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A48625 VVar and peace reconciled, or, A discourse of constancy in inconstant times containing matter of direction and consolation against publick calamities / written originally in a foreign language and translated for the benefit of the gentrie of this nation.; De constantia. English Lipsius, Justus, 1547-1606.; Wanley, Nathaniel, 1634-1680. 1672 (1672) Wing L2365; ESTC R610 89,515 324

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But it doth but allay it does not quench it for that thorne which also molested the ancients about the inequality of punishments remains still fixed in my breast For Langius if that ballance of Justice be even how comes it to pass that this arrow of Calamities So oft the nocent passes but is sent Amongst the Virtuous still and innocent Why I say are some guiltless people rooted out and what have our wretched posterity done that they should rue the crimes of their ancestours This is that thick and troublesome mist that is got before my Eyes which if you can I pray dissolve and scatter with some ray of Reason Langius frowning upon me Young man said he dost thou thus again begin to wander from the path I set thee in I may not suffer it for as skillful Huntsmen suffer not their Doggs to change but force them to persist in the chase of that first buck they were lay'd into So I am resolved you shall follow me in that track which I first trac'd out to you I was discoursing you the Ends of Calamities that if you are good you may know your self exercised by them if offending corrected if wicked punish'd and you forthwith hale me away to speak of the causes And vvhat vvould that vvandring Mind of yours by its so curious an inquisition Would you touch those heavenly fires They will melt you Would you scale that Tower of Providence You vvill fall headlong As Moths and other little vvinged insects towards Night vvill fly round about a Candle till they are burnt With the same danger doth the Mind of Man sport it self and vvanton about that secret fire Assign the causes say you vvhy divine vengeance overpasses these and seises upon these The causes I may lawfully say I know them not For that Heavenly Court never admitted me nor I its decrees This only I know that the chief cause of all other causes is the vvill of God Beyond vvhich if any Man enquire after any force or power he is ignorant of the Divine Nature For it is necessary that every cause be both before and greater than its effect but than God and his Will there is nothing either before or greater There is therefore no cause of it God strikes and God passes by vvhat would you have more As Salvian sayes piously and truly the vvill of God is the perfection of Justice But you vvill say vve desire some reason of this inequality from vvhom from God To vvhom alone it is lawful to do vvhatsoever he pleases and vvho is pleased to do nothing but vvhat is lawful Shall a Servant call his Master or a Subject his Prince to account The one vvould call it an affront and the other Rebellion and vvill you be more insolent against God himself Avvay vvith this perverse curiosity This reason doth not otherwise appear to be one than because it may be rendred to none And yet vvhen you have all done you shall never be able to disingage your self from these shades nor ever arrive to the knowledge of those truly so called Privy Councels Sophocles said excellently Divine decrees thou shalt not know Though thou knew'st all beside For those from us who are below The Gods themselves do hide CHAP. XIII Yet to satisfie the curious three usual Objections are answered First of that that evil Men are not punished To which is reply'd that though their punishments are deferred they are not remitted And this comes to pass either for Mans sake or from the Nature of God which is slow to Revenge THis rude and simple vvay Lipsius is here the only safe one the rest are slippery and deceitful In superiour and divine things the only acuteness is to discern nothing and the only knowledge is to be ignorant But forasmuch as this Cloud hath heretofore and doth still rest upon the Minds of Men in a few words if possible I shall endeavour to remove it and vvaft you now at a-stand over this River also Pardon me O thou Heavenly Mind said he lifting up his Eyes if I shall deliver any thing of these secrets yet vvith a pious intention less pure and pious than I ought And first of all Lipsius methinks I am able in general to vindicate the justice of God vvith this one Argument If God doth behold humane things he doth also care for them if he cares for them he governs them if he governes them it is with judgement and if vvith judgement how then unjustly For vvithout judgement there is no government but a meer heap confusion and Tumult What have you to oppose against this Javelin What Shield or vvhat armes If you vvill confess it nothing but humane ignorance I cannot conceive say you vvhy these should be punish'd and those other escape Be it so vvill you