do iniquity he tempteth not any man but in as much as he leaveth men to themselves and to Satan he layeth no impediments upon their power or active restraint upon their wils yea he so ordereth outward occurrences as that they meet with fit occasion and suiteable inducements to those evils which his carriage to men he predetermineth before to use for holy ends and most righteously and foreseeth infallibly what men will thereupon do hence therefore their running into those sins is in a large and lesse proper sense said to be of God 2. Secondly things are said to be of God providentially or of his hand worke and doing more directly or in a more proper and positive acception that is so as he is the author or efficient cause of them or so as they are not meerly from his working providence as the hint or occasion only but from him as the worker or agent producing them or putting them in rerum naturâ Thus all positive beings are of God Rom. 11.36 1 Cor. 8.6 Heb. 2.10 that is the existence of all individuals or singulars with all their motions effluxes or actions Act. 17.28 whether the agents be irrational Mat. 10.29 or moral rational and free Isa 28.29 Prov. 16.1 9. 20.24 21.1 and all the conditions and events all the evil and all the good that befals any creature Psal 75.7 8. 2 King 6.33 Ia. 1.17 and these whether they be from second causes advisedly and intendedly or they be meerly casual and contingent in respect of them Prov. 16.33 1 King 22 34. 2 Chron. 22.7 Gen. 50.20 And things are this way of God viz. of his direct and positive proceeding two wayes 1. By his ordinary providence or as he worketh in and by natural causes and in a natural course as in the aforegiven instances 2. In a way of supernatural efficiency or working of Grace So persons are of him in their estate of Grace 1 Joh. 5.19 3 Joh. 11. and so the gracious effects that are in persons are of him 2 Cor. 5.18 2.17 1 Chron. 29.14 the former way the Schools call his general the latter his special concourse Secondly of God signifies of Gods mouth word or declaring a thing is said to be of God that proceedeth out of his mouth or is spoken or uttered by him Now we must note the things that proceed out of the mouth of God are more principally of two sorts in as much as the mouth or word of God is a declaration of his will and the will of God is distinguisht by a twofold acceptation 1. The first is his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or will of Decree or that will which himself purposeth to execute or have to be 2. The second is his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or his Legislative or preceptive will which delivereth the rule or law which man is to do or walk by Hence it is that the declarations of the mouth of God are sutably twofold and of two sorts of things 1. Narrative or manifesting 2. Imperative or regulating Under the first sort are comprised all the discoveries of Gods own wayes and works or of what God himself hath done doth or will do all the revelations or prophesies of Gods proceedings past present and to come all Divine histories promises threatnings or other predictions That saith the Prophet which I have heard of the Lord of hosts the God of Israel have I declared unto you Isa 21.10 Under the latter head the declarations of his Imperative or regulating will are contained all his Commandements or concessions unto men whatsoever God injoynes or allowes man to do or not to do all divine warrants commissions precepts or permissions touching humane actions and affairs According to this last acception that is of God that is authorized by him unto men that is not of God which he disapproveth prohibiteth or warranteth not unto men Let us in reference to the latter the being of a thing of Gods mouth by way of declaring his approving or authorizing will observe for explications sake some instances of both sorts viz. both Positive and Negative out of Scripture 1. According to this sense both persons and things are affirmed to be of God 1. Persons are owned thus to be of God that is to be authorized and approved of him to be in their respective states and places Rabbi we know that thou art a teacher come from God saith Nicodemus unto Jesus Joh. 3.2 and Christ saith He that is of God he hath seen the Father Joh. 6.46 If this man were not of God he could do nothing saith the blind man of Christ Joh. 9.33 And the Apostle John often hath this phrase Try the spirits whether they are of God every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God Ye are of God little children we are of God 1 Joh. 4.1 2 4 6. 5.19 2. As persons so wayes doctrines and practises are in this acceptation said to be of God If any man saith our Saviour will do his will he shall know of the Doctrine whether it be of God or whether I speak of my self Joh. 7.17 If this counsel or this work be of God ye cannot overthrow it quoth the Doctor in the councel at Jerusalem Act. 5.38 39. And David said of his enterprise of bringing up the Ark of God to his Câ—ty If it seem good unto you and that it be of the Lord our God Let us send c. 1 Chron. 