most extensive as to al effects Doth not every cause by how much the higher it is by so much the more extend it self to varietie of effects Must not God then by being the first Cause necessarily extend his Concurse to al effects 4 From the Providence of God That althings fal under the Providence of God Plato as wel as Scripture greatly proves as we shal hereafter Ch. 8. § 2. shew and if so must not then the Concurse of God universally extend to althings so far as they partake of Being either natural or moral 4. Prop. Gods Concurse in regard of al second causes and objects is principal Gods concurse principal The Principatie and Soveraintie of Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects is frequently asserted in sacred Philosophie Esa 53.11 So it 's said of Christ Esa 53.11 He shal see the travel of his Soul Which assures us that Christ is the principal Parent of the New Creature as wel as of the old and that al Ministers or other Instruments are but as it were Midwifes unto Christ Thence Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 151. brings in Socrates using the same phrase touching himself and his Philosophemes Socrates being about to instruct Theaetetus one of his Disciples of great ingenie the more effectually to engage his attention and diligence he professeth That for his part he was but as his Mother a Midwife to assiste the Soul in the bringing forth of moral virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God compels me to play the Midwife but forbids me to generate Whereby he ascribeth the principal efficience of al moral virtue to God reserving only a ministerial subservience to man So great was the modestie of this poor Philosopher beyond many that professe Christianitie Thus Plato Repub. 6. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first and most soverain cause of althings whereas al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were children or effects and products and therefore al their efficience and causalitie is only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by commistion with and participation from God the first Cause Thence in his Phaed◠pag. 99. he affirmes that second causes if compared with the first deserve not the name of causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cal these causes is very importune or absued Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is a cause indeed is one thing and that without which a cause is not a cause another Plato here makes mention of two sorts of causes 1 One which is truely a cause i. e. the First cause 2 Another which is only causa sine qua non a cause without which the effect is not produced such are al second causes whose ministerie the First cause makes use of yet so as that the principal efficience belongs only to the First cause in respect of which second causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concauses or subservient causes employed by God for the production of things So in his Timaeus pag. 46. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These are concauses whose ministerie God useth to perfect so far as it may be the idea and forme of what is best But very many estime these to be not concauses but causes of althings But he subjoins Such have no reason or sense for what they assert 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For we must say that there is a Soul of althings that existe to whom only belongs the power of Vnderstanding but he is invisible Whence in what follows he expressely distinguisheth between the first and second causes ascribing principal causalitie to the former and ministerial or instrumental to the later There are in these Philosophemes of Plato observable 1 That God is the principal prime cause of althings 2 That al second causes if compared with God deserve not the name of causes but are only concauses or instruments to transfer the efficience of God unto the effect 3 That such as ascribe any causalitie to second causes more than what as instruments they receive from the First cause have neither sense nor reason on their side 4 That there is an universal Spirit or Soul which diffuseth it self throughout al create Beings and gives vigor determination and motion to al second causes and effects But now the more fully to explicate Plato's mind touching the principal Concurse of God the first cause How second Causes are Instruments of the first and the ministerial or instrumental causalitie of second causes we must first distinguish and then state and determine our Hypothesis We must distinguish 1 between principal causalitie simply considered and that which is such in its kind and in some respect 2 Between the second cause its respect to the first and its respect to the effect 3 Between an instrument taken in a laxe notion and in a strict also between a moral and a physic Instrument again between an active and passive Instrument lastly between a pure Instrument and a vital elevate Instrument 4 Between effects natural and supernatural These distinctions being premissed we shal state and determine our Hypothesis in the following Propositions 1 The Causalitie of God is simply and universally principal yet that of second causes may be principal in its kind The concurse of God is so far principal as that it can and oft doth produce its effect without the concurse of second causes but second causes can never produce their effects without the concurse of God the first Cause Hinc est quod omnes operationes hominis bonas quantumcunque fiant à libera voluntate tribuere solet augustinus ipsi Deo tanquam qui per voluntatem ut per instrumentum quod pro libero suo beneplacito agit impellit flectit vertit inclinat quoliber motus ipsius voluntatis operetur Ipse inquit cantat in nobis cujus gratia cantamus Nempe dicuntur ista non ut homini libera voluntas sed ut gloriatio de sua voluntate tollatur ne puter à se esse quod Deus donat Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. There is no effect which the second cause produceth but the first cause can produce it alone for his omnipotent concurse reacheth to al effects that implie not a contradiction without the least dependence on any second cause the second cause needs the first in al its operations but the first cause needs not the second in any Yea where the first and second cause concur to the same effect the concurse of the first cause is infinitely more principal than that of the second because the second cause actes not but as acted by the first cause The Excitation Application Determination and Actuation of the second cause is from the first Yet we may not denie a principal efficience to some second causes so far as the first cause has communicated to them a virtue of their own to be communicated to their effects as it wil appear by what follows
Mat. 7.18 How did Paul when he was a Persecutor become a Preacher How did Peter when he had abjured Christ get off this spot By what means was the wild Olive implanted into the good Olive Rom. 11.17 Rom. 11.17 How did the Thief get admission into Paradise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 having perceived therefore the force of precedent Divine aide every one that wils both labors and moves althings for a naked wil sufficeth not and learnes and attains Salvation Wherein he assertes 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that supernatural antecedent aide or Grace workes al in maters of Salvation 2 That the naked wil sufficeth not to performe any good Chrysostome in Genes Hom. 9. cals this prevenient Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace that seeks what is lost and is found by such as seek it not Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipant Grace So de Baptis lib. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By the prevenient Grace of God we worke and confer our duties according to saith by love This antecedence and Prioritie of Divine Concurse may be demonstrated 1 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil which necessarily precedes the Act of the second cause because eternal and independent as before 2 From the efficace of the Divine Concurse as it infallibly determines the second cause to act and so must be necessarily antecedent thereto not only simultaneous as the Jesuites hold 3 From the Dependence and Subordination of the second cause to the First Al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses dependent on and subordinate to the First cause as Plato now where there is dependence and subordination here must necessarily be Prioritie and Antecedence of that on which the subordinate dependes Thus Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 2. pag. 568. By comparing saith he the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the Creature whence it is said that the first cause doth first influence or concur because the second cause actes not but in and by its virtue Yet it cannot be denied but that the Jesuites generally allow God only a simultaneous Concurse as o the acts of the Wil because otherwise as they conceit the libertie of the Wil cannot be preserved This simultaneous concurse they make to be nothing else but the very action of the second cause as it procedes from God Burgersdicius Metaph. l. 2. c. 11. grants that Gods Concurse in supernatural Acts is previous but yet in naturals he allows it to be only simultaneous But that Gods Concurse not only in supernaturals but also in naturlas is previous the Dominicans strongly prove from the very nature of the First cause and dependence of the second for where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie there is posterioritie c. 4. Gods Concurse to and with second causes is total Gods Concurse total This Totalitie of the First cause doth not exclude the Totalitie of the second cause in its kind but only its partialitie and coordination in the same kind For it 's a trite Rule in Philosophie that in causes subordinate there may be diverse total causes in different kinds concurring to the same effect but not in the same kind So we say that God and the Sun and Man are al total causes in the production of a Man because they al have different kinds of causalitie When therefore we say that Gods Concurse is total we do only denie the Coordination or Copartialitie of the second cause We allow the second cause to cooperate with God in a way of subordination but not to be a coordinate social or copartial cause with God Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects workes al totally and solitarily it admits not of a Corrival or Copartner it is no partial cause but workes the whole effect though not without the subservience of inferior causes and instruments As in natural causes you ascribe the whole efficace and causalitic of the instrument to the principal cause specially if the instrument be purely passive without any inherent virtue of its own As you ascribe not the victorie to the Generals Sword but to his Valor so here the instruments which Christ useth in the workes of the new Creation are purely passive they have no efficace but what is imparted to them by him the principal Efficient and therefore they cannot be partial social causes This Totalitie of Divine Concurse is wel demonstrated by that great and pious Witnesse against Antichrist even in the darkest times of Poperie Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lancolne in his MSS. de Libero Arbitrio Efficacious Grace so workes with the Freewil that at first it prevents the act of the Wil and afterwards concurs yet not so as if part were wrought by Grace and part by Free-wil but each in its kind workes the whole for two individual Agents must necessarily worke one and the same effect when their action is indivise This Augustin illustrates by a Rider and the Horse by whom one and the same act or motion is totally produced so the Action of God and of the Wil concur totally And so in every effect of every Creature God and the next second cause produce the same conjointly not apart or one this part and that the other part c. This Totalitie of Divine Concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently and lively illustrated and demonstrated by the Greek Theologues Thus Chrysostome Hom. 12. ad Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We see houses beautifully built Hoc inquit Bonaventura piarum mentium est ut nihil sibi tribuant sed totum Gratiae Dei unde quantumcunque aliquis det Gratiae Dei à pietate non receder etiamsi multa tribuendo Gratiae Dei aliquid subtrahit potestati Naturae cùm verò aliquid Gratiae Dei subtrahitur Naturae tribuitur quod Gratiae est ibi potest periculum intervenire Cassandri Consuloat Art 18. and we say the whole is the Artificers albeit he has worke men under him so the whole of good must be ascribed to God So in Genes 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole is from the Grace of God So ad Ephes Hom. 18. speaking of Paul he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thou seest how in althings be conceles what is his own and ascribes al to God So Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 31. speaking of Paul saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he ascribes al to God Thus also Cyril Alexandr and others as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Ch. 9. Sect. 3. § 12. This partial concurse supposeth God and the Creature to act together in the same kind of causalitie which is repugnant both to the nature of God as also to the condition of the Creature 1 This partial Concurse is repugnant to the independent simple perfect nature of God as also to his prime soverain efficacions causalitie What more incongruous and unbecoming
