their unserviceableness he sometimes bestows them in great number which nevertheless produces but little Effect Why all these Ambages and indirect wayes Would it not have been sufficient for him to have will'd the Conversion of a Sinner to have effected it after an efficacious and invincible manner Is it not plain that 't is because he acts by the most simple wayes and that Order requires it although we do not alwayes see it For God can only act according to Order and Wisdom although his Order and Wisdom are often impenetrable abysses to the Mind of Man There are certain very simple Laws in the Order of Grace consonant to which God commonly acts For this Order has its Rules as well as that of Narure although we know them not as we see in the Communication of Motions Let us only follow the Counsel given us in the Holy Gospel by him who perfectly knew the Laws of Grace I say this to quiet the unjust Complaints of Sinners who despise the Advice given them by JESVS CHRIST and who charge God with their Malice and Disorders They would have him to perform Miracles in their Favour and dispence with the common Laws of Grace They live in Pleasure seek after Honour and continually renew those Wounds which sensible Objects have made in their Brain and often add more to them and yet would have God cure them by a Miracle Like to wounded Men who in the excess of their Pain rend their Cloaths tear up their Wounds and then at the sight of approaching Death complain of the Cruelty of their Surgeons They would have God save them because say they he is Good Wise and Powerful and need but Will it and we are Happy He ought not surely to have made us to Damn us But they ought to know that God has done all that could be done by Order and Wisdom which he consults We should not believe that he leaves us since he has given us his own Son to be our Mediator and Sacrifice Yes God would have us all saved But by such wayes as we ought carefully to study and exactly to follow He consults not our Passions in the execution of these designs but only his Wisdom and follows Order And Order requires us to imitate JESVS CHRIST and to follow his Counsel that we may be sanctified and saved But if God has not predestinated all Men to be conformable to the Image of his Son who is the Model and Exemplar 't is because in this he acts by the most simple wayes in relation to his designs which tend all to his Glory And God is an Universal Cause and ought not to act like Particular Causes which have particular wills for whatever they do 'T is also because his Wisdom which in this respect is an Abyss to our Understandings wills it should be so In fine 'T is because this conduct is more worthy of God than any other which would be more favourable to Reprobates For even the Order which condemns them is as worthy of our Adorations as that whereby the Elect are sanctified and saved And nothing but our Ignorance of Order and our Self-love could make us condemn such a Conduct as Angels and Saints will eternally admire But let us return to the Proofs of the Efficacy of Second Causes The Fifth Proof If Bodies had not a certain Nature or Power to act and if God did all things there would be nothing but what was Supernatural in the most Common Effects The distinction of Natural and Supernatural which is so well received in the World and established by the universal consent of all the Learned would be Chimerical and Extravagant ANSWER I Answer That this distinction is as ridiculous in the Mouth of Aristotle for the Nature that this Philosopher has established is a pure Chimera I say that this distinction is not clear in the mouth of the Vulgar who judge of things by the impression they make upon their Senses For they know not precisely what they mean when they say that Fire burns by its own Nature I confess this distinction may pass from the Mouth of Divines if by Natural Effects they mean those which are consequences of General Laws that God has established for the general production and preservation of all things and that Supernatural Effects are such as depend not upon these Laws In this sense this distinction is true But the Philosophy of Aristotle joyn'd to the impression of the Senses I think makes it dangerous because this distinction may turn those from God who have too much respect for the Opinions of this wretched Philosopher or such as consult their Senses instead of entering within themselves to seek the Truth there So that we ought not to make use of this distinction without explaining it St. Austin having used the word Fortune L. 1. de Retract 1 Cor. 10.19 retracted it although there were few persons who could be deceived by it St. Paul speaking of Meats offered to Idols tells us That Idols are Nothing If the Nature of the Heathen Philosophy is a Chimera a Nothing Men ought to be advertized of it for there are many Men who will be deceived by it And more than we suppose who inconsiderately attribute the Works of God to it who are taken up with this Idol or Fiction of Mans Mind and render it Honours which are only due to the Divinity They are willing that God should be the Author of Miracles and certain extraordinary Effects which in one sense are unworthy of his Greatness and Wisdom and they refer to the Power of their imaginary Nature those constant and regulated Effects that Wise Men only know how to admire They likewise pretend that this wonderful disposition which all living Bodies have to preserve themselves and beget their like is a production of Nature For according to these Philosophers 't is the Sun and Moon which begets a Man We may further distinguish Supernatural from Natural Order in many respects For we may say that the Supernatural refers to future good that it is established in consideration of the Merits of JESVS CHRIST that it is the first and chief of all Gods designs and many other things sufficient to preserve a distinction which they are vainly apprehensive should fall to the ground The Sixth Proof The Chief Proof that Philosophers bring to prove the Efficacy of Second Causes is deducted from the Will and Liberty of Man Man wills and determines of himself and to will and determine is to act It is certain it is Man who commits sin God is no more the Author of it than he is of Concupiscence and Error Therefore Man acts ANSWER In many places of the Search after Truth I have sufficiently explained what the Will and Liberty of Man is and principally in the First Chapter of the First Book and in the First Explanation upon that Chapter It is useless to repeat it here I confess that Man wills and determines of himself because
only try to know a Relation which is sufficiently rambling and indetermined It is plain 1. That to resolve Questions of the first Kind and perfectly to know all the exact Relations of Magnitude and Quality that is between two or many things we must have distinct Idea's which perfectly represent them and compare these things all possible ways We may for instance resolve all Questions which tend to discover the exact Relations which are between 2 and 8 because 2 and 8 being exactly known we may compare them together in all necessary manners to discover their exact Relations of Magnitude or Quality We may know that 8 is Quadruple of 2 that 8 and 2 are even Numbers and that 8 and 2 are not Squares It is clear in the second place That to resolve Questions of the second Kind and exactly to discover any Relation of Magnitude or Quality which is between two or many things it is necessary and it will be sufficient to know very distinctly the Superficies of them according to which we must compare them to discover the Relation we seek For instance To resolve any Question which tends to the discovering some exact Relation between 4 and 16 as that 4 and 16 are even Numbers and Squares it is sufficient to know exactly that 4 and 16 may be divided into half without a Fraction and that both are the Product of a Number multiplied by it self and it is useless to examine what their true Magnitude is For 't is evident To know the exact Relation of Quality which is between things it is sufficient to have a very distinct Idea of their Quality without thinking any thing of their Magnitude and that to know their exact Relations of Magnitude it sufficies to know exactly their Magnitude without enquiring after their true Quality It is plain in the third place That to resolve Questions of the third Kind and to know any Relation that is almost exact between two or more things it is sufficient to know pretty near the Superficies or sides thereof according to which we must compare them to discover the approaching Relation that we seek whether it be of Magnitude or Quality For instance I can evidently know that √ 8 is greater than 2 because I can know very near the true Magnitude of the √ 8. But I cannot know how much the √ 8 exceeds 2 because I cannot exactly know the true Magnitude of √ 8. Lastly It is plain That to resolve Questions of the fourth kind and discover their trifling and undetermined Relations it suffices to know things after a manner proportionate to the need we have of comparing them to discover the Relations we seek So that to resolve all sorts of Questions 't is not always necessary to have very distinct Idea's of their Terms or to know perfectly the things their Terms signifie But it is requisire to know them so much the more exactly as the Relations we endeavour to discover are more exact and in greater Number For as we have already shewed in imperfect Questions it is enough to have imperfect Idea's of the things that we consider to resolve these Questions perfectly or according to what they contain And we likewise resolve Questions very well although we have no distinct Idea of the Terms which express them for when it is demanded if Fire is capable of melting Salt hardening Dirt and evaporating Lead and a thousand other like things we understand these Questions perfectly and can very well resolve them although we have no distinct Idea of Fire Salt Dirt c. because those who make these demands would only know if we have had any sensible Experience that Fire has produced these Effects Wherefore according to the Discoveries we have made by our Senses we can answer them in such a manner as may be capable of satisfying them CHAP. VIII An Application of the other Rules to particular Questions THere are Questions of two sorts Simple and Compound The Resolution of the first depends alone upon the Attention of the Mind to the clear Idea's of the Terms which express them The others cannot be resolved but by the Comparison of a third or many other Idea's we cannot discover the unknown Relations which are expressed by the Terms of the Question by immediately comparing the Idea's of these Terms for they cannot be joyned or compared We must therefore have one or many mean Idea's to be able to make necessary Comparisons to discover these Relations and exactly observe that these mean Idea's are clear and distinct in proportion as the Relations we endeavour to discover are more exact and in greater Number This Rule is only a Consequence of the first and is of equal Importance For if it is necessary to know exactly the Relations we compare to have clear and distinctly Idea's of them For the same reason it is necessary to know well the mean Idea's by which we pretend to make these Comparisons since we must distinctly know the Relation of Measure with each of the things that we measure to discover the Relations of them For instance When we suffer a little light Vessel to swim freely with a Loadstone in it if we turn towards the North Pole of this Loadstone another Loadstone that we hold in our Hands we shall immediately see the first Loadstone retire as if it were compelled by some violent Wind. And if we desire to know the Cause of this Effect It is plain That to give a Reason for the Motion of this Loadstone it is not enough to know the Relations it has with the other for although we should even perfectly know all we could not comprehend how these two Bodies could thrust one another without meeting We must therefore examine what things we know distinctly to be capable according to the Order of Nature of moving Bodies since the Question is to discover the Natural Cause of the Motion of the Loadstone which is certainly a Body To that end we must not have recourse to any Quality Form or Entity or even of any Intelligence that we do not clearly know to be capable of moving Bodies For we cannot certainly know that Intelligences are the common Causes of the Natural Motions of Bodies nor even whether or no they can produce Motion We know evidently That 't is a Law of Nature that Bodies should move each other when they meet We must then endeavour to explain the Motion of the Loadstone by the means of any body which meets it It is true that it may be something else besides a Body which moves it but if we have no distinct Idea of this thing we must not make use of it as a fit Mean to discover what we seek nor to explain it to others For 't is not giving a Reason of an Effect to ascribe something as a Cause of it which no body conceives clearly We must not then trouble our selves too much whether there is any other Natural Cause of the Motion of Bodies than their
Mutual Concurrence but rather suppose that there is none and attentively consider what Body can meet and move this Loadstone We discover at first sight that 't is not the Loadstone we hold in our Hands since it does not touch that which is moved But because it is only moved at the approach of that which we hold in our Hands and is not moved of it self we ought to conclude That although it is not the Loadstone in our Hands which moves it it must be some little Bodies which proceed from it and which are past by it towards the other Loadstone To discover these little Bodies we must not open our Eyes and look near the Loadstone for the Senses would impose upon Reason and it may be we should judge that nothing proceeds from the Loadstone because we cannot see any thing go out from thence 'T is very probable we should forget that we do not see the most impetuous Winds nor many other Bodies which produce as extraordinary Effects We must keep firm to this clear and most intelligible Mean and carefully examine all the Effects of the Loadstone that we may discover how it can continually emit these little Bodies without being diminished For the Experiments that have been made shew that these little Bodies that go out on one side immediately enter in again at the other and they will serve to explain all Difficulties that can be brought against the manner of resolving this Question But it must be well observed That we ought not to abandon this Mean although even we could not answer some Difficulties proceeding from our Ignorance in several things If we have not a Mind to examine from whence it is that Loadstones are repelled when we oppose the same Poles to each other but rather the Reason why they approach and joyn to each other when we present the North Pole of the one to the South Pole of the other the Question would be more difficult and one way alone would not be sufficient to resolve it It is not enough to know exactly the Relations that are between the Poles of these two Loadstones nor to have recourse to the Means we have taken for the precedent Question for on the contrary this Method seems to hinder the Effect whose Cause we would seek Neither must we have recourse to any thing that we do not clearly know to be the natural and common Causes of Corporeal Motions nor deliver our selves from the Difficulty of the Question by a rambling and undeterminate Idea of an Occult Quality in Loadstones by which they attract each other for the Mind can conceive but one Body as having a sufficient Power to attract another The Impenetrability of Bodies makes us clearly conceive that Motion may be communicated by Impulsion and Experience proves plainly that it is communicated by this means But there is neither Reason nor Experience which clearly demonstrates the Motion of Attraction for in the Experiments which seem most proper to prove this kind of Motion we visibly perceive when we find the true and certain Cause that what appears to be done by Attraction is only perform'd by Impulsion So that we must not keep to any other Communication of Motion but that which is made by Impulsion Since this way is certain and undoubted and there is at least some Obscurity in the others which we cannot imagine But although we could demonstrate that in things purely Corporeal there are other Principles of Motion than the meeting of Bodies we could not reasonably reject this we ought even to keep to it before all others since it is the most clear and evident and appears so undoubted that we are not afraid to affirm it has been received by all People in all Ages Experience shews us that a Loadstone that swims freely upon the Water draws near to one which we hold in our Hands when we present different Poles we must then conclude that it is pushed towards it But as it is not the Loadstone we hold that pushes that which swims since that which swims draws nigh to that which we hold and nevertheless that which swims would not be moved if we did not present that to it which we hold in our Hands It is evident that at least we must recur to both Methods to explain this Questoin if we will resolve it by the received Principle of the Communication of Motion The Loadstone c draws near to the Loadstone C Therefore the Air which encompasses it pushes it since there is no other Body which can push it and that is the first way The Loadstone c approaches only at the presence of the Loadstone C therefore 't is necessary that the Loadstone C should determine the Air to push the Loadstone c and that is the second way It is evident that both these ways are absolutely necessary so that the Difficulty is now reduced to joyn them together which may be done two ways either in beginning with something known in the Air which encompasses the Loadstone c or by beginning with something known in the Loadstone C. If we would know that the parts of Air like those of all fluid bodies are in continual Agitation we cannot doubt but they still strike against the Loadstone c which they surround but because they strike it equally on all sides they do not push it more on one side that another whilst there is an equal quantity of Air on both sides Things being thus it is easie to judge that the Loadstone C prevents there being so much of this Air as we speak of towards a as towards b but that can be done only by dispersing some other bodies in the space which is between C and c. There must then some little bodies go out from the Loadstones to fill this space So these little bodies chasing away the Air near a the Loadstone c is less pushed on that side than the other and consequently must approach to the Loadstone C since all bodies move to the side where they are least pushed But if the Loadstone c had not many Pores about the Pole a fit to receive the little bodies which go out from the Pole B of the other Loadstone and too small to receive those of Air It is plain that these little bodies being more agitated than Air since they are to chase it from between the Loadstones they would push the Loadstone c and remove it from C. Thus since the Loadstone c approaches to or deviates from C when we present its different Poles it is necessary to conclude that the Poles a and b of the Loadstone c are filled with different Pores Otherwise the little bodies which are emitted from the Loadstone C would not freely pass without pushing the Loadstone c by the side a and would not be repulsed by the side b What I say of one of the Loadstones must also be understood of the other It is evident that we always learn something by this way of reasoning upon clear Idea's
