Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	effect_n	natural_a	supernatural_a	1,915	5	10.5176	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A97067	Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.	Wallis, John, 1616-1703.	1643 (1643)	Wing W615; Thomason E93_21; ESTC R11854	114,623	143

is Vnity But be it granted That there be divers particular Species under the same Genericall nature as when all particular acts of duty are comprised in One generall name of Love or Obedience Be it so That many Effects may proceed from the same Cause as all virtuous acts from the subordination of the Will to Reason That there be many Combinations of Beings or Persons Naturall Voluntary O●conomicall Politicall Logicall c. whence may arise One Aggregatum One Praedicament one City or Kingdome one World Be there S●pernaturall or Spirituall Societies One Church Paroch●all Nationall O●cumenicall Visible Invisible one mysticall Body Be there also in Lines Bodies Sounds c. besides their Absolute Affections Length Bignesse Lowdnesse c. some mutuall Relations of Proportion Harmony Discord c. Be there in Physicall Bodies a desire of Union or Conjunction in One to another Yet will not this prove That all things have One Nature One Essence much lesse That this Essence is Vnity If Iron desire Union or conjunction rather with the Loadstone doth this prove their Specificall Essence to be One Or if it doe doth it pro●e that this One Essence is Vnity And so of the rest All that can arise from hence is That God hath so ordered the severall Natures of particular Creatures as that his Wisdome doth not only appear in their Absolute and Simple natures but hath also put Relative or Respective natures in them whereby his Wisdome may appear in their mutuall Oppositions Conjunctions Similitude Dissimilitude Sympathy Antipathy Help and Hinderance of one thing to another whereby not onely Every thing Severally in its Absolute nature doth set forth Gods glory but also All things joyntly doe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and work together in their respective Relations as well for the good of those that love God as for their mutuall advancing of Gods glory All which may be though neither Vnity nor any One specificall Being be the formalis ratio the essentiall form of all things but each species have a severall kind of Being For my own judgement I am as confident that Vnity is Nothing as his Lordship is That it is All things 'T is a meer rationall nominall Notion that hath no more Reality in it then Darknesse then non esse Yea to be One is a pure Negative Proposition and what Reality you can allow to a Negation so much you may allow to Vnity It is true Vnus as it is opposed to Nullus is Affirmative and is the same with Aliquis or Nonnullus But if it signifie the same with Vnicus and be opposed to Multitude according as we now take it it is a meer Negation and no more Which to make clear observe but this Syllogisme Whatsoever is in England is in Europe But in England there is Rex Vnicus One only King Therfore in Europe there is Rex Vnicus but One King Where you shall find no fault in the Syllogisme save that the Minor is Negative in the first figure Whence it is apparent That Vnity as it is opposed to Multitude is a meer Negative term There is One Sunne but is this Vnity Essentiall to it Whether another Sunne be or be not it nothing concerns the Essence of this Sun but onely grounds an externall Relation which is yet but Relati● rationis Was not the Essence of Adam the Same and he Equally a Man before the production of Eve while he was Vnicus and after both the Production of Eve and the Generation of sonnes and daughters when he ceased to be Vnicus there being more beside him Was there any Detraction or Addition of Essence or any Reality that concerned Adams person at such time as his children were born or would there have been afterwards if all except Adam had been swept away Nay when two Drops of Water are separated or conjoyned is there any Essentiall or Reall Mutation in either Surely if Vnity may come and goe without any Reall Alteration then is Vnity so farre from being Essentiall to all things that it is not so much as Reall Object You will say But God is indeed One Vnus et Vnicus and not onely supposed to be One Therefore his Unity must needs be Reall and not Imaginary Answ I grant it But what then must therefore Unity be Positive or Reall The Ayr in the night time is indeed Dark and not onely ●●●posed to be Dark Will you therefore infer that Darknesse hath a Reall a Positive Being and is not a privation of Light When the Moon is eclipsed it doth Really and Indeed want the Illumination of the Sun-beams and is not onely supposed to want them but you will not I suppose say that this Want of Light hath a Reall Essence So here God is indeed One and not only imagined so to be yet hath not Vnity●ny ●ny Entity or Positive Being in it There is Negatio Realis and Negatio Rationis a Reall absence and a Supposed absence Of the one you may truly frame a Negative