Law of their natures apt to obey the first independent Cause namely God in the receiving or acting any possible effect that implies not a contradiction albeit it may excede the natural capacitie force or efficace of their Beings So that this obediential power regardes supernatural effects which the second cause cannot reach by its own Virtue and Activitie but only as elevated by the efficacious Concurse of God Thus the Humanitie of Christ had an obediential power to the Hypostatic Union unto which it was elevated by the supernatural efficacitie of the Spirit of God This obediential power which is essential to every dependent Being is founded in the participation and limitation of a Creature and its subordination to the absolute Dominion of God of which more anon Hence 4 every dependent Being is contingent For whatever has any passive or obediential power is obnoxious to the soverain pleasure and concurse of its first cause to which it owes absolute obedience even to annihilation Hence 5 every dependent Being is defectible For as it is essential to the first independent Being to be indefectible so also to al second dependent Beings to be defectible The supreme God being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-being and self-sufficient a pure simple Act without the least mater or passive power it is impossible that he should ever fail in any thing but every Creature being Ens or Being by participation and so composed of Something and Nothing or of Act and Pfassive Power it cannot be but that it should be Defectible or apt to fail which is the root of its Dependence as it wil appear by the next Proposition § 4. The Origine of Dependence 1. Passive Power The Root and origine of al Creatural Dependence is the creatures passive power and Gods Absolute Dominion ever it 1. One Root and Origine of al creatural Dependence is that passive power which every Creature is invested with For the explication whereof we are to consider that all Creatures being educed by God out of Nothing stil retain a tincture or mixture of their Primitive Nothing so that no Creature can be said to be pure Being for this is an attribute peculiar to the first Independent Being whose name is Exod. 3.14 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who is or according to Plato's Phraseologie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being Every Creature has something of Nothing contempered with its Being yea more of Nothing than of Being which makes it obnoxious to Limitation Contingence Mutabilitie Defectibilitie and Dependence Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. L. 2. C. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The increate being solely is interminate or unlimited in nature for every Creature is terminated or limited by God who created it Now al limits as to Nature and Essence speake a mixture of Nihilitie Passive Power and Dependence resulting therefrom whence Damascene addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Deitie only is impassible namely because exemt from Nihilitie Passive Power and Dependence This Nihilitie or Nothingnesse of the Creature is the same with its Passive Power either Physic or Metaphysic Natural or Obediential whereby it is limited and confined to such or such a degree of Entitie Existence and Operation For where-ever there is any mater or passive power of any kind there is ever coarctation and confinement Nothing is or can be Infinite but the first pure simple Act who is void of al power and composition and therefore of al finitude and limitation But every Creature being compound of Something and Nothing i.e. of Act and Power it 's thereby rendred finite and limited to such a degree of Essence and Activitie and according to the Degree of its Entitie and Actualitie such is the Degree of its Amplitude and Perfection Angelic and human Spirits have of al Creatures least of Nihilities or Nothing and most of Entitie and Actualitie and therefore they have least of passive power and confinement But yet because they retain something of their Primitive Nothing and Passive Obediential power therefore they have something also of limitation and confinement So for al other Creatures which are by so much the lesse or more limited and confined in Essence and Operation by how much the more or lesse they partake of mater or passive power So that al Dependence ariseth from the Nihilitie Passive Power and limitation of the Creature Hence 2. Another main root of Dependence is the Dominion of God the first cause of althings For al Creatures having been educed 2. The Dominion of God by the Omnipotent Power of God out of Nothing and invested only with a finite limited Being composed of Something and Nothing or Act and Passive Power hence it necessarily follows that al are subject to the Absolute Dominion of their Creator and impedible according to his pleasure Where ever there is passive Power there is impedibilitie There is nothing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible but God who is Pure Act and Lord of all God has an Absolute Dominion over his Creature for al uses that implie not a contradiction This plenary and absolute Dominion of God appertains to his Infinite Omnipotence and Supremacie as the first Cause of althings For no Dominion is complete and perfect unlesse it include a Power for al possible use May we estime that a perfect Dominion which has not an absolute dispose of al under its Dominion And to this absolute Dominion of God must there not correspond an absolute subjection in the Creature Are not these two correlates And doth not this absolute subjection of the Creature to God speak its absolute dependence on God Is it possible that any Creature made by God should be exemted from his Absolute Dominion And doth not Absolute Dependence on God necessarily follow hence Neither doth this absolute Dependence on God regard only the Essence and Conservation of the Creature but also al its operations for otherwise the Creature were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible which is against the Law of its Creation and Dependence as § 11 12. Thus every Create Being is under the Absolute Dominion of God both as to its Essence Existence Activitie and Operation God can deprive it of each of these as he pleaseth yea reduce it to its first Nothing Hence Dependence on God as to each of these is essential to every Creature as in what follows § 5. Every Creature as such is Dependent on its Creator or first Cause Every Creature Dependent For the Demonstration of this we shal lay down this Hypothesis which I conceive al wil grant That it is impossible the same thing should be and not be This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition thus 1 Dependence both in Essence and Operation is so essential to a Creature as that the negation of it supposeth the Creature not to be a Creature The force and evidence of this Argument wil more fully appear in the explication of the next Proposition wherein we are to demonstrate the intime connexion
influential on al the former parts of Logic as also on the operations of the mind about which they are conversant For how can the mind define or divide or distinctly explicate simple Ideas and Notions without Method How imperfect and confused wil its Judgements Ratiocinations and Discourses be unlesse Method assist Hence the Ancients Plato and others reduced the whole of Logic to Method which without al peradventure is the most utile part thereof if not Comprehensive of the whole In the general Method is an Art whereby the Mind is rendred capable rightly to dispose a series of many simple Notions or Apprehensions Judgements and Ratiocinations in order to the Investigation Explication and Demonstration of truth as also the deeper impression thereof on the Memorie In this description we have both the Object Ends and Effects of Method The Object of Method is 1 Simple Notions and Apprehensions Wherein we are to consider their Definition and Distribution In the Definition we are to consider 1 The Name And herein the principal care is to clear the Name from al Obscuritie and Equivocation which is best performed by an Examen of and Inquisition into its Etymologie or Origination Homonymie and Synonymie 2 The Definition of the Thing which must be expressed in termes most known and essential for what is a Definition but the Idea or manifestation of a Thing As for Distribution it is of the whole into its parts which gives a distinct Idea or Notion of a thing 2 Another Object of Method is Propositions and Judgements Wherein we are to avoid al Precipitance Anticipation and Prejudice giving to al Propositions that Measure of Assent as their insite Reason or Autoritie requires admitting nothing as certain or evident but what we know or have reason to believe is certainly or evidently true 3 The last object of Method is Ratiocination and Discourse Wherein we are 1 To leave nothing ambiguous or obscure in the Termes 2 To deduce al Ratiocinations from principes most certain and evident in themselves such as no one invested with commun sense may gainsay For first principes give evidence and force to al conclusions but receive none from them 3 Al Cogitations and Ratiocinations employed for the Investigation of Truth or Remotion of any error must be digested and ranged into the most natural order beginning from things more general simple and easily to be known and thence passing on to things more difficult and composite 4 In seeking out Arguments and examining Difficulties there must be a complete enumeration of all singulars and parts with a distribution proportionable thereto that so nothing be omitted that may conduce to the examen of truth More touching Method see Court Gent. Part 2. B. 3. c. 8. § 3. B. 4. c. 1. § Thus much for Logic wherein we have been the more large because we have no where treated distinctly and fully of it § 3. Real Philosophie may be according to its different Objects Real Philosophie distributed into Natural Moral and Metaphysic or Supernatural Natural 1. Natural Philosophie regardes things considered in their natural Ideas and Essences or things considered in their notional extension 1 Things considered in their natural Ideas and Essences belong to Physic or Natural Philosophie strictly so termed Physic which considers Things Natural 1 In their General Principes and Affections 2 In their parts which are two the Macrocosme or greater world and the Microcosme or Man Of which see Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 2. and Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. 2 Natural things considered in their Notional Extension or Quantitie are discoursed of in Mathematics Mathematic which comprehend Arithmetic Geometrie Astronomie Music Optics Geographie Mechanics c. Of which Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. s 2. 2. Moral Philosophie is according to its object Moral Philosophie distributed into Ethic 1. Ethic. strictly so termed Oeconomic and Politic. 1 Ethic strictly so termed regards the morals of private persons Wherein we may consider 1 It s Generic Idea Moral Prudence whereof we have copiosely discoursed Philos Gen. P. 2. L. 2. c. 6. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. § 1. 2 It s prime Object which is the last end and chiefest good which we have largely discussed Philosoph Gen. P. 1. L. 1 3. c. 3. s 1. P. 2. L. c. 1. s 3. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 2 3. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. § 2. 3 The Principes of Human Acts Practic Judgement Volition or Intention Consultation Election of which Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 24-27 P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. also Philos Gen. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. § 4. 4 Subjective and Formal Beatitude wherein we are also to consider Vse Fruition and Delectation or Joy Of the first see Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 1. § 2. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 3. § 2. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 23. But of Vse Fruition and Delectation see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. § 4-8 5 The Moralitie of human Acts of which Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 29. P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. § 1 c. also Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 3. § 1. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 4. § 1. 6 Natural Libertie which we have copiosely explicated Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 2. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 4. § 2. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. s 3. § 11 12. B. 4. c. 1. § 28. 7 Moral Good or Virtue its Causes Formal Idea or Nature Parts and Adjuncts Of which Court Gent. Part 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 29-32 P. 4. B. 1. c. 2 3. also Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 3. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 4. 8 Moral Libertie of which Court Gent. Part 4. B. 1. c. 3. also Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 3. 9 Sin its Nature and Causes of which Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 33. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. also Philos General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 4. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 4. § 6. 10 The effects and servitude of Sin Oeconomic of which Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. 2 Oeconomic of which Politic. Philos General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 6. 3 Politic of which Court Gent. Part 4. B. 1. c. 5. Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 6. 3. Metaphysic or prime Philosophie Metaphysic which principally regards the supreme most excellent Being and prime Cause of althings namely God his Existence Essence and Attributes his Acts of Creation and Providence his Concurse and Gubernation both Natural and Supernatural and Creatural Dependence c. Which we have more copiosely discussed Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. more cursorily Court Gent. P. 2. B. 2. c.