therefore add impudence to your imprudence and carp at the power of that Divine Lavv vvhich you cannot conceive of What more unjust way of proceeding against justice can there be than this If any stranger should take upon him to judge of the Laws and Constitutions of your Country you vvould command him to desist and be silent because he understands them not and shall you vvho are the inhabitant of earth presume rashly to censure the Laws of Heaven you understand not Or you that are the vvork to question your Maker But it matters not go on for I shall now come up more close to you and distinctly examine as you desire me these misty calumnies of yours by the Sun of Reason Three things you object that God doth not punish the vvicked that he doth punish the innocent and that he substitutes and and exchanges offendours You say first divine vengeance doth ill to pass by vvicked men Doth it then overpass them In my apprehension it doth not but rather deferrs their punishment If divers Men owe me money and I require it of this debtour assoon as it becomes due and allow to that other a longer time of payment Am I therefore culpable Or are not these things at my own dispose The same does our Great God to vvhom all vvicked men owe a punishment He requires it presently of these but gives day to others yet to be paid with interest and what injustice is this unless possibly you are solicitous for God and fear he should lose part of his debt by his merciful forbearance But you need not fear it no Man ever prov'd bankrupt to this supream Creditour We are all under his Eye vvheresoever we betake our selves nay already in his shackles and custody But I vvould say you have such a Tyrant immediately punished that by his present slaughter he may satisfie so many as he hath oppressed For this vvay the Justice of God vvould shine out the more illustriously to us Rather your stupidity in my Mind For vvho art thou that not only presumest to lead on the judgements of God but also to prescribe him his season Do you think him your judge or rather your Lictour
from Eternity to Eternity Now from thence doth Necessity derive it self together vvith that Fate vvhich you so despise The truth of vvhich is so very obvious and clear that amongst all sorts of Men there is not a more ancient or receiv'd Opinion And look to how many the light of a Deity and Providence hath shin'd to vvell nigh as many hath this of Fate Insomuch that those very same privative Fires vvhich discovered the knowledge of a God to Men seem also to have guided Man in the knowledge of this other Consult Homer that first and vvisest of all Poets There is not any one path vvherein that Divine Muse hath so frequently pass'd and repass'd as this of Fatality Nor hath the vvhole Race of the Poets dissented from their Ancestour Look upon Euripides Sophocles Pindar and our Virgil Look upon Historians their common Language is such a thing fell out by Fate and Kingdomes owe their Ruine and establishment to Fate Look upon Philosophers vvhose charge it vvas to ransome and defend Truth against the encroachments of the vulgar Howsoever these have in most other things dissented from one another transported thereunto by an over eager itch after contention and dispute yet 't is marvellous to observe vvhat a Universal accord there is amongst them as to the beginning of this vvay vvhich leads to Fate I say in the beginning of the vvay For I am not about to deny but that soon after it vvas trod out into divers paths All vvhich notvvithstanding seem to be reducible to these four Mathematical Natural Violent and true Fate Each of these I shall briefly explain and as it vvere set a foot in each Forasmuch as commonly much of confusion and errour doth arise from hence CHAP. XVIII The three First kinds of Fate briefly explained The description of them The Stoicks in part excused MAthematical Fate I call that vvhich chaines and fastens all Actions and Events vvhatsoever unto the influences of the Starrs and the Positions of Heaven Of vvhich the Chaldeans and Astrologers vvere the First Authors and amongst the Philosophers that profound and sublime vvriter Mercurius Trismegistus vvho subtilly and not altogether idlely distinguishing of Providence Necessity and Fate hath these vvords Providence saith he is the perfect and absolute Counsel of the Heavenly God to which there are two faculties nearly ally'd Necessity and Fate Fate doth administer and is subservient at one and the same time both to Providence and Necessity and the Stars are subject to Fate For no man can evad● the force of Fate nor with all his caution prevent the powerful influence of the Starrs For these are the Artillery and weapons of Fate by whose direction they cause and conclude all those things which are in Nature or amongst Men. And in this Ship of Folly are at this day embarked the most of the Astrologers amongst us to the great reproach of Christianity Natural Fate I call such an Order of Natural causes vvhich unless they are hindred do by their own Nature