Notion is Distinguishable is Potential and that the Distinguishing Notion is more Actual than it Since then no Notion can be more Actual than is that of Existence it follows it cannot possibly be Distinguish'd at all Whence follows this Unexpected tho' Clear Consequence that if Existence does constitute the Individuality all the Individuums in the world as having one and the Self-same Constituter would be but one Individuum 9. Next Mr. L. fancies that the Existing of a Thing in the same Time and Place constitutes the Identity of a Thing and the being in several Times and Places constitutes its Diversity By which 't is easy to discern that he distinguishes not between the Extrinsecal Marks and Signes by which we may know the Distinction of Individuals and what Intrinsecally and Essentially constitutes or makes them differeut Things Who sees not that Time and Place are meerly Extrinsecal to the Notion of Substance or rather toto genere different from it as belonging to other Common Heads And therefore they are too Superficial Considerations for their Identity and Diversity which are Relations grounded on their Essence to consist in them Besides Time and Place are evidently no more but Circumstances of the Thing wherefore that very word Circumstance shows plainly that they cannot be Intrinsecal much less Essential to it and it evidences moreover that they suppose the Thing already constituted to which they are annext Tho' then Practical men may have light thence to distinguish Individuums yet it is very Improper for Philosophers or Speculative Reflecters to make the Entity of Things which grounds the Relations of Identity and Diversity to consist in these Outward Signes and Circumstantial Tokens 10. This Learned Gentleman conceives there must be a Different Reason for the Individual Identity of Man To make way to which he premises and would perswade us gratis that it is one thing to be the same Substance another the same Man and a third to be the same Person But I must forestall all his Subsequent Discourses by denying this Preliminary to them For speaking of one and the
of Substance The Essences are no otherwise Ingenerable but as they are from Eternity in the Divine Ideas nor Incorruptible but as they are either there or else in some Humane or Angelical Understanding out of which they can never be effaced Lastly What have Names or Words which are nothing but Articulate Air or Figur'd Ink excepting what is Annexed to them by our Minds to do with the Intrinsecal Natures of Things that they should be one Sort or Kind of Essences 13. This Learned Author justly complains that we have so few Definitions and my self have both resented it in my Preface to my Method and have also excited and encourag'd Learned Men to make good that Defect But till the Best and only Proper Way which I mention'd lately to make Definitions be allow'd and taken I am sure there will be no new ones made that will deserve that Name and those Few that are already made will still be exposed to the baffling Attacks of Fancy Aristotle was certainly the best Definer of any Philosopher yet extant yet his Definitions are excepted against by Witty Men and which is worse for no other Reason but because they are too Learned that is too Good Mr. Locke expresses here great Dis-satisfaction at two of them which to my best Judgment not all the Wit of Man can mend The First is of Motion which Aristotle defines to be Actus Entis in potentia quatenus in potentia Now I wonder not that Mr. Locke who in his large Chapter of Power never so much as mention'd the Idea of Power to be a Thing nor the Power to have such an Accident or Mode nor consequently the Idea of an Act answering to such a Power should conceit this Definition to be Gibberish However he came to pretermit them it is most manifest that we have Natural Ideas or Notions of both these We cannot see a Thing made actually of Another or Alter'd to be any way otherwise than it was but Nature obliges us to see and say that that Thing of which the new one was made could or had a Power to be It or have Another made of it Or when we see 't is anew made Hot Cold Round White Moved Placed c. but that it could or had a Power to become such ere it was Actually such These Ideas then of Act and Power are so Natural that Common Sense forces us to acknowledge them and Common Language must use them And 't is a strange Fastidiousness not to allow those Transcendent that is most Common and most Clear Words in Definitions whose Notions or Meanings Nature gives us and which Words or Equivalent Expressions Common Discourse forces us to use Yet in the Uncouthness of these Words to some Men's Fancies consists all the Difficulty which they so boggle at in this Definition The Ens or Body was only Capable or had a Power to be moved ere Motion came and now by Motion it is Actually moved It is evident then that Motion is the Act or which is the same the Formal Cause which reduced that Power into Act or formally denominated it moved Actually Act then was a Proper Genus as far as