freezes the Water in Rivers We must say that the Air dryes the Earth because it agitates and sucks up the Water which is tempered with it And that the Air or subtle Matter freezes Rivers in Winter because it does not then communicate motion enough to the parts of which the Water is composed In a word we must if we can give the Natural and Particular Cause of the Effects produced But as the action of these Causes consist only in the Moving Power which acts them and that this Moving Power is nothing else but the Will of God who creates them or successively preserves them in different places we must not say that they have in themselves a Strength or Power to produce any Effects And when in Reasoning we are at last come to a general Effect whose Cause we seek 't would be a very ill way of Philosophizing to imagine any other besides the general one And to feign a Certain Nature a First Moveable an Vniversal Soul or some such like Chimera of which we have no clear and distinct Idea would be to argue like the Heathen Philosophers For instance When we are ask't whence it comes that some Bodies are in Motion or how the Air when agitated communicates its Motion to the Water or rather from whence it proceeds that Bodies impell one another As Motion and its communication is a general Effect whereupon all others depend it is necessary I dont say to be a good Christian but to be a Philosopher to recur to God who is the Universal Cause since 't is his Will which is the Moving Power of Bodies and which also regulates the communication of their Motions If he had Will'd there should be no new production in the World he would not have put the parts of it in Motion And if he should hereafter Will the incorruptibility of any of the Beings he has Created he would cease to Will certain communications of Motions in respect to these Beings The Third Proof All Labour would be useless 't would be un necessary to water and to give certain preparatory dispositions to Bodies to fit them for what we desire of them For God has no need of preparing the subjects upon which he acts ANSWER Suarez in the same place To which I Reply That God can absolutely do what he pleases without finding any dispositions in the subjects he works upon But he cannot do it without a Miracle or by Natural wayes that is according to the general Laws of the communication of the Motions he has established and according to which he generally acts God never multiplies his Wills without Reason but alwayes acts by the most simple wayes and therefore he makes use of the meeting of Bodies in giving them Motion not as their shock is absolutely necessary to move them as our Senses tell us but because that being the occasion of the communication of Motion there needs only a few Natural Laws to produce all the admirable Effects that we see For by this means we can reduce all the Laws of the communication of Motion to one only which is That Bodies which shock each other being look'd upon but as one in the moment of their contact or shock the Moving Power is at their separation divided between them according to the proportion of their magnitude But as concuring Bodies are incompassed with an infinite number of other Bodies which act upon them by vertue and efficacy of this Law how constant and uniform soever it may be it produces an infinite number of different communications because it acts upon infinite Bodies which all relate to one another See the last Chap. of the Search after Truth It is necessary to water a Plant to make it grow because according to the Laws of the communication of Motions there is scarce any other but watery Particles which by their Motion and Figure can insinuate themselves and enter the Fibres of the Plants and by various uniting themselves together take the Figure necessary for their Nourishment The subtle matter which the Sun continually diffuses may by agitating the Water draw it up into the Plants but it has not Motion enough to raise gross Particles of Earth However the Earth and even the Air are necessary to the growth of Plants The Earth to preserve the Water at their Root and the Air to excite a moderate fermentation in the same Water But the action of the Sun Air and Water consist only in the Motion of their parts and to speak properly none but God can act For as I have just said there is only he who by the efficacy of his Will and infinite extent of his Knowledge can produce and regulate the infinite communications or Motions which are made every moment and according to an infinite exact and regular proportion The Fourth Proof Can God oppose or resist himself Bodies meet shock and resist one another therefore God acts not in them except by his concurrence For if he only produced and preserved Motion in Bodies he would divert them before their meeting since he knows very well that they are impenetrable Why should Bodies be impelled to be thrown back again or made to advance that they may recoil Or wherefore are useless Motions produced and preserved Is it not extravagant to say that God fights against himself and destroys his own works when a Bull opposes a Lion or a Wolf devours a Sheep and a Sheep eats the Grass which he gave growth to Therefore there are Second Causes ANSWER Then Second Causes do every thing and God does nothing at all For God cannot act against himself and to concur is to act Concurring to contrary actions is giving contrary concourses and consequently a performing contrary actions To concur with the action of the Creatures which resist one another is to act against himself and to concur to useless Motions is to act unusefully Now God does nothing in vain he performs no actions contrary to one another Therefore he concurs not in the action of the Creatures who often destroy one another and make useless actions and motions Hither 't is that this Proof of Second Causes conducts us but let us examine what Reason teaches us about it God does all in every thing and nothing resists him He performs all things since 't is by his Wills that all Motions are produced and regulated and nothing resists him because whatever he wills is effected And thus it ought to be conceived He having resolved to produce by the most simple wayes as the most conformable to order this infinite variety of Creatures that we admire he determined Bodies to move in a right line because this line is the most simple But Bodies being impenetrable and their Motions inclining to opposite lines or such as intersect they must necessarily meet one another and consequently cease to move in the same manner God foresaw this and nevertheless positively willed the meeting or opposition of Bodies not because he was pleased
Second Causes which I have just now Refuted Or perhaps it might be concluded That The Search after Truth is a Book full of visible and gross Contradictions as some Persons do who it may be have not equity or penetration enough to make them fit Judges of the Works of others The Holy Scripture the Fathers and most good Men oftener speak of sensible Goods Riches and Honours according to the common Opinion than according to the true Ideas they have of them JESVS CHRIST introduces Abraham speaking to the wicked Rich Man Fili recepisti BONA in vita tua Thou hast received thy good things in thy life time that is Riches Honours What we through prejudice call good our good that is our Gold or our Silver is in an hundred places in the Scripture called our Maintenance or our Substance and even our Honesty or that which honours us Pawpertas honestas á Deo sunt But must this manner of speaking used by the Holy Scripture Eccl. 11.14 and most Pious Persons make us think they contradict themselves or that they look upon Riches and Honours as real goods and that therefore we ought to love and seek after them No without doubt because these wayes of speaking complying with prejudices signifie nothing And we see in other places JESVS CHRIST has compared Riches to Thorns has told us we must renounce them because they are deceitful and that whatsoever is great and alluring in this World is an abomination before God We must not therefore collect the passages of Scripture or of the Fathers to judge of their Opinion by the greatest number of them except we would continually attribute the most unreasonable prejudices to them This once supposed Matth. 6.28 29 30. we see that the Holy Scripture positively sayes That 't is God who has Created every thing even the grass of the field That 't is he who cloaths the Lillies with such ornaments as our SAVIOVR prefers before the Glory of Solomon There is not only two or three but an infinite number of passages which ascribe to God the pretended Efficacy of Second Causes and which destroy the Nature of the Peripatetics Besides we are carried by a kind of Natural Prejudice not to think on God in common Effects and to attribute Power and Efficacy to Natural Causes and seldom any thing but Miracles induce us to think on him as the Author of them And the sensible impression ingages us in favour of Second Causes Philosophers hold this Opinion because say they the Senses convince us of it and this is their strongest Proof Lastly This Opinion is received by all those who follow the Judgments of the Senses Our common Language is formed from this prejudice and we as generally say that Fire has a power to burn as we call Gold and Silver our good Therefore the passages drawn from the Holy Scriptures or the Fathers for the Efficacy of Second Causes prove no more than those that an Ambitious or Covetous Man shall choose to justifie his own Conduct But 't is quite different with those passages we may bring to prove that God does all things For this Opinion being contrary to Prejudice these passages must be understood in their utmost rigour for the same Reason that we ought to believe that 't is the Sentiments of the Cartesians that Beasts are insensible although they have said it but two or three times and continually say to the contrary in all familiar Discourses affirming they feel see and understand In the First Chapter of Genesis God commands the Earth to produce Plants and Animals and likewise the Waters to bring forth Fish And consequently sayes the Peripatetics Water and Earth have received a Power capable of producing these Effects I don't see the certainty of this Conclusion And although we were even obliged to explain this Chapter by it self without having any recourse to other passages of Scripture there would be no necessity to receive this consequence This way of explaining the Creation is accommodated to our conception of things therefore 't is not necessary to take it literally nor ought we to make use of it to maintain Prejudices As Animals and Plants are upon the Earth Fowls live in the Air and Fish in the Water so God to make us apprehend 't is by his Order they are in these places has produced them there 'T is from the Earth that he formed Animals and Plants not that the Earth was capable of generating them or that God to that end gave it a Power or Vertue which it still keeps for we all agree that the Earth does not produce Horses or Oxen but because from the Earth the Bodies of these Animals were formed as is declared in the following Chapter Formatis igitur Dominus Deus de humo cunctis animantibus Terrae Ver. 19. universis volatilibus Coeli Animals were formed out of the Earth formatis de humo and not produced by the Earth Also after Moses has related how Beasts and Fish were produced by vertue of the Command which God gave the Earth and Water to produce them he adds that 't was God himself who made them that we might not attribute their production to the Earth and Water CREAVIT quae DEVS cete grandia omnem animam viventem atque notabilem quam PRODVXERVNT aquae in species suas omne volatile secundùm genus suum And a little lower after having spoken of the formation of Animals he adds Et FECIT DEVS bestias terrae juxta species suas jumenta omne reptile terrae in genere suo We may observe by the by that where the Vulgar reads it Producant aquae reptile animae viventis volatile super terram the Hebrew has it Volatile VOLITET For as it clearly appears by the passage I related from the Second Chapter this word omitted shows that Fowls were not produced from the Water and that the design of Moses is not here to prove that the Waters had received a true Power to bring forth Fish and Fowl but only to denote the place design'd for each by the Order of God whether to live or be produced in And volatile VOLITET super terram For commonly when we say that the Earth produces Trees and Plants we only design to show that it supplyed them with the Water and Salt which is necessary for their Germination and Growth But I will stay no longer to explain the other passages of Scripture which literally taken favour Second Causes for we are not obliged Besides 't would be very dangerous to understand such expressions literally as are maintained upon common Opinions agreeably to which the Language is formed the Vulgar speaking every thing according to the impression of the Senses and prejudices of Infancy The same Reason which obliges us to take such passages of the Scripture in the Letter as are directly opposite to Prejudices still gives us just cause to believe that the Fathers never
places in Scripture where God is only said to act Ego sum Dominus sayes Isaiah faciens OMNIA extendens Coelos SOLVS stabiliens terram chap. 44.24 NVLLVS mecum A Mother animated with the Spirit of God sayes to her Children that it was not she who formed them Nescio qualiter in utero meo aparuistis singulorum membra NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI Mac. 7.22 23. sed Mundi Creator c. She does not say with Aristotle and the Peripatetic Schools that 't was she and the Sun who gave them birth but the Creator of the Vniverse Now this Opinion that 't is God only who works and forms Children in the Womb is neither conformable to Prejudices or the common Notions Therefore according to the Principle I have before established these passages must be explain'd literally But on the contrary the Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Causes being conformable to the common Notion and impression of the Senses Sol homo generant hominem Arist Phys ausc l. 2. c. 2. See St. Th. upon this Text. although we should find such passages as expresly tell us that Second Causes act of themselves alone they would be of no force when compared with these Concourse therefore is not sufficient to reconcile the different passages of the Scripture and all Force Power and Efficacy must be ascribed to God But although the immediate concourse of God with Second Causes should be proper to reconcile these different Texts I know not whether it ought to be admitted after all For the Sacred Books were not made for the Divines of these times but for the Jews So that if the Jews were not formerly sufficiently inlightened or subtle enough to imagine such a concourse as is admitted in our School-Divinity and to reconcile a thing that the most able Divines have had much trouble to explain it follows methinks that the Holy Scripture which attributed to God and to him only the production and preservation of all things would have thrown them into Error and that the Holy Penmen of these Books would have spoke to Men not only in an unknown but deceitful Language For by telling them that God does all things they would only have intended that God gives his concourse to all things and 't is probable the Jews never so much as thought of this concourse those amongst them that were not great Philosophers believing that God did all things and not that he concurred to all But that we may make a more certain Judgment about this Concourse it would be very proper carefully to explain the different Hypotheses of the Schools about it For besides the impenetrable obscurities which are common to all Opinions that we can explain or maintain only upon rambling and indeterminate terms there are upon this matter so great a variety of Opinions that it would not be very difficult to discover the cause of them But I will not ingage in a discussion which will be too tiresom both for my self and the greatest part of those who will read this Book I rather choose on the contrary to endeavour to show that my Opinions may in some respect be reconciled to the greatest number of the School Divines although I must not dissemble but confess their Language appears very equivocal and confused to me I will explain my self I believe as I have already said elsewhere that Bodies for instance have no power to move themselves and that their Moving Power is only the action of God Or to avoid a term which signifies nothing distinct