and efficacy produce alwayes a certain and the same effect Aristotle is for such a Fate if vve may credit Alexander Aphrodisiensis one of the most Faithful of his Interpreters and of the like Mind vvas Theophrastus vvho plainly asserts that Fate is nothing else but every Mans Nature Agreeable to those Mens Opinions it is that a man's begetting a Man is by Fate that if a man arrive to his death by internall causes vvithout the accession of such as are forreigne and outward this is by Fate On the other-side that a Man begets a Serpent or some other Monster this is not by Fate neither if he perish by the Sword or Fire An opinion truly not very peccant inasmuch as it rises not to the force and height of Fate And how can that be in danger of falling vvhich never adventures to climb And such is Aristotle almost every vvhere in Divine matters I except only that little Book of his de Mundo vvhich is a golden one indeed and such as seems to me to be inspired by some other and more heavenly Genius I read also farther in a Greek Writer that Aristotle vvas of Opinion That Fate it self is not a cause but a certain accidental Mode to the cause in such things as proceed from Necessity O the courage of a Philosopher Who durst seriously Number Fortune and chance amongst the causes but not Fate But I pass him and return to my Stoicks for not to dissemble I have a great affection and esteem for that Sect vvho are the Authors of violent Fate vvhich I define vvith Seneca such a Necessity of all things and actions as no power is able to interrupt Or vvith Chrysippus a spiritual power that doth orderly govern this vvhole Universe Nor are these Definitions very remote from that vvhich is right and true if they may have a sound and modest interpretation As neither is their vvhole Opinion perhaps vvere it not that it hath been already murthered by the retorted Thumbs of the whole hand of the vulgar These charge them vvith two crimes that they subject God himself to the disposal of Fate and that they place also the internal actions of our vvill under the same power Nor vvill I over-confidently undertake to clear them of either of these faults For amongst those few of their vvritings vvhich are yet extant there are such from vvhence these Tenents may be collected as there are others from vvhence vvee may receive that vvhich is sound and Orthodox It must be confess'd that Seneca no mean Trumpet of that School seems to dash upon that first Rock in that Book vvhere he had least Reason to do so of Providence The same Necessity saith he doth bind even the Gods themselves that irrevocable decree doth equally carry along with it both humane and Divine things The great Creator and Ruler of all things did indeed write down this Law of Fate But he followes it himself and ever obeys what he once commanded And that indissoluble Chain and twist of causes vvhereunto they fasten all things and Persons seems and that not Obscurely neither to offer violence to the vvill of Man But the Genuine and true Stoicks did never openly avouch these things Or if any such matter did fall from them as it is possible enough in their heat of writing and dispute you shall rather find it in vvords than in their sense and meaning Chrysippus himself vvho first corrupted and Enervated that Masculine Sect vvith the intricate niceness of Questions he in Agellius sufficiently cleares them from attempting upon the liberty of the vvill Nor doth our Seneca subject God to Fare he vvas better advised but in a certain Mode of speech God to God For those amongst them vvho came nearest to the truth do by Fate sometimes understand Providence and at others God And therefore Zeno when he defines Fate to be a power moving the matter according to the same respects in the same manner he adds it
Do they learn languages Yes but languages alone Do they understand the Greek and Latine Authors Yet they do but understand them and as Anacharsis said vvell of the Athenians heretofore they used money only to count it so these their knowledge only to know So utterly regardless are they of their lives and of what they do that even in my judgement the vulgar seem vvith some reason to look upon learning as the Mistress of vice But it is indeed the Directress to vertue if we use it as we ought and conjoyn it with wisdom to which learning should prepare our Minds but not seize upon them and detain them to it self For as there are some sorts of Trees that will bear no fruit unless they are planted by other male ones as I may call them so will the Virgin Muses remain barren unless wedded to the Masculine strength of wisdom To what end dost thou correct Tacitus and at the same time suffer so many Errata's in thine own life Why dost thou illustrate Tranquillus and yet permit thy self to be benighted vvith Errour Dost thou carefully expunge the faults out of Plautus vvhen thou sufferest thy Mind to be over-grown and neglected Espouse at the last more worthy designs and look after such a kind of learning as may serve not only for austentation