write and yet not omit writing on any occasion that shall be offer'd for if my Principles be overthrown which when I see I shall most ingenuously confess with thanks to the Author such an acknowlegement will ly in a little room and this failing I am deceiv'd if I shall not now be able to shew any Writer against me that his Answer is none within the compass of three or four sheets THIS also will be the fittest way for Boys-play with which I am sure enough to be entertain'd by the quibling University men I mean a certain busy Gang of 'em who having publicly vanted that they would bring 40 examples against the Balance and since laid their Caps together about it have not produc'd one These vants of theirs offering prejudice to truth and good Principles were the cause why they were indeed press'd to shew som of their skill not that they were thought fit Judges of these things but first that they had declar'd themselves so and next that they may know they are not An Answer to three Objections against Popular Government that were given me after these two Books were printed Object 1. MONARCHICAL Government is more natural because we see even in Commonwealths that they have recourse to this as Lacedemon in her Kings Rome both in her Consuls and Dictators and Venice in her Dukes Answer GOVERNMENT whether Popular or Monarchical is equally artificial wherfore to know which is more natural we must consider what piece of Art coms nearest to Nature as for example whether a Ship or a House be the more natural and then it will be easy to resolve that a Ship is the more natural at Sea and a House at Land In like manner where one man or a few men are the Landlords a Monarchy must doubtless be the more natural and where the whole People are the Landlords a Commonwealth for how can we understand that it should be natural to a People that can live of themselves to give away the means of their livelihood to one or a few men that they may serve or obey Each Government is equally artificial in effect or in it self and equally natural in the cause or the matter upon which it is founded A COMMONWEALTH consists of the Senat proposing the People resolving and the Magistracy executing so the Power of the Magistrats whether Kings as in Lacedemon Consuls as in Rome or Dukes as in Venice is but barely executive but to a Monarch belongs both the Result and Execution too wherfore that there have bin Dukes Consuls or Kings in Commonwealths which were quite of another nature is no Argument that Monarchical Government is for this cause the more natural AND if a man shall instance in a mix'd Government as King and Parlament to say that the King in this was more natural than the Parlament must be a strange Affirmation TO argue from the Roman Dictator an Imperfection which ruin'd that Commonwealth and was not to be found in any other that all Commonwealths have had the like recourse in exigences to the like remedy is quite contrary to the universal Testimony of Prudence or Story A MAN who considers that the Commonwealth of Venice has stood one thousand years which never any Monarchy did and yet shall affirm that Monarchical Government is more natural than Popular must affirm that a thing which is less natural may be more durable and permanent than a thing that is more natural WHETHER is a Government of Laws less natural than a Government of Men or is it more natural to a Prince to govern by Laws or by Will Compare the Violences and bloody Rapes perpetually made upon the Crown or Royal Dignity in the Monarchys of the Hebrews and the Romans with the State of the Government under either Commonwealth and tell me which was less violent or whether that which is more violent must therfore be more natural Object 2. THE Government of Heaven is a Monarchy so is the Government of Hell Answer IN this says MACCHIAVEL Princes lose themselves and their Empire that they neither know how to be perfectly good nor intirely wicked He might as well have said that a Prince is always subject to Error and Misgovernment because he is a Man and not a God nor a Devil A Shepherd to his Flock a Plowman to his Team is a better Nature and so not only an absolute Prince but as it were a God The Government of a better or of a superior Nature is to a worse or inferior as the Government of God The Creator is another and a better Nature than the Creature the Government in Heaven is of the Creator over his Creatures that have their whole dependence upon him and subsistence in him Where the Prince or the Few have the whole Lands there is somwhat of dependence resembling this so the Government there must of necessity be Monarchical or Aristocratical But where the People have no such dependence the causes of that Government which is in Heaven are not in Earth for neither is the Prince a distinct or better Nature than the People nor have they their subsistence by him and therfore there can be no such effect If a Man were good as God there is no question but he would be not only a Prince but a God would govern by Love and be not only obey'd but worship'd or if he were ill as the Devil and had as much power to do mischief he would be dreaded as much and so govern by Fear To which latter the Nature of man has so much nearer approaches that tho we never saw upon Earth a Monarchy like that of Heaven yet it is certain the perfection of the Turkish Policy lys in this that it coms nearest to that of Hell Object 3. GOD instituted a Monarchy namely in MELCHIZEDEC before he instituted a Commonwealth Answer IF MELCHIZEDEC was a King so was ABRAHAM too tho one that paid him Tithes or was his Subject for ABRAHAM made War or had the power of the Sword as the rest of the Fathers of Familys he fought against So if CANAAN was a Monarchy in those days it was such a one as Germany is in these where the Princes also have as much the right of the Sword as the Emperor which coms rather as has bin shewn already to a Commonwealth But whether it were a Monarchy or a Commonwealth we may see by the present state of Germany that it was of no very good Example nor was MELCHIZEDEC otherwise made a King by God than the Emperor that is as an Ordinance of Man THE ART OF LAWGIVING In Three BOOKS The First shewing the Foundations and Superstructures of all kinds of Government The Second shewing the Frames of the Commonwealths of Israel and of the Jews The Third shewing a Model fitted to the present State or Balance of this Nation The Order of the Work The First Book THE Preface considering the Principles or Nature of Family
and giving a brief Answer to Mr. WREN'S last Book intitl'd Monarchy asserted against Mr. HARRINGTON'S Oceana That a Commonwealth not rightly order'd is less seditious than the best of Monarchys FOR a Nation to be still upon the cast of a Dy to be ever in Sect. 1 trepidation as to the main chance of Government is a dreadful state of things Such indeed with us has bin the Constitution of our late Governments of which therfore not any can be call'd a Common-wealth Yet has the like state of things in favor of Monarchs and thro the industry of the Clergy bin for many Ages that wherof Commonwealths unheard are still accus'd and condemn'd For proof in this case the Tribunitian Storms of the Roman People are thought abundantly sufficient But these having bin without Blood if with our Affairs they hold any parallel are not to be compar'd with the Barons Wars those of York and Lancaster or the like but with the Contests or Strivings of our Parlaments with their Kings while such Disputes came not to Arms. Or if the Roman Fields from the time of the GRACCHI grew bloody we have known a matter of a dozen years in which ours might have compar'd with them The Seditions under the Commonwealth of Rome to those under the Empire hold such a proportion as the Seditions under the Commonwealth of Israel to See Book 2. chap. 4. those under their Kings I am contented at this time for discourse sake that the Seditions of Venice should pass as they are computed by Mr. WREN Let those also which have happen'd in the Common-wealths of the Switzers and of the United Provinces by the skill of som Man who may be thought more impartial than my self be rightly enumerated and added This being don let the Seditious that have happen'd in the Monarchys of England France and Spain be as impartially sum'd up and I may venture to promise you That you shall not find the sum of the Seditions which have happen'd in those three Commonwealths to balance the foot of the account with those Seditions which have happen'd in any one of those Monarchys nor are we without sufficient inducement to believe that the whole account in this particular of those Commonwealths which have bin in the World can com any whit nearer to that of the Monarchys But this being so be it also suppos'd tho not granted that a Commonwealth is a seditious Government yet must it be the least seditious Government The Republic of Corinth never 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lib. 4. suffer'd but that one Sedition which is describ'd by Xenophon and this too from an external cause Sect. 2 BUT I am the more confirm'd by the Assaults of Mr. WREN That Mr. Wren's Opposition of Pâ—pular Pâ—â—deâ—â—e amounts to a Consumatiâ—n of it to have no less than demonstrated in the propos'd Model that a Commonwealth rightly order'd is altogether incapable of Sedition and so consequently of Dissolution that is from any internal cause To render his Confutation intire and the truth of this Assertion the more conspicuous I shall first insert those Rules or Maxims wherby a Model of a Commonwealth may be exactly prov'd or examin'd and then shew how they totally enervat and overturn those Arguments elaborated by Mr. WREN towards the examination and confutation of the Model propos'd How a Model of Popular Government may be try'd or examin'd THE Maxims or Rules wherby a well order'd Model of Popular Government may be most exactly prov'd or examin'd are specially two 1. IT must be wholly void of any Contradiction or Inequality 2. IT must be such in which no number of Men having the Interest can have the Power or Strength and no number of Men having the Power or Strength can have the Interest to invade or disturb the Government IT is not in the power of Nature that there should be an effect where there is not the cause of that effect and in a Frame of Government that is exactly according to the foregoing Maxims there can be no cause of Sedition or Dissolution A Model of Government therfore that will hold examination by these Maxims must without ostentation or with Mr. WREN'S patience be perfect NOW let us observe how he bestirs himself to examin and confute this Model As to contradiction he dos not so much as pretend that there is any Guile in it yet will not allow it to have any truth W. p. 78. For says he as in a Fiction the several Members may be so contriv'd as not to give one another the ly but be all contain'd within the limits of Verisimilitude and yet the whole remain without the least syllable of Truth so in a Model of Government To which I answer that there being a truth of Nature and a truth of Fact this way of Mr. WREN'S disputing is mere equivocation For the Model is not propos'd to shew the truth of Fact or that there has bin any such exactly in practice but to shew the truth of Nature or that such a Model is practicable wherfore he needed not to have alleg'd that it has not the truth of Fact which we all know but was to shew where it fails of such a truth in Nature as can any way render it impracticable But instead of this he is gon to the Moon and will read us a Lecture in Politics by the Planets or the various Hypotheses of Celestial Motions Ibid. which may be excogitated including no absurdity in themselves and yet perhaps not any one of them prove to be the true method of Nature But may a man therfore argue in this manner It is very hard to know certainly which are the Highways of the Planets therfore there can be no certain knowlege which are the Highways to London Let us e'en say Because the Rotation of the World may as well go upon the Heavens as upon the Earth therfore a man may as well go upon his Head as upon his Heels and a Commonwealth as well stand upon a Milkwoman's Pattins as upon the strongest Interest or the Interest of the strongest W. p. 179. So much for Contradiction Now for Inequality says Mr. WREN Tho it should be allow'd Mr. HARRINGTON that his Commonwealth has none in it yet would it fail of attaining the perfection of Government seeing there is an inequality in the Nature of man which is not rectify'd by the Model of his Commonwealth As if the equality of a Government was pretended to be such as should make a crooked man straight a wicked man good or a passionat man a Philosopher and it were not perfect in being sufficient to prevent any influence that Wickedness or Passion in a man or men may have upon the Government But for farther discovery of these Inequalitys in the Nature of man that are not rectify'd by the Model Mr. WREN sends us to his eight and ninth Chapters where he produces them in such order as I shall observe in
the Hollanders Val. PUBLICOLA have you any more to tell me Pub. VALERIUS have you any more to ask me Val. Not except why you have not given the Parlament to understand thus much Pub. I have printed it over and over Val. They take no great notice of Books you should have laid it as they say in their dish by som direct Address as a Petition or so Pub. I did petition the Committee for Government Val. What answer did they make you Pub. None at all Val. I would have gon further and have presented it to the House Pub. Towards this also I went as far as I could Val. How far was that Pub. Why I think my Petition may have bin worn out in the pockets of som two or three Members Val. Have you a Copy of it about you Pub. Let me see here are many Papers this same is it To the Parlament of the Commonwealth of England c. The Humble Petition c. Sheweth THAT what neither is nor ever was in Nature can never be in Nature THAT without a King and Lords no Government either is or ever was in Nature but in mere force other than by a Senat indu'd with Authority to debate and propose and by a numerous Assembly of the People wholly and only invested with the right of Result in all matters of Law-giving of making Peace and War and of levying Men and Mony WHERFORE your Petitioner to disburden his Conscience in a matter of such concern to his Country most humbly and earnestly prays and beseeches this Parlament to take into speedy and serious consideration the irrefragable truth of the Premises and what therupon must assuredly follow that is either the institution of a Commonwealth in the whole People of England without exception or with exception for a time of so few as may be by way of a Senat and a numerous Assembly of the People to the ends and for the respective Functions aforesaid or the inevitable ruin of this Nation which God of his mercy avert And your Petitioner shall pray c. Val. I would it had bin deliver'd Pub. Look you if this had bin presented to the House I intended tohave added this other Paper and to have printed them together The Petitioner to the Reader Reader I SAY not that the Form contain'd in the Petition if we had it and no more would be perfect but that without thus much which rightly introduc'd introduces the rest there neither is was nor can be any such thing as a Commonwealth or Government without a King and Lords in Nature WHERE there is a coordinat Senat there must be a King or it falls instantly by the People as the King failing the House of Peers fell by the Commons WHERE there is a Senat not elective by the People there is a perpetual Feud between the Senat and the People as in Rome TO introduce either of these Causes is certainly and inevitably to introduce one of these Effects and if so then who are Cavaliers I leave you to judg hereafter BVT to add farther reason to experience All Civil Power among us not only by declaration of Parlament but by the nature of Property is in and from the People WHERE the Power is in the People there the Senat can legitimatly be no more to the Popular Assembly than my Counsil at Law is to me that is auxilium non imperium a necessary Aid not a Competitor or Rival in Power WHERE the Aids of the People becom their Rivals or Competitors in Power there their Shepherds becom Wolves their Peace Discord and their Government Ruin But to impose a select or coordinat Senat upon the People is to give them Rivals and Competitors in Power SOM perhaps such is the temper of the times will say That so much human Confidence as is express'd especially in the Petition is Atheistical But how were it Atheistical if I should as confidently foretel that a Boy must expire in Nonage or becom a Man I prophesy no otherwise and this kind of Prophesy is also of God by those Rules of his Providence which in the known Government of the World are infallible In the right observation and application of these consists all human Wisdom and we read that a poor man deliver'd a City by his Wisdom Eccles 9. 14. yet was this poor man forgotten But if the Premises of this Petition fail or one part of the Conclusion coms not to pass accordingly let me hit the other mark of this ambitious Address and remain a Fool upon Record in Parlament to all Posterity Val. Thou Boy and yet I hope well of thy Reputation Pub. Would it were but as good now as it will be when I can make no use of it Val. The Major of the Petition is in som other of your Writings and I remember som Objections which have bin made against it As that à non esse nec fuisse non datur argumentum ad non posse Pub. Say that in English Val. What if I cannot are not you bound to answer a thing tho it cannot be said in English Pub. No truly Val. Well I will say it in English then Tho there neither be any House of Gold nor ever were any House of Gold yet there may be a House of Gold Pub. Right but then à non esse nec fuisse in natura datur argumentum ad non posse in natura Val. I hope you can say this in English too Pub. That I can now you have taught me If there were no such thing as Gold in nature there never could be any House of Gold Val. Softly The frame of a Government is as much in Art and as little in Nature as the frame of a House Pub. Both softly and surely The Materials of a Government are as much in Nature and as little in Art as the Materials of a House Now as far as Art is necessarily dispos'd by the nature of its Foundation or Materials so far it is in Art as in Nature Val. What call you the Foundation or the Materials of Government Pub. That which I have long since prov'd and you granted The Balance the distribution of Property and the Power thence naturally deriving which as it is in one in a few or in all dos necessarily dispose of the form or frame of the Government accordingly Val. Be the Foundation or Materials of a House what they will the Frame or Superstructures may be diversly wrought up or shapen and so may those of a Commonwealth Pub. True but let a House be never so diversly wrought up or shapen it must consist of a Roof and Walls Val. That 's certain Pub. And so must a Commonwealth of a Senat and of a Popular Assembly which is the sum of the Minor in the Petition Val. The Mathematicians say They will not be quarrelsom but in their Sphere there are things altogether new in the World as the present posture of the Heavens is and as was the Star in
in vain to put it to somthing requir'd the name of one that was in their ey particularly on whom when he mov'd not they commanded a Lictor to lay hands but the People thronging about the Party summon'd forbad the Lictor who durst not touch him at which the Hotspurs that came with the Consuls inrag'd by the affront descended from the Throne to the aid of the Lictor from whom in so doing they turn'd the indignation of the People upon themselves with such heat that the Consuls interposing thought fit by remitting the Assembly to appease the Tumult in which nevertheless there had bin nothing but noise Nor was there less in the Senat being suddenly rally'd upon this occasion where they that receiv'd the repulse with others whose heads were as addle as their own fell upon the business as if it had bin to be determin'd by clamor till the Consuls upbraiding the Senat that it differ'd not from the Marketplace reduc'd the House to Orders And the Fathers having bin consulted accordingly there were three Opinions PUBLIUS VIRGINIUS conceiv'd that the consideration to be had upon the matter in question or aid of the indebted and imprison'd People was not to be further extended than to such as had ingag'd upon the promise made by SERVILIUS TITUS LARGIUS that it was no time to think it enough if mens Merits were acknowleg'd while the whole People sunk under the weight of their debts could not emerge without som common aid which to restrain by putting som into a better condition than others would rather more inflame the Discord than extinguish it APPIUS CLAUDIUS still upon the old hant would have it that the People were rather wanton than fierce It was not oppression that necessitated but their power that invited them to these freaks the Empire of the Consuls since the appeal to the People wherby a Plebeian might ask his fellows if he were a Thief being but a mere scarecrow Go to says he let us create the Dictator from whom there is no appeal and then let me see more of this work or him that shall forbid my Lictor The advice of APPIUS was abhor'd by many and to introduce a general recision of Debts with LARGIUS was to violat all Faith That of VIRGINIUS as the most moderat would have past best but that there were privat Interests that constant bane of the Public which withstood it So they concluded with APPIUS who also had bin Dictator if the Consuls and som of the graver sort had not thought it altogether unseasonable at a time when the Volsci and the Sabins were up again to venture so far upon alienation of the People for which cause VALERIUS being descended from the PUBLICOLAS the most popular Family as also in his own person of a mild nature was rather trusted with so rigid a Magistracy Whence it happen'd that the People tho they knew well enough against whom the Dictator was created sear'd nothing from VALERIUS but upon a new promise made to the same effect with that of SERVILIUS hop'd better another time and throwing away all disputes gave their names roundly went out and to be brief came home again as victorious as in the former Action the Dictator entring the City in Triumph Nevertheless when he came to press the Senat to make good his promise and do somthing for the ease of the People they regarded him no more as to that point than they had don SERVILIUS Wherupon the Dictator in disdain to be made a stale abdicated his Magistracy and went home Here then was a victorious Army without a Captain and a Senat pulling it by the beard in their Gowns What is it if you have read the Story for there is not such another that must follow Can any man imagin that such only should be the opportunity upon which this People could run away Alas poor men the Aequi and the Volsci and the Sabins were nothing but the Fathers invincible There they sat som three hundred of them arm'd all in Robes and thundering with their Tongues without any hopes in the earth to reduce them to any tolerable conditions Wherfore not thinking it convenient to abide long so near them away marches the Army and incamps in the fields This Retreat of the People is call'd the Secession of Mount Aventin where they lodg'd very sad at their condition but not letting fall so much as a word of murmur against the Fathers The Senat by this time were great Lords had the whole City to themselves but certain Neighbors were upon the way that might com to speak with them not asking leave of the Porter Wherfore their minds became troubl'd and an Orator was posted to the People to make as good conditions with them as he could but whatever the terms were to bring them home and with all speed And here it was covenanted between the Senat and the People that these should have Magistrats of their own Election call'd the Tribuns upon which they return'd TO hold you no longer the Senat having don this upon necessity made frequent attempts to retract it again while the Tribuns on the other side to defend what they had got instituted their Tributa Comitia or Council of the People where they came in time and as Disputes increas'd to make Laws without the Authority of the Senat call'd Plebiscita Now to conclude in the point at which I drive such were the steps wherby the People of Rome came to assume Debate nor is it in Art or Nature to debar a People of the like effect where there is the like cause For ROMULUS having in the Election of his Senat squar'd out a Nobility for the support of a Throne by making that of the Patricians a distinct and hereditary Order planted the Commonwealth upon two contrary Interests or Roots which shooting forth in time produc'd two Commonwealths the one Oligarchical in the Nobility the other a mere Anarchy of the People and ever after caus'd a perpetual feud and enmity between the Senat and the People even to death THERE is not a more noble or useful question in the Politics than that which is started by MACCHIAVEL Whether means were to be found wherby the Enmity that was between the Senat and the People of Rome could have bin remov'd Nor is there any other in which we or the present occasion are so much concern'd particularly in relation to this Author forasmuch as his Judgment in the determination of the question standing our Commonwealth falls And he that will erect a Commonwealth against the Judgment of MACCHIAVEL is oblig'd to give such reasons for his enterprize as must not go a begging Wherfore to repeat the Politician very honestly but somwhat more briefly he disputes thus Macch. Disc B. 1. c. 6. THERE be two sorts of Commonwealths the one for preservation as Lacedemon and Venice the other for increase as Rome LACEDEMON being govern'd by a King and a small Senat could maintain it self a long
signify nothing else but the Result of the Commonwealth so that to say that the guard of Liberty may be committed to the Nobility is to say that the Result may be committed to the Senat in which case the People signify nothing Now to shew it was a mistake to affirm it to have bin thus in Lacedemon sufficient has bin spoken and wheras he will have have it to be so in Venice also * * Quello appresso il quale e la somma autorita di tutta la città e delle leggi decreti de i quali â—ende l'autoritâ cosi del Senato come ancora di tutti i Magistrati e il Consiglio Grande They says CONTARINI in whom resides the Supreme Power of the whole Commonwealth and of the Laws and upon whose Orders depends the Authority as well of the Senat as of all the other Magistrats is the GREAT COVNCIL It is institutively in the Great Council by the judgment of all that know that Commonwealth tho for the Reasons shewn it be somtimes exercis'd by the Senat. Nor need I run over the Commonwealths in this place for the proof of a thing so doubtless and such as has bin already made so apparent as that the Result of each was in the popular part of it The popular part of yours or the Prerogative Tribe consists of seven Deputys wherof three are of the Horse annually elected out of every Tribe of Oceana which being fifty amounts to one hundred and fifty Horse and two hundred Foot And the Prerogative consisting of three of these Lists consists of four hundred and fifty Horse and six hundred Foot besides those of the Provinces to be hereafter mention'd by which means the overbalance in the Suffrage remaining to the Foot by one hundred and fifty Votes you have to the support of a true and natural Aristocracy the deepest root of a Democracy that has bin ever planted Wherfore there is nothing in Art or Nature better qualify'd for the Result than this Assembly It is noted out of CICERO by MACCHIAVEL That the People tho they are not so prone to find out Truth of themselves as to follow Custom or run into Error yet if they be shewn Truth they not only acknowlege and imbrace it very suddenly but are the most constant and faithful Guardians and Conservators of it It is your Duty and Office wherto you are also qualify'd by the Orders of this Commonwealth to have the People as you have your Hauks and Greyhounds in Leases and Slips to range the Fields and beat the Bushes for them for they are of a nature that is never good at this sport but when you spring or start their proper quarry Think not that they will stand to ask you what it is or less know it than your Hauks and Greyhounds do theirs but presently make such a flight or course that a Huntsman may as well undertake to run with his Dogs or a Falconer to fly with his Hauk as an Aristocracy at this game to compare with the People The People of Rome were possest of no less a prey than the Empire of the World when the Nobility turn'd tails and perch'd among Daws upon the Tower of Monarchy For tho they did not all of them intend the thing they would none of them indure the Remedy which was the Agrarian BUT the Prerogative Tribe has not only the Result but is the Supreme Judicature and the ultimat Appeal in this Commonwealth For the popular Government that makes account to be of any standing must make sure in the first place of the ††Ante omnes de provocatione adversus Magistratus ad Populum sacrandcque cum bonis capite ejus qui regni occupandi consilia iniisset Appeal to the People As an Estate in trust becoms a man's own if he be not answerable for it so the Power of a Magistracy not accountable to the People from whom it was receiv'd becoming of privat use the Commonwealth loses her Liberty Wherfore the Right of Supreme Judicature in the People without which there can be no such thing as popular Government is confirm'd by the constant practice of all Commonwealths as that of Israel in the cases of ACHAN and of the Tribe of BENJAMIN adjudg'd by the Congregation The Dicasterion or Court call'd the Heliaia in Athens which the Comitia of that Commonwealth consisting of the whole People and so being too numerous to be a Judicatory was constituted somtimes of five hundred at others of one thousand or according to the greatness of the cause of fifteen hundred elected by the Lot out of the whole Body of the People had with the nine ARCHONS that were Presidents the cognizance of such Causes as were of highest importance in that State The five Ephors in Lacedemon which were popular Magistrats might question their Kings as appears by the cases of PAUSANIAS and of AGIS who being upon his Trial in this Court was cry'd to by his Mother to appeal to the People as PLUTARCH has it in his Life The Tribuns of the People of Rome like in the nature of their Magistracy and for som time in number to the Ephors as being according to HALICARNASSEUS and PLUTARCH instituted in imitation of them hâ—d power ††Diem dicere to summon any man his Magistracy at least being expir'd for from the Dictator there lay no Appeal to answer for himself to the People As in the case of CORIOLANUS who was going about to force the People by withholding Corn from them in a Famin to relinquish the Magistracy of the Tribuns in that of SPURIUS CASSIUS for affecting Tyranny of MARCUS SERGIUS for running away at Veii of CAIUS LUCRETIUS for spoiling his Province of JUNIUS SILANUS for making War without a command from the People against the Cimbri with divers others And the Crimes of this nature were call'd Laesâ—e Majestatis or High Treason Examples of such as were arrain'd or try'd for Peculat or Defraudation of the Common-wealth were MARCUS CURIUS for intercepting the Mony of the Samnits SALINATOR for the inequal division of Spoils to his Soldiers MARCUS POSTHUMIUS for cheating the Commonwealth by a feign'd Shipwreck Causes of these two kinds were of a more public nature but the like Power upon Appeals was also exercis'd by the People in privat matters even during the time of the Kings as in the case of HORATIUS Nor is it otherwise with Venice where the Doge LOREDANO was sentenc'd by the Great Council and ANTONIO GRIMANI afterwards Doge question'd for that he being Admiral had suffer'd the Ture to take Lepanto in view of his Fleet. NEVERTHELESS there lay no Appeal from the Roman Dictator to the People which if there had might have cost the Commonwealth dear when SPURIUS MELIUS affecting Empire circumvented and debauch'd the Tribuns wherupon â—ITUS QUINTIUS CINCINNATUS was created Dictator who having chosen SERVILIUS AHALA to be his Lieutenant or Magister Equitum sent him to
The like for the Auxiliarys And this upon pain in the case of failure of what the People of Oceana to whom the Cognizance of Peculat or Crimes of this nature is properly appertaining shall adjudg or decree UPON these three last Orders the ARCHON seem'd to be haranguing at the head of his Army in this manner My Dear Lords and Excellent Patriots A GOVERNMENT of this make is a Commonwealth for Increase Of those for Preservation the Inconveniences and Frailtys have bin shewn Their Roots are narrow such as do not run have no Fibers their tops weak and dangerously expos'd to the weather except you chance to find one as Venice planted in a Flowerpot and if she grows she grows top-heavy and falls too But you cannot plant an Oak in a Flowerpot she must have Earth for her Root and Heaven for her Branches Imperium Oceano famam quae terminet astris ROME was said to be broken by her own weight but poetically For that weight by which she was pretended to be ruin'd was supported in her Emperors by a far slighter Foundation And in the common experience of good Architecture there is nothing more known than that Buildings stand the firmer and the longer for their own weight nor ever swerve thro any other internal cause than that their Materials are corruptible But the People never dy nor as a political Body are subject to any other Corruption than that which derives from their Government Unless a Man will deny the Chain of Causes in which he denys God he must also acknowlege the Chain of Effects wherfore there can be no effect in Nature that is not from the first Cause and those successive Links of the Chain without which it could not have bin Now except a Man can shew the contrary in a Commonwealth if there be no cause of Corruption in the first make of it there can never be any such Effect Let no Man's Superstitition impose Profaneness upon this Assertion for as Man is sinful but yet the Universe is perfect so may the Citizen be sinful and yet the Commonwealth be perfect And as Man seeing the World is perfect can never commit any such Sin as shall render it imperfect or bring it to a natural dissolution so the Citizen where the Common-wealth is perfect can never commit any such Crime as will render it imperfect or bring it to a natural dissolution To com to experience Venice notwithstanding we have found fom flaws in it is the only Commonwealth in the Make wherof no man can find a cause of dissolution for which reason we behold her tho she consists of men that are not without sin at this day with one thousand Years upon her back yet for any internal cause as young as fresh and free from decay or any appearance of it as she was born but whatever in nature is not sensible of decay by the course of a thousand Years is capable of the whole Age of Nature by which Calculation for any check that I am able to give my self a Commonwealth rightly order'd may for any internal causes be as immortal or longliv'd as the World But if this be true those Commonwealths that are naturally fall'n must have deriv'd their Ruin from the rise of them Israel and Athens dy'd not natural but violent deaths in which manner the World it self is to dy We are speaking of those causes of Dissolution which are natural to Government and they are but two either Contradiction or Inequality If a Commonwealth be a Contradiction she must needs destroy her self and if she be inequal it tends to strife and strife to ruin By the former of these fell Lacedemon by the latter Rome Lacedemon being made altogether for War and yet not for Increase her natural Progress became her natural Dissolution and the building of her own victorious Hand too heavy for her Foundation so that she fell indeed by her own weight But Rome perish'd thro her native Inequality which how it inveterated the Bosoms of the Senat and the People each against other and even to death has bin shewn at large LOOK well to it my Lords for if there be a contradiction or inequality in your Commonwealth it must fall but if it has neither of these it has no principle of Mortality Do not think me impudent if this be truth I should commit a gross indiscretion in concealing it Sure I am that MACCHIAVEL is for the immortality of a Commonwealth upon far weaker Principles If a Commonwealth Disc â— 3. c. 22. b. 3. c. 29. says he were so happy as to be provided often with men that when she is swerving from her Principles should reduce her to her Institution she would be immortal But a Commonwealth as we have demonstrated swerves not from her Principles but by and thro her Institution if she brought no Biass into the world with her her course for any internal Cause must be streight forward as we see is that of Venice She cannot turn to the right hand nor to the left but by som rub which is not an internal but external cause against such she can be no way fortify'd but thro her Situation as is Venice or thro her Militia as was Rome by which Examples a Commonwealth may be secure of those also Think me not vain for I cannot conceal my opinion here a Commonwealth that is rightly instituted can never swerve nor one that is not rightly instituted be secur'd from swerving by reduction to her first Principles Wherfore it is no less apparent in this place that MACCHIAVEL understood not a Commonwealth as to the whole piece than where having told you That a Tribun or any other Citizen Disc B. 1. c. 18. of Rome might propose a Law to the People and debate it with them he adds this Order was good while the People were good but when the People became evil it became most pernicious As if this Order thro which with the like the People most apparently became evil could ever have bin good or that the People or the Common-wealth could ever have becom good by being reduc'd to such Principles as were the Original of their Evil. The Disease of Rome was as has bin shewn from the native inequality of her Balance and no otherwise from the Empire of the World than as this falling into one Scale that of the Nobility an evil in such a Fabric inevitable kick'd out the People Wherfore a Man that could have made her to throw away the Empire of the World might in that have reduc'd her to her Principles and yet have bin so far from rendring her immortal that going no further he should never have cur'd her But your Commonwealth is founded upon an equal Agrarian and if the Earth be given to the Sons of men this Balance is the Balance of Justice such a one as in having due regard to the different Industry of different men yet faithfully judges the Poor And Prov. 29. 14.
