casually upon something in the dark or run against it tho' we neither see or know what that thing is or when we see a thing a far off we know that that thing is tho' as yet we know not what it is The Course of Nature is carry'd on by Efficient Cauâ—es and Effects For since a First Cause being suppos'd who is Infinitely Wise he Administâ—rs his workmanship the World after the wisest and best manner which is that the contexture of the whole be not loose and slack but perfectly Coherent nor can this be done among an infinit variety of Bodies by any other means so as to make up the Course of Nature but by making Effects necessarily follow from their Causes since if that were not the Course of Nature would be at a stand and need the Artificers hand at every turn to make it go on which argues an Imperfection in the Workmanship it self it follows that the Course of Nature must be carry'd on by Efficient Causes and Effects 4. The Course of Nature must be câ—â—ry'd on by such Efficient Causes and Effects as 〈◊〉 â—roper to one another For were â—ot â—â—ese â—auses and Effects Proper to one anotheâ— any 〈◊〉 might do any thing or suffâ—r from any thing v. g. Fire might both heat and cool and mâ—iâ—ten and Water might be as combustible as dry Wood and so of all the rest In whiâ—h case no man could tell how to Order his Actions or what Efficient Cause or what Matter rather than another he is to make use of to produce any Effect nor consequentlâ— sinâ—e â—uch Essences are ordain'd for such and such Ends could the Essences or Natures of things be Known or Distinguisht more than in Outward Appearance 5. Hence follows immediately that every such Proper Efficient Cause put to be Actually Causing must most necessarily produce 〈◊〉 Proper Effect For since to Causâ— is 〈◊〉 do and to do nothing is not to do what 〈◊〉 Actually causing must cause something or proâ—uce some Effect Anâ— this Effect must be a Proper one as has been prov'd § 4. 6. All the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually causing For since the Virtue or Power of working is in the Efficient Cause it self as being nothing but it's Existence and the Matter to be wrought upon is Quantitative that is of it 's own nature either Perfectly or Imperfectly Divisible and Variable innumerable Manners of ways according to it's Qualities nor can it have an Infinite Power of resisting the Efficiency of the least Cause hence it is apt to have an Impression made upon it to some degree by any Quantitative Agent provided there be but Immediate Application of the Agent to the Patient and that it is prâ—st upon it But there being no vacuum immediate Application of one Natural Body to another must needs be throughout all Nature and the Course of Nature consisting in Moâ—ion one Body must necessarily press upon that which is next it From all which it follows evidently that all the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually Causing 7. From these Discourses 't is evident that we can Demonstrate Proper Effects from Proper Efficient Causes which we call Demonstrating â priori and Proper Efficient Causes from Proper Effects which is call'd Demonstrating à posteriori For since a Cause and a Reason do onely differ in this that the word Cause speaks the thing as it is in Nature and Reason the same thing as 't is in our understanding and Proper Causes and Effects in Nature are necessarily connected to one another and consequently do Infer one another naturally it follows that those Causes and for the same reason Effects as they are in our Vnderstanding must be the Reason why one infers the other in our Understanding Whence follows that thoâ—e Causes and Effects can be uâ—'d as Proper Middle Terms to Infer or Conclude one another And that Proofs made by such Mediums are Demonstrative is clear for no Proof can be more Clear than that which is Grounded on those Notions or Natures being connected Naturally and so Connected that it is Impossible it should be otherwise as 't is shown these are § § 5. and 6. 8. This is farther confirm'd because Two Bodies that are Immediate do Act and Re-act or are in some respect mutually Causes and Effects to one another For since their Existences which is their Power of Acting are immediately Apply'd and by the Course of Nature consisting in Motion prest upon one another and no Natural Agent is of Infinite Power nor consequently can it subdue all the Resistence of the Patient in an Instant it follows that till one of them be by degrees totally subdu'd the Resisting Body must necessarily for the reason given Re-act upon it whence they will be to some degree or in some respect Mutual Causes and Effects in regard of each other Corol. I. The carrying on this Connected Course of Natural Causes is called Providence and as joyn'd with a Course of Supernatural ones Interiour and Exteriour perfecting and streâ—gthening the Will all along to the very end and ripening Souls for Bliss which we call Grace is that which is truly meant by Predestinatioâ— which sounds so terribly and is such â—â—ugbeaâ— to those that mis-understand it Corâ—â— â—I Every Step of this Order of Causes has Entity or Goodness in it For it is manifestly the Causing of Something by Something Corol. â—â—I Therefore 't is directly against the 〈◊〉 of â—â—e First Cause to cause or lay any 〈◊〉 for Sin For Sin formally as such has no kind of Entity or Goodness in it either â—etaphysical Physical or Moral but is formally a meer Privation of some Entity or Goodness which ought to be in an Intelligent Creature whence it comes that by falling-short here in using the Means that Creature falls short hereafter of attaining the End which is only attainable by such Means To explicate which high Points fully is left to Solid Divines I mean such as do not guide themselves by meer Words but by Reason and Good Sense Corol. IV. Hence follows also that were all the Efficient Causes that produce any Effect known to us we could have no Accidental Predications nor consequently any Opinions but the Effect would still be equally Demonstâ—able from the Complexion of those Causes as it is now from some one single Efficient as was hinted formerly Corol. V. Hence to one that comprehends the Complexion of all Causes there could be no Chance nor could such a Man have any Ground for such a Notion For Chance as the common use of the word tells us signifies an Vnseen or Vnforeseen Cause whereas no Cause is Vnseen to him who sees Demonstratively how all Natural Effects follow all along from the Causes and that they cannot but follow from such Causes Corol. VI. Hence tho' we know not particularly the Quid est of this Exact Order of the World or the Course of Nature because we Comprehend not all Causes nor know what Cause or Causes did
than this which is or should be the chief Subject of their Physicks I shall dare to affirm that they are in plain Terms most ridiculous and most unintelligible Fopperies as I have shown at large in my Appendix And indeed how should we make any Clear Idea of their Matter when themselves speak Contradictions concerning it as may be seen hereafter p. 417. where I shall hope I have demonstrated that their Forc'd Silence Open Prevarications and perfect Inconsistency in telling us the Intrinsecal Nature of that First Matter of theirs has render'd them utterly Incapable of explicating any Body in Nature Nor can we need any greater Confirmation that their Natural Philosophy is utterly Unprincipled and Unaccountable in the most Essential part of it than to observe that neither Cartesius himself nor Regius Rohault Regis Le Grand nor any of that School I have met with have as I must think been Able to give us any Light of it since they neither Attempt nor Mention it which shows they are at an utter Loss about the Primordial Constitution of their First Matter of which notwithstanding they acknowledge all their Three Elements and consequently all Nature was made These few Particulars omitting innumerable others I have thought fit to hint to show that the Method to Science which the Great Cartesius follows is utterly Incompetent to attain it and that the Scheme of his Doctrine is merely a piece of Wit That which gives it most Credit is that his Suppositions granted he proceeds consequently in the subsequent parts of it which are purely Mathematical But what signifies that if he neither observes True Logick in laying his Principles nor Nature in his Physicks which he cannot pretend to do unless he gives us a particular account of the Intrinsecal Constitution of his First Matter upon which all depends A Task I say again his Followers neither will ever attempt nor can possibly perform by his Principles as is shown at large in my Appendix Yet it must be confess'd that those kind of Discourses are very Plausible and Taking with the Middling sort of Readers and with such who are much pleas'd with a Melodious Gingle of Words prettily laid together with Neat Eloquence Quaint Wit and Unusual Remarks For those kind of Embellishments do divert the Reader make the Authours pass for Curious men and bear a fine Appearance of Truth till they come to be scann'd Exactly and grasp'd close by Severe Reason reducing them to Principles and Connexion of Terms Which done it will be found that they afford to the Learner who sincerely seeks for Truth nothing but certain Bright Flashes or Coruscations which do indeed for a time dazle the Fancy but they settle in the Iudgment no Constant Steady Light to direct them in their Way to true Science Farther I must declare for the Honour of our English Genius that tho' we do not match the French in the Finery Gayity and Neatness of their delivering their Conceptions a Talent in which they are very Excellent any more than we do in our Outward Garb and Dress yet that there are more Solid Productions well built Truths and more Iudicious and Ingenious Thoughts of his own in our Learned Countryman Mr. Locke's Treatise Entituled An Essay concerning Human Understanding than as far as I have observ'd is found in great Multitudes of such slight Discoursers put together We are come now to consider the Other pretended Method to Science which is the Way of Experiments or Induction Concerning which not to repeat what I have occasionally by way of Reason alledg'd against it in my following Book I need say no more but that Matter of Fact shows evidently that this Method alone and Unassisted by Principles is utterly Incompetent or Unable to beget Science For what one Universal Conclusion in Natural Philosophy in knowing which kind of Truths Science consists has been Demonstrated by Experiments since the the time that Great man Sir Francis Bacon writ his Natural History The very Title of which laborious Work shows that himself did not think Science was attainable by that Method For if we reflect well on what manner such pieces are writ we shall find that it is as he calls it meerly Historical and Narrative of Particular Observations from which to deduce Universal Conclusions is against plain Logick and Common Sense To aim at Science by such a Method may be resembled to the Study of finding out the Philosopher's Stone The Chymist lights on many Useful and Promising things by the way which feed him with false hopes and decoy him farther but he still falls short of his End What man of any past or of our present Curious Age did ever so excell in those Industrious and Ingenious Researches as that Honour of our Nation the Incomparable Mr. Boyle yet after he had ransack'd all the hidden Recesses of Nature as far as that Way could carry him he was still a Sceptick in his Principles of Natural Philosophy nor could with the utmost Inquisitiveness practic'd by so great a Wit arrive at any Certain Knowledge whether there was a Vacuum or no And certainly we can expect no Science from such a Method that can give us no Certain Knowledge whether in such a Space there be Something or Nothing which of all others should be the most easily Distinguishable and Knowable Lastly we may observe that when an Experiment or which is the same a Matter of Fact in Nature is discover'd we are never the nearer knowing what is the Proper Cause of such an Effect into which we may certainly refuâ—d it which and onely which is the Work of SCIENCE For Gassendus will explicate it according to his Principles Cartesius according to his the Noble Sir Kenelin Digby and his most Learned Master Albius whom I Iudge to have follow'd the true Aristotelian Principles according to theirs So that after all the assigning the True Natural Cause for that Effect and explicating it right must be Decided by way of Reason that is by Demonstrating first whose Principles of Natural Philosophy are True and Solid and onely He or They who can approve their Principles to be such can pretend to explicate that Natural Production right by resolving it into its Proper Causes or to have Science how 't is done and however the Experimental Men may be highly Commendable in other Respects yet onely those who can lay just Claim to True Principles and make out their Title to them can be truly held Natural PHILOSOPHERS Which sufficiently shows that the Way of Experiments cannot be a True METHOD TO SCIENCE But to leave other Men's Failings and Return home to my Self To obviate the Superficial ways of Reason so magnify'd by other Speculaters I have endeavour'd to take the quite Contrary Method and have laid my Discourses as deep as I could possibly and perhaps it will be thought I have over-done in those about Identical Propositions for which yet I shall hope the Reasons I have given there for that
Sublunary Motions must bear a proportion to it and be measur'd by it being perform'd while such a proportionable part of it was Flowing and Mankind is forced to need and make use of such a Measure to Adjust Proportion and Design all their Motions or Actions by and to know the determinate distance of them from known and notorious Periods hence there must be a Common Head of the time When those Motions were perform'd which we call Quando If the Extrinsecal application be conceiv'd to be made to the Subject or thing in Rest then either that Extrinsecal thing is conceiv'd to be barely apply'd to the whole that is to be Immediate to it or meerly to Contain it which grounds the Notion and answers to the Question Where or Ubi Or it denotes some certain determinate Manners how it is apply'd to the whole or to some parts of it and then either the whole or at least some Parts of the Subject or thing must be conceiv'd to be ply'd and accommodated to the parts of the Extrinsecal thing and 't is call'd its Site or Situation or else the Extrinsecal thing or its parts are conceiv'd to be Fitted Ply'd or Accommodated to the Subject or Thing and then 't is call'd Habit. 20. These ten Common Heads are call'd Predicaments that is Common Receptacles which Contain and whence we may draw all our Predicates for the Common Subject Thing which we may briefly exemplifie thus Peter 1 tho' but a yard2 and half high yet a Ualiant3 Subject4 fought5 and was wounded6 yesterday7 in8 the Field standing9 upon his guard armed10 21. All these Notions under whatever Head if they be Corporeal ones are Natural and Common to all Mankind For since they are made by Impressions on the Senses which are Common to all Mankind it follows that the Notions which are the Effects of those Impressions must be such also since the same Causes upon the same-natur'd Subjects must work the same Effects 22. Our Soul has in it a Power of Compounding those several Notions together of Considering them diverse ways of Reflecting on its own Thoughts and Affections and lastly of joyning a Negative to its Natural Notions if there be occasion such as are the Notions of Indivisible Immaterial Incorruptible Unactive Insignificant c. which particularly happens when we would strive to frame Notions of spiritual Things All which is manifest by plain Experience if we reflect never so little on what passes in our own Interiour 23. No Notions can be imagin'd that do not arise from one of these Heads For Corporeal Notions are imprinted directâ—y Spiritual Notions by Reflexion on our Mind and on its Operations or Affections or else by joyning a Negative to our Positive natural Notions And Mix'd or Compound Notions are framed by joyning our former simple Notions Wherefore since there can be nothing imagin'd which is not either Corporeal Spiritual or Mix'd or Compounded of Former Notions 't is manifest that all the Notions we have or can have do arise from one of those Heads 24. Wherefore 't is hence farther shewn that there is no necessity at all of making some Notions to be Innate and consequently that Conceit of the Cartesians is Groundless who affirm That by a Motion made on the Senses the Soul by an unknown Vertue peculiar to its self Excites or awakens such and such an Innate Idea which till then lay dormant in it because they find that that Notion is nothing like to the Idea it excites For first how do they prove that only Motion is communicated to the Brain from the Object or that that Motion does not carry along with it different-natur'd Particles or Effluviums of these several Bodies which are as it were little Models of their Nature It is certain this passes thus in the grosser Senses and no more is requisite to do it in the subtiler but that the Particles emitted be more subtil which cannot shock the Fancy or Reason of a Natural Philosopher who knows well into what almost-infinite smallness Body is Divisible And of all Men in the World the Cartesians should not be startled at it whose Principles do allow lesser Particles than those Effluviums and to pass thro' far lesser Pores than those within the Nerves or even than such as are in the substance of the Nerves themselves Now this being granted the whole contexture of this Doctrine of ours has a clear Coherence For such Particles bearing the nature of the thing along with them are apt when they are carried to the Seat of Knowledge to breed in the Mind or convey into it the Nature or an Intellectual Notion of the Thing it self To do which there can need no more than that every thing according to the Maxim be receiv'd according to the Nature or Manner of the Receiver viz. that those Effluviums by affecting the Body Corporeally do affect the Soul Intellectually Secondly How is it conceivable or any way Explicable that a Motion which they confess is utterly Unlike the Idea in the Mind should be the Proper Exciter of such an Idea Indeed were those Motions of the Nature of our Signs that are voluntarily agreed on and fore-known to the Users of them they might have a Power to make such a peculiar Excitation of those Ideas as our Words do now or as any odd and disagreeing Things are made use of by us when we practise the Art of Memory But here things are quite otherwise for we have no Fore-knowledge either by Agreement nor by our voluntary Designation that such Motions shall excite such Idea's or Notions nor as is confess'd are they Naturally alike wherefore it is altogether inexplicable how they should ever come to excite such particular Idea's Add That this hidden Virtue in the Soul to make such a particular Idea start up as soon as that Motion is made in the Nerve is both said gratis and is as Obscure as an Occult Quality and so far from Explicable that even themselves as far as I can learn have not so much as attempted to explain it but it seems to be in part taken up gratis to make good their Doctrine of innate Idea's as the Tenet of such Idea's is to prove the Soul is a distinct Thing from the Body Lastly Their Argument drawn from Experience that the Idea in the Mind is quite different from that Impression in the Senses or any Bodily Faculty is shewn to be Inconclusive by alledging as was said lately that the Nature of the Object found in those emitted Particles and the Nature of it found in the Soul Intellectually or as standing under Notion are the self-same and not so Vnlike as they imagin Add That their Argument faulters in this too that the makers of it did not duly reflect when they advanced it on that ' foresaid Axiom Quicquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis For had they done this they could not have wonder'd that an Affection of the Body which is imprinted directly and an