and applause but also for use Betake your self unto Wisdom which may reform your manners calme and enlighten your troubled and dark Soul For 't is she alone that can fix upon you the impress of vertue and consign you to Constancy and give you a free admission into the Temple of a good Mind CHAP. V. Wisdom is not acquir'd by wishes but endeavours The discourse of Constancy renew'd The desire of knowledge a happy presage in a Young Man THis admonition so inflam'd me that not able to dissemble it My Father said I with my Mind I follow you already but when shall I with my Actions also When shall that day appear which releasing me from these cares shall place me in the path of true vvisdom that thereby I may attain to true Constancy Langius as one reproving me Do you then said he choose rather to with than to act It is to no purpose at all and as the vulgar use to do However Ceneus in the Fable was transformed from a Woman to a Man by wishing Yet hope not you after the same manner to pass from a fool to a wise or from a wavering to a constant Man It will concern you to use your utmost endeavour to turn every stone and that vvith an industrious diligence you must seek read and learn Here interrupting him I know it Langius reply'd I but do you also I beseech you lend me your assistance and continue the thread of Yesterdays discourse vvhich our summons to supper did unhappily break off Return I sav unto Constancy vvhose intermitted rites it vvill be dangerous to deferre Langius as refusing shall I again said he be shut up in that School I vvill not Lipsius at least not in this place vvhich you should consider I have devoted to my recreations and not to business another time vve will attend it Yes at this time reply'd I for vvhat place is more fit for a discourse of vvisdom than this her dwelling I mean that Atbour vvhich to me seems a Temple and the little Table in it no other than an Altar at vvhich sitting down let us Sacrifice to the Goddess Besides I take an Omen from the very place What Omen sayes Langius 'T is this said I that as he who sits in a place where Odors and sweet Unguents are carrys along with him in his Garments the perfume and scent of the place So I am not without hope that some Air and Odour of Wisdom may adhere unto my Mind by sitting in this her Store-house I am afraid sayes Langius smiling there is but little of vveight in so light an Omen Howsoever Lipsius let us set forward for not to dissemble with you this so ingenious heat of yours does excite and vvarm me too And as the searchers after springs when in the Morning they observe a certain vapour exhailing from the Earth do forthwith conclude that there they shall meet vvith vvater So have I hopes of a plentiful spring of vertue wheresoever I observe in Youth an early desire of knowledge to betray it self And vvith this he led me into the Arbour and seated himself at the Table But I first turning my self and calling to the Boyes stay there said I and vvait but be sure you lock the door and observe vvhat I say upon your lives see that no Man nor Dog nor Woman enter no though good Fortune her self should come and vvith that I sat down But Langius laughing out-right did you ever sway Scepter Lipsius said he so Princelike and so severe are your edicts Yesterdays misfortune reply'd I has dictated to me this necessary caution and now in Gods name proceed CHAP. VI. A third Argument for Constancy drawn from utility Calamities are good both in their Original and End Their Original is from God who being eternally and immutably good cannot be the cause of any Evil. LAngius without any considerable pawse thus began In my discourse of Constancy it is fit I be constant I shall therefore observe the same order and method vvhich Yesterday I propounded Then as you know I form'd Four Squadrons as I call them to fight in its behalf against grief and dejectedness The two former of these from Providence and Necessity I have already drawn forth and have sufficiently evinc'd that publick evils are sent down from God as also that they are necessary and impossible to be declin'd I shall now therefore bring up my Third Squadron led by Utility vvhich I may truly call the Legion Adjutrix a Valiant and subtile power vvhich I know not how doth convey and insinuate it self into the Minds of Men and with a pleasing kind of violence so overcomes them as that themselves are not unwilling to be conquer'd ●t rather gains upon us by degrees than by violent impressions and rather perswades than compells us For we as readily permit our selves to be led by Utility as drawn by Necessity This Lipsius I now oppose against you and your failing troops For these publick evils vvhich we suffer are profitable and contribute much to our inward advantage Did I call them Evils They are rather goods if removing this veil of Opinion we have a due recourse unto their Original and End of vvhich the former is from good and the latter is for good For the Original of these Calamities as Yesterday I sufficiently prov'd is certainly from God That is not only from the chiefest good it self but from the Author cause and Fountain of all other good vvhatsoever from vvhom it is as utterly impossible that any evil should proceed as that himself should be evil That power is only benign and healthful equally despising to receive and to do vvrong