such an Example are posted As if for a Christian Commonwealth to make so much use of Israel as the Roman did of Athens whose Laws she transcrib'd were against the Interest of the Clergy which it seems is so hostil to popular Power that to say the Laws of Nature tho they be the Fountains of all Civil Law are not the Civil Law till they be the Civil Law or thus that thou shalt not kill thou shalt not steal tho they be in natural Equity yet were not the Laws of Israel or of England till voted by the People of Israel or the Parlament of England is to assert Consid p. 35 40. the People into the mighty Liberty of being free from the whole moral Law and inasmuch as to be the Adviser or Persuader of a thing is less than to be the Author or Commander of it to put an Indignity upon God himself In which Fopperys the Prevaricator boasting of Principles but minding none first confounds Authority and Command or Power and next forgets that the dignity of the Legislator or which is all one of the Senat succeding to his Office as the Sanhedrim to MOSES is the greatest dignity in a Commonwealth and yet that the Laws or Orders of a Commonwealth derive no otherwise whether from the Legislator as MOSES LYCURGUS SOLON c. or the Senat as those of Israel Lacedemon or Athens than from their Authority receiv'd and confirm'd by the Vote or Command of the People It is true that with Almighty God it is otherwise than with a mortal Legislator but thro another Nature which to him is peculiar from whom as he is the cause of being or the Creator of Mankind Omnipotent Power is inseparable yet so equal is the goodness of this Nature to the greatness therof that as he is the cause of welbeing by way of Election for example in his chosen People Israel or of Redemption as in the Christian Church himself has prefer'd his Authority or Proposition before his Empire What else is the Book I meaning of these words or of this proceding of his Now therfore if ye will obey my Voice indeed and keep my Covenant ye shall be to me a Exod. 19. 5. Kingdom or I will be your King which Proposition being voted by the People in the Affirmative God procedes to propose to them the ten Commandments in so dreadful a manner that the People being excedingly Exod. 20. 19. afrighted say to MOSES Speak thou with us and we will hear thee that is be thou henceforth our Legislator or Proposer and we will resolve accordingly but let not God speak with us lest we dy From whenceforth God proposes to the People no otherwise than by MOSES whom he instructs in this manner These are the Judgments which thou shalt propose or set before them Wherfore it is said of the Deut. 29. 1. Book of Deuteronomy containing the Covenant which the Lord commanded MOSES to make with the Children of Israel in the Land of Moab besides the Covenant which he made with them in Horeb This is Deut. 4. 44. the Law which MOSES set before the Children of Israel Neither did GOD in this case make use of his Omnipotent Power nor CHRIST in the like who also is King after the fame manner in his Church and would have bin in Israel where when to this end he might have muster'd up Legions of Angels and bin victorious with such Armys or Argyraspides as never Prince could shew the like he says no more Matth. 23. 37. than O Jerusalem Jerusalem how often would I have gather'd thee and thy Children as a Hen gathers her Chickens under her wings and ye would not where it is plain that the Jews rejecting CHRIST that he should not reign over them the Law of the Gospel came not to be the Law of the Jews and so if the ten Commandments came to be the Law of Israel it was not only because God propos'd them seeing Christ also propos'd his Law which nevertheless came not to be the Law of the Jews but because the People receiv'd the one and rejected the other It is not in the nature of Religion that it should be thought a profane saying that if the Bible be in England or in any other Government the Law or Religion of the Land it is not only because God has propos'd it but also because the People or Magistrat has receiv'd it or resolv'd upon it otherwise we must set lighter by a Nation or Government than by a privat Person who can have no part nor portion in this Law unless he vote it to himself in his own Conscience without which he remains in the condition he was before and as the Heathen who are a Law to themselves Thus wheras in a Covenant there must be two Partys the Old and New Testament being in sum the Old and New Covenant these are that Authority and Proposition of GOD and CHRIST to which they that refuse their Vote or Result may be under the Empire of a Clergy but are none of his Commonwealth Nor seeing I am gon so far dos this at all imply Freewil but as is admirably observ'd by Mr. HOBBS the freedom of that which naturally precedes Will namely Deliberation or Debate in which as the Scale by the weight of Reason or Passion coms to be turn'd one way or other the Will is caus'd and being caus'd is necessitated When God coms in thus upon the Soul of Man he gives both the Will and the Deed from which like Ossice of the Senat in a Commonwealth that is from the excellency of their Deliberation and Debate which prudently and faithfully unsolded to the People dos also frequently cause and necessitat both the Will and the Deed. GOD himself has said of the Senat that they are Gods an expression tho divine yet not unknown to the Heathens Homo homini Deus one man for the excellency of his Aid may be a God to Chap. 8 another But let the Prevaricator look to it for he that leads the blind out of his way is his Devil FOR the things I have of this kind as also for what I have said upon the words Chirotonia and Ecclesia the Prevaricator is delighted to make me beholden underhand to Mr. HOBBS notwithstanding the open enmity which he says I profess to his Politics As if JOSEPHUS upon that of SAMUEL They have not rejected thee but they have rejected me 1 Sam. 8. 7. that I should not reign over them had not said of the People 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that they unchirotoniz'd or unvoted God of the Kingdom Now if they unchirotoniz'd or unvoted God of the Kingdom then they had chirotoniz'd or voted him to the Kingdom and so not only the Doctrin that God was King in Israel by Compact or Covenant but the use of the word Chirotonia also in the sense I understand it is more antient than Mr. HOBBS I might add that of CAPELLUS
any Power to disturb the Commonwealth in case they had such an Interest nor can have any such Interest in case they had such Power For example in Oceana putting the case that the Few were as powerful as it is possible they should be that is that the whole Land was fallen into five thousand hands The five thousand excluding the People could get no more Riches by it because they have the whole Land already no more Liberty by it because they were in perfect Liberty before nor any more Power by it because thro the equality of the Balance or of their Estates they can be no more by themselves than an equal Commonwealth and that they were already with the People but would be much less the Power or Commonwealth in which there be five thousand Equals being not greater but much less than the Power or Commonwealth wherin the whole People are equal because the Power or Effect of a greater People is proportionably greater than the Power or Effect of a lesser People and the Few by this means would get no more than to be the lesser People So the People being no bar to the Riches Liberty nor Power of the five thousand and the desire of Liberty Riches and Power being the only causes of Sedition there could arise no Sedition in this Commonwealth by reason of the Nobility who have no such Interest if they had the Power nor have any such Power if they had the Interest the People being equally possest of the Government of the Arms and far superior in number In sum an equal Commonwealth consists but of one hereditary Order the People which is by election divided into two Orders as the Senat and the Congregation in Lacedemon or the Senat and the Great Council in Venice for the Gentlemen of Venice as has bin often said are the People of Venice the rest are Subjects And an inequal Commonwealth consists of two Hereditary Orders as the Patricians and Plebeians in Rome wherof the former only had a hereditary Capacity of the Senat whence it coms to pass that the Senat and the People in an equal Commonwealth having but one and the same Interest never were nor can be at variance and that the Senat and the People in an inequal Commonwealth having two distinct Interests Book I never did nor can agree So an equal Commonwealth cannot be seditious and an inequal Commonwealth can be no other than seditious IF a man be resolv'd as the Considerer is to huddle these things together there is no making any thing of this kind of Policy of which therfore it will be a folly to talk For example Lacedemon is either to be consider'd as not taking in the Helots and then in her self she was an equal Commonwealth void of any Sedition or cause of it how much soever she were troubl'd with the Helots So the Objection made by him of her Troubles by the Helots is impertinently urg'd to shew that she was a seditious Commonwealth Or if he will needs have it that she took in the Helots it is undeniable that she took them in inequally and so was inequal whence the Troubles by the Helots must needs be impertinently urg'd against an equal Commonwealth AGAIN when I allege Venice from PIERO GRADENIGO that is for the space of about four hundred years from the present date at which time the Reformation yet in force began as an Example of an equal Commonwealth for him to instance in the times before when tho the Commonwealth according to the intention was as equal as now yet being not bound by sufficient Orders to give her self Security of her native Liberty her Dukes on the one side did what they pleas'd and the inrag'd People on the other side banish'd condemn'd to death or murder'd them who sees not the Imposture Indeed he blushes at it himself Wherfore my Assertion being not yet knock'd on the head he promises to kill it better first by the example of Lacedemon leaving out the Helots and next by that of Venice since the time of PIERO GRADENIGO Consid p. 60. Pausan Lacon FOR the first you must know that once upon a time there was a quarrel between CLEOMENES and DEMARATUS Kings of Lacedemon about Succession which was determin'd by the Ephori that is by a Court of Justice and not by the Sword the like happen'd Plut. Alcib in LEOTYCHIDES the known Bastard of ALCIBIADES or so confest to be by his Mother to divers of her Maids Now this is a Maxim in the Politics Where the differences of Kings can go no further than a Court of Justice there the Government is seditious Most ridiculous Is there a stronger Argument that such a Government is not seditious No matter give him room Much more fatal was the contest between CLEONYMUS and his Brother AREUS the Son of ACROTATUS by whose War ZARAX was ruin'd and PYRRHUS came into the game who besieg'd the Capital City the Reign of AGIS and CLEOMENES was so full of turbulency as would put a man out of breath to relate Fair and softly was not all this after LYSANDER and the Spoils of Athens had broken the Agrarian and so ruin'd Lacedemon I affirm there can be no Sedition in an equal Commonwealth and he to oppose me shews that there was Sedition in an inequal one whether dos this affirm his Assertion or mine BUT for better luck in Venice This City by Mr. HARRINGTON'S own confession is possest of several Advantages Yes I say that the Commonwealth of Venice thus seated is like a man in a Citadel who therby may be the safer from his Enemys but ne're a whit the safer from diseases What conclusion would you expect he should infer from hence Why among these therfore there is good cause to reckon her Immunity from Seditions Dos not our Logician repeat faithfully and Chap. 8 dispute honestly Again Sir she is like a Ship ready to be boarded by Pirats has the Turc on this Frontier the Pope on that the King of Spain on another As if this were an Argument every Government must not be void of Sedition seeing there is none except they be Ilands whose Frontiers are not bounded by the Territorys of other Princes Well but since the last Reglement in English Reformation in the time of GRADENIGO you have had three Seditions in Venice that of MARINO BOCCONI that of BAIAMONTE TIEPOLO and that of MARINO FALERIO BODIN has bin long since beaten for this like Stockfish and yet our Author will be serving it up for a Courtly dish BOCCONI would have kill'd the Duke but was hang'd before he could do it FELTON kill'd a Duke that had greater power here than the other in Venice and was hang'd afterwards therfore England was a seditious Government for this must either be undeniable for FELTON'S sake or why must the other be so for BOCCONI'S Again FALERIO and his Complices would have destroy'd the Great Council but were hang'd before they could do
it VAUX and his Accomplices would have blown up the Parlament but were hang'd before they could do it therfore England was in this relation a seditious Government else why was Venice There passes not a month but there dy Rogues at Tyburn is the Government therfore seditious or is this one regard in which it is not Where all that so invade the Government are by virtue of the same brought to that end there the Commonwealth or the Orders of it are not the cause but the cure of Sedition and so these are undeniable Arguments that Venice is not seditious where since the Reformation there has not bin a cut finger upon this score save only thro the conspiracy of BAIAMONTE which indeed came to blows Nor for this yet can Venice be call'd a seditious Common-wealth You find no man accusing Rome of Sedition in that she had a MANLIUS or a MELIUS that dangerously affected Monarchy because to these her Orders by which they suffer'd Death as soon apply'd the Remedy But Rome was a seditious Commonwealth because the perpetual feud that was between the Senat and the People sprung out of her Orders and was that to which there was no Remedy to apply England was not a seditious Government because it had a VAUX or a FELTON but because the Power antiently of the Nobility and late of the People was such by the Orders of the same as might at any time occasion Civil War Put the case a Slave or som desperat fellow has kill'd the Great Turc the Government for that cannot be said to be seditious but in this that thro the very nature of the Policy the Janizarys at any time may do as much it is undeniably seditious BAIAMONTE'S Conspiracy he will not say was of this nature It was not a Disease in the Bones of the Commonwealth but a thing that no sooner appear'd or broke out tho it be true there happen'd a little scratching first than it fell off like a Scab such an accident may besal the best Constitution and Venice never had the like but once if he could say as much of a Monarchy he gains no advantage yet let him say it and prove it I give him all I omit many Falshoods and Absurditys in the proceding of the Prevaricator as where he intimats the Power of the Dukes to have bin that wherby Venice gain'd I know not what and yet to have Book I bin that also by which FALERIO had like to have spoil'd all each of which the Duke of Venice having no power at all is known to be false Why should I stay to put you in mind that having affirm'd Venice to derive her Immunity from intestin Discord no otherwise than a Ship that is ready to be boarded by Pirats he instances in such examples to the contrary as took occasion by the hair of a soren scalp while in those of BOCCONI and TIEPOLO the Common-wealth by her Wars with the Genoeses and Ferrara was put to her plunges and in that of FALERIO reduc'd to the last extremity I shall only note that if such sudden flashes as these may com under the name of Sedition he has don a fine Office for Monarchy seeing no Senat is so much expos'd to like blows as any Prince WELL but for all this it is confest that there may be such a thing as a seditious Commonwealth in that the feud between the Senat and Consid p. 48. the People of Rome could not be cur'd What Security says he will you give us that the like may not happen in Oceana or that the whole body of the People being intrusted with giving a Vote and keeping a Sword may not by way of Counsil or Arms fall to such work as levelling the five thousand or bringing the Agrarian from two to one thousand pounds a year or less as they fancy TO which I answer by a like question What security will he give me that the People of any Commonwealth shall not cast themselves into the Sea A Prince may be mad and do so but the People are naturally incapable of such madness If men will boast of their knowlege in Principles and yet talk of nothing but effects why may not a Man fly as well as a Bird but if Causes may be regarded let him once shew how the Will seeing it is not free nor mov'd without som Object should move the People in such a manner or for what they having all the Liberty and all the Power that can be had should it strive Well that is soon don for the Land may com into the hands of five thousand and so the Booty may be great and the resistance small Good The Romans being the wisest of all People went no further towards the Remedy of their Grievances than to strive for the introduction of an Agrarian in which they fainted too even to the destruction of that Government Except these none have bin so wise and if there be any such thing familiar with the nature of the People why appear'd it but once and then vanish'd without effect why did not the People for example under the late Monarchy when the Dominion or Freehold of the Nation by greater shares was in a smaller Party and they had not only Riches but Liberty and Power too to whet them on ever so much as think of levelling three hundred Men for the Nobility and Clergy in whom was the Balance were no more If it be reply'd that the People were not arm'd by whom did the Barons make War with the Kings If they were not trusted with a Vote what was that of the House of Commons Let Dominion or Freehold stand upon what balance you will inequal or equal from the beginning of the world you shall never find a People turning Levellers And as Reason is Experience in the root so Experience is Reason in the branch which might therfore be sufficient in the case Nevertheless for clearer satisfaction in a point of such concernment I shall indeavor to dig up and discover the root of this branch or the reason of this Experience That which in Beasts is Instinct wherof they can give no account is in it self that Wisdom of God wherby he provides for them so it is with the People they are not Chap. 8 Levellers nor know they why and yet it is because to be Levellers were to destroy themselves For seeing I must repeat to repeat briefly There is no Territory of any Extent and Populousness where the Revenue of Industry is not twice as much as the dry Rent This has bin demonstrated in Oceana The Revenue of Industry is in those that work that is the People Wherfore the Revenue of the People where their Industry is not obstructed is twofold to that of the Nobility holding the whole Territory in Freehold But where their Industry is obstructed their Revenue is nothing Civil War being of all other the greatest Obstruction of Industry the People in taking Arms must venture all they
farthest way about as I think the nearest way home Arms are of two sorts Proper or Improper that is Native or Foren PROPER and Native Arms are according to the triple nature of Government of three kinds Servants in Arms as the Helots in Lacedemon the Timariots and Janizarys in Turky Subjects in Arms as the Horse in France and the Seaguards or Forces in Venice or Citizens in Arms as those upon the Lexiarcha in Athens of the Morae in Lacedemon and the Legions in Rome IMPROPER or Foren Arms are of two sorts Auxiliarys and Mercenarys AUXILIARYS are such as are supply'd by virtue of som League as were those of the Latins and Italians to the Romans and those of the Cantons of Swiss except Zuric to the King of France or they may be such as are occasionally lent freely or let forth for Mony by one State to another the latter wherof differ not much from Mercenarys MERCENARYS are Soldiers of Fortune that have no other Trade than their Arms and let out themselves for Mony of such consisted the greatest part of the Carthaginian Strength such is the Land Force of Venice and notwithstanding the antient League of France with those Nations such at this day are the Swiss and Scotish Guards and somtimes a good part of the Foot in France MACCHIAVEL discourses upon these Particulars in his Art of War to admiration by whom I shall therfore steer WHERE the Arms in bulk are proper and consisting of Citizens they have other Trades and therfore are no Soldiers of Fortune and yet because the Commonwealth has Arms for her Trade in regard she is a Magistrat given for the good of Mankind and bears not her Sword in vain they are all educated as well in Military as Civil Disciplin taking their turns in service of either nature according to the occasion and the Orders of the Commonwealth as in Israel Athens Lacedemon and Rome which had if their Territorys permitted and somtimes as I may say whether their Territorys permitted or no as in Israel the vastest the highest temper'd and the best disciplin'd Militia that is to be found in the whole compass of Story Som Armys of Israel have consisted of three or four hundred thousand men Rome upon the rumor of a Gallic Tumult arm'd in Italy only without Plin. L. Aemilio Papo C. Atilio Regulo Coss. foren Aid seventy thousand Horse and seven hundred thousand Foot Book I things in our days when the Turk can hardly arm half so many not to be credited HENCE that a Commonwealth which had not first broken her self or bin broken by som other Commonwealth should not be found to have bin conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch is not miraculous but a natural effect of an apparent Cause In this place or upon this Text Divines whom I would desire not to be Enemys of popular Power but to give MACCHIAVEL his due shall if they please hear him make a Arte della Guer. Proem goodly Sermon in these words If antient Commonwealths and Governments us'd Diligence in any other Order to make their People lovers of Peace faithful to their Country and to have the fear of God before their eys they doubl'd it in this of their Militia for of whom should your Country expect greater Faith than of such as have offer'd themselves to dy for her Whom should she indeavor to make greater Lovers of Peace than them who only can inslave her by force In whom should there be greater Fear of God than in such as carry their Lives in their hands This when Lawgivers and Captains rightly cinsider'd was the cause why Soldiers were esteem'd honor'd follow'd and imitated above all men in the World wheras since such Orders are broken and Custom is altogether deviated from the course of antient Prudence men are com to detest the Iniquity of the Camp and fly the Conversation of such as are in Arms as the Pestilence Where the Arms in bulk are proper but consist of Subjects they are the best next and but the best next as appears by all Examples antient and modern The Arms with which PYRRHUS Prince of Epyrus invaded the Romans were of Subjects yet that Prince tho he was not vanquish'd by the Romans confest their advantage and gave them over The Spaniard being a far more potent King than was PYRRHUS has acknowleg'd as much to the Hollanders tho a far less Commonwealth than Rome So have the Princes of Austria and of Burgundy to the Switzers That the Arms of Subjects are nevertheless as much superior to the Arms of Servants as inferior to the Arms of Citizens is as plain seeing as ALEXANDER with thirty thousand Subjects vanquish'd DARIUS having innumerable Slaves so thirty thousand Christians are at this day a match for any Army of Turks and we see Venice whose Force by Sea consists of Subjects to have made him quit that Element near as fully to her Dominion or Empire as did the Persian to Athens TO Arms that are proper but consist of Servants all the preeminence that can be given is that they are better than foren Arms a proof wherof we have in those of SELIMUS wherby he conquer'd the Mamalucs who being but a foren Force that held Egypt in subjection the Country was irrecoverably lost and for the reasons already shewn as easily kept IMPROPER Arms whether Auxiliary or Mercenary where the Force of a Prince or of a Commonwealth consists for the bulk or greater part of no other are the least effectual and the most dangerous of all For Auxiliarys or what effect has bin found of them by Princes or Commonwealths it was seen in France during the League by the Spaniard and in Holland during the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH by the English but especially in the Goths and Vandals who having bin Auxiliarys or Mercenarys rely'd upon by the later Emperors came therby to ruin the Roman Empire MERCENARYS who make their Arms their Trade must of Chap. 9 all others be the most pernicious for what can we expect less of such whose Art is not otherwise so profitable than that they should as MACCHIAVEL shews be breakers of their Faith given up to Rapin Enemys of Peace and Government TO instance in som Commonwealths that of Carthage after her first War with the Romans fell thro the Rebellion of SPENDIUS and MATHO Ringleaders of her Mercenarys into another that was far more dangerous Of such a Dilemma were the Arms of this State that if HANNIBAL had conquer'd Rome he must have bin King of Carthage and not conquering Rome Carthage was ruin'd The Commonwealth of Milan trusting her self to F. SFORZA and his Mercenarys became the Subject of her Servant and he her Duke Nor is Venice whose Land-Forces are of the same kind otherwise in safety as to these than by her Situation To give som instances of the same nature in Princes The Father of F. SFORZA being Captain of a like mercenary Army forc'd JOAN Queen of Naples whom
highest Mystery of Popular Government and indeed the supreme Law wherin is contain'd not only the Liberty but the Safety of the People FOR the remainder of the Civil part of this Model which is now but small it is farther propos'd Rule for Vacations THAT every Magistracy Office or Election throout this whole Commonwealth whether annual or triennial be understood of consequeuce to injoin an interval or vacation equal to the term of the same That the Magistracy of a Knight and of a Burgess be in this relation understood as one and the same and that this Order regard only such Elections as are National or Domestic and not such as are Provincial or Foren Exception from the Rule THAT for an exception from this Rule where there is but one Elder of the Horse in one and the same Parish that Elder be eligible in the same without interval and where there be above four Elders of the Horse in one and the same Parish there be not above half nor under two of them eligible at the same Election OTHERWISE the People beyond all manner of doubt would elect so many of the better sort at the very first that there would not be of the Foot or of the meaner sort enough to supply the due number of the Popular Assembly or Prerogative Tribe and the better sort being excluded subsequent Elections by their intervals there would not be wherwithal to furnish the Senat the Horse of the Prerogative Tribe and the rest of the Magistracys each of which Obstructions is prevented by this Exception Where by the way if in all experience such has bin the constant temper of the People and can indeed be reasonably no other it is apparent what cause there can be of doubt who in a Commonwealth of this nature must have the leading Yet is no man excluded from any Preferment only Industry which ought naturally to be the first step is first injoin'd by this Policy but rewarded amply seeing he who has made himself worth one hundred Pounds a year has made himself capable of all Preferments and Honors in this Government Where a man from the lowest state may not rise to the due pitch of his unquestionable Merit the Commonwealth is not equal yet neither can the People under the Limitations propos'd make choice as som object of any other than Book III the better sort nor have they at any time bin so inclining to do where they have not bin under such Limitations Be it spoken not to the disparagement of any man but on the contrary to their praise whose Merit has made them great the People of England have not gon so low in the election of a House of Commons as som Prince has don in the election of a House of Lords To weigh Election by a Prince with Election by a People set the Nobility of Athens and Rome by the Nobility of the old Monarchy and a House of Commons freely chosen by the Nobility of the new There remains but the Quorum for which it is propos'd The Quorum THAT throout all the Assemblys and Councils of this Commonwealth the Quorum consist of one half in the time of Health and of one third part in a time of Sickness being so declar'd by the Senat. HOW the City Government without any diminution of their Privileges and with an improvement of their Policy may be made to fall in with these Orders has * In Oceana elswhere bin shewn in part and may be consider'd farther at leisure Otherwise the whole Commonwealth so far as it is merely Civil is in this part accomplish'd Now as of necessity there must be a natural Man or a Man indu'd with a natural Body before there can be a spiritual Man or a Man capable of Divine Contemplation so a Government must have a Civil before it can have a Religious part And if a man furnisht only with natural parts can never be so stupid as not to make som Reflections upon Religion much less a Commonwealth which necessitats the Religious part of this Model CHAP. II. Containing the Religious Part of this Model propos'd practicably THERE is nothing more certain or demonstrable to common Sense than that the far greater part of Mankind in matters of Religion give themselves up to the public Leading Now a National Religion rightly establish'd or not coercive is not any public driving but only the public leading If the Public in this case may not lead such as desire to be led by the Public and yet a Party may lead such as desire to be led by a Party where would be the Liberty of Conscience as to the State Which certainly in a well order'd Commonwealth being the public Reason must be the public Conscience Nay where would be the Liberty of Conscience in respect of any Party which should so procede as to shew that without taking their Liberty of Conscience from others they cannot have it themselves If the Public refusing Liberty of Conscience to a Party would be the cause of Tumult how much more a Party refusing it to the Public And how in case of such a Tumult should a Party defend their Liberty of Conscience or indeed their Throats from the whole or a far greater Party without keeping down or tyrannizing over the whole or a far greater Party by force of Arms These things being rightly consider'd it is no wonder that Men living like men have not bin yet found without a Government or that any Government has not bin yet found without a National Religion that is som orderly and known way of public Chap. 2 leading in divine things or in the Worship of God A NATIONAL Religion being thus prov'd necessary it remains that I prove what is necessary to the same that is as it concerns the State or in relation to the Duty of the Magistrat CERTAIN it is that Religion has not seen corruption but by one of these three causes som Interest therwith incorporated som ignorance of the truth of it or by som complication of both Nor was ever Religion left wholly to the management of a Clergy that escap'd these Causes or their most pernicious Effects as may be perceiv'd in Rome which has brought Ignorance to be the Mother of Devotion and indeed Interest to be the Father of Religion Now the Clergy not failing in this case to be dangerous what recourse but to the Magistrat for safety specially seeing these Causes that is Interest and Ignorance the one proceding from evil Laws the other from the want of good Education are not in the right or power of a Clergy but only of the Civil Magistracy Or if so it be that Magistrats are oblig'd in duty to be nursing Fathers and nursing Mothers to the Church Isa 49. 23. how shall a State in the sight of God be excusable that takes no heed or care lest Religion suffer by Causes the prevention or remedy wherof is in them only To these therfore it
