Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	effect_n	nature_n	power_n	3,155	5	5.1866	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A29500	An essay in morality written by G.B. to his friend H.P., Esquire ; in which the nature of virtue and vice is distinctly stated, their respective reasonableness and unreasonableness demonstrated, and several useful conclusions inferred.	G. B. (George Bright), d. 1696.; Plumptre, Henry.	1682 (1682)	Wing B4672; ESTC R18007	26,324	158

where there is no Law there is no transgression because God himself and his Volition of what is right and just are eternal or the Apostle may mean by Law not strictly an act of some Will concerning anothers Action and Will but an obligation to will or do any thing a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Such there always is whenever any will exist being a relation betwen the Will and its due Object the Universal good Besides St. Paul may mean comparatively the Transgression or Sin is much less where there is no express known Law 23. Nor doth the nature of Sin or Virtue depend upon liberum arbitrium or Free-will for whether any Will hath power to determine its own Volition to the greatest or any lesser good or no which I do not deny yet most certainly whenever there is a direction thereof to a lesser good there is a defect in that Volition come it from what cause it will though it should be the effect of some other Being without it which by his power was able so to determine it or suppose any Nature should be eternally and necessarily so constituted 24. It follows likewise that supposing it possible for any Being to have for the Object of his Volition the rectitude the perfection thereof and should not place it in the willing the greatest good but in willing some particular or which is most common some personal good as self-preservation this very Volition would have that defect in it we call Sin and would not be capable of any reward i. e. any thing which should maintain or encourage such an action If it were possible for a man unfeignedly in his Conscience to judge it his bounden duty to desire and pursue always as his ultimate end his own greatest personal good without regard to God or others and accordingly should Will and Act this would be a vitious man And whether God may not by way of punishment for pride c. permit a man so to err is not here to be determined and there have been two pernicious and foolish mistakes if not wilful Errors that men might securely indulge their lusts of some late new Modellers of Morality to which a great part of the ill-nature and debauchery of the Age is to be imputed the one the advancing of their personal good to the place and dignity of the last end of all their actions the other the pitching upon no better than the preservation of life and limb or to enlarge their own Sence the greatest measures of the Conveniencies Comforts and Pleasures proper to this bodily life In these Opinions they have quite perverted the nature of things and made Vice to be Virtue Or because according to the same mens Doctrine every one is necessarily carried to his own greatest good or happiness in general only through ignorance is oft out of the way they have made no Vice at all substituting in its room Folly and Imprudence 25. What hath been said of Volition may be said of Actual and Habitual Inclination and because Volition and Actual Inclination are but sometimes existent in men but Habitual Inclinations constant and perpetual 't is according to this a man is chiefly to be estimated viz. by three things 1. It s direction to its right Object the Universal Good 2. The force and strength thereof 3. It s constancy or frequency in the Soul each of which hath degrees so that it is easie to set down certain rules for the judgment of the goodness or badness of any man For example sake only He is the worst man in the first respect who is habitually inclined to and in love with the meanest or least delectable good in the second respect who is the most vehemently inclined thereto in the third respect who is perpetually or constantly so Contrariwise he is the best who hath the greatest good absolutely or the Eternal Felicity for by Felicity I mean the greatest degree of delight or pleasure as to intension of the Vniverse or all Beings existent for the Object of his Habitual Inclination or who is habitually inclined thereto and that with the greatest force and strength of his nature and then constantly and perpetually It is easie to see what an indefinite number of degrees there are between these two extremes in all the three respects The greatest difficulty is not to know these Rules of our Judgment but to know our selves and consequently to apply them And since Denominatio fit à Majore he only is to be called a good man who hath a stronger and more constant Habitual Inclination to the Universal good than to any one or more particulars And this was or might have been the reason why Martyrdome was so highly esteemed and magnified in the Primitiue Church A Martyr by his suffering for his Faith even though he was not actually Baptized was thought to expiate all former bad life and to be undoubtedly saved or to obtain a most glorious and blissful condition in Heaven because such his suffering death or parting with life itself deemed the greatest personal good amongst men rather than to deny that Truth which they supposed God had commanded to believe and profess and consequently to disobey God was a certain sign and argument of a stronger actual and habitual inclination at that time of his death to obey God and consequently to that which was right just and good than to any other thing in the world besides Nor may it be here amiss to hint how easie it is to understand it possible for this Habitual Inclination Bent and Propension to any certain Object to be so forcible and strong as to be inconsistent with an act of Free Will or choice about that Object nor may a man be able to divert suspend or withhold his actual Volition consent or embrace from it when it is proposed Though by prudent contrivance these Habitual Inclinations generally I do not say all may also by degrees be weakned and at last quite extinguished and destroyed 26. 'T is as easie hence to deduce all particular virtues and vices of which we shall find many to have as yet no Names For one way and the most common is by distinguishing particular delectable Good or Pleasure whether that particular Good be in a mans self or in another as the Subject whether it be mine or anothers but it is usually if not always a mans own from its various Causes or Objects And it seems there may be six general ones I do but now suggest not determine 1 The possession of any Good in general so esteemed many things thus onely please 2 The pain mischief evil suffering of another Whether any Being is of such a temper as to be delighted therewith let others consider but I see no reason why it is not possible Now to will ones delight or pleasure from this Object or Cause is called Malice to be habitually inclined thereto Maliciousness but the renouncing of this or the