Lascivious Covetous Impious We shall suffer for it For in every external punishment God not only beholds the present but also looks back upon pass'd times and vvith the vveights of them both doth most equally poise the ballance of his Justice I sayd in external punishments and I vvould have you to observe it For crimes themselves are not transferr'd nor is there a kind of confusion of them God forbid there should But certain punishments and corrections only such as are about us not in us and which properly respect the Body or estate but not this inward Mind of ours And in all this where is the injury We are doubtless willing to be heirs of those advantages and rewards if any that are due to our ancestours And if so why do we refuse the burdens and punishments Those Plagues for which the former times did call On thee poor Roman undeservedly fall Sings the Roman Poet and truly had he not added undeservedly For 't is most deservedly since our ancestours did deserve it But the Poet could only see the effect He ascended not to the cause but as in one and the same Man we justly punish in his old age that offence which he committed in his youth So doth God the elder crimes of Empires and Kingdomes because in respect of their outward communion they are to him but one conjoyned thing These intervalls of time do not divide us with him who comprehends all eternity in the vastness of his Mind Should those martial Wolves heretofore rase so many Cities and break so many Scepters vvith impunity Should they broach so much blood by the slaughters of others and themselves never bleed for 't I should then indeed confess that God to be no avenger who yet hears and sees all that we do But they shall not scape so at length of Necessity they must undergo punishments at least in their posterity such as are slow indeed but not too late Nor is there a conjunction of time only vvith God but of parts too I mean thus that as in a Man the whole Body suffers when possibly only the hand or groin or belly has offended So is it in great Societies All many times do account for the fault● of a few Especially if those that ha●● sinned are as it were the more pri●cipal members as Kings Princes and Magistrates Hesiod spake truly and from the most inward recess of Wisdom it self For one Mans crime oft the whole City smarts For his oppressive sacrilegious Arts Jove from high Heaven his dreadful vengeance sheds Of Plague or Famine upon all their heads So the vvhole Navy of the Graecians perished For ones offence what Ajax did commit In the distemper of a brain-sick fit Thus in Judea threescore and ten thousand were slain with a single pestilence for the unlawful pleasure of their King And sometimes on the other side God singles out one or but some few to be the expiatours of a general sin In which if he recede something from the rigid Law of parity yet out of that very disparity a new equity is raised and that is a merciful act of Justice towards many which seems cruelty upon a few Does not the School-master give the Ferula to some one of his wantonizing Scholars And does not a General chastize his cowardly Army by the decimation of them And both these upon the safest considerations because the punishment though but of those few does terrify and amend all I have often seen the Physitian strike a vein in the Foot or Arm vvhen the whole body was distempered how know I but it may be thus here These are secrets Lipsius secrets I say and if vve are vvise let us presume no nearer unto this sacred fire some sparkling emanations and bright emissions of which Men may possibly behold but it self they cannot As they lose their sight that too daringly gaze upon the Sun So they all the light of their Minds who too intentively fix it upon this more glorious light Let us therefore abstain from that which is at once of so curious and so dangerous a disquisition And let us rest satisfied at least in this that crimes neither can not ought to be estimated by Men that the ballance and tribunal of God is different from that of ours and that how abstruse soever those judgments are yet they are not to be blamed but patiently undergone and trembled at by us This one Sentence I shall immind you of and with it shall both close this discourse and shut the mouths too of all those Curioso's The judgments of God are many of them hidden but none of them unjust CHAP. XVIII A transition to the last Argument for Constancy from Examples That sometimes it is adviseable to mix harsher Physick with such things as are pleasant THis is that Lipsius which I thought meet to say in the behalf of Divine justice against these unjust Cavillers And though I confess it doth not directly lead on my discourse