interest to break but to preserve the Orders which therfore no other can have the power or strength to break or som other breaking must but lose that which they pretend to gain to wit the Right which in this case must still fall to the Might devolving upon the People That Mr. WREN will needs fancy the Tribes or Citys in Oceana as those in W. p. 87. the united Provinces or the Cantons of Switzerland to be distinct Soveraintys concerns not me seeing the form of Oceana is far otherwise nor indeed him seeing neither do the Citys in Holland nor the Cantons in Switzerland go about to dissolve their Commonwealths or Leagues The Champion having thus fail'd at the head is contented to play low Tho there be care taken says he that at the Assembly of the Hundred W. p. 181. and the Tribe such and such Magistrats should be elected out of the Horse there is no necessary provision there should be any Horse there out of which to elect And where can they be then if not in som Parish He might better have said that at the Parish there was no care taken that the People should not elect too many of the Horse which being indeed the defect of the former is in this Edition rectify'd His last See Proposition 44. W. p. 183. exception is against the place where I say that They who take upon them the profession of Theology Physic or Law are not at leisure for the Essays wherby the Youth commence for all Magistracys and Honors in the Commonwealth To which reason he offers not so much as any Answer nor pretends any other Argument against it than that this excludes Divines Lawyers and Physicians from those Honors to which their Parish Clerks their Scriveners and their Apothecarys nay Farriers and Coblers may attain And what can I help that if it ought nevertheless so to be for a reason which he cannot answer Nay if so it be in common practice where the reason is nothing near so strong seeing a Parish Clerk a Scrivener an Apothecary nay a Cobler or a Farrier is not uncapable of being of the Common Council nor yet of being an Alderman or Lord Mayor of London which nevertheless that a Divine a Lawyer or a Physician should be were absurd to think Divines have a Plow from which they ought not to look back they have above a tenth of the Territory with which they ought to be contented and more than all Civil Interest contracted by a Clergy corrupts Religion For Lawyers their Practice and Magistracys are not only the most gainful but for life and in a Common-wealth neither is accumulation of Magistracy just or equal nor the confounding of Executive and Legislative Magistracy safe Will Mr. WREN believe one of our own Lawyers and one of the learnedst of them upon this point It is the Lord VERULAM They says he Verulam de Aug. Scien lib. 8. cap. 3. who have written de legibus of Lawmaking have handl'd this Argument as Philosophers or as Lawyers Philosophers speak higher than will fall into the capacity of practice to which may be refer'd PLATO'S Commonwealth Sir THOMAS MORE' 's Vtopia with his own Atlantis and Lawyers being obnoxious and addicted each to the Laws of their particular Country have no freedom nor sincerity of Judgment but plead as it were in bonds Certainly the cognizance of these things is most properly pertaining to political Persons who best know what stands with human Society what with the safety of the People what with natural Equity with antient Prudence and with the different Constitution of Common-wealths These therfore by the Principles and Precepts of natural Equity and good Policy may and ought to determin of Laws For Physicians who as such have in the management of State Affairs no prejudice if you open them the door they will not at all or very rarely com in wherby it appears First that such a bar may in som cases be no violation of Liberty and secondly that the Divines who for better causes might be as well satisfy'd and for more unanswerable Reasons ought to forbear yet are impatient and give a full testimony that their meaning is not good THUS is the Commonwealth by Mr. WREN oppos'd by him asserted There remains no more to the full confutation of his Book than to shew how the Monarchy by him asserted is by him destroy'd This is to be don by the examination of his ninth Chapter which is the next of those to which he refer'd us Sect. 3 THE opposition made by Mr. WREN to a Commonwealth That Mr. Wren's Assertion of Monarchy amounts to the Subversion of it and his pretended asserting of Monarchy run altogether upon Mr. HOBS'S Principles and in his very words but for want of understanding much enervated so that Mr. WREN'S whole â—eat of Arms coms but to have given me a weaker Adversary for a stronger In Soverainty says he the diffus'd strength of the Multitude is united W. p. 97. in one person which in a Monarchy is a natural person in a State an artificial one procreated by the majority of Votes This then is the grand W. p. 99. security of all Soverains whether single Persons or Assemblys that the united Forces of their Subjects with which they are invested is sufficient to suppress the beginnings of Seditions Who reads Mr. HOBS if this be news But what provision is made by either of these Authors that the Forces of the Subject must needs be united Is Union in Forces or in Government an Effect wherof there is no Cause Or to what cause are we to attribute this certain Union and grand Security Why let W. p. 103. there be such a Nobility as may be a Monarch's Guard against the People And lest a Monarch stand in need of another Guard against this Nobility let none of these excel the resâ— of his Order in power or dignity Which Effects or Ends thuâ— commanded â—ouchsafe not to acquaint us with Ibid. their ways Yâ—s let the Nobility hâ—â—e no right to assemble themselves for electing a Succâ—ssor to the Monarchy or for making of War or Peace or for nominating the great Ministers of State or for performing any other Act which by the nature of it is inseparable from the Soverain Power But why then must such a Nobility be a guard against the People and not rather a guard for the People seeing both their Interests and Sufferings at this rate are the same and include those very causes for which in the Barons War the Nobility became Incendiarys and Leaders of the People of England against their Kings and so those wherby their Captain came to excel the rest of his order in power or dignity But for this W. p. 105. the Prince is to be provided by having always in pay a sufficient Militia and som places of strength where a few may be secure against a number For places of Strength Citadels or Castles
the Minister of State takes his pastime 16. THE Complaint that the Wisdom of all these latter times in Princes Affairs consists rather in fine deliverys and shiftings of Dangers or Mischiefs when they are near than in solid and grounded courses to keep them off is a Complaint in the Streets of Aristocratical Monarchy and not to be remedy'd because the Nobility being not broken Chap. X the King is in danger and the Nobility being broken the Monarchy is ruin'd 17. AN Absurdity in the form of the Government as that in a Monarchy there may be two Monarchs shoots out into a mischief in the Administration or som wickedness in the Reason of State as in ROMULUS'S killing of REMUS and the monstrous Associations of the Roman Emperors 18. USURPATION of Government is a Surfeit that converts the best Arts into the worst Nemo unquam imperium flagitio acquisitum bonis artibus exercuit 19. AS in the privation of Virtue and in Beggery men are Sharks or Robbers and the reason of their way of living is quite contrary to those of Thrift so in the privation of Government as in Anarchy Oligarchy or Tyranny that which is Reason of State with them is directly opposit to that which is truly so whence are all those black Maxims set down by som Politicians particularly MACCHIAVEL in his Prince and which are condemn'd to the fire even by them who if they liv'd otherwise might blow their fingers 20. WHERE the Government from a true Foundation rises up into proper Superstructures or Form the Reason of State is right and streight but give our Politician peace when you please if your House stands awry your Props do not stand upright 21. TAKE a Jugler and commend his Tricks never so much yet if in so doing you shew his Tricks you spoil him which has bin and is to be confess'd of MACCHIAVEL 22. CORRUPTION in Government is to be read and consider'd in MACCHIAVEL as Diseases in a man's Body are to be read and consider'd in HIPPOCRATES 23. NEITHER HIPPOCRATES nor MACCHIAVEL introduc'd Diseases into man's Body nor Corruption into Government which were before their times and seeing they do but discover them it must be confest that so much as they have don tends not to the increase but the cure of them which is the truth of these two Authors POLITICAL APHORISMS Obsequium amicos veritas odium parit Terent. 1. THE Errors and Sufferings of the People are from their Governors 2. WHEN the Foundation of a Government coms to be chang'd and the Governors change not the Superstructures accordingly the People becom miserable 3. THE Monarchy of England was not a Government by Arms but a Government by Laws tho imperfect or ineffectual Laws 4. THE later Governments in England since the death of the King have bin Governments by Arms. 5. THE People cannot see but they can feel 6. THE People having felt the difference between a Government by Laws and a Government by Arms will always desire the Government by Laws and abhor that of Arms. 7. WHERE the Spirit of the People is impatient of a Government by Arms and desirous of a Government by Laws there the spirit of the People is not unfit to be trusted with their Liberty 8. THE spirit of the People of England not trusted with their Liberty drives at the restitution of Monarchy by Blood and Violence 9. THE Spirit of the People of England trusted with their Liberty if the Form be sufficient can never set up a King and if the Form be insufficient as a Parlament with a Council in the intervals or two Assemblys coordinat will set up a King without Blood or Violence 10. TO light upon a good Man may be in Chance but to be sure of an Assembly of good Men is not in Prudence 11. WHERE the Security is no more than personal there may be a good Monarch but can be no good Commonwealth 12. THE necessary Action or Use of each thing is from the nature of the Form 13. WHERE the Security is in the Persons the Government makes good men evil where the Security is in the Form the Government makes evil men good 14. ASSEMBLYS legitimatly elected by the People are that only Party which can govern without an Army 15. NOT the Party which cannot govern without an Army but the Party which can govern without an Army is the refin'd Party as to this intent and purpose truly refin'd that is by Popular Election according to the Precept of MOSES and the Rule of Scripture Take ye wise men and understanding and known among your Tribes and I will make them Rulers over you 16. THE People are deceiv'd by Names but not by Things 17. WHERE there is a well order'd Commonwealth the People are generally satisfy'd 18. WHERE the People are generally dissatisfy'd there is no Commonwealth 19. THE Partys in England declaring for a Commonwealth hold every one of them somthing that is inconsistent with a Common-wealth 20. TO hold that the Government may be manag'd by a few or by a Party is inconsistent with a Commonwealth except in a Situation like that of Venice 21. TO hold that there can be any National Religion or Ministry without public Indowment and Inspection of the Magistracy or any Government without a National Religion or Ministry is inconsistent with a Commonwealth 22. TO hold that there may be Liberty and not Liberty of Conscience is inconsistent with a Commonwealth that has the Liberty of her own Conscience or that is not Popish 23. WHERE Civil Liberty is intire it includes Liberty of Conscience 24. WHERE Liberty of Conscience is intire it includes Civil Liberty 25. EITHER Liberty of Conscience can have no security at all or under Popular Government it must have the greatest security 26. TO hold that a Government may be introduc'd by a little at once is to wave Prudence and commit things to Chance 27. TO hold that the Wisdom of God in the formation of a House or of a Government gos not universally upon natural Principles is inconsistent with Scripture 28. TO hold that the Wisdom of Man in the formation of a House or of a Government may go upon supernatural Principles is inconsistent with a Commonwealth and as if one should say God ordain'd the Temple therfore it was not built by Masons he ordain'd the Snuffers therfore they were not made by a Smith 29. TO hold that Hirelings as they are term'd by som or an indow'd Ministry ought to be remov'd out of the Church is inconsistent with a Commonwealth 30. NATURE is of GOD. 31. SOM part in every Religion is natural 32. A UNIVERSAL Effect demonstrats a universal Cause 33. A UNIVERSAL Cause is not so much natural as it is Nature it self 34. EVERY man either to his terror or consolation has som sense of Religion 35. MAN may rather be defin'd a religious than a rational Creature in regard that in other Creatures there may be somthing of Reason but there
to support Monarchy tell us not what kind of Monarchy it is and consequently gain nothing tho we should grant them the former Proposition to be true For what dos it avail to tell me of the Title of such a Prince if I know not by what Title he holds Grant it were visible to me that such a Man was mark'd out by Providence to be my Governor yet if I cannot tell what kind of one whether absolute mixt limited merely executive or only first in order how shall I know to direct my Obedience If he be absolute my very natural Liberty is taken away from me nor do I know any Power that can make any Man such the Scripture setting just limitations and restrictions to all Governors If mixt and limited I must know the due Temper and Bounds wherby he is to rule or else he may usurp or be mistaken and I opprest or injur'd If executive the Power fundamentally resides not in him but in the Great Council or them intrusted by the People then I adore only a Shadow Now if any Prince of Europe can really clear up these Mists and shew the Lines of his Government drawn fairly and his Charter whole and authentic like that of Venice and antient Rome for my part I 'll be the first man shall swear him Allegiance and the last that will preserve him But you will find that they will tell you in general about their Office and in particular of their Claims of Succession Inheritance and Ancestors when look but three or four Storys back and you will meet either som savage unnatural Intrusion disguiz'd under som forc'd Title or chimerical Cognation or else som violent Alteration or possibly som slender Oath or Articles hardly extorted and imperfectly kept Now if any man that will but run over these Rules and apply them to any History whatever as we shall exemplify in that of Scotland upon which for the present we have pitcht and not find most Titles ambiguous the Effects of former Monarchys for where in a Catalogue of forty Kings can you almost shew me three good ones but things merely strugling to maintain their Titles and domestic Interest ruinous to the People who for the most part consider them no otherwise than as to be rescu'd from violent Confusion not as they conduce to the positive Happiness of a civil Life I say all this will be found to be true or my small Conversation in Books is extremely false And truly I conceive reading of History to be the most rational Course to set any Judgment right because it instructs by Experience and Effects and grounds the Judgment upon material Observations and not blindly gropes after Notions and Causes which to him are tantum non inscrutabile but of that anon A main Mistake under this Topic has bin an erroneous comparison and application of matters Civil and Military for Men observing that mixt Councils about Generals Plurality Equality of Commands frequent and sudden Military Alterations have brought no small Distempers and Dangers to several Governments and Attemts therefore they presently conclude that in Civils also it is the safest to continue a Command in one hand for preventing the like Disturbances But here they are deceiv'd Civil matters consist in long debate great consideration patient expectation and wary foresight which is better to be found in a number of choice experienc'd Heads than in one single Person whose Youth and Vigor of Spirit inables him rather to Action and fills him with that noble Temerity which is commonly so happy in Martial Affairs that must be guided always to improve Occasions which are seldom to be found again and which mistaken are to be scarcely amended Besides the Ferocity of daring Spirits can hardly be bounded while they stand level so that it is no wonder if they extinguish all Emulations by putting the Power into the hands of one wheras in a Commonwealth it is quite otherwise and Factions unless they be cruelly exorbitant do but poise and balance one another and many times like the discord of Humors upon the natural Body produce real good to the Government That slender conceit that Nature seems to dress out a Principality in most of her works as among Birds Bees c. is so slender indeed in regard they are no more Chiefs than what they fancy them but all their Prepotency is merely predatory or oppressive and even Lions Elephants Crocodils and Eagles have small inconsiderable Enemys of which they stand in fear and by which they are often ruin'd that the Recital confutes it and if it were so yet unless they could prove their One Man to be as much more excellent than the rest as those are and that solely too I see not what it would advantage them since to comply with the design of Nature in one they would contradict it in others where she is equally concern'd But these Philological and Rhetorical Arguments have not a little hinder'd the severer Disquisition of Reason and prepossess'd the more easy Minds with Notions so much harder to be laid aside as they are more erroneous and pleasing THESE are the fundamental Errors that have misled the Judgment now those which have misguided the Conscience have principally proceded from the Misinterpretation of Scripture and therfore seeming Sacred have bin less examin'd and doubted as carrying the most Authority Thus in the Old Testament there being such frequent mention of Kings which notwithstanding were given in Wrath they superstitiously maintain not only the necessity but even the impunity of Kings wheras we know not their Powers and Limitations and it is inconsequent to argue That because Judea was so govern'd we should follow the same Pattern when we find neither Precept Consequence nor Necessity convincing us And it is madness to think that while the Divine Spirit so freely and vehemently exclaims against the Iniquity of men God would authorize it so far as to leave it in them only unpunishable who should exterminat and reform it As for the Antiquity from ADAM it is true before his Fall his Dominion was large and wide but it was over the Beasts that after his Fall learn'd to rebel against him and oeconomically not despotically over his Wife and Children But what is this to Civil Government In the New Testament for I the briesâ—ier pass over this head in regard it has bin so copiously treated upon by those under whose Profession it falls and that it dos not immediatly conduce to my Design the principal Argument has bin the meekness of CHRIST and his compliance with Civil Powers which certainly if he had bin dispos'd to have resisted say they he could as easily have overthrown as with a few Cords whip the Buyers and Sellers out of the Temple But he that was the Wisdom of his Father rather thought fit to build up his Kingdom which is not earthly nor known of earthly men in Meekness and Obedience to Civil Powers which are perpetually chang'd and hurry'd
the removal of this evil from under the Sun this evil against which no Government that is not secur'd can be good this evil from which the Government that is secure must be perfect SOLOMON tels us that the cause of it is from the Ruler from those principles of power which balanc'd upon earthly trash exclude the heavenly treasures of Virtue and that influence of it upon Government which is Authority We have wander'd the Earth to find out the balance of power but to find out that of Authority we must ascend as I said nearer Heaven or to the Image of God which is the Soul of Man THE Soul of Man whose life or motion is perpetual Contemplation or Thought is the Mistress of two potent Rivals the one Reason the other Passion that are in continual suit and according as she gives up her will to these or either of them is the felicity or misery which Man partakes in this mortal life FOR as whatever was Passion in the contemplation of a man being brought forth by his will into action is Vice and the bondage of Sin so whatever was Reason in the contemplation of a man being brought forth by his will into action is virtue and the freedom of Soul AGAIN as those actions of a man that were Sin acquire to himself Repentance or Shame and affect others with Scorn or Pity so those actions of a man that are Virtue acquire to himself Honor and upon others Authority NOW Government is no other than the Soul of a Nation or City wherfore that which was Reason in the debate of a Commonwealth being brought forth by the result must be Virtue and forasmuch as the Soul of a City or Nation is the Soverain Power her Virtue must be Law But the Government whose Law is Virtue and whose Virtue is Law is the same whose Empire is Authority and whose Authority is Empire AGAIN If the Liberty of a man consists in the Empire of his Reason the absence wherof would betray him to the bondage of his Passions then the Liberty of a Commonwealth consists in the Empire of her Laws the absence wherof would betray her to the Lust of Tyrants And these I conceive to be the Principles upon which ARISTOTLE and LIVY injuriously accus'd by LEVIATHAN for not writing out of nature have grounded their Assertion That a Commonwealth is an Empire of Laws and not of Men. But they must not â—arry it so For says he the Liberty wherof there is so frequent and Pag. 110. honorable mention in the Historys and Philosophy of the antient Greecs and Romans and the Writings and Discourses of those that from them have receiv'd all their Learning in the Politics is not the Liberty of particular Men but the Liberty of the Commonwealth He might as well have said that the Estates of particular Men in a Commonwealth are not the Riches of particular Men but the Riches of the Commonwealth for equality of Estates causes equality of Power and equality of Power is the Liberty not only of the Commonwealth but of every Man But sure a Man would never be thus irreverent with the greatest Authors and positive against all Antiquity without som certain demonstration of Truth and what is it Why there is written on the Turrets of the City of Lucca in great Characters at this day the word LIBERTAS yet no Man can thence infer that a particular Man has more Liberty or Immunity from the Service of the Commonwealth there than in Constantinople Whether a Commonwealth be Monarchical or Popular the Freedom is the same The Mountain has brought forth and we have a little Equivocation For to say that a Luchese has no more Liberty or Immunity from the Laws of Luca than a Turk has from those of Constantinople and to say that a Lucchese has no more Liberty or Immunity by the Laws of Lucca than a Turk has by those of Constantinople are pretty different Speeches The first may be said of all Governments alike the second scarce of any two much less of these seeing it is known that wheras the greatest Basha is a Tenant as well of his Head as of his Estate at the Will of his Lord the meanest Lucchese that has Land is a Freeholder of both and not to be control'd but by the Law and that fram'd by every privat Man to no other end or they may thank themselves than to protect the Liberty of every privat Man which by that means coms to be the Liberty of the Commonwealth BUT seeing they that make the Laws in Commonwealths are but Men the main Question seems to be how a Commonwealth coms to be an Empire of Laws and not of Men or how the Debate or Result of a Commonwealth is so sure to be according to Reason seeing they who debate and they who resolve be but Men And as often â—obs as Reason is against a Man so often will a Man be against Reason THIS is thought to be a shrewd saying but will do no harm for be it so that Reason is nothing but Interest there be divers Interests and so divers Reasons AS first there is privat Reason which is the Interest of a privat Man SECONDLY There is Reason of State which is the Interest or Error as was said by SOLOMON of the Ruler or Rulers that is to say of the Prince of the Nobility or of the People THIRDLY There is that Reason which is the Interest of Mankind Hooker B. 1. or of the whole Now if we see even in those natural Agents that want sense that as in themselves they have a Law which directs them in the means wherby they tend to their own perfection so likewise that another Law there is which touches them as they are sociable parts united into one Body a Law which binds them each to serve to others good and all to prefer the good of the whole before whatsoever their own particular as when stones or heavy things forsake their ordinary wont or center and fly upwards as if they heard themselves commanded to let go the good they privatly wish and to relieve the present distress of Nature in common There is a common Right Law of Nature or Interest of the whole which is more excellent and so acknowleg'd to be by the Agents Grot. themselves than the Right or Interest of the Parts only Wherfore tho it may be truly said that the Creatures are naturally carry'd forth to their proper utility or prosit that ought not to be taken in too general a sense seeing divers of them absâ—ain from their own prosit either in regard of those of the same kind or at least of their young MANKIND then must either be less just than the Creature or acknowlege also his common Interest to be common Right And if Reason be nothiâ—g else but Interest and the Interest oâ— Mankind be the right Interest then the Reason of Mankind must be right Reason Now compute well for if
Armys receive withal a pleasing Idea of all they have don besides and imagin their great prosperity not to have proceded from the emulation of particular Men but from the virtue of their popular form of Government not considering the frequent Seditions and Civil Wars produc'd by the imperfection of their Polity Where first the blame he lays to the Heathen Authors is in his sense laid to the Scripture and wheras he holds them to be young Men or Men of no antidot that are of like opinions it should seem that MACCHIAVEL the sole retriever of this antient Prudence is to his solid Reason a beardless Boy that has newly read LIVY And how solid his Reason is may appear where he grants the great prosperity of antient Commonwealths which is to give up the Controversy For such an effect must have som adequat cause which to evade he insinuats that it was nothing else but the emulation of particular Men as if so great an Emulation could have bin generated without as great Virtue so great Virtue without the best Education the best Education without the best Laws or the best Laws any otherwise than by the excellency of their Polity BUT if som of these Commonwealths as being less perfect in their Polity than others have bin more seditious it is not more an argument of the infirmity of this or that Commonwealth in particular than of the excellency of that kind of Polity in general which if they that have not altogether reach'd have nevertheless had greater prosperity what would befal them that should reach IN answer to which Question let me invite LEVIATHAN who of all other Governments gives the advantage to Monarchy for perfection to a better disquisition of it by these three assertions THE first That the perfection of Government lys upon such a libration in the frame of it that no Man or Men in or under it can have the interest or having the interest can have the power to disturb it with Sedition THE second That Monarchy reaching the perfection of the kind reaches not to the perfection of Government but must have som dangerous flaw in it THE third That popular Government reaching the perfection of the kind reaches the perfection of Government and has no flaw in it THE first assertion requires no proof FOR the proof of the second Monarchy as has bin shewn is of two kinds the one by Arms the other by a Nobility and there is no other kind in Art or Nature for if there have bin antiently som Governments call'd Kingdoms as one of the Goths in Spain and another of the Vandals in Africa where the King rul'd without a Nobility and by a Council of the People only it is expresly said by the Authors that mention them that the Kings were but the Captains and that the People not only gave them Laws but depos'd them as often as they pleas'd Nor is it possible in reason that it should be otherwise in like cases wherfore these were either no Monarchys or had greater slaws in them than any other BUT for a Monarchy by Arms as that of the Ture which of all models that ever were coms up to the perfection of the kind it is not in the wit or power of Man to cure it of this dangerous flaw That the Janizarys have frequent interest and perpetual power to raise Sedition and to tear the Magistrat even the Prince himself in pieces Therfore the Monarchy of Turky is no perfect Government AND for a Monarchy by a Nobility as of late in Oceana which of all other models before the declination of it came up to the perfection in that kind it was not in the power or wit of Man to cure it of that dangerous flaw That the Nobility had frequent interest and perpetual power by their Retainers and Tenants to raise Sedition and wheras the Janizarys occasion this kind of Calamity no sooner than they make an end of it to levy a lasting War to the vast effusion of Blood and that even upon occasions wherin the People but for their dependence upon their Lords had no concernment as in the feud of the Red and White The like has bin frequent in Spain France Germany and other Monarchys of this kind wherfore Monarchy by a Nobility is no perfect Government FOR the proof of the third assertion LEVIATHAN yields it to me that there is no other Commonwealth but Monarchical or Popular wherfore if no Monarchy be a perfect Government then either there is no perfect Government or it must be popular for which kind of Constitution I have somthing more to say than LEVIATHAN has said or ever will be able to say for Monarchy As FIRST That it is the Government that was never conquer'd by any Monarch from the beginning of the World to this day for if the Commonwealths of Greece came under the yoke of the Kings of Macedon they were first broken by themselves SECONDLY That it is the Government that has frequently led mighty Monarchs in Triumph THIRDLY That it is the Government which if it has bin seditious it has not bin so from any imperfection in the kind but in the particular Constitution which wherever the like has happen'd must have bin inequal FOURTHLY That it is the Government which if it has bin any thing near equal was never seditious or let him shew me what Sedition has happen'd in Lacedemon or Venice FIFTHLY That it is the Government which attaining to perfect equality has such a libration in the frame of it that no Man living can shew which way any Man or Men in or under it can contract any such Interest or Power as should be able to disturb the Commonwealth with Sedition wherfore an equal Commonwealth is that only which is without flaw and contains in it the full perfection of Government But to return BY what has bin shewn in Reason and Experience it may appear that tho Commonwealths in general be Governments of the Senat proposing the People resolving and the Magistracy executing yet som are not so good at these Orders as others thro som impediment or defect in the frame balance or capacity of them according to which they are of divers kinds Division of Common-wealths THE first division of them is into such as are single as Israel Athens Lacedemon c. and such as are by Leagues as those of the Acheans Etolians Lyceans Switz and Hollanders THE second being MACCHIAVEL'S is into such as are for preservation as Lacedemon and Venice and such as are for increase as Athens and Rome in which I can see no more than that the former takes in no more Citizens than are necessary for defence and the latter so many as are capable of increase THE third division unseen hitherto is into equal and inequal and this is the main point especially as to domestic Peace and Tranquillity for to make a Commonwealth inequal is to divide it into partys which sets them at perpetual variance