Proposition of the other you cannot there may be indeed in the Understanding concerning thi● Negatio actus which is all one with Abstraction but not actus negationis actus negativus When the Ayr in the Night time is Dark there is a Reall Absence of Light when in the Day time I conceive of the Ayr according to its Essence or according to some other Qualities not at all regarding its being Light this is Negatio Rationis or negatio Abstractionis there is only a supposed Absence of Light but indeed a reall Presence Yea ipsum Non-esse is a Reall Praedication though it be not a reall Praedicate Like as Mendacium esse Falsum is a Truth Therefore when I say Centaurus non est I do not Forge this Proposition or suppose a non-entity in a Centaure where indeed there is none but I affirm that non-entity to be which is for a Centaure Is non-ens and not only Supposed to be Non-ens And of Negations or Privations That is onely Negatio Rationis when by Abstraction Things are supposed to be separate which are indeed conjoyned Other Negations though they have not realiter Esse yet they have realiter Non-esse their non-entity is not Imaginary I speak of Negatio Physica not Negatio Logica for a Logicall Negation that is a Negative Enunciation is as Reall as an Affirmation A supposed Being is Ens rationis and a supposed Absence is Negatio rationis Negations and Privations are Non-Entia and not Entia Rationis for they have not in themselves so much as Esse Cognitum which is requisite to Ens Rationis And when as sometimes a Negation is said to be Ens Rationis it is not to be understood of its internall Entity for so Darknesse in it selfe doth not include esse cognitum but when the Understanding considers of a Negation and so makes it Objectum Cognitionis then of a Non-ens it becomes Ens Rationis But then I say it is ●●trationis not Negatio rationis Yet

Objects formerly seen or now first represented Next he lays down three Requisites to the constitution of every Being A Fountaine commu●icating a Channell entertaining and Waters imparted Conferen● Collatum Recipiens And he asks Where we shall find these three if the Vnderstanding be a Faculty I answer If you speak of Advenient light last mentioned which is a Representative Truth or an Idea of that R●all Truth which is in the Things Known I say the Reall Truth or Veritas Ess●ndi sends forth this Representative Truth or Idea which is conveyed by a Deferent Light either of Discourse or Information or the like till it come to the Vnderstanding where it is received and entertained by the Innate Light or Truth of Reason Like as the Inherent light of Colour in the Object sends forth a Representative light of visible Species which is conveyed by a Deferent light in the Ayr till it come to the Eye where it is entertained by the Innate light which is the faculty of Seeing And as the Remotenesse or Obscurity of the Object the Darknesse of the Medium or the Weaknesse of the Faculty may hinder Sight so that we see not at all or not perfectly In like manner the Distance of the Object as in things quite out of our reach or the Obscurity of them which send forth no Species or manifestation of their essence towards us our imperfect Discourse or insufficient Information which is as a dark Medium and lastly the weaknesse of our Apprehension doe cause Ignorance in the Understanding which is answerable to not-seeing in the Eye Again as in Ignorance so in Errour A reflection of a false Light upon the Object casting a false seeming colour which may be mistaken for the true colour of it an indisposed Medium as when we see through Red glasse c. and a distempered Organ by reason of some vitious humours accidentall in the Eye c. may cause a mistake and Errour in Sight So here when there is a False Light upon the Object as when we conceive that to be the effect of one thing which indeed proceeds from some other cause fallacia non causae pro causâ or the like a false Discourse or Inference or a false Relation which is as a stained Medium or a distempered Vnderstanding by reason of Passion of l●sa Phantasia or the like may cause an Erroneous Judgement apprehending things to be otherwise then inde●d they are And thus I have shewed not onely those three requisites which his Lordship requires but some others besides them supposing in the mean time the Vnderstanding to be a Faculty and taking Truth for those sweet B●ams of Light which beat upon us Advenient Light If you take Truth for Reason and withall suppose Reason to be distinct from the Vnderstanding and ●t also from the Soule You may say The Understanding is the Recip●ent Reason the thing Received in it and that Then and from Those when and from whence it received its Essence to which Reason is a conna●e and appendent Faculty That is either from God by immediate Creation which many think or from the Parents by Propagation which others ●old But I suppose there be few or none that hold Reason to be distinct from the Vnderstanding and That also from the Soule For when they speak of Reason as a faculty