13.2 A parallel phrase to this of being of God is that of being from Heaven in distinction from that which is of men As in that question of our Saviour to the chief Priests Mat. 21.25 The baptism of John whence was it from heaven or of men 2. Negatively in this sense many both persons and things are denyed to be of God 1. Persons are said not to be of God Whosoever doth not righteousness is not of God Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God He that is not of God heareth not us 1 Joh. 3.10 4.3 6. This man is not of God because he keepeth not the Sabbath Joh. 9.16 2. Wayes are denyed to be of God All that is in the world the lust of the flesh c. is not of the Father but is of the world 1 Joh. 2.16 I have thus endevoured to gather together and lay down distinctly the several wayes wherein persons and things may be said to be of God and so the various senses of this phrase of God The sum is of God is first either of his hand and providence and so a thing may be of God 1. Either occasionally 2. or casually And this latter way things are of God either 1. By his general or 2. By his special concourse Or secondly of his mouth and word and so a thing may be of God 1. Either Narratively 2. or Legislatively and by way of authorization approbation or warrant to men And this last way
that did he Psal 115.3.136.6 First that is from all eternity his Will of good pleasure determineth and then in the foreset time his Providence effecteth things Only here we are to beware we stretch not this discovery beyond its own line that is beyond the past and present time We must not conceit or pretend to understand from is that of the purpose of God which it tels us not or to see by it that which it shewes us not Some there are that will proceed fuâ—ther then this mark and meerly out of their own airy imagination presume by it to divine of things to come I mean of moral and contingent futurities for where experience hath discovered a natural connexion of causes and effects there a probable conjecture and expectation of future events neer at hand by the intuition of their particular and immediate causes may be gathered as that a pregnant woman will bring forth a childe that the evening or morning face of the skie will be followed with such or such weather the day next ensuing thus the Aâ—â—rologer and the self-interested Statist â—oully overlash and exceed their bounds in interpreting the providences of God The Astrologer pretends a cunning to read in the great Ordinances of the heavens whose huge volums in regard of variety distinction and distribuâ—ion of influences as to this use doubtless are to them as the hand writing of the wall before Belshazzar was to the Caldean Astrologers altogether illegible and unintelligible yet they pretend I say to read and to be able to draw out from them a map of the disposition of the aire of every day for whole moneths and years to come and of the temper of living bodies of the successes of Husbandry Trade-adventurers and political-enterprises yea and of the very propensions contrivements counsels of mens mindes about Civill Church and spiritual affairs with the revolutions that will attend mens lives estates names and societies temporal and ecclesiastical yea what will passe not only betwixt man and man but betwixt God and man and which is very strange this map to be every year new and for every Countrey Nation City yea for every distinct sort or condition of men whether they live far dispersed from one another or promiscuously intermixt with others yea for each single person different The self-interested statist from Gods present proceedings either in punishing or prospering a way person family profession or Nation will needs fancy and confidently conclude that he doth foresee and can presage what God hath determined and will do with the same hereafter Forgetting with what reason Solomon hath cautioned us against boasting of to morrow to wit for thou knowest not what a day may bring forth and not minding that men and Nations even in regard of their visible worldly condition are in the hands of God as the clay is in the Potters hand soon made and soon marred now moulded into this frame and quickly turned into another and that as the grace of God may suddenly unexpectedly and wonderfully change mens hearts CHAP. III. SECT III. Subsect 3. or men deprived thereof may strangely alter themselves so God hath reserved out of what he hath clearly threatned in his word concerning mens temporal punishments much more out of what his Providence at present dispenseth a power to alter his proceeding in an instant Subsection 3. That Providence doth declare to us that God is and what he is 2. PRovidence is the Index or Character of the Divine Nature and so it is Doctrinal or delivers to us matter of faith or what