those most Common Notions can have one Now comes the Difference in potentia which is to determine what kind of Act Motion is To understand which we may reflect that a Body has many other Acts or as we conceive and call them Forms in it such as are Quantity Figure and all Qualities whatever as Roundness Length Breadth Health c. But they are not Acts of that Body as 't is in power to be otherwise than it is but as 't is actually such or such For they truly denominate it to be actually Round Long Healthful c. Whereas Motion being formally a meer Tendency to an Effect not yet produced constitutes and denominates a Body to be only in power to be what by that Motion it is to be afterwards For reflecting on all Motions whatever v. g. Generation Alteration Augmentation Sanation c. none of them affect the Subject or Body in order to what it has already fixedly but in order to a newly generated or rather producible Thing Quality Quantity Disposition Health c. which the Matter or Subject has only a Power to have or acquire by means of those respective Motions The last Words quatenus in potentia signifie that the Thing as affected with Motion is formally and precisely consider'd to be in power to be such or such and not at all as actually so Matter has the Notion of Power to be another Thing but in regard it is a kind of Compart constituting actually the stable and entire Ens the Thing or Body which has Matter in it cannot be said to be meerly in power to have Matter which it has Already Whereas by having Motion in it which is only the Way or Means to attain what Nature aims to produce it must be thus meerly and formally in Power to that to which it is Tending Wherefore this Definition most appositely fits the Notion of Motion by distinguishing it most perfectly from all other Sorts of Acts whatever without a Tittle conceivable in it that is Defective Superfluous or Disparate Yet this is here character'd to be Exquisite Jargon and a Famous Absurdity I should be glad to see how one of our new Philosophers would define Motion I doubt he would find it a puzzling Task to explicate its Formal and Proper Nature in regard that besides its being very General it is the Blindest and most Imperfect Notion we have and most approaching to Non-Entity being neither the Thing as it is in it self nor as it is yet another but hovering as it were between both And I am certain it is impossible to perform it without varying the Words used by Aristotle to others of the same Sense or even to give some tolerable Explication of it which can sute with its Formal Notion 14. The other Definition which Mr. Locke mislikes is that of Light which he says Aristotle defines The Act of a Perspicuous Thing as it is Perspicuous Now tho' Light be Fire were the Particles of it contracted into one closer Body as it is by a Burning-Glass yet the Rays of it thinly scatter'd have like all other Effluviums the Notion of a Quality or Mode of the Body they are receiv'd in and Modes or Accidents have their Analogical Essences from the manner they affect their Subjects The Question then is What is the Proper Subject of Light Mr. Locke's Principles deny the Sun is the Subject and put it to be onely the Cause of it Nor can an Opacous Body be the Subject of it for it affects not that Body it self but the Surface which reflects it and then it has the Notion of Colour 'T is left then that the Proper Subject of Light must be a Medium which is Perspicuous or which has a Power in it to let it pass through it to our Eyes and therefore
have shewn already that divers of them are Intelligible and Explicable by Rarity and Density only certain little Respects are added to them which too lie in our Ken Nor do I doubt but most of the others may be clearly and distinctly known by the same Grounds Indeed divers of them depend on the Figure and Texture of Parts which tho' we can never know with a Mathematical Exactness yet I see not why we may not demonstrate the Natures or Kinds of each Quality so far as to distinguish them from others and refund them into their Proper Causes which is enough for our purpose and most proportionable to our State For Example Light brings from the Wall into the Eye and so into our Knowing Power the Notion of Whiteness and of other Colours from other Objects It cannot be doubted then since Light of its self is Uniform but that there is some Disposition in the Surface of the Object or the Figure of its outmost Parts which reflects Light after a different manner and affects the Seer accordingly Nor is it hard to conceive but very Evident that a very smooth Surface as having fewest Pores in it will reflect more Light and so make it more Visible especially if those Outmost Parts be Roundish which reflect Light every way or towards all sides It is manifest then that that Quality which is most Visible of all others being that which we call Whiteness the Proper Causes of that Quality may be found out Which will further appear hence that if on the contrary the Surface have Small-pointed Parts and Large Pores