its chiefest good Thence that great Essate of the spurious Dionysius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Bonitie or the chiefest Good convertes althings to it self i. e. althings tend to and acquiesce therein as in their Centre or ultimate perfection 6 The more the Wil is conformed to the Divine Wil the more free it is and whose Wil is more conforme to the Divine Wil than his who actually and resolutely adheres to God Doth not such a Wil touch the Divine Wil in every point as two strait Lines 3. Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in an actual Dependence on the first Cause total and immediate Dependence on the first Cause of althings Every Creature having something of Nothing or passive Power either physic or metaphysic and obediential it thence fals under the Law of Mutabilitie which is the root of Dependence Novitie of Being Deficience and Dependence is essential to the Creature as Eternitie of Being Immutabilitie and Independence is to the Creator For every Creature being only Being by participation hence Dependence becomes intrinsecal to it and inseparable from its nature as Suarez Metaph. Disp 20. Sect. 5. acutey demonstrates Yea Disp 31. Sect. 14. he further demonstrates That Subordination or Dependence of a created Being both in acting and causing formally belongs to its essential reason as such because this dependence is founded not in any qualitie or proprietie of the Creature extrinsecal to its Essence but in the very intrinsecal limitation thereof So that the very Essence of the Creature as such is the root of this dependence and to suppose a Creature and not to suppose it to be dependent in essence and operation implies a contradiction Neither has the rational Creature a natural dependence only but also moral on its first Cause We find both mentioned by Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715. where he shews That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of al Beings whose conduct he that follows shal be happy And Epinom pag. 980. he assures us That he who praying to God doth trust in his Benignitie shal act wel So in his Timaeus pag. 27. he tels us That al who have any thing of an awakened mind when they attemt any mater either great or smal are always wont to cal on God Which is an high act of Dependence Thence Theages pag. 128. he brings in Socrates philosophising of his Dependence on God thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▵ AIMONION For there is a certain DEMON which has followed me with a Divine Afflation even from my childhood This is a voice that signifies to me what I must do c. What this Demon of Socrates was is greatly controverted by the ancient Philosophers who have written Books concerning it That it was some Divine Afflation or Inspiration they generally grant as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 1. § 4. It certainly importes his great sense of Dependence on some Divine Power either Real or Imagiuary Yea Planto in his Timaeus saith That Beatitude or moral Libertie is nothing else but to have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Demon dwelling in him Whereby peradventure he may allude to the Hebraic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Shekinah i.e. the Divine Habitation of Gow with men Thence the Greek Fathers terme efficacious Grace and our Dependence thereon in imitation of sacred Philosophie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitation of the holy Spirit also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indwelling Grace Which alludes to that of Paul 2 Cor. 12.9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 12.9 that the power of Christ might tabernacle or dwel on me It evidently alludes both name and thing to the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitation of God with and in men which denotes the highest Dependence And indeed herein consistes one main part of moral Libertie as to exercice Look as the beams of the Sun touch the Earth yet hang on the Sun as their original Cause so doth al true moral Virtue on its first Cause Virtuose persons who are most feeble in themselves are most strong and free by dependence on their first Principe Where there is a subordination of Causes either moral or natural it is the libertie of the inferior to depend on and receive from the superior Doth not the first Cause give forth actual assistances usually according to the measure of our actual dependence on him If he drop not in every moment new spirits and influences how soon do al moral Virtues wither and die away What more natural than for the second cause to depend on the first Where there is a limited essence is there not also a limited dependent Activitie Can a dependent cause produce any more than a dependent effect Must not every mutable variable defectible Being he reduced to some immutable indefectible first Cause That which had not Being from it self may it have Operation independently from it self Is not the operation of the second cause founded on the operation of the first If the created Wil cannot subsist of it self may it expect the privilege of acting from it self independently as to the first Cause Is not the human Wil a mere passive though vital instrument as to the reception of divine influences albeit it be active as to its own operation Must not then its dependence on the first Cause be absolute and total Yea is not this Dependence immediate And O! how is the Soul enlarged according to the measure of its actual dependence on the first Cause Without this dependence the most facile moral duties are most difficult but with it the most difficult are most facile The Soul is wel compared to a Glasse without a foot which so long as the Divine hand holds there is no danger of its being broken but if God withdraws his hand it soon sals to the ground and is deshed in pieces he need not take it and throw it against the wal it wil break of it self Hence the efficacious Grace of God is termed by the Ancients 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Munudaction also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 assistent Grace Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the energie and cooperation of God Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 al manner of energie Cyril 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the aide from above Chrysostome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the auxiliant or assistent Power Greg. Nyssen in Psalm saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Aide of God is the Head and Sum of Virtue And Chrysostome in Gen. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole of good is from the Grace of God Whence God is termed by Cyril in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Creator and Framer of al good and his efficacious Grace is termed by him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficacious Aide as by Chrysostome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the invincible Assistence Of which more hereafter The moral divine Life is nothing in regard of the first Cause but continual effusions and insusions into
has had no smal influence on Atheisme in that some of the principal Masters in these Sciences have endeavored to reduce al natural products and effects either to the accidental Concurse of Atomes or to some hidden virtues and spirits in Nature or to the various modifications of mater or to some mundane Spirit exclusive as to the first Cause and divine Providence Thus we find the first appearance of Atheisme to be among those philosophic Wits of Grece Democritus Epicurus c. who did al ways possible trie if they could salve the Phenomena of Nature without a Deitie 3 Eristic Logic has had too great influence on Atheisme as Plato Repub. 7. pag. 539. seems to intimate telling us That young men by frequent Dialectic litigations and contradictions each of other at last come to disbelieve every thing For Scepticisme naturally tends to Atheisme he that disputes every thing at length comes to believe nothing even in things divine 4 But yet the principal Parent and Nurse of Atheisme has been in al Ages carnal Policie The chief lineaments of Atheisme were formed at Rome when it became the Seat of State-policie For the secular Politician ascribes al the revolutions of States and human Affaires to some politic contrivement or defect therein And what makes the present Conclave at Rome and al their adherents so much to abound with Atheisme but the great confidence they have in their carnal policie Neither hath this politic Atheisme infected Rome only but also diffused it self throughout the European World Hence Machiavel that great secular Politician of Florence layeth Atheisme at the foundation of his carnal policie And it is to be feared there are too many such politic Atheists amongst us some are so bold and daring as that they are not ashamed openly to professe it others by their doutful Scepticisme give cause of suspicion I wish we had not too strong motives to force such a belief that a great part of those who professe themselves Christians had they but the advantages of interest and such like selfish motives could with as much facilitie turne Atheists It is natural to carnal reason and policie to step up into the Throne of God and take the Sceptre of his Providence out of his hand as we find it exemplified in Nebuchadnezar Dan. 4.30 Dan. 4.30 Is not this great Babylon that I have built i. e. by my wisdome and power c. 3. 3. From the carnal Mind Pride c. Atheisme springs not from true Philosophie but from the abuse thereof by the carnal mind of man This Plato has wel observed in the place fore-cited de Leg. lib. 12. pag. 967. where he shews that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Atheists who opposed the existence and providence of God as also overthrew the main fundaments of Religion were but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophistic spurious Philosophers Hence that grand Effate of Sr. Francis Bacon That a little Philosophie makes a man an Atheist but a great deal cures him of Atheisme And indeed to speak the truth it is not Philosophie simply in it self but the infidelitie carnal reason and spiritual pride of mans heart that makes men Atheists Psal 10.4 This we are assured of by sacred Philosophie as Psal 10.4 The wicked through the pride of his countenance The Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through is causal denoting the proper interne impulsive cause of the wicked's Atheisme The countenance here is brought in not as the formal subject or proper seat but as the Index of his pride that wherein it doth chiefly discover it self though the proper subject of it be the heart Thence the Thargum thus paraphraseth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through the pride of his spirit Thence it follows wil not seek after God This notes his practic Atheisme founded in speculative Whence it follows al his thoughts are that there is no God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies mischievous thoughts politic designing imaginations The wicked through the pride of his heart is ful of politic Atheistic imaginations that there is no God Thus Psal 14.1 Psal 14.1 The fool hath said in his heart there is no God The fool here is not such an one as wants reason but he that abuseth it unto practic Atheisme This I am bold to assert that the genuine and proper cause of that overspreading Atheisme which covers the face of this politic World is the carnal Reason Infidelitie and spiritual Pride of mens hearts not any defect of evidence in the objects of our Faith This is very clear because the most of your moderne Atheists are as credulous in their way as any other of the simplest of men Why else do they so greedily assent unto any infirme Hypothesis of those they admire upon as sleight and trivious reasons as may be imagined Certainly this so great credulitie in things natural or politic is a sufficient demonstration that it is not so much the want of evidence in maters of Faith that makes men Atheists as the pride and folie of their carnal reasons which they idolise It is a thing most prodigiose that those who abound with such soft facile credulous humors and inclinations to believe yea idolise false Deities created by their own lusts should have their minds prepossest with an incredulitie so obstinate and unpenetrable by al the impressions of the true Deitie 2. Plato gives us an account not only of the origine of Atheisme Threesorts of Atheisme but also of its kinds Thus de Leg. lib. 10. pag. 888. with mild and soft words he endeavors to convince the proud Atheists of his Age under the Symbol of a young man in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. My Son thou art yet young neither do I dout but that progresse of time wil make thee change thy opinion Expect therefore I beseech thee that now thou give thy judgement of the highest points 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which thou now judgest a mater of no moment is indeed a point of the highest consequence namely that any one thinking rightly of God lives wel or il But first touching this mater I wil signifie to thee one great thing lest I should seem to thee a lyer in this mater and it is this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Not thou alone nor thy friends have been the first who have entertained this Atheistic sentiment of God but from al memorie there have been more or fewer who have labored under this disease And I wil tel thee what has happened to them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 namely no one of them who from their youth entertained this opinion that God is not hath persevered therein even unto old age We find a great instance hereof in Bion mentioned by Laertius in his Life who in his health said The Gods were nothing but being worne out by a long disease and fearing death he acknowleged their existence c. Plato addes As for the two other opinions about God namely 1