of XENOPHON they kill'd more men in eight months than the Lacedemonians had don in ten years oppressing the People to use Sir WALTER RALEIGH'S words with all base and intolerable Slavery THE usurp'd Government of the Decemvirs in Rome was of the same kind Wherfore in the fear of God let Christian Legislators setting the Pattern given in the Mount on the one side and these execrable Examples on the other know the right hand from the left and so much the rather because those things which do not conduce to the good of the Govern'd are fallacious if they appear to be good for the Governors God in chastising a People is accustom'd to burn his Rod. The Empire of these Oligarchys was not so violent as short nor did they fall upon the People but in their own immediat ruin A Council without a Balance is not a Commonwealth but an Oligarchy and every Oligarchy except it be put to the defence of its Wickedness or Power against som outward danger is factious Wherfore the Errors of the People being from their Governors which Maxim in the Politics bearing a sufficient testimony to it self is also prov'd by MACCHIAVEL if the People of Oceana have bin factious the Cause is apparent But what Remedy The General IN answer to this Question I com now to the Army of which the most victorious Captain and incomparable Patriot OLPHAUS MEGALETOR was now General who being a much greater master of that Art wherof I have made a rough draught in these Preliminarys had such sad reflections upon the ways and procedings of the Parlament as cast him upon Books and all other means of diversion among which he happen'd on this place of MACCHIAVEL Thrice happy is that People which chances to have a Man able to give them such a Government at once as without alteration may secure them of their Libertys seeing it is certain that Lacedemon in observing the Laws of LYCURGUS continu'd about eight hundred years without any dangerous Tumult or Corruption My Lord General as it is said of THEMISTOCLES that he could not sleep for the Glory obtain'd by MILTIADES at the Battel of Maratho took so new and deep an Impression at these words of the much greater Glory of LYCURGUS that being on this side assaulted with the emulation of his illustrious Object and on the other with the Misery of the Nation which seem'd as it were ruin'd by his Victory to cast it self at his feet he was almost wholly depriv'd of his natural rest till the debate he had within himself came to a firm resolution that the greatest Advantages of a Commonwealth are first that the Legislator should be one Man And secondly that the Government should be made altogether or at once For the first It is certain says Des B. 1. c. 9. MACCHIAVEL that a Commonwealth is seldom or never well turn'd or constituted except it has bin the Work of one Man for which That a Legislator is to bâ— one cause a wise Legislator and one whose mind is firmly set not upon privat but the public Interest not upon his Posterity but upon his Country may justly endeavor to get the soverain Power into his own hands nor shall any man that is Master of Reason blame such extraordinary means as in that case will be necessary the end proving no other than the Constitution of a well-order'd Commonwealth The reason of this is demonstrable for the ordinary means not failing the Commonwealth has no need of a Legislator but the ordinary means failing there is no recourse to be had but to such as are extraordinary And wheras a Book or a Building has not bin known to attain to its perfection if it has not had a sole Author or Architect a Common-wealth That a Commonwealth is to be made at once as to the Fabric of it is of the like nature And thus it may be made at once in which there be great advantages for a Commonwealth made at once takes Security at the same time it lends its Mony and trusts not it self to the Faith of Men but lanches immediatly forth into the Empire of Laws and being set streight brings the Manners of its Citizens to its rule whence follow'd that uprightness which was in Lacedemon But Manners that are rooted in men bow the tenderness of a Commonwealth coming up by twigs to their bent whence follow'd the obliquity that was in Rome and those perpetual Repairs by the Consuls Axes and Tribuns Hammers which could never finish that Commonwealth but in destruction MY Lord General being clear in these Points and of the necessity of som other course than would be thought upon by the Parlament appointed a meeting of the Army where he spoke his sense agreable to these Preliminarys with such success to the Soldiery that the Parlament was soon after depos'd and he himself in the great Hall of the Pantheon or Palace of Justice situated in Emporium the capital City was created by the universal Suffrage of the Army Lord ARCHON or sole Legislator of Oceana upon which Theatre you have to conclude this piece a Person introduc'd whose fame shall never draw its Curtain THE Lord ARCHON being created fifty select Persons to assist him by laboring in the Mines of antient Prudence and bringing its hidden Treasures to new light were added with the stile also of Legislators and sat as a Council wherof he was the sole Director and President The Council of Legislators OF this piece being the greater half of the whole work I shall be able at this time to give no farther account than very briefly to shew at what it aims MY Lord ARCHON in opening the Council of Legislators made it appear how unsafe a thing it is to follow Phansy in the Fabric of a Commonwealth and how necessary that the Archives of antient Prudence should be ransack'd before any Counsillor should presume to offer any other matter in order to the work in hand or towards the consideration to be had by the Council upon a Model of Government Wherfore he caus'd an Urn to be brought and every one of the Counsillors to draw a Lot By the Lots as they were drawn The Commonwealth of ISRAEL fell to PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE ATHENS NAVARCHUS DE PARALO LACEDEMON LACO DE SCYTALE CARTHAGE MAGO DE SYRTIBUS the ACHEANS AETOLIANS and LYCIANS ARATUS DE ISTHMO the SWITZ ALPESTER DE FULMINE HOLLAND and theVNITED PROVINCES GLAUCUS DE ULNA ROME DOLABELLA DE ENYO VENICE LYNCEUS DE STELLA THESE contain'd in them all those Excellencys wherof a Common-wealth is capable so that to have added more had bin to no purpose Upon time given to the Counsillors by their own Studys and those of their Friends to prepare themselves they were open'd in the Order and by the Persons mention'd at the Council of Legislators and afterwards by order of the same were repeated at the Council of the Prytans to the People for in drawing of the Lots there
the end they may be the better protected by the State in the free exercise of the same they are desir'd to make choice in such manner as they best like of certain Magistrats in every one of their Congregations which we could wish might be four in each of them to be Auditors in cases of differences or distast if any thro variety of opinions that may be grievous or injurious to them should fall out And such Auditors or Magistrats shall have power to examin the matter and inform themselves to the end that if they think it of sufficient weight they may acquaint the Phylarch with it or introduce it into the Council of Religion where all such Causes as those Magistrats introduce shall from time to time be heard and determin'd according to such Laws as are or shall hereafter be provided by the Parlament for the just defence of the Liberty of Conscience THIS Order consists of three parts the first restoring the power of Ordination to the People which that it originally belongs to them is clear tho not in English yet in Scripture where the Apostles ordain'd Acts 14. 23. Elders by the holding up of hands in every Congregation that is by the suffrage of the People which was also given in som of those Citys by the Ballot And tho it may be shewn that the Apostles ordain'd som by the laying on of hands it will not be shewn that they did so in every Congregation EXCOMMUNICATION as not clearly provable out of the Scripture being omitted the second part of the Order implys and establishes a National Religion for there be degrees of Knowlege in divine things true Religion is not to be learnt without searching the Scriptures the Scriptures cannot be search'd by us unless we have them to search and if we have nothing else or which is all one understand nothing else but a Translation we may be as in the place alleg'd we have bin beguil'd or misled by the Translation while we should be searching the true sense of the Scripture which cannot be attain'd in a natural way and a Commonwealth is not to presume upon that which is supernatural but by the knowlege of the Original and of Antiquity acquir'd by our own studys or those of som others for even Faith coms by hearing Wherfore a Commonwealth not making provision of men from time to time knowing in the original Languages wherin the Scriptures were written and vers'd in those Antiquitys to which they so frequently relate that the true sense of them depends in great part upon that Knowlege can never be secure that she shall not lose the Scripture and by consequence her Religion which to preserve she must institute som method of this Knowlege and som use of such as have acquir'd it which amounts to a National Religion THE Commonwealth having thus perform'd her duty towards God as a rational Creature by the best application of her Reason to Scripture and for the preservation of Religion in the purity of the same yet pretends not to Infallibility but coms in the third part of the Order establishing Liberty of Conscience according to the Instructions given to her Council of Religion to raise up her hands to Heaven for further light in which proceding she follows that as was shewn in the Preliminarys of Israel who tho her National Religion was always a part of her Civil Law gave to her Prophets the upper hand of all her Orders Definition of a Parish BUT the Surveyors having now don with the Parishes took their leaves so a Parish is the first division of Land occasion'd by the first Collection of the People of Oceana whose Function proper to that place is compriz'd in the six preceding Orders Institution of the Hundred THE next step in the progress of the Surveyors was to a meeting of the nearest of them as their work lay by twentys where conferring their Lists and computing the Deputys contain'd therin as the number of them in Parishes being nearest Neighbors amounted to one hundred or as even as might conveniently be brought with that account they cast them and those Parishes into the Precinct which be the Deputys ever since more or fewer is still call'd the Hundred and to every one of these Precincts they appointed a certain place being the most convenient Town within the same for the annual Rendevouz which don each Surveyor returning to his Hundred and summoning the Deputys contain'd in his Lists to the Rendevouz they appear'd and receiv'd 7. Order THE seventh ORDER requiring That upon the first Monday next insuing the last of January the Deputys of every Parish annually assemble in Arms at the Rendevouz of the Hundred and there elect out of their number one Justice of the Peace one Juryman one Captain one Ensign of their Troop or Century each of these out of the Horse and one Juryman one Crowner one High Constable out of the Foot the Election to be made by the Ballot in this manner The Jurymen for the time being are to be Overseers of the Ballot instead of these the Surveyors are to officiat at the first Assembly and to look to the performance of the same according to what was directed in the Ballot of the Parishes saving that the High Constable setting forth the Vrn shall have five several sutes of Gold Balls and one dozen of every sute wherof the first shall be mark'd with the Letter A the second with the letter B the third with C the fourth with D and the fifth with E and of each of these sutes he shall cast one Ball into his Hat or into a little Vrn and shaking the Balls together present them to the first Overseer who shall draw one and the sute which is so drawn by the Overseer shall be of use for that day and no other for example if the Overseer drew an A the High Constable shall put seven Gold Balls mark'd with the letter A into the Vrn with so many Silver ones as shall bring them even with the number of the Deputys who being sworn as before at the Ballot of the Parish to make a fair Election shall be call'd to the Vrn and every man coming in manner as was there shew'd shall draw one Ball which if it be Silver he shall cast it into a Bowl standing at the foot of the Vrn and return to his place but the first that draws a Gold Ball shewing it to the Overseers who if it has not the letter of the present Ballot have power to apprehend and punish him is the first Elector the second the second Elector and so to the seventh which Order they are to observe in their function The Electors as they are drawn shall be plac'd upon the Bench by the Overseers till the whole number be complete and then be conducted with the List of the Officers to be chosen into a Place apart where being privat the first Elector shall name a Person to the first
the Council having chosen a Competitor shall bring his name into the Senat which in the usual way shall chuse four more Competitors to the same Magistracy and put them with the Competitor of the Council to the Ballot of the House by which he of the five that is chosen is said to be elected by the Scrutiny of the Council of State A Vice-Admiral a Polemarch or Field Officer shall be elected after the same manner by the Scrutiny of the Council of War A Judg or Serjeant at Law by the Scrutiny of the Commissioners of the Seal A Baron or considerable Officer of the Exchequer by the Scrutiny of the Commissioners of the Treasury Men in Magistracy or out of it are equally capable of Election by the Scrutiny but a Magistrat or Officer elected by the Scrutiny to a military Imployment if he be neither a Knight of the Senat nor a Deputy of the Prerogative ought to have his Office confirm'd by the Prerogative because the Militia in a Common-wealth where the People are Soverain is not lawful to be touch'd injussu Populi THE Romans were so curious that tho their Consuls were elected in the * Centuriatis Centuriat Assemblys they might not touch the Militia except they were confirm'd in the †Curiatis Comitiis Parochial Assemblys for a Magistrat not receiving his Power from the People takes it from them and to take away their Power is to take away their Liberty As to the Election by the Scrutiny it is easily perceiv'd to be Venetian there being no such way to take in the Knowlege which in all reason must be best in every Council of such men as are most fit for their turns and yet to keep them from the biass of particular Affection or Interest under that pretence For the cause why the Great Council in Venice scarce ever elects any other than the Name that is brought in by the Scrutiny is very probable to be that they may .... This Election is the last of those appertaining to the Senat. The Councils being chosen by the Orders already shewn it remains that we com to those wherby they are instructed and the Orders of Instruction to the Councils are two the first for the Matter wherupon they are to procede and the second for the Manner of their proceding The Matter of the Councils is distributed to them by 19. Order Instructions for the Councils as to their Matter THE nineteenth ORDER distributing to every Council such Businesses as are properly to belong to their Cognizance wherof som they shall receive and determin and others they shall receive prepare and introduce into the House As first For the Council of State THE Council of State is to receive all Addresses Intelligences and Letters of Negotiation to give audience to Ambassadors sent to and to draw up Instructions for such as shall be sent by this Commonwealth to receive Propositions from and hold Intelligence with the Provincial Councils to consider upon all Laws to be enacted amended or repeal'd and upon all Levys of Men or Mony War or Peace Leagues or Associations to be made by this Commonwealth so far forth as is conducible to the orderly preparation of the same to be introduc'd by them into the Senat. Provided For the Council of War that all such Affairs as otherwise appertaining to the Council of State are for the good of the Commonwealth to be carry'd with greater secrecy be manag'd by the Council of War with Power to receive and send forth Agents Spys Emissarys Intelligencers Frigots and to manage Affairs of that nature if it be necessary without communication to the Senat till such time as it may be had without detriment to the Business But they shall have no Power to ingage the Commonwealth in a War without the consent of the Senat and the People It appertains also to this Council to take charge of the Fleet as Admiral and of all Storehouses Armorys Arsenals and Magazins appertaining to this Commonwealth They shall keep a diligent Record of the military Expeditions from time to time reported by him that was Strategus or General or one of the Polemarchs in that Action or at least so far as the Experience of such Commanders may tend to the improvement of the military Disciplin which they shall digest and introduce into the Senat and if the Senat shall therupon frame any Article they shall see that it be observ'd in the Musters or Education of the Youth And wheras the Council of War is the Sentinel or Scout of this Commonwealth if any Person or Persons shall go about to introduce Debate into any popular Assembly of the same or otherwise to alter the present Government or strike at the root of it they shall apprehend or cause to be apprehended seiz'd imprison'd and examin arraign acquit or condemn and cause to be executed any such Person or Persons by their proper Power and Authority and without appeal For the Council of Religion THE Council of Religion as the Arbiter of this Commonwealth in cases of Conscience more peculiarly appertaining to Religion Christian Charity and a pious Life shall have the care of the National Religion and the protection of the Liberty of Conscience with the cognizance of all Causes relating to either of them And first as to the National Religion They shall cause all Places or Preferments of the best Revenue in either of the Vniversitys to be confer'd upon no other than such of the most learn'd and pious Men as have dedicated themselves to the study of Theology They shall also take a special care that by such Augmentations as be or shall hereafter be appointed by the Senat every Benefice in this Nation be improv'd at least to the value of one hundred pounds a year And to the end that there be no interest at all wherby the Divines or Teachers of the National Religion may be corrupted or corrupt Religion they shall be capable of no other kind of Imployment or Preferment in this Commonwealth And wheras a Directory for the Administration of the National Religion is to be prepar'd by this Council they shall in this and other Debates of this nature procede in manner following A Question arising in matter of Religion shall be put and stated by the Council in writing which Writing the Censors shall send by their Beadles being Proctors chosen to attend them each to the Vniversity wherof he is Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor of the same receiving the Writing shall call a Convocation of all the Divines of that Vniversity being above forty years of Age. And the Vniversitys upon a point so propos'd shall have no manner of Intelligence or Correspondence one with another till their Debates be ended and they have made return of their Answers to the Council of Religion by two or three of their own Members that may clear their sense if any doubt should arise to the Council which don they shall return
of Athens THIS Speech concluded the Debate which happen'd at the Institution of the Senat. The next Assembly is that of the People or Prerogative Tribe The Face of the Prerogative Tribe THE face or mein of the Prerogative Tribe for the Arms the Horses and the Disciplin but more especially for the select men is that of a very noble Regiment or rather of two the one of Horse divided into three Troops besides that of the Provinces which will be shewn hereafter with their Captains Cornets and two Tribuns of the Horse at the head of them the other of Foot in three Companys besides that of the Provinces with their Captains Ensigns and two Tribuns of the Foot at the head of them The first Troop is call'd the Phoenix the second the Pelican and the third the Swallow The first Company the Cypress the second the Myrtle and the third the Spray Of these again not without a near resemblance of the Roman division of a Tribe the Phoenix and the Cypress constitute the first Class the Pelican and the Myrtle the second and the Swallow with the Spray the third renew'd every Spring by 21. Order The Change or Election of the Triennial Officers of the Prerogative THE one and twentieth ORDER directing that upon every Monday next insuing the last of March the Deputys of the annual Galaxy arriving at the Pavilion in the Halo and electing one Captain and one Cornet of the Swallow triennial Officers by and out of the Cavalry at the Horse Vrn according to the Rules contain'd in the Ballot of the Hundred and one Captain with one Ensign of the Spray triennial Officers by and out of the Infantry at the Foot Vrn after the same way of ballotting constitute and becom the third Classes of the Prerogative Tribe SEVEN Deputys are annually return'd by every Tribe wherof three are Horse and four are Foot and there be fifty Tribes so the Swallow must consist of 150 Horse the Spray of 200 Foot And the rest of the Classes being two each of them in number equal the whole Prerogative besides the Provinces that is the Knights and Deputys of Marpesia and Panopea must consist of 1050 Deputys And these Troops and Companys may as well be call'd Centurys as those of the Romans for the Romans related not in so naming theirs to the number And wheras they were distributed according to the valuation of their Estates so are these which by virtue of the last Order are now accommodated with their triennial Officers But there be others appertaining to this Tribe whose Election being of far greater importance is annual as follows in 22. Order The Change or Election of the Annual Magistrats of the Prerogative THE twenty second ORDER whereby the first Class having elected their triennial Officers and made Oath to the Old Tribuns that they will neither introduce cause nor to their power suffer Debate to be introduc'd into any popular Assembly of this Government but to their utmost be aiding and assisting to seize and deliver any Person or Persons in that way offending and striking at the Root of this Commonwealth to the Council of War are to procede with the other two Classes of the Prerogative Tribe to election of the new Tribuns being four annual Magistrats wherof two are to be elected out of the Cavalry at the Horse Vrn and two out of the Infantry at the Foot Vrn according to the common Ballot of the Tribes And they may be promiscuously chosen out of any Classis provided that the same Person shall not be capable of bearing the Tribunitian Honor twice in the term of one Galaxy The Tribuns thus chosen shall receive the Tribe in reference to the Power of mustering and disciplining the same as Commanders in chief and for the rest as Magistrats whose proper Function is prescrib'd by the next Order The Tribuns may give leave to any number of the Prerogative not exceding one hundred at a time to be absent so they be not Magistrats nor Officers and return within three months If a Magistrat or Officer has a necessary occasion he may also be absent for the space of one month provided that there be not above three Corners or Ensigns two Captains or one Tribun so absent at one time TO this the ARCHON spoke at the Institution after this manner My Lords IT is affirm'd by CICERO in his Oration for FLACCUS that the Commonwealths of Greece were all shaken or ruin'd by the intemperance of their Comitia or Assemblys of the People The truth is if good heed in this point be not taken a Common-wealth will have bad legs But all the world knows he should have excepted Lacedemon where the People as has bin shewn by the Oracle had no power at all of Debate nor till after LYSANDER whose Avarice open'd a gulf that was not long ere it swallow'd up his Country came it ever to be exercis'd by them Whence that Commonwealth stood longest and firmest of any other but this in our days of Venice which having underlaid her self with the like Institution ows a great if not the greatest part of her steddiness to the same principle the great Council which is with her the People by the Authority of my Lord EPIMONUS never speaking a word Nor shall any Common-wealth where the People in their political capacity is talkative ever see half the days of one of these But being carry'd away by vain-glorious Men that as OVERBURY says piss more than they drink swim down the stream as did Athens the most prating of these Dames when that same ranting fellow ALCIBIADES fell a demagoging for the Sicilian War But wheras Debate by the authority and experience of Lacedemon and Venice is not to be committed to the People in a well-order'd Government it may be said That the Order specify'd is but a slight bar in a matter of like danger for so much as an Oath if there be no recourse upon the breach of it is a weak ty for such hands as have the Sword in them wherfore what should hinder the People of Oceana if they happen not to regard an Oath from assuming Debate and making themselves as much an Anarchy as those of Athens To which I answer Take the common fort in a privat capacity and except they be injur'd you shall find them to have a bashfulness in the presence of the better sort or wiser Men acknowleging their Abilitys by attention and accounting it no mean honor to receive respect from them But if they be injur'd by them they hate them and the more for being wife or great because that makes it the greater injury Nor refrain they in this case from any kind of intemperance of Speech if of Action It is no otherwise with a People in their political capacity you shall never find that they have assum'd Debate for it self but for somthing else Wherfore in Lacedemon where there was and in Venice where there is nothing else
time in that condition because the Inhabitants being few having put a bar upon the reception of Strangers and living in a strict observation of the Laws of LYCURGUS which now had got reputation and taken away all occasion of Tumults might well continue long in Tranquillity For the Laws of LYCURGUS introduc'd a greater equality in Estates and a less equality in Honors whence there was equal Poverty and the Plebeians were less ambitious because the Honors or Magistracys of the City could extend but to a few and were not communicable to the People nor did the Nobility by using them ill ever give them a desire to participat of the same This proceded from the Kings whose Principality being plac'd in the midst of the Nobility had no greater means wherby to support it self than to shield the People from all injury whence the People not fearing Empire desir'd it not And so all occasion of enmity between the Senat and the People was taken away But this Vnion happen'd especially from two causes the one that the Inhabitants of Lacedemon being few could be govern'd by the Few the other that not receiving Strangers into their Common-wealth they did not corrupt it nor increase it to such a proportion as was not governable by the Few VENICE has not divided with her Plebeians but all are call'd Gentlemen that be in administration of the Government for which Government she is more beholden to Chance than the Wisdom of her Lawmakers For many retiring to those Ilands where that City is now built from the inundations of Barbarians that overwhelm'd the Roman Empire when they were increas'd to such a number that to live together it was necessary to have Laws they ordain'd a form of Government wherby assembling often in Council upon Affairs and sinding their number sufficient for Government they put a bar upon all such as repairing afterwards to their City should becom Inhabitants excluding them from participation of Power Whence they that were included in the Administration had right and they that were excluded coming afterwards and being receiv'd upon no other conditions to be Inhabitants had no wrong and therfore had no occasion nor being never trusted with Arms any means to be tumultuous Wherfore this Commonwealth might very well maintain it self in Tranquillity THESE things consider'd it is plain that the Roman Legislators to have introduc'd a quiet State must have don one of these two things either shut out Strangers as the Lacedemonians or as the Venetians not allow'd the People to bear Arms. But they did neither By which means the People having power and increase were in perpetual tumult Nor is this to be help'd in a Commonwealth for increase seeing if Rome had cut off the occasion of her Tumults she must have cut off the means of her Increase and by consequence of her Greatness Wherfore let a Legislator consider with himself whether he would make his Commonwealth for preservation in which case she may be free from Tumults or for increase in which case she must be infested with them IF he makes her for preservation she may be quiet at home but will be in danger abroad First Because her Foundation must be narrow and therfore weak as that of Lacedemon which lay but upon 30000 Citizens or that of Venice which lys but upon 3000. Secondly Such a Commonwealth must either be in Peace or in War If she be in Peace the Few are soonest effeminated and corrupted and so obnoxious also to Faction If in War succeding ill she is an easy prey or succeding well ruin'd by increase a weight which her Foundation is not able to bear For Lacedemon when she had made her self Mistriss upon the matter of all Greece thro a slight accident the Rebellion of Thebes occasion'd by the Conspiracy of PELOPIDAS discovering this infirmity of her nature the rest of her conquer'd Citys immediatly fell off and in the turn as it were of a hand reduc'd her from the fullest tide to the lowest eb of her fortune And Venice having possest her self of a great part of Italy by her purse was no sooner in defence of it put to the trial of Arms than she lost all in one Battel WHENCE I conclude That in the Ordination of a Common-wealth a Legislator is to think upon that which is most honorable and laying aside Models for Preservation to follow the example of Rome conniving at and temporizing with the enmity between the Senat and the People as a necessary step to the Roman Greatness For that any Man should find out a balance that may take in the Conveniences and shut out the Inconveniences of both I do not think it possible These are the words of the Author tho the method be somwhat alter'd to the end that I may the better turn them to my purpose MY LORDS I do not know how you hearken to this sound but to hear the greatest Artist in the modern World giving sentence against our Commonwealth is that with which I am nearly concern'd Wherfore with all honor due to the Prince of Politicians let us examin his reasoning with the same liberty which he has asserted to be the right of a free People But we shall never com up to him except by taking the business a little lower we descend from effects to their causes The causes of Commotion in a Common-wealth are either external or internal External are from Enemys from Subjects or from Servants To dispute then what was the cause why Rome was infested by the Italian or by the Servil Wars why the Slaves took the Capitol why the Lacedemonians were near as frequently troubl'd with their Helots as Rome with all those or why Venice whose Situation is not trusted to the faith of Men has as good or better quarter with them whom she governs than Rome had with the Latins were to dispute upon external causes The question put by MACCHIAVEL is of internal causes Whether the enmity that was beeween the Senat and the People of Rome might have bin remov'd And to determin otherwise of this question than he dos I must lay down other Principles than he has don To which end I affirm that a Commonwealth internally consider'd is either equal or inequal A Commonwealth that is internally equal has no internal cause of Commotion and therfore can have no such effect but from without A Commonwealth internally inequal has no internal cause of quiet and therfore can have no such effect but by diversion TO prove my Assertions I shall at this time make use of no other than his examples Lacedemon was externally unquiet because she was externally inequal that is as to her Helots and she was internally at rest because she was equal in her self both in root and branch In the root by her Agrarian and in branch by the Senat inasmuch as no Man was therto qualify'd but by election of the People Which Institution of LYCURGUS is mention'd Arist Polit. B. 2. by ARISTOTLE