't is evident that Rarefaction and Condensation import no more in their Notion but the altering the Subject according to some Quality whereas Division imports directly the taking away the Vnity of the Thing and consequently its Entity Again meer Rarefaction does not change the Substance but the Degree of it when it comes to great height and every Body admits Rarefaction a long time without losing its former Essence whereas Division consists in an Indivisible so that the Divisum esse is esse aliud or esse duo ex uno whereas the Rarefactum esse may be without any such Effect following it 5. Rarefaction and Condensation are the next Actions in Dignity For since as was proved above Rarity and Density are the First Intrinsecal Differences of Quantity as it affects Body in order to natural Action and Passion it follows that those natural Actions that cause Rarity or Density are the next in dignity to Division which works more upon Divisibility their Genus 6. These three sorts of Action take up the whole Head of Natural Action For since the Genus and its two Differences must needs comprehend all under any common Head as being Adequate to it and Division answers to Divisibility the Genus and Rarefaction and Condensation to the Intrinsecal Differences of more or less thus Divisible it follows that these three sorts of Action do take up all that Head so that there cannot be any kind of Natural Action which is not reducible to some of these or not comprehended under them Besides all the First and Second Passible Qualities which generally are the Immediate Objects of Natural Actions are comprehended in or spring out of Rarity and Density as will be seen in Physicks 7. The Formal Virtue of Acting or working any Effect which we call its Causality is the Agent 's being what it is or its very Existence apply'd by Motion to the Patient and Communicated to it or as it were imprinted on it For since no particular Agent in Nature can do every thing whatever the reason why such particular Causes work such particular Effects must spring hence that the Effect has something in its Nature that is like the Cause comes from it and is Communicated to the Patient or partak'd by it Whence come those Vulgar Axioms Operari sequitur esse Every thing acts as it is An Effect is a participation of the immediate Caâ—se c. Thus the Cause or Reason why Water moistens is because it is moist in it self and imparts that Quality to another thing The reason why a Seal makes such an Impression is because it self is of such a stamp The reason why God Creates or is the Cause of Being is because Being is Essential to him Corol. II. Hence Motion is only requisit to apply the Virtue or Existence of the Agent to the Matter or Patient but the Substance of the Effect springs from the Cause's being what it is Whence it happens that the Effect from the same Causes is more or less perfect according as the Existence of a Cause which is of such a Nature or Essence or more or fewer parts of it are apply'd better or worse to the Patient or to more or fewer parts of it by a feebler or smarter Motion 8. It follows from this discourse that there must be Four Sorts of Causes necessarily belonging to every Effect in Nature viz. There must be an Acter which we call the Efficient Cause a Subject for the Acter to work upon called the Material Cause The Effect wrought in that Matter or Receiv'd in it which makes it otherwise than it was before and therefore has the Notion of some Form newly accruing to it which constitutes the Formal Cause And since Corporeal Action is Motion and no Body can move it self and therefore all Motion in Nature must be caus'd either Mediately or Immediately by something that is not a Body that is by a Spiritual or Intelligent Being and such Agents do design or act for an End therefore there must also be a Final Cause to make those Agents to move Bodies and make them act as they do in every particular Action tho' never so minute which grounds our Notion of Providence adequately Governing the World even as to the least circumstance of it Wherefore there are to every Action in Nature Four Causes necessarily requisit which will afford Reflecters ample occasion for Speculation and Contemplation For example When I write a Letter the Efficient Cause is my Self the Material Cause Paper which receives the Effect of my Writing The Formal Cause the Characters received in the Paper the Final Cause to gratify my Friend treat of Business or acquaint him with News 9. There is no Fifth Cause call'd an Idea as Plato affirms For either that Idea is conceiv'd as introduced in the matter and Receiv'd there and then 't is clearly a Formal Cause or as 't is in the Mind of the Artificer and then it concurrs to make him an Efficient Cause for without such an Idea he could not produce such an Artificial Effect 10. Operation has not the same Notion with Action but is Indifferent to Action and Passion or rather a kind of Neutral Notion made up of both For example Notions or Simple Apprehensions are said to be the First Operation of our Understanding tho' the Soul in having them is purely Passive So also my Acts of Discoursing Willing c. are call'd Operations tho' they be both perform'd by my Soul and Receiv'd in it Whence they have a kind of Neutral Notion such as have Curro ardeo and such-like taking such words not in a Grammatical but in a Philosophical and Natural Sense Of which kind are all Immanent Actions or Acts And therefore these are not so properly call'd Actions as Operations in order to what they have of Effective in them or else Acts because they Actuate or Inform the Subject in which they are as well Received as they are Produced by it Whence Action in the Proper and Obvious Sense signifies the Efficience of a Natural Cause which has a Transitive Notion and inferrs Passion and consequently some Effect in the Extrinsecal Subject it lights on Note That since Action inferrs Passion and referrs to it hence whatever is discoursed here of Action may by turning the Tables as it were or considering Motion in order to its other Term be understood likewise of Passion for which reason we treat of both those Heads in the same Discourse LESSON IX Of the Common Head of Ubi or Where 1. UBI or Where signifying in what Place the Notion of Place must first be rightly understood e're we can have a right Notion of the Common Head call'd Ubi And the word Place being no Artificial Term but a Natural one and us'd by all Mankind we are to learn the true and proper meaning of it from the Users of it that is we must take the Notion of Place not from men of Art or Speculaters but from the Vulgar
propositions are directly opposit to Contradictions since Man's Wit cannot invent a proposition directly Opposit to what runs runs not but what runs runs which is perfectly Identical Add that all Fault consisting in this that 't is a Privation of the Opposit Good Contradictions would not be at all Faulty but that they violate the Truth of Identical propositions as has been now proved since there are no other Truths which they directly and formally Oppose or destroy 12. Again as will be seen hereafter to Conclude is to shew the Terms of the Conclusion to be Connected by their being Connected with a Third or Middle Term in the Premisses But how can we shew that Middle Term is really connected with those Two other Terms in the Premisses By finding still another Middle Term to be connected with the Terms of the proposition to be proved And how far must this go on Endlesly or no If Endlesly it is impossible any thing should ever come to be prov'd if not then we must come to some proposition whose Terms are so Connected that no Middle Term can come between them that is such as cannot be Connected by means of Another that is which cannot be prov'd or made evident that is which are self-connected or self-evident that is which are formally Identical To enforce this we may observe that the more Remotâ— the Terms of a proposition are from Formal Identity the less evident they are and the more prooâ— they require as also that they grow still nearer to Evidence according to the degree of their Approaching to be Formally the same Wherefore since all Approach of Distant things ends in their Conjoyning and Centering in the same 't is manifest that all Approach of Distant Notions ends in their being the same in Notion or in a proposition Formally Identical as in a First and Self-evident Principle 13. Besides all Causality or the whole Course of Nature is finally refunded into this Self-evident Principle that Things are such as they are that is are what they are For since an Effect is a Participation of something that is in the Cause and the Cause as such is that which imparts or communicates something it has to the Matter on which it works its Effect Again since the Effect is such as the Cause is as to that which is imparted to it and if the Cause be of another sort the Effect still varies accordingly there can be no doubt but that Causality is the Imprinting the Existence of that Essence or Thing which is the Cause upon the Matter Whence follows evidently that the very Notion of Natural Causality and the whole Efficacy of it consists in the Causes existing that is being what it is Only Motion is added as a Common Requisit to apply that Existing Cause better or worse which is refunded into a Nature Superiour to Body as will be shewn hereafter 14. Lastly God himself has exprest his own Supreme Essence by this Identical Proposition Ego Sum qui Sum that is I exist or am Existence Which is the same in a manner with Self existence is Self-Existence Which therefore is the First Increated Truth as 't is the First Created one that what is is or A thing is what it is which is therefore True because God is what He is or because Self-existence is Self-existence From which Divine and Soveraign Verity all our Created First Principles derive their Truth For were not This True all our Identical Proposition and First Principles would all be False in regard they have their Verity from the Natures of the Things and of our Vnderstanding neither of which could have their Metaphysical Verity nor consequently could they ground or be capable of any Truth at all if Self-Existence their Cause were not Self-Existence and thence Unlimited in Power Wisdome and Goodness to Create and Conserve those Beings which are the Foundation of all the Truth we have or can have The Reader is desired to referr this Section to the Third Corollary and to consider them well together because they mutually give Light to one another And if we rightly consider it as the Proposition Homo est Homo is onely the reducing the Metaphysical Verity of Homo into a Formal Truth so Self Existence is self-Existence is the same in respect of the Soveraign Metaphysical Verity of the Divine Nature Corol. IV. Hence is seen that an Atheist can have no perfectly Certain Knowledge or Evidence of any thing but that by denying his Maker he deservedly comes to lose the best Perfection of his own Nature For if a Sceptick should put him to prove that things have any Metaphysical Verity in them grounding our first Principles and consequently all our Knowledge and object that for any thing he knows Things are Chimerical and so contriv'd as to beget in us False Judgments he is utterly at a loss through his denying a First Cause whose Unchangeable and Essential Truth and Goodness has Establisht their Natures to bee Unalterably what they are whence onely any Certain and Evident Knowledge of them is possible to be attain'd 15. Definitions tho' very useful to Science are not Self evident nor are those Propositions that Predicate the Definition of the Notion Defin'd First Principles For Self-evident Principles by force of their very Terms do oblige the Understanding to assent which such Propositions do not Again Art is requisit to make such Definitions as are Proper and Adjusted to the Thing Defin'd whereas First Principles must antecede all Art and be known by the Natural Light of our Understanding Besides the Possibility of being defind goes before the Definition which Possibility the Thing has from its Metaphysical Verity determining it to be This and no other For if the thing were not truly what it is it could not be exexplaind to be what it is were it not One that is Undivided in its self and Divided from all others it could not be compriz'd in one Definition and if it were not Determinately of this or that Nature it 's certain Bounds and Limits could not be drawn which is done by the Definition Whence 't is manifest that that proposition which affirms that a Thing is what it is is the First Principle and Ground to all Definitions and therefore Definitions themselves are not First Principles 16. This is further evinc'd because Words being liable to Equivocalness where there are more words as there are in Definitions there is more room for Equivocation which Inconvenience appears no where more than in the known Definition of Man For there wants not many Witty or rather half-witted Discoursers who Distinguish that is makes Ambiguous the Word Rational and do not stick to maintain that Man is Rational or Concluding being the Proper Act of Reason can Conclude Evidently in Lines and Numbers but not in Logick Physicks Ethicks or Metaphysicks much less in Theology and by this means they cramp the Definition to less than half the sense the words contain There are others
it The Objecter then slides over the Certainty of this proposition I think as compar'd with the proposition I am and other Judgments experimentally known and compares it with other propositions subsequent to I think Wherefore he first supposes it to be most Certain that is more Certain than they are and prefers it before all others without Comparing it with those others which is to suppose it so gratis and which is yet more strange he grounds all Knowledge whatever upon it 13. 'T is yet a worse Error that whereas Ens or Being is the Basis of all other Notions so that if no Thing be They cannot be the Alledger by arguing thus Cogito ergo sum does by a strange Hysteron proteron put an Operation to be Antecedent to Being it self and that to be Thinking is a more Simple Clear and Distinct Notion than to be And then from an Operation found out or suppos'd he concludes the very Notion of Being it self to be in the Thing Nay which is yet more odd he supposes the Notion of Knowledge of Himself imported by the Word Ego and supposes that Ens or Ego to be as is signified by the Copula Sum nay more he supposes that Ens or himself not onely to be â—ut moreover to be such viz. Operating or Thinking which most evidently speak or imply Existence and when he has done all this he Infers thence contrary to our 3d. 4th Sect. the simple being of that which he had not onely put to be and be known but which he had over and above put to be or be known to be such that is to be Operating or Thinking 14. Hence this Method of Generating Science is Unnatural Preposterous and Self-contradictory T is Vnnatural first because the way Nature takes to Beget Knowledge in us is not by divesting our selves of all other Knowledges to find out what 's most Certain but she at first instils Knowledge into us by a Natural way of Imprinting Notions in our Mind and our Conparing them and thence letting us See whether they Agree or Disagree 2 ly because it strains Nature to fancy our selves Ignorant of many Clear Truths which the goodness of the same Nature forces us to assent to as Evident And 3 ly because I am is according to the Order of Nature Antecedent to I am Thinking T is Preposterous because it argues from Compound Judgments which are less known to inâ—er what 's more Simple and so more known And lastly t is Self contradictory because it supposes that to bee or to be known which as yet according to that doctrine is not or is not known but is to be Concluded that is made known as is shewn Section 13th 15. Hypothetical Philosophy which is grounded on Suppositions and beggs that such and such things may be yielded and then it will explicate alâ— Nature is built on meer Fancy and is unworthy the name of Philosophy For since it belongs to a Philosopher to Resolve all Truths into their Principles and all Natural Effects into their Proper Causes and finally if need be into their first Principles or First Causes and a Hypothetical Philosopher can never perform this Duty which is most Essential to a Philosopher in regard the First Grounds he layes are barely begg'd or Supposed that is neither self-Evident nor made Evident by way of Proof Hence Hypothetical Philosophy is utterly unworthy the name of Philosophy since all its Assertions and Conclusions if driven home are resolved finally into Precarious Suppositions Again since all Speculation is Aiery and Fantastical that is not grounded on the Things as they are found in Nature and such Discoursers do not finally build their Discourses on the Natures of the Things as they find them to be but on their being such as they suppose them or would have them to be it follows that the whole Scheme of their Doctrine and all the speculations they advance how Ingenious so ever they may appear are far from Solid and in reality Groundless Aiery and Fantastical 16. Hence follows that who ever supposes any Principle or Proposition that influences his Explication of Nature or of Natural Effects which arâ— apt to be produced by Natural Causes and demonstrated by them whether that Principle be that Matter is divided into such or such parts or that it is moved in such a manner That it continues its motion without a Natural Motive Cause continually acting on it notwithstanding that it still meets with Rubbs from other parts of Matter which it â—reaks asunder That there are such Figures of it's Parts or such Qualities affecting the Subject and giving it a Virtue of Operating thus or thus That â—here are multitudes of little Entities brought in â—o serve a present turn when the Discourser is at 〈◊〉 plunge or Atomes pursuing and over taking â—heir fellows and clinging together conveniently â—or his purpose without giving a reason why and 〈◊〉 they must do so as is the manner of the Epiâ—ureans or what ever other useful Expedient he â—upposes to carry on the Clockwork of his Scheme such a man is no true Philosopher 17. Likewise who ever layes for his Ground â—hat neither is nor can be viz. Vacuum Imaginary Space Subsistent Dimensions Infinit Expansion of Continu'd Quantity Infinit Number of Atomes and suchlike can be no true Philosopher since they as do the former Resolve things finally into their own Unprov'd and Ridiâ—ulous Suppositions and would have us accept their Groundless Fancies for First Principles when as many â—imes the contrary to these is clearly demonstrable 18. Whoever proceeds meerly upon Experiments and Induction and cannot assign Proper Causes for the Effects or Matters of Fact they see â—one how ever their Inquisitiveness into Nature may merit Commendation and oblige Artificers and Practical men by many useful Observations and in some measure help Speculative Men also who do make use of Principles to find out more easily the Proper Causes of many Effects from which Industrious Researches into Nature such men may deserve the name of Virtuosi or Curious and Ingenious persons yet since as will be shewn hereafter they cannot by that Method alone without making use of Principles refund Effects into their Proper Causes nor give the true reason of the Effects they Experience nor Deduce so much as one Scientifical Conclusion they cannot in true speech be call'd Men of Science or Philosophers 19. Those of the Vulgar who have good Mother-witts and addict themselves to think much and attentively of some certain Natural Objects may by Practical Self-evidence well improv'd arrive to such a true Knowledge of the Causes of things as may rank them in the next Class of Knowers to Scientifical Men or true Philosophers For such Men by an Innate or Casual Addiction of their Thoughts to some particular sorts of Natures and by industrious and frequent consideration of them joyn'd with a natural Sagacity to penetrate them and natural Logick to discourse them in their thoughts are furnish'd with