Yet neither is it at all besides it For we shall doubtless undergo our Calamities with greater cheerfulness and patience when once we are throughly satisfyed that they are not unjust And here Langius pawsing a while he suddenly broke forth again 'T is well said he I have recovered breath I have got beyond all those Rocks of objections and now methinks I may with full Sails spoom away into the Haven I discover my fourth and last Brigade which I shall very cheerfully lead up And as Marriners in a tempest when they behold the Twins are full of hopes and mirth So also am I after all these storms at the appearance of my Twinny Legion I may safely call it so after the old custom since it is double And two things I shall evince by it that these miseries which we now suffer are neither grievous nor new Which while I shall dispatch in those few things that remain yet to say see Lipsius that you be attentive Never more Langius reply'd I for it joyes me to have passed these difficulties and after these scrious and severer Medicines I greedily long after this gentle and more popular one for so the Title promises me it is Nor are you mistaken said Langius for as Physitians after they have sufficiently made use of Causticks and Incisions do not so cast off and relinquish their patients but apply some gentle somentations and other remedies to asswage their pains So will I deal vvith you whom because I have enough followed with the sharper methods of wisdom I will now cherish with milder discourses and handle as they say vvith a Ladies hand I shall descend from that steep hill of Philosophy and take a turn or two vvith you in the pleasant plains of your Philology and that not so much to recreate you as to compleat your cure As they say Demochares the Physitian did to the Lady Considia since she refused all harsher prescriptions he caused her to drink the Milk of Goats but yet such as he
matters not if I had called it either Providence or Nature And Chrysippus from the same Principle doth elsewhere call Fate the Eternal purpose of Providence Now Panetius the Stoick affirm'd that God himself vvas Fate and the same thing is clearly the Opinion of Seneca You may saith he as you please vary the Title of this Author of things and Natures You may lawfully call him either the best and greatest Jove or the Thunderer or the Stayer Nor for that Reason which Historians assigne because after a Vow made to him He stayed the flying Army of the Romans but he is therefore the Stayer and Establisher because all things do stand and consist by his goodness neither shall you erre if you call him Fate For since Fate is nothing else but an implexed series of causes he is the Principall cause of all things on which the rest do depend Which last vvords are so piously spoken that even Calumny it self is not able to calumniate them Nor did that great vvriter unto Alexander the Great in this at all dissent from the Stoicks I conceive saith he that Necessity ought not to be call'd any thing else than God as an unchangeable Nature And so also Fate it self because it knits together all things and is moved and carryed on without any impediment Which Speeches though possibly they may have something in them vvhich is not so advised Yet they contain nothing that is impious and by modest interpreters vvill be thought not farr distant from that true Fate vvhich I am about to assert The truth is I do heartily applaud the Stoicks in this That there is not any Sect vvhich hath more studiously asserted the Majesty and Providence of God or more earnestly endeavoured to incline the Minds of Men to things Heavenly and Eternal than they And if in the performance of this fatal Race they have at any time stumbled I believe it occasioned by a good and praise-vvorthy desire to recall blind Mortalls from their blind goddess I mean Fortune not only vvhose Deity but Name too was by them very manfully exploded CHAP. XIX The Fourth true Fate explained Of its Name its Definition How it differs from Providence BUt I have said enough of the Sentiments and dissents of the ancients for why should I over curiously or subtilly search into the Mysteries of Hell my business is vvith true Fate this I shall now propound and illustrate And I here call it an eternal decree of Providence vvhich is as inseparable from things as Providence it self Nor let any one cavil at the Name for I do confidently affirm that the Latine language doth not afford any other that is proper to the thing Did the ancients abuse it Let us use it nevertheless and inlarging the vvord from the Prison of the Stoicks let us bring it forth into a better light For certainly Fate is derived a fando from speaking Nor is it properly any other than the Divine Sentence and injunction vvhich is that very thing I here mean by it For I define the true Fate either vvith the illustrious Picus Mirandula a Series and Order of Causes depending upon Divine Counsel or in my own termes though not so plainly yet more exactly an immoveable decree of Providence