where he says that rendering his Citizens emulous not careless of that honor he assign'd to the People the election of the Senat. Wherfore MACCHIAVEL in this as in other places having his ey upon the division of Patrician and Plebeian Familys as they were in Rome has quite mistaken the Orders of this Commonwealth where there was no such thing Nor did the quiet of it derive from the Power of the Kings who were so far from shielding the People from the injury of the Nobility of which there was none in his sense but the Senat that one declar'd end of the Senat at the institution was to shield the People from the Kings who from that time had but single Votes Neither did it procede from the straitness of the Senat or their keeping the People excluded from the Government that they were quiet but from the equality of their administration seeing the Senat as is plain by the Oracle their fundamental Law had no more than the Debate and the Result of the Commonwealth belong'd to the People Wherfore when THEOPOMPUS and POLYDORUS Kings of Lacedemon would have kept the People excluded from the Government by adding to the antient Law this Clause If the determination of the People be faulty it shall be lawful for the Senat to resume the Debate the People immediatly became unquiet and resum'd that Debate which ended not till they had set up their Ephors and caus'd that Magistracy to be confirm'd by their Kings * * Nam cum primus instituisset Theopompus ut Ephori Lacedamone crearentur ita futuri regiae potestati oppositi quemadmodum Romae Tribuni plâ—bis consulati imperio sunt objecti atque illi uâ—or dixiâ—â—et id egiâ—â—â— illum ut filâ—is minorem potestatem reâ—inqueret Relinquam inquit sed diuturniorem Optimè quidem Ea enim demum tuta est potentia quae viribus suis modum imponit Theopompus igitur legitimis regnum vinculis constringendo quo longius à licentia â—etraxit hot propius ad benevolentiam civium admovit Val. Max. l. 4. c. 1. de externis §. 8. For when THEOPOMPUS first ordain'd that the Ephori or Overseers should be created at Lacedemon to be such a restraint upon the Kings there as the Tribuns were upon the Consuls at Rome the Queen complain'd to him that by this means he transmitted the Royal Authority greatly diminish'd to his Children I leave indeed less answer'd he but more lasting And this was excellently said for that Power only is safe which is limited from doing hurt THEOPOMPUS therfore by confining the Kingly Power within the bounds of the Laws did recommend it by so much to the Peoples Affection as he remov'd it from being Arbitrary By which it may appear that a Commonwealth for preservation if she coms to be inequal is as obnoxious to enmity between the Senat and the People as a Commonwealth for increase and that the Tranquillity of Lacedemon was deriv'd from no other cause than her Equality FOR Venice to say that she is quiet because she disarms her Subjects is to forget that Lacedemon disarm'd her Helots and yet could not in their regard be quiet wherfore if Venice be defended from external causes of Commotion it is first thro her Situation in which respect her Subjects have no hope and this indeed may be attributed to her fortune and secondly thro her exquisit Justice whence they have no will to invade her But this can be attributed to no other cause than her Prudence which will appear to be greater as we look nearer for the effects that procede from Fortune if there be any such thing are like their cause inconstant But there never happen'd to any other Commonwealth so undisturb'd and constant a Tranquillity and Peace in her self as is that of Venice wherfore this must procede from som other cause than Chance And we see that as she is of all others the most quiet so the most equal Commonwealth Her Body consists of one Order and her Senat is like a rolling stone as was said which never did nor while it continues upon that rotation never shall gather the moss of a divided or ambitious interest much less such a one as that which grasp'd the People of Rome in the talons of their own Eagles And if MACCHIAVEL averse from doing this Commonwealth right had consider'd her Orders as his Reader shall easily perceive he never did he must have bin so far from attributing the Prudence of them to Chance that he would have touch'd up his admirable work to that perfection which as to the civil part has no pattern in the universal World but this of Venice ROME secure by her potent and victorious Arms from all external causes of Commotion was either beholden for her Peace at home to her Enemys abroad or could never rest her head My LORDS you that are Parents of a Commonwealth and so freer Agents than such as are merely natural have a care For as no man shall shew me a Commonwealth born streight that ever became crooked so no man shall shew me a Commonwealth born crooked that ever became streight Rome was crooked in her birth or rather prodigious Her twins the Patricians and Plebeian Orders came as was shewn by the foregoing story into the World one body but two heads or rather two bellys for notwithstanding the Fable out of AESOP wherby MENENIUS AGRIPPA the Orator that was sent from the Senat to the People at Mount Aventin shew'd the Fathers to be the Belly and the People to be the Arms and the Legs which except that how slothful soever it might seem they were nourish'd not these only but the whole Body must languish and be dissolv'd it is plain that the Fathers were a distinct Belly such a one as took the meat indeed out of the Peoples mouths but abhorring the Agrarian return'd it not in the due and necessary nutrition of a Commonwealth Nevertheless as the People that live about the Cataracts of Nilus are said not to hear the noise so neither the Roman Writers nor MACCHIAVEL the most conversant with them seem among so many of the Tribunitian storms to hear their natural voice for tho they could not miss of it so far as to attribute them to the strife of the People for participation in Magistracy or in which MACCHIAVEL more particularly joins to that about the Agrarian this was to take the business short and the remedy for the disease A PEOPLE when they are reduc'd to misery and despair becom their own Politicians as certain Beasts when they are sick becom their own Physicians and are carry'd by a natural instinct to the desire of such Herbs as are their proper cure but the People for the greater part are beneath the Beasts in the use of them Thus the People of Rome tho in their misery they had recourse by instinct as it were to the two main Fundamentals of a Commonwealth participation of Magistracy and the Agrarian
Crimes against the Majesty of the People such as High Treason as also of Peculat that is robbery of the Treasury or defraudation of the Commonwealth appertains to this Tribe And if any Person or Persons Provincials or Citizens shall appeal to the People it belongs to the Prerogative to judg and determin the case provided that if the Appeal be from any Court of Justice in this Nation or the Provinces the Appellant shall first deposit a hundred Pounds in the Court from which he appeals to be forfeited to the same if he be cast in his Suit by the People But the Power of the Council of War being the expedition of this Commonwealth and the martial Law of the Strategus in the Field are those only from which there shall ly no Appeal to the People THE Proceding of the Prerogative in case of a Proposition is to be thus order'd The Magistrats proposing by Authority of the Senat shall rehearse the whole matter and expound it to the People which don they shall put the whole together to the Suffrage with three Boxes the Negative the Affirmative and the Nonsincere and the Suffrage being return'd to the Tribuns and number'd in the presence of the Proposers if the major Vote be in the Nonsincere the Proposers shall desist and the Senat shall resume the Debate If the major Vote be in the Negative the Proposers shall desist and the Senat too But if the major Vote be in the Affirmative then the Tribe is clear and the Proposers shall begin and put the whole matter with the Negative and the Affirmative leaving out the Nonsincere by Clauses and the Suffrages being taken and number'd by the Tribuns in the presence of the Proposers shall be written and reported by the Tribuns to the Senat. And that which is propos'd by the Authority of the Senat and consirm'd by the Command of the People is the Law of Oceana THE Proceding of the Prerogative in a case of Judicature is to be thus order'd The Tribuns being Auditors of all Causes appertaining to the cognizance of the People shall have notice of the Suit or Trial whether of Appeal or otherwise that is to be commenc'd and if any one of them shall acâ—ept of the same it appertains to him to introduce it A Cause being introduc'd and the People muster'd or assembl'd for the decision of the same the Tribuns are Presidents of the Court having power to keep it to Orders and shall be seated upon a Scaffold erected in the middle of the Tribe Vpon the right hand shall stand a Seat or large Pulpit assign'd to the Plaintif or the Accuser and upon the left another for the Defendent each if they please with his Council And the Tribuns being attended upon such occasions with so many Ballotins Secretarys Doorkeepers and Messengers of the Senat as shall be requisit one of them shall turn up a Glass of the nature of an Hourglass but such a one as is to be of an hour and a halfs running which being turn'd up the Party or Council on the right hand may begin to speak to the People If there be Papers to be read or Witnesses to be examin'd the Officer shall lay the Glass sideways till the Papers be read and the Witnesses examin'd and then turn it up again and so long as the Glass is running the Party on the right hand has liberty to speak and no longer The Party on the right hand having had his time the like shall be don in every respect for the Party on the left And the Cause being thus heard the Tribuns shall put the question to the Tribe with a white a black and a red Box or Nonsincere whether Guilty or not Guilty And if the Suffrage being taken the major Vote be in the Nonsincere the Cause shall be reheard upon the next juridical day following and put to the question in the same manner If the major Vote coms the second time in the Non-sincere the Cause shall be heard again upon the third day but at the third hearing the question shall be put without the Nonsincere Vpon the first of the three days in which the major Vote coms in the white Box the Party accus'd is absolv'd and upon the first of them in which it coms in the black Box the Party accus'd is condemn'd The Party accus'd being condemn'd the Tribuns if the case be criminal shall put with the white and the black Box these Questions or such of them as regard had to the case they shall conceive most proper 1. WHETHER he shall have a Writ of ease 2. WHETHER he shall be sin'd so much or so much 3. WHETHER he shall be consiscated 4. WHETHER he shall be render'd incapable of Magistracy 5. WHETHER he shall be banish'd 6. WHETHER he shall be put to death THESE or any three of these Questions whether simple or such as shall be thought sitly mix'd being put by the Tribuns that which has most above half the Voies in the black Box is the Sentence of the People which the Troop of the third Classis is to see executed accordingly BVT wheras by the Constitution of this Commonwealth it may appear that neither the Propositions of the Senat nor the Judicature of the People will be so frequent as to hold the Prerogative in continual imployment the Senat a main part of whose Office it is to teach and instruct the People shall duly if they have no greater Affairs to divert them cause an Oration to be made to the Prerogative by som Knight or Magistrat of the Senat to be chosen out of the ablest men and from time to time appointed by the Orator of the House in the great Hall of the Pantheon while the Parlament resides in the Town or in som Grove or sweet place in the sield while the Parlament for the heat of the year shall reside in the Country upon every Tuesday morning or afternoon AND the Orator appointed for the time to this Office shall first repeat the Orders of the Commonwealth with all possible brevity and then making choice of one or som part of it discourse therof to the People An Oration or Discourse of this nature being afterward perus'd by the Council of State may as they see cause be printed and publish'd THE ARCHON'S Comment upon the Order I find to have bin of this sense My Lords TO crave pardon for a word or two in farther explanation of what was read I shall briefly shew how the Constitution of this Tribe or Assembly answers to their Function and how their Function which is of two parts the former in the Result or Legislative Power the latter in the supreme Judicature of the Common-wealth answers to their Constitution MACCHIAVEL has a Discourse where he puts the question Whether the guard of Liberty may with more security be committed to the Nobility or to the People Which doubt of his arises thro the want of explaining his terms for the guard of Liberty can
Prudence of Venice in her contrary practice affirming it to have bin no small step to the ruin of the Roman Liberty that these having tasted in their Youth of the supreme Honors had no greater in their age to hope for but by perpetuating of the same in themselves which came to Blood and ended in Tyranny The opinion of VERULAMIUS is safe The Errors says he of young men are the ruin of business wheras the Errors of old men amount but to this that more might have bin don or sooner But tho their Wisdom be little their Courage is great Wherfore to com to the main Education of this Commonwealth the Militia of Oceana is the Province of Youth THE distribution of this Province by the Essays is so fully describ'd in the Order that I need repeat nothing the Order it self being but a Repetition or Copy of that Original which in antient Prudence is of all others the fairest as that from whence the Commonwealth of Rome more particularly deriv'd the Empire of the World And there is much more reason in this age when Governments are universally broken or swerv'd from their Foundations and the People groan under Tyranny that the same causes which could not be withstood when the World was full of popular Governments should have the like effects THE Causes in the Commonwealth of Rome wherof the Empire of the World was not any miraculous but a natural nay I may safely say a necessary consequence are contain'd in that part of her Disciplin which was domestic and in that which she exercis'd in her Provinces or Conquest Of the latter I shall have better occaon to speak when we com to our provincial Orbs the former divided the whole People by Tribes amounting as LIVY and CICERO shew at their full growth to thirty five and every Tribe by the Cense or Valuation of Estates into five Classes for the sixth being Proletary that is the Nursery or such as thro their poverty contributed nothing to the Commonwealth but Children was not reckon'd nor us'd in Arms. And this is the first point of the Militia in which modern Prudence is quite contrary to the antient for wheras we excusing the rich and arming the poor becom the Vassals of our Servants they by excusing the poor and arming such as were rich enough to be Freemen became Lords of the Earth The Nobility and Gentry of this Nation who understand so little what it is to be Lords of the Earth that they have not bin able to keep their own Lands will think it a strange Education for their Children to be common Soldiers and oblig'd to all the Dutys of Arms nevertheless it is not for 4 s. a week but to be capable of being the best man in the Field or in the City the latter part of which consideration makes the common Soldier herein a better man than the General of any monarchical Army And wheras it may be thought that this would drink deep of noble Blood I dare boldly say take the Roman Nobility in the heat of their fiercest Wars and you shall not find such a shambles of them as has bin made of ours by mere Luxury and Slothfulness which killing the Body kill the Soul also Animasque in vulnere ponunt Wheras common Right is that which who stands in the vindication of has us'd that Sword of Justice for which he receives the Purple of Magistracy The Glory of a man on Earth can go no higher and if he falls he rises again and coms sooner to that reward which is so much higher as Heaven is above the Earth To return to the Roman Example Every Classis was divided as has bin more than once shewn into Centurys and every Century was equally divided into Youth and Elders the Youth for foren Service and the Elders for the guard of the Territory In the first Classis were about eighteen Centurys of Horse being those which by the Institution of SERVIUS were first call'd to the Suffrage in the * * Centuriatis Centurial Assemblys But the Delectus or Levy of an Army which is the present business proceded according to POLYBIUS in this manner Upon a War decreed the Consuls elected four and twenty military Tribuns or Colonels wherof ten being such as had merited their tenth Stipend were younger Officers The Tribuns being chosen the Consuls appointed a day to the Tribes when those in them of military age were to appear at the Capitol the day being com and the Youth assembl'd accordingly the Consuls ascended their Tribunal and the younger Tribuns were straight divided into four parts after this manner four were assign'd to the first Legion a Legion at the most consisted of 6000 Foot and 300 Horse three to the second four to the third and three to the fourth The younger Tribuns being thus distributed two of the elder were assign'd to the first Legion three to the second two to the third and three to the fourth And the Officers of each Legion thus assign'd having drawn the Tribes by Lots and being seated according to their divisions at a convenient distance from each other the Tribe of the first Lot was call'd wherupon they that were of it knowing the business and being prepar'd presently bolted out four of their number in the choice wherof such care was taken that they offer'd none that was not a Citizen no Citizen that was not of the Youth no Youth that was not of som one of the five Classes nor any one of the five Classes that was not expert at his Exercises Moreover they us'd such diligence in matching them for Age and Stature that the Officers of the Legions except they happen'd to be acquainted with the Youth so bolted were forc'd to put themselves upon fortune while they of the first Legion chose one they of the second the next they of the third another and the fourth Youth fell to the last Legion and thus was the Election the Legions and the Tribes varying according to their Lots carry'd on till the Foot were complete The like course with little alteration was taken by the Horse Officers till the Horse also were complete This was call'd giving of Names which the Judg. 20. 9. Children of Israel did also by Lot and if any man refus'd to give his Name he was sold for a Slave or his Estate confiscated to the Commonwealth When * * Marcus Curius Consul cum subitum delectum edicere coactus esset juniorum nemo respondisset conjectis in sortem omnibus Polliae quae proxima exierat primum nomen urna extractum citari jussit neque eo respondente bona adolescentis hastâ subjecit Val. MARCUS CURIUS the Consul was forc'd to make a sudden Levy and none of the Youth would give in their Names all the Tribes being put to the Lot he commanded the first Name drawn out of the Vrn of the Pollian Tribe which happen'd to com first to be call'd but the Youth not answering he
better Proveditor than the Venetian another Strategus sitting with an Army standing by him wherupon that which is marching if there were any probability it should would find as little possibility that it could recoil as a foren Enemy to invade you These things consider'd a War will appear to be of a contrary nature to that of all other reckonings inasmuch as of this you must never look to have a good account if you be strict in imposing checks Let a Council of Huntsmen assembl'd beforehand tell you which way the Stag shall run where you shall cast about at the fault and how you shall ride to be in at the chase all the day but these may as well do that as a Council of War direct a General The hours that have painted wings and of different colors are his Council he must be like the Ey that makes not the Scene but has it so soon as it changes That in many Counsillors there is strength is spoken of Civil Administrations as to those that are military there is nothing more certain than that in many Counsillors there is weakness Joint Commissions in military affairs are like hunting your Hounds in their Couples In the Attic War CLEOMENES and DEMARATUS Kings of Lacedemon being thus coupl'd tug'd one against another and while they should have join'd against the Persian were the cause of the common calamity wherupon that Commonwealth took better Counsil and made a Law wherby from thenceforth there went at once but one of her Kings to Battel THE Fidenati being in rebellion and having slain the Colony of the Romans four Tribuns with Consular Power were created by the People of Rome wherof one being left for the guard of the City the other three were sent against the Fidenati who thro the division that happen'd among them brought nothing home but Dishonor wherupon the Romans created the Dictator and LIVY gives his Judgment in these words * * Tres Tribuni potestate Consulari documento fuêre quà m plurium imperium bello inutile esset tendendo ad sua quisque consilia cum alii aliud videretur aperuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti The three Tribuns with Consular Power were a lesson how useless in War is the joint Command of several Generals for each following his own Counsils while they all differ'd in their opinions gave by this opportunity an advantage to the Enemy When the Consuls QUINTIUS and AGRIPPA were sent against the AEQUI AGRIPPA for this reason refus'd to go with his Collegue saying * * Saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum summam imperii apud unum esse That in the administration of great Actions it was most safe that the chief Command should be lodg'd in one Person And if the Ruin of modern Armys were well consider'd most of it would be found to have faln upon this point it being in this case far safer to trust to any one Man of common Prudence than to any two or more together of the greatest Parts The Consuls indeed being equal in Power while one was present with the Senat and the other in the Field with the Army made a good Balance and this with us is exactly follow'd by the Election of a new Strategus upon the march of the old one THE seven and twentieth Order wherby the Elders in case of Invasion are oblig'd to equal duty with the Youth and each upon their own charge is sutable to Reason for every Man defends his own Estate and to our Copy as in the War with the Samnits and Tuscans ††Senatus justitium indici delectum omnis generis hominum haberi jussit nec ingenui modo juniores Sacramento adacti sunt sed seniorum etiam cohortes factae The Senat order'd a Vacation to be proclaim'd and a Levy to be made of all sorts of Persons And not only the Freemen and Youths were listed but Cohorts of the old Men were likewise form'd This Nation of all others is the least obnoxious to Invasion Oceana says a French Politician is a Beast that cannot be devour'd but by her self nevertheless that Government is not perfect which is not provided at all points and in this ad Triarios res rediit the Elders being such as in a martial State must be Veterans the Commonwealth invaded gathers strength like ANTAEUS by her fall while the whole number of the Elders consisting of five hundred thousand and the Youth of as many being brought up according to the Order give twelve successive Battels each Battel consisting of eighty thousand Men half Elders and half Youth And the Commonwealth whose Constitution can be no stranger to any of those Virtues which are to be acquir'd in human life grows familiar with Death ere she dys If the hand of God be upon her for her Transgressions she shall mourn for her Sins and ly in the dust for her Iniquitys without losing her Manhood Si fractus illabatur orbis Impavidam ferient ruinae THE remaining part being the Constitution of the Provincial Orb is partly Civil or consisting of the Elders and partly Military or consisting of the Youth The Civil part of the provincial Orb is directed by 28. Order Constitution of the Civil part of the Provincial Orb. THE twenty eighth ORDER wherby the Council of a Province being constituted of twelve Knights divided by four into three Regions for their term and revolution conformable to the Parlament is perpetuated by the annual election at the Tropic of four Knights being triennial Magistrats out of the Region of the Senat whose term expires and of one Knight out of the same Region to be Strategus or General of the Province which Magistracy is annual The Strategus or Magistrat thus chosen shall be as well President of the Provincial Council with power to propose to the same as General of the Army The Council for the rest shall elect weekly Provosts having any two of them also right to propose after the manner of the Senatorian Councils of Oceana And wheras all Provincial Councils are Members of the Council of State they may and ought to keep diligent correspondence with the same which is to be don after this manner Any Opinion or Opinions legitimatly propos'd and debated at a Provincial Council being therupon sign'd by the Strategus or any two of the Provosts may be transmitted to the Council of State in Oceana and the Council of State proceding upon the same in their natural course whether by their own Power if it be a matter within their Instructions or by Authority of the Senat therupon consulted if it be a matter of State which is not in their Instructions or by Authority of the Senat and Command of the People if it be a matter of Law as for the Levys of Men or Mony upon common use and safety shall return such Answers Advice or Orders as in any of the ways mention'd shall be determin'd upon the case The Provincial Councils of