we are to know and believe concerning the Divine Essence to wit as it is absolutely considered or abstracted from distinction of personal relations God is made known by his works as the workeman is by his artifice the cause by its effect Jer. 32.20 Rom. 1.19 20. Psal 19.1 c. Act. 14.17 Hence we finde that so frequently added in the prophets to the comminations and promises of God as the end of the execution of them and so of his providences And they shall know that I am the Lord. CHAP. III. SECT III. Subsect 4. Subsection 4. Certain distinctions premised for the discovery how far Providence is declarative of the will of God which we are to do 3 BUt to come neerer to the thing in question Providence is in some sort preceptive and directive in matter of practice Now for the opening of this use of Providence we must distinguish 1. Of preceptiveness or the delivery of Divine precepts to us This may be 1. Either by way of original institution 2. Or by way of abrogation of what is already in force 3. Or by way of declaration remembrance or monition of that which is already ordained And again this third may be 1. Either solitarily 2. Or joyntly and by way of concurrence with other means or the delivery of them otherwayes 2. Of divine precepts 1. Some are of the law of nature 2. Others are positive or subsequently instituted And of both those whether natural or positive 1. Some contain our duty to God 2. Some our duty to man 3. Distinguish of the use of Providence This is 1. Either ordinary which the general rules of the word of God allow and dirâ—ct us in 2. Or extraordinary the which special â—arrants in the word given on special occasions have allowed or prescribed 4. Distinguish betwixt the giving of a rule or law and the determining of it to this or that particular matter or case Subsection 5. CHAP. III. SECT III. Subsect 5. Five Propositions explaining wherein Providence is and wherein it is not declarative of Gods will to be done by us I Shall apply these distinctions and make use of them to our purpose in these following propositions 1. Providence as I understand câ—nnot be said to deliver us the will or precepts of God for our practise by way of original institution neither can it of it self abolish or make void any rule or law of God before ordained or draw a warrant for us to proceed contrary to the same Suspend it may or disenable from doing in point of affirmaâ—ive precepts but to the doing of the contrary it cannot dispense nor can it dissolve a law 2. Providence may by it self without the help of any other Index or Law-book deliver to us somewhat of the law of nature that is so much of our duty to God as is contained therein Divines distinguish betwixt cultum naturalem voluntarium Ames Medul Theol. lib 2. cap. 5. 13. seu institutum the natural worship of God and that which is voluntary or instituted The natural is that which belongs to him as Gods or by virtue of what he is or the consideration of his nature and this is taught by the law of nature The instituted is that which is given him by virtue of his own voluntary appointment The former is simply necessary and immutable one and the same in all ages and to all persons The
Subsection 2. Certain Propositions to explain those several wayes wherein things are said to be of God BUt the question will be concerning the being of a thing of Gods hand by way of efficiency and the being of a thing of Gods mouth by way of warrant rule or precept whether both of these or but one of them and if but one then which of them is it which is intended by this clause of God Before I come to determine this question as it lies betwixt these two in particular it may be somewhat conducible to compare them together and to explain them a little more and the reduceableness of things to both or each of them For the which observe 1. Sometimes a thing is both these wayes of God viz. both of his mouth authorizing and of his hand working it That which his mouth enjoynes his hand sometimes effects 2 Chron. 30.12 In Judah the hand of God was to give them one heart to do the commandement of the King and the Princes by the word of the Lord. The like see 1 Chron. 29.14 Phil. 2.13 2 Cor. 5 5 18. 2. Sometimes a thing is of Gods mouth commanding but not of his hand working God shews injoynes to men their duty mâ—ny times when as it is not performed in them see Jer. 7.23 24. 3. A thing is sometimes of Gods hand but not of his mouth Many things come to passe by divine providence or working which though himself effect and that by mans agency yet he allowes not of that agency of man in them Take for instances Gods sending of Joseph into Egypt by his Brethrens selling of him Gen. 45.5 7 8. 50.20 the expulsion of David out of his Kingdom and the ravishment of his Wives by Absolom 2 Sam. 12.11 12. The destruction and captivity of Judah by Nebuchadnâ—zar Isa 10.5 6 15. Jer. 51.7 25.9 compared with Chap. 47.6 Jer. 50.17 18. 