their Moving Power is only the Will of God alwayes necessarily efficacious which successively preserves them in different places For I don't believe that God creates certain Beings to make them the Moving Power of Bodies Not only because I have no Idea of this kind of Being nor see how they could move Bodies but also since these Beings would themselves have need of some others to move them and so on ad infinitum For none but God is truly immovable and sole Mover together Which being supposed when a Body strikes and moves another I may say that it acts by the Concourse of God and that this Concourse is not distinct from its own action For a Body moves another which it meets only by its Action or Moving Power which at the bottom is nothing but the Will of God that successively preserves this Body in many places The transferring of a Body not being its Action or Moving Power but the effect of its Moving Power Most Divines likewise say That the Action of Second Causes differs not from the Action whereby God concurs with them For although they understand it variously they suppose that God acts in the Greatures in the same Action with the Creatures And they are it seems obliged to speak thus For if the Creatures acted by an Action which God did not produce in them their Action considered as such would as it appears to me be independant Now they believed as they ought that the Creatures depended immediately upon God not only as to their Being but also as to their Operation So in respect to Free Causes I believe that God continually gave the Mind an impression towards Good in general and that he also determined this impression towards particular Goods by the Ideas or Sensations he has given us as I have shewn in the First Explanation And 't is the same Thing with what the Divines believe when they say That God moves and prevents our Wills So that the power which puts our Minds in motion is the Will of God which animates and inclines us towards Good For God created not Beings to make them the Moving power of Minds for the same Reason that he did not create any to make them the Moving power of Bodies The Wills of God being Efficacious of themselves it is enough for him to Will a Thing to have it done And it is useless unnecessarily to multiply Beings Besides whatever is real in the determinations of our Motions likewise proceeds from the Action of God in us as is clear from the First Explanation Now we neither Act or produce any Thing but by our Wills I mean by the impression of the Will of God which is our Moving power For our Wills are Efficacious no farther than as they proceed from God even as Bodies put in motion impell not others but in as much as they have a Moving power which transfer them and this Moving power is only the Will of God which creates or successively preserves them in different places Then we Act only by the Concourse of God and our Action considered as Efficacious and capable of producing any Effect differs not from that of God's And is as most Divines say the very same Action Eadem numero Actio Now all the Changes which happen in the World See Suarez l. 1. de concursu Dei cum voluntate c. 1. have no other Natural Cause than the Motion of Bodies and Wills of Spirits For First According to the General Laws of the Communication of Motions the invisible Bodies which surround the visible ones by their divers Motions produce all these various Effects the Cause of
which does not appear to us Secondly According to the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body when Bodies which are about us Act upon ours they produce in our Souls an infinite variety of Sensations Ideas and Passions Thirdly Our Mind produces by its Wills a great many different Ideas in it self For it is our Wills which apply and modifie our Minds as Natural Causes whose Efficacy nevertheless proceeds from the Laws which God has Established Lastly When our Mind Acts upon our Body many Changes are therein produced by vertue of the Laws of its Union with it And by the means of our Body it also produces in those about it a great Number of Changes by vertue of the Laws of the Communication of Motions Thus all Natural Effects have no other Natural or Occasional Cause than the Motions of Bodies and Wills of Spirits which will easily be granted by any who will use but a little application supposing he is not already prepossessed by such as know not what they say who instantly imagine Beings which they have no clear Idea of and pretend to explain Things they understand not by what is absolutely incomprehensible So that God executing by his Concourse or rather by his Efficacious Will whatever the Motions of Bodies or Determinations of Spirits perform as Natural or Occasional Causes it 's plain God does every Thing by the same Action of the Creature Not that Creatures of themselves have any Efficacious Action but because the Power of God is in some sort communicated to them by the Natural Laws which God has Established in their favour This is all that I can say to reconcile my Thoughts with the Opinion of those Divines who maintain the necessity of immediate Concourse and that God does All in all Things by the same Action as that of the Creatures For as to the rest of the Divines I believe their Opinions are indesensible every way and chiefly that of Durandus See Durand in 2. Dist 1. Qu. 5. Dist 37. de Genesi ad Litteram l. 5. c. 20. and some Ancients whom St. Austin refutes who absolutely denyed the necessity of Concourse and would have Second Causes do every Thing by a Power which God had given them at the Creation For although this Opinion be less perplexed than that of the other Divines yet it appears to me so opposite to Scripture and conformable to Prejudices to say no more that I believe it cannot be maintained I confess that the Schoolmen In 4. Sent. Dist 1. q. De aliaco ibid. who say the immediate Concourse of God is the same Action as that of the Creatures do not absolutely understand it according to my Explanation And except Biel and Cardinal D' Ailly all those I have read think that the Efficacy which produces Effects proceeds from the Second Cause as well as the First But as I determined with my self not to say any thing but what I conceive clearly and always take that Side which best agrees with Religion I believe it will not be taken amiss if I forsake an Opinion which to many persons appears so much the more intricate as they endeavour more assiduously to apprehend it And since I have established another which agrees perfectly not only with Reason but also with the Holiness of Religion and Christian Morality 'T is a Truth I have already proved in the Chapter upon which I make these Reflection but it will be very proper for me to offer yet something more fully to Justifie what I have already said upon the present Question Reason and Religion convinces us than God would be loved and rever'd by his Creatures Loved as good and Rever'd as powerful Which is a Truth we cannot doubt of without impiety and folly To love God as he requires and deserves to be loved we must according to the First Command both of the Law and Gospel and even of Reason as I have elsewhere shown do it with all our strength or according to the utmost Capacity we have of Loving It is not enough to prefer him to all Things but we must also love him in all Things Else is not our Love so perfect as it ought to be l. 4. ch 1. nor do we give to God all the Love he has impressed upon us and that only for himself since all his Actions center in himself Likewise to render to God all the Reverence due to him it is not enough to adore him as the Soveraign Power and fear him more than any of his Creatures We must also fear and adore him in all his Creatures and all our Actions must tend towards him for Honour and Glory are due only to him Which is what God has commanded us in these Words Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo ex tota anima tua Deut. 6. ex tota fortitudine tua And in these Dominum Deum tuum timebis illi soli servies Thus the Philosophy which teaches us That the Efficacy of Second Causes is a Fiction of the Mind that the Nature of Aristotle and some other Philosophers is a Chimera that God only is strong and powerful enough not only to Act in our Souls but also to give the least Motion to Matter This Philosophy I say agrees perfectly with Religion the design of which is to unite us to God after the strictest manner We commonly love such Things only as are capable of doing us some good This Philosophy therefore only Authorises the Love of God and absolutely condemns the Love of every Thing else We ought to fear Nothing but what is able to do us some Evil This Philosophy therefore only permits us to fear God and positively forbids our fearing any Thing else So that it Justifies all the Motions of the Soul which are Just and Reasonable and condemns all those that are contrary to Reason and Religion For this Philosophy will never Justifie the Love of Riches the Desire of Greatness nor the Extravagance of Debauchery since the Love of the Body appears mad and ridiculous to the Principles established by this Philosophy 'T is an Undoubted Truth a Natural Opinion and even a common Notion that we ought to love the Cause of our Pleasure and love it in proportion to the Felicity it does or can make us enjoy It is not only Just but it is also very Necessary that the Cause of our Happiness should be the Object of our Love Thus following the Principles of this Philosophy we ought only to love God for it tells us that He alone is the True Cause of our Happiness that the Bodies which are about us cannot Act upon that which we Animate consequently much less upon our Minds 'T is not the Sun which enlightens us
the Brain as well as those which excite the chief Idea of the Object of the Passion as those that relate to it We must not therefore wonder if Men carry their Hatred or Love so far and perform such Capricious and Surprizing Actions There is a particular Reason of all these Effects although we do not know them because their accessory Ideas are not always like ours we cannot discover them Thus there is always some cause or other for those actions which appear most ridiculous and extravagant CHAP. VII Of the Passions in particular and first of Admiration and its ill Effects WHatever I have hitherto said of the Passions is general but it will not be very difficult to draw particular Inferences from thence It is only requisite to make some reflexion upon what passes within our selves and the actions of others for us to discover more of these sort of Truths at one view than we could explain in a considerable time Yet there are so few Persons who think of retiring into themselves and make any endeavour to that end that to excite them to it and stir up their attention it will be necessary to descend to particulars When we hit or strike our selves it seems as if we were almost insensible but if we are only touched by others we receive Sensations lively enough to stir up our Attention In short we never tickle our selves or so much as think of it and it may be we could not do it if we had a mind to it 'T is almost for the same reason that the Soul neglects to enquire into and examine it self it is immediately displeased with this sort of enquiry and is commonly incapable of discovering or perceiving what belongs to it except when excited or stirred up by others Thus to assist some Persons in the knowing of themselves it is necessary to relate some of the particular Effects of the Passions that by affecting them therewith we may make them sensible of all the parts their Soul are composed of Those who will read what follows must nevertheless be advertized that they will not always be sensible that I touch them nor will they always find themselves subject to the Passions and Errors I shall speak of because all particular Passions are not always the same in all Men. 'T is true indeed all Men have the same Natural inclinations which have no relation to the Body when their Bodies are perfectly well disposed But the different temperaments of Bodies and their frequent changes cause a great deal of variety in particular Passions And if to the diversity of the Body's constitution we add that which proceeds from Objects which likewise makes very different impressions upon all those who have neither the same Employs nor manner of living it is evident that such a Person may feel himself strongly affected in some place of his Soul by certain things who will yet absolutely remain insensible of many others Thus we should often be deceived if we judged of what others feel by what passes in our selves I am not afraid of being mistaken when I affirm that all Men would be happy for I am absolutely assured that the Chinese and Tartars Angels Devils and even all Spirits whatever have an inclination for felicity I know likewise that God will never produce any Spirit without this desire Yet is it not experience that has taught it me I never saw either Chinese or Tartar nor is it the inward testimony of my Conscience for that only teaches me I would be happy my self But 't is God alone who can inwardly convince me that all other Men Angels and Devils have a desire to be happy and 't is he only who can assure me that he will never give a Being to any Spirit who will be indifferent in respect to it For who is there besides himself that can positively assure me of what he does and even of what he thinks And as he can never deceive me so I cannot doubt of what he teaches me I am therefore certain that all Men would be happy because this inclination is natural and depends not upon the Body But it is very different in particular Passions For though I should extreamly love Musick Dancing Hunting Sweetmeats or Luxurious Dishes c. I could conclude nothing certain from thence concerning the Passions of other Men. Pleasure doubtless is sweet and agreeable to all Men but every one does not find it in the same Object The love of pleasure is a Natural inclination depends not on the Body and is therefore general to all Men. But the inclination for Music Dancing and Hunting is not general because the disposition of the Body on which it depends being different in all Men whatsoever Passions depend upon it are not always the same General Passions as Desire Joy Sorrow c. keep the mean between Natural inclinations and particular Passions They are general as well as the Inclinations but not equally strong because that which produces and maintains them is not always it self equally active There is also a great deal of variety in the degrees whereby the Animal Spirits are agitated in their plenty and fineness and in the relation betwixt the Fibres of the Brain and these Spirits Thus it often happens that we don 't at all affect some Persons when we speak of particular Passions but if we chance to touch them they are violently moved But with general Passions and Inclinations it is quite contrary we are always affected when they are mentioned yet after such a weak and languishing manner that we scarcely perceive it I speak these things to prevent any Persons judging whether I am deceived by the Sensation only which he has received of what I have already or shall afterwards say for I would have every one judge by considering the Nature of the Passsions I treat of If I proposed the treating of every particular Passion or to distinguish them by all the Objects which excite them it 's plain I should never conclude and should only repeat the same thing The first is evident because the Objects of our Passions are infinite and the last also since we must always treat of the same Subject The particular Passions for Poetry History Mathematics Hunting and Dancing are only one and the same general Passion for for instance the Passions of Desire or Joy or for whatever pleases differ not although the peculiar Pleasures which excite them do We must not therefore multiply the number of the Passions according to the number of Objects which are infinite but only by the chief relations they may have in respect to us And after this manner we shall discover as will further appear upon our Explanation that Love and Hatred are the Mother Passions Which produce no other general Passions but Desire Joy and Sorrow and that particular Passions are composed only of these three first and are so much the more compounded as the chief Idea of Good or Evil which excites them