* Deus Populi Judaici Rex crat veluti politicus civilis Legislator In Diatriba de Voto Jephthae God was a Political King and Civil Legislator of the Jews And for the use I have made of the word Ecclesia as no man can read such as have written of the Grecian Commonwealths and miss it so I do not remember that Mr. HOBBS has spoken of it To these things fuller satisfaction will be given in the second Book which nevertheless I do not speak to the end I might wave Obligation to so excellent an Author in his way It is true I have oppos'd the Politics of Mr. HOBBS to shew him what he taught me with as much disdain as he oppos'd those of the greatest Authors in whose wholsom Fame and Doctrin the good of Mankind being concern'd my Conscience bears me witness that I have don my duty Nevertheless in most other things I firmly believe that Mr. HOBBS is and will in future Ages be accounted the best Writer at this day in the world And for his Treatises of human Nature and of Liberty and Necessity they are the greatest of new Lights and those which I have follow'd and shall follow CHAP. VIII Whether a Commonwealth coming up to the perfection of the kind coms not up to the perfection of Government and has no flaw in it WHAT a Commonwealth coming up to the perfection of the kind is I have shewn both by the definition of an equal Commonwealth and the Exemplification of it in all the parts THE Definition is contain'd in the first of my Preliminarys which because it is short I shall repeat An equal Commonwealth is a Government establish'd upon an equal Agrarian arising into the Superstructures or three Orders the Senat debating and proposing the People resolving and the Magistracy executing by an equal Rotation or interchangeable Election thro the suffrage of the People given by the Ballot The Exemplification is the whole Common-wealth Book I of Oceana Each of which by him who if his Doctrin of pure and absolute Monarchy be observ'd can be no Englishman is call'd an Irish Bog as in som sense it is seeing the Prevaricator has set never Consid p. 43. a foot in it that will stand nor has more to say than that Where there is one ambitious poor man or one vicious rich man it is impossible there should be any such Government as can be secure from Sedition WHICH First is rather to make all Governments ineffectual or to make all Governments alike than to object against any seeing That there should not be one ambitious poor man or one vicious rich man is equally if not more improbable in a Monarchy than in a Common-wealth SECONDLY That one man alone whether he be rich or poor should without a Party be able to disturb a Commonwealth with Sedition is an absurdity nor is such a party as may be able in som sort to disturb the Peace by robbing upon the Highway or som such disorder always able to disturb a Government with Sedition Wherfore this feat gos not so much upon the ability of any one man rich or poor as the Power of the Party he is able to make and this strength of the Party gos upon the nature of the Government and the content or discontents thence deriving to the Few or the Many The Discontents whether of the Few or the Many derive from that which is or by them is thought to be som bar to their Interest and those Interests which are the causes of Sedition are three the desire of Liberty the desire of Power and the desire of Riches nor be there any more for where the People thro want of Bread thro Violence offer'd to their Women or Oppression rise up against their Governors it relates to the desire of Liberty those also under the name of Religion make not a fourth but com to one of the three NOW to speak in the first place of the Many and anon of the Few the People in an equal Commonwealth have none of these three Interests Not the desire of Liberty because the whole Frame of an equal Commonwealth is nothing else but such a method wherby the Liberty of the People is secur'd to them Not of Power because the Power which otherwise they could not exercise is thus estated in them Nor of Riches because where the Rich are so bounded by an Agrarian that they cannot overbalance and therfore neither oppress the People nor exclude their Industry or Merit from attaining to the like Estate Power or Honor the whole People have the whole Riches of the Nation already equally divided among them for that the Riches of a Commonwealth should not go according to the difference of mens Industry but be distributed by the Poll were inequal Wherfore the People in an equal Commonwealth having none of those Interests which are the causes of Sedition can be subject to no such effect TO affirm then with the Considerer that the whole of this Libration is reduc'd to the want of Power to disturb the Commonwealth must needs be a mistake seeing in the Commonwealth propos'd the People have the Power but can have no such Interest and the People having no such Interest no Party can have any such Power it being impossible that a Party should com to overbalance the People having their Arms in their own hands The whole matter being thus reduc'd to the want of Power to disturb the Government this according to his own Argument will appear to be the Libration in which the Power wherof the Governor is possest so vastly excedes the Power remaining with those Chap. 8 who are to obey which in case of contest must be so small a Party that it would be desperatly unreasonable for them to hope to maintain their Cause If the true method then of attaining to perfection in Government be to make the Governor absolute and the People in an equal Commonwealth be absolute then there can be none in this Government that upon probable terms can dispute the Power with the Governor and so this State by his own Argument must be free from Sedition Thus far upon occasion of the ambitious poor Man objected I have spoken of the Many and in speaking of the Many implicitly of the Few for as in an equal Commonwealth for example in England during the Peerage or Aristocracy the Many depended upon or were included in the Few so in an equal Commonwealth the Few depend upon or are included in the Many as the Senat of Venice depends upon or is included in the Great Council by which it is annually elected in the whole or in som part So what was said in an equal Common-wealth of the Many or the poorer sort is also said of the Few or of the Richer who thro the virtue of the Agrarian as in Oceana or of other Orders supplying the defect of an Agrarian as in Venice not able to overbalance the People can never have
have for that which if they obtain they lose two for one and if they obtain not all for nothing Wherfore a People never will nor ever can never did nor ever shall take Arms for Levelling But they are intrusted with a Vote and therfore taking away the Lands of the five thousand or diminishing the Agrariâ—n by way of Counsil they need not obstruct their Industry but preserving the Revenue of that may bring themselves into the possession of the Land too This will they this can they less do because being in Counsil they must propose somthing for the advantage of the Commonwealth or of themselves as their end in such an Action But the Land coming to be in the possession of five thousand falls not into a number that is within the compass of the Few or such a one as can be Princes either in regard of their Number or of their Estates but to such a one as cannot consent to abolish the Agrarian because that were to consent to rob one another nor can they have any Party among them or against their common Interest strong enough to force them or to break it which remaining the five thousand neither are nor can be any more than a Popular State and the Balance remains every whit as equal as if the Land were in never so many more hands Wherfore the Commonwealth being not to be better'd by this means the People by Counsil can never go about to level nor diminish the Agrarian for the good of the Common-wealth Nor can they undertake it for the inrichment of themselves because the Land of Oceana as has bin demonstrated being level'd or divided equally among the Fathers of Familys only coms not to above ten pounds a year to each of them wheras every Footman costs his Master twenty pounds a year and there is not a Cottager having a Cow upon the Common but with his own Labor at one shilling a day gets twenty pounds a year which the Land being level'd were impossible because there would be no body able to set a Laborer on work oâ— to keep a Servant wherfore neither would nor could the People by Counsil go about any such business So there being no possible cause of Disagreement between the Few and the Many the Senat and the People there can be no such effect whence this is the Government which being perfectly equal has such a Libration in the frame of it that no man in or under it can contract such an Interest or Power as should be able to disturb the Common-wealth with Sedition Yet after all this the Prevaricator will only tell Consid p. 67. Mr. HARRINGTON for to deny the Conclusion is a fair way of disputing that this Libration is of the same nature with a Perpetual Motion in the Mechanics But let me tell him that in the Politics there is nothing mechanic or like it This is but an Idiotism of som Mathematician Book I resembling his who imagin'd the Stream of a River to be like that of his Spiggot Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis at ille Labitur labetur in omne volubilis aevum The silly Swain upon a River stood In hope the rolling bottom of the Flood Would once unwind it self whose liquid Clew The silver Thred for ever shall renew THE Mathematician must not take God to be such a one as he is Is that of the Sun of the Stars of a River a perpetual Motion Galen de usu partium l. 4. Even so one Generation gos and another coms Nature says GALEN has a tendency to make her Creature immortal if it were in the capacity of the matter on which she has to work but the People never dys This motion of theirs is from the hand of a perpetual Mover even God himself in whom we live and move and have our being and to this Current the Politician adds nothing but the Banks to which end or none the same God has also created human Prudence Wherfore there is not any thing that raises it self against God or right Reason if I say that it is in human Prudence so to apply these Banks that they may stand as long as the River runs or let this Considerer consider again and tell me out of Scripture or Reason why not Mathematicians it is true pretended to be the Monopolists of Demonstration but speak ingenuously have they as to the Politics hitherto given any other Demonstration than that there is a difference between Seeing and making of Spectacles Much more is that comparison of the Politics going upon certain and demonstrable Principles to Astrologers and Fortunetellers who have none at all vain and injurious For as in relation to what DAVID has said and Experience confirm'd of the Age of Man that it is threescore years and ten I may say that if a Man lys bedrid or dys before threescore years and ten of any natural Infirmity or Disease it was not thro any imperfection of Mankind but of his particular Constitution So in relation to the Principles and Definition of an equal Commonwealth yet unshaken nay untouch'd by this Prevaricator I may safely affirm that a Commonwealth is a Government which if it has bin seditious it has not bin from any imperfection in the kind but in the particular Constitution which where the like has happen'd must have bin inequal My Retreat to these Principles is call'd running into a Bog as if such as have no Principles were not Bogs Informis limus Stygiaeque paludes CHAP. IX Chap. 9 Whether Monarchy coming up to the perfection of the kind coms not short of the perfection of Government and has not som flaw in it In which is also treated of the Balance of France of the Original of a landed Clergy of Arms and their kinds ON Monarchy I have said that wheras it is of two kinds the one by Arms the other by a Nobility for that by Arms as to take the most perfect model in Turky it is not in Art or Nature to cure it of this dangerous flaw that the Janizarys have frequent Interest and perpetual Power to raise Sedition or tear the Magistrat in pieces For that by a Nobility as to take the most perfect Model of late in Oceana it was not in Art or Nature to cure it of that dangerous flaw that the Nobility had frequent Interest and perpetual Power by their Retainers and Tenants to raise Sedition and levy War whence I conclude that Monarchy reaching the perfection of the kind reaches not the perfection of Government but must still have som dangerous flaw in it THIS place tho I did not intend by it to make work for a Tinker could not be of less concernment than it proves to the Prevaricator who as if he were oblig'd to mend all falls first to patching with a Monarchy by Arms then with a Monarchy by a Nobility at length despairing throws away each and betakes himself with egregious confidence to make out of both a
new Monarchy which is neither By observation of these three flourishes the present Chapter may be brought into some method The first blow of his Hammer or that wherby he intends the flaw or hole in Monarchy by Arms shall henceforth be mended and tite is this That the Guards of the King's Consid p. 46. Person be not increas'd beyond the necessity of security that they be not suffer'd to stagnat at Court but be by a perpetual circulation drawn out upon service and chiefly that they consist not of one intire Body united under the same Head but be divided into distinct Partys and Commands as we may see in France where tho in proportion to the extent of their Dominions the King's Guards be more numerous than those of the Roman or Turkish Emperors yet being divided into distinct Bodys of French Scots and Switzers under their several Colonels and Captains they have never bin the Authors of any the least Sedition And in Turky of late years they begin to learn the Art of poisoning the Janizarys by the Spahys and so have frequently evaded the danger of their Mutinys Which fine work at first view gos upon this false ground that the Foundation of Monarchy by Arms is laid upon the Princes Guards or the Court Militia wheras Monarchy by Arms consists in no other Balance than the Princes being sole Landlord which where imperfect as it was in that of the Roman Emperors the Empire is the most troubl'd and where perfect as in Turky the Empire is less seditious For that which he says of France it relates to Monarchy by a Nobility and therfore is not to be confounded according to his method with this but refer'd to the next branch Book I AS to Monarchy by Arms tho it be true that the balance of Dominion in any of the three kinds may be said to be natural in regard of the effect yet seeing God has given the Earth to the Sons of Men that of a sole Landlord as Turky is not so natural in the cause or foundation as the Timars and therfore requires the application of som kind of force as the Janizarys who are not the root of the Government that being planted in the Earth of the Timars or military Farms and Colonys for that the Janizarys are not the Foundation of this Empire which was founded long before is plain in that this Order was not introduc'd till AMURATH the Second but the Dragon that lys at that root and without which the Fruit would fall into the mouths of the Timariots by way of Property as when the Knights Fees granted first for life became afterwards hereditary in Oceana which would cause such a fall from Monarchy that it would becom as we have seen the rise of popular Power the Lots in case this should happen of the Timariots little differing from those divided by JOSHUA to the Children of Israel wherfore when this happens in the Turkish Monarchy it is at an end And that this dos not happen tho there be divers other concurrent Policys I would have any man shew me how it could be but for the Janizarys Otherwise it is plain that the Janizarys being a flying Army on wing at all games and upon all occasions are not so much the Guard of the Prince as of the Empire which ruin'd the Prey falls to the Timariots as those that are in possession except these be ruin'd too who being all Horse and far greater in number than the Janizarys that are Foot would in case the aw of the Prince and the Policy of the Government which holds them divided were broken be invincible by the Janizarys who nevertheless by these aids can easily contain them Whence the Sedition of the Janizarys like that of a Nobility may be dangerous to the Prince but never threatens the Throne wheras the Sedition of the Timariots like that of a People would be more against the Throne than the Prince These things consider'd and in them the Nature Constitution or Disease of Monarchy by Arms we may consult the more rationally with the Considerer upon the Applications or Remedys by him offer'd which are three FIRST That the Guards of the King's Person be not increas'd beyond the necessity of Security But of what Security that of his Person or of his Empire or of both for speaking of a Monarchy by Arms in this latter sense only it is true and if so then this singular Maxim of State Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora might have bin spar'd Cela s'en va sans le dire comme les heures de nostre curè SECONDLY That they be not suffer'd to stagnat at Court but be by a perpetual circulation drawn out upon service for if there be not perpetual service it should seem men might be apt to think that Government was instituted for Peace as well as War I add no more than is imply'd in his words which as to this of Turky have chanc'd well where not the Stagnation of the Janizarys only but of the Court it self which by the institution should always be in exercise of Arms is the cause of that present decay so perceivable in this Empire But the Prince sitting still or stagnating to what the Circulation of the Janizarys whose Alienation from the Government or Intelligence with the Timariots must needs be of dangerous consequence could tend should have bin thought on otherwise to expose the Empire to Chap. 9 danger for the safety of the Prince is no cure of the Government BUT his chief Remedy remains This Court Militia must not consist of one intire body united under the same head but be divided under several Colonels Captains Partys Brigades and distributed to several Quarters As if this were a cure there were any Army that could be mutinous but where he says not united under the same Head he intimats perhaps divers Generals and divers Armys now such are the Turkish Beglerbegs and the Provinces under their Governments That these therfore be kept divided so that not any two of them can lay their heads together without having them cut off nor any Son succede the Father in Government requires that there be always a sufficient force distinct from the Interest of the Timariots and Beglerbegs united and still ready upon occasion of this service and the Janizarys with the Spahys or Court-Horse being united are no more than sufficient for this service Wherfore if these also were so divided as therby to be weaken'd they could not be sufficient for this service and their division except such as might weaken them would be of no security to the Prince That the Provinces under this aw are less apt to rebel than the Court-Guards to mutiny is no wonder but the Court-Guards being cur'd by the prescription of this Physician of the possibility of Mutiny which without weakening them is impossible the Provinces if Liberty or Riches or Power be desirable would never indure the yoke
of the Magistrat as in Spain But this by making som Familys too secure as those in possession and others too despairing as those not in possession may make the whole People less industrious WHERFORE the other way which by the regulation of Purchases ordains only that a mans Land shall not excede som certain proportion for example two thousand Pounds a year or exceding such a proportion shall divide in descending to the Children so soon as being more than one they shall be capable of such a division or subdivision till the greater share excedes not two thousand pounds a year in Land lying and being within the native Territory is that which is receiv'd and establish'd by the Commonwealth of Oceana BY Levelling they who use the word seem to understand when a People rising invades the Lands and Estates of the richer sort and divides them equally among themselves as for example No where in the World this being that both in the way and in the end which I have already demonstrated to be impossible Now the words of this Lexicon being thus interpreted let us hearken what the Prevaricator will say and out it coms in this manner Consid p. 73. TO him that makes Property and that in Lands the Foundation of Empire the establishing of an Agrarian is of absolute necessity that by it the Power may be fix'd in those hands to whom it was at first committed WHAT need we then procede any further while he having no where disprov'd the Balance in these words gives up the whole Cause For as to that which he says of Mony seeing neither the vast Treasure of HENRY the 7 th alter'd the Balance of England nor the Revenue of Book I the Indys alters that of Spain this Retrait except in the Cases excepted is long since barricado'd But he is on and off and any thing to the contrary notwithstanding gives you this for certain THE Examples of an Agrarian are so infrequent that Mr. HARRINGTON is constrain'd to wave all but two Commonwealths and can find in the whole extent of History only Israel and Lacedemon to fasten upon A MAN that has read my Writings or is skill'd in History cannot chuse but see how he slurs his Dice nevertheless to make this a Pol. L. 2. C. 5. little more apparent It has seem'd to som says ARISTOTLE the main point of Institution in Government to order Riches right whence otherwise derives all civil Discord Vpon this ground PHALEAS the Chalcedonian Legislator made it his first work to introduce equality of Goods and PLATO in his Laws allows not increase to a possession beyond certain bounds The Argives and the Messenians had each their Agrarian after the manner of Lacedemon If a man shall translate the words Plut. Lycurg 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 virtus facultas civilis Political Virtue or Faculty where he finds them in ARISTOTLE'S Politics as I make bold and appeal to the Reader whether too bold to do by the words Political Balance understood as I have stated the thing it will give such a light to the Author as will go nearer than any thing alleg'd as before by this Prevaricator to deprive me of the honor Pol. L. 3. C. 9. of that invention For example where ARISTOTLE says If one man or such a number of men as to the capacity of Government com within the compass of the Few excel all the rest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in balance or in such a manner that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Political Facultys or Estates of all the rest be not able to hold weight with him or them they will never condescend to share equally with the rest in power whom they excel in Balance nor is it to any purpose to give them Laws who will be as the Gods their own Laws and will answer the People as the Lions are said by ANTISTHENES to have answer'd the Hares when they had concluded that every one ought to have an equal Portion For this cause he adds Citys that live under Popular Power have instituted the Ostracism for the preservation of Equality by which if a man increase in Riches Retinue or Popularity above what is safe they can remove him without loss of Honor or Estate for a time IF the Considerer thinks that I have strain'd courtesy with ARISTOTLE who indeed is not always of one mind further than is warrantable in relation to the Balance be it as he pleases I who must either have the more of Authority or the less of Competition in the point shall lose neither way However it is in this place enough that the Ostracism being of like nature was that which supply'd the defect in the Grecian Citys of an Agrarian To procede then to Rome that the People there by striving for an Agrarian strove to save their Liberty is apparent in that thro the want of such a Law or the nonobservance of it the Commonwealth came plainly to ruin If a Venetian should keep a Table or have his House furnish'd with Retainers he would be obnoxious to the Council of Ten and if the best of them appear with other State or Equipage than is allow'd to the meanest he is obnoxious to the Officers of the Pomp which two Orders in a Commonwealth where the Gentry have but small Estates in Land are as much as needs be in lieu of an Agrarian But the German Republics have no more to supply the place of this Law than that Estates descending are divided among the Children which sure no man but will say must needs be Chap. 11 both just and pious and we ask you no more in Oceana where grant this and you grant the whole Agrarian Thus had I set him all the Commonwealths in the World before and so it is no fault of mine that he will throw but at three of them These are Israel Lacedemon and Oceana Consid p. 77. FIRST at Israel Mr. HARRINGTON says he thinks not upon the Promise of GOD to ABRAHAM whence the Israelites deriv'd their Right to the Land of Canaan but considers the division of the Lands as a Politic Constitution upon which the Government was founded tho in the whole History of the Bible there be not the least footstep of such a design WHAT means the man the Right of an Israelite to his Land deriv'd from the Promise of GOD to ABRAHAM therfore the Right of an Oceaner to his Land must derive from the Promise of GOD to ABRAHAM Or why else should I in speaking of Oceana where Property is taken as it was found and not stirr'd a hair think on the Promise to ABRAHAM Nor matters it for the manner of division seeing that was made and this was found made each according to the Law of the Government But in the whole Bible says he there is not the least footstep that the end of the Israelitish Agrarian was Political or that it was intended to be the Foundation of the Government THE
Footsteps of God by the Testimony of DAVID may be seen in the deep Waters much more by the consent of the whole Bible in Land or in the foundation of Empire unless we make the Footsteps of God to be one thing and his ways another which as to Government are these Grot. ad Numb 26. 53. GOD by the Ballot of Israel more fully describ'd in the next Book divided the Land som respect had to the Princes and Patriarchs for the rest to every one his inheritance according to the number of names which were drawn out of one Urn first and the Lots of Land the measure with the goodness of the same consider'd drawn afterwards out of the other Urn to those names Wherfore God ordaining the Cause and the Cause of necessity producing the Effect God in ordaining this Balance intended Popular Government But when the People admitting of no Nay would have a King God therupon commanding SAMUEL to shew them the manner of the King SAMUEL declar'd to the People concerning the manner or policy of the King saying He will take your Fields and your Vinyards and your Oliveyards even 1 Sam. 8. the best of them and give to his Servants which kind of proceding must needs create the Balance of a Nobility over and above this he will take the tenth of your Seed and of your Vinyards and of your Sheep by way of Tax for the maintenance of his Armys and thus your Daughters shall com to be his Cooks and Confectioners and your Sons to run before his Chariot There is not from the Balance to the Superstructures a more perfect description of a Monarchy by a Nobility For the third Branch the People of Egypt in time of the Famin which was very sore com to JOSEPH saying Buy us and our Land Gen. 47. 19 20. for Bread and we and our Land will be Servants to PHARAOH And JOSEPH bought all the Land of Egypt except that of the Priests for PHARAOH So the Land became PHARAOH'S who lest the remembrance of their former Property by lively marks and continual remembrancers should stir them up as the Vandals in Africa strip'd in Grot. ad Gen. 47. like manner of their Property and yet remaining in their antient Book I Dwellings were stir'd up by their Women to Sedition remov'd the People thus sold or drave them like Cattel even from one end of the borders of Egypt to the other end therof In which you have the Balance of a sole Landlord or absolute Prince with the miserable and yet necessary consequence of an inslav'd People Now the Balance of Governments throout the Scriptures being of these kinds and no other the Balance of Oceana is exactly calculated to the most approv'd way and the clearest Footsteps of God in the whole History of the Bible and wheras the Jubile was a Law instituted for preservation of the popular Balance from alteration so is the Agrarian in Oceana BUT says the Prevaricator Hocus Pocus or in the name of Wonder how can this Agrarian be the Foundation of that Government which had subsisted more than forty five years without it For they were so long after the giving of this Law for the division of the Land before they had the Land to divide WHICH is as if one should say upon that other Law of the like date Judges and Officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates Hocus Pocus or in the name of Wonder how should the Children of Israel make them Judges and Officers in their gates before they had any gates to make them in fine sport to be play'd by an Attorny for the Clergy with Scripture where it is plain enough that the Laws of a Commonwealth were given by MOSES to an Army to be put in execution when that Army should becom a Commonwealth as happen'd under JOSHUA BUT no saying will serve his turn If this Agrarian were meant as fundamental to the Government the Provision he will have it was weak and not proper for attaining the end propos'd there being nothing in the nature of the Agrarian to hinder but that the whole Country might for the space of near fifty years that is the time between the two Jubiles have com into the hands of one man and so have destroy'd Balance Agrarian Government and all THIS they that boast of their Mathematics might have taken the pains before they had bin so confident to have demonstrated possible as how or by what means one Lot could com in fifty years to be multiply'd six hundred thousand times and that without Usury which bar the Israelits being no Merchants was thought sufficient to be given or thus to call the Prudence of God by their impracticable Phansys in question is abominable I WOULD have Divines as this Prevaricator persuades and it should seem has persuaded som of them to overthrow the Commonwealth of Israel for otherwise I will give them my word they shall never be able to touch that of Oceana which except in the hereditary Succession and Dignity of the Princes of the Tribes and the Patriarchs and that the Senat was for life differs not from the former for as to the divers working up of the Superstructures in divers Commonwealths according to the diversity of occasions it coms to no accountable difference and much I conceive of this carving or finishing in Israel which had it bin extant would perhaps have shewn a greater resemblance is lost For the Senats as to their numbers that of the 300 in Oceana considering the bulk of the People excedes not that of the Seventy in Israel the Succession and Dignity of the Princes of the Tribes and of the Patriarchs was ordain'd for the preservation of the Pedigrees which CHRIST being born are not any more to be of like consequence and that the Senators were for life deriv'd from a Chap. 11 former Custom of such a number of Elders exercising som Authority in Egypt tho not that of the Senat till it was instituted by God from the descent of the Patriarchs into that Land who being at their descent seventy Persons and governing their Familys by the right of Paternity as the People increas'd and they came to dy had their Successors appointed in such a manner that the number of Seventy in remembrance of those Patriarchs was diligently preserv'd And forasmuch as the Patriarchs governing their own Familys which at first were all in their own right were consequently for life this also pleas'd in the substitution of others These things rightly consider'd I have not vary'd from the Authority of Israel in a tittle there being neither any such necessary use of Pedigrees nor uninterrupted Succession of Elders for life in Oceana and unless a man will say That we ought to have the like Effect where there is not the like Cause which were absurd the Authority of a Commonwealth holds no otherwise than from the Cause to the Effect OCEANA I say cannot be wounded but by piercing the