their Identicals And the same may be said of other Qualities that affect our Senses very distinctly as Heat Cold Moist Dry c. Note that in such as these if it be too laborious to arrive at their Definitions by dividing the Common Genus as it often happens when the Dividing Members are more than Two and are not Contradictory to one another then we may frame our Definitions of them by observing the carriage of the Vulgar towards them or their Sayings concerning them For such Qualities being sensible ones are the Objects of the Senses of Mankind and do imprint Lively and Distinct Notions of themselves in all men Wherefore their Sayings being the Effect of the true Notions they have of them they if enow of them be collected must give us the true Notion of them or which is all one of what they mean by the Word that expresses them which is equivalent in Sense to a perfect Definition For example when they speak of those Qualities we call Dry and Moist we shall observe that they are sollicitous lest Moist things should squander and run about and therefore they are careful themselves to put such things in some Receptacle or Vessel that may keep them from doing so or they bid their Servants do it On the Contrary they bid them set Dry things on the Cupboard or on a Shelf and never put them in a Vessel or be at the needless labour of pounding them into a Pot or Tub out of fear they should squander about Which sayings and behaviour of theirs gives us the Definitions of both those Qualities viz. that Moist is that which difficultly keeps its own bounds or Figure and is easily accommodated to the bounds of another thing and Dry is that which easily retains its own bounds or Figure and is Difficulty accommodated to the bounds of another which are the very Definitions which that great Observer of Nature Aristotle gives us of those two Qualities Note II. Whence we may with a humble Acknowledgment and Thanks reflect on the Infinite Goodness of the God of Truth who unenviously bestows knowledge on all who will dispose themselves to receive it that where-ever Art by reason of our Shortness is at a plunge he supplies it by Practical Self-evidence or the naturally instill'd Knowledge of the Vulgar whence it is a high Pride in the greatest Men of Art to conceit that they are above being still the Children of Nature whereas 't is the best Title they have to True and Solid Learning Sus Minervam 8. All Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses For since the Premisses by Means of the Middle Term and the right Placing of it have in them the whole force of the Consequence and the Consequence cannot be of nothing but must be of some Determinate Proposition which can be nothing but the Conclusion it follows that all Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses Again since before we Conclude Determinately and Expresly we must know what to Conclude and we know what to Conclude by knowing the Premisses and the Conclusion is that Proposition which is to be Concluded it follows evidently that since we know the Conclusion e'er we Actually Inferr and Express it to be in the Premisses it is there virtually 9. All Deduced Truths are virtually in one another For since all Deduced Truths are Conclusions and the Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses and the same reason holds for all the following Conclusions as for the first or for one single one it follows that let there be never so many orderly-succeeding Syllogisms necessary to prove any point the Conclusions are still in the Premisses and the following ones in those that went before them 10. All Truths are virtually in the Identical Propositions and consequently in the Definitions For since all Truths are taken from the Nature of the Things and from their Metaphysical verity and consequently are in the Nature of the Thing fundamentally and This is Contain'd and Exprest in the whole by Identical Propositions and in all its parts by the Definitions it follows that all Truths are Virtually contain'd in Identical Propositions and consequently in the Definitions 11. From what 's lately said 't is evinced that if a Middle Term be taken which is a Proper Cause or Proper Effect the Conclusion is seen to be in the Premisses For though the Proper Causes and Effects be not the very Essence of the Thing yet since an Effect is a Participation of the Cause and so is apt to manifest the Nature of the Proper Cause that produced it and the Operation of a Proper Cause is nothing but the Existence of such a Cause which is sutable to its Essence imprinted upon the Patient hence such Mediums do Demonstrably and Mutually inferr one another and therefore nothing hinders but that the Conclusions may be seen to be in the Premisses as well in such Syllogisms as in those which have an Essential Notion for their Middle Term. 12. Hence all Natural Truths and this throughout the whole Course of Nature from the very Creation are virtually in one another For since as will be more clearly seen hereafter all those Natural Effects were Demonstrative of their Proper Causes and those Causes Demonstrative of their proper Effects and this from the First starting of Nature into Motion and so were apt to Inferr one another all along that is new Conclusions were still apt to spring from such Middle Terms Connected with the two Extremes in the Premisses and consequently the Truth of those Conclusions were all along Virtually in those several Premisses it follows that all Natural Truths are in one another and this throughout the whole Series or Course of Nature from the very Creation 13. Hence had we liv'd in every Place and in every part of Time where and when those several Causes wrought those several Effects and had been endowed with Capacity Sufficient for such a performance and not been diverted with other thoughts from Application to that work we might have actually Demonstrated those Effects by their Proper Causes or those Causes by their Proper Effects through the whole Series or Course of the World from the beginning to the end except Miracle had alter'd that Natural Course For in that case all those Subjects had afforded us Matter or fit Mediums for Demonstration as well as any single Subject does now Wherefore if we had had wit enough to demonstrate as aforesaid and that wit sufficiently apply'd in every circumstance it had been done 14. Hence every Soul separated from the Body that knows any one Natural Truth knows all Nature and this all at once at the first Instant of her Separation For since all Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes and Proper Effects and those Mutually inferr one another that is the Truth grounded on the one is seen to be in the Truth grounded on the other as being Virtually in one another and we experience that the Capacity of the Soul to know Truths is not
a stand or non-plust to find a Reason for the thing it admires whence it inferrs demonstratively a Power of Reasoning capable to act or exercise it self in other things Of this kind are all Passive Properties which are quarto modo as the Schools Phrase is or properly such For these springing necessarily or immediatly out of the Essence are by consequence Naturally Connected with it and the Essence with them whence they are Proper Mediums to inferr demonstratively such an Essence à Posteriori and the Essence a fit Medium to demonstrate them à priori 12. That Demonstrations may be taken from the Formal Cause or from the Subject as 't is Formally and Essentially such has been shewn above Lesson 3. §§ 7. and 8. where it was manifested that the Middle Notions in the Gradual Line giving us the parts that were included in the Definition are Proper Middle Terms to connect demonstratively the Inferiour and Superiour Notions 13. The Causality of the Final cause consiststing in this that it moves the Efficient to act this Cause can have no place but in Intelligent Beings This is Evident because only such can know an End or consequently aim at it or work for it Corol. II. Wherefore when 't is said that such an Effect v. g. the following of water in a Pump happens in Nature ne detur vacuum that Nature flies from or abhors vacuum that as Aristotle acutely speculated Entia nolunt malè gubernari and such like the true Meaning of those Sayings can only be this that 't is highly against the Nature of the First Intelligent Being who created the World and of the Inferior ones Angels who manage it under him that Ground should be laid in Nature for a Contradiction to be True or that the Course of Nature should be contriv'd in a bad method or carry'd on after an absurd manner Corol. XII Hence these sayings thus rightly understood have in them the force of a Nobler and more Solid Demonstration from the Final Cause than can be taken from any Corporeal Efficients and Effects though they be never so Proper to one another For these Sayings engage the Nature of the Supreme Cause and of the Noblest causes under him and which had they not Rectitude in their Understandings Wills and Operations all Nature would be wrong and ground or beget in us nothing but Error The Demonstration stands thus The Immediate End of those Causes is that the World should be Order'd Wisely that is so as that thâ— Things should be a Ground for Truth therefore 't is most highly Impossible there can be any Ground for a Contradiction in Things which the First Cause did make and the others do manage But were there a vacuum there would be Ground for a Contradiction Ergo c. Corol. XIII Hence we may with pity remark the Ignorance Folly or rather Phrenzy of those gross Speculators who by allowing nothing but the Course of Nature are forcâ—d by their Impious and Foolish Tenet to speak of Insensible things as if they were Intelligent 'T is something pardonable in Lovers when they speak to Trees Rivers and Mountains to vent the Passion that be-mads them but 't is shameful in Pretenders to Philosophy who are to reduce Natural Effects to their Causes and to speak of both literally as they are Yet such and so apply'd must be the Common language of meer Naturalists who look no higher than Matter and talk of Great Nature or the Soul of the World and such windy whimsies Ordering things thus and thus that is Designing an End Hating and Abhorring this thing Affecting another Which yet all the while they deny to be Intelligent things lest they should grant a First Being making Nature and Spiritual Second Causes carrying on the Course of it and Moving it regularly Nor Matters it that we had now and than to use the same Language for we do acknowledge it to be Improper and can reduce it to a Litteral Sense agreeing to the Natures of those things manag'd by such Governors which these Men cannot 14. There can be no Final Cause in respect to GOD. For End and Good being the same and GOD being Infinitely Perfect and Infinitely Happy in Himself there can no Good accrue to him from any thing out of himself or from Creatures and so they cannot have the Notion of an End in respect to him Wherefore when it is said that GOD aims at the Good of his Creatures or that to Govern the World wisely is his End the meaning of these words is only this that he acts as becomes his Wisdom or his Wisdom being his Essence he acts as he is 15. Speaking of Mankind we can demonstrate some Acts of his Will from the Final Cause supposed and a Final Cause from the supposed Acts of his Will For since the Will is a Power and all Powers are specify'd or have their particular Essence from the respect they have to such or such Objects and the Object of the Will is an Appearing Good it follows that it is Essential to the Will to act for an Appearing Good Wherefore if we can demonstrate as we may often that such a particular Object must all things consider'd appear a Good to a Man in such circumstances it will both follow â priori that if his Will acts it is for an Appearing Good and also â posteriori that if there be an Appearing Good there will follow an Act of his Will The Proof of both is plain For since the Will is a Power to Act for an Appearing Good if it did not in due circumstance act for it it would follow that the Will is not a Will or else it must follow that an Appearing Good is not the Object of the Will Whence since it can have no other Object Imaginable it would follow again that the Will is no Power and consequently no Will. Nor does this take away the Liberty of the Will which is exercis'd in Chusing one out of many but establisheth the Essence of it Corol. 14. Hence the most easie and most connaturall way to manage or treat with Mankind is to make that which you would bring them to do appear to be their Good for then they will be sure to obey And if either thro' Perversness or Delusion by others they will not be brought to see that which is for the Common Good to be their own there is no way left but to Over-awe them with fear that so at least it may appear to them a Good to avoid Punishment LESSON VI. Several Instances of Demonstration 1. THE Method of Demonstrating is two-fold the One Is perform'd by Exact Syllogisms in right Mood and Figure The other by laying first certain Maxims Axioms or Pestulatums and then proving the Theses by the Concatenation of many Propositions orderly succeeding one another which is the way Euclid takes For this later way may be full as solid as the other tho' it looks not so Artificially provided it's several Consequences
to the Cause to Expose him to Contempt by Baffling him 8. To reflect that tho' the Words in Common have the same Sence yet as standing in the Context it may have diverse Constructions and so cause that Fallacy we call Amphibology 9. That not only Single words and Sentences may be Ambiguous but there may lurk an Equivocation even in the Connexion it self as when the Middle Term is Accidentally joyn'd to one Extreme by is and Essentially to another Thus far of Disputation when the Defendent holds a False Tenet which is the only Method an Honest Man whose sole End is to evince Truth and beat down Error ought to take The following ways are more becoming vain Sophisters whose aim it is to combat Truth on any Fashion Yet 't is fit that Honest Men should know them that they may know how to avoid the Ambushes and Snares of Truth 's Enemy 5. The second Case then is when the Defendent holds a True point v. g. that there are Angels and yet holds a False one Inconsistent with it v. g. that That which is no where or in no place is not The Disputant if crafty may make use of this False Thesis to overthrow the True one Thus Nothing that is in no where or in no place is but All Angels are no where therefore No Angels are 6. The Third Case is when the Defendent does not hold an Inconsistent Thesis yet he is Ignorant of the Antecedents and Consequents of his Tenet In which case if the Defendent can be brought to deny some Truth necessarily Connected with his Thesis he will be forc'd to deny the Thesis it self As put case the Defendent holds that GOD our Creator is Infinitly Perfect in himself yet through want of Logick is Ignorant that GOD has no Real Relation to Creatures and therefore that the word Creator apply'd to him is meerly an Extrinsecal Denomination and no ways Intrinsecally perfecting Him or affecting him such a Man may be in danger of foregoing his Christian Tenet by this Argument Fe-Nothing that depends on another for some Perfection is Infinitly perfect in it self but ri-GOD depends on Creatures for his being a Creator which is some Perfection in him therefore a-GOD is not Infinitly Perfect in Himself 7. The Fourth is when the Defendent Understands only his own Thesis and is in a manner Ignorant of all others For example Let us suppose that some Defendent by the Language of Christianity with which he is imbu'd or by some Solid Discourse he has accidently heard and though not Learned yet having a good Mother-wit is made well Understand does hold that GOD is Vnchangeable but yet being not us'd to Disputes or Speculative Reflexions he is little verst in other points as in the Nature of Christian Language in Spiritual Points of which consequently we have no Natural Notions and therefore is not aware that all our Words we use when we speak of them are Equivocal and Improper and especially when we speak of GOD highly Metaphorical Such a man no better qualify'd may be stumbled and perhaps made forego that Evident and True Tenet by a Contentious alledging things very Forrein which he not skilful in and then backing them with Authority on this manner What is not GOD Pleas'd when we do well and when we Sin becomes displeas'd that is changes from being Pleas'd to be Angry and when we repent is he not Pleas'd again Will or dare you deny that which Scripture Fathers Catechisms Prayer-books and Sermons do so often inculcate and the Consent of all good Christians does Unanimously and Constantly avow Why are we afraid of Sinning but for fear of losing GOD's Favour and of a Friend making him become our Enemy Will any but a Heretick deny this Again is not GOD Omnipotent cannot he do all things 'T is an Article of our Creed he both is and can since then to change Himself is to do Something will you stint GOD's Omnipotence and say there is Something he cannot do Such Insulting Talk as this tho' there be never a wise word in it working upon the Weakness of half-witted People may hap to make them forego their True Tenet and even fright them to renounce their Faith out of Fear of renouncing it Corol. I. These three last Cases inform us how dangerous it is that any man be allowed to be Truth 's Champion and to undertake her cause unless he be thorow-pac'd in Logick and such other knowledges as are requisit to defend her lest Truth it self Suffer for the Confident Weakness of the Unable Undertaker Corol. II. This last Case belongs to such Disputants who to maintain Absurd and Impossible things do use to argue from Divine Omnipotence by alledging and magnifying which they hope to fright the Piety of a well-meaning but weak Defendent to admit any thing though never so Senseless or Ridiculous The way to answer these men is to show the Effect to be contrary to our Natural Notions and consequently to the Wise Conduct of the World which was the Cause of those Notions And therefore what GOD can do or cannot do is nothing to the purpose unless the thing in question be Agreeable to his Wisdom and Goodness which determin his Power to act and without which it cannot be that he should act Whence it is generally more Safe more Edifying and more Proper to say in such Cases that it cannot be that GOD should will to do such a thing than bluntly to say GOD cannot do it For This flatly limits Omnipotency That only restrains its exerting it self hic nunc because of some Attribute of the Divine Nature to which 't is Disagreeable I say Generally For oft times such Discourses would havâ— GOD's Power to do perfect Contradictions that is to undo the Natures of things Establisht by himself which is not to do As in the Instance of his Changing Himself which is the same in Effect as not being Himself Or when they say GOD has a Power to Annihilate For since Powers are specify'd by their Objects and Non-ens which can do nothing in any kind nor consequently specify a Power is the Object of Annihilation a Power to Annihilate is to be no Power And 't is as ill to say GOD can suspend his Action of Conserving for this takes away from GOD his Goodness or the Redundancy Exuberancy or Communicativeness of Being which is Essential to him and was the Sole Cause of the Creation Thus far of Disputation it self or True Syllogisms The Faults of it come next to be consider'd which are call'd Fallacies or Paralogisms 8. Fallacies are of two sorts Those which arise out of Words which happens when the Ambiguity of some Single word or of some Words put together do lead us into a Mistake of the Thing And those which are not in the Words but arise out of the Thing or the Sense and thence make us mistake the Thing and the Words too 9. Those of the Former sort are almost all little