instructes us The least notice of God of great moment That the least notices of God and his Divine Perfections ought to be of great moment and estime with us So in his Critieas pag. 107. by an allusion taken from Painters he illustrates this Hypothesis thus When Painters draw the Pictures of the Gods c. we thinke it sufficient if they give us but any darke representation of them neither do we being unskilful animadvert with a censorious eye on their worke but rest abundantly satisfied in what representation they give us But when they come to draw our own picture or the picture of any that belong to us we more severely animadvert and censure them if they erre in the least point The same is to be observed in the explication of these things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. When we discourse of things celestial and divine we thinke our selves abundantly satisfied if there be the least evidence brought for the explication of their nature but on the contrary in our examens of things mortal and human we are wont to use greater diligence Wherefore if those things which we are now about to discourse of be not so exactly as their dignitie requires represented by us you 'l pardon us An excellent preface to a discourse of things divine touching God which Plato is here entering on Hence 4. Al notices of God by Divine Revelation Plato adviseth us not to expect or desire farther discoveries of God than his own revelation and illumination shal afford to us So in his Timaeus pag. 29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It must be remembred both by me that speak and by you who are Judges of my discourses that we have but human Nature and therefore if we can but attain unto some Oriental Tradition or probable relation of these things touching God c. we may not inquire farther about them That by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must understand some Oriental Judaic Tradition originally of divine revelation I thinke wil appear evident to any that considers the use of this phrase in Plato Indeed in our contemplations and discourses of God it is neither profitable nor safe to procede further than divine Revelation and Illumination shal conduct us Neither need we be ashamed to be ignorant of such Secrets of God the humble ignorance of which argues more solid knowlege than curiose and vain speculations thereof These are the best bounds for our inquiries about God not only to follow God learning but also to leave off inquiring when and where God leaves off to teach as we may not neglect what God has reveled of himself so we may not search into what God has kept secret for as the former argues too much sloth and ingratitude so the later too much pride and curiositie It was a great Saying of Augustin We may safely follow Scripture which as an indulgent mother goes softly that she may not go beyond our infirmitie A believing ignorance in things not reveled about God is much better than a rash science Al natural reason and investigation about God ought to follow not precede faith Hence 5. The Gradation of our ascent to God Plato informes us That our ascent in the contemplation of God musk be by the same degrees by which he descendes to us either in his workes or words Thus Repub. 6. pag. 509 c. he informes us That it is above al human capacitie to comprehend the Majestie of the chiefest Good as it is in its inaccessible splendor yet we may ascend thereto by certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gra es or degrees which Grades of Ascent must be taken from Gods Grades or degrees of Descent unto us that so we may by a certain Analogie and similitude ascend up to the knowlege of God so far as it is possible for man Yet he gives us this needful caution That we must speake soberly of these so great Mysteries and take heed that we ascribe not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a spurious birth to the Parent of the Vniverse The grades or degrees whereby God descendes to us and we ascend to him are either natural or supernatural 1. Natural Grades of knowing God The natural Grades or Degrees whereby God descendes down to us and we ascend up to him are al the Effects Products and Workes of God with al their Virtues Efficaces Orders Varieties and al manner of Perfections So Plato Repub. 6. treating largely of Gods Causalitie he saith Al natural Causes and Effects are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Workes Artifices and Children of God the great Parent of the Vniverse whereby we may ascend up to the knowlege of God This is more natively and clearly laid down in sacred Philosophie Rom. 1.19 20. as Rom. 1.19 20. where he saith the visible workes of God as so many ascents lead us up to the contemplation of the invisible perfections of God specially his eternal power and Godhead That there is a natural knowlege of God gained by the Book of Nature is most evident albeit the Socinians to serve their Hypothesis denie it This natural knowlege of God is either insite or acquisite So Dion Prusaeensis said that our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 persuasion of God was either innate or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 acquisite Our insite and innate knowlege of God consistes in those commun notices of God both speculative and practic which are impressed on the Conscience Our acquisite natural knowlege of God is that which is gained by actual comparation and discourse from the workes of God This acquisite knowlege may according to the distribution of that spurious Dionysius who was indeed a great Platonist cap. 2. de Myst Theolog. be acquired and promoved three ways by way of Causalitie by way of Eminence by way of Negation 1 By way of Causalitie when by the Effects of God 1. By way of Causalitie which are either little Images or at least Vestigia Footsteps of God we mount up to the knowlege and contemplation of God the original Parent or first Cause of al. For indeed the effect carries with it the signature impresse and ressemblance of its Cause as you frequently see the Parents complexion or conditions in the Child Thus Plato Repub. 6. pag. 507. having laid down this preface that it was impossible to comprehend yea to apprehend any thing of the Divine Majestie in himself he tels us That he would inquire after him in his off-spring or effects and then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but take heed lest I should against my wil give you a spurious Idea of the Child of this great Parent He speakes in the language of Aratus cited by Paul Act. 17.28 we are al his off-spring Act. 17.28 and applies this notion to al lower goods which he makes to be the off-spring or issue of the chiefest Good and therefore by them we ascend up to the
2 Al second Causes if compared with the first are but instruments of his principal concurse Thus not only Aquinas Bradwardine and the more sane Scholastics but also Averroes de Somno Vigilia where he affirmes That second causes are moved by the first as instruments by the Artificer But here occurs a spinose knotty question much ventilated in the Scholes Whether the Wil in the reception of supernatural habits be an instrument or principal cause According to the former distinctions I should answer 1 That according to the general notion of an Instrument the Wil may be termed such in the reception and acting of Grace As it receives Grace it is a passive instrument yet as it actes Grace it is an active instrument 2 That the Wil in the receiving and acting Grace is a vital instrument Hence it is termed by Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Instrument a rational Instrument an Instrument composed and knocked at by that preclare Artificer the Spirit of God In receiving the first Grace the Wil is only naturally remotely and passively vital as it is a piece of human Nature but in the actuating what Grace is received it is a spiritually vital instrument Grace received elevates the human Soul to a spiritual Vitalitie and Instrumentalitie for the acting of Grace Hence 3 the Wil may as to the acting of Grace so far as it is clothed with Divine habits be termed in some respect a principal Agent under God specially if compared with the effect produced It 's true if the Wil be compared with God even in the acting of Grace received it is but a mere instrument because both Habit and Act are received from God yet if we consider the Wil as invested and qualified with supernatural habits which are the same to the Soul that it is to the Bodie whereby it is informed and capacitated to produce such or such supernatural Acts and Effects in this regard we may stile it a principal cause though I must confesse the notion of an Instrument used by Aquinas and others seems more adequate and genuine to expresse its causalitie by in as much as al is from God by supernatural infusion § 3. Having inquired into the Concurse of God in regard of its object Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with Gods Wil. we now procede to consider it as relating to its Subject or Principe which wil afford to us great notices of its genuine nature The Scholastic Theologues in their debates about the concurse of God to the supernatural Acts of the Wil are greatly divided some placing it in a certain efficacious impulse or motion of God whereby the Wil is determined to consent and act others in a certain actual premotion in the manner of a transient qualitie together with the operation of the Wil others in the very operation of the second cause or Wil as it procedes from the influxe of God premoving These make it to be an efficacious premotion or physic predetermination whereby the first cause makes the second to act others place this concurse as to gratiose effects in certain pious inspirations cogitations and indeliberate motions of love injected by God Albeit some of these scholastic sentiments may have their place if we consider the concurse of God with relation to its passive Attingence or as it terminates on the second cause and effect yet if we take it strictly according to its formal Idea I conceive no one of these opinions explicate the true nature thereof Therefore to explicate the genuine nature of the Divine concurse we must consider what relation it has to the Divine Wil whether it be really distinct therefrom or not And here we must in the first place reflect on what was asserted and proved in the former C. 5. § 4. touching the ordinate or executive power of God and its Indentitie with the Divine Wil which being supposed as it has been demonstrated it naturally follows that Gods concurse as to is active Attingence and effective principe is nothing else but the omnipotent efficacious volition of God For Gods executive power being the same with his Effective Wil it thence necessarily follows that his concurse is the same also Hence Sacred Philosophie every where makes Gods Wil the Effective Principe whereby althings are made and governed or directed to their proper Actions and Ends. As Psal 39.9 and 115.3 and 135.6 Mat. 8.2 3. 