much of the Light will be lost in those shady Grotts and scarce any Beam of it reflected which therefore is the Proper Cause of that Lightless Appearance call'd Blackness which is the Reason why when there is no Light at all to be reflected all things seem Black If we hold a Thousand Needles Points towards our Eye they appear Black because of the vastness of the Interstices or Cavities in proportion to the extant Parts which should have reflected the Light Whereas were the Object a polish'd Plate of Steel the Interstices or Pores being less it appears more luminous and whitish which may give us some faint but sure Light how this Colour is made The Intermediate Colours are made by the Mixture and Demixture of those Extreams whence out of the Degrees of their partaking those Contrary or Subcontrary Qualities are framed as Blue Green Yellow and all other Colours Nor is this Degree constituting each of those Species Unknowable A Picture-drawer can tell us what Proportion of his Paint of such a Colour he adds to that of another Colour to make what Third Colour he pleases We see then that the Secondary Quality of Colour may come within the Compass of our Knowledge Nor do I see why the rest of them may not become equally Intelligible did we seriously set our Reflex Thoughts on work to study them especially Experimental Knowledge assisting by hinting to us such Matters of Fact as give Light to our Reason when furnish'd with and attentive to true Natural Principles how it may reduce those Qualities unto their Proper Causes which is the only Work of Science REFLEXION Eighteenth ON The 4th and 5th CHAPTERS 1. I Come now to a nearer view of the 4th Chapter Of the Reality of Knowledge the main point in which the whole Doctrine of the Ideists is concern'd To State it rightly I do not doubt as I have exprest my self formerly but that the Ideists have many true Notions of the Things that is the Things themselves in their Minds after a Natural Manner as well as their Opposers have notwithstanding their ill Speculation and thence oftentimes discourse right for the same Reason that tho' some Philosophers held that the Eye sees per Emissionem others per Receptionem Radiorum yet they naturally saw both a like however their Speculative thoughts disfer'd about the manner how Seeing was made Wherefore the true State of the Question is whether they can have any Real Knowledge of the things in Nature according to the Principles of the Ideists or by their puting our Notions which are the Ground and Materials of our Knowledge to be onely Likenesses Appearances Similitudes Resemblances Pourtraitures or Pictures of the Things which are the names they give them and not the Things themselves in our minds For if they can have no Real Knowledge or Knowledge of the Thing by such meerly representing Ideas then it must be said that those Ideas being confessedly the First and onely Materials of their Knowledge the Ideists will become oftentimes liable to deviate from Nature and fall into Errour by adhering to such Groundless Principles as is the Substituting very often Empty Resemblances or Fancies for the Things themselves nor can they ever be able to give a Solid Account by their Principles that they know any thing 2. Now it seems to me tho' I should wave those many pregnant Arguments brought against them in my three first Preliminaries that the very Position of the Ideists does decide the Question and confute themselves For if we may trust their words they agree that we know the Things as well as the Ideas and onely differ in the manner how Of which Mr. L. tell us here § 3. 'T is Evident the mind knows not Things immediately but onely by the Intervention of the Ideas it has of them Whence I much fear that by Ideas he means Phantasms or Material Pictures in the Imagination by whose Intervention 't is indeed confest we know For otherwise it is far from Evident that we know them by means of those Spiritual Conceptions we call Notions since we bring many close Arguments fetcht from the Nature of the Thing to prove that there is perfect Evidence of the Contrary For those Ideas or Notions being held and shown by us to be the Things in our Mind their very being there or in a Knowing Power is to be known Nor can they be held by us to be the means to know themselves for so the same would be the Means and End both which is a Contradiction But let us consider his words The mind he says knows the Things by the Intervention of Ideas The Question then is what the Idea does and what the word Intervention means Does the Mind see the Thing without by sending out her Rayes of Knowledge to it This cannot be said in regard all the Acts of Knowledge which the Mind has are Immanent ones and are receiv'd in that which produced them as in their onely Subject Does then the Thing that is without send its beams by the Ideas as by a kind of Spiritual Optick-glass to which the mind lays her Intellectual Eye Neither can this be said for the Mind could see or know the Thing it self were it in it else how could it know the Ideas Rather were the Thing in the Understanding it could not but be known whether there were any Similitude besides