Manners of Working have and consequently those Relations are far more Real than those which are grounded on Corporeal Powers and their Operations 15. The Substance as it were of Relation consists in that Immediate Ground which is the Reason of our referring one thing to another For 't is Evident that 't is the Thing it self in my Mind which is Referr'd and not the Act of the Mind Referring it For example Two White things have Vnity of Form or the same Notion in them which makes them Really Alike of themselves were they in a Comparing Power that could actually Referr them and denominate them Relatively as their Nature requires so that it is not the Act of my Understanding which made the white Walls really Alike but their own Natures which are the Object of my Act by means notwithstanding of the Comparative Act of my Understanding which they inform'd as a necessary Condition to relate them actually and without which they had each of them had but the Absolute Notion of White and not the Relative one of being Alike Corol. II. Hence we have some light given us how there may be True and Real Relations in God Knowing and Loving himself and how they depend and not depend on our Understanding 16. The Intrinsecal Differences of Relation being more and less and our Act adding nothing to the Substance of the Relation they must be taken from the Greater or Lesser Ground or Reason why the thing is referr'd to another Hence our greatest Relation is to God because all the good we have or can have does entirely Referr us to him Upon which therefore is founded all our Religious Respects and our Duties of Serving Obeying and Adoring him Next follows the Relation of a Husband to a Wife who is in some manner the same Individual with himself After them comes our Relation to our Parents who concurr'd to our Being gave us Education and provided for our Subsistence Then to Mankind to whom we are Related by Identity of Nature to our Country our King and other Superiours according to their several Ranks to our Kinsfolks Neighbours c. from which Relations arise several Duties in proportion to the more or less important Reason or Ground that makes them more or less nearer or remotely Related to us LESSON VIII Of the Common Heads of Action and Passion 1. THERE are Two and but Two Common Heads of Extrinsecals conceiv'd to be apply'd to one another by way of Motion For since Motion has two Terms viz. that thing from whence it comes and that to which it reaches and these are distinct Considerations hence we have Two Common Heads of one Extrinsecal thing conceiv'd to be apply'd to another by way of Motion Nor can there be more for Motion consider'd as it were in the Midway between those Terms has no Notion but that of meer Motion whence it is the very Notion of Successive Quantity and belongs clearly to that Common Head and therefore cannot belong to another or constitute a new one 2. The Notion of Motion is the most Imperfect of all our Notions and most approaching to Non-Entity For since Motion as it superadds to the Extensive Quantity of its Subject is wholly made up of not being in this place or that or of not being still here and not being yet there nor has any thing of Permanency which is in a manner the same Notion with Actual Being it follows that besides the Common disadvantage other Accidents are liable to of having no Entity of their own but what 's borrow'd of their Subjects it has moreover this that neither it self nor any part of it self exists so much as for one Moment Wherefore Ens being a Capacity of Existence Motion seems to be in a manner incapable of Existence or a Non-Entity and this out of its own peculiar Nature or Notion Again since in every part of Motion the thing moved is in a space bigger than it self and Place as will be shewn hereafter properly such is but Equal to the thing it contains and not bigger than it hence Motion hinders its Subject to be properly speaking in any place that is any where which amongst Bodies seems next akin to not being at all Lastly Motion is destructive of Actual Being in those things that are arriv'd to their full state of perfection which shews its nature to be in some sense directly opposit to the Notion of Being which has some kind of Constancy and Stability in it Nor can it be said that it gives Actual Being or Existence to the new Entities it helps to produce for Existence is the proper Effect of Self-Existence or the First Cause Wherefore the Notion of Motion is the most Imperfect of all our Notions and most approaching to Non-Entity Corol. I. Hence is demonstrated that since every Agent produces an Effect suitable to its own Nature and therefore an Agent infinitely perfect cannot be the Immediate Cause of what 's most Imperfect therefore Motion being both most imperfect and withal most disagreeable nay directly contrary to God's Nature which is pure Self-Existence and Essentially Immovable and Vnchangable was not immediately caus'd by God but by some imperfect Agent or some Creature that is by such a Cause as of it self is a Non-Entity 3. The Notion of Action as it superadds to meer Motion is the Exercise of a Power which is Effective of something For since to Act is to Do and to do Nothing is not to do it follows that to Act is to Do something but to do something presupposes a Power to do it and this so as not to stay in the Notion of meer Power for if it stays there it only denominates the Thing Able to do which again is not to do wherefore Action is not the Notion of a sluggish Power but of a Power Exerted and Exercis'd that is Effecting something whence the Power is call'd Effective the Action Efficiency and the Something it does is term'd an Effect All which superadd to the notion of meer Motion 4. The Primary and Chief Natural Action is Division For since Substance is the Subject of all Accidents and which being changed all the Accidents do suffer a change with it hence that Action that works upon a Body according to the Substantial Notion of it has more of Action in it as working a Greater Effect But Division makes Two Things of One and so destroys the former Vnum or Ens and makes Two new ones therefore Division is the Primary and Chief of all other Natural Actions Note That this is to be understood of Perfect Division which makes the thing Divided and is therefore only properly to be call'd Division for Imperfect Division only alters the Figure It may be objected That Rarefaction and Condensation if they be in a great degree change the Substance as well as Division does Answ. This arises out of the nature of some particular sort of Bodies and not out of the precise Notion of those Actions For
but must be made so by Proof Yet since all Deduction or Proof is made by Connexion of Notions and those Notions or what corresponds to them must be Connected in the Thing e're they can be so in our Understanding and Properties are more nearly ally'd to the Essence than other Accidents as resulting necessarily from it or being immediately Connected with it hence they are by consequence most easily Proveable to belong truly to the Thing and therefore very fit to be made use of in Demonstrations 14. Of this sort are all Propositions whose Predicates are Proper Causes and Effects and more immediately the Powers or Virtues by which they Act on others or Suffer from others as will be seen when we come to treat of Demonstration 15. Propositions whose Predicates belong to the last Predicable are utterly Inevident and as such not easily Evidenceable For since as was shewn above such Predicates do belong to the Subject but by chance or as their very name imports by Accident and Chance signifies a Cause which we do not see or know it follows that the Connexion of such Predicates with the Subject can never be known by Reason or prov'd that they must belong to it because we can never know alâ— the Causes that concur'd to make them belong to it Wherefore such Propositions are utterly Inevident nor as they are Accidents or Unconnected with the Essence easily Evidenceable by way of Reason that they must belong to them however they may be known to belong actually to them hic nunc by Sense or Experience Such Predicates are mostly those of the six last Predicaments and many Quantities Qualities and Relations 16. Notwithstanding those Propositions which have such Accidental Predicates were all the Causes by which they hap to belong to the Subject perfectly known might be perfectly Evident and Demonstrable For as we can Demonstrate one Effect that needs but one Cause to put it from that single Cause so did we know all the Causes that concur'd to any Effect which is brought about by many Causes we could certainly conclude and know such an Effect would follow in which case the Predicate would be no longer an Accident but the Proper Effect of that Complex of Causes nor would the Proposition it self be any longer meerly Accidental Corol. VI. Hence there is nothing Contingent or Accidental to God but all Events tho' never so minute or so odd are Equally Certain to him as the most Immediate Effect of the most Proper and most Necessary Causes because he lays and comprehends the whole Series of Causes that concur to bring about every least Effect LESSON IV. Of the Generating of Knowledge in us and of the Method how this is perform'd HItherto of Knowledges or Judgments according to their Dependence on one another and their being Resolv'd Artificially into First Principles Our next task is to consider them according to the Order they are instill'd into us Naturally 1. The Soul or the Understanding is at first void of all kind of Knowledge or Rasa Tabula For since the Author of Nature does nothing in vain nor acts needlesly he puts no Effects immediately or without Second Causes when there are Causes laid by him to produce them and since we experience that Causes are laid by Him apt to imprint Notions in us and that the Nature of our Soul being evidently Comparative we can compare those Notions and can see how they Agree or Disagree which is to know Hence in case the Soul had any Notions or Knowledges infus'd into her otherwisâ— than by those Causes it would frustrate and make void that Course of natural Agents which is apt to beget Knowledge in us and make Nature contradict her self Again since we experience that we know no more than we have Notions of and that we can compare those Notions and can know all things we have Notions of and do thus rightly Compare and that both those effects do follow naturally from the Impressions of Objects and from the nature of the Soul it falls into the same Absurdity to affirm that those Causes do only Excite and not Beget Knowledge in us Lastly the contrary Opinion supposes the Soul to be an Ens before the Body or at least distinct from it and then 't is both Unconceivable and Inexplicable how they can ever come to be Vnited so as to compound one Ens. For this cannot be done Quantitatively as is evident nor by their Acting together as the Cartesians hold both because all Action presupposes the Being of a thing whence they must be one Ens before they can Act as one Ens as also because the Line or predicament of Action is distinct from that of Ens and Extrinsecal to it and so cannot Intrinsecally constitute those Joynt-Acters One Ens or Thing Nor can it be conceiv'd that the Body if it be not one Ens with the Soul can act with it otherwise than as its Instrument and it would be most Absurd to say that my Hand and Pen are oâ—e thing because they jointly concurr in their different ways to the Action of Writing Wherefore the Soul has no Antecedent Knowledge but is a Rasa Tabula capable to receive such Impressions as beget Knowledge in her 2. The First Judgment in order of Nature the Soul has is that its self or the Man exists For since as was shewn the First Notions the Soul has are of the Man himself and of his Existence and all Judgmenâ—s are made by Compounding or Comparing of Notions it follows that the most Obvious most Easie most Natural and consequently the First Judgment in priority of Nature that a Man has when he is ripe to judge is that Himselâ— is or I am 3. The next Judgment is that He is struck or affected by some Object without him for since the Course of Nature is Motion and therefore Objects are continually moving where the Man is and so do light and act on his Senses that is do work Experimental Knowledge in him that he is acted upon or struck by them it follows that he must after he comes to frame Judgments necessarily and frequently know and consequently Judge he is struck Nor can this be the first Judgment both for the Reason lately given Sect. 2. as also because in this Proposition I am struck the Proposition I am is most Simple and manifestly antecedes I am struck the Notion of struck being clearly superadded to it 4. The next Knowledge or next Judgment to the former in order of Nature is I am struck thus or Affected after such a manner For the Notion of I am struck is more Simple and so antecedes I am struck thus which superadds to it Whence this proposition is prov'd by the same reason that was brought for the third Section 5. These Judgments had we are furnish'd by Nature with Means of Knowing in some measure the Distinct Natures of all things that affect us For since we get all our Notions
the Premisses affirms Universally the other Particularly the Conclusion must be a particular Affirmative For tho' one of the Extremes be Universally or Totally connected with the Medium yet the other Extreme is but Particularly or in part Connected with it and so it can never infer the Total Connexion of them nor can the Conclusion be an Universal Affirmative because they were not to that degree Connected with the Medium in the Premisses For Example Da Every Good Man is Charitable ri Some Rich Man is a Good Man Therefore i Some Rich Man is Charitable 14. When one of the Extremes is Universally deny'd of the Medium and the Medium particularly affirm'd of the other Extreme the Conclusion must be a particular Negative For were the Terms Totally the same in the Minor as it was in Celarent then the Terms of the Conclusion had been not at all the same but Vniversally deny'd of one another as it was there wherefore being but in part the same in the Minor they can only be in part not the same in the Conclusion For Example Fe-No harmful thing is to be used ri Some Mirth is a harmful thing therefore o Some Mirth is not to be used From these Grounds the Reason may be given for diverse Maxims or Axioms commonly used by Logicians concerning this present matter telling us when and how the Conclusions follow or not follow such as are 15. From two Vniversal Negatives nothing follows Because neither Extreme is Connected with the Medium either in whole or in part nor from this that two Notions are different from a Third is it consequent that they are or are not the same thing with one another Wherefore a Syllogism being such an Artificial and perfectly order'd Discourse that putting the Premisses to be True the Conclusion must be True also such as this and the same may be said in part of those other that follow wanting that due Connexion of the Terms which is Essential to a Syllogism are not Syllogisms but Paralogisms v. g. No Brute is Rational No Man is a Brute Therefore No Man is Rational 16. From two particular Propositions nothing follows For a Particular Proposition expressing but some part of the whole Notion of the Middle Term with which it is joyn'd and there being more parts in that whole Notion one of the Extremes may be united with it according to one part or Consideration of it and the other according to another part in which case it cannot follow they are united at all with one another in the Conclusion v. g. Some Man is a Fool. Some Wise Man is a Man Therefore Some Wise Man is a Fool Where some Man the Medium is taken for a diverse Part as it were of Man in common and so the Medium as considered according to it's Parts which are Diverse is not One it self nor consequently can it unite others by it's being one or the same with it's self which is the Fundamental Ground of all Consequence Corol. Hence follows immediatly that one of the Premisses must be an Vniversal else nothing is Concluded Which deserves Remarking this being useful to confute some Wrong Methods to Science 17. A Negative Conclusion cannot be deduced from Affirmative Premisses Because if the Extremes were the same with the Medium in the Premisses and not the same with one another in the Conclusion it would follow that the Middle Term is the same and not the same with it self or else that the Connexion or Inconnexion