inherent in things moveable vvhich surely disposes every of them in its own Order Place and Time I call it a decree of Providence for I am not altogether of the same Mind vvith the Divines of our dayes I crave leave for a free Investigation of Truth vvho confound it as vvell in Name as Thing vvith Providence it self I know it is a high and rash presumption to enterprize the comprisal and limitation of that supersubstantial and supercelestial Nature I mean God or vvhatsoever pertains to him vvithin the compass of definite Termes Yet according to our humane capacity I am sensible that Providence is one thing properly and this Fate I am speaking of is another For I apprehend not nor conceive of Providence any otherwise than that it is a faculty and power in God by vvhich he sees knows and governs all things such a power I mean as is universal undivided guarded and as Lucretius faith firmly united But now the notion of Fate seems rather to descend to things themselves and in each of them to be observed That so there may be such a digestion and explication of common Providence as is distinct and agreeable to its parts Providence therefore is in God and is ascribed unto him alone Fate is in things and to them it is ascribed It is possible I may seem to you to trifle and as one saith to drill Millet No Lipsius I have these things from the common discourses of the Vulgar amongst whom nothing is more usuall than to say this or that came to pass by my Good or Evil Fate This is the Fate of that Kingdom or City But of Providence no man vvill speak after this manner I mean none can attribute it to things themselves without impiety or folly I have therefore justly said that Providence is in God Fate is indeed from God but is understood in things I add further that howsoever Providence is really inseparable from Fate yet it seems to be something more excellent and superiour to it as vve commonly say in the Schools the Sun excells Light Eternity Time and the intellect Reason Not to enlarge my self any farther about these serious though uncommon matters by what hath passed you may readily apprehend the Reason of my distinction as also of my retaining the old Name against the new Senate of Divines For those ancient and heretofore Conscript Fathers do not at all oppose me but that I may very freely use this word Fate in the sound and true notion of it But to return to the clearing of my Definition I call'd it an inherent Decree to shew that Fate is to be observed in those things to vvhich not in him from vvhence it comes I added in moveable things signifying thereby that howsoever Fate it self is immoveable yet it doth not destroy the infixed Nature and proper motion of things but acts in a mild and gentle vvay according as those marks and Characters do require vvhich God hath engraven upon every thing In causes I understand second ones necessary necessaril● in natural ones naturally in contingent contingently In respect therefore of things it is no vvay violent or compulsory but bends and leads on every thing according as the Nature of it is to do or suffer But if you reduce it to its own Original that is to say to Providence and God Then I must affirm vvith the greatest Constancy and boldness that all things vvhich are by Fate do necessarily come to pass I added in the last place somewhat of the Order Time and Place confirming vvhat I had before asserted that Providence is of all things taken together but Fate is by vvay of distribution of particulars By Order I understand a Series of Causes vvhich Fate
defines By Place and Time I understand that vvonderfull and inexplicable power by vvhich all Events are ty'd to certain circumscriptions of place and moments of time Is it the Fate of Tarquine to be expell'd his Kingdom Let it be done but vvithall let Adultery precede You see the Order Is it the Fate of Cesar to be slain Be it so but be it also in the Senate-house and at the foot of Pompey's Statue You see the Place Shall Domitian be murther'd by his Servants Let him fall but let it be in that very hour which he sought in vain to decline viz. the Fifth you see the time CHAP. XX. Its Difference from the Stoicks Fate in four respects That it offers no violence to the will That God is neither a Copartner in nor the Author of Evil. ARe you sufficiently apprehensive of these things young Man or do you yet stand in need of a further and a clearer light I shaking my Head a clearer Langius a clearer said I or you will leave me for ever in the midst of this Night For vvhat means the subtile thread of distinctions What captious snares of questions are these Believe me I vvas in fear of some stratagem and began to be as suspitious of these your vveigh'd and vvary vvords as of so many Enemies Langius smiling you may be confident said he no Hanibal is here nor are you fallen into an Ambush but into a safe place of retreat I shall very vvillingly enlighten you declare only vvhere and in vvhat part it is you desire a further satisfaction There Langius said I vvhere