in it or no. It may be said that the Mind knows the Thing by the Idea because it is a Picture or Similitude that represents it But I way walk in a Gallery and see a Hundred Pictures in it of Men and many other Things in Nature and yet not know one jot the better any one of the Things represented unless I had know them formerly tho' Apelles himself had drawn them I may remember them again indeed if I had known them before which cannot be said in our case because those Ideas of theirs are to give them the First Knowledge of the Thing 3. Being thus at a loss to explicate Intervention or to know what It or the Idea or Representation serves for we will reflect next upon the Word know which Mr. Locke applies tho' not so immediately yet indifferently to the Thing and to the Idea Now if this be so and that to to be known agrees to them both then as the Idea is in the Mind when it is known so the Thing when known should be in the Mind too which is our very Position thought by the Ideists so Paradoxical and yet here forcibly admitted by themselves And if neither the Idea brings the Thing into the Knowing Power or which is the same into the Mind nor the Mind or Knowing Power goes out of the Soul to it I know not how they can pretend to show how the Knowing Power and the Thing known can ever come to meet as they must when ever an Act of Knowledge is made 'T is to no purpose then to alledge that the Thing comes into the mind or is brought thither by means of the Idea for if it comes or is brought thither let it be by what means it will 't is most incontestably Evident that after it is come or brought thither it is there Nor can all the Wit of Man avoid this Consequence unless plain words must lose their Signification Wherefore Mr. L. in pursuance of his own Principles should not have said that the Mind does not know Things immediately but by means of the Ideas but that it does not know them at all neither mediately nor immediately for if the Thing be in the Knowledge at all they must be in the Mind where onely the Knowledge is which comes over thus far to our Position 4. It must be confess'd that Mr. Locke has here § 3. put the Objection against the Ideists as strongly and home as it is possible But I must still persist and avow that neither his own excellent Wit which had he light on right Principles could reach to any thing that is within the Compass of Possibility nor all the World joining in his Assistance can clear that Objection so as to satisfie any Intelligent Man who is true to his Reason guiding it self as it ought by Connexion of Terms and not by Fancy nor shew that by his Ideas any Knowledge at all of the Thing can be possibly had First He alledges the Agreement or Conformity of the Things with his Simple Ideas And I reply that he cannot by the Principles of the Ideists shâ—w that the Things do agree or disagree with his Simple Ideas at all To demonstrate which I argue thus Ere he can know that the Representation and the Thing represented do agree Common Sense tells us he must have both the Idea and the Thing in his Comparing Power that is in his Mind that so he may take a View of both of them and consider them in order to one another and by doing this see whether the one does truly resemble the other or no. But this is directly against the Principles of the Ideists who do not allow that the Thing can be in the Mind but the Idea only Next he alledges that his Complex Ideas are Archetypes and not Conformable to the Things as the others were but to themselves only and therefore he says they cannot lead us into Errour because they cannot but represent themselves I pass by the Oddness of the Position that the Idea which is a Picture should be a Picture of it self or represent it self I only note that this Allegation which should clear the Point quite loses it and gives it up For the Question is whether his Ideas do give us the Knowledge of the Things in Nature and 't is evident and confess'd they cannot give us this Knowledge of them but by representing them Now he tells us that his Complex Ideas are not Copies of the Things nor represent them but themselves only Whence is evidently concluded that we are never the nearer to the Knowing of Things by them no not obliquely and at Second hand or by the Intervention of those Ideas or Similitudes representing them as was pretended formerly Whence for any thing he has produced we may justly doubt whether such Ideas are not Whimsical Fancies without any Reality at all since he will not allow them even that slightest Relation to the Things of so much as representing them But which is much worse he affirms § 5. that those Ideas themselves are consider'd as the Archetypes and the Things no otherwise regarded but as they are conformable to them Now this seems to me a strange way of proving the Reality of our Knowledge by Ideas to affirm that we are not to regard the Things but as conformable to our Ideas