of the Terms in the Conclusion is not to be taken from the Connexion or Inconnexion with the Middle Term in the Premisses which utterly subverts all Ground of Discoursing 18. The Conclusion cannot be Vniversal unless the Medium be once taken Vniversally in the Premisses Because otherwise both the Premisses would be Particulars from which as was proved § 16. no Conclusion can follow 19. The Conclusion always follows the worser part that is it must be Negative or Particular if either of the Premisses be such The reason of the former is because if either of the Premisses be Negative then the Medium is not the same with one of the Terms of the Conclusion and therefore it can never be the cause of Identifying them both which is done by inferring an Affirmative Conclusion The reason of the latter is because if it be only in part the same with one of the Extremes it cannot prove those Extremes to be wholly the same which can only be done by their being united with it universally for it can give no greater degree of Connexion to the two Extremes than it self has with them as was shown § 10. These Maxims or Positions being shown to be Rational and necessarily Consequent to the Grounds of Rigorous or Syllogistical Discoursing we proceed in our intended Method 20. A Singular Proposition may supply the Place of a Particular one in the Minor of Darii and Ferio For a Singular or Individual Notion is in reality some part of the Common Notion and the words Some Man or Some Men do signify some Individual Man or Men wherefore abating the manner of the Indeterminate Expression the sense is the same in both Hence these are right Syllogisms and Conclusive Da-Every Philosopher resolves Effects into their Proper Causes ri Aristotle is a Philosopher therefore i Aristotle resolves Effects into their Proper Causes Fe-No Man who supposes his Grounds gratis is a Philosopher ri Epicurus supposes his Grounds gratis therefore o Epicurus is not a Philosopher 21. Expository Syllogisms that consist of Singular Propositions are true and perfect Syllogisms For since a Syllogism is such a Discourse as from the Clear Connexion of a Middle Notion with the two Extremes inferrs the Connexion of those Extremes with one another and Singulars have their Notions as well as Universals and may be connected with one another it follows that in case these Discourses be not Faulty in other respects they cannot from the regard of their consisting wholly of Singulars be degraded from being true and perfect Syllogisms v. g. Tom Long brought me a Letter This Man is Tom Long Therefore This Man brought me a Letter 22. Such Syllogisms do not advance Science For since we experience that our Soul is not only Capable of having Universal Notions but that 't is her peculiar Nature to Abstract that is to draw Singular Notions to Universal ones and since Notions are the Ground of all Knowledge and consequently Universal Notions of Universal Knowledges and Science is a Perfection of our Mind according to her Nature and therefore does dilate and enlarge her Natural Capacity by Extending it to the Knowledge of Vniversal Truths Wherefore since on the other side an Expository Syllogism as consisting of Singulars can Conclude or gain the Soul knowledge of no more but some one Singular it Cramps Contracts or makes Narrow her Natural Capacity whence it follows that such Syllogisms are far from Perfecting the Soul or from generating Science which is
fill'd by knowing many Truths but is Enlarged and Enabled to know still more and being clear of the Body she is not distracted by Objects working upon the Senses and the Fancy but intimately and necessarily present to her self and consequently to what is in her self and so is Addicted Apply'd and Naturally Necessitated to know the Nature of her Body and consequently of her self as being the Form of that Body and fitted for it and by her self to know all the Truths Connected with the Knowledge of her self that is as was shown all Nature and this not Successively one Truth after another as she did when she was in the Body and needed the Fancy and so accommodated her manner of working to its slow pace but being now a Pure Spirit and Indivisible and so not commensurable to Time or to before and after which are the Differences of Time she is to know all she could know in the first instant she was a Pure Spirit that is at the Instant of her Separation These things being evidently so it follows that every Soul separated from the Body that knew any one Natural Truth knows all Nature and this all at once in the first instant of her Separation But of this more hereafter Corol. I. Hence we may frame some imperfect Conception how our Science differs from that of Angels and how Angels must know things Intuitively For since they have no Senses they can have no Abstracted Notions by different Impressions from the Objects on the Senses nor consequently can they Compound any two Notions to frame a Proposition much less can they Discourse or Compare Two Notions to a Third and so deduce thence New Knowledges call'd Conclusions It is left therefore that they must a tone view comprehend entirely the Metaphysical verity of the whole Thing and all that is in it which we express by an Identical Proposition Whence this Knowledge or Intuition of theirs abating the Composition found in an Identical Proposition which too is the least that is Imaginable is the nearest a-kin to that which we have of these Identicals By which we see that the Supremum Infimi in respect of an Angel's and Man's manner of Knowledge is as the Order of Entities requires contiguous as it were to that which is Superiour to it Corol. II. Hence also is seen how a Separated Soul knows all things after a different manner than Angels do For though the Substance of a Separated Soul's Operation be Intuitive as is the Angels yet because her natural Genius led and forced her here to dâ—scourse and gather one Truth by another that is to see one Truth in another hence she retains a modification or a kind of tang of the Discoursiveness she had here though she cannot in that State exercise it and that though she cannot then actually deduce new Truths yet she sees all Truths as Deducible from one another or following one another by Consequence We may frame some imperfect conception how this passes by this course Similitude When we look upon a Picture call'd a Prospective all the parts of it are equally near our Eye in themselves and we see them too all at once yet they appear to us as if one of them were farther of than another even to a vast distance observing still a perfect Order and decorum in their greater Propinquity or Remoteness according as those parts are more or less Shadowed or Luminous So the Soul knows all at once whatever is Knowable by her and they are equally near the Eye of her understanding yet because of her acquiring them here by way of Discourse that is by proceeding from more-Clear to less Clear Truths she sees them as following one another or as it were beyond one another because they were not to her in this state so clear as the other in themselves but depending on the others for their Evidence LESSON V. Of other Mediums for Demonstration taken from the Four Causes 1. THere must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to every Effect in Nature For since Nothing can do Nothing it follows that Nothing can be Done unless there be something that Does or Acts that is unless there be an Efficient Cause Which Efficient must act upon something or some Patient which is the Matter on which it works or the Material Cause And it must work something in that Matter which being Received in it must be some Form either Substantial or Accidental which must consequently concurr to that Action Formally or be the Formal Cause of it And since the Orderer of all Nature or the First Cause is an Intelligent Being and not Blind Chance for whà t's Blind can Order nothing and this First Cause is the Adequate Governour of the World and being an Intelligent Being acts Seeingly or with design that is with prospect of some End in every thing that is done how great or minute soever and eâ—ery Intelligent Creature that administers the World in their several Stations under him whâ—â—her they be Angels or Men do for the same reason act Designingly too that is do propose to themselves some end Good Reason or Moâ—ive for which they Act and without â—hich 't is against their Nature to Act and since Metaphysicks do clearly Demonstrate that the Immediate action of the First Cause is only to give Being and * the Oeconomy of the World is administred Immediately by other Intelligent Beings under him hence there must be a Final cause too for every Effect that is done in the World how small and inconsiderable soever it may seem Wherefore there must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to evâ—ry Effect in Nature viz. The Efficient Maâ—â—rial Formal and Final For Example in my Action of Writing a Letter the Efficient Cause is my self the Material Cause is the Paper the Formal the Characters drawn in the Paper and the Final to gratify my friend acquaint him with News c. 2. Hence we can demonstrate the An est of those Four Causes in the whole Mass of Corporeal Nature how Remote soever it is from us and that they must concur to every Effect tho' we do not know the Quid est of them The first part of our Thesis is proved For since the An est of all those Causes or that there must be such four Causes necessarily concurring to every Effect follows out of the nature of Action from the Subjectâ—s being Quantitative and consequently variable Substantially or Accidentally and from the Supreme Agent 's being Intelligent and these are equally found in all parts of the Universe how Remote soever they be or in the whole Mass of Bodies it follows that the same Causes do concur to every Effect all over the World as they do in those Bodies near us and with whose Operations we are acquainted The Second part is evident since the knowledg of the An est or that there is something may it be known by Experience tho' we know not what that thing is as we experience when we hit
all a long produce such Effects yet since we know and can demonstrate the An est of this Order or that the Course of Nature is still carry'd on by Proper Causes and Effects hence we can demonstrate there is no such thing as that Chimerical Cause call'd Chance governing the World which Fantastick whimsy is imputed to the Epicureans Corol. 7. Hence we can Demonstrate that every the least motion of a Fly or an Insect the Figure of every leaf of a Tree or grain of Sand on the Sea Shore do come within the Compass of this Course of Nature or Gods Providence which neglects not the least of his Creatures but has a Superintendency over all Which Considerations tho' they may at first sight seem Incredible and paradoxical and Stun our Reason yet after that by recourse to our Principles we have recover'd our dazled sight and clearly see they must be True will exceedingly conduce to raise our Souls connaturally to deep Contemplations of Gods Infinit Wisdom Goodness and Providence and ground in us a perfect Resignation to his Will in all occurrences and let us see and be asham'd of our froward proud peevish and selfish humour which nothing will content but the having the Whole Course of Nature alter'd for our sakes as if the World were made meerly for us or that Causes should not have their Proper Effects Which being a Contradiction is therefore as Unreasonable and Foolish as it is in a Man that wants Money to be angry that Two and Three Shillings do not make Forty Corol. VIII Hence none can have just occasion to grumble at God's Providence for Ill Successes For since we know à priori that God he being Infinitely wise casts the whole Frame of the World or the Course of Causes in the most perfect and best Order to wish we should be otherwise after we see that no Causes can bring our endeavouring it to Effect is to wish the Whole World should be worse for the Interest of one Inconsiderable piece of it which is against Common sense and the Light of Nature to expect from a Common Governour who is to provide in the first place for the Common Good and is even against the Judgment and Generous Practice of diverse Heathens who for the Common Good of a Small part of the World their own Country have not car'd to ruine their Private Concerns nay to Sacrifice their Lives Corol. IX On this Doctrine is grounded the Duty of Gratitude we owe to God for all the Good we have of what nature soever For it is hence seen demonstratively that God is as much the Giver of that Good by laying such a steady Course of innumerable Causes to convey it to us as if he had given it by his own hand Immediately nay it ought more to increase our Gratitude to see that he has Ordered such an Infinity of Causes from the beginning of the World to be Instrumental to our Good Corol. X. Hence lastly is shewn the Wisdome of Christianity which instructs all its Followers to express in their Common Language and to put in practise all the Substance of those Truths which we have with so much labour Speculatively Demonstrated As when they say that Every thing that happens is Gods Will pray his Will may be done Resign to it Acknowledg that all the Good they have comes from God thank him for it free him from all Imputation of Injustice when any Harm lights to them and bear it with a Humble Patience c. 9. There is a certain Order or priority of Nature in our Notions taken from the same subject by which one of them or which is the same the Subject as grounding one of those Notions is conceiv'd to be kind of Efficient Cause of Another of them For it is Evident that the First Efficiency of Fire is the making that smart Impression on our Feeling Sense which we call Heating out of which if continu'd it follows that it dissipates or shatters asunder all the parts of the mixt Body on which it works To which 't is Consequent that it Disgregates the Heterogeneous parts of it and Congregates the Homogeneous ones from which latter Effects of Heating as being most obvious and discernible to Mankind Aristotle takes his Definition of Hot things Thus out of Rationality springs a Solid and Serious Content in Discovering new Truths which are the Natural Perfection of a Soul and from this Content a greater degree of the Love of seeing still more Truths Thus Risibility springs from Rationality the Object of which is not a Solid Food nourishing and dilating the Soul as is this later which causes some increase of Science in her but as it were a kind of Light Repast and Recreation to her sprung from the Observing some trifling particulars which were Odd Aukward and Sudden or Unexpected and withal not Harmful or Contristating 10. In those Subjects which have many Accidents in them we must Separate those Accidents from the Subject and consider attentively according to which of them it produces such an Effect which found we shall discover a Proper Cause and its Proper Effect For example put case we experience Aloes purges Choler we must separate its Colour Smell Hardness Bitter Tast and the rest of its Accidents and endeavour to find out according to which of them it produces that Effect and if we can find it does this precisely as Bitter we shall discover that Bitterness is the proper Medicine against Choler and thence we can gain this Certain Knowledge and establish this Universal Conclusion that Every Bitter Thing is good against Choler according to that Solid Maxim in Logick A Quatenus ad Omne valet consequentia Note That Induction in such cases gives great light to a Man already well vers'd in Natural Principles But this former Maxim must be Understood with this Provis◠that it be meant to hold per se loquendo as the Schools phrase it that is if nothing hinders as it does often in the Practise of Physick For in Mixt Bodies there is a Strange Variety and Medly of Accidents or Qualities divers of which are of a Disparate and sometimes of a Sub-contrary or Contrary nature to one another so that it requires a great Sagacity to add to them such other Mixts as may obviate their Interfering and make the intended Effect follow Thus much of Demonstration from the thing as it is Active or from the Efficient which is the first of the Four Causes 11. Demonstrations may be taken also from the Matter or Material Cause that is from the Thing or Subject as it is Passive For from the Divisibility of a Thing whether that Divisibility be Metaphysical or Physical we may demonstrate the Corruptibility of it which necessarily following out of the Thing as 't is Divisible is therefore a Property of it Thus capable of Admiring is a Property necessarily Inferring Rationality in it's Subject Admiration being nothing but a Suspension of the Rational Faculty at