have don This as reason good will be upon Wheels or Rotation For AS the Agrarian answers to the equality of the Foundation or Root so dos Rotation to the equality of the Superstructures or Branches of a Commonwealth EQUAL Rotation is equal Vicissitude in or Succession to Magistracy confer'd for equal terms injoining such equal Vacations as case the Government to take in the Body of the People by parts succeding others thro the free Election or Suffrage of the whole THE contrary wherto is prolongation of Magistracy which trashing the wheel of Rotation destroys the Life or natural Motion of a Commonwealth THE Prevaricator whatever he has don for himself has don this for me that it will be out of doubt whether my Principles be capable of greater Obligation or Confirmation than by having Objections made against them Nor have I bin altogether ingrateful or nice of my Labor but gon far much farther than I needed about that I might return with the more valuable Present to him that sent me on the Book I errand I shall not bo short of like proceding upon the present Subject but rather over ROTATION in a Commonwealth is of the Magistracy of the Senat of the People of the Magistracy and the People of the Magistracy and the Senat or of the Magistracy of the Senat and of the People which in all com to six kinds FOR example of Rotation in the Magistracy you have the Judg Grot. of Israel call'd in Hebrew Shophet The like Magistracy after the Kings ITHOBAL and BAAL came in use with the Tyrians from these with their Posterity the Carthaginians who also call'd their supreme Magistrats being in number two and for their Term Annual Shophetim which the Latins by a softer Pronunciation render Suffetes THE Shophet or Judg of Israel was a Magistrat not that I can find oblig'd to any certain term throout the Book of Judges nevertheless it is plain that his Election was occasional and but for a time after the manner of a Dictator TRUE it is that ELI and SAMUEL rul'd all their lives but upon this such impatience in the People follow'd thro the corruption of their Sons as was the main cause of the succeding Monarchy THE Magistrats in Athens except the Areopagits being a Judicatory were all upon Rotation The like for Lacedemon and Rome except the Kings in the former who were indeed hereditary but had no more Power than the Duke in Venice where all the rest of the Magistrats except the Procuratori whose Magistracy is but mere Ornament are also upon Rotation FOR the Rotation of the Senat you have Athens the Achaeans Aetolians Lycians the Amphictionium and the Senat of Lacedemon reprov'd Pol. l. 2. c. 7. in that it was for life by ARISTOTLE Modern Examples of like kind are the Diet of Switzerland but especially the Senat of Venice FOR the Rotation of the People you have first Israel where the Congregation which the Greecs call Ecclesia the Latins Comitia or Concio having a twofold capacity first that of an Army in which they were the constant Guard of the Country and secondly that of a Representative in which they gave the Vote of the People at the creation of their Laws or election of their Magistrats was Monthly 1 Chron. 27. 1. Now the Children of Israel after their Number to wit the chief Fathers and Captains of thousands and hundreds and their Officers that serv'd the King in any matter of the Courses which came in and went out month by month throout all the months of the year of every Course were twenty and four thousand Grot. ad loc SUCH a multitude there was of military Age that without inconvenience four and twenty thousand were every month in Arms whose term expiring others succeded and so others by which means the Rotation of the whole People came about in the space of one year The Tribuns or Commanders of the Tribes in Arms or of the Prerogative for the month are nam'd in the following part of the Chapter to the sixteenth Verse where begins the enumeration of the Princes tho GAD and ASHUR for what reason I know not be omitted of the Tribes remaining in their Provinces where they judg'd the People and as they receiv'd Orders were to bring or send such farther Inforcement or Recruits as occasion requir'd to the Army after these some other Officers are mention'd There is no question to be made but this Chap. 12 Rotation of the People together with their Prerogative or Congregation was preserv'd by the monthly Election of two thousand Deputys in each of the twelve Tribes which in all came to four and twenty thousand or let any man shew how otherwise it was likely to be don the nature of their Office being to give the Vote of the People who therfore sure must have chosen them By these the Vote of the People was given to their Laws and at Elections of their Magistrats TO their Laws as where DAVID proposes the reduction of the Ark And DAVID consulted with the Captains of thousands and hundreds 1 Chron. 13. and with every Leader And DAVID said to all the Congregation of Israel If it seems good to you and it be of the Lord God let us send abroad to our Brethren every where the Princes of Tribes in their Provinces that are left in the Land of Israel and with them also to the Priests and Levites which are in the Citys and Suburbs that they may gather themselves to us and let us bring again the Ark of our God to us for we inquir'd not at it in the days of SAUL And all the Congregation gave their Suffrage in the Affirmative said that they would do so for the thing was right in the eys of the People Nulla lex sibi soli conscientiam Justitiae Grot. è Tertul. suae debet sed eis a quibus obsequium expectat Now that the same Congregation or Representative gave the Vote of the People also in the Election of Priests Officers and Magistrates Moreover DAVID and 1 Chron. 25. the Captains of the Host separated to the Service of the Sons of ASAPH and of HEMAN and of JEDUTHUN who should prophesy with Harps with Psalterys and with Cymbals But upon the occasion to which we are more especially beholden for the preservation and discovery of this admirable Order DAVID having propos'd the business in a long and 1 Chron. 28. 2. pious speech the Congregation made SOLOMON the Son of DAVID King the second time and anointed him to the Lord to be chief Governor 1 Chron. 29. 22. and ZADOK to be Priest For as to the first time that SOLOMON was made King it happen'd thro the Sedition of ADONIJAH to 1 Kings 1. have bin don in hast and tumultuously by those only of Jerusalem and the reason why ZADOK is here made Priest is that ABIATHAR was put out for being of the Conspiracy with ADONIJAH I MAY expect by
month of October that these being all chosen by that time then receive their Magistracy it consists also of sixty more call'd the Junta which are elected by the Scrutiny of the Old Senat that is by the Senat proposing and the Great Council resolving the rest of their Creation is after the same manner with the former In the Sixty of the Senat there cannot be above three of any one Kindred or Family nor in the Junta so many unless there be fewer in the former These Magistracys are all annual but without interval so that it is at the pleasure of the Great Council whether a Senator having finish'd his year they will elect him again The College THE College is a Council consisting more especially of three Orders of Magistrats call'd in their Language Savi as the Savi grandi to whose cognizance or care belong the whole affairs of Sea and Land the Savi di Terra ferma to whose care and cognizance belong the affairs of the Land and the Savi di Mare to whose cognizance appertain Book I the affairs of the Sea and of the Ilands These are elected by the Senat not all at once but for the Savi grandi who are six by three at a time with the interposition of three months and for the Savi di Terra ferma and the Savi di Mare who are each five after the same manner save only that the first Election consists of three and the second of two Each Order of the Savi elects weekly one Provost each of which Provosts has Right in any affair belonging to the cognizance of his Order to propose to the College Audience of Embassadors and matters of foren Negotiation belong properly to this Council The Signory THE Signory consists of the Duke and of his Counsillors The Duke is a Magistrat created by the Great Council for life to whom the Commonwealth acknowleges the Reverence due to a Prince and all her Acts run in his name tho without the Counsillors he has no Power at all while they can perform any Function of the Signory without him The Counsillors whose Magistracy is annual are elected by the Scrutiny of the Senat naming one out of each Tribe for the City is locally divided into six Tribes and the Great Council approving so the Counsillors are six whose Function in part is of the nature of Masters of Requests having withal power to grant certain Privileges but their greatest preeminence is that all or any one of them may propose to any Council in the Commonwealth Certain Rights of the Councils THE Signory has Session and Suffrage in the College the College has Session and Suffrage in the Senat and the Senat has Session and Suffrage in the Great Council The Signory or the Provosts of the Savi have power to assemble the College the College has power to assemble the Senat and the Senat has power to assemble the Great Council the Signiori but more peculiarly the Provosts of the Savi in their own Offices and Functions have power to propose to the College the College has power to propose to the Senat and the Senat has power to propose to the Great Council Whatever is thus propos'd and resolv'd either by the Senat for somtimes thro the security of this Order a Proposition gos no further or by the Great Council is ratify'd or becoms the Law of the Commonwealth Over and above these Orders they have three Judicatorys two Civil and one Criminal in each of which forty Gentlemen elected by the Great Council are Judges for the term of eight months to these Judicatorys belong the Avogadori and the Auditori who are Magistrats having power to hear Causes apart and as they judg fitting to introduce them into the Courts IF a man tells me that I omit many things he may perceive I write an Epitome in which no more should be comprehended than that which understood may make a man understand the rest But of these principal parts consists the whole body of admirable Venice THE Consiglio de' Dieci or Council of Ten being that which partakes of Dictatorian Power is not a limb of her but as it were a Sword in her hand This Council in which the Signory has also Session and Suffrage consists more peculiarly of ten annual Magistrats created by the Great Council who afterwards elect three of their own number by Lot which so elected are call'd Capi de' Dieci their Magistracy being monthly Again out of the three Capi one is taken by Lot whose Magistracy is weekly this is he who over against the Tribunal in the Great Council sits like another Duke and is call'd the Provost of the Dieci It belongs to these three Magistrats to assemble Chap. 12 the Council of Ten which they are oblig'd to do weekly of course and oftner as they see occasion The Council being assembl'd any one of the Signory or two of the Capi may propose to it the power which they now exercise and wherin for their assistance they create three Magistrats call'd the Grand Inquisitors consists in the punishment of certain heinous Crimes especially that of Treason in relation wherto they are as it were Sentinels standing upon the guard of the Commonwealth But constitutively with the addition of a Junta consisting of other fifteen together with som of the chief Magistráts having Right in cases of important speed or secrecy to this Council they have the full and absolute Power of the whole Commonwealth as Dictator THAT Venice either transcrib'd the whole and every part of her Constitution out of Athens and Lacedemon or happens to be fram'd as if she had so don is most apparent The Result of this Common-wealth is in the Great Council and the Debate in the Senat so was it in Lacedemon A Decree made by the Senat of Athens had the power of a Law for one year without the People at the end wherof the People might revoke it A Decree of the Senat of Venice stands good without the Great Council unless these see reason to revoke it The Pryians were a Council preparing business for the Senat so is the Collegio in Venice the Presidents of the Prytans were the ten Proedri those of the Collegio are the three Provosts of the Savi The Archons or Princes of Athens being nine had a kind of Soverain Inspection upon all the Orders of the Commonwealth so has the Signory of Venice consisting of nine besides the Duke The Quarancys in Venice are Judicatorys of the nature of the Heliaea in Athens and as the Thesmothetae heard and introduc'd the causes into that Judicatory so do the Avogadori and the Auditori into these The Consiglio de' Dieci in Venice is not of the Body but an Appendix of the Commonwealth so was the Court of the Ephori in Lacedemon and as these had power to put a King a Magistrat or any Delinquent of what degree soever to death so has the Consiglio de' Dieci This again is
is nevertheless Phil. 1. shewn by POLLUX to have bin the peculiar Office of the Thesmothetae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to chirotonize the Magistrats For as the Proedri were Presidents of the People in their Legislative Capacity so were the Thesmothetae upon occasion of Elections thus the Chirotonia L. 8. c. 8. of the Proedri or of the Thesmothetae signifys nothing else but the Chirotonia of the People by which they enacted all their Laws and elected all their Civil or Ecclesiastical Magistrats or Priests as the Rex Sacrificus and the Orgeones except som by the Lot which Ordination as is observ'd by ARISTOTLE is equally popular This whether ignorantly or wilfully unregarded has bin as will be seen hereafter the cause of great absurdity for who sees not that to put the Chirotonia or Soverain Power of Athens upon the Proedri or the Thesmothetae is to make such a thing of that Government as can no wise be understood Book II WHAT the People had past by their Chirotonia was call'd Psephisma an Act or Law And because in the Nomothetae there were always two Laws put together to the Vote that is to say the old one and that which was offer'd in the room of it they that were for the old Law were said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to pronounce in the Negative and they that were for the new 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to pronounce for the Affirmative THESE Laws these Propositions or this frame of Government having bin propos'd first by SOLON and then ratify'd or establish'd by the Chirotonia of the Athenian People ARISTOTLE says of him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he instituted or constituted the popular Government which Constitution implys not any Power in SOLON who absolutely refus'd to be a King and therfore the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to him implys no more than Authority I have shew'd you the Words in controversy and the Things together in the Mint now whether they that as to Athens introduc'd them both understood either I leave my Reader by comparing them to judg IT is true that the Things exprest by these Words have bin in som Commonwealths more in others less antient than the Greec Language but this hinders not the Greecs to apply the Words to the like Constitutions or Things wherever they find them as by following HALICARNASSAEUS I shall exemplify in Rome Lib. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ROMULUS when he had distributed the People into Tribes and Parishes proceded to ordain the Senat in this manner the Tribes were three and the Parishes thirty out of every Tribe he elected three Senators and out of every Parish three more all by the Suffrage of the People These therfore came to ninety nine chosen by the Chirotonia to which he added one more not chosen by the Chirotonia but by himself only Which Election we may therfore say was made by the Chirothesia for as in this Chapter I am shewing that the Chirotonia is Election by the Many so in the next I shall shew that the Chirothesia is Election by One or by the Few But to keep to the matter in hand the Magistrat thus chosen by ROMULUS was praefectus urbi the Protector of the Commonwealth or he who when the King was out of the Nation or the City as upon occasion of war had the exercise of Royal Power at home In like manner with the Civil Magistracy were the Priests created tho som of them not so antiently for the Pontifex Maximus the Rex Sacrificus and the Flamens were all ordain'd by the Suffrage of the People Pontifex Tributis Rex Centuriatis Flamines Curiatis the latter of which being no more than Parish Priests had no other Ordination than by their Parishes All the Laws and all the Magistrats in Rome even the Kings themselves were according to the Orders of this Commonwealth to be created by the Chirotonia of the People which nevertheless is by APPIAN somtimes call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Chirotonia of the Tribuns whether these Magistrats were Presidents of the Assemblys of the People or elected by them Sic Romani Historici non raro loquuntur Consulem Calv. Inst l. 4. cap. 3. â— 15. qui comitia habuerit creasse novos Magistratus non aliam ob causam nisi quia suffragia receperit Populum moderatus est in eligendo WHAT past the Chirotonia of the People by the Greecs is call'd Dion Hal. l. 8. Psephisma 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 When the Congregation of the People was to be dismist MARCUS standing up said Your Psephisma Chap. 3 that is your Act is exceding good c. THIS Policy for the greater part is that which ROMULUS as was shewn is said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to have instituted or ordain'd tho it be plain that he ordain'd it no otherwise than by the Chirotonia of the People THUS you have another example of the three words in controversy Chirotonia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psephisma still apply'd in the same sense and to the same things Have I not also discover'd already the original Right of Ordination whether in civil or religious Orders This will be scandalous How derive Ordination as it is in the Church of CHRIST or as it was in the Church of the Jews from the Religion or rather Superstition of the Heathens I meddle not with their Religion nor yet with their Superstition but with their Ordination which was neither but a part of their Policy And why is not Ordination in the Church or Commonwealth of CHRIST as well a political thing as it was in the Churches or Commonwealths of the Jews or of the Heathens Why is not Election of Officers in the Church as well a political thing as Election of Officers in the State and why may not this be as lawfully perform'd by the Chirotonia in the one as in the other Philo de Inst Princ. THAT MOSES introduc'd the Chirotonia is expresly said by PHILO tho he opposes it to the Ballot in which I believe he is mistaken as not seeing that the Ballot including the Suffrage of the People by that means came as properly under the denomination of the Chirotonia as the Suffrage of the Roman People which tho it were given by the Tablet is so call'd by Greec Authors All Ordination of Magistrats as of the Senators or Elders of the Sanhedrim of the Judges or Elders of inferior Courts of the Judg or Suâ—fes of Israel of the King of the Priests of the Levits whether with the Ballot or viva voce was perform'd by the Chirotonia or Suffrage of the People In this especially if you admit the Authority of the Jewish Lawyers and Divines call'd the Talmudists the Scripture will be clear but their Names are hard wherfore not to make my Discourse more rough than I need I shall here set them together The Authors or Writings I use by way of Paraphrase upon the Scripture are the Gemara Babylonia Midbar Rabba Sepher
So that this being the Militia of the Nation a few Noblemen discontented could at any time levy a great Army the effect wherof both in the Barons Wars and those of York and Lancaster had bin well known to divers Kings This state of Affairs was that which inabl'd HENRY the Seventh to make his advantage of troublesom times and the frequent unruliness of Retainers while under the pretence of curbing Riots he obtain'd the passing of such Laws as did cut off these Retainers wherby the Nobility wholly lost their Officers Then wheras the dependence of the People upon their Lords was of a strict ty or nature he found means to loosen this also by Laws which he obtain'd upon as fair a pretence even that of Population Thus Farms were so brought to a Verulam H. 7. standard that the Houses being kept up each of them did of necessity inforce a Dweller and the proportion of Land laid to each House did of necessity inforce that Dweller not to be a Begger or Cottager but a man able to keep Servants and set the Plow on going By which means a great part of the Lands of this Nation came in effect to be amortiz'd to the hold of the Yeomanry or middle People wherof consisted the main body of the Militia hereby incredibly advanc'd and which henceforth like cleaner underwood less choak'd by their staddles began to grow excedingly But the Nobility who by the former Laws had lost their Offices by this lost their Soldiery Yet remain'd to them their Estates till the same Prince introducing the Statutes for Alienations these also became loose and the Lords less taken for the reasons shewn with their Country lives where their Trains were clip'd by degrees became more resident at Court where greater pomp and expence by the Statutes of Alienations began to plume them of their Estates The Court was yet at Bridewel nor reach'd London any farther than Temple-Bar The latter growth of this City and in that the declining of the Balance to Popularity derives from the decay of the Nobility and of the Clergy In the Reign of the succeding King were Abbys than which nothing more dwarfs a People demolish'd I did not I do not attribute the effects of these things thus far to my own particular observation but always did and do attribute a sense therof to the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH and the Wisdom of her Council There is yet living Testimony that the ruin of the English Monarchy thro the causes mention'd was frequently attributed to HENRY the Seventh by Sir HENRY WOTTON which Tradition is not unlike to have descended to him from the Queen's Council But there is a difference between having the sense of a thing and making a right use of that sense Let a man read PLUTARCH in the Lives of AGIS and of the GRACCHI there can be no plainer demonstration of the Lacedemonian or Roman Balance yet read his Discourse of Government in his Morals and he has forgot it he makes no use no mention at all of any such thing Who could have bin plainer upon this point than Sir WALTER RALEIGH where to prove that the Kings of Egypt were not elective but hereditary he alleges that if the Book I Kings of Egypt had bin elective the Children of PHARAOH must have Hist of the World part 1. p. 200. bin more mighty than the King as Landlords of all Egypt and the King himself their Tenant Yet when he coms to speak of Government he has no regard to no remembrance of any such Principle In Mr. SELDEN'S Titles of Honor he has demonstrated the English Balance of the Peerage without making any application of it or indeed perceiving it there or in times when the defect of the same came to give so full a sense of it The like might be made apparent in ARISTOTLE in MACCHIAVEL in my Lord VERULAM in all in any Politician there is not one of them in whom may not be found as right a sense of this Principle as in this present Narrative or in whom may be found a righter use of it than was made by any of the Partys thus far concern'd in this story or by Queen ELIZABETH M. D. l. 1. b. 10. and her Council If a Prince says a great Author to reform a Government were oblig'd to depose himself he might in neglecting of it be capable of som excuse but reformation of Government being that with which a Principality may stand he deserves no excuse at all It is not indeed observ'd by this Author that where by reason of the declination of the Balance to Popularity the State requires Reformation in the Superstructures there the Prince cannot rightly reform unless from Soverain Power he descends to a Principality in a Commonwealth nevertheless upon the like occasions this fails not to be found so in Nature and Experience The growth of the People of England since the ruins mention'd of the Nobility and the Clergy came in the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH to more than stood with the interest or indeed the nature or possibility of a well founded or durable Monarchy as was prudently perceiv'd but withal temporiz'd by her Council who if the truth of her Government be rightly weigh'd seem rather to have put her upon the exercise of Principality in a Commonwealth than of Soverain Power in a Monarchy Certain it is that she courted not her Nobility nor gave her mind as do Monarchs seated upon the like foundation to balance her great Men or reflect upon their Power now inconsiderable but rul'd wholly with an art she had to high perfection by humoring and blessing her People For this mere shadow of a Commonwealth is she yet famous and shall ever be so tho had she introduc'd the full perfection of the Orders requisit to Popular Government her fame had bin greater First She had establish'd such a Principality to her Successors as they might have retain'd Secondly This Principality the Common-wealth The great Council of Venice has the Soverain Power and the Duke the Soverain Dignity as Rome of ROMULUS being born of such a Parent might have retain'd the Royal Dignity and Revenue to the full both improv'd and discharg'd of all Envy Thirdly It had sav'd all the Blood and Confusion which thro this neglect in her and her Successors has since insu'd Fourthly It had bequeath'd to the People a Light not so naturally by them to be discover'd which is a great pity For M. D. l. 1. c. 9. even as the Many thro the difference of opinions that must needs abound among them are not apt to introduce a Government as not understanding the good of it so the Many having by trial or experience once attain'd to this understanding agree not to quit such a Government And lastly It had plac'd this Nation in that perfect felicity which so far as concerns mere Prudence is in the power of human nature to injoy To this Queen succeded King JAMES who
aid of som political Anatomist without which they may have Appeâ—iâ—s but will be chopfallen Examples wherof they have had but too many one I think may be insisted upon without envy THIS is that which was call'd The Agreement of the People consisting in sum of these Propositions The Anarchy of the Levellers THAT there be a Representative of the Nation consisting of four hundred Persons or not above WHICH Proposition puts the Bar on the quite contrary side this being the first example of a Commonwealth wherin it was conceiv'd that five hundred thousand men or more might be represented by four hundred The Representation of the People in one man causes Monarchy and in a few causes Oligarchy the Many cannot be otherwise represented in a State of Liberty than by so many and so qualify'd as may within the compass of that number and nature imbrace the interest of the whole People Government should be establish'd upon a Rock not set upon a Precipice a Representative consisting but of four hundred tho in the nature therof it be popular is not in it self a Weapon that is fix'd but has somthing of the broken Bow as still apt to start aside to Monarchy But the paucity of the number is temper'd with the shortness of the term it being farther provided THAT this Representative be biennial and sit not above eight Months But seeing a supreme Council in a Commonwealth is neither assembl'd nor dissolv'd but by stated Orders directing upwards an irresistible strength from the root and as one tooth or one nail is driven out by another how is it provided that this Biennial Council shall not be a perpetual Council Wheras nothing is more dangerous in a Commonwealth than intire Removes of Councils how is it provided that these shall be men sufficiently experienc'd for the management of Affairs And last of all wheras dissolution to Soverain Power is death to whom are these after their eight months to bequeath the Commonwealth In this case it is provided THAT there be a Council of State elected by each new Representative within twenty days after their first meeting to continue till ten days after the meeting of the next Representative In which the faults observ'd in the former Order are so much worse as this Council consists of fewer Thus far this Commonwealth is Oligarchy but it is provided THAT these Representatives have Soverain Power save that in som things the People may resist them by Arms. Which first is a flat contradiction and next is downright Anarchy Where the Soverain Power is not as intire and absolute as in Monarchy it self there can be no Government at all It is not the limitation of Soverain Power that is the cause of a Commonwealth but such a libration or poize of Orders that there can be in the same no number of men having the interest that can have the power nor any number of men having the power that can have the interest to invade or disturb the Goverment As the Orders of Commonwealths are more approaching to or remote from this Maxim of which this of the Levellers has nothing so are they more quiet or turbulent In the Religious part only proposing a National Religion and Liberty of Conscience tho without troubling themselves much with the means they are right in the end AND for the Military part they provide THAT no man even in case of Invasion be compellable to go out of the Country where he lives if he procures another to serve in his room Which plainly intails upon this Commonwealth a fit Guard for such a Liberty even a Mercenary Army for what one dos of this kind may and will where there is no bar be don by all so every Citizen by mony procuring his man procures his Master Now if this be work of that kind which the People in like cases as those also of Rome when they instituted their Tribuns do usually make then have I good reason not only to think but to speak it audibly That to sooth up the People with an opinion of their own sufficiency in these things is not to befriend them but to feed up all hopes of Liberty to the slaughter Yet the Leveller a late * A later Pamphlet call'd XXV Querys using the Balance of Property which is fair enough refers it to Sir Thomas Smith's 15th chap. de Repub. populi ingenio accommodanda where the Author speaks not one word of Property which is very foul Pamphlet having gather'd out of Oceana the Principles by him otherwise well insinuated attributes it to the Agitators or that Assembly which fram'd this wooden Agreement of the People That then som of that Council asserted these Principles and the reason of them BVT Railery apart we are not to think it has bin for nothing that the wisest Nations have in the formation of Government as much rely'd upon the invention of som one man as upon themselves for wheras it cannot be too often inculcated that Reason consists of two parts the one Invention the other Judgment a People or an Assembly are not more eminent in point of Judgment than they are void of Invention Nor is there in this any thing at all against the sufficiency of a People in the management of a proper Form being once introduc'd tho they should never com to a perfect understanding of it For were the natural Bodys of the People such as they might commonly understand they would be as I may say wooden Bodys or such as they could not use wheras their Bodys being now such as they understand not are yet such as in the use and preservation wherof they are perfect THERE are in Models of Government things of so easy practice and yet of such difficult understanding that we must not think them even in Venice who use their Commonwealth with the greatest prudence and facility to be all or any considerable number of them such as perfectly understand the true Reason or Anatomy of that Government nor is this a presumtuous Assertion since none of those Venetians who have hitherto written of their own form have brought the truth of it to any perfect light The like perhaps and yet with due acknowlegement to LIVY might be said of the Romans The Lacedemonians had not the right understanding of their Model till about the time of ARISTOTLE it was first written Book III by DICEARCHUS one of his Scholars How egregiously our Ancestors till those foundations were broken which at length have brought us round did administer the English Government is sufficiently known Yet by one of the wisest of our Writers even my Lord VERULAM is HENRY the Seventh parallel'd with the Legislators of antient and heroic times for the institution of those very Laws which have now brought the Monarchy to utter ruin The Commonwealths upon which MACCHIAVEL in his Discourses is incomparable are not by him any one of them sufficiently explain'd or understood Much less is it to be expected from