Is not this to make Philosophy not the Knowledge of Things but of Ideas only and to pretend that the Thing must only be held True if it be Conformable to our Ideas He might as well have said Fancies for he expresly says these Complex Ideas are made by the Mind and not taken from the Thing nor like it And whatever is neither the Res nor so much as like it can neither have Reality nor Shew of Reality and therefore must be a meer Fancy Now these Complex Ideas reach much farther than all the others do viz. to Modes Substances and Relations as is seen Book 1. Chap. 12. So that this Discourse of his destroys the Reality of our Knowledge in almost all the Things we are to know He will perhaps say those Complex Ideas are the Effects of certain Powers to Cause them found in the Thing and by this Means they bring the Things as being their Causes into their Mind But the Argument returns still with the same Force for if they bring the Thing into the Mind then the Thing is in the Mind when it is brought thither Add that this makes them Resemblances of the Thing which he denies for the Effect being a Participation of the Cause must necessarily resemble it especially if it be a Natural Effect Nor can he say they make us know the Thing because they are made up of Simple ones For as the Simple Ideas only made us know the Thing by representing it so these other not representing It have lost the Power of making us know it at all So that let them turn which way they will either the Thing
Ens adequately divided into Body and Spirit 8. Vacuum must either be Res or Modus Rei otherwise we can have no Notion of it 9. The Extravagant Arguments for Vacuum refuted 10. VVe can set Bounds to Space Time and to all Durations but God's 11. Annihilation implies a Contradiction and is not an Act of Omnipotency but of Impotency 12. The Cartesians can hardly avoid Vacuum 13. The having an Idea of Vacuum distinct from that of Plenum no Argument to prove it Reflexion Eighth § 1. THE plain Sense of the Vulgar gives us the true Notion of Time 2. Duration is not Succession but rather Opposite to it 3. 'T is a strange Paradox to say the Notion of Succession or Duration is to be taken from the Train of Ideas in our Mind 4. Our not perceiving Duration when we Sleep no Argument for it 5. This Tenet is against Experience 6. And against the Nature of Things and of Resemblances too 7. One Motion if Known and Regular may and must be a Measure to another 8. There is no Shew of Reason that the Equality of the Periods of Duration can possibly be taken from the Train of our Ideas 9. This odd Tenet not positively asserted by Mr. Locke Reflexion Ninth § 1. IMaginary Time before the VVorld a meer Illusion of Fancy 2. They who advance Tenets against Nature must alter the Meaning of those VVords that express our Natural Notions 3. God's Immensity not Commensurate to an Infinitely Expanded Space 4. VVe can have no Notion of a Vacuum but a Fancy onely 5. Scripture-Texts the worst sort of Arguments for Philosophers unless they be most Plain and Literally meant 6. Onely Self-Existence and what flows from that Notion is peculiar to God 7. Our Natural Notions assure us that 't is meer Fancy to explicate God's Attributes by respect to Corporeal Natures Reflexion Tenth § 1. ENdless Addition of Numbers can never give us the Notion of Infinity 2. How we come to have that Notion 3. And with what Ease 4. The Notion of Infinite is most perfectly Positive 5. Duration easily conceivable without Succession Reflexion Eleventh § 1. THoughts are not to be called Sensations § 2. Thinking is the Action and not the Essence of the Soul § 3. Mr. Locke's Position that Things are Good or Evil onely in reference to Pleasure or Pain is True and Solid Reflexion Twelfth § 1. THE due Commendation of Mr. Locke's Doctrine in this Chapter of Power 2. That some Spiritual Agent is the First Mover of Bodies The VVill cannot move our Bodies 3. The Understanding and VVill not Distinct Powers 4. Man's Freedom or Self-Determination deduced from Principles 5. The Difference between Men and Brutes in their Determination to Action 6. Man naturally pursues what is according to Reason or Virtuous Therefore his Nature has been perverted since his Creation 7. Therefore Supernatural Motives are added to strengthen Man's Weaken'd Nature or Reason 8. Supernatural Motives being the Stronger would always prevail were they duely apply'd to a Subject disposed 9. Why the Understanding and VVill must be the same Power Substantially 10. How to Conquer in our Spiritual Warfare 11. 'T is evident that Man Determins himself to Action 12. Yet as Pre-determin'd by God 13. Determination to Virtuous Action does perfect and not destroy Freedom 14. Good if evidently appearing such does certainly Determin the VVill. 