Indivisible added to Another can make Quantity but la All Infinit Number of Indivisibles Consists of or is One Indivisible added to Another Therefore rent-No Infinit Number of Indivisibles can make Quantity 10. The Minor is Evident for all Number tho' Infinit consists of Ones that is of One added to another Add that 't is demonstrated above that all Infinit Number is Impossible Proposition III. If any two parts of Quantity be Actually distinct All the parts must be Actually distinct also Bar-What ever springs out of the precise nature of Quantity must be equally found where ever there is Quantity or throughout all the parts of Quantity by Axiom 3 d. But ba-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity if put in any two springs out of the precise Notion of Quantity therefore ra-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity if put in any two must be equally found wherever there is Quantity or throughout all the parts of Quantity 11. The Minor is proved for all Unity and Distinction in any Line follows out of the Entity to which it is peculiar that is in our case out of the Entity or Essence of Quantity Again this Actual Distinction of Quantitative parts cannot spring from Substance for this has no Distinction of parts but that of Matter and Form Nor out of any other Line for all those do presuppose Quantity and spring from it as the Primary Affection of Body therefore if any two parts of Quantity be actually Distinct that Distinction must proceed from the Nature of Quantity it self 12. Now that all the parts of Quantity should be Actually Distinct destroys the Nature of Quantity and is Contradictory is thus proved Da-Whatever makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles contradicts the Nature of Quantity But ri-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity Actually Distinct makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles therefore i-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity actually Distinct contradicts the nature of Quantity 13. The Minor is Evident For those things which are Actually Distinct quantitatively may be Divided quantitatively or rather are already so as those which are Actually Distinct in the Line of Substance are Distinct Substances or Distinct things in that Line Wherefore since the Nature of such a Subject as they put Quantity to be does bear it let us suppose Quantity divided into all it's Actual parts it can be divided into that is into All they being all of them suppos'd Actually Distinct it is manifest there could remain only Infinit Indivisibles They must be Indivisible because it is supposed to be Divided into all it could be Divided into and they must be Infinit for Divisibility that is but Finite would contradict Euclid's Clear and most Approved Demonstration Besides it would follow hence that if all the parts of Quantity were Actually Distinct each of them must be Determinate in the line of Quantity Wherefore they being also Infinit in Number for a Finite Number of parts makes Quantity not to be Divisible Infinitly against Euclid's Demonstration it would follow that each least Quantity would be of Infinit Extension for the least Determinate Quantity Infinit times repeated makes an Infinit Extension 14. Hence is evinced our Main Demonstration that since Continu'd Quantity is neither compounded of a Finit nor of an Infinit Number of Indivisibles nor of Actual parts it is made up of Potential parts that is there is but One Actual Whole in the Line of Quantity and this Whole is Divisible without end Corol. I. Hence is farther demonstrated the Unity of the whole World as to it's Quantity or which is the same the Continuity of the whole imaginable Mass of Body Corol. II. Hence is demonstrated likewise that all Vacuum and Epicurus's Scheme of Plenum and Vacuum are Contradictory As likewise that there cannot possibly be more Worlds than One the very Nature of Quantity being but One whole Divisible still into its Potential parts or parts still farther Divisible Thesis III. 15. Successive Quantity or Motion and consequently the Course of Nature could not have been ab Aeterno but must have had a Beginning Demonstration IV. Bar-All Infinit Motion or Time is Impossible but ba-All Duration of Motion ab Aeterno must have been for an Infinit Time therefore ra-All Duration of Motion ab aeterno is Impossible The Minor is Self-evident The Major is thus prov'd Bar-All Infinit Time must be an Infinit Number of Determinate Parts of Time v. g. Infinit Hours but ba-All Infinit Number of the Determinate parts of Time is Impossible Therefore ra-All Infinit Time is Impossible 16. The Major is clearly Evident for were the Number of the Determinate parts of Time Finite then all the Parts which are equivalent to the Whole being Finite the Whole must likewise be Finite The Minor is prov'd above Demonstration 1. and 2. where it was demonstrated that all Infinit Number is Impossible 17. Whence is Demonstrated our main Thesis that Time Motion or the Course of Nature had a beginning Whence many useful Conclusions may be drawn against Heathens and Atheists Note that 't is the same as to our Argument whether there be an Infinit Number of parts of Time which are Actually Determin'd and Measur'd or no 't is sufficient the Subject Infinit Motion or Infinit Time bears the having such a Determination made by having that in it which corresponds to all those Infinit Determinate parts for this necessarily induces and enforces a Contradiction Thesis IV. There are Spiritual Beings which we call Angels Demonstration V. Axiom 1. What acts is 2. Every thing acts as it is and à fortiori cannot act directly contrary to what it is especially as an Immediate Agent 3. Motion is Change 4. There are no Created Beings but either Divisible or Indivisible ones that is Body or Spirit 5. The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable Da-Whatever must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect acts and consequently is but ri-An Angel must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect viz. of the First Motion in Nature therefore i-An Angel acts and consequently is The Minor is thus prov'd Da-Every Effect that can neither be caused Immediatâ—ly by the First Cause noâ— by a Body must have been caus'd immediatly by a Created Spirit or an Angel But ri-The First Motion in Nature is an Effect which could not have been caus'd Immediatly by the First Cause nor by a Body Therefore i-The first Motion in Nature must have been caus'd Immediatly by an Angel and consequently an Angel acts is The former part of thâ— Minor viz. that the first Motion could not be caus'd immediately by the First Cause is thus demonstrated 19. Fe-No being that is Essentially Vnchangeable and whose Nature is directly contrary to the Nature of Change can be the Immediate Cause o Change or Motion nor consequently of the First Motion in Nature but ri-The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable and his Nature is directly
contrary to the Nature of Change or Motion therefore i-The First Being cannot be the Immediate Cause of Motion or Change nor consequently of the First Motion in Nature 20. The latter part of the former Minor viz. that a Body could not have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature is thus prov'd Ce-Nothing that antecedently to the First Motion was not-Moving or in Rest could have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature but la-Every Body antecedently to the First Motion in Nature was not-Moving or in Rest therefore rent-No Body could have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature Note that this Demonstration supposes a First Motion in Nature which was prov'd Demonstration 4. LESSON VII Other Instances of Demonstration Thesis V. THere is a First Self-Existent Being or a Deity Demonstration VI. Proposition I. The Notion or Nature of Ens and of Existent in Creatures and consequently of Essence and Existence are Distinct. Da-Every Notion of which Existent and not-existent may be truly predicated is Different from the Notion of Existent But ri-The Notion of Ens in its First and Proper Signification taken for an Individual Substance is a Notion of which Existent and not-existent may be predicated therefore i The Notion of Ens thus understood is dâ—fferent from the Notion of Existent and consequently the Notions of Essence and Existence are also Distinct. 2. The Minor is Evident For we can truly say that Petrus est while he is Living and as truly say of the same Peter that Fuit or non-est when he is Dead 3. The Major is no less Evident For when we say Petrus est or Peter is Existent were the notion of the Predicate Existent the same with Peter the Subject the Proposition would be in sense formally Identical and the same as 't is to say what 's Existent is Existent Wherefore when we say Petrus non est or Peter is not-Existent Peter Signifying the same as Existent it would be the same as if we said what 's Existent is not Existent which is a Contradiction Proposition II. 4. The Notion of Ens Abstracts from Existence or is Indifferent to it and to Non-existence This needs no farther Proof For in the two Propositions lately mention'd Existent and not Existent are truly predicated of the same Ens viz. Peter which could not be unless the Subject Peter did Abstract from both or were Indifferent to both Besides all the Words which we use to express the Notions or Natures of any Created Ens whatever do so perfectly Abstract from Existence that it is neither Exprest Imply'd nor in the least Hinted in them as appears in the words Lapis Quercus Bucephalus Petrus Raphael which give us not the least light or intimation that they are Existent or not-Existent Proposition III. 5. Were there any Inclination in Created Entities to one more than to the other it seems to be rather to Not-being than to Being For since Peter even tho' possest of Actual Being is still no less capable of Not-being it seems as if he had a particular Natural Tendency to Not-being because tho' supported Formally as it were by it's Opposit Actual Existence he is notwithstanding no less a Capacity of Not-existing his Original nothingness being so radicated in his Nature as he is a Creature that it sticks to it and inclines him to it even while he is Proposition IV. 6. Existence is no ways Intrinsical to any Created Ens either Essentially or as an Affection springing out of it's Essence This has been demonstrated Prop. 2 d. and 3 d. Because Every nature requires all it's Intrinsicals and what follows out of them or is Connected with them and is not Indifferent to have them or not have them as Ens is to have or not have Existence Proposition V. 7. All Created things have their Existence from something that is Extrinsical to them For whatever has any thing and not from it's self or from it's own Intrinsical Nature must have it from Another or from something that is Extrinsical to it there being no Third sort of Cause imaginable which is neither Intrinsical nor Extrinsical that is which is neither it's self nor Another Proposition VI. 8. No Created Ens can give Existence to another For tho' as was shown formerly the virtue by which the Ens operates be the Existence of that Ens yet it can work no otherwise than as the Thing it self is or according to the Nature of the Thing which has that Existence whose Nature it actually Imprints as it were on the Subject as we find in Fire heating in Water moistning and in the whole Line of Universal Causality Again since the whole Line of Causality also bears that no Cause can act unless it be first Determin'd and as it were Appropriated to work such an Effect whence come those establisht Maxims that the Course of Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes to Proper Effects and Ex indifferente nihil sequitur Therefore seeing Prop. 2. The Created Ens to which such an Existence belongs and consequently the Nature or Essence of that Ens Abstracts from all Existence and is perfectly Indifferent even to it 's own and much more to the Existence of any other Ens it follows demonstratively that no Created Ens can give Existence to another or be the Proper Cause of it Therefore Proposition VII 9. There must be some Vncreated Cause that gives Existence to all Created Entities This is already Evident since no Created Entity can have it's Existence either from it's own Intrinsical Nature or from any other Creature Proposition VIII 10. This Vncreated Cause of all Existence must be Self-Existent that is his Essence must be his Existence For were his Essence Indifferent to Existence or Existence Accidental to him and not Essential he would need Another Cause to give him Existence for the same reason Creatures do and so He would not be Vncreated Therefore there is a First Self-existent Being or a DEITY Corol. III. Hence it is seen that all that Created Causes operate upon Entities grown to maturity is to dispose to the not being of the things they work upon by Altering the Matter so that out of those Alterations brought to such a point the Body ceases to be any longer of such a Nature or Kind and consequently loses it's Existence At which Instant the Providence of the First Being so Orders his World that those Determinations of Matter which were Inconsistent with the Former Ens should be Proper for the New Ens that is to succeed to which in the very First Instant the other ceases to be and this new one is Ultimately Determin'd to be this He by his Bountiful and Steady Emanation of Being gives it such a peculiar Existence as is Commensurated and Proper to it's Essence Thesis VI. An Angel cannot undergo any Change after the First Instant of it's Being Demonstration VII Axiom 1. If Agent and Patient be perfectly fitted
as to the nature of Agent and Patient there needs no more to begin the Effect actually but Application 2. If Agent and Patient be perfectly fitted as to the nature of Agent and Patient and the Effect be Indivisible there needs no more to begin and end that is to Compleat the Effect at once but Application 3. An Indivisible Effect cannot be perform'd by piecemeal or by parts 4. Every thing operates as it is 5. No Change can be made without the Operation of some Cause 6. A Pure Spirit is not Quantitative a Body is Proposition I. No Corporeal Operation is without Local Motion For since Ax. 4. Every thing operates as it is what is Quantitative operates Quantitatively but nothing can operate Quantitatively or exercise 't is Quantity when it perfectly rests according to it's Quantity that is moves not according to it's Quantity It follows then that to Operate Quantitatively is to move according to Quantity Wherefore since nothing can move according to it's Quantity but either Intrinsically by having it's Quantity made greater or less or Extrinsically that is by having it's Quantity unmov'd as to it 's own parts or it's self mov'd towards Another and both these do evidently require some kind of Local Motion 't is Evident likewise that No Câ—â—poreal Operation is without Local Motion Proposition II. 13. That an Angel is not susceptible of Local Motion For since Motion is Mutation and consequently Local Motion Mutation or Change according to Place and Change of Place does necessarily require some Space and Space is Quantity it follows that Local Motion cannot be made in a Subject which has no Quantity But Angels they being Pure Spirits are not Quantitative therefore they are not Susceptible of Local Motion or capable of having Local Motion made in them Proposition III. 15. That no Body can cause a Change in an Angel For since no Operation of Body is without Local Motion and an Angel it being a Pure Spirit is not susceptible of Local Motion it follows that neither is it Susceptible of the Operation of Body But No Cause can change any thing unless that Cause operates upon it Therefore no Body can cause any Change in an Angel Proposition IV. 16. That an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant For since a Cause the self same in all respects if the Patient be likewise the self same and the Application also the self same produces the self-same Effect equally in any time assignable that is sufficient for such an Effect and an Angel put to act upon it self or change it self after the first Instant is put to be the self-same as to its being a Cause in every Instant before it acts as likewise to be the self-same Patient in all respects and the Application of it self to its self cannot but be Equal it follows that in any time sufficient for the same Effect it will produce the same Effect that is act upon it self or change it self Wherefore since an Effect in an Indivisible subject is Indivisible that is Impossible not to be all at once or in one Instant and an Angel being a Pure Spirit is an Indivisible Subject t is Evident that this Effect or the Action of that Spirit upon it self would be equally made in every Instant in case it were not already made that is can only be made in the First Instant Wherefore an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant Proposition V. 17. If there were only Two Angels Existent one of them could not act upon the other after the very First Instant of their Being Let there be only Two Angels the one whereof can work upon the other and let the Agent be A the Patient B and because they are suppos'd not to act in the First Instant but after some Duration let the Duration assign'd be C the Instant at the end of that Duration in which they first work D. Since neither A. nor B. are able to work upon themselves except in the First Instant and as is suppos'd one works not upon the other till the Instant D they must necessarily remain in all respects the same they were in the First Instant till the Instant D that is for the whole Intermediat Duration C Therefore they are equally fitted in point of Agent and Patient in each nay in the very First Instant of the Duration C as they are in the Instant D But in the Instant D in which they acted they were in all points fitted to act therefore they were also in all points perfectly fitted to act in the very first Instant of the Duration C Wherefore the Effect Begun and the Subject being Indivisible Ended in the very First Instant in case their wanted not Application of the perfectly-ready Agent to the perfectly-dispos'd Patient But there wanted not Application in the very First Instant For since Quantitative Application or Propinquity is not competent to Pure Spirits all the Application they can be imagin'd to have to one another is by Knowledg and Will But they had the same Knowledg and Will for the Whole Duration antecedent because they are suppos'd Vnchang'd and perfectly the same for that whole Duration And tho' they had not had it formerly the Argument returns with the same force that they could not have had this new Knowledg and Will from Themselves in any part of that Duration nor from a Body and therefore they must have had it from anâ—ther Spirit and this in the First Instant because that Other was then perfectly apt to give it This perfectly apt to receive it And consequently If there were only Two Angels Existent one of them could not act upon rhe other after the very First Instant of their Being Proposition VI. 18. Put any multitude of Angels how great soever all that they can work upon one another will be perform'd in the First Instant of their Being For since where there are only Two one must therefore act upon the other in the First Instant or not at all because all the imaginable Concurrents to that Action were then adequately put the rest also where there are more will for the same reason be wrought upon in the same Instant in case the Causes of that Action be then adequately put But they are all Adequately put in the same First Instant For the second Angel that acts either is a perfect Agent and perfectly apply'd by what it has of it self or by what it has from another wherefore since it can never want what it has of it self or by it's self it cannot want any thing to work upon the Third unless it be to be wrought upon by the First and so be fitted to work upon the Third but this is done in the very first Instant wherefore also the Third will for the same reason be wrought upon in the self-same Instant Again since the Third cannot be imagin'd to want any thing to enable it to work