2 Chron. 20.6 and elsewhere as before C. 5. § 4. Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates dialogising with young Alcibiades that Athenian Gallant in this manner Doest thou know saith Socrates by what means thou mayst avoid this inordinate motion of thy mind Alcibiad Yes Socrat. How Alcibiad If thou wilt O Socrates i. e. by thy precepts and institutes Socrat. Thou mayst not say so Alcibiad How then Socrat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if God wil. Meaning that Gods wil was omnipoten and so could without more ado merely by his act of volition worke virtue in young Alcibiades But now to explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis namely That the Divine Wil is of it self operative we shal resolve the whole into the following Propositions 1. Prop. God as the first cause of althings doth not concur by his Essence absolutely considered Gods concurse not his essence absolutely considered For 1 If God should concur by his Essence absolutely considered he should act althings by a natural necessitie not with any precedent Libertie and then Gods making the world yea things most contingent would be as absolutely and naturally necessary as his loving himself It 's true Gods loving himself and al other immanent Acts have a concomitant Libertie or Divine spontaneitie attending them yet they admit not any Antecedent Libertie or Indifference of any kind But now Gods workes ad extra such as terminate on the Creature have not only a Concomitant but also Antecedent Libertie or some kind of Indifference so that God could according to a signum rationis or prioritie of nature not have willed them 2 If God should worke althings by his Essence absolutely considered things possible should have one and the same Idea with things future and so Gods Science of simple Intelligence should be the same with his Science of Vision And the reason of the consequence is most evident because the Essence of God absolutely considered is equally indifferent to things possible which shal never be as to things future which are to be 3 Again Gods Absolute Power should be the same with his Ordinate and his Sufficience the same with his Efficience if he wrought al things by his Essence absolutely considered 4 Hence also it would follow that God should alwaies worke and put forth his Omnipotence to the utmost extent in al operations For Causes that worke from a Necessitie of Nature worke to the utmost of their power 2. Prop. Gods concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God No executive
concurse Thence in sacred Philosophie the Divine Efficience is frequently expressed by the Word of God as the Word of Creation Gen. 1.3 Conservation Psal 107.20 Gubernation Destruction Restitution c. thereby to denote the efficacitie of the Divine Wil as mans Wil is expressed by his word of which hereafter § 4.6 Prop. See this Hypothesis wel demonstrated in Bradward Caus Deil l. 1. c. 9. p. 190. c. 10. p. 196. Ariminensiâ— Sent. 1. Distinct 45. Joan. Major Sent. 2. Quaest 3. § 4. Having discussed the Concurse of God The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 1. It is immediate as it relates to its Object and Subject or Principe we now come to treat of it in its Adjuncts and Modes of operation which wil give us great indications and notices of its nature 1. The concurse of God is as to its Mode of operation immediate This Adjunct or Mode of operation follows immediately on the origine or principe of Divine Concurse for it being nothing but the simple volition of God Particularly as to gratiose effects it thence necessarily follows that it must be immediate as to al objects and effects Esa 55.10 11. This immediation of Divine Concurse is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie So Esa 55.10 11. For as the rain cometh down and the snow from Heaven and returneth not thither but watereth the earth and maketh it to bring forth and bud that it may give seed to the sower and bread to the eater so shal my word that goeth forth out of my mouth it shal not returne unto me void but it shal accomplish that which I please and it shal prosper in the thing whereto I sent it 1 This must be understood not only of Gods reveled word but also of his efficacious word of concurse productive of things Psal 72.6 So Psal 72.6 2 Gods effective operative word or concurse is compared to the Rain which by Gods ordinance fals to water the earth straining it self through the liquid Air as through a Sieve dividing it self into millions of drops and immediately watering every inch of earth that so every herbe may receive its proportion of moisture gradually and immediately according to its exigence just so proportionably doth the efficacious concurse of God immediately insinuate it self into al second causes operations and effects specially such as are gratiose Hos 14.5 The like allusion we find Hos 14.5 I wil be as the dew to Israel he shal grow as the lillie Esa 26.19 The like Esa 26.19 For thy dew is as the dew of herbes The dew you know fals in a silent quiet night in millions of smal imperceptible drops and being of a gentle insinuating nature gradually and insensibly sokes into the erth tempers and allays the heat thereof specially in those hotter countries and immediately insinuates it self into the roots of plants which by reason of its moist benigne nitrose qualitie it comfortes refresheth and encourageth calling forth the fruits hereof and causing the face of things to flourish with beautie and delight much more efficaciously than sudden great shours or land-flouds which are more violent but lesse beneficial Thus Christ's gratiose concurse and influence fals like dew on the Believers heart in millions of drops which gradâ—aly insensibly and immediately insinuate thereinto causing it to fructifie and flourish much more effectively than al the shours of Divine wrath or Land-flouds of spiritual Bondage which suddenly break in on the consciences of many convict legal consciences but soon drie up again and leave them more barren and hard-hearted than before The Greek Theologues expresse this immediation of Divine Grace various ways sometimes they terme it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitant or indwelling Grace sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitation of the holy Spirit because it is wrought by the Spirit of God immediately as dwelling in the Believers heart But to treat more generally of Divine Concurse and its immediation as to al Objects Operations and Effects Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715 assures us That according to the ancient Tradition God has not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the beginning and the end but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the middle of althings i. e. God by his efficacious concurse penetrates althings and is more intimate and immediate to them than they are to themselves So also in his Parmenides he tels us That the prime Idea or cause is intimately present with althings influencing al both smal and great Whence he termes al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Co-operators with God But before we come to the demonstration of our Hypothesis we must premit somethings by way of explication and limitation 1 When we say Gods concurse to al second causes and effects is immediate we do not thereby exclude al means as if God did so concur as not to make use of second causes and instruments but that God concurs immediately in and with al means As in order to health God prescribes and useth means yet he concurs immediately in and with those means so in supernatural effects God useth Ministers and Ordinances yet concurs immediately in and with them 2 God concurs immediately to al second causes and effects not only by the immediation of Virtue but also immediatione suppositi by the immediation of his Essence for indeed the virtue of God is nothing else but his Essence or Wil as the effective Principe of althings The Divine Supposite is not so much as ratione or formally distinguished from his Virtue which is his effective omnipotent Wil. These premisses being laid down we procede to explicate and demonstrate the Immediation of Gods Concurse in the following Propositions 1. Prop. God concurs immediately unto every Act of the second Cause God concurs immediately to every Act of second Causes This Proposition is asserted not only by the Thomistes but also by the Jesuites Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. sect 1. and others And the reasons are invincible 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Aristotle in his Physics l. 8. c. 5. Metaphys l. 2. c. 12. assures us That in Agents per se and properly subordinate the inferior cannot act without the influxe or concurse of the superior cause And the reason is evident because if the inferior cause could act without the influxe of the superior it were not subordinate unto the superior in that act Neither is it sufficient to say that the second cause is subordinate to God as its Essence and Virtue is conserved by God according to the sentiment of Durandus and his Sectators for such a subordination of the second cause to the first is only accidental and remote as to its acting And who knows not that an accidental remote cause is not properly a cause Al proper subordination implies dependence of the inferior cause on the superior not only quando but quatenus agit both when and as it actes 2 From the limitation
the supreme infinite Being than to be yoked with his Creature as a partial social coordinate cause 2 This also is inconsistent with the Subordination Dependence and Inferioritie of the second cause For al social partial causes are as such coordinate and equal the effect dependes on each but they depend not each on the other To make the second cause social and coordinate with the first what is it but to make it a first cause 3 This also is inconsistent with the prioritie and antecedence of Gods concurse for a partial causalitie is only simultaneous which has been already refuted 4 The sober Scholastic Divines have ever owned and approved a Totalitie of Divine concurse So Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. cap. 70. It 's manifest saith he that the same effect is ascribed to the natural and second cause and to the Divine Efficace not as if it were partly from God and partly from the natural Agent but the whole effect is from both in a different mode as the same effect is attributed totally to the Instrument and yet totally to the principal cause The like Alvarez Disput 85. The Totalitie of Divine concurse as to the new Creature and Gratiose Effects is lively illustrated and demonstrated in Sacred Philosophie Thus Esa 43.7 Esa 43.7 Even every one that is called by my name for I have created him for my Glorie I have formed him yea I have made him Here Christ assumes to himself as the sole total principal Agent the Creation Formation and Consummation of the New Creature As in the old Creation God made first the rude Chaos out of nothing then out of the rude Chaos he formed the several species of the Universe and particularly the Bodie of Man out of the dust of the Earth which was Formation thence in the last place he breathed into Man a Rational Soul which gave Consummation to him So proportionably hereto Christ here assumes to himself a threefold concurse and each total in the framing of the New Creature he saith 1 I have created him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have educed or called him out of nothing as I did the first rude Chaos The new Creature is not educed out of the potence of corrupt