Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	effect_n	natural_a	supernatural_a	1,915	5	10.5176	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A49317	Moral essays wherein some of Mr. Locks and Monsir. Malbranch's opinions are briefly examin'd : together with an answer to some chapters in the oracles of reason concerning deism / by Ja. Lowde ...	Lowde, James.	1699 (1699)	Wing L3301; ESTC R31564	81,257	196

agreeable to the Office of Baptism I then recall what I have said upon that particular only I could have wish'd that he had not given that o●●asion to others of misapprehending him Some Remarks upon Monsieur Malebranch his Opinions of the non-efficiency of Second Causes and of seeing all thing●s in God THE true liberty of Phylosophizing and the free and ingenuous use of ● Mans own Reason is certainly a very great perfection of a Rational creature a just freedom of thinking together with that of ●hoice being two great prerogatives of humane nature but the best things may be abused and perverted to bad purposes thus Men sometimes under the plausible pretence of free thinking give their fancyes leave to Rove about for new Opinions and then presently● are so enamour'd of their own inventions that it is very difficult if at all possible eve● to convince 'em of the con●rary and that which more confirms them in their own way is that they fancy themselves the only Men that enjoy the true genius of contemplation and those who differ from em and cannot assent to their way of reasoning● they look upon to be Men whose understandings are crampt by the prejudice of an unha●py Education Here I shall propound these two things to Consideration● 1. No Opinion in Philosphy is either to be rejected o● imbraced merely upon account of its Antiquity or novelty but only as it comes attended or no● attended with the Evidence of reason and probability at least of truth thus a more true genius of Philosophysing may appea●● in the defence of an old truth than in the asserting of a new error 2. In things purely Physical relating to things meerely of a material Nature w● may indulge a greater liberty of thinking but in things that terminate more immediately upon God as this Opinion of Monsi●ur Malbranch does in seeing all things in God in such I conceive we ought to be more wary and guide both our Thoughts and Words with greater caution There are some positive Moralists if I may so call 'em such who tell us that there is nothing good or evill in its own nature but that things are so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only because of the positive decree and determination of God that they should be so Monsieur Malbranch seemes in some respect to be the same in Natural Phylosophy that those others are in Moral that is he grants no Natural efficiency to 2 d. Causes and that they are only signes and occasions upon which God will and without which he will not produce such effects Thus what Mr. Norris● Pa. 59. Of his Remarks upon the A●henian Society says concerning sensible impressions in resp●ct of Ideas may be said of all other causes tha● God has established a certain Order or connexion betwixt such impressions made upon our sences and such Ideas not that these impressions doe cause or produ●e these Ideas but that they are conditions upon the presence of which God will raise them or to speak more properly exhibit them to our m●nds Now according to this Hypothesis if God had ordered things so at first or shall hereafter do so then the running of a feather tho' never so lightly over a Mans hand might have caus'd the most exquisite pain imaginable then Tent●rden Steeple might have been as much the cause of Goodwins Sands as any second cause is of the effect which yet seems to follow from it But then if we consider what he sayes pa. 116. of his Illustrations he there seems not much to differ from the common Hypothesis ad deum seu ad causam Vniversalem ●bi effectuum specialium ratio postulatur recurrendum non esse fateor but withall he says naturae inestigatio falla●e● omnino vana ubi in eâ aliae verae causae quaeruntur quàm voluntates omnipotentis Again in the same place si fieri possit effectuum de quibus agitur causa naturalis specialis est explicanda but again he says actio istarum causarum consistit duntaxat in vi movente quâ agitantur illa vero vis movens nihil ali●d est quàm ipsa dei voluntas But it is no great sign of truth or of a good Cause when its Patron seems as it were thus opprest by its weight and thus operosely labours in the explication of it But it s observable that he himself grants that it● would be more agreeable if it could be done to assigne special natural causes of particular effects But now would it not be more Phylosophical to say that there are such particular causes in Nature tho' at present we are not able to assign 'em then thus to run to the more immediate power of God for the salving of every ordinary Phaenomenon of Nature I grant that it is very difficult to assign the just limits betwixt Natural and Supernatural power to determine justly where the one ends and the other begins or indeed fully to explain all the modes of Natural Phaenomena's but yet methinks it is not altogether so Philosophycal to ascribe these commonly reputed ordinary Phaenomena's of gravitation for example or the growing of a pile of Grass to the constant efficiency or Supernatural influence of almighty God I do not say that we are able to give a full solution of these things as to all the minutest circumstances of 'em nor would I ascribe too much to Natural causes but yet I think presently to have recourse to Divine power for the solution of all things this would damp all our further enquirys into Nature which is an employment very worthy of a rational Creature provided it does not extend too far I mean to the excluding of providence out of the World besides to ascribe all things immediatly to God exclusively of second causes might perhaps seem to detract from the tr●e Notion and nature of providence it self in that just and wise order of things in that exact harmony betwixt the Natural● and moral World which God has constituted in the Universe And it would be difficult to give any tolerable account worthy of the wisdom of God of those things commonly call'd second causes if they be but bare signes or conditions of those things which they seem to have some causal influence upon But he tells us Pa. 124. Of his Illustrations which I should have mentioned before ●●m voluntas mea determina● voluntatem dei certe brachium meum movebitur non voluntate meâ quae inessicax est perse sed voluntate dei quae effectu suo nunquam frustratur But why should he call the will of Man Inefficax when at the same time he tells us that it determins the will of God Might not Mans will if God had so pleas'd as well determine the motion of his own Arme as determine the will of God And I do not yet see how he has prov'd Gods pleasure to be otherwise Neither will those words per se do him any service for no