a People that they should overcom the like difficultys by reason wherof the wisest Nations finding themselves under the necessity of a change or of a new Government induc'd by such offers as promis'd fair or against which they could find no exceptions have usually acted as men do by new Clothes that is put them on that if they be not exactly fit at first they may either fit themselves to the body in wearing or therby more plainly shew wherin they can be mended even by such as would otherwise prove but bad workmen Nor has any such offer bin thought to have more Presumtion much less Treason in it than if one conscious of his skill in Architecture should offer himself to the Prince or State to build a more convenient Parlament house England is now in such a condition that he who may be truly said to give her Law shall never govern her and he who will govern her shall never give her Law Yet som will have it that to assert Popular Power is to sow the seed of Civil War and object against a Commonwealth as not to be introduc'd but by Arms which by the undeniable testimony of later Experience is of all other Objections the most extravagant for if the good old Cause against the desire even of the Army and of all men well affected to their Country could be trod under foot without blood what more certain demonstration can there be that let the deliberations upon or changes of Government be of what kind soever which shall please a Parlament there is no appearance that they can occasion any Civil War Streams that are stop'd may urge their Banks but the course of England into a Commonwealth is both certain and natural The ways of Nature require Peace The ways of Peace require Obedience to the Laws Laws in England cannot be made but by Parlaments Parlaments in England are com to be mere popular Assemblys The Laws made by popular Assemblys tho for a time they may be aw'd or deceiv'd in the end must be popular Laws and the sum of popular Laws must amount to a Commonwealth The whole doubt or hazard of this Consequence remains upon one question Whether a single Council consisting but of four hundred indu'd both with Debate and Result the Keys of whose Doors are in the hands of ambitious men in the croud and confusion of whose Election the People are as careless as tumultuous and easy thro the want of good Orders to be deluded while the Clergy declar'd and inveterat Enemys of popular Power are laying about and sweating in the throng as if it were in the Vinyard upon whose Benches Lawyers being feather'd and arm'd like sharp and sudden Arrows with a privat interest pointblank against the Public may and frequently do swarm can indeed be call'd a popular Council This I confess may set the whole state of Liberty upon the cast of a Dy yet questionless it is more than odds on the behalf of a Commonwealth when a Government labors in frequent or long struggles not thro any certain biass of Genius or Nature that can be in such a Council but thro the impotence of such Conclusions as may go awry and the external force or state of Property now fully introduc'd whence such a Council may wander but never find any rest or settlement except only in that natural and proper Form of Government which is to be erected upon a mere Popular Foundation All other ways of proceding must be void as inevitably guilty of contradiction in the Superstructures to the Foundation which have amounted and may amount to the discouragement of honest men but with no other success than to imbroil or retard Business England being not capable of any other permanent Form than that only of a Common-wealth tho her supreme Council be so constituted that it may be Monarchically inclin'd This contradiction in the Frame is the frequent occasion of contradictory Expostulations and Questions How say they should we have a Commonwealth Which way is it possible that it should com in And how say I can we fail of a Commonwealth What possibility is there we should miss of it IF a man replys he answers thus No Army ever set up a Common-wealth To the contrary I instance the Army of Israel under MOSES that of Athens about the time of ALCIBIADES that of Rome upon the expulsion of the TARQUINS those of Switzerland and Holland But say they other Armys have not set up Commonwealths True indeed divers other Armys have not set up Commonwealths yet is not that any Argument why our Armys should not For in all Armys that have not set up Commonwealths either the Officers have had no Fortunes or Estates at all but immediatly dependent upon the mere Will of the Prince as the Turkish Armys and all those of the Eastern Countrys or the Officers have bin a Nobility commanding their own Tenants Certain it is That either of these Armys can set up nothing but Monarchy But our Officers hold not Estates of Noblemen able upon their own Lands to levy Regiments in which case they would take home their People to plow or make Hay nor are they yet so put to it for their Livelihood as to depend wholly upon a Prince in which case they would fall on robbing the People but have good honest Popular Estates to them and their Heirs for never Now an Army where the Estates of the Officers were of this kind in no reason can in no experience ever did set up Monarchy Ay but say they for all that their Pay to them is more considerable than their Estates But so much more must they be for a Commonwealth because the Parlament must pay and they have found by experience that the Pay of a Parlament is far better than that of a Prince But the four hundred being Monarchically inclin'd or running upon the Interest of those irreconcilable Enemys of Popular Power Divines and Lawyers will rather pay an Army for commanding or for supporting of a Prince than for obeying Which may be true as was acknowleg'd before in the way but in the end or at the long run for the reasons mention'd must be of no effect THESE Arguments are from the Cause now for an Argument to Sense and from the Effect If our Armys would raise Mony of themselves or which is all one would make a King why have they not made a King in so many Years Why did they not make one yesterday Why do they not to day Nay why have they ever bin why do they still continue to be of all others in this point the most averse and refractory BVT if the case be so with us that Nature runs wholly to a Common-wealth and we have no such Force as can withstand Nature why may we not as well have golden Dreams of what this Commonwealth may be as of the Indys of Flanders or of the Sound The Frame of a Commonwealth may be dreamt on or propos'd two
Result in every Government is the Law in that Government 5. IN absolute Monarchy the ultimat Result is in the Monarch 6. IN Aristocracy or regulated Monarchy the ultimat Result is in the Lords or Peers or not without them 7. IN Democracy the ultimat Result is in the People 8. LAW in absolute Monarchy holds such a disproportion to natural Equity as the Interest of one Man to the Interest of all Mankind 9. LAW in Aristocracy holds such a disproportion to natural Equity as the Interest of a few Men to the Interest of all Mankind 10. LAW in Democracy holds such a disproportion to natural Equity as the Interest of a Nation to the Interest of all Mankind 11. ONE Government has much nearer approaches to natural Equity than another but in case natural Equity and Selfpreservation com in competition so natural is Selfpreservation to every Creature that in that case no one Government has any more regard to natural Equity than another 12. A Man may devote himself to death or destruction to save a Nation but no Nation will devote it self to death or destruction to save Mankind 13. MACCHIAVEL is decry'd for saying that no consideration is to be had of what is just or injust of what is merciful or cruel of what is honorable or ignominious in case it be to save a State or to preserve Liberty which as to the manner of expression is crudely spoken But to imagin that a Nation will devote it self to death or destruction any more upon Faith given or an Ingagement therto tending than if there had bin no such Ingagement made or Faith given were nor piety but folly 14. WHERSOEVER the power of making Law is there only is the power of interpreting the Law so made 15. GOD who has given his Law to the Soul of that man who shall voluntarily receive it is the only Interpreter of his Law to that Soul such at least is the judgment of Democracy With absolute Monarchy and with Aristocracy it is an innat Maxim That the People are to be deceiv'd in two things their RELIGION and their LAW Chap. IX or that the Church orthemselves are Interpreters of all Scripture as the Priests were antiently of the Sibyls Books FORM of Government as to the Legal part being thus completed is sum'd up in the three following Aphorisms 16. ABSOLUTE Monarchy for the Legal part of the Form consists of such Laws as it pretends God has deliver'd or given the King and Priests power to interpret or it consists of such Laws as the Monarch shall chuse or has chosen 17. ARISTOCRACY for the Legal part of the Form consists of such Laws as the Nobility shall chuse or have chosen or of such as the People shall chuse or have chosen provided they be agreed to by their Lords or by the King and their Lords 18. DEMOCRACY for the Legal part of the Form consists of such Laws as the People with the advice of their Council or of the Senat shall chuse or have chosen CHAP. IX Of Form in the Judicial part 1. MULTIPLICITY of Laws being a multiplicity of Snares for the People causes Corruption of Government 2. PAUCITY of Laws requires arbitrary Power in Courts or Judicatorys 3. ARBITRARY Power in reference to Laws is of three kinds 1 In making altering abrogating or interpreting of Laws which belong to the Soverain Power 2 In applying Laws to Cases which are never any one like another 3 In reconciling the Laws among themselves 4. THERE is no difficulty at all in judging of any case whatsoever according to natural Equity 5. ARBITRARY Power makes any man a competent Judg for his Knowlege but leaving him to his own Interest which oftentimes is contrary to Justice makes him also an incompetent Judg in regard that he may be partial 6. PARTIALITY is the cause why Laws pretend to abhor Arbitrary Power nevertheless seeing that not one case is altogether like another there must in every Judicatory be som arbitrary Power 7. PAUCITY of Laws causes arbitrary Power in applying them and Multiplicity of Laws causes arbitrary Power in reconciling and applying them too 8. ARBITRARY Power where it can do no wrong dos the greatest right because no Law can ever be so fram'd but that without arbitrary Power it may do wrong 9. ARBITRARY Power going upon the Interest of One or of a Few makes not a just Judicatory 10. ARBITRARY Power going upon the Interest of the whole People makes a just Judicatory 11. ALL Judicatorys and Laws which have bin made by Arbitrary Power allow of the Interpretation of Arbitrary Power and acknowlege an appeal from themselves to it 12. THAT Law which leaves the least arbitrary Power to the Chap. IX Judg or Judicatory is the most perfect Law 13. LAWS that are the fewest plainest and briefest leave the least arbitrary Power to the Judg or Judicatory and being a Light to the People make the most incorrupt Government 14. LAWS that are perplext intricat tedious and voluminous leave the greatest arbitrary Power to the Judg or Judicatory and raining snares on the People make the most corrupt Government 15. SEEING no Law can be so perfect as not to leave arbitrary Power to the Judicatory that is the best Constitution of a Judicatory where arbitrary Power can do the least hurt and the worst Constitution of a Judicatory is where arbitrary Power can do the most ill 16. ARBITRARY Power in one Judg dos the most in a few Judges dos less and in a multitude of Judges dos the least hurt 17. THE ultimat Appeal from all inferior Judicatorys is to som soverain Judg or Judicatory 18. THE ultimat Result in every Government as in absolute Monarchy the Monarch in Aristocracy or Aristocratical Monarchy the Peers in Democracy the Popular Assembly is a soverain Judg or Judicatory that is arbitrary 19. ARBITRARY Power in Judicatorys is not such as makes no use of the Law but such by which there is a right use to be made of the Laws 20. THAT Judicatory where the Judg or Judges are not obnoxious to Partiality or privat Interest cannot make a wrong use of Power 21. THAT Judicatory that cannot make a wrong use of Power must make a right use of Law 22. EVERY Judicatory consistâ— of a Judg or som Judges without a Jury or of a Jury on the Bench without any other Judg or Judges or of a Judg or Judges on the Bench with a Jury at the Bar. FORM of Government as to the Judicial part being thus completed is sum'd up in the three following Aphorisms 23. ABSOLUTE Monarchy for the Judicial part of the Form admits not of any Jury but is of som such kind as a Cadee or Judg in a City or as we say in a Hundred with an Appeal to a Cadaliskar or a Judg in a Province from whom also there lys an Appeal to the Mâ—phti who is at the devotion of the Grand Signor or of the Monarch 24. ARISTOCRACY or Aristocratical
consist of too many 71. IN every Commonwealth there has bin a Popular Assembly This in Israel at least consisted of twenty four thousand upon a monthly Rotation In Athens Lacedemon Rome it consisted of the whole Citizens that is of all such as had a right in the Commonwealth whether they inhabited in City or Country In Venice it consists of about two thousand In the Province of Holland only which contains eighteen or nineteen Soveraintys the Popular or resolving Assemblys consist at least of five hundred Persons these in the whole Union may amount to five or six thousand in Switzerland I believe they com to a greater number And the most of these Assemblys have bin perpetually extant 72. IF the Popular Assembly consists of so few and so eminent Persons as are capable of any orderly Debate it is good for nothing but to destroy the Commonwealth 73. IF the Popular Assembly consists of so many and for the greater part of so mean Persons as are not capable of Debate there must be a Senat to help this defect 74. THE Reason of the Senat is that a Popular Assembly rightly constituted is not capable of any prudent debate 75. THE Reason of the Popular Assembly is that a Senat rightly constituted for Debate must consist of so few and eminent Persons that if they have the Result too they will not resolve according to the Interest of the People but according to the Interest of themselves 76. A POPULAR Assembly without a Senat cannot be wise 77. A SENAT without a Popular Assembly will not be honest 78. THE Senat and the Popular Assembly being once rightly constituted the rest of the Commonwealth will constitute it self 79. THE Venetians having slain divers of their Dukes for their Tyranny and being assembl'd by such numbers in their great Council as were naturally incapable of Debate pitch'd upon thirty Gentlemen who were call'd Pregati in that they were pray'd to go apart and debating upon the Exigence of the Commonwealth to propose as they thought good to the great Council and from thence first arose the Senat of Venice to this day call'd the Pregati and the Great Council that is the Senat and the Popular Assembly of Venice And from these two arose all those admirable Orders of that Commonwealth 80. THAT a People of themselves should have such an understanding as when they of Venice did institute their Pregati or Senat is rare 81. THAT a Senat or Council of Governors having supreme Power should institute a popular Assembly and propose to it tho in all reason it be the far more facil and practicable is that which is rarer 82. THE diffusive body of the People is not in a natural capacity of judging for which cause the whole judgment and power of the diffusive Body of the People must be intirely and absolutely in their collective Bodys Assemblys or Representatives or there can be no Commonwealth 83. TO declare that the Assemblys or Representatives of the People have power in som things and in others not is to make the diffusive Body which is in a natural incapacity of judging to be in a political capacity of judging 84. TO bring a natural incapacity of judging to a political capacity of judging is to introduce Government To bring a natural incapacity of judging to such a collective or political capacity of judging as yet necessarily must retain the Interest of the diffusive Body is to introduce the best kind of Government But to lay any appeal whatsoever from a political capacity of judging to a natural incapacity of judging is to frustrat all Government and to introduce Anarchy Nor is Anarchy whether impos'd or obtruded by the Legislator first or by the People or their Demagogs or Incendiarys afterwards of any other kind whatsoever than of this only 85. TO make Principles or Fundamentals belongs not to Men to Nations nor to human Laws To build upon such Principles or Fundamentals as are apparently laid by GOD in the inevitable necessity or Law of Nature is that which truly appertains to Men to Nations and to human Laws To make any other Fundamentals and then build upon them is to build Castles in the Air. 86. WHATEVER is violent is not secure nor durable whatever is secure or durable is natural 87. GOVERNMENT in the whole People tho the major part were disaffected must be secure and durable because it waves Force to found it self upon Nature 88. GOVERNMENT in a Party tho all of these were well affected must be insecure and transitory because it waves Nature to found it self upon Force 89. COMMONWEALTHS of all other Governments are more especially for the preservation not for the destruction of Mankind 90. COMMONWEALTHS that have bin given to cut off their diseas'd Limbs as Florence have brought themselves to impotence and ruin Commonwealths that have bin given to healing their diseas'd Limbs as Venice have bin healthful and flourishing 91. ATHENS under the Oligarchy of four hundred was infinitly more afflicted and torn with Distraction Blood and Animosity of Partys than is England yet by introduction of a Senat of four hundred and a Popular Assembly of five thousand did therupon so suddenly as if it had bin a Charm recover Might and Glory See the eighth Book of THUCYDIDES A Story in these Times most necessary to be consider'd 92. TO leave our selves and Posterity to a farther purchase in Blood or Sweat of that which we may presently possess injoy and hereafter bequeath to Posterity in Peace and Glory is inhuman and impious 93. AS certainly and suddenly as a good state of health dispels the peevishness and peril of Sickness dos a good state of Government the animosity and danger of Partys 94. THE Frame of a Commonwealth having first bin propos'd and consider'd Expedients in case such should be found necessary for the safe effectual and perfect introduction of the same may with som aim be apply'd or fitted as to a House when the Model is resolv'd upon we fit Scaffolds in building But first to resolve upon Expedients and then to fit to them the Frame of a Commonwealth is as if one should set up Props and then build a House to lean upon them 95. AS the chief Expedients in the building of a House are Axes and Hammers so the chief Expedient in the building of a Government is a standing Army 96. AS the House which being built will not stand without the perpetual noise or use of Axes and Hammers is imperfect so is the Government which being form'd cannot support it self without the perpetual use of a standing Army 97. WHILE the Civil and Religious parts of a Commonwealth are in forming there is a necessity that she should be supported by an Army but when the Military and Provincial parts are rightly form'd she can have no farther use of any other Army Wherfore at this point and not till then her Armys are by the practice of Common-wealths upon slighter occasions to have
Senat. 33. THAT in all cases wherin Power is deriv'd to the Senat by Law made or by Act of Parlament the result of the Senat be ultimat That in all cases of Law to be made or not already provided for by Act of Parlament as som particular Peace or War levy of Men or Mony or the like the Result of the Senat be not ultimat but preparatory only and be propos'd by the Senat to the Prerogative Tribe or Assembly of the People except only in cases of such speed or secrecy wherin the Senat shall judg the necessary slowness or openness of like proceding to be of detriment or danger to the Commonwealth 34. THAT if upon the motion or proposition of a Council or Proposer General the Senat add nine Knights promiscuously or not promiscuously chosen out of their own number to the Council of War the said Council of War be therby made Dictator and have power of Life and Death as also to enact Laws in all cases of speed or secrecy for and during the term of three months and no longer except upon new Order from the Senat And that all Laws enacted by the Dictator be good and valid for the term of one year and no longer except the same be propos'd by the Senat and resolv'd by the People 35. THAT the Burgesses of the annual Election return'd by the Tribes enter into the Prerogative Tribe on Monday next insuing the last of March and that the like number of Burgesses whose term is expir'd recede at the same time That the Burgesses thus enter'd elect to themselves out of their own number two of the Horse one to be Captain and the other to be Cornet of the same and two of the Foot one to be Captain the other to be Insign of the same each for the term of three years That these Officers being thus elected the whole Tribe or Assembly procede to the election of four annual Magistrats two out of the Foot to be Tribuns of the Foot and two out of the Horse to be Tribuns of the Horse That the Tribuns be Commanders in chief of this Tribe so far as it is a Military Body and Presidents of the same as it is a Civil Assembly And lastly that this whole Tribe be paid weekly as follows to each of the Tribuns of the Horse seven pounds to each of the Tribuns of the Foot six pounds to each of the Captains of Horse five pounds to each of the Captains of Foot four pounds to each of the Cornets three pounds to each of the Insigns two pounds seven shillings to every Horseman one pound ten shillings and to every one of the Foot one pound 36. THAT inferior Officers as Captains Cornets Insigns be only for the Military Disciplin of the Tribe That the Tribuns have Session in the Senat without Suffrage That of course they have Session and Suffrage in the Dictatorian Council so often as it is created by the Senat. That in all cases to be adjudg'd by the People they be Presidents of the Court or Judicatory 37. THAT Peculat or Defraudation of the Public and all Cases or Crimes tending to the subversion of the Government be triable by the Prerogative Tribe or the Assembly of the People and that to the same there ly an Appeal in all Causes and from all Courts Magistrats or Councils National or Provincial 38. THAT the right of Debate as also of proposing to the People be wholly and only in the Senat without any power at all of Result not deriv'd from the People and estated upon the Senat by act of Parlament 39. THAT the power of Result be wholly and only in the People without any right at all of Debate 40. THAT the Senat having debated and agreed upon a Law to be propos'd cause promulgation of the said Law to be made for the space of six weeks before Proposition that is cause the Law to be written fair and hung up for the time aforesaid in som of the most eminent places of the City and of the Suburbs 41. THAT promulgation being made the Signory demand of the Tribuns sitting in the Senat an Assembly of the People That the Tribuns upon such demand of the Signory or of the Senat be oblig'd to assemble the Prerogative Tribe in Arms by sound of Trumpet with Drums beating and Colors flying in any Town Field or Marketplace being not above six miles distant upon the day and at the hour appointed except the meeting thro inconvenience of the Weather or the like be prorogu'd by consent of the Signory and of the Tribuns That the Prerogative Tribe being assembl'd accordingly the Senat propose to them by two or more of the Senatorian Magistrats therto appointed at the first promulgation of the Law That the Proposers for the Senat open to the People the occasion motives and reasons of the Senat for the Law to be propos'd and that the same being don they put the Law or Proposition by distinct clauses to the Ballot of the People That if any material Clause or Clauses of the Proposition or Law so propos'd be rejected by the People the Clause or Clauses so rejected may be review'd alter'd and propos'd again to the third time if the Senat think fit but no oftner 42. THAT what is thus propos'd by the Senat and resolv'd by the People be the Law of the Land and no other except what is already receiv'd as such or reserv'd to the Dictatorian Council 43. THAT every Magistracy Office or Election throout this whole Commonwealth whether annual or triennial be understood of course or consequence to injoin an interval or vacation equal to the term of the same That the Magistracy or Office of a Knight and of a Burgess be in this relation understood as one and the same and that this Order regard only such Elections as are National or Domestic and not such as are foren or contain'd in the Provincial part of this Model 44. THAT for an Exception from this Rule where there is but one Elder of the Horse in one and the same Parish that Elder be eligible in the same without interval and where there be above four Elders of the Horse in one and the same Parish there be not above half nor under two of them eligible at the same Election 45. THAT throout all the Assemblys and Councils of this Commonwealth the Quorum consist of one half in the time of health and of one third part in a time of sickness being so declar'd by the Senat. THE use of the Ballot being as full of prolixity and abstruseness in writing as of dispatch and facility in practice is presum'd throout all Elections and Results in this Model and for the rest refer'd rather to practice than writing There remain the Religious Military and Provincial parts of this Frame But the Civil part being approv'd they follow or being not approv'd may be spar'd CONCLUSION or the use of these PROPOSITIONS THESE Propositions are so laid
out to debate or examination that a man having the mind to weigh discourse upon or object against this Model may do it in the parts with the greatest convenience ANY examination of or objection against the whole or any part in print or in writing the Author holds himself bound to acknowlege or answer But as to mere discourse upon matters of this compass it is usually narrow besides that in writing a man must put himself upon better aim than he can be oblig'd to take in discourse ANY one objection lying in writing against any one Order in this part of the Model after such manner as to shew that the Part or Order so invaded ought to be expung'd alter'd or amended unless it may be expung'd alter'd or amended accordingly destroys the whole AND any one or more Objections so lying against any one or more of these Orders or Propositions that therby they may be expung'd alter'd or amended must in the whole or in part make a better Model IN this case therfore or in case no Objection lys the use of these Propositions will be such as therby any Man or any Assembly of men considering or debating upon them in order may find or make a true Model of a well order'd Commonwealth AND that an Assembly can never make or frame a Model of any Government otherwise than in som such manner is provable first by a demonstration from the effect and secondly by a demonstration from the cause THE demonstration from the Effect is that an Assembly no otherwise frames a Law or Order than by having it first pen'd by som one man and then judging upon it and the Model of a Commonwealth must consist of many Laws or Orders THE demonstration from the Cause is that wheras Reason consists of two parts the one Invention and the other Judgment a Man may be as far beyond any Assembly for Invention as any Assembly can be beyond a Man for Judgment or which is more that the formation of a Model of Government requires a strong faculty of Invention and that an Assembly is naturally void of all manner of Invention Nov. 13. 1658. THE Ways and Means Wherby an Equal and Lasting COMMONWEALTH May be suddenly introduc'd and perfectly founded with the free Consent and actual Confirmation of the Whole People of England Scire tuum nihil est nisi te scire hoc sciat alter Pers A WORD fitly spoken is like Apples of Gold in Pictures of Silver THE Desire of the People of England now runs strongly to have a Free Parlament LET there be a free Parlament TO the end that the People may be most equally represented or that the Parlament may be Freest LET there be a new Division of England and Wales with as much equality as may stand with convenience into fifty Shires LET every Shire elect annually two Knights to be of one House and seven Deputys to be of another House of Parlament for the term of three years For the first year only let the Deputys in each Division be elected triple that is seven for the term of one year seven for the term of two years and seven for the term of three years The like for the Knights save only that the present Parlament remain that is let two Knights in each Division be elected the first year only for the term of one year two other Knights at the same time for the term of two years and let the present Parlament be the triennial part of the Knights House for the first Election THE House of Knights and the House of Deputys being assembl'd let the House of Knights debate and propose LET what is propos'd by the House of Knights be promulgated for the space of six weeks PROMULGATION being thus made let the House of Deputys meet and give their Result upon the Proposition LET what was thus propos'd by the Senat or House of Knights and resolv'd by the People or House of Deputys be the Law IN this Constitution these Councils must of necessity contain the Wisdom and the Interest of the Nation IN this method Debate must of necessity be mature IF it be according to the Wisdom and the Interest of the Nation upon mature debate that there be a King let there be a King IF it be according to the Wisdom and the Interest of the Nation upon mature debate that there be a Commonwealth two Assemblys in this Order are actually a Commonwealth and so far a well order'd Commonwealth that they are capacitated and inclin'd to reach to themselves whatever furniture shall be further necessary in more particular Orders which also is at hand TILL this or the like be don the Line of the late King and the People must be fellowsufferers in which case the impatience of the People must be for the restitution of that Line at all adventures BUT this or the like being once don immediatly the Line of the late King and the People becom Rivals in which case they will never restore Monarchy WILL never may som say But if the Senat and the Popular Assembly be both Royalists they both will and can restore Monarchy THO both Royalists they neither will nor can for let them that look no further than home or self say what they will to affirm that a Senat and a Popular Assembly thus constituted can procreat Monarchy is to affirm that a Horse and a Mare can generat a Cat that Wheat being rightly sown may com up Pease or that a River in its natural channel may run upwards IN the present case of England Commonwealthsmen may fail thro want of Art but Royalists must fail thro want of Matter the former may miss thro impotence the latter must thro impossibility Or where the State is purely popular that is not overbalanc'd by a Lord or Lords let there be one Example or one Reason given that there is was or ever can be Monarchy There will be this when all fails for the aftergame tho the work should fall as is like enough into the hands of Royalists CERTAIN it is that where any privat Citizen or Freeman might not som way or other propose there never was a well order'd Commonwealth UPON this incouragement I offer'd this Paper to good hands but it was according to custom thrown after me SO it went in the Protector 's time in every Revolution since La fortuna accieca gli animi de gli huomini but that is Atheism that 's MACCHIAVEL WELL but now says the Protectorian Family O that we had set up the equal Commonwealth So say broken Parlaments and Statesmen so say the sadly mistaken Sectarys so say the cashier'd Officers so says he that would have no nay but Oligarchy was a good word and so will more say after these except they learn to say after another Aut reges non exigendi fuerunt aut plebi re non verbo danda libertas either the Kings ought not to have bin driven out or the People to