51.24 34 35 36. The sufferings of Christ by the Jews Act. 2.13 4.28 with many other things as 1 King 11.14 23. 1 Sam. 26.19 Judg. 2.14 15. Hab. 1.6 13. 4. Some things are neither of Gods mouth approving nor of his hand acting So are the sins of men in their formal precise or abstract consideration Jam. 1.13 Gal. 5.8 1 Joh. 2.15 Subsection 3. CHAP. II. SECT II. Subsect 3. Of Gods working in humane actions whether good or evill and the difference betwixt the being of the one of God and of the other FOr the better understanding of these four particulaâ—s especially the two last of them upon which there may lie some obscurity let these Propositions be thereto added 1. All beings or things whatsoever hath subsistence or existence all events effects and productions as to their matter or positive entity are of Gods hand and working Rom. 11.36 1 Cor. 8.6 Ephes 1.11 2. Of those things that are of Gods hand of working 1. Some are of him as the sole efficient of them So are those things which receive their being by creation regeneration or other such like supernatural or miraculous production 2. Others are so of God as to be also the work and effect of second agents So are all those things which come to passe here below and in the order of nature or the ordinary course of providence 3. In the causing of the latter sort of effects viz. those wh ch are both of God and the creature these two are not coordinate agents or set collaterally or in parity or equality of order for that would import that both were first and but partial sociall causes and as well the one as the other to be independent or to have their causality in and from themselves alone But the one is subordinate to the other that is God is the supreme and first the creature is the inferior and second cause and is dependent on and receive its physical efficiency or attingency of the effect from God and that not partially or by way of addition or supply but wholly Act. 17.25 28. Isa 54.16 Ezek. 30.24 32.3.11 12. and this holdeth in all acts of the creature whether holy or sinful good or evill as to the natural being of the action That which the Apostle saith of his gracious workings Not I but the grace of God which was with me 1 Cor. 15.10 the same Joseph saith of his brethrens sinful deed It was not you that sent me hither but God Gen. 45.8 The creature acteth yet not it but the power of God with it The creature hath truly and really in it an active principle and that principle truly and really exerteth or putteth forth acts but it hath both the principle and the activenesse put into it of God His influence not only toucheth the effect but the second cause and moveth it * Contrary to this some of the Schoolmen Molina de lib. Arbitrio qu. 14. Disp 26. pa. 111. Disp 32. pag. 133 He worketh not only with but by it and that though in some sense mediately in regard of his elevation and use of the second cause yet immediately also in regard of his nearest attingency and that both by immediety of person and of virtue 4. It behoves us to consider the subordinacy of the second to the fiâ—st cause of the creature to God somewhat more distinctly Observe therefore it is twofold 1. Physicall 2. Morall The former simply and absolutely concernes the being of every reall effect and the virtue or power by which it is produced by any second cause The latter respecteth the manner of the procedure of an effâ—ct fâ—om a rational agent and the relation and correspondency it bears to the revealed and preceptive will of God given unto him All creatures in all their actions are physically subordinate to God but reasonable creatures moreover are and particularly man is morally subordinate to him viz. as he receives all his activity from him so he is to act by his Commission and in a conformity to his direction or command given forth by word the ground and reason of the former subordination is his being a creature for as such he totally depends on God for his being and operation the latter is from his being a creature endued with reason and will and therefore working with deliberation and free volition thence his person and actions are qualifiable with a moral goodness and evilness and are capable of being regulated by a law and prosecuted with rewards and punishments Man therefore in respect of his moral actions stands in this twofold subordination unto God physical and moral 5. There are divers differences twixt these two subordinations of man unto God some of which it is to our present purpose to consider They are different 1. In the formall respect or term to which they refer the physical subordination respecteth Gods will of purpose and hand of providence the moral respecteth Gods revealed will or word of precept 2. In point of necessity the physical subordination is certain and immutable so necessary as