15. How Wrong Judgments come § 16. Sin generally springs from True but Disproportionate Judgments 17. Of Uneasiness and Mr. Locke's Discourse concerning it 18. Good is the onely Determiner of the Will and not Uneasiness 19. Prov'd from our Natural Defire of Happiness 20. The Appearance of Good is of Greatest Weight but in a manner disregarded by Mr. Locke 21. Putting this Appearance his Reasons do not conclude 22. Prov'd because Ease is not the Perfection of a Soul 23. The Truth of this Point stated 24. Mr. Locke omits here the Idea of Power to be a Thing tho' Nature suggests and forces it Reflexion Thirteenth § 1. OUR Mixture of our Notions is Regular Mr. Locke's Irregular and Disorderly 2. Without knowing what Substance or Thing is we cannot pretend to Philosophy 3. All our Notions and amongst them that of Substance or Res is taken from the Thing 4. We cannot be Ignorant of the Notion of Substance or Thing 5. We know the more Inferiour Notions of Things less perfectly And Individual Essence the least of all 6. To gain a Distinct Notion of Substance or Thing we must consider it abstractedly from its Modes singly Consider'd 7. The Literal Truth how Substance and its Accidents or the Thing and its Modes are exactly known § 8. 'T is impossible not to know Extension it being in a manner Self-evident 9. The Cohesion of Extended Parts is above Physical Proofs and can onely be known by Metaphysicks 10. Whence 't is in vain to seek for Natural Efficient Causes for those Effects that depend on Formal Causes 11. We may have Clear Knowledge of Spiritual Natures by Reflexion 12. The Reason why and the Manner how Reflexion Fourteenth § 1. THE Mind alone does not collect Notions or compare them 2. Verbal Relations come not from Defect in our Language but for want of a Real Ground 3. What Causality is and what Grounds the Relations of Cause and Effect 4. The Knowing the Principle of Individuation must antecede the Knowledge of Identity and Diversity 5. What gives the Ground to specifie all Notions 6. What gives the Ground to our Notions of the Individuum 7. How Individual Men are constituted 8. Existence cannot possibly be the Principle of Individuation 9. The Outward Circumstances of Time and Place cannot conduce to constitute the Individual Essence 10. An Individual Man is formally an Individual Thing of that Kind and an Individual Person too § 11. The Essence of Things not to be taken from the Judgment of the Vulgar nor from Extravagant Suppositions 12. Consciousness cannot constitute Personal Identity 13. That Consciousness is Inseparable from every Individual Man 14. Yet Angels who are pure Acts are Constituted in part by the Act of Knowing themselves 15. No Soul is Indifferent to any Matter The Notion of the Individuum is Essential The Substance is the same tho' some Quantity of the Matter does come and go Reflexion Fifteenth § 1. THat is onely True Virtue which is according to Right Reason 2. How we come to have Confus'd Ideas or Notions 3. The VVhole Thing as it needs not so it cannot be known clearly 4. The Metaphysical Reason why this Complexion of Accidents which constitutes Individuums should be almost infinitely Various 5. VVe can Sufficiently know Things without Comprehending fully this Complexion 6. No Formal Truth or Falshood in Ideas or Notions Reflexion Sixteenth § 1. WHence Proper and Metaphorical Notions and VVords have their Origin 2. The General Rules to know the Right Sense of VVords § 3. Words of Art most liable to be mistaken 4. The Way how to avoid being
nice respect The Common Explication of Extension defended Ens adequately divided into Body and Spirit Vacuum must either be Res or Modus Rei otherwise we can have no Notion of it * Preliminary 4. §. 39. The Extravagant Arguments for Vacuum refuted Psal. 103. v. 24. We can set Bounds to Space Time and to all Duration but GOD's Annihilation implies a Contradiction and is not an Act of Omnipotency but of Impotency The Cartesians can hardly avoid Vacuum The having an Idea of Vacuum distinct from that of Plenum no Argument to prove it The plain Sense of the Vulgar gives us the true Notion of Time Duration is not Succession but rather opposit to it 'T is a strange Paradox to say the Notion of Succession or Duration is to be taken from the Train of Ideas in our Head Our not Perceiving Duration when we Sleep no Argument for it This Tenet is against Experience And against the Nature of Things and of Resemblances too One Motion if Known and Regular may and must be a Measure to another There is no shew of Reason that the Equality of the Periods of Duration can possibly be taken from the Train of our Ideas This odd Tenet not positively asserted by Mr. L. ImaginaryTime before the World a meer Illusion of Fancy They who advance Tenets against Nature must alter the Meaning of those Words that express our Natural Notions God's Immensity not Commensurate to an Infinitely Expanded Space We can have no Notion of a Vacuum but a Fancy only Scripture-Texts the worst sort of Arguments for Philosophers unless they be most Plain and Literally meant Only Self Existence and what flows from that Notion is Peculiar to GOD. Our Natural Notions assure us that 't is meer Fancy to explicate GOD's Attributes by respect to Corporeal Natures Endless Addition of Numbers can never give us the Notion of Infinity How we come to have that Notion * Prelim. 