upon the Fourth but to be chang'd by the Second and this was done as was now shown in the First Instant the Causes of changing the Fourth were adequately put in the same Instant too and consequently the Effect And since how far soever we proceed the same reason holds viz. that the Effects are still Indivisible and all the Causes of each immediately succeeding Effect still adequately put in the first Instant it will follow that the Effects will still be put in the same Instant by the same necessity that the Effect of the First up on the Second was put in the First Instant of their Being Therefore all whatever any Multitude of Angels how great soever can work upon one another is perform'd in the First Instant of their Being Proposition VII 19. That 't is Infinitly more Impossible an Angel should be chang'd by God after the first Instant than by any other Spirit For since the Angel is in the same manner capable of Change as far as concerns it's self or it 's own power to be changed whether God or any other Spirit be to change it on that side precisely there is a perfect Equality Wherefore seeing on the other side 't is infinitly more Impossible that GOD should not have Power to change her in the First Instant than that any other Spirit should not have such a Power and Infinitly more Impossible that GOD should not of himself be ultimately dispos'd to act where the nature of the thing is capable of it his Nature being Pure Actuality Also since 't is Infinitly more Impossible that GOD should after some Duration receive any Change in himself fitting him to produce that Effect than that any other Spirit should And lastly since 't is Infinitly more Impossible his Active Power should not be Apply'd to the Patient both in regard he most necessarily and comprehensively knows it and most intimately by himself conserves it in Being Wherefore since from these Considerations or Reasons however Infinitly short in Creatures it is concluded to be Impossible that even any Other Spirit if it should change an Angel at all should not change it in the First Instant and these Considerations or Reasons are found to be in GOD with Infinitly greater Advantage it is Evident that 't is Infinitly more Impossible that GOD if he change an Angel at all should not change it in the first Instant that is should change it in the Intermediate Duration than that any other Spirit should Proposition IX 20. That 't is absolutely Impossible an Angel should be Changed after the First Instant of it's Being For since no Change can be made without â—he working of Some Cause and no Body can work upon an Angel and all that it self or any other Created Spirit can work upon it must necessarily be in the very First Instant of it's Being and 't is much more Impossible GOD should work upon it unless in the First Instant than that any Created Spirit should and there can be no Cause possible or Imaginable besides GOD Created Spirits or Bodies it follows that there can be no Cause at all to work upon an Angel or to Change it after the First Instant of it's Being and therefore it can undergo no Change after that First Instant ADVERTISEMENT 1. THIS last Conclusion may seem a strange Paradox to some Readers whose Reason and Principles have not rais'd them above Fancy But not to insist farther on the Evidence of our Consequences from Undeniable Principles which have forced the Necessity of our Conclusion such men are desirâ—d to reflect that Ens being divided as by it's Proper Differences by Divisible and Indivisible and these Differences being Contradictory to one another it follows that Body and Spirit which are the Species constituted by those Differences do agree in nothing at all but in the Common and Generical notion of Ens or in this that they are both of them Capable of Being Whence 't is Logically demonstrated that they must Differ nay contradictorily disagree in every thing else so that whatever else is Affirm'd literally of the one must be deny'd of the other Wherefore since we can truly and literally Affirm that Body is Quantitative Corruptible in Place mov'd Locally Chang'd by Time or Subject to it Capable of Succession or of Before and After which are the Differences of time c. we must be forced with equal Truth Literally to Deny all these of Pure Spirits or Angels because none of these do belong to the Common Generical Notion of Ens but to that Difference which constitutes that Species call'd Body and therefore the Contradictory to all these and amongst them to be Vnsuccessive in it's Operations must be predicated of the other Species call'd Spirit It will I doubt not be much wonder'd at too that the Devils should be Damn'd in the First Instant of their being which looks as if they were Created in the state of Damnation A thing certainly most Unworthy GOD who is Essentially and Infinitly Good But their wonder will cease if they reflect that those Bad Angels had far more Knowledg and consequently more perfect Deliberation such as they can have in that one Single Instant than We could have had tho' we have been a thousand years Considering and Deliberating e'er we had made our Choice of our last End and fix our Resolution to adhere to it Finally So that it never lay in the power of any Man to have so Clear a Knowledg of his Duty and so perfect and full sight of all the Motives to continue in that Duty as the Devil and his Angels had in that one Instant Whence the Crime of Lucifer and his Adherents was a Sin of pure Malice and not mere Frailty or mixt with Frailty much less of Inadvertence Speculative Ignorance or suggested by the Soul 's deprav'd Companion the Body as are the Sins of the Generality of Mankind some Inconsiderable number of them excepted whose Souls are thorowly poison'd with Spiritual Sin 's peculiar to the Devil such as are Spiritual Pride Malice Envy or such like which wicked Sinners are therefore even while here so many Limbs as it were of the Devil and very difficult to be brought to any Repentance And this is the reason why GOD's Wisdom Goodness and Justice laid so many Miracles of Mercy to save poor weak Mankind and left the Faln Angels in the sad condition in which they had so wilfully and desperately engulft themselves Wisely and Justly placing it in the Order of Causes that that Sin which was so perfectly and in despite of all Motives to the contrary so Wilfully Resolute should be Irretractable whereas on the other side Sins of mere Frailty are not hard to be repented of when the alluring circumstance is past and gone The same Faculty which permitted them to fall leaving them likewise in a Pliableness to reform and retract what their Reason abus'd by Passion had perhaps either by surprize or after much
money to morrow will be Where Omitting the Former at present the Medium what 's Promis'd is a Common Notion in respect of Paying whence we use to say All Promises are either Broken or Kept Besides 't is far from being Proper or Immediate to the Effect of Paying in regard that multitudes of cross-Cross-causes may intervene hindering that Effect from following tho' never so really intended whereas taking a Proper Effect viz. my Chambers being Enlightn'd prov'd by it's Proper Cause the Suns darting it's Rayes in through my Window at which rate all the Course of Nature and all the Demonstrations that might be fram'd of it all along do hang together nothing can intervene to hinder it the Efficiency of the Cause being still the Putting the Effect 3. Common Mediums not being immediate but Remote are not in true Speech Mediums apt to Connect the Extremes For since what Connects two others must it self be Connected with them both and what is Connected to two things must be Immediate to them both it follows that a Common Notion not being Immediate to the Two Extremes cannot Connect them and so cannot be in proper Speech or Univocally a Middle Term with that which is Immediate 4. Wherefore all Assent to a Conclusion from a Common Medium is a Deviation from Humane Nature and consequently Opprobrious Whence comes the Proverb Turpe est opinari 't is Shameful to Assent upon Uncertain and Inconclusive Mediums such as are Common ones To which agrees that saying of Holy Writ Qui credit citò levis est corde He that assents hastily is light of heart that is Inconstant or Unsteady in his Thoughts and Actions Whence also he that adheres stiffly upon Opinionative Grounds incurrs the Note of being an Opiniatre The reason is becauâ—e Reason being Man's Nature so that as Brutes are led by Sense so he is led by some Reason good or bad in all his Actions and True Reason being a Power to draw True Conclusions out of True Premisses hence every Assent Involves as it were practically that the thing is True for such a Reason which Proposition is False if that Reason for which he assents does not Conclude it True as Common Mediums do not Wherefore Reason being the true Nature given us by GOD and Truth the Perfection of that Nature all Assents upon Incompetent or Inconclusive Grounds do doubly injure our Nature First as to its Essence by Concluding unduely next as to it's Perfection in making it embrace a Falshoâ—d and such a Falshood as makes it liable to fall into many others by imbuing the understanding with a wrong Method of Reasoning whence he lies expos'd by leaving the paths of Right Reason to the Disrepute of being either Passionate or Ignorant 5. They who do Assent upon such an Inconclusive Medium notwithstanding that they see it is Inconclusive are convinc'd to be Deserters of Humane Nature and led blindly by Passion For since all Reasoning is built upon First Principles they who come nearest the Denyâ—ng First Principles do radically as it were put off and abdicate their Whole Nature But such Assenters come as near as is possible to the Denying First Principles for they Assent that is they Judge or say interiourly the Conclusion is True or that the thing is and yet they see at the same time that the Reason on which only they relie for that Assent does not Conâ—lude it to be that is they see it may not be notwithstanding that Reason which is to Assent or Judge that to be which yet at the same time they Judge may not be which is in Substance though not in Direct Terms Nature not permitting such a palpable Contradiction to settle in a Subject made to see Truth as 't is to Deny the First Principle what it is or It is Impossible a Thing should be and not be at once Corol. I. Hence such Men are convinc'd to bely their own knowledge to be False to themselves Self-condemn'd highly Passionate Prejudic'd and Govern'd by meer Will that is to be blindly Willful which is the Greatest and most Unnatural Depravation that a Spiritual or Knowing Nature is capable of Wherefore they are Justly held to be disposed for any Ill that a Depraved Soul can desire Which ought to make every prudent Man wary in his Conversing or Negotiating with them if he cannot well avoid them totally since having renounced the Conduct of Evident Reason no Reason can manage them nor the wisest Man give any guess at what they will do or whether the blind Impulse of Ungovernable Passion will hurry them 6. Whatever Allowance may be made for Weak or Ignorant People there can be no Excuse for a Learned Man if he Assents upon a Common or Inconclusive Medium Because there can be no Necessity Imaginable that can compel him to Interiour Assent as perhaps there may be to force him to Outward Actions in regard God has given us a Faculty of Suspending our Assent till we see Evidence lest our Weakness or Carelessness should at every turn precipitate us into Error 7. From what has been said 't is seen that Common Mediums can at most but prove a thing Probable or likely to be which may consist with it's not-being or being False The Former part is prov'd because Proper Mediums only make the Conclusion Certain and therefore such as these can only render it Probable or Likely The Second part is prov'd by every days Experience which shows us how often we are Deceiv'd in Likelihoods or Probabilities even though Great ones and that the Contrary frequently happens to what such slight Grounds made us expect 8. When those who are Invincibly Ignorant do assent upon such Common Mediums it leaves no Note upon them more than that of Weakness and Ignorance For since such Men do as is suppos'd use the best of their Understanding their Erring does not spring from the Obliquity or Byass of their Wills perverting their Light of Reason which secures their Morality Untainted 9. Tho' we ought not to Act thus Interiourly or Assent upon Inconclusive Mediums yet Probability is very often enough to make us act Exteriourly when those Actions are Necessary to be done even though they be subject to great hazard Thus Merchants venture their Effects to Sea even in the time of War because their State of life requires it yet even then they must have Evidence that 't is best to venture otherwise their Reason is some way Defective So that Humane Nature still Obliges all Men to Act upon some Evidence 10. In Cases of Conscience and Law-suits which are only Probable and in which Interest is concern'd the safest way is first to purge our Affections from Coveting that which is perhaps our Neighbours next not to trust to Casuists whom we apprehend to have Large Cases favourable to our Interest nor to make choice of a Lawyer who is a Crafty Knave but rather one who is reputed Honest so he be Intelligent For while we proceed thus the
Mediums taken from the Nature of the Thing and those must be also Conclusive ones For their Knowledg and Veracity must either be made known by Intrinsical Mediums or by Extrinsical ones that is by Another Authority and the same question recurrs How we are Certain of the Knowledg and Veracity of that other Authority and so in infinitum Whence we must come to be certain of the Knowledg and Veracity of Authority by Intrinsical Mediums or we can have no Ground at all to believe any Authority Moreover the proper work of Reason is to Demonstrate which is done by Intrinsical Mediums and unless they be Conclusive they prove nothing and so are good for nothing 21. The Knowledg of the First Attesters is ascertain'd by what has been prov'd § § 15.16 Their Veracity must be prov'd by shewing there could be no Apparent Good to move their Wills to deceive us and the best proof omitting the Impossibility of joyning in such an Universal Conspiracy to deceive the Certain loss of their Credit to tell a Lie against Notorious Matters of Fact c. is the seen Impossibility of Compassing their Immediate End which was to Deceive Which reason is grounded on this that no one man who is not perfectly Frantick acts for an End that he plainly sees Impossible to be compassed For example to fly to the Moon or to swim over Thames upon a Pig of Lead Thus it is Demonstrable that all England could not Conspire to deceive those born since in asserting to them that there was a King Charles the First or a Long Parliament which rais'd a Civil War here because they must see it is impossible to gain Belief of it which was their Immediate End whatever farther End they might propose to themselves So many Records Practices Laws and other Consequences Issuing thence giving them the Lie besides the Histories of our own and other Countries and the Concatenation of Causes and Effects in the Political part of our Neighbouring Nations all conspiring unanimously and appositly to detect the Cheat. Wherefore the End being Evidently Impossible to be atchiev'd it could never be an Apparent good to them in such a case to act for such an End or to attempt to deceive us by Attesting it and therefore they could not tell such a Lie in such a Case therefore they were Veracious while they Attested it 22. Tho' both the Knowledg and Veracity of the Attesters be Demonstrated and Consequently the thing Attested by them be most Certainly and necessarily True yet our Assent to the Truth of that thing is neither Science no◠Opinion It cannot be Opinion because the Medium that begets Opinion is not Necessarily Connected with the Extremes as is found here Nor can it be Science because our Knowledg of the thing is not taken from the Thing it self that is attested causing such a Notion or Impression in us directly by it's self or by Reflex Knowledges upon those Direct ones on which kind of Impressions all Science is built but it is a Knowledg Reflected to us from Anothers Knowledg of it or a kind of Second-hand Knowledg Nor is the Knowledg which even the Attesters had of the Object at First-hand a Proper Effect of the Ens or Thing which is the Object of that Knowledg Nor is the Thing as an Object the Proper Cause of that Knowledg only which can beget Science For a Proper Cause has a Real Order or Relation to it 's Proper Effect whereas the Objects have no Real Relation at all to the Senses or our Knowing Power as was shown above where we treated of Relation By which we may farther more clearly discover the Essential Differences between Science Faith and Opinion It may be objected that Intelligibility is a Property of Ens therefore every Ens is a Proper Cause of Knowledg 'T is answer'd that it is only a Property of Ens Negatively as it were in regard nothing can be understood but Ens Non Ens not being able to cause any knowledg in us Or it may mean that 't is only a Property of Ens in order to an Extrinsical thing not a true Property Perfecting it Intrinsically as Properties due to a thing by Nature and Springing from their Essences do It may be objected farther that all Natural Powers are true Properties tho' they respect Extrinsical things on which they are to work 'T is answer'd that they perfect those Entities Intrinsically or give them some perfection in their Intrinsical Nature which Intelligibility does not for nothing is Intrinsically better or otherwise than it would be for being Known or Vnderstood To explicate this better we may consider that every Entity being a Part of the World has some Office or Place there and some part which it is to act on the Stage of Nature And accordingly Metaphysicks teach us that every Body is constituted such by it's having some Primary Operation which 't is fitted to produce as Fire to heat Water to Cool c. Whence what ever fits it for such an Operation is either Essential to it or a Property immediately Connected with it's Essence such as are those Natural Powers objected Now 't is Evident that those Powers do perfect each Nature Intrinsically since without them it would be Imperfect and Impotent to perform that which it was Essentially Ordain'd for and so the whole course of Nature carry'd on by such Proper Causes to Proper Effects would be quite out of frame and Order whereas 't is manifest it would suffer no detriment at all in it self whether those Proper Causes or Effects were Vnderstood or no. Which shows that their being Known by the First Attesters or made known to us by their Knowing them is not a Proper Effect of those Causes nor Intrinsical to them as they are parts of Corporeal Nature but Accidental to them as such but yet so Accidental that it is Inseparable from them and so does Necessarily infer the Conclusion 23. Testimony on which Human Faith relies is adequately divided into Living and Dead that is into such Attesters as speak vivâ voce and those that speak by Writing Because there is no Common or Ordinary way but Speech and Written or Printed Characters by which Men can relate Matters of Fact to others or testify to them their Knowledg of such things 24. Matters of fact done long a go if very Concerning to have the Knowledg of them Continu'd and that they were known at first by the Experience of a great portion of Mankind may be made known to us who live now by a Delivery of them down from the foregoing Age to the succeeding One Which Continued Testimony or Delivery of them is call'd Tradition For since the Generality of First Attesters who liv'd in the same time when they happen'd could not but know them and the Continual Concern of them could not but still prompt and provoke Foregoers to speak of them to their Descendents it follows that the Continuance of those Causes may still