that it cannot be otherwise it is impossible the creature should not be in all things subject to dependent on Gods decree and hand of providence both passively and actively the moral is not so but may be and is varied from though this subordination be necessary de jure and ought to be kept inviolate yet it is not de facto but it is oftentimes infringed And here comes in sin what is sin but the creatures breach and transgression of the moral subordination he stands in and owes unto God his preceptive will or word either by a non acting or by a contrary acting to the same 6. By these differences it may appear for I shall not strive to take notice of all that these two subordinations are in humane actions not only distinguishable but separable and dissociable Man may be subordinate to God physically in those actions wherein he is inordinate morally And Gods will of purpose and work of providence may go on and be done when his preceptive will takes no place but is directly crossed as it is in all the sinful motions of man And hence it may appear of the sinfull acts of men as they are something in rerum naturâ how it may be said as in the third Proposition above the thing is of Gods hand working but not of his mouth warranting it to man If it be here asked Why God makes use of such agents to act by as are displeasing and crosse to his preceptive will when as he hath such choice of other ministerial agents yea and makes use of his creatures agency meerly of choice not of necessity I answer though mans sinful acts cannot but be displeasing and dishonorable to him yet the use he can and doth make of them is not so It is for his honour to work by variety of instruments and the commendation of his workmanship to bring to passe a straight and perfect work with crooked and untoward tooles His providences of this nature are the probations of men both good and evil and hereby he both worketh out more good then there is evill in the act of the subordinate agent so peccant and accomplisheth the just punishment both of others and of those he so imployes 7. We must observe in the subordination of the creature to God in its production though it receive all its efficacy and working from God yet the causality of the first and second of the superiour and inferiour cause and the efflux of the effect as from the one and the other are distinguishable As the creatures essence and existence are wholly in and from God yet far enough different and distinct from Gods so the creatures power and operation unto the causing of an effect is totolly received of God yet Gods agency therein is one and the creatures is another Hence our sense tels us the sun shines the fire warmes chalke whitens and it is so really If we should say as many Schoolmen do that in this subordinate agency of the creature under G d and their working together unto any effect Molina Suarez the action of God and the creature is the same strictly and properly as action is taken for productio activa for as taken for productio passiva or the effect it may be clearly granted yet although I see not why totall dependency and derivation should more infer or be a reason for the confounding or identifying Gods and the creatures actions then it is for the identifying of their beings we must understand it of the materiale and not of the formale of their actions and so must be forced to put some distinction betwixt the creatures causality and the virtue by which he causeth betwixt the divine influx to the creature agent and the creatures 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or efflux to the effâ—ct betwixt the creatures taking in the concourse of the first cause and his issuing or putting it forth That God and the creature are different agents in their producing of the same effect is granted but how should they be so if their action or agents were altogether the same Besides if it were so then the same action must be said to be morally good viz. as from God and evill as from man to be subordinate to a law â—s from man not subordinate as from God Again if in this concurrence of these two agents to the causing of the same effect the action of each were wholly the same then the same action would denominate them both which we see it doth not When a stone fals downward a plant growes a beast goes eats sleeps we do not nor can properly say that God fals growes goes eats sleeps For although all these acts are in and from his concourse yet as they only are in the creature as their subject so they are also from the creatures natural principles from which there is a procedure of these acts different formally from that of the divine cooperation for which they peculiar denominate the creature and not God In man whose actions have a moral 〈◊〉 different from their physical and who acteth with deliberation and choice this difference though it 〈◊〉 in all creature actâ— is more apparent Let it be granted that in all his actions he is physically â—â—â—ed by God though some admit it only of his imperate transient and productive actions unto the immanent and illicit acts of his understanding and will they