you speak of force and necessity For I am not able to apprehend vvhich vvay you dissever this Fate of yours from that of the Stoicks For howsoever you have excluded it in vvords and as they say at the Portall yet in reality and at the Postern you seem to me to readmit it Langius readily farr farr be it from me Lipsius said he I vvould not so much as in my dreams introduce that Fate of the Stoicks nor do I endeavour to revive those long sinceexpired Beldames the destinies It is a modest and pious fate I contend for and vvhich differs from the violent one these four vvayes The Stoicks subject God to Fate neither was Jupiter himself in Homer able to exempt his Sarpedon from its bonds when he carnestly desired it But we on the contrary subject Fate to God vvhom vve acknowledge to be a most free Author and independent Agent in all things Who vvhen he pleases can surpass and break through all the strengths and intricate foldings of Fate They also constitute a Series and Flux of Natural causes from Eternity vve admit not such a Series of these causes vvithout interruption for God makes Prodigies and worketh Miracles oftentimes besides yea contrary to Nature nor can this Series of causes be from Eternity For Second causes are not Eternal as having most certainly their beginings vvith that of the world Thirdly they seem to have remov'd contingency from things vve restore it and as often as second causes are such vve admit contingency and accident in events Lastly they seem to have brought in a violent force upon the Will this is farr from us vvho as vve do assert Fate so vve reconcile it with the Liberty of the Will For vve so avoid the deceitfull Gust of Fortune and Chance as that yet vve do not force our Ship upon the Rock of Necessity Is there Fate That Fate is the first cause which is so farr from removing the second and subordinate ones that ordinarily and for the most part it acts not but by them Now amongst these second causes is the Will vvhich never believe that God vvill either enforce or destroy Here is all the Errour and Cloud in this matter no Man knowes or thinks that he wills what Fate vvills and yet that he wills it freely For that God who created all things employes those things vvithout the destruction of them As the highest Heaven doth so carry along with it all the inferiour Orbs as not to stop or break off the proper motion of any of them So God by the force of Fate disposes of all things but destroyes not the peculiar power or motion of any of them Is it his vvill that Trees and Fruits should grow They do so by Nature without any compulsion Is it his pleasure that Men should deliberate and choose They deliberate without any inforcement and they choose vvith their own vvill And yet God from Eternity foresaw that very thing in which their choice vvould determine But he only foresaw he did not inforce he knew but did not enjoyn he foretold it but he did not prescribe it Why stumble our Curioso's at this Poor wretches There is no point that seems to me to carry a greater evidence of truth vvith it vvere it not for that vvanton Mind of ours vvhich being infected vvith an evil Itch of wrangling and dispute is ever and anon urging and exasperating it self For say they if God foresaw that I should sin and this foresight of his is no vvay to be deceiv'd How can it otherwise be but that I should sin Necessarily I acknowledge it is Necessarily but not in respect of your Mind since your own free vvill doth here intervene For he foresaw that you should sin the same vvay he foresaw but he foresaw you should do it freely and therefore of Necessity you must sin freely Is not this sufficiently clear But they urge again that God is the Author of all motions in us He is indeed I confess the Author of all motions in common but the fautor and favourer of nothing but vvhat is good Do you prepare your self to an action that is virtuous He knowes and assists it Or to one that is vitious He knows and permits it nor is he herein chargeable vvith any fault I ride upon and spur a dull and lame Horse that I spur him is from me that he is dull is from himself I play upon a Harp that is out of tune and ill strung You vvill easily acknowledge that the discordancy of the instrument is not imputable to me but to it self This very Earth doth feed all sorts of Trees and Plants vvith one common juice and yet some of these bring forth vvholesome Fruits and some others Poysons What vvill you here say That this is from the Earth Or rather in that inbred Nature of the Trees which converts the good nourishment into their own poyson In like manner it is here That you move is from God from your self and in your self that you move to Evil. Finally that I may at last finish my discourse about this Liberty Fate is as it were the Leader of the Dance in this Masque of the world But so that we also have our parts to act of alwayes vvilling or nilling but not further of effecting For it is only a will that is left unto Man whereby he may be desirous to oppugne and resist