of the Understanding by Vnderstanding they mean the Soule it selfe quatenus intelligens being considered a● the Subject of Reason And when they speak of the Vnderstanding●● ●● a faculty whereby the Soule is able to conceive and judge of Truth Then they take the Vnderstanding to be the same with Reason I should rather say That Reason and the Vnderstanding as it denotes a Faculty are two words Synonima denoting the same Faculty or Power of Knowing and Judging Which Faculty I would not grant to be another Thing from the Soule-Knowing or the Soule-Understanding but a Modus As neither doe I allow to Any Naturall-Power or Faculty which they make the second Species of Quality any other Being then the Being of a Modus and not the being of ● Thing And thus we may safely say the Soule receives the Faculty of Reason or Understanding Thence from whence it receives its Being as a Stone receives its Heavinesse from that which Produceth it That which gave it to Bee gave it to be Thus. Sometimes indeed Accidents are not received from that which produceth the Substance but from some other Efficient as the Smoothnesse of Marble proceeds not from the Producer but from the Polisher And yet I hold not the Smoothnesse to be One Thing and the Marble to be another Thing but the Marble to be a Thing and the Smoothnesse to be Modus And thus it must be granted in Acqui●●te Habits where the Giver and Receiver are the Same and the Thing Received Modally but not really distinct from either But for Faculties or Naturall-Powers If you look for an Externall Efficient or Giver it will be the same that produceth the Substance But if you be contented with an Efficient per Emanationem Thus they are said to flow or arise from the Form or Substance And then the Giver and Receiver is the Same for the Form which i● the Subject Receiving is also per emanation●m Effectiva from whence it ariseth as an Essentiall Consequent and if you say the Faculty Received is not so much as Modally distinguisht from it but onely ratione 〈…〉 I contend not But so much distinction at least I suppose we must allow it Having thus answered his Lordships Qu re I proceed to answer his Objections If the Vnderstanding saith he be the Recipient then the Light of Reason which differenceth us from the Vegetative and Sensitive creatures lieth in the Vnderstanding and not in the Soul And so the Soul is either not enlightened at all but only a Theca to the Intellect or else there be two Enlightened rationall Beings in ●●● Reasonable creature For answer First I suppose as I said before that there are few if any that will affirm the Soul the Understanding and Reason to be Three things But they will either say Reason Is the Understanding and not in the Understanding or else Reason is in the Understanding which Understanding is the Soul considered only under this Notion quatenus Intelligens as it is the Subject of Reason And thus the difficulty appears not For the Light which differenceth us from Unreasonable creatures whether you call it Reason or call it the Understanding is seated in the Soule and so denominates it Intelligent or Vnderstanding But secondly we want not a Recipient for Truth though the Soul be not it It may be the Understanding Yet thirdly though the Soul be not the Immediate Subject it may yet be the Vltimate which is more then a Theca Object But you will reply However it be so that wee make this Light to be inherent in the Soul yet it is not sufficient to make an Essentiall difference

of the division of Quantity pag. 42. that all must at last be reduced to an Vnity Nor as pag. 98. that it is divisibilis in infinitum Lest we establish Episcopacy which himselfe likes not or become Independent which others like as ill The distinction between Scientia simplicis Intelligentiae and Scientia Visionis if it be taken only for distinctio rationis and I suppose none ever tooke it otherwise may well enough be admitted By the One God knows the Nature of All things Possible By the Other he Sees that These things Are. The Object of the One is All things Possible all things Intelligible the Object of the Other is only Things Existent either past present or to come But saith his Lordship If Gods Power and Will be all one If God be p●r●● Actus and not Potentia Then all things that ever Shall be Were ab aeterno under ● Decree and so what God Could doe he Did doe and Can doe no more Hee had said before pag. 99. That all things did exist in their Beings ab omni aeterno And are they now but under ● Decree But for answer I grant that God cannot doe what he hath not decreed for then were his Decree either Void or Imperfect And supposing such a Decree the Power of God is limited by his Will But a Conditionall and Hypotheticall Impossibility doth not inferre an Absolute Impossibility And therefore we affirm that Deus Potest ea quae non Vult He Can doe More then he Will in sensu diviso not in sensu Composito God is able saith Christ of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham Yet he doth not Knowest thou not that I can