Nature but out of nothing by Divine Omnipotence But if this be not enough to expresse the Totalitie of his efficacious Essicience he addes 2 I have formed him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This also is a terme whereby the formation of Creatures out of the first chaos is expressed The sense is I have not only given him some first lines a rude masse or shape of a new Creature but I have fashioned and formed him as I at first formed Adam out of a piece of Red Earth or Clay For so the word signifies to forme or shape a thing as the Potter doth his Clay to this or that forme And if al this wil not suffice to demonstrate that Christ is the total Creator and Formator of the New Creature he addes yet farther 3 Yea I have made him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. I have perfected and completed the whole worke I have made him such as I would have him conforme to mine eternal Idea concerning him he has no part wanting or misplaced not a finger or little toe defective he is a complete perfect new Creature and that by virtue of my Creation Formation and Consummation Thus the whole of the new Creature as wel as of the old is to be ascribed to Christ totally and solely as the Creator Fictor and Effector thereof And here we are also to note that it was usual with the Hebrews to expresse the workes of the interne new Creation under the symbol of the externe old Creation The Totalitie of the Divine concurse is also we expressed Esa 63.5 and Psal 94.17 5. Gods concurse particular not general only The concurse of God as the first cause is particular and proper not only general This Adjunct or mode of operation may seem novel but really it is not so Before we come to the demonstration of it we must premit some Distinctions and Limitations 1 We must distinguish between a general providence and general concurse we denie not but that Gods Providence as it extendes to althings universally may be termed general which yet doth no way induce or suppose a general concurse i. e. such as is alike commun to al effects and determinable thereby as the concurse of the Sun is determinable by the effects it workes on Such a general concurse is unworthy of the first cause who determines al effects but is determinable by none Bradwardine de Causd Dei l. 3. c. 7. p. 668. undertakes to give us the origine of this general influxe or concurse which he makes to be from the Pagan Philosophers ' specially the Astrologers who asserted an emanation or irradiation of general influxes from celestial Bodies which they supposed to be Gods on al subjects or maters 2 We must distinguish between a particular cause and a particular concurse We do not affirme that God is a particular cause but an universal cause concurring in a particular manner to al second causes and their effects And here Heereboord Select Disputat Vol. 1. Disput 10 and 11. whiles he justly opposeth his Master Burgersdicius for denying Gods concurse to be particular he himself false into this easie mistake of making God a particular cause For the obviating of which as also for the taking away the foundation of al the objections urged against our Hypothesis we say that God is an Vniversal Cause and yet his concurse as to the mode of its operation is particular God is said to be an Vniversal Cause in regard of the extent of his causalitie as it extendes to al objects effects and second causes universally and yet his concurse is particular as it is not like that of the Sun determinable by its object but doth in a particular manner according to the exigence and condition of the subject determine the same These things being premissed we procede to demonstrate that the concurse of God is not general but particular as to its manner of working with al second causes 1 From the nature of a General concourse which is of it self indifferent but modified and determined by the mater it workes on So the influxe of the Sun is only general and indifferent because modified by the mater it workes on as it is evident by the colors in a Rain-bow as also by the opposite effects it has on the waxe and clay To suppose Gods concurse to be thus General and Indifferent is every way unworthy of the first cause which determines al second causes but is determined by none To assert that the concurse of God is in the power of the second cause or mater it workes on what is this but to suppose the second cause to be first and the first second 2 From the manifold imperfections that are hereby imposed on God For if
Judicial Gubernation of Sin consistes of these several particulars 1 God suspendes and withdraws the Celestial Influences of Divine Grace and means of restraint Thus Gen. 6.3 My Spirit shal not always strive with man How soon wil the softest heart grow harder than the Adamant if God withdraw his celestial dews of Grace as Zach. 7.12 14.17 18 Hence 2 God leaves men to the plague of their own corrupt hearts which is Plato notes is the worst judgement 3 God leaves Sinners to the heart-betwitching allurements and blandishments of this World Thus Balaam Num. 22 c. 2 Pet. 2.14 15. 4 God delivers Sinners up to the power of Satan 2 Cor. 4.3 4. 2 Tim. 2.26 5 God so orders and disposeth his providences as that al do accidentally by reason of their corrupt hearts tend to their induration Rom. 11.9 10 11. 6 Yea God permits that the very means of life be to them the savor of death 2 Cor. 2.16 Esa 28.12 13 14. 7 Yea the Prince and Mediator of life is to such a strumbling-stone and occasion of death Esa 8.14 15 16. 38.13 8 God leaves them to a spirit of slumber or spiritual occecasion Rom. 11.8 Esa 19 11-14 44.18 19. 60.1 2. 2 Thes 2.10 11. 9. Prop. In the whole of Divine Gubernation about Sin his Wisdome Justice and Sanctitie Gods Attributes illustrious in his Gubernation of Sin with other Attributes are most illustrious and resplendent 1 Gods Wisdome is eminently manifest in his gubernation of Sin in that he brings the greatest good out of the greatest evils those very sins whereby wicked men endeavor to darken the Glorie of God he turnes to the advance of his Glorie We have a good Philosopheme to this purpose in Plato Theaetet pag. 167. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A wise man makes those things which are in themselves evil turne to good and to seem such as a wise Physician turnes poison into a medicament which similitude he useth 2 The Justice of God is most resplendent in the punishing that sin he permits to be 3 Gods Sanctitie is also most conspicuous in that those very acts which are morally evil in regard of God are both morally and naturally good in regard of Divine Gubernation The sin which God governes is not sin in regard of God but of the Creature that comes short of the Divine Law The holy God violates no Law by concurring as an universal Cause with the Sinner that violates his Law The sinful qualitie of a moral effect may not be imputed to the first universal Cause Duo cùm faciunt idem non est idem Proverb but only to the second particular cause Here that commun Proverbe holds true When two do the same it is not the same i. e. the same sinful act whereto God and the Sinner both concur is not the same as to both but morally evil as to the Sinner and yet naturally yea morally good as to Gods concurrence Sin as to God speakes a negation of his concurse not a privation of any thing due neither doth God wil sin simply as sin under that Reduplication but only as good and conducible to his Glorie The reason of Gods willing and governing sin both in the Elect and Reprobate is univocally one and the same namely the advance of Divine Glorie For the greatest evil of sin has something of good mixed with it which God wils and orders for his Glorie There is nothing in the world purely simply and of it self evil if there were God who is the chiefest good could not wil it Lastly man only is the proper and formal cause of sin or moral evil because he alone comes short of the rule of moral good so that Divine Gubernation both as permissive ordinative and judicial about Sin is sufficiently vindicated from the least imputation thereof CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose men and Angels Supernatural Illumination from God The Infusion of Virtues Gods care of virtuose Men. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World The Angels Law Obedience and Disobedience Good Angels their Communion with Saints The Ministration of Angels 1 At the giving of the Law and Christ's Incarnation 2 For the Protection of Saints 3 For their Conduct 4 Their Sympathie with Saints Their Ministration at the final Judgement Divine Gubernation as to evil Angels Satans power to temt and his Limitation § 1. Supernatural Illumination from God HAving discussed Gods Divne Gubernation about Sin we now passe on to his supernatural Efficience and Gubernation of Virtue and virtuose Men. We intend not to treat hereof as it belongs to Christian Theologie but only as it fals under metaphysic or prime Philosophie termed by some Natural Theologie 1. Plato gives us frequent and great notices of Divine Illumination which is the Origine of al supernatural Virtue Thus in his Theages he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If it please God thou shalt profit much and speedily otherwise not So in his Philebus he assures us That the cognition of the supreme infinitie Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the gift of God to men The like Epinom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 How is it that God should be accounted the cause of al other good things and not much more of wisdome which is the best good But to treat more distinctly of Divine Ilumination we are to know that as there is a twofold spiritual Darknesse the one objective in the things to be known the other subjective in the mind that is to know them so proportionably there is a twofold Light the one objective whereby God reveles the things to be known the other subjective whereby God takes off the veil from the mind and thereby inables it to apprehend supernatural Objects Now by this twofold Light Divine Gubernation conductes the Rational Creature to his supernatural end 1 God conductes the Rational Creature by an objective Light or Divine Revelation of his Wil whereby he reveles mans supernatural end and the means conducing thereto Some imperfect fragments or broken notices of this Divine Revelation were gleaned up by the wiser Heathens Pythagoras Solon Socrates Plato which gave them sufficient cause to admire and in some superstitiose manner to imitate the Judaic Institutes and Laws as the Fountain of the best Wisdome as it was foretold by Moses Deut. 4.5 6 7. and as we have sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Parts Whence we find mention in Plato Minos pag. 317. of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Word which if I mistake not refer to Divine Revelations vouchsafed the Church of God for its conduct unto eternal life 2 As God governes and conductes the Rational Creature by an objective so also by a subjective Light which is essentially requisite for the acquirement of its supernatural end Of this also we find some and those not vulgar notices in Plato So in his Repub. 6. pag. 507 508. where he