force of Bodies therefore is not in the Bodies which move since this power of Motion is nothing else but the Will of God Thus Bodies have no Action and when a Bowl which is moved by meeting it moves another yet it communicates nothing of its own for in it self it hath not the Impression that it communicates to the other Yet a Bowl is the Natural Cause of the motion which it communicates A Natural Cause then is not a real and true Cause but only an occasional one and which determined the Author of Nature to act after such and such a manner in such and such an Occurrence It is certain that 't is by the Motion of visible or invisible Bodies that all things are produced For Experience teaches us that Bodies whose parts are in greatest Motion always act more than others and produce the greatest Change in the World All the Powers of Nature then proceed from the Will of God He has created the World because he willed it Dixit facta sunt He moves all things and so produces all the Effects that we see happen because he has also willed certain Laws according to which Bodies communicate their Motions in their Rencounter and because these Laws are Efficacious they act and Bodies cannot act There is therefore no Force Power or true Cause in the Material and Sensible World nor must we admit of Forms Facilities and real Qualities to produce Effects that Bodies cannot and to divide with God the Force and Power which is Essential to him Not only Bodies cannot be the true Causes of any thing the most noble Spirits also are under a like Impotence They can know nothing it God does not enlighten them nor can they have any Sensation if he does not modifie them They are capable of willing nothing if God moves them not towards him I confess they can determine the Impression that God gives them towards him to other Objects but I know not whether that can called a Power If the Capability of Sinning is a Power it would be a Power which the Almighty has not St. Austin says in some of his Works It Men had in themselves the Power of loving Good we might say they had some Power But can only Love because God Wills they should Love and because his Will is Efficacious They Love only because God continually inclines them to Good in General that is towards himself For God has created them only for himself he never preserves them without turning them towards and inclining them to himself They have no Motion towards Good in general 't is God who moves them they only follow by an entire free Choice this Impression according to the Law of God or determine it towards a false Good after the Law of the Flesh They can only be determined by a Prospect of Good For being able to do only what God makes them they can love nothing but Good But if we should suppose what is true in one Sense that Spirits have in themselves the Power of knowing Truth and loving Good if their Thoughts and Wills produced nothing External we might always say they were able to do nothing Now it appears most certain to me that the Will of Spirits is not capable of moving the least Body in the World For 't is evident there is no necessary Connexion between the Will we have of moving our Arms and the Motion of them It is true they are moved when we please and by that means we are the Natural Cause of their Motion But Natural Causes are not true Causes they are only Occasional ones which act meerly through the Power and Efficacy of God as I have already explained For how can we move our Arms To move them we must have Animal Spirits and convey them by certain Nerves into such and such Muscles to swell and contract them For by this means the Arms move or according to the Opinion of some we know not yet how 't is performed And we see that Men who do not so much as know they have Spirits Nerves and Muscles to move their Arms yet move them with as much Art and Facility as those that understand Anatomy best 'T is then granted that Men Will the Motion of their Arms but 't is only God that can and knows how to remove them If a Man cannot throw down a Tower at least he knows well what must be done in order to it But there is no Man that knows so much as what he must do to move one of his Fingers by the help of his Animal Spirits How then can Men move their Arms These things appear evident to me and to all those that will think of them though perhaps they may be incomprehensible to such as will not consider them But Men only are not the True Causes of the Motions produced in their Bodies it seems even a Contradiction that they should be so A True Cause is such an one as the Mind perceives a necessary Connexion between it and its Effect 't is that I mean Now there is only the Infinitely Perfect Being whose Mind can perceive a necessary Connexion between his Will and the Effects of it 'T is only God then who is the True Cause and who has really the Power of moving Bodies I say moreover 't is not probable that God should communicate either to Men or Angels this Power he has of moving Bodies and those who pretend the Power we have of moving our Arms is a true Power must confess that God can also give to Spirits the Power of creating annihilating and performing all possible things In a word That he can make them Almighty as I shall further shew God has no need of any Instrument to act it is sufficient if he Wills a thing for it to be because it is a Contradiction to suppose he Wills it and that it should not be His Power then is his Will and the communicating of his Power is a Communication of his Will But to communicate his Will to a Man or an Angel can signifie nothing else but Willing some body for instance should be effectively moved when 't is Will'd by a Man or an Angel Now in this case I see two Wills which concur when an Angel would move a Body that of God and that of the Angel and to know which of the two will be the true Cause of the Motion of this Body we must know which it is that is Efficacious There is a necessary Connexion between the Will of God and what he Wills God Wills in this case that a Body should move when it is willed by an Angel There is a necessary Connexion therefore between the. Will of God and the Motion of this Body and consequently 't is God who is the true cause of the Motion of the Body and the Will of the Angel only an occasional one But to shew it yet more clearly let us suppose that God Wills it should happen quite contrary to what some
Spirits desire as we may think of Devils or some other Spirits who merit this Punishment we cannot say in this case that God communicates his Power to them since they can do nothing that they would do Yet the Wills of these Spirits would be the Natural Causes of whatever Effects should be produced as such Bodies should be moved to the Right Hand because these Spirits would have them moved to the Left and the desire of these Spirits would determine the Will of God to act as our Wills to move the parts of our Bodies determine the first Cause to move them So that the Wills of Spirits are only occasional Causes Yet if after all these Reasons we will still maintain that the Will of an Angel which moves any body should be a true Cause and not an occasional one it is plain that this same Angel might be the true Cause of the Creation and Annihilation of all things For God could as well communicate to him his Prower of Creating and Destroying Bodies as that of moving them if he will'd that things should be created and annihilated In a word If he will'd that all things should happen as the Angel wishes them even as he Wills Bodies should move as the Angel pleases If it be said that an Angel or a Man would be the true movers because God moves Bodies when they wish it it may also be said that a Man and an Angel may be true Creators since God can create Beings when they will it Nay perhaps it might be said that the molt Vile Animals or Matter of it self should be the effective Cause of the Creation of any Substance if we supposed as the Philosophers do that God produces substantial Forms whenever the Disposition of Matter requires it In fine Because God has resolved from all Eternity in certain times to create such or such things we might also say that these times should be the Causes of the Creation of these Beings as reasonably as to pretend that a Bowl which meets another is the true cause of the motion it communicates to it Because God has determined by his general Will which constituted the Order of Nature that when two Bodies should meet there should be such and such a Communication of Motion There is then but one only true God and he the one only true Cause And we must not imagine that which precedes an Effect to be the true Cause of it God cannot even communicate his Power to the Creatures if we follow the Light of Reason he cannot make them true Causes because he cannot make them Gods Bodies Spirits pure Intelligences can all do nothing 'T is he who hath made these Spirits that illuminates and acts them 'T is he who has created the Heavens and the Earth which regulates the Motions thereof In short 't is the Author of our Being that executes our Wills semel jussit semper paret He even moves our Arms when we make use of them against his Orders for he complains by his Prophets that we make him serve our unjust and criminal Desires All these little Heathen Divinities and all these particular Causes of the Philosophers are only Chymera's that the wicked Spirit endeavours to establish to ruin the Worship of the true God It is not the Philosophy they have received from Adam which teaches these things 't is that they have received from the Serpent for since the Fall the Mind of Man is perfectly Heathenish 'T is this Philosophy which joyned to the Errors of the Senses has made them adore the Sun and which is fall at this Day the universal Cause of the Irregularity of the Mind and Corruption of the Heart of Man By their Actions and sometimes by their Words why say they should we not love the Body since the Body is capable of affording us all Pleasures And why do we laugh at the Israelites which regretted the Loss of the Garlick and Onyons of Egypt since in Effect they were unhappy by being deprived of what in some Measure could make them happy But the new Philosophy which they represent as a dismal thing to affrighten weak Minds that is despised and condemned without being understood The new Philosophy I say since they are pleased to call it so destroys all the Arguments of the Libertines by the Establishment of the chiefest of its Principles which perfectly agrees with the * Haec est Religio Christiana fratres mei quae praedicatur per universum mundum horrentibus inimieis ubi vincuntur murmurantibus ubi praevalent saevientibus haec est Religie Christiana ut Colatur unus Deus non Dii qui facit Animam Beatum nisi unus Deus Aug. tr 23. in Joan. first Principle of the Christian Religion that we must love and fear but one God since there is only one God who can make us happy For if Religion teaches us that there is but one true God this Philosophy shews us there is but one true Cause If Religion informs us that all the Divinities of the Heathens are only Stones and Metals without Life and Motion This Philosophy discovers to us also that all second Causes or all the Divinities of their Philosophy are only Matter and inefficacious Wills In short if Religion teaches us that we must not bow our Knees to false Gods This Philosophy also tells us that our Imaginations and Minds ought not to be prostituted to the Imaginary Greatness and Power of Causes which are not true Causes That we must neither love nor fear them nor busie our selves about them but think upon God only see him adore him fear and love him in all things But this agrees not with the Inclination of some Philosophers They will neither see nor think upon God For since the Fall there is a secret Opposition between God and Man Men take Pleasure in erecting Gods after their own Fancy they voluntarily love and fear the Fictions of their own Imagination as they Heathens did the Works of their own Hands They are like Children who tremble at their Companions after they have daubed their Faces Or if they will have a more Noble Comparison although perhaps it be not so just they resemble those famous Romans who had some Fear and Respect for the Fictions of their own Minds and foolishly adored their Emperors after they had let loose the Eagle when they deified them CHAP. IV. An Explanation of the Second Part of the general Rule That Philosophers neglect it but Mr. Descartes has very exactly observed it WE have already shewed unto what Errors we are subject when we reason upon the false and confused Idea's of the Senses and upon the rambling and indeterminate Idea's of pure Logick We have sufficiently discovered that to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions it is absolutely necessary exactly to observe the Rule that we have prescribed if our Idea's are clear and distinct and then to reason according to these Idea's In this same general Rule which respects the Subject
of our Studies there is yet this Circumstance to be well considered Namely that we must always begin with the most simple and easie things and continue a long Time upon them before we undertake more compounded and difficult ones For if we must only reason upon distinct Idea's always to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions it is plain that we must never proceed to an Enquiry after compounded things before we have very carefully examined and made those simple ones on which they depend familiar to us Since the Idea's of compounded things neither are nor can be clear when we have only a confused and imperfect Knowledge of the more simple which compose them We know things imperfectly when we are not assured that we have considered all their Parts And we have a confused Knowledge of them when they are not familiar to the Mind although we are certain we have examined them in all their Parts When we know them but imperfectly we only reason upon Probabilities when we perceive them confusedly there is neither Order nor Understanding in out Deductions We often know neither where we are nor where we go But when we know them imperfectly and confusedly together which happens most commonly we have neither a clear Knowledge of what we enquire after nor the means of attaining it So that it 's absolutely necessary to keep strictly to this Order in our Studies To begin always with the most simple things examine all their Parts and make them familiar to us before we pass to the more compounded on which they depend But this Rule agrees not with Mens Inclinations they naturally have a Contempt for whatever appears easie and their Mind which was not made for a limited Object that may be easily comprehend cannot stop long in considering these simple Idea's which have no Character of Infinity for which they are made On the contrary and for the same Reason they have much Respect and Inclination for great things which include something of Infinity and such things as are obscure and mysterious 'T is not because they love Darkness but 't is that in this Darkness they hope to find a Good and a Truth capable of satisfying them Vanity also inclines the Mind immediately to imploy it self about great and extraordinary things and gives it a Foolish Hope of accomplishing whatever it undertakes Experience shews us That the most exact Knowledge of common things gives no Reputation in the World and that the Knowledge of such things as are uncommon how confused and imperfect soever it may be always gains Esteem and Respect to those who freely express some high Idea of what they understand not And this Experience determines all those who are more sensibly touched with Vanity than Truth who are certainly in the greatest Number to make a blind Enquiry after a specious and imaginary Knowledge of whatever is great rare and obscure How many Men reject the Philosophy of Descartes for this pleasant Reason that his Principles are too simple and easie There are no obscure and mysterious Terms in this Philosophy Women and Persons who know neither Greek nor Latin are capable of apprehending it It must therefore be of very small Consequence and it would not be reasonable for great Genii to apply themselves to it They imagine Principles so clear and simple are not extensive enough to explain the Effects of Nature which they suppose obscure and perplexed They do not immediately see the Benefit of these Principles which are too easie and simple to stop their Attention so long as it is necessary to discover the Use and Extent of them They rather choose to explain those Effects whose Causes they do not comprehend by Principles they conceive not and which it is absolutely impossible to conceive than by such as are both simple and intelligible For these Philosophers explain obscure things by Principles which are not only obscure but also intirely incomprehensible When any Persons undertake to explain things extreamly perplexed by clear and known Principles it is easie to see whether or no they accomplish it because if we conceive well what they say we can discover whether or no they speak true So the fasly Learned would not find their Expectation nor make themselves admired as they wish to be if they made use of intelligible Principles because it would evidently be discovered that they say nothing But when they make use of unknown Principles and speak of very compounded things as if they exactly knew all their Relations they are admired because what they say is not conceived and we naturally have a Respect for what passes our Understandings Now as obscure and incomprehensible things seem to be better connected than such as are clear and intelligible Incomprehensible Principles are of a greater Use than intelligible ones in the most compounded Questions There is nothing so difficult but Philosophers and Physicians give some brief Reason of it from their Principles For their Principles being yet more incomprehensible than all the Questions that can be put to them if they be once taken for granted there is no Difficulty but will soon be solved For instance they boldly and without any Hesitation answer these obscure and indetermined Questions Why is it that the Sun attracts Vapours That the Jesuits Powder cures the Quartan Feaver That Ruburb purges Choler Chymical Salt Flegm And other like Questions And the Generality of Mankind are satisfied with their Answers because obscure and incomprehensible agrees with both But unintelligible Principles do not well agree with Questions that are clearly proposed and easily resolved because it is evidently discovered that they signifie nothing These Philosophers cannot by their Principles explain how Horses draw a Chariot how Dust stops a Watch how Trepoly cleanses Metals and a Brush out Cloaths For they would make themselves ridiculous to all the World if they supposed a Notion of Attraction and attractive Faculties to explain the Reason why Chariots follow the Horses which are fastned to them and a detersive Faculty in Brushes for cleaning Cloaths and so of other Questions Therefore their great Principles are useless except in obscure Questions because they are incomprehensible We must not therefore stop at any of all these Principles which we have not an evident and clear Knowledge of and which we may think some Nations receive not We must attentively consider the Idea's we have of Extension Figure Local Motion and the Relation these things have amongst themselves If we conceive these Idea's distinctly and find them so clear that we are perswaded that all Nations have always received them we must rest here and examine all their Relations But if we find them obscure we must seek after others For if to reason without Fear of deceiving our selves it is always necessary to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions we must only reason upon clear Idea's and their Relations distinctly known In order to consider the Properties of Extension we must with M. Descartes begin with the