will only allow a moral motiveness * Jo. Cameron Resp ad Epist viri Docti cap. 1. in operibus eius pag. 736. a 737. a. but whether way soever it be let the physical influence be supposed of all in these humane actions the strength and virtue is from God the actuosity or agency is formally mans Though the action be good and so more peculiarly of God he not only sustaining the will in the use of its freedom but determining and carrying it whether by a physical or moral influence is not here to be disputed to the willing and working of that good yet the formal agency is only ascribed to man Hence he is said to believe hope pray and do the like gracious acts and not God Hence it may appear which is the reason I have travailed so far in these School intricacies how in the sinful acts of man the usual distinction betwixt the action and the moral obliquity of it and that the former is from God the latter is mans only may hold For 1. Take it only in its natural or physical consideration and so the action is both from God in as much as from him is the energie or force that goes to it and from man also in as much as he hath an hand or activity in it distinct though inseparable from that of God 2. And take it as a moral act in which the creature oweth subordination and conformity to Gods law and which floweth from a moral faculty in man and so it is only from man from his own will according to that of
that be convenient to be amongst them that are one Common-wealth yet 1. It is not alwayes so one part of a Common-wealth sometimes lying from another beyond the Seas or beyond another or divers other Nations yea some imes one part in Europe another in East-India or America 2. How far that cohabitation must go or to what compasse to be the boundaries of a Common-wealth inclusively and extensively is not by any generall rule much lesse by any dictate of nature defined or otherwise determined then by humane choice and so it is not uniformely or by one constant proportion but variously and unequally every Common-wealth being of a different latitude of place from others and one and the same Republique often varying from it self by vicissitudinary contraction and extension 3. Naturalization or Denisonship is not tyed to habitation but ordinarily some that live among are not of and some that are of live not among this or that Nation or State 3. Not by mens appertaining or subjection to one Soveraign or Civil head For 1. A Common-wealth being ens aggregatum and the term unto which a Magistrate is immediately referred being not a multitude of persons in their individual or single beings but as aggregate and formed into one body politique the Magistrate cannot be either in nature or time before the aggregation or the republique union and relation of the people one to another as one State and therefore cannot be the procreant or efficient cause thereof 2. The same person we know may be the Civil head or Soveraign Lord of divers politique bodies they under him still remaining divers 4. It remains therefore to be done as far as my imagination reacheth only by consent and this consent to be the consent of all that are interessed in the association viz. of the parties themselves to be incorporate and of those whether superiors or people they are dissociated or severed from It is most congruous to say the distinction of politique societies or distributing one into many cometh by the same means or hath the same efficient which the first contract or entring into politique society hath but that is the voluntary accord of the associated as not only the learned agree * Boterus de Origin urbium lib. 1. cap. 1. Bodin de Repub. lib. 1. cap. 6. Althusius polit cap. 4. pag. 24. Grot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 6. Sect. 4. Dithmars Polit. lib. 1. pag. 20. but plain reason dictates It is a common principle which not only Scripture and humane Authors tell but our own experience suggests to us That man is a sociable creature fitted for and affected to mutual converse and is by his natural instinct and bent led to seek acquaintance cohabitation and communion with his kinde To this we may add his necessity in mans vitiated state of distributive Justice and defence against occurrent injuries †Dum enim haec amittere timent tenent in his utendis quendum modam aptum vinculo civitatis qualis ex hujusmodi hominibus constitui potest August de liber Arbitr lib. 1. cap. 15. By these two inducements men were betimes and still are moved to close together in large and populous societies and then to erect Government for the upholding of them in union order equity and safety And beginning first with the aggregation of one politique body when that by multiplication of mankind was grown over numerous and unwieldy to its self and its superiors if no distemper could have arisen to have made a violent breach no such immediate and miraculous hand of God should have interposed as was that of the confusion