ful and convictive demonstration and explication of the Necessitie and Nature of creatural Dependence we shal resolve the whole into the following Propositions 1. Every Being dependent or independent Prop. Every Being is dependent or independent That this distribution of Ens into independent and dependent is adequate and commensurate is generally confessed by such as discourse of Metaphysics And for the demonstration and explication hereof we are to consider That a dependent Being and that on which it dependes do really differ in number And the reasons are demonstrative 1 Because nothing as such can be said to depend to itself 2 The dependent is in order of Nature at least posterior and inferior to that on which it dependes 3 Dependence importes subordination to that on which the dependence is Hence Divines say that the Son of God albeit he be as to Origine from the Father yet in as much as he partakes of the same Essence with the Father he cannot be said to be dependent on him For he being in the forme or Essence of God thought it not robberie to be equal with God Phil. 2.6 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Phil. 2.6 here is generally rendred by al Rapine or Robberie and we may take it properly and so make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he did not unjustly assume or arrogate to himself this title and character of being equal with God For that is accounted Rapine or Robberie in a proper sense when any injuriosely assumes or takes to him that which belonges to another Thus the fallen Angels and Adam committed rapine or robberie against God by endeavoring or affecting an equalitie with God Thus also should a Creature affect or arrogate an independence either in Essence or Operation it may justly fal under the imputation of Robberie against God because it thereby equaliseth itself to God But our Lord Christ accounted it not robberie to be equal with God i. e. independent as God is For one person in the Trinitie is not essentially divided from the other but the Son is so generated by the Father as that he is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 another essence or thing albeit he be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 another person The Son has the same numeric independent Essence with the Father and the Spirit So that although one person be really distinct from the other yet this distinction being involved in one most simple Divine Essence it implies a contradiction to say one person dependes on the other which was the great error of Origene imbibed from Platonic Philosophie as before Ch. 6. § 4. P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. § 8 9. § 2. One prime independent Being An independent Being is that which needs not any other Being essentially precedent to itself as the cause of its Being and Operation This Proposition may be demonstrated and explicated by its parts thus 1 There is one prime independent Being This is evident from the series of causes in which we find that althings obey the superior Power from which they derived their origine whence it necessarily follows that to prevent a progresse into infinite we stop in one prime supreme infinite Power which received no this Being from any other but is truely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Self-being and Self-sufficient or Independent Again that there can be but one prime independent Being is manifest because where-ever there is Participation Limitation Potentialitie and Contingence there must needs be Dependence But now al Beings except the first Cause admit Participation Limitation Potentialitie and Contingence as to their Essence and therefore none but the first Being can be independent Hence it follows 2 That the first independent Being admits not any precedent Being as the cause of its Being For whatever presupposeth the efficience of some precedent cause supposeth also Participation Posterioritie and Inferioritie which the prime independent Being excludeth Whence also it follows 3 That the prime independent Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Self-being or from himself When we say the prime independent Being is from himself it must not be understood positively as if he did effectively produce himself for that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and impossible but negatively that he receives not his Being from any other Hence we conclude 4 That Independence is as essential to the first Being and Cause as Dependence is to second Beings and Causes As it is essential to the Creature to be defective indigent limited receptive and dependent so it is as essential to the Creator to be infinite alsufficient and without al deficience indigence and dependence either actual or possible Hence § 3. Dependent Being by participation c. Whatever is dependent is Ens or Being by participation finite potential contingent and defectible 1 Every dependent is Ens by participation For whatever is not Being by Essence and independently must necessarily be such by participation where there is not self-Being there must be a reception of Being from some other which connotes participation 2 Whatever is dependent is also finite and limited both in Being Virtue and Operation 1 Whatever is dependent is finite in Being because its Being is by participation and according to communication of the superior Cause 2 Every dependent is also finite in virtue and efficace For whatever is limited in its essence must necessarily also be limited in its virtue and efficace Hence 3 every dependent is also finite in its Operation For the sphere of Activitie cannot be larger than the sphere of Essence if the principe be limited the operation cannot but be limited 3 Whatever is dependent is also potential To explicate and demonstrate this Attribute of a dependent Being we must consider 1 that nothing is pure Act but the first most simple independent Being no Creature is pure Actualitie where there is dependence there is somewhat of Potentialitie or passive Power either physic or metaphysic Al mater hath a physic passive power or natural possibilitie of being corrupted Spirits have not a physic passive power or natural principe of corruption yet they have a met a physic passive power of being annihilated or cast back into their primitive nothing 2 Besides the natural power which a dependent Being has there is an obediential power appendent to its nature For the explication of which we are to know that it is essential to a create Being to be subject and subordinate to the first increate and independent Being so far as to obey it in receiving al impressions and acting under it whatsoever implies not a contradiction Hence the Scholes distribute the power of the second cause or dependent Beings into natural and obediential their natural power of receiving influences from the superior cause or acting is that which is appendent to their natures and whereby they naturally receive or act and produce effects proportionate to their natures But the obediential power of dependent Being is that whereby they are according to the
limits this modal distinction to the dependence of the Creature in its first Emanation or Creation but grants that its dependence in operation is really the same with the Essence of the Creature 4 Suppose we allow a modal distinction between the Creatures dependence and essence yet who knows not but that the most awakened Philosophers now generally grant that Modes specially such as are substantial and essential do not really differ from the things modified Thus Calovius Metaphys pag. 434. Dependence saith he is a mode of a create Being agreeing to it by reason of its imperfection which is not the very Essence of the Creature nor yet a new Entitie distinct from the Essence but something affecting the create Essence And he cites Suarez for this his Hypothesis Hence § 7. Creatural Dependence according to its formal Idea and notion Dependence importes Subordination importes a presupposition of influence or subordination posterioritie and inferioritie 1 Creatural dependence importes a presupposition of influence or subordination to the first Cause This is primarily and formally included in the very notion of Dependence neither doth it adde any real entitie or mode distinct from the Creature but explicates only the intrinsec condition and habitude of the Creature relating to the omnipotent causalitie and influence of God This subordination to God as the first cause ariseth from the imperfection of the Creature and the absolute Dominion of God And as to its latitude and extent it regardes both natural and supernatural Influences and Beings By supernatural Beings and Influences I mean such as being above the sphere of Nature are not connatural to or producible by its force and power These supernatural Beings have causalities proportionable to their Entities in which they are subordinate to God and dependent on him as natural Beings in their kind And in this respect the Creatures subordination to and dependence on God in the whole of its causalitie is commun both to natural and supernatural Beings Yea supernatural Beings by virtue of their subordination to God may be elevated and raised to act and cause somewhat beyond that causalitie which is connatural to them For even in this regard they are not lesse subordinate and subject to God than natural Beings are in their kind as Suarez wel urgeth Metaph. Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. pag. 215. Such is the subordination both as to Naturals and Supernaturals which creatural Dependence on God as the first cause formally includes Hence 2 follows Posterioritie 2. Posterioritie Every dependent as such is posterior to that on which it dependes so the Creature as to God Aquinas tels us That al second causes act by virtue received from the first cause as instruments act by the direction of Art wherefore it is necessary that al other Agents whereby God fulfils the order of his Gubernation act by virtue from God and thence that they are posterior to him And this I thinke if wel understood might satisfie al those who with so much vehemence oppose al kind of predetermination by Divine concurse as to the human Wil For if we grant That God is the first cause of the Wils motion I cannot see how we can denie him the predetermination of the Wil. Though to avoid needlesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I generally abstain from the terme predetermination yet without that prejudice which some I conceive undeservedly lode it with For if the Concurse of God be previous to the causalitie of the Wil so as to determine the same to act as we have demonstrated Ch. 7. § 4. I as yet cannot according to my shallow capacitie see any cogent reason why the said previous concurse may not be termed predeterminant But to returne to our Argument Creatural Dependence implies a posterioritie 1 as to Nature and Causalitie 2 As to Origination and Order 3 As to Dignitie 3. Inferioritie Whence 3 Creatural Dependence importes also Inferioritie For every dependent as such as inferior to that it dependes on Thus Alvarez de Auxil Grat. Disput 90. pag. 714. Dependence properly in causes efficient importes a certain subordination and inferioritie of him who dependes to him on whom he dependes therefore the Divine operation of the first cause doth not depend on the cooperation of the second cause but on the contrary the cooperation of the second cause dependes on the operation of the first cause which is previous as Ch. 7. § 4. § 8. Althings create depend on God as to their Futurition Creatural Dependence as to Futurition For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we may consider 1 That althings future must have some cause of their Futurition Nothing future is of its own nature or by its own force future but indifferent to Futurition or Non-futurition If things were in their own nature and of themselves future then they would be always future and never present for that which agrees to any thing of its own nature agrees to it inseparably Hence it follows that Futurition cannot agree to things of their own nature but by some cause which brings them from a state of indifference and possibilitie to a state of Futurition And assuredly that which has not a certain determinate cause of its Futurition cannot be certainly and determinately future but only possible 2 That which gives futurition unto althings is the Divine Wil and Decree It 's impossible that any thing should passe from a state of pure possibilitie to a state of futurition but by the wil of God Things are not foreseen and decreed by God because future as some would needs persuade us but they are therefore future because decreed by God Thus Wiclef held That the Determination of God gave the highest firmitie in the futurition of his worke as Walden Tom. 1. L. 1. C. 23. pag. 37. and Bradwardine asserted That every Proposition of what is future is subjected to the Divine Wil and originated thereby So that indeed no Create Being either simple or complexe can be future antecedently to the Divine Wil. Whence it necessarily follows 3 That althings future depend on God for their futurition Every thing may as wel give Being to it self as Futurition Of this see more Ch. 5. § 2. Of Gods Science § 9. Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Conservation 1 Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Existence Plato in his Timaeus p. 28. saith Creatural Dependence as to Essence and Conservation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That every thing produced is necessarily produced by some Cause For nothing can be the cause of it self As Novitie of Essence is essential to the Creature so also Dependence on God for that Essence Yea every mutation and state of the Creature with al its various modifications are from God Yea Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disp 31. sect 14. p. 216. tels us That a create Being as such considered precisely and abstractly requires no other cause