Description of that the Centers of these Vortices are Stars which are as so many Suns That the Vortices encompass one another and are disposed after such a manner as to prejudice each others Motion as little as can be But things have not been able to come to that pass but the weakest Vortices have been drawn along and almost swallowed up by the strongest To apprehend which we need only reflect that the first Element which is in the Center of a Vortix may and continually does get out by the Spaces of the Balls towards the Circumference of the same Vortix and that at the Time that this Center or Star empties it self through its Equator the other first Element must re-enter by its Poles For neither the Star nor its Poles can be emptied on one side without being filled on the other since there is no Void in Extension But because an infinite Number of Causes can hinder much of the first Element from entring into this Star which we speak of It is requisite that the Parts of the first Element which are obliged to remain in it should be so disposed as to move the same Way 'T is that which makes them unite and joyn one with another and form Spots which condense into Crusts and by little and little cover the Center and make a solid and gross Matter of the most subtle and agitated of all Bodies 'T is this gross Matter that Mr. Descartes calls the third Element and it must be observed that as it proceeds from the first whose Figures are infinite it ought to be invested with an infinite Number of different Forms This Star thus covered with Spots and Crusts and become like the other Planets is no longer able to maintain and defend its Vortex against the continual Effort of those that environ it This Vortex therefore diminishes by little and little The Matter which composes it is dispersed on all sides and the strongest Vortex about it draws the greatest Part of it and at last swallows up the Planet which was the Center of it This Planet being encompassed with the Matter of the great Vortex it swims there to preserve it self with some little Matter of its own Vortex keeping the Circular Motion it had before And at last it takes a Situation there which puts it in Equilibrio with an equal Quantity of Matter in which it swims If it has but a little Solidity and Magnitude left it descends very near to the Center of the Vortex which swallowed it up because having some Power to continue its Motion in a right Line it must place it self in this Vortex in which an equal Quantity of the second Element has as much Power as it has to remove it self from the Center for it can be in Equilibrio only in this Place If this Planet is greater or more solid it will be in Equilibrio with a Place more distant from the Center of the Vortex And in short if in this Vortex there is any Place or equal Quantity of Matter that has as much Solidity as this Planet and consequently as much Power to continue its Motion in a right Line because this Planet will perhaps be very great and covered with very solid and thick Crusts it cannot stop in this Vortex since it cannot be put in Equilibrio with the Matter which composes it This Planet will pass then into some other Vortex and if it cannot be in Equilibrio it will not stay there neither So that we shall see it sometimes pass like Comets when they happen to be in our Vortex and near enough for us to discern them And we shall not see it again till a long time after when it is in other Vortices or in the Extremity of ours If we how think that one Vortix alone by its Magnitude Force and Advantagious Situation can by little and little undermine attract and swallow up many Vortices and such Vortices which before had swallowed some others it would be necessary that the Planets which are in the Centers of these Vortices being entered into the great Vortex which has swallowed them up should be there put in Equilibrio with an equal Quantity of Matter in which they swim So that if these Planets are unequal in Solidity they will be in an unequal Distance from the Center or the Vortex in which they swim And if it be found that two Planets have near the same Power to continue their Motion in a right Line or that one Planet draws into its little Vortex one or many other less Planets which according to our Manner of conceiving the Formation of things it has swallowed up then this little Planet shall turn about the great one while that turns upon its Center and all these Planets shall be carried along by the Motion of the great Vortex in almost an equal Distance from its Center We are obliged by the Light of Reason so to dispose the Parts which compose the World that we imagine to have been formed by the most simple Ways For all that we have said is grounded only upon the Idea we have of Extension the Parts of which we suppose to incline to the most simple Motion which is that of a right Line And when we examine by the Effects whether we are not deceived by endeavouring to explain things by their Causes we areas much surprized to see the Phenomena of Celestial Bodies so perfectly agree with what we have said For we see that all the Planets that are in the Middle of a little Vortex turn upon their own Center like the Sun that they swim all in the Vortex of the Sun and about the Sun that the smallest or least solid are nearest the Sun and the more solid are at the greatest Distance from it and that there is also some amongst them like Comets which cannot remain in the Vortex of the Sun In short there are many Planets which yet have many little ones that turn about them as the Moon does about the Earth Jupiter has four of them and Saturn three It may be also that Saturn has so great a Number of small ones that they form a continued Circle which seems to have no Thickness because of its great Distance These Planets being the greatest that we see we may consider them as having been engendered of Vortices large enough to have swallowed up others before they were involved in the Vortices we are in All these Planets turn upon their Center the. Earth in Twenty Four Hours Mars in Twenty Five or near Jupiter in Ten Hours or thereabouts c. They turn about the Sun Mercury which is the nearest in about Four Months Saturn which is the farthest off in Thirty Years near and those which are between both in more or less Time but not perfectly in the Proportion of their Distance For all the Matter in which they swim turns swifter when it is nearest the Sun because the Line of its Motion is then shorter When Mars is opposite
things of the same kind and is not easily contained in its own Limits but in that of others Water is a cold and moist Element which gathers things together both of the same and of a different Nature which is hot easily contained within its own Bounds but in that of others And in fine the Earth cold and dry and therefore collects things of the same and of a different Nature which is not easily contained in its own Bounds and very difficultly in that of others Here the Elements are explained according to the Sentiment of Aristotle or according to the Definitions he has given of their chief Qualities and because if we will believe him the Elements are simple Bodies whereof all others are compounded the Knowledge of these Element and their Qualities must be most clear and distinct since all Physicks or the Knowledge of Sensible Bodies which are composed of them ought to be deduced from thence Let us see then what is defective in these Principles First Aristotle joyns no distinct Idea to the Word Quality We know not whether by Quality he means a real Being distinct from Matter or only the Modification of Matter It seems sometimes as if he meant it in one Sense and sometimes in another It is true in the Eighth Chapter of Categories he defines Quality to be that which causes a thing to have such or such a Name but that will not satisfie our Demands Secondly the Definitions he gives of his four first Qualities Heat Cold Moist and Dry are all false or useless This is his Definition of Heat Heat is that which assembles things of a like Nature First we do not see that this Definition perfectly explains the Nature of Heat although it should be true that Heat collects all things of the same Nature But secondly it is false for Heat does not collect all things of the same Nature Heat does not assemble the Parts of Water it rather dissipates them into a Vapour Nor does it assemble the Particles of Wine or those of all other Liquors or fluid Bodies whatever Nor even those of Quicksilver On the contrary it resolves and separates all solid Bodies and even Fluids although of a different Nature And if there are any whose Parts Fire cannot dissipate 't is not because they are of the same Nature but because some are too gross and too solid to be raised by the Motion of the Parts of Fire In the third place Heat indeed can neither assemble nor dissipate the Parts of any Body whether Homogeneous or Heterogeneous For to assemble to separate or dissipate the Parts of any Body it must move them Now Heat can move nothing or at least 't is not evident that Heat can move Bodies For although we consider Heat with all the Attention possible we can only discover that it may communicate to Bodies a Motion which it has not in it self Yet we see that Fire moves and separates the Parts of Bodies that are exposed to it It is true but it may be it is not from its Heat for even it is not evident that it has any at all 'T is rather by the Action of its Parts which are visibly in a continual Motion It is plain that the Parts of Fire which strike against any Body must communicate a Part of their Motion to it whether there is Heat in Fire or not If the Parts of this Body are but a little solid and gross the Fire cannot move them and make them slip one upon another In short if they are a Mixture of subtle and gross ones the Fire can only dissipate those that it can push strong enough to separate intirely from the rest Thus Fire can only separate them and if it assembles them 't is merely by Accident But Aristotle pretends quite the contrary Separation says he which some attribute to Fire is only a resembling of things of the same kind De gen corr l. 2. c. 2. for 't is only by Accident that Fire dissipates things of a different kind If Aristotle had at first distinguished the Sentiment of Heat from the Motion of the Particles whereof the Bodies we call Heat are composed and had afterwards defined Heat taken for the Motion of the Parts by saying Heat is that which agitates and separates the invisible Parts whereof visible Bodies are composed he would have given a tollerable Definition of Heat Nevertheless it would not perfectly have contented us because it would not precisely have discovered to us the Nature of the Motion of hot Bodies Aristotle defines Coldness to be that which assembles Bodies of the same or of a different Nature This Definition is good for nothing For 't is false that Cold assembles Bodies To assemble them it must move them but if we consult Reason 't is evident Cold can move nothing In Effect by Cold he means either what we feel when we are cold or that which causes the Sensation of Cold. Now it is plain that the Sensation of Cold can move nothing since it can push nothing What it is that causes Sensation we cannot doubt when we examine things by our Reason for 't is only Rest or a Cessation from Motion So Cold in Bodies being only a Cessation from this Sort of Motion which accompanies Heat it is evident that if Heat separates yet Cold does not Thus Cold assembles neither things that are of a like or different Nature for what can push nothing can assemble nothing In a Word as it does nothing it collects nothing Aristotle judging of things by the Senses imagines Cold is also positive as well as Heat because the Sensations of Heat and Cold are both real and positive And he also thinks that these two Qualities are active And indeed if we follow the Impression of our Senses we have Reason to believe that Cold is a very active Quality since cold Water congeals reassembles and in a Moment hardens melted Gold or Lead after a little is poured upon them although the Heat of these Metals is great enough to separate the Parts of any Body they touch It is evident by what we have said of the Errors of the Senses in the first Book that if we rely only upon the Senses to judge of the Qualities of Sensible Bodies it is impossible to discover any certain and undoubted Truth which can serve as a Principle to assist us in the Knowledge of Nature For by this Method only we cannot discover what things are hot and what cold For of many Persons who should touch Water that is luke-warm some of them would think it hot and others cold Those that are of a hot Constitution would think it cold and those that are of a cold would think it hot And if we supposed Fish capable of Sensation 't is very probable they would think it hot when all Men think it cold It is the same with the Air it seems hot or cold according to the different Dispositions of the Bodies that are exposed
We have in our selves the Idea's of Numbers and Extension whose Existence is undoubted and whose Nature is immutable which would eternally furnish our Thoughts if we would know all their Relations And it is necessary for us to begin to exercise our Minds upon these Idea's for Reasons that will not be unnecessary to remark whereof the chief are these three The first is That these Idea's are the most clear and evident of all For if to shun Error we ought always to preserve Evidence in our Reasonings it is plain that we ought rather to reason upon the Idea's of Numbers and Extension than upon the confused and compound Idea's of Physicks Morality Mechanicks Chymistry and all other Sciences The second is These Idea's are the most distinct and exact of all chiefly those of Numbers So that the Habit we gain in Arithmetick and Geometry of not contenting our selves without knowing precisely the Relations of things gives the Mind a certain Exactness that those have not who content themselves with the Probability that is to be met with in other Sciences The third and greatest of all is That these Idea's are the immutable Rules and common Measures of all other things that we know or can know Those who perfectly know the Relations of Numbers and Figures or rather the Art of making the Comparisons necessary for the knowing their Relations have a kind of universal Science and a most certain means to discover evidently and certainly whatsoever exceeds not the common limits of the Mind But those that have not this Art can never certainly discover any Truths if but a little compounded although they have very clear Idea's of those things whose compounded Relations they endeavour to know These or the like are the Reasons which induced the Ancients to make young Men study Arithmetick Algebra and Geometry Without doubt they knew that Arithmetick and Algebra gave a certain Penetration to the Mind that could not be acquired by other Studies and that Geometry so well regulates the Imagination that it is not easily confounded for this Faculty of the Soul so necessary for the Sciences acquires a certain just Extension by the use of Geometry which promotes and preserves the clear view of the Mind in the most perplexing Difficulties If we would then always preserve Evidence in our Perceptions and discover the pure Truth without any Obscurity or Mixture of Error we ought first to study Arithmetick Algebra and Geometry at least after having acquired some Knowledge of our selves and the Soveraign Being If we would have any Book which Facilitates these Sciences I would prefer Descartes's Meditations to know God and our selves and to learn Arithmetick and Algebra we may read the Mathematical Elements for common Geometry Tacquet's Elements and for Conick Sections and the Resolution of Geometrick Problems De la Here 's Conicks his Geometrick Places and Construction of Equations to which we may add Descartes's Geometry I would not advise to the reading of the Mathematical Elements for Arithmetick and Algebra if I knew of any Author that had clearly demonstrated these Sciences but the Truth obliges me to a thing which some Men will oppose Algebra and Arithmetick being absolutely necessary to discover compounded Truths I believe it a Duty to testifie some Esteem for a Book which directs very far in these Sciences and which according to the Opinion of some Learned Men explains them more clearly than any one has yet done When with Care and Application we have studied these general Sciences we shall evidently discover a great number of Truths that are for all exact and particular Sciences Afterwards we may study Physicks and Morality because these Sciences are very useful although they are not so fit to make the Mind exact and penetrating And if we would always preserve Evidence in our Perceptions we must be very careful that we are never prejudiced in favour of any Principle that is not evident and from which the Chinese for instance would not be supposed to dissent after having throughly weighed and considered it So for Physicks we must only admit the Notions common to all Men viz. The Axioms of Geometricians and clear Idea's of Extension Figure Motion and Rest or any others as clear as these It may perhaps be said That the Essence of Matter is not Extension but what signifies that It is enough that the World which we conceive to be formed of Extension appears like to that which we see if it be not of this matter which is useless and unintelligible although we make such a noise about it It is not absolutely necessary to examine whether there are indeed External Beings which answer to these Idea's for we reason not upon these Beings but upon their Idea's We ought only to take care that the Reasonings we make upon the Properties of things agree with the Sensations we have of them viz. That what we think perfectly agrees with Experience because we endeavour in Physicks to discover the Order and Connection of Effects with their Causes or in Bodies if they Exist or in the Sensations we have of them if they have no Being Indeed we cannot doubt whether there are actually any Bodies when we consider that God is no Deceiver or reflect upon the just Order which he hath instituted in our Sensations whether in Natural Occurrences or in those things only that happen to make us believe what we could not naturally comprehend But it is not necessary at first sight to make deep Reflections upon a thing which no body doubts of and which is not very useful in the Knowledge of Physicks if considered as a true Science Nor must we trouble our selves much to know whether there is or is not any other Qualities in those Bodies that surround us than such as we have clear Idea's of for we must reason only according to our Idea's And if there is any thing else of which we have not a dear distinct and particular Idea we can never know any thing of it nor reason justly upon it Whereas if we reason according to our Idea's we follow Nature and discover that it is not so hidden as we commonly imagine So those that have not studied the Properties of Numbers often imagine that 't is not possible to resolve certain Problems although most Simple and Easie and those that have not thought upon the Properties of Extension Figure and Motion are extreamly inclined to believe and maintain that Physical Questions are inexplicable We must not stop at the Opinion of those that have examined nothing or have examined nothing with a necessary Application For although there are few Truths concerning Natural Things which are fully demonstrated it is certain that there are some general ones of which it is not possible to doubt although it is very possible not to think of them be ignorant and deny them If we would meditate regularly and with all necessary Application we should discover many of these certain Truths that I speak