pray to my Father and he will send ●e more then twelve Legions of Angels But neither did Christ pray nor the Father send them The God which wee serve is Able to deliver us said the three men in Daniell yet they were not certain that he Would doe it And if Media Scientia wherby God is supposed to know an Hypotheticall Proposition as That the men of Keilah would deliver up David if he stayed there had no other hinderance but this It might well enough be admitted CHAP. 17. Concerning Curiosity in the search of Causes With a Close of all ANd now he returns again to his former complaint of too much curiosity in the search of Causes There is he grants a secondary intermediate Being which we may call a Cause Which doth precede and produce another The Observation of which saith he is very ●itting so that wee search and puzle not our selves with the grounds and reasons of this precedency As to observe That Fire applied to combustible matter will burn it Without inquiring How the Fire doth work upon the Wood c. He would have us therefore observe What is the Cause of this Effect and What is the Effect of this Cause without any curious search How this Cause comes to produce such an Effect There is no Generall Rule can be prescribed in this case Sometimes it is needlesse to inquire so much as By what Cause this or that was produced Sometimes again it is usefull to Know not only What did produce it but also How it did produce it Thus farre I allow Curiosity in searching Trifles also How it did produce it Thus farre I allow Curiosity in searching Trifles hinders the finding of more solid and profitable Truths fo● as he speaks Intus existens prohibet alienum What his Lordship hath concerning the Holinesse of Time and Place I assent to That they are not capable of any other Sanctification then a holinesse of Separation a Relative Holynesse And the contrary Opinion is disclaimed by him on whom his Lordship fastens it That the Heart also should be always in such a holy frame as that it be fit for a Sabbaths imployment fit for a Sacrament I hold for an an undoubted Truth Yet are we not always to be imployed in such services of Gods Worship For even Adam in Paradise had a Particular calling besides his Generall calling and the exercise thereof being done in obedience to Gods command was no doubt pleasing and acceptable ●o God Nor can I assent that All things are Ordinances though in All things we should acknowledge God The rest of the Chapter is but a Recapitulation of his Position and its Consequents which needs no further consideration besides what I have already given you in the Examination of those severall Particulars I need not make answer to the Conclusion having already delivered my judgement concerning the Premises But leave it to another to passe Censure And thus Sir I have finished that Task which at your request I have undertaken Which beyond my expectation is grown into a farre larger body then I intended You expect not Accuratenesse in that which is drawn up in so short a time Nor the Judgement of Authors in these Points for that was not the task imposed to give you account of Others opinions but of mine own I have therefore spared the labour of turning over any other books save his Lordships own nor have made any farther use of any then as my present memory did supply I may seem too prolix perhaps in some Digressions prosecuting somewhat largely occasionall questions lighted on by the way But if I have discovered any Truth though with some breach of Method If with Samson I can impart to my friends some Honey though I step a little out of the way to fetch it If as he found that Honey in the conquered Lion which yet was not of it but only accidentally there so I in the examining the main question have withall cleared some doubts which though not directly contained in it were yet occasioned by it I hope a small errour in Methode will be passed over Sir I am sorry it so falls out that the first occasion wherein I should have to doe with so Noble a Lord should be by way of Encounter But being partly injoyned by your request which is to me a Command whom therefore it concerns to excuse my presumption to his Lordship and having also so fair an Invitation in Mr. Sadlers Epistle prefixed to his Lordships Treatise as being that then which nothing could be more gratefull to this Noble Lord I have adventured to commit this with my selfe to be at your service J. W. A Postscript SIR I Sent you a while since certain Animadversions upon my Lord Brook's Treatise concerning the Nature of Truth Which briefly tend to this purpose By Truth or Light his Lordship understands that Light whereby the Soule and Understanding is able to See or Understand Which can be no other then the Light of Reason Which he considereth first in It selfe then in its Operations that is Truth in the Fountain this in the Streams that the Spring this the Off-spring Propositio 1. Arg. 1. Chap. 1. Which Truth or Light of Reason he contends to be the same with the Understanding Because the Understanding