of tongues yet meer populousness and distance of habitation thence ensuing would have perswaded to a partition into more Common-wealths It is very probable that the division of the earth made in the dayes of Peleg * Gen. 10.25 was a distribution and alotment thereof unto several Nations and Kingdoms into which mankinde were then severed and that the first partition of Common-wealths at least after the floud was then made and that it was occasioned by the confusion of Languages at Babel for immediately before that it is said the people were one Occasioned I say for that occasion did but prepare men for that reduction into divers communities in that it did dissolve their union and parcel and disperse them abroad upon the face of the earth by making them uncapable of conversing together and some of the Hebrew Doctors say it did set them at oddes and embroyled them in fight and bloud-shed Vide Cartwright in Gen. 11.7 but it did not mould of incorporate the several parties so divided asunded into several communities no that was the effect of some other cause and what should that be but the joynt will and conspiration of the severally languaged and severed parties each among and for themselves immediately acted and therefore we read both of the sons of Japhet and of all the sons of Noah that they were divided by families tongues and lands into distinct nations * Gen. 10.5 31 32. But though that were the occasion of the division then made yet many after divisions in every age almost there have been of nations into new Common-wealths as also unitings of more Republiques into one of which divisions though confusion and discord not of tongues but of minds even as a modern Author would have that at Babel to have been no more †Tho Anglus Instit peripat Append. cap. 19. Sect. 5 6. hath been as oft as any other thing the occasion yet such discord could be but the introduction unto not the former or founder of new Common-wealths the associating of them could only be accomplished by the will and consent of the incorporated As for the distinction of property in Lands and other possibles which must needs accompany this partition of Common-wealths when the first divisions after the flood or any since were made whereby the prrties distributed left unto those they parted from the Countrey wherein they were and entred into void regions there could be no entrenchment upon the common right of mankinde by such entry there being a sufficient consent given to it by all others in that the places were left and exposed empty in regard both of occupation and claim The first property whether National or personal unto Land or goods accruing if not by an Expresse declared consent and agreement of the first multitude in whom a common-right promiscuously or indiscriminately resided yet doubless by their reall accord signified by their act of cession permission or giving way unto the seisure and enjoyment of the first occupant Vide Grotium de Jure Belli lib. 2. cap. 2. Sect. 3. 2. This doubt being passed the next is Common-wealths being distinguished how come these each to set up their Supreme Rulers In this matter 1. It is Objected That either it must be done by a universal consent even to a man nemine contradicente The same Author and
interpreted first of Zerubbabel in whom the soveraign dignity was restored at the return from the captivity and then of Christ * So Calvin Diodate and the Divines Annotat. So may this parallel prophecy be understood But whether we apply it to Zerubbabel or to Christ this must needs be granted that after Zedekiah's removall and the Lands captivity was consummate by Nebuchadnezzar a right there was extant and remaining somewhere or in some person to the Crown and Kingdome of Judah though for the present suspended from actuall exercise both by the hand of Gods providence in the full conquest of Nebuchadnezzar and by his extraordinary direction and dispensation by word of mouth sent by his Prophet Jeremiah as we find Jer. 27.12 16.21.8 9. and that right did not descend upon Christ till he was born nor then per saltum or immediately from Zedekiah or Jehoiakim to him but by the interposal of those peâ—sons in whom the race and line of blood or inheritance was continued down to Christ Subsection 9. CHAP. VII SECT II. Subsect 9. Argument 9. Taken from the nature of Magistracy 9 REason is to be drawn from the nature of Magistracy It cannot agree thereunto to say that actuall possession or rule gives being to the power or is an inseparable adjunct or convertible attribute thereof Magistracy is a râ—lation of office Every relation is founded upon something that is absolute What should be the foundation of the relatâ—on of Magistrate and Subject but the act of constitution of such a person or persons in authority or to be and stand in the office of Magistracy to such a people from this transaction as from its foundation results this estate or relation and then from this estate or