particular Enumeration but these that follow are the chief of them Sometimes we enquire after the unknown Causes of some known Effects and sometimes seek unknown Effects by their known Causes The Fire burns and dissipates the Wood we seek the Cause of it Fire consists in a very great Motion of the Fiery Particles we would know what Effects this Motion is capable of producing if it can harden Dirt and melt Iron c. We seek sometimes the Nature of a thing by its Properties and sometimes knowing the Nature we seek the Properties of things We know or at least suppose that Light is transmitted in an instant that yet it is re-united and reflected by the means of a concave Mirror in such sort that it penetrates the most Solid Bodies and we would make use of these Properties to discover the Nature of it On the contrary We know that all the Spaces which are betwixt Earth and Heaven are full of little Spherical Bodies extreamly agitated and which continually fly from the Sun And we would know if these little Bodies can transmit themselves in an instant or if being reflected by a Concave Mirror can re-unite and dissipate or penetrate the most Solid Bodies Sometimes we seek all the Parts from the whole and sometimes a whole by its Parts We seek all the unknown Parts of a whole that is known when we seek all the Alliquot parts of a Number all the Roots of an Equation all the right Angles which a Figure contains c. And we seek an unknown whole whose Parts are known when we seek the Sum of many Numbers the Area of many Figures the Capacity of different Vessels or we seek a whole which has one of its parts known and the others although unknown include some known Relation with what is unknown As when we enquire what that Number is whereof we have 15 a known part and the other which composes it is the half or third of the unknown Number Or when we seek an unknown Number which is equal to 15 and to twice the Root of the unknown Number In fine We sometimes enquire if certain things are equal or like to others or how far they are unequal or different As when we would know if Saturn is greater than Jupiter or how near their Magnitudes are alike If the Air at Rome is hotter than that at Marseilles or what difference between them What is general in all Questions is that we form them only to know some Truths and because all Truths are but Relations we may say generally that in all Questions we seek only the Knowledge of some Relations whether Relations between things Relations between Idea's or Relations between things and their Idea's There are Relations of many Kinds there are some between the Nature of things between their Magnitudes their Parts their Attributes Qualities Effects Causes c. But we may reduce them all to two viz. the Relations of Magnitude and Relations of Quality by calling all those Relations of Magnitude which are between things considered as capable of More or Less and all others Relations of Qualities Thus we may say that all Questions tend to the Discovery of some Relations of Magnitude or Quality The first and chief of all Rules is to know most distinctly the State of the Question proposed to be resolved and to have very clear Idea's of its Terms to be able to compare and by this means discover the unknown Relations We must therefore first perceive very clearly the unknown Relation that we seek for it is evident that if we had no certain Mark to discover this unknown Relation when we look for it or when we would find it it would be in vain for us to enquire after it Secondly as much as possible we must render those Idea's distinct which answer to the Terms of the Question by taking away all Equivocal Terms and make them clear by considering them with all possible Attention For if these Idea's are so confused or obscure that we cannot make the Comparisons necessary for discovering the Relations we seek we are not yet in a Condition of resolving the Question In the third place we must consider with great Attention the Conditions exprest in a Question if there is any because without that we have only a confused Notion of the State of the Question Besides the Conditons generally shew the Way for resolving it So that having once well conceived the State of the Question and Conditions of it we know what we seek and sometimes the Way that we must take to discover it It is true there is not always some Conditions exprest in Questions but then these Questions are indetermined and we may resolve them many Ways as if a Square Number or Triangle is required c. without specifying any more or else 't is because he that proposes them knows not the means of resolving them or else hides them with a Design to perplex the Question As if it is required to find two mean Proportionals between two Lines without adding by the Intersection of the Circle and Parabola or Circle and Elipsis c. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the Character by which we know what we seek should be very distinct and not Equivocal and specifie only what we seek otherwise we can never be certain of having resolved the Question proposed We must likewise take care to retrench from the Question whatever Conditions may perplex it and without which it is compleat For they unnecessarily divide the Capacity of the Mind Nay we cannot be said to know the State of a Question when the Conditions which accompany it are useless For instance if a Question were proposed in these Terms whether a Man being sprinkled with some Liquors and covered with a Garland of Flowers can be able to rest although he see nothing that can agitate him We must know whether the Word Man is not Metaphorical or the Word Rest Equivocal if it is not taken in Relation to Local Motion or in Relation to the Passions as these Words although he see nothing that is able to agitate him seem to note We must know if the Conditions being sprinkled with some Liquors and crowned with a Garland of Flowers are Essential Afterwards the State of this Ridiculous and Indetermined Question being clearly known we may easily resolve it by saying that we only need put a Man into a Ship according to the Conditions exprest in the Question The Artifice of those that propose such like Questions is to joyn Conditions to them which seem to be necessary although they are not to divert the Mind of those they propose them towards things unuseful to be resolved As in that Question that Servants commonly offer to Children I have seen say they unto them Hunters or Fishers carry away with them what they could not take and cast into the Water what they took The Mind being prejudiced with the Idea of Fishermen angling for Fish it cannot conceive what
Fermentation or Dilatation of the Liquors probably is not enough known to all that shall read this Book to pretend to have shewn an Effect when we have in general discovered that its Cause is Fermentation but we must not resolve all particular Questions by going back unto the first Causes It is not because we cannot by this demonstrate and discover the true System upon which all particular Effects depend provided we stop only at clear Idea's But that this manner of Philosophizing is neither the most exact nor shortest To explain what I mean we must know there are Questions of two Sorts In the first we try to discover the Nature and Properties of something In the others we only desire to know if such a thing hath or hath not such a Propriety or if we know it has such a Propriety we would only know the Cause of it To resolve Questions of the first Kind we must consider things in their Original and always conceive them produced by the most Simple and most Natural Ways To resolve the rest a very different manner must be taken They must be done by Suppositions and we must examine whether these Suppositions make us guilty of any Absurdity or if they conduce to any Truth clearly known For Instance we would discover what are the Properties of the Cycloid or of some of the Conick Sections These Lines must be considered in their Generation and formed according to the most Simple and least perplext Ways for 't is the best and shortest Method to discover the Nature and Properties of them We easily see that the Subtense of the Cycloid is equal to the Circle which forms it and if we do not easily discover many Properties by this means 't is because the Circular Line which serves to form it is not sufficiently known But for these Lines purely Mathematical or such whose Relations we can know more exactly as Conick Sections we may discover a great Number of their Properties by considering them in their Generation We must only observe that as they may be generated by a Regular Motion several Ways so all Sorts of Generations are not equally proper to enlighten the Mind but the most Simple are the best and that it often happens that certain particular Methods are more proper than others to demonstrate some particular Properties But if the Question is not in general to discover the Properties of a thing but to know if a thing has such a Property Then it must be supposed that it hath it effectively and examine attentively what must follow this Supposition whether it leads to a manifest Absurdity or else to some undoubted Truth which may serve as a means to discover what we enquire after And 't is that Method Geometricians make use of to resolve their Problems They suppose as done what they seek for and examine what must happen from thence and attentively consider the Relations which result from their Suppositions They represent all these Relations which include the Condition of the Problem by Equations and afterwards reduce these Equations according to their Rules so that what is unknown they find equal to one or many things perfectly known If the Question then is in general to discover the Nature of Fire and the different Fermentations which are the most universal Causes of Natural Effects I say that the shortest and most secure Way is to examine it in its Original We must consider the Formation of the most agitated Body the Motion of which is dispersed into those that ferment By clear Idea's and the most Simple Way we must examine what Motion is capable of producing in Matter And because Fire and different Fermentations are very general things and which consequently depend upon few Causes it will not be requisite long to consider what Matter is capable of when it is animated by Motion to discover the Nature of Fermentation is its Principle and at the same time we shall learn many other things absolutely necessary to the Knowledge of Physicks Whereas if in this Question we would reason by Suppositions we should go back to the first Causes to the Laws of Nature according to which all things are formed and suppose many false things which would be of no Use We might soon discover that the Cause of Fermentation is the Motion of an Invisible Matter which communicates its self to the Parts of that which acts it for we know plain enought that Fire and the different Fermentation of Bodies consist in their Agitation and that by the Laws of Nature Bodies immediately receive their Motion only by their meeting with some others more agitated Thus we may discover that there is an Invisible Matter whose Agitation is communicated to Visible Bodies But it would be Morally impossible by way of Supposition to discover how it is done And it is not near so difficult to discover when we examine the Formation of the Elements or some Bodies whereof there 's a great Number of the same Nature as is evident by Mr. Descartes's System The third Part of the Question which is of Convulsive Motions will not be very difficult to resolve provided we suppose in Bodies Animal Spirits capable of some Fermentation and of Humours sufficiently penetrating to insinuate themselves into the Pores of the Nerves by which the Spirits disperse themselves through the Muscles provided also we do not pretend to determine what the true Disposition of the Invisible Parts is which contribute to these Convulsive Motions When we have separated a Muscle from the rest of the Body and hold it by the Extremities we Sensibly perceive that it makes all its Effort to contract it self when we prick it in the Middle It is very probable that this depends upon the Construction of the Imperceptible Parts that compose it which like so many Springs are determined to certain Motions by this Pricking But who can affirm they have found the true Disposition of the Parts which serve to produce this Motion or who can give an undoubted Demonstration of it Certainly it would appear impossible although it may be through the Power of Thought we can imagine a Construction of the Muscles fit to perform all the Motions we see them capable of Yet must we not think to determine what is the true Construction of the Muscles But because we cannot reasonably doubt that there are Spirits Susceptible of some Fermentation by the Mixture of some Subtle Matter and that the sharp and pungent Humours may insinuate themselves into the Nerves we may suppose it To resolve the Question proposed we must first examine how many Sorts of Convulsive Motions there are and because the Number of them appears indetermined we may keep to the chief whose Causes seem to be different We must consider the Parts wherein they are performed the Diseases which precede and follow them If they are produced with or without Pain and particularly how quick and violent they are for some of them are performed very quick
Agitation of this Matter by what I have said of Gunpowder It will not be difficult to see that 't is absotutely necessary that the Matters acting infinitely more upon the Surface of hard Bodies that it encompasses and compresses than within the same Bodies it must be the Cause of their Inflexibility or the Resistance we feel when we endeavour to break them Now as there is always many Particles of this Invisible Matter which passes through the Pores of hard Bodies they make them not only hard as we have already explained but further are the Cause that some are Springy and Elastick others stand bent and that others are fluid and liquid and in fine that they are not only the Cause of the Force that hard Bodies have to continue united together but also that fluid Bodies have to separate that is are the Cause that some Bodies are hard and others fluid But because 't is absolutely necessary to know distinctly the Physicks of Descartes the Figure of his Elements and Parts which compose particular Bodies to give a Reason why certain Bodies are stiff and some others pliable I shall not stay here to explain it Those who have read the Works of this Philosopher will easily enough imagine what may be the Cause thereof which I could not explain without great Difficulty and those who are unacquainted with this Author would but confusedly understand the Reason that I might bring for it Nor shall I also stop here to resolve a great Number of Difficulties that I foresee may be brought against what I have established Because if those that raise them have no Knowledge of true Physicks I should only tire and displease them instead of satisfying them But if they are learned Persons their Objections being stronger I could not answer them but by a great Number of Figures and long Discourses so that I believe I ought to desire those that find any Difficulty in what I have advanced very carefully to read this Chapter over again for I hope if they do so and meditate on it as much as is necessary all their Objections will vanish But if they find my Request incommodious they may omit it for there is no great Danger in being ignorant of the Cause of Bodies inflexibility I speak not here of Contiguity For 't is plain Contiguous things touch so little that there is always much Subtle Matter which passes between them and which endeavours to continue its Motion in a right Line to prevent their uniting For the Union that is observed between Marbles which have been polished one upon another I have explained it and 't is easie to see that although this Subtle Matter always passes between these two Parts how united soever they may be the Air cannot pass it and therefore 't is that which compresses and binds those two Pieces of Marble together and causes some Trouble to disunite them if we do not make them slide off one another It is plain from all this that the Continuity Contiguity and Union of two Marbles will only be the same thing in a Void neither have we different Idea's of them so that 't is as much as to say we do not understand them if we make them absolutely differ without any Relation to the Bodies which surround them Here now follows some Reflexions upon Descartes's Sentiment and the Original of his error I call his Opinion an Error because