4. § 31 32. And with what Ease The Notion of Infinite is most perfectly Positive Duration easily conceivable without Succession * James 1. 17. * Apocal. cap. 1. v. 7. Thoughts are not to be call'd Sensations Thinking is the Action and not the Essence of the Soul Mr. L.'s Position that Things are Good or Evil only in reference to Pleasure or Pain is True and Solid The due Commendation of Mr. L's Doctrine in this Chapter of Power That some Spiritual Agent is the First Mover of Bodies The Will cannot move our Bodies * Preliminary 4. §. 25. 26. Refl 5. §. 1. The Understanding and Will not Distinct Powers Man's Freedom or Self determination deduced from Principles The Difference between Man and Brutes in their Determination to Action Man naturally pursues what is according to Reason or Virtuous Therefore his Nature has been perverted since his Creation Therefore Supernatural Motives are added to strengthen Man's weaken'd Nature or Reason Supernatural Motives being the stronger would always prevail were they duly Apply'd to a Subject dispos'd Why the Understanding and Will must be the same Power substantially How to conquer in our Spiritual Warfare 'T is evident that Man determines himself to Action Yet as Predetermin'd by GOD. Determination to Virtuous Action does perfect and not destroy Freedom Good if evidently Appearing such does certainly determine the Will How Wrong Judgments come Sin generally springs from True but Disproportionate Judgments Of Uneasiness and Mr. L's discourse concerning it Good is the only Determiner of the Will and not Uneasiness Prov'd from our Natural Desire of Happiness The Appearance of the Good is of greatest weight but in a manner disregarded by Mr. Locke Putting this Appearance his Reasons do not conclude Prov'd because Ease is not the Perfection of a Soul The Truth of this Point stated Mr. L. omits here the Idea of Power to be a Thing tho' Nature suggests iâ— Our Mixture of our Notions is Regular Mr. L.'s Irregular and Disorderly Without knowing what Substance or Thing is we cannos pretend to Philosophy All our Notions and amongst them that of Substance or Res is taken from the Thing We cannot be Ignorant of the Notion of Substance or Thing We know the more Inferiour Notions of Things less perfectly And the Individual Essence least of all To gain a Distinct Notion of Substance or Thing me must consider it abstractedly from its Modes singly consider'd The Literal Truth how Substance and its Accidents or the Thing and its Modes are distinctly known 'T is impossible not to know Extension is being in a manner Self-evident The Cohesion of Extended Parts is above Physical Proofs and can only be known by Metaphysicks Whence 't is in vain to seek for Natural Efficient Causes for those Effects that depend on Formal Causes We may have Clear Knowledge of Spiritual Natures by Reflexion The Reason Why and the Manner How * Reflex 9. §. 7. * See Method to Science B. 4. C. 6. §. 18. The Mind alone does not collect Notions or compare them Verbal Relations come not from Defect in our Language but for want of a Real Ground What Causality is and what grounds the Relations of Cause and Effect The Knowing the Principle of Individuation must anteceede the Knowledge of Identity and Diversity What gives the Ground to Specify all Notions What gives the Ground to our Notions of the Individuum How Individual Men are constituted * Method to Science B. 2. L. 1. §. 10. Existence cannot possibly be the Principle of Individuation The Outward Circumstances of Time and Place cannot conduce to constitute the Individual Essences An Individual Man is formally an Individual Thing of that Kind and an Individual Person too The Essence of Things not to be taken from the Judgment of the Vulgar nor from Extravagant Suppositions Consciousness cannot constitute Personal Identity * Reflex 2. § 2 3 4 5. That Consciousnes is Inseparable from every Individual Man Yet Angels who are Pure Acts are constituted in part by the Act of Knowing themselves No Soul is Indifferent to any Matter The Notion of the Individuum is Essential The Substance is the same tho' some Quantity of the Matter does come and go That is only true Virtue which is according to Right Reason How we come to have Confused Ideas or Notions The whole Thing as it needs not so it cannot be known clearly The Metaphysical Reason why this Complexion of Accidents which constitutes Individuums should be almost infinitely various * Job 36. 26. We can sufficiently know Things without comprehending fully this Câ—mplexion No Formal Truth or Falshood in Ideas or Notions Whence Proper and Metaphorical Notions and Words have their Origin The General Rules to know the right Sense of Words Words of Art most liable to be mistaken The way how to avoid being mistaken in Words of Art Even in Terms of Art the Thing is chiefly signify'd Metaphysical Words not Unintelligible but most Clear This Third Book concerning Words seems Unnecessary Whence J. S. is not much concern'd to