relation result the mutual duties and acts of Magistrate and Subject his actual superiority and their subjection his rule and their obedience Well then actuall superiority and rule being acts proper to and resulting out of Magistracy they must needs presuppose it to be first in being ere they can be educed First I say not onely in order of nature but of time for the civill transactions whereby Magistracy is produced and the politcall acts which proceed from it are not immanent or instanâ—aneous such as are those whereby the forms of natural beings do produce their facultieâ— or properties but transient and succedaneous and such as require some â—lâ—xâ— of time to be put forth in It must needs be then an incongruous assertion to affi me that the acts which flâ—w from Magistracy in timâ— dâ— gâ—ve being to or are convertible adjuncts of it A man is first a man and then he reasons A man is first an Artificer and then he works in his Art So a man is first a power and then he rules possession of the Throne or Territory and Regency or coercion of the people by the sword are after and latter in time then the Creation or Investure of the power Magistracy is the antecedent the cause the principle the first act and actual dominion or coercion is the consequent the effect the effluxe or the second act thereof Men first are Kings and then they reign they rule because they are the higher powers and they are not the higher powers because they rule As on the other hand the state of inferiority in a politicall body is the cause and principle of the Subjects acts of obedience Men are first in the relation of Subjects and then they act or yield obedience This precept of the Apostle Let every soule be subject to the higher powers though delivered in â—â—arms illimitedly universall is onely intended and given to them that are in the state of Subjects and because they are in that estate therefore it takes hold on them they that are either supream Magistrates or within no Common-wealth are not obliged by it And as every person is not involved so every act of submission which may be done to any kind of power in the civill State is not that which is comprized in this precept or contained within the matter of it It is possible a man may submit out of a principle of humility or policy or be forcibly prostrated where he oweth no obedience but it is a submission ex debito and that stricti juris or proper to the conscience of him that is in the state of a Subject that is hereby required Let Solomon be our instance to illustrate this Having been before designed and chosen to be his Father Successor in the Kingdome of Israel he is thereupon first anointed and proclaimed King by Zadok Nathan and Benaiah and then after this it is said He sate on the throne of the King in stead of David his father and prospered and all Israel obeyed him and all the Princes and the mighty men CHAP. VII SECT II. Subsect 5. and all the sons likewise of K. David submitted themselves unto lomon the King Here Solomons constitution precedes his actuall possession and rule and the Subjects submission and obedience both in order of nature and of time as the ground and reason thereof And the same is exemplified in Joshua When Moses was to dye he spake unto the Lord saying Let the Lord the God of the spirits of all flesh set a man â—ver the congregation which may goe out bâ—fore them and which may lead them out and which may bring them in Here in this petition there is first desired the setting of one over the Congregation which is the calling admitting of him to the Soveraign power and then follows his leading them out and bringing them in his exercise of rule And according to the order of this Petition is the method of the Lords concession and direction upon it The Lord in the next words commands Moses to take Joshua and lay his hand upon him and set him bâ—fore Eleazar the Priest and before all the congrâ—gation and give him a charge in their sight and puts some of his honour upon him and then it follows That all the Congregation of the children of Israel may be obedient There may be a violent brutish subduednessâ— but there can be no rational moral submission and obedience as of Liege-people to their Liege-Lord in any other course And as to this the case is altogether the same and there is no dâ—fference whether the Magistrate come in by extraordinary assignation from God as Joshua and Solomon did or by the ordinâ—ry means Those commands and rules that are given in Scripture for the doing of publique distribâ—tive jâ—stice as that Defend the poor and fatherlesse do jâ—stice to the afflâ—cted and needy and deliver the poor and needy rid them out of the hand of the wicked Psalâ— 82.3 4. and many others * See Levit. 19.15 Deut. 1.16 17.16.19 1 Sam. 23.3 2 Chr. 19.6 c. I would aske â—o whom they are given who do they concern are they spoken to all without exception or onely to them that are Magistrates and Governours I suppose