I find no Expedient to defend what he says of the Rules of Motion and Cause of the Hardness of Bodies in many Places at the End of the Second Part of his Principles and it seems to me that I have sufficiently proved the Truth of the contrary Opinion This great Man very distinctly conceived that Matter could not move of it self and that the Natural moving Power of all Bodies was nothing else but the general Will of the Author of Nature and that the Communications of the Motions of Bodies at their mutual Meeting could only proceed from this same Will If we take this for granted we can give no Rules for the different Communication of Motions but by the Proportion that is found between the different Magnitude of Bodies which beat against them since it is impossible to penetrate the Designs of God's Will And because he judges that every thing had Power to continue in the State it was in whether in Motion or Rest because that God by his Will determined this Power always to act after the same manner he concludes that Rest has as much Power to act as Motion So he measures the Effects of the Power of Rest by the Magnitude of Bodies which possessed it as those of the Power of Motion and hence he gave the Rules for the Communication of Motion that are in his Principles and the Cause of the Hardness of Bodies which I have endeavoured to refute It is difficult enough not to be of Descartes's Opinion when we look upon it as he did for once more since the Communication of Motions proceed only from the Will of the Author of Nature and that we see all Bodies continue in the State they are once placed in whether it be Motion or Rest It seems we ought to seek the Rules of the different Communication of Motions at the meeting of Bodies not in the Will of God which is unknown to us but in the Proportion there is between the Magnitudes of these Bodies I do not therefore wonder that Descartes had this Thought but I only wonder that he did not correct it when he had made a farther Advance in his Discoveries and found both Existence and the Effects of the Subtle Matter which environs all Bodies I am surprized that in the 132 Article of the 4th Part he attributes the Elastick Force that certain Bodies have to this subtle Matter and that in Articles 55 and 43 of the Second Part and in other Places he does not attribute it to their Hardness or the Resistance they make when we endeavour to bend or break them but to the rest of their Parts It appears evident to me that the Cause of the Elasticity and Stiffness of certain Bodies is the same with that which gives them the Power of Resistance when we would break them for indeed the Force that we use to break Steel differs but insensibly from that by which we bend it I will not here bring all the Reasons that might be urged to prove these things nor answer to any Difficulties that we might form from hard Bodies making no Sensible Resistance and yet we have some Trouble to bend them For it will be enough to make these Difficulties vanish to consider that the Subtle Matter cannot easily take a new course in Bodies which break when we bend them as in Glass and in tempered Steel and that it cannot more easily do it in Bodies that are composed of branchy Parts which are not brittle as in Gold and Lead And indeed there is no hard bodies which make not some
little Resistance It is difficult enough to perswade our selves that Descartes positively believed the Cause of Hardness was different from that of Elasticity And what appears most probable is that he has not sufficiently reflected upon the Matter When we meditate long upon any Subject and are satisfied in things we would know we often think no more of them We believe that the Thoughts that we have had are undoubted Truths and 't is useless to examine farther But in Men there are many things which disgust them against Application incine them to a rash Assent and make them subject to Error and although the Mind continues apparently satisfied it is not always because it is well informed of the Truth Descartes was a Man like us I confess we never saw more Solidity Exactness Extension and more Penetration of Mind than what appears in his Works yet he was not infallible So that it is probable he was so very strongly perswaded of his Opinion from not sufficiently reflecting that he asserted something elsewhere in nis Principles contrary to it He maintained it upon very specious and probable Reasons but such however as were not of sufficient Force to make us submit and therefore he might and ought to have suspended his Judgment It is not enough to examine in a hard Body what might be the Cause that made it so We ought also to think of the invisible bodies which might render them hard as he has done at the End of his Philosophical Principles when he attributes the Cause of Resistance to them He ought to have made an exact Division which comprised whatsoever might contribute to the Inflexibility of bodies It is not sufficient still to seek the Cause in God's Will he ought also to have thought of the Subtle Matter which environed them For although the Existence of this extreamly agitated Matter was not yet proved in that Place of his Principles where he speaks of Hardness it was not then rejected He ought then to have suspended his Judgment and to have remembered that what he had writ of the Cause of Hardness and Rules of Motion ought to have been reviewed anew which I believe he did not do carefully enough Or else he did not sufficiently consider the true Reason of a thing that is very easie to discover and which yet is of the utmost Consequence in Physicks I will explain it Descartes well knew that to maintain his System of the Truth which he could not reasonably doubt It was absolutely necessary that great bodies should always communicate their Motion to the lesser bodies they should meet and the less reflect at their meeting with the greater without a like Loss on their Side For without that the First Element would not have all the Motion that it is necessary it should have above the Second nor the Second above the Third and his whole System would be absolutely false as is sufficiently known to those that have but thought a little upon it But in supposing that Rest had Force enough to resist Motion and that a great Body in Rest could not be moved by another that is less than it although it strike it with a furious Agitation It is plain that great Bodies must have much less Motion than a like Mass of little Bodies since according to this Supposition they can always communicate what they have and cannot always receive from the lesser Thus this Supposition not being contrary to whatsoever Descartes has said in his Principles from the Beginning unto the Establishment of his Rules of Motion and agreeing very well with the Sequel of his Principles he believed that the Rules of Motions which he thought he had demonstrated in their Cause were also sufficiently confirmed by their Effects I agree with Descartes that great Bodies communicate their Motion much more easily than little Bodies do and therefore his First Element is much more agitated than the Second and the Second than the Third But the Cause of it is clear without having any Regard to his Supposition Little and fluid Bodies as Water Air c. can only communicate to great Bodies an uniform Motion which is common to all their Parts The Water in a River can only communicate to a Boat the Motion of Descent which is common to all the little Parts of which the Water is composed and every one of these Parts besides this common Motion has also an infinite Number of other Particulars Thus by this Reason 't is plain that a Boat for instance can never have so much Motion as an equal Bulk of Water since the Boat can only receive from the Water that Motion which is direct and common to all the Parts that compose it If Twenty Particles of a fluid Body push any other Body on the one Side and as many on the other it will continue immoveable and all the little Particles of the fluid Body in which it swims rebound up without losing any thing of their Motion Thus great Bodies whose Parts are united can only receive the Circular and Uniform Motion of the Vortex of the Subtle Matter which environs them This Reason seems sufficient to them to make it comprehended how great Bodies are not so much agitated as the lesser and that there is a Necessity for an Explanation of these things to suppose any Force in Rest to resist Motion The Certainty of Descartes's Principles cannot be a sufficient Proof to defend his Rules of Motion and we may believe that if Descartes himself had again without Prejudice examined his Principles and compared them with such Reasons as I have brought he would not have believed that the Effects of Nature had confirmed his Rules nor have fallen into a Contradiction by attributing the Hardness of Bodies only to the rest of their Parts and their Elasticity to the Force of a Subtle Matter Here follows now the Rules of the Communication of Motions in a Void which are only the Consequences of what I have established about the Nature of Rest Bodies not being hard in a Void since they are only hard by the Pressure of the Subtle Matter which surrounds them if Two Bodies meet they would flatten without rebounding we must therefore give these Rules Suppose them hard of themselves and not by the Pressure of this Subtle Matter Rest having no Power to resist Motion and many Bodies before being considered as one only in the moment of their meeting it is plain they ought not to rebound when they are equal in Magnitude and Velocity or that their Velocity supplies the Desect of their Magnitude or their Magnitude the Defect of their Velocity And it is easie from thence to conclude that in all other Cases they must always communicate their Motion A general Rule for the Communication of Motion so that they may afterwards proceed with an equal Swiftness So that to know what must happen in all the different Suppositions of Magnitude and Swiftness of Bodies which meet one another we need
that are but a little enlightened may sometimes destroy our Soul as unexpert Physicians may our Body As I don 't throughly explain the Rules which might be given in respect of the choice and use that should be made of Guides and Physicians I desire my Sentiments may be equitably interpreted and that it may not be imagined that I would hinder any from seeking necessary assistance from others I know that a particular Blessing attends our submission to the Opinions of the Wise and Understanding and I am willing to believe this General Rule Let us dye according to the received Laws of Phisics to the generality of Men they are safer than any other that I could establish for the Preservation of Life But because it is alwayes profitable to examine our selves and consult the Gospel to hearken to Jesus Christ whether he speaks immediately to our Mind and Heart or by Faith declares himself to our Ears or Eyes I believe I might say what I have said for our Guides themselves deceive us when they speak contrary to what Faith and Reason teach us And as it is to give Honour to God by believing his Works to have that which is necessary for their preservation I thought I should make Men sensible that the Machine of their Body is contrived after so admirable a manner that of it self it discovers more easily what is necessary for its Preservation than by Science or even the Experience of the most able Physicians AN EXPLANATION OF THE Third Chapter of the Fifth Book That Love is different from Peasure and Joy THE Mind commonly confounds things which are very different when they happen at the same time and are not contrary to one another Of which I have given many Instances in this Work because 't is therein that our Errors chiefly consist in respect to what passes in our selves As we have no clear Idea of what constitutes the Nature or Essence of our Mind nor of the Modifications it is capable of it often happens that we confound things absolutely different if they happen within us but at the same time since we easily confound what we do not know by a clear and distinct Idea It is not only impossible clearly to discover wherein the difference of such things consists as pass within us but it is also difficult to discern whether there is any difference between them For to effect this we must look into our selves not to consider what is voluntarily done in reference to Good and Evil but to make an abstracted Reflection upon our selves which cannot be performed without much Distraction and Pains We easily conceive that the Roundness of a Body is different from its Motion And although we know by Experience that a Bowl upon a Plane cannot be pushed without being moved and then Roundness and Motion are found together however we don't confound them one with the other because we know both Motion and Figure by very distinct and clear Ideas But 't is not so with Pleasure and Love for we commonly confound them Our Mind if we may so say becomes movable by Pleasure as a Ball does by its Roundness and because it is never without an impression towards good it is immediately put in motion towards the Object which causes or seems to cause this Pleasure So that this motion of Love happening to the Soul at the same time it feels this Pleasure it is enough to make it confound its Pleasure with its Love because it has not so clear an Idea either of its Pleasure or its Love as it has of Figure and Motion Wherefore some Persons will believe that Pleasure and Love are not different and that I distinguish too many things in each of our Passions But to make it plainly appear that Pleasure and Love are very different I shall distinguish two sorts of Pleasures one of which precedes Reason as agreeable Sensations which we commonly call Pleasures of the Body and the other sort neither precede Reason nor the Senses and are generally called the Pleasures of the Soul Such as Joy which is excited in us in consequence of a clear Knowledge or a confused Sensation which we have that some good is or will happen to us For instance A Man tasting of a Fruit which he knows not finds some Pleasure in eating it if this Fruit be good for his Nourishment This is a preventing Pleasure for since he feels it before he knows whether this Fruit is good or nor it is evident that this Pleasure prevents his Reason An Huntsman when hungry expecting or actually finding something to eat actually feels Joy Now this Joy is a Pleasure which follows the knowledge he has of his present or future good It is perhaps evident by this distinction of Pleasure into that which follows and precedes Reason that there is neither of them but differs from Love For that Pleasure which precedes Reason certainly precedes Love since it precedes all knowledge which in some degree or other is always supposed by Love And on the contrary Joy or Pleasure which supposes Knowledge also supposes Love since Joy supposes the confused Sensation or clear Knowledge that we do or shall possess what we love and if we possessed a thing we had no love for we should receive no Joy by it Thus Pleasure is very different from Love since the Pleasure which precedes Reason precedes and causes Love and the Pleasure which follows Reason necessarily supposes Love as an Effect supposes the Cause Otherwise if Pleasure and Love were the same thing there would never be Pleasure without Love nor Love without Pleasure for a thing cannot be without it self Yet a Christian loves his Enemy and a Child well educated loves his Father how unreasonable and unkind soever he may be The sight of their Duty the fear of God and love of Order and Justice makes them love not only without Pleasure but even with a kind of Horrour such Persons as are not agreeable to them I confess they sometimes feel Pleasure or Joy when they think they do their Duty or when they hope to be recompensed according to their Merit But besides that this Pleasure visibly differs very much from the Love they have to their Father or Enemy although it be perhaps the Motive of it it often happens that 't is not even this Motive which makes them act it is sometimes only an abstracted view of Order or notion of Fear which preserves their Love We may even in one sense say they have a Love for these Persons at the time they think not of them For Love remains in us during the diversions of our thoughts and whilst we sleep but Pleasure seems to me to subsist no longer in the Soul than whilst it is sensible of it Thus Love or Charity remaining in us without Pleasure or Delight it cannot be maintained that Pleasure and Love is the same thing As Pleasure and Pain are two direct contraries If Pleasure were the same thing with Love