of Sir Charles Woosley's but I must Beg leave to tell him that it it not his busines to answer Arguments unless they be such upon which the Issue and success of our cause depends And here 1 We assert the truth of the History of the Gospel as to matter of fact 2. This suppos'd we say it certainly proves the Divinity of the Doctrine and a Supernatural Revelation contain'd therein Here he must prove the falseness of the one and the in-consequence of the other and what ever he doth less than this it is altogether nothing to his purpose no ways tends to make good his cause Tho' I do not say that he has Answered Sir Charles his Arguments I think he has not but suppose he had Sir Charles never design'd the whole cause should depend upon these two he might urge 'em as further confirmations of the thing he was then about but he did not lay the whole stress of the cause upon ' em I shall make some short remarks upon his Answer to the 2 d. Argument Pa. 206. The Argument is this Propitiation for our Offences must be supernaturally discovered or else we can come upon no certain terms of acceptation with God In answer to this he tells us that all the World who have agreed upon the fault agreed upon the compensation viz. Sorrow and true Repentance and reason dict●tes this without revelation I wonder why he should say that all the World is agreed upon this point when all the Christian World differs f●om him in it that is tho' they grant that Sorrow for sin and Repenance are necessary conditions in order to our being reconcil'd to God yet they do not exclude but necessarily include the satisfaction of Christ. And whereas he says that Reason dictates this without Revelation I answer that tho' Reason may dictate a natural propensity and inclination in God to pardon and forgiveness yet we cannot come to God upon such certain terms of acceptation as we may do upon the assurance we have by Divine Revelation and that for these two reasons 1. Guilt is naturally full of fears and jealousies but Natural Religion is not so fully suited to answer and take away all these as Christianity is as might easily be made appear 2. Natural reason cannot so fully assure us of the truth and sincerity of our Repentance as it doth or may convince us of the heinousness of our many sins and repeated provocations against God and I think Natural Religion doth not dictate Sorrow and Repentance for sin any further a means of reconciliation with God than as it is sincere But he tells us now that more in all Ages ha●● agreed that Lustrations and Sacrifices without repentance were nothing c. Before he had said that all in all Ages were agreed c. Now only more were so But it will be hard here rightly to compute the number of Voices and it is probable it may go against him here too since there is scarce any whole Nation in the Heathen World without Sacrifices and Lustrations by Lustrations I mean whatever is outward and Ceremonial or if there be t is probable they are without Repentance too But he sayes that bare Repentance is a suffici●nt compensation for an Infinite Offence against an Infinite Being is what our Adversarys deny and therefore point us to an Infinite Sacrifice for sin viz. Iesus Christ But we do not point to any other Sacrifice or propitiation for sin than what God himself has pointed them to and that with such clearness and evidence as to matter of fact as is beyond the possibility of their ever proving the contrary and here will return the force of that Argument Which like a dead weight hung about the neck of Deisme will at last ●ink it viz. The necessity they lye under of proving the History of the Gospel and the Doctrine therein contain'd to be false I would willingly assert the necessity of Christs satisfaction as far as possible only not to introduce a fatality into the Divine nature or to destroy the liberty of God's acting herein Therefore I do not well understand what Mr. Norris meanes when he tells us pa. 4. Of his Reason and Faith that the necessity of Christ's satisfaction ought to be grounded on the Essential order and justice of God Was Christ's coming into the World made necessary by any other essential order or justice of God different from his own free good will and love to Mankind That Sin should not go unpunish'd was highly agreeable both to the wisdom and justice of God but yet we should be carefull not to entertain any opinions herein which may seem to lessen the riches and freeness of Divine goodness in sending his Son into the World for Mans Redemption And when we have asserted the truth of Christs satisfaction in offering himself a sacrifice for Sin doth it any way derogate from the glory of God or rather is it not highly agreeable to his manifold wisdom Ephe. 3. 10. Thereby also to accomplish some other subordinate ends of Divine providence such as were yet truly worthy of God to propound and not unworthy of Christ to undertake But he tells us pa. 207. That till all who profess Christianity agree whether Christ be a propitiation or no I need not goe about a further confutation of this Argument But this seemes rather a slight way of shuffling off than Answering the Argument but is it indeed a sufficient Answer to any Doctrinal point to say that all who profess the same Religion are not agreed in that particular I may then tell this Gentleman who asserts Repentance only a sufficient propitiation for Sin against God that till all who profess Deisme agree in this particular I need not go about any further refutation of it For the Author of the summary account of the Deists Religion pa. 89. Tells us that some thing further besides repentance viz. Obedience for the future ending in an assimilation to God is required in order to the reinstating a Man after Sin in God's favour The Socinians indeed will not allow Christ in a strict and proper sence to be a Sacrifice or propitiation for Sin But will it therefore follow that it is not a truth because these Men deny it If what Limborch says pa. 108. Of his Amica Collatio cum Iudaeo Speaking of the two Natures in Christ be true Ad huc non credunt Sociniani satis sunt Christiani If Socinians be Christians enough than there is very little required of a Man in reference to his Credenda To make him a Christian. What remains is either much what the same with what has been already con●idered before or something which seems his own peculiar way of arguing against himself that so he might return the more easy Answers But I am afraid I have already tired my Reader in prosecuting these little things I cannot in justice or Charity suppose these Gentlemen such Deisis as border more immediately upon