Gramarical Quibbles and it would do too much honour to them to spend labour to name them being too open of themselves to need Exposing Those which are less discernable and worth Remark are such as this He that says you are an Animal says true but He that says you are an Ass says you are an Animal Therefore He that says you are an Ass says true Where as has been particularly shown above the word Animal is taken in diverse Senses for in this Proposition Peter is an Animal it is restrain'd by the Subject to signify one Individual Animal and of such a kind viz. Rational But in the Proposition An Ass is an Animal it is restrain'd to signify an Animal of Another kind viz. Irrational whence 't is no Syllogism because it has Four Terms 10. Of these Fallacies which are not grounded on the Ambiguity of the Words but are built on the Thing or the Sense the First worth remarking is that call'd the Fallacy ex Accidente which happens when the Middle Term is only Accidentally connected with the Extremes and not per se or out of its own Nature As Bar-Whatever breeds stirs in a Common-Wealth is bad but ba-All Religion breeds stirs in a Common-Wealth therefore ra-All Religion is bad The Common answer is to distinguish the Major and Minor both and to say that what breeds Stirs out of its own Nature is Bad but not that which breeds them Accidentally for otherwise a Sword and Wine must be bad because the one sometimes helps to commit Murther and the other causes Drunkenness But the more Solid way and which bears up best to Logical Grounds is to deny it to be a Syllogism because though the Form of it be Legitimate yet the Matter or the Middle Term is not so For a Syllogism being a Speech contriv'd by True Logicians to Conclude a Third Proposition out of the Premises so as by Connexion of the Medium with the Extremes we may know it to be Certainly True for that which leaves us Vncertain leaves us Ignorant it follows that the Middle Term must be either a Notion Essentially Connected with the Extremes or else as a Proper Cause or Effect of it neither of which it can be if it be but Accidentally belonging to them We may Note here how Accidental Mediums are Common and Remote ones or such as beget Opinion For between Religion and Commotions intervene Perversity of will Disregard of Virtue Irrational Assents upon Opinionative Ground Pride and Faction against Church Governours who would bind them to good Principles and Religious Duties Interest c. All which or some if not most of them are the Proper and Immediate Causes of Dissention at least nearer and more Proper Causes of it than Religion it self the Principles of which do Oblige men to the preservation of Peace and Unity 11. The Second is called Ignoratio Elenchi which in easier Language is the attempting to prove what 's not in question or putting upon our Adversary to hold a Tenet he never own'd nor held as it usually passes among Passionate Discourses and Scolds when they object to others what they neither held nor thought that they may the more easily confute them or render them Odious This is avoided in disputes by Stating the Question right and by Agreeing before-hand in the Signification of the Words in which the Question is conceiv'd as was recommended in the second and third Rule Or if this be not done before the Dispute begins it is answer'd by saying Transeat totum and forcing the Adversary weary with aiming his blows amiss to recur to the true point and to Conclude the Contradictory to the Defendents Tenet which was his only Duty and ought to have been done at first 12. The Third is Begging the Question or Supposing that which should have been Prov'd Which is manifestly faulty For the Premisses must be Clearer than the Conclusion which they cannot be if the Proof in whole or in part is as Unknown and Obscure as is the Conclusion it self as it must be if it is barely Suppos'd and begg'd gratis Of which Fallacy therefore all the whole Body of Hypothetical Philosophy is Guilty as also that Fallacy call'd An Ill Enumeration of the Parts as follows here 13. The Fourth is that of an Imperfect or Incomplete Division which happens wâ—en 't is falsly pretended that the thing in Question must be one of those which are Nominated or that it must be perform'd one of the ways Assign'd when perhaps there is Another way how that thing may be done which was never assign'd but either Unthought of or Neglected As if it should be asserted that Motion must either happen by Atoms descending in an Immense Vacuum or by the Impression of so much Motion in the Mass of Matter at First by GOD and his Continuing it ever since when as a third way may be assign'd viz. that a Created Intelligent Being Causes and all along Continues the Motion of the first-moved Bodies which move the rest This Fallacy is defeated by Denying the Proposition which contains the Enumeration of all those Causes or Manners of Action and by Obliging the Disputant to show his Division to be Adequate 14. The Fifth is called non causa pro causa That is in plain terms the bringing a Medium that does not Conclude or the pretending the Conclusion follows from a Medium that cannot necessarily inferr it This Fallacy if it must be call'd so happens chiefly to Experimental Philosophers who going by meer Induction and laying no Evident or Certain Principles of Nature a priori to guide their Thoughts by but Hypothetical ones only do hence refund all the Effects of Nature into false-pretended Causes whence every man who sets up a new Scheme does still assign new Reasons or Causes according to which he strives to Explicate Nature and into which he endeavours to Resolve all the several Productions and Effects of it But why this should be call'd a Fallacy I cannot comprehend At this rate every Argument that does not Conclude may be call'd a Fallacy For since the Premisses in a Demonstrative Syllogism are the Cause of the Conclusion whoever argues ill argues Fallaciously and assigns a wrong Cause by producing an Incompetent Medium But in case the Disputant puts it upon the Defendent to have made use of such a Ground as he never meant it is then enough to deny it and put him to prove that that was indeed his Ground as was pretended 15. The Fifth is the Arguing from what 's taken in a Divided sense as if it were taken in a Compound sense or conjoyntly or from what 's taken in a compound sense or conjoyntly to infer the same thing in a Divided sense Example of the Former is this He that is actually sitting may Walk Peter is actually sitting therefore Peter actually sitting or while he sits may walk Where the Major is False unless Sitting and Walking be taken Divisively and mean that he who sits
an Ens or Thing because it can and does Exist alone and to be a Distinct Ens from all the Other Atomes for otherwise all his several Atomes might be but One Ens or One Atome which is both a flat Contradiction and besides quite destroys his own Hypothesis Wherefore each Atome must have something in it that makes it a Distinct Ens or distinguishes it from all the rest which cannot be the Matter of the Atome for That is Common to them All and what is Common to all cannot distinguish One from Another And if there be Somewhat in each Atome that makes it a Distinct Ens then Essence being that which formally constitutes an Ens it gives it a Distinct Essence or distinguishes it Essentially which is what the Aristotelians mean by an Essential Form So that they are at unawares in despite of their own Doctrine become thus far Aristotelians 15. To proceed Therefore it is not Impossible but each Atome may be Chang'd according to the Form and not according to the Matter that is each Atome is Capable of Formal Mutation Which I thus demonstrate Whatever does not imply a Contradiction is not Impossible but The putting each Atome to be Chang'd another to the Form and not according to the Matter does not imply a Contradiction therefore The putting each Atome to be thus Chang'd is not Impossible The Minor only which can need Proof is thus Evidenc'd For since a Contradiction is no where but in our Vnderstanding there can be no Contradiction unless the Same be Affirm'd and Deny'd Secundum Idem or according to the same Notion or Respect in our Understanding But this cannot be in our case For the Notions of the Matter and Form of each Atome as has been in the last § Metaphysically demonstrated from the natures of Idem and Diversum are Distinct Notions that is Distinct Considerations Regards or Respects of the same Thing and therefore to Affirm that the Atome is Chang'd according to One of those Different Regards or Notions viz. the Form and Not-chang'd according to the Other viz. the Matter has not the least show of Affirming and Denying secundum idem nor consequently the least show of a Contradiction Wherefore it is evidently Demonstrable from plain Logick acknowledg'd by all Mankind that it is Possible each Atom should be Chang'd according to the Form or Formally Chang'd whence if there be Causes in Nature sufficient to change it it will be Actually Chang'd or Broken that is it will undergo such a Mutation as is not only Formal but Essential because the former Ens is no more when Two Entities are made of it It remains then only to examin whether there be sufficient Causes in Nature to work this Change supposing each Atom of it's own Nature Changeable as has been demonstrated 16. In order to which we are to reflect that Epicurus puts those Atomes of his to be of all imaginable Figures Wherefore there must be some of them like Needles ending in the smallest Point that can be conceiv'd Others full of Pores or very small holes into which some of these sharpest Points will light and the more bulky part of the Atome not being able to enter it that Point will remain Wedg'd in that Pore or Cavity Now this Point of the Atome may be so almost infinitely Slender that the least Impulse of other Atomes crouding and pressing upon it may be able to break it much more when it happens as it needs must that the vast weight of Mountains or a great Part of the Body of the Earth do press with a Transverse or Side-motion upon that Atome In which case it will be impossible to conceive how that smallest Point perhaps a million of times less than a Hair can be able to resist such a stupendious Pressure The same may be said of those Atomes made like our Hooks clasping with another Hooked one when a very strong Divulsive force able to rend Rocks asunder tears the Compound several ways as when Mines of Gun-powder blow up Castles or Mountains Wherefore since as has been shown the Atome is Capable of being Broken that is Capable to be Intrinsecally or Formally Chang'd and there are Causes sufficient to break it it follows that whatever Epicurus does extravagantly and against the Sense of Mankind suppose his Atomes would be de facto Broken that is Two Entities would be made anew and the Vnity that is the Entity of the Former Ens or Atome would be destroy'd and consequently there must be not only Intrinsecal but Essential that is the Greatest of Formal Mutations made in his Atomes 17. The same is Demonstrated from the Notion of Mutation it self and the Effects it causes in our Understanding I discourse thus Our Words express our Notions and our Notions unless they be Fictitious are taken from the Thing Wherefore unless there be some Change or other in the Thing our Notions and consequently our Expressions and Denominations must still be the same But when Local Motion of the Atom is made in the Vacuum we must be forced to speak of it or Denominate it diversly and to say it is now Here now There or in another place than it was before for otherwise it could not be said truly to be mov'd Locally if it did not change Place There must then be some Novelty or some Change in some Thing or other to ground this New Notion which causes this New Denomination Themselves will not say 't is in the Vacuum and should they say so it would be perfect Nonsense for the Vacuum being nothing cannot be Capable of Change Therefore this Novelty or Change must be in the Atome Otherwise did all the Causes whatever remain the Same the same Effect viz. the same Notion and the same Denomination and not a Different one must ensue or else there would be an Effect viz. this New Notion and Denomination without any Cause which is Impossible Wherefore 't is Logically Demonstrated that there must be Formal Mutation made in the Atome 17. Perhaps they will say for such Discoursers think they have given a sufficient Answer if they can but give us a New Word there is only an Extrinsical Change made by the Application of the parts in the Atom to Different parts of the Vacuum But first a Vacuum can have no parts much less any Difference of Parts Next an Extrinsical Change is a most Improper Expression and signifies a Thing may be Chang'd and yet no Change in it But suppose we should admit those Words yet themselves must say an Extrinsical Change means or implies a Change in some Extrinsical Thing which is realy and Intrinsically Changed and which by being thus Changed give an Extrinsical Denomination to Another Thing which is all they can mean by these words Extrinsical Change As when the Wall is Extrinsically denominated Seen from the Act of my Seeing Power my Eye is Intrinsically Chang'd by having that Act and thence gives that Extrinsical Denomination
to the Wall And if the words Extrinsically Chang'd have not this meaning they can have no Sense but are altogether Inexplicable To be Cloath'd is an Extrinsical Denomination to the man on whom Cloaths are put But then the Cloaths suffer an Intrinsical Change of their Figure and perhaps their Quantity by being fitted and acomodated to the Body of that man and the Air suffers the same while the Action or Motion of Cloathing is perform'd To be Mov'd Locally is an Extrinsical Denomination to the Body that is Moved but then Local Motion being a Division of the Medium through which that Motion is made there is an Intrinsical Change in the Medium Divided and a New Continuity of the parts of the thing Moved to New parts of the Medium is acquir'd which is a Quantitative and therefore an Intrinsical Mutation whence the Extrinsical Denomination of Moved accrues to the Moved Body Besides it is scarce possible in Nature where there can be no Action without some Degree of Reaction but the Body it self that is Moved must undergo some small Change But now in the Scheme of Epicurus his Philosophy all things are quite otherwise since neither the Vacuum nor the Atoms and he puts nothing else even according to his own Doctrin are in the least degree Capable of Change Wherefore he is convinced to Deny this Self-evident Maxim Idem manens idem semper facit idem while he must affirm that there can be a New Effect viz. that New Notion and Denomination without any Novelty or Change in the Cause or the Thing that is he must put a New Effect without any New Cause or which is the same an Effect without a Cause 18. But leaving him and turning our Discourse to our Modern Corpuscularians the Cartesians These Philosophers tell us the Particles of their Maâ—ter are Crumbled or Shattered by Rubbing against one another Wherefore their Matter and each Part of it was One Thing before it was Moved and now is by Motion become Many Things Nor can it be deny'd but that All of them were Entities before their Motion since both that Whole Mass of Matter and each of the first Divided Parts were antecedently to the Division Capable of Existing apart and pre-suppos'd to the Division as the Subject of it Wherefore both that Whole Bulk of Matter and each of those Parts by losing their Vnity did eo ipso lose their Entity too and consequently the respective Forms that constituted them such Entities which is the Greatest Formal and Intrinsical Mutation that can be and far Greater even by their own Doctrin than could be made afterwards according to any Accident or Modification of those foresaid Entities 19. Again since Motion cannot be made in an Instant that Mass of Matter must be granted to have been Created that is to have had Being antecedently in Priority of Nature to Motion Wherefore it had in that Instant some kind of Intrinsecal Nature and somewhat in it which made it to be of that Nature Hence I argue thus that Nature and the Form that constituted it is either Lost when it came to be Divided and then it was Intrinsecally and Formally Chang'd Or else it retain'd that Nature after it was Divided and then 't is Manifest that that Mass was Diminisht that is Chang'd according to its Extension in regard the Greater Extension of that Original Mass was now made Less and yet was Vnchang'd according to its Nature Let them take which of these they please they must unavoidably yield there was Formal Mutation in the former case of its Essence in the Later of its Extension and a Formal Divisibilâ—ty in it either of its Form from its Matter or of its Extension from its Nature or Essence in regard it was by Motion Chang'd according to the One and not according to the Other But now in case they make as they do Extension to be the Essential Form of that Matter Formal Mutation is made more Unavoidable and must be granted even by themselves 20. To understand the force of this Demonstration more Clearly it is to be noted that the Cartesians do not make their First Matter to be only an Abstracted Conception of an Ens or Body as it has in it a Power to have a Form and so to be a Thing as the Aristotelians do for which reason they rightly and acutely Define or rather Describe it as thus Abstracted by our consideration to be Neque Quid neque Quantum neque Quale neque aliquod aliud eorum quibus Ens determinatur in regard that as thus consider'd 't is a meer Power to be any of them or all of them that is none of them Actually But they put their first Matter to be Inform'd otherwise they could not put it to have Extension in it which must necessarily be granted to be a Form either Essentially Constituting it or some Accident or Modification of some Thing that has a Substantial Form Whence they must hold that their First Matter is an Ens or Compleat Thing that is Compleatly Capable of Existing which appears farther by its Terminating the Action of Creation the peculiar Effect of which is to give Actual Being which concludes it to have been Compleat under the Notion of Ens since it is Self-evident that that cannot Actually be which is not Capable to be that is which is not an Ens. This Note reflected on it is manifest it must have a Nature of its own and Somewhat in it to constitute that Nature or some Essential Form and so is Formally Mutable whether Extension be that Form or no as is deduced by our Argument § 19. 21. To come up closer to them and enforce the Evidence of our Argument to a Nonplusage of their Cause we ask Of what kind of Consistency was that Original Matter into which GOD according to them did infuse the first Motion and so Divided it The very Terms tells us that it must have been of it's own Nature either Easie or Hard to be Divided nor do we ask the precise Degree Let them say 't is either One or the Other or a Middle Degree between both we are so reasonable it shall serve the turn It being then indifferent to our Question in this perfect silence of theirs we will gâ—ess as well as we can at what they should say as most congruous to their Doctrin and so we will suppose it to be Dense We enquire next in what consists this Modification or Affection of it call'd Density or how they will explicate it Motion had not yet begun in that Instant in which it first was by the Means of which they put all Qualities and this amongst the rest to be Produced If they should say which yet I do not read they do nor so much as speak of it as 't is found in their First Matter that it consists in the Rest of it's Parts 'T is reply'd first that that Matter has as yet no Parts for these are made by