the execution of his designs Therefore 't will not be useless for me to prove and explain this Truth for 't is of the greatest consequence not only for the knowledge of Nature but much more for the knowledge of Religion and Morality By the word God we understand a Being infinitely Perfect whose Wisdom and Knowledge have no limits and who consequently knows all the means whereby he can execute his designs This being granted I say God acts alwayes by the shortest means and most simple wayes That I may be the better understood I 'll make use of a sensible Example I suppole that God wills the Body A should strike the Body B. Since God knows every thing he perfectly knows that A. can go to strike B. by an infinite number of Curve-Lines and but by one Right-Line only Now God only wills the shock of B. by A. and we suppose that he only wills the transferring of A. to B. to effect this shock Therefore A. must be transferred to B. by the shortest way or by a Right-Line For if the Body A. were transported to B. by a Curve Line that would show either that the Transporter knew no other way or else that he not only will'd the concurrence of these Bodies but also the means to produce it which is against the supposition There 's as much more action requisite to transfer a Body A. to B. by a Curve-Line than by a Right-Line as the Curve is greater than the Right If God therefore should transfer A. to B. by a Curve-Line which is double to a Right half the Action of God would be wholly useless consequently produced without design or end as well as without effect Moreover Action in God is Will therefore there must be more Will in God to cause A. to be transported circularly than directly Now we have already supposed that God had no Will in respect to the motion of A but only as it relates to the shock Therefore there is not Will enough in God to move A. by a Curve-Line And consequently this motion of A. to B. is a contradiction Thus 't is a contradiction that God should not act by the most simple wayes except we suppose that God in the choice of wayes he makes use of to execute his designs has something else in view besides these designs which is a contradiction in our supposition When I say there is more Will in God to transfer a Body from A. to B. by a Curve than by a Right Line we must from thence conclude nothing against the simplicity of the Being and Action of God For it must be confessed that it cannot be comprehended either how the simplicity of an Infinite Being includes all the different Perfections of Finite Beings nor how his Will continuing alwayes the same and alwayes conformable to Order changes with reference to the different Beings it produces and preserves I speak only according to our manner of conceiving It seems to me now that we clearly conceive when God Wills and for instance creates a Cubic Foot of Matter he Wills another thing than if he creates two For 't is evident that God could not create two different things nor know whether he had created one or two feet of Matter or if he conveyed a Body circularly or directly if there was not some difference in his Wills in respect to Matter or to its Motion since God sees only in himself and in his Wills the variety of his Creatures Now whatever that Action is in God which relates to the different Beings he produces or preserves I call it the differences augmentations and diminutions of Wills in God And according to this manner of conceiving things I say God cannot imploy more Will than is necessary to execute his designs So that God alwayes acts by the most simple wayes in reference to them I don't deny however but God may have a great number of wayes equally simple to produce the same effects or that he may produce them by different means but he alwayes produces them by the most simple provided they are all of the same kind for 't is a contradiction that a Being infinitely Wise should have useless and irregular Wills If we would apply this Principle to Morality we shall see that those secure their Salvation who so prepare themselves for Grace by Self-denyal Repentance and an exact Obedience to the Commands of our Saviour that God acting in them by the most simple wayes I mean by giving them but few New Graces operates very much in them For although God would have all Men be saved he will only save those that can be saved by the most simple means which have relation to the great design he has of Sanctifying through JESVS CHRIST a certain number of the Elect and he will multiply the Children of Eve till that number be fulfilled for 't is because God is willing to sanctifie us through the most simple means that after Sin it was necessary for him to multiply the Children of Men to compleat the number of his Elect since there are many persons who cause their own Damnation by withdrawing themselves from the Order of God Now as God acts not as a particular Cause we must not imagine that he has like us particular Wills for every thing he produces for if it were so it appears evident to me that the generation of Monsters would be impossible and that it would never happen that one work should destroy another As God cannot have contrary Wills we should have recourse to a Principle of Evil as the Manichses had for instance to freeze the Fruits produced by God This being so we are methinks obliged to suppose that there are some general Rules according to which God predestinates and sanctifies the Elect and that those Laws are what we call the Order of Grace as his general Wills whereby God produces and preserves whatever is in the World are the Order of Nature I don't know whether I am not mistaken but methinks from this Principle a great many Consequences may be drawn which perhaps would resolve some Difficulties about which there has been much Controversie some years since but I don't think my self obliged to deduce them every one may do it according to his own Capacity 'T is more convenient to be silent than to say such things as are not necessary to be known and which perhaps will one day be more easily agreed upon than they would now I would only have it known that the most simple ways of our Sanctification are Self-denyal and Repentance or that at least we should continually reflect that our Blessed LORD distinctly knowing the Laws of the Order of Grace we run perpetual dangers when we don't follow the wayes that he has showed us not only by his Words but also by his Actions But as in the course of our Lives there happens particular Occurrances wherein we don't know which way to determine our selves because of the contrary Reasons that may be
enough to confound the most evident things and in these Questions where 't is necessary to remove the Equivocation they see nothing to distinguish If we consider that the greatest Part of the Questions of Philosophers and Physicians include some equivocal Terms like those we have spoken of we cannot doubt but that these learned Men who have not been able to define them have delivered nothing Solid in all the great Volumes they have composed and what I have said may suffice to overthrow almost all the Opinions of the Ancients But for Descartes he perfectly knew how to distinguish these things He resolved no Question by Sensible Idea's and if we take the Pains to read him we shall see he explained every thing after a more clear and evident Manner and almost always demonstrated them only by the distinct Idea's of Extension Figure and Motion The other kind of equivocal Terms which Philosophers make use of comprehend all these general Terms of Logick by which it is easie to explain things without having any Knowledge of them Aristotle has made the most use of them all his Books are full of them and some are a mere Logick He proposes and resolves all things by these Specious Words Genus Species Power Nature Form Faculty Quality Causa per se Causa per accidens His Followers have had no small Trouble to apprehend the meaning of these Words which signifie nothing at all nor are they more learned than before when they have heard say that Fire dissolves Metals because it has a Faculty of dissolving them and that a Man digests not because he has a weak Stomach or that his Faculty of Concocting does not perform its Functions well It is true those who have made use of these Terms and general Idea's to explain all things by do not commonly fall into so great a Number of Errors as those who only make use of them to stir up the confused Ideas of the Senses The Philosophers of the Schools are not so subject to Error as certain Dogmatical decisive Physicians who form Systems upon some Experiments which they know not the reason of because they speak so generally that they run no great Hazzard The Fire warms dries hardens and softens because it has such Faculties as produce these Effects Senna purges by its Purgative Quality Bread nourishes by its Nutritive Quality These Proportions are not subject to Error for a Quality is that which denotes a thing by such a Name and we cannot deny it to Aristotle for indeed this Definition is indisputable Such or the like manner of speaking are not false but only in Effect they signifie nothing These indetermined Idea's ingage us not in Error but they are wholy useless in the Discovery of Truth For although we know there is a substantial Form in Fire accompanied with a thousand Faculties like to those of heating dilating melting Gold Silver and all Metals of clearing burning and baking If this Difficulty be proposed to me to be resolved viz. whether Fire can harden Dirt and soften Wax The Idea's of Substantial Form and of those Faculties that produce Heat Ratification Fluidity c. would be of no use to me in resolving the Question for there being no Connexion betwen the Idea's of the Hardness of Dirt and Softness of Wax and those of the Substantial Form of Fire and the Qualities of producing Rarification Fluidity c. It is the same with all general Idea's so they are wholly useless for the Ends designed But if we know that Fire is nothing else but the Parts of Wood put into continal Motion and that 't is only by this Agitation that it excites the Sensation of Heat in us If we knew at the same Time that the Softness of Dirt consists only in a Mixture of Earth and Water as these Idea's are not confused and general but distinct and particular It would not be difficult to see that the Heat of Fire must harden Dirt because one Body can move another being it self in Motion We likewise easily discover that since Heat which is felt near the Fire is caused by the Motion of the invisible Parts of the Wood which strike against the Hands if we expose Dirt to the Heat of the Fire the Watery Parts which are joyned to the Earth being more lose and consequently sooner agitated by the Shock of the little Bodies which go out from the Fire than the gross Particles of the Earth they must separate and leave it dry and hard It would also evidently apppear that Fire cannot harden Wax if we knew that the Particles which compose it are branched and very near of the same Bigness Thus particular Idea's are very useful in an Enquiry after Truth And indeterminate Idea's are hot only useless but on the contrary insensibly lead us into Error These Philosophers content not themselves with making use of general Terms and indetermined Idea's that answer nothing But they will have those Terms signifie certain particular Beings They pretend that there is some Substance distinct from Matter which is the Form of Matter and an infinite Company of little Beings really distinct from Matter and Form of which they suppose as many of them as they have different Sensations of Bodies and they think these Bodies produce different Effects Yet it is plain to any Man that is capable of Attention that all these little Beings distinct from Fire for instance and which we suppose to be contained therein for the Production of Heat Light Hardness Fluidity c are only Fictions of the Imagination which are contrary to Reason For Reason hath no particular Idea which represents these little Beings If we ask the Philosophers what Sort of Entity that Faculty in the Fire is which gives Light they will only answer that 't is a Being which is the Cause why Fire is capable of producing Light So that the Idea they have of the Faculty of Light is not different from the general Idea of the Cause and confused Idea of the Effect which we see They have therefore no clear Idea of what they say when they admit these particular Beings Thus they say what they conceive not and what indeed is impossible to be conceived CHAP. III. Of the most dangerous Error in Philosophy Of the Ancients PHilosophers have not only spoke what they did not conceive when they explained the Effects of Nature by certain Beings which they have no particular Idea of but even establish a Principle from whence may directly be drawn most false and dangerous Consequences For if according to their Opinion we suppose that in Bodies there are some Beings distinct from Matter and not having any distinct Idea of these Entities we might easily imagine that they are the true or principal Causes of the Effects which we see produced 'T is even the common Sentiment of most Philosophers For 't is chiefly to explain these Effects that they make use of Substantial Forms Real Qualities and other the like Entities
But when we come to consider attentively the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine For the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of Sovereign Divinity and the Idea of a Subordinate Power is the Idea of an inferiour but a true Divinity at least according to the Opinion of the Heathens if it be the Idea of a Power or true Cause We admit therefore something Divine in all Bodies which encompass us when we admit Forms Faculties Qualities Vertues and real Beings capable of producing certain Effects by the Power of their own Nature And thus they insensibly enter into the Opinions of the Heathens by the Respect they have for their Philosophy Faith indeed works it but it may perhaps be said that if we are Christians in our Hearts we are Heathens in our Minds Moreover it is difficult to perswade our selves that we ought neither to love or fear true Powers and Beings who can act upon us punish us with Pain or recompense us with Pleasure And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration 't is also difficult to perswade our selves that we ought not to adore them For whatever can act upon us as a real and true Cause is necessarily above us according to St. Austin and right Reason The same Father and the same Reason tells us 't is an immutable Law that Inferiour things should submit to superiour And from hence Ego enim ab animâ hoc corpus animari non puto nifi intentione facientis Nec ab isto quicquam illam pati Arbitror sed facere de illo in illo tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationi suae l. 6. mus c. 5. * this great Father concludes that the Body cannot act upon the Soul and that nothing can be above the Soul but God In the Holy Scriptures when God proves to the Israelites that they ought to adore him that is that they ought to fear and love him the chief Reasons he brings are taken from his Power to recompence and punish them He represents to them the Benefits they have received from him the Evils wherewith he hath chastised them and that he has still the same Power He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens because they have no Power over them and can do them neither Good nor Hurt He requires them to honour him only because he only is the true Cause of Good and Evil and that there happens none in their City according to the Prophet which he has not done for Natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Evil that appears to be done to us 'T is God alone that acts in them and 't is he only that we must fear and love Soli Deo Honor Gloria In short this Opinion that we ought to fear and love whatsoever is the true Cause of Good and Evil appears so natural and just that it is impossible to destroy it so that if we suppose this false Opinion of the Philosophers which we endeavour here to confute that Bodies which encompass us are the true Causes of the Pleasures and Evils which we feel Reason seems to justifie a Religion like to that of the Heathens and approves of the universal Irregularity of Manners It is true that Reason does not tell us that we must adore Onyons and Leeks as the Sovereign Divinity because they cannot make us intirely happy when we have of them or intirely unhappy when we want them Nor have the Heathens ever done to them so much Honour as to the great Jupiter upon whom all their Divinities depend or as to the Sun which our Senses represent to us as the universal Cause which gives Life and Motion to all things and which we cannot hinder our selves from regarding as a Sovereign Divinity if with the Heathen Philosophers we suppose it includes in its being the true Causes of whatever it seems to produce not only in our Bodies and Minds but likewise in all Beings which encompass us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Honour to Leeks and Onyons yet we may always render them some particular Adoration I mean we may think of and love them in some manner if it is true that in some sort they can make us happy we must honour them in Proportion to the Good they can do us And certainly Men who give Ear to the Reports of their Senses think that Pulse is capable of doing them good for else the Israelites for instance would not have regretted their Absence in the Defect nor considered it as a Misfortune to be deprived of them if they did not in some manner look upon themselves happy in the Enjoyment of them These are the Irregularities which our Reason engages us in when it is joyned to the Principles of the Heathen Philosophy and follows the Impressons of the Senses That we may longer doubt of the Falseness of this Miserable Philosphy and the Certainty of our Principles and Clearness of the Idea's we make use of It is necessary clearly to establish those Truths which are opposite to the Errors of the ancient Philosophy and to prove in short that there is only one true Cause because there is only one true God That Nature or the Power of every thing proceeds only from the Will of God That all Natural things are not true Causes but only occasional ones and some other Truths which will be the Consequences of these It is evident that all Bodies both great and small have no power of removing themselves A Mountain an House a Stone a grain of Sand and in short the least or biggest Bodies we can conceive have no power of removing themselves We have only two sorts of Idea's that of Bodies and that of Spirits whereas we ought to speak only of those things which we conceive we should reason according to these two Idea's Since therefore the Idea we have of all Bodies shows us that they cannot move themselves it must be concluded that they are moved by Spirits only But when we examine the Idea we have of all finite Minds we do not see the necessary Connexion between their Wills and the Motion of any Body whatsoever it be On the contrary we see that there is none nor can be any whence we ought to conclude if we will argue according to our Knowledge that as no body can be able to move it self so there is no created Spirit can be the true or principal cause of the Motion of any body whatever But when we think of the Idea of God viz. of a Being infinitely Perfect and consequently Almighty we know that there is such a Connexion between his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that 't is impossible to conceive he should Will the Motion of a Body that should not be moved We must then say that his Will only can move Bodies if we will speak things as we conceive them and not as we feel them The moving