is necessary 368. Gods Ordinate Justice from his Wil. 370. Gods Ordinate Justice the same with his Veracitie 371. No Acception of Persons with God 372. The Difference between the Justice of God and that of Men. Ib. How far Gods Justice regardes the Qualities of its Object 373. Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie Ib. 1 In fulfilling Promisses 376. 2 In fulfilling Threats 377. Gods Veracitie Demonstrated 378. The Sanctitie of God 379. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie with their Abuse 382. CHAP. VII Of Gods Prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general 1 GOD the first Cause of althings 387. 2. The Object of Divine Concurse 391. 1 God's Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe 392. Durandus's Objections against Gods Immediate Concurse to al Operations answered 394. Gods Concurse to the Substrate mater of Sin what 395. 2 Divine Concurse reacheth the human Wil and al its Acts. 396. 3 Gods Concurse Vniversally extensive as to al Objects 397. 4 Gods Concurse Principal 398. How Second Causes are al Instruments of the First 399. 3. Divine Concurse as to its Principe or Subject 401. 1 Gods Concurse not his Essence absolutely considered 402. 2 Gods Concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God 403. 3 The Divine Wil Omnipotent 404. 4 The Divine Wil of it self Operative and Influential on al second Causes and Effects 405. 4. The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 406. It is 1 Immediate Ib. 1 God Concurs Immediately to every Act of the second Cause 408. 2 God Concurs Immediately to the second Cause it self 409. 3 The Act of the first and second Cause the same 410. 2 Independent and Absolute 412. 3 Previous and Antecedent 416. 4 Total not Partial 417. 5 Particular not general only 420. Objections against Gods Particular Concurse answered 421. 6 Most potent and efficacious 422. Gods Moral and Physic Concurse 426. Gods Efficacious Concurse Demonstrated 427. 7 Congenial and Connatural 428. The Suavitie and Efficace of Divine Grace 429. CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in General GODs Creation demonstrated and explicated 431. Creation the Production of something out of nothing 432. Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. 433. Passive Creation a mode of the thing Created 435. The Providence of God demonstrated 436. The Wisdome of Divine Providence 439. The Eternal Law of Providence 441. The Wisdome of Providence Active 442. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. 443. The Spirit the Immediate Efficient of Providence 445. Platonic notions of the Mundane Spirit 447. Providential means used by the Spirit 449. No second Cause can act but in Subordination to God and by his Providence 450. Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit 452. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal 453. The particular Objects of Providence 454. The Adjuncts of Providence It is 1 Efficacious 455. 2 Immobile and fixed 456. 3 Connatural and Agreable 457. 4 Beautiful and Perfect Ib. 5 Mysterious 459. The distributions of Providence 460. Of Miracles Ib. Providential Conservation proper to God 461. Gods Conservative Influxe Immediate 463. Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. 464. Gods Conservation by Means 465. Gods Extraordinary Provision for some 466. Conservation continued Creation 467. The Object of Divine Conservation 468. CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin DIvine Gubernation 469. God the supreme Gubernator 470. Divine Glorie the last end of Divine Gubernation 471. The order of Divine Gubernation fixed 472. None can avoid Divine order and Gubernation 474. The order of Gods Gubernation a Law Ib. Gods Gubernation by second Causes 475. Gods Gubernation reaches althings 476. Divine Gubernation as to Man 1 Moral by Law 2 Efficacious 477. Wicked Men fal under Gods Gubernation 478. Gods Gubernation about Sin Ib. The Causes and parts of Sin 479. God not the Author of Sin 480. God the Prine Cause of the Entitative Act of Sin 482. Gods Concurse to the Entitative Act of Sin Demonstrated 483. How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. 485. Gods Wil about the Obliquitie of Sin Permissive Ib. Gods Permissive Wil about Sin Efficacious 486. Gods Gubernation of Sin Ordinative 487. Judicial Gubernation of Sin 488. Gods Attributes Illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin 489. CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose Men and Angels SVpernatural Illumination from God 490. The Infusion of Virtues 493. Gods care of Virtuose Men. 496. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World 498. The Angelic Law Obedience and Disobedience 500. Good Angels Ministerie as to God Ib. Good Angels Converse with Saints 501. Angels employed 1 at the giving of the Law 502. At Christs Birth and for the propagation of the Gospel Ib. 2 For the Conservation and Protection of the Saints Ib. 3 For Information Counsel Conduct and Consolation 503. 4 Angels Communion with Saints 504. 5 The final service of Angels 505. Gods Gubernation as to evil Angels Ib. Satans the Prince of this World 507. Satans Power to Temte 508. CHAP. XI Of Creatural Dependence both Natural and Supernatural CReatural Dependence what 509. Every Being Dependent or Independent 510. One Prime Independent Being 511. Dependent Being by Participation 512. The Origine of Dependence 515. 1 Passive Power Ib. 2 The Dominion of God 516. Every Creature Dependent Ib. Dependence the same with the Essence 517. Dependence Importes 1 Subordination 519. 2 Posterioritie Ib. 3 Inferioritie 520. Creatural Dependence 1 As to Futurition Ib. 2 As to Essence and Conservation 521. 3 As to Operation 522. 4 The Dependence of the human Wil in al its Acts. 523. Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural 524. Supernatural Dependence on Christ Ib. 1 For Habitual Grace 526. 2 For Actual Grace 527. Table of Hebraic Notions Explicated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai my Lord 242 339 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ehjeh I shal be 242 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light and Fire 452 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Then Eternitie 275 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El the potent God 242 358 430 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eloah and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim 242 358 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If a formule of swearing 374 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Amen ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truth Fidelitie 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick 128 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince or Principatie 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Belial lawlesse 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a son devoted 122 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to create 419 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gillulehim filthy Idols 129 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to adhere 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word or thing 363 428 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dath Order Law 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mad sinners 136 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hallelujah 241 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 separate 496 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 glued 135 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 force or power 429 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aberration 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abilitie force 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes Gods soverain Wil 340 345 〈◊〉
is not the last end the rule and measure of al order Is not every thing then rightly disposed when it is conveniently brought into a subordination to its last end Wherefore the contemplation of the last end is of greatest moment in Moral Philosophie And they say that Plato was the first that used the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in this philosophic and strict Notion for Homer and other of the Ancients used the word to expresse an Effect in its accomplishment and perfection but Plato restrained it so as to signifie thereby a final Cause or that which is last in the series of things desired yet first in intention This Cicero interprets extreme last chiefest What force efficace and influence the last end has in Morals Plato frequently inculcates So in his Theaetetus he assures us That al Science is inutile yea noxious without the notice of the best End This last End he makes to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal End of althings which Proclus cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the End of Ends. And for the more ful and clear explication of this last End its universal influence and excellence the following Propositions are diligently to be considered 1. Prop. It is necessarie that we constitute some last End as wel posititively as negatively in every Series of Actions This Hypothesis is wel argued by Suarez Metaph. Disput 24. Sect. 1. And the reason is most evident for look as in Descent from the intention of the end to the election and execution of the means we must necessarily at last stop in some one or more means which are first in execution though last in intention so in Ascent from the means to the end it is as necessary that we at last stop in some last end which is first in intention and last in execution Again as there is a subordination of second Causes to the first Cause so in like manner of inferior Ends to the last End For in Ends and those things that conduce thereto there cannot be a progresse into infinite but as there is a first means from whence the motion begins so there must be a last end in which it terminates In Ends there is a twofold order 1 of Intention 2 of Execution and in both orders there must be a first and a last That which is first in the order of Intention is as it were the Principe which moves the appetite and gives bounds to it and therefore can be no other than the last End that which is first in the order of Execution is the first means conducing to the last End So that a progresse into infinite is on neither part possible if there were not a last end nothing could be desired no action of the appetite could be terminated neither would the intention of the Agent ever cease if there were not a first means from whence the execution should begin no Agent could begin to worke c. 2. Prop. The last End of althings must be as extensive and ample as the first Principe or Cause Thus Plato de Leg. 4 p. 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God as the old Tradition testifies having in himself the Principe and End and Medium of althings In which he plainly indigitates That God is the first Cause and last End of althings That the last End is as large as the first Principe is evident because the order of Ends must correspond and answer to the order of Agents as they who are under God ought not morally neither can they physically move but as dependent on the motion and concurse of God the first Cause so neither ought they to desire any thing under God but what may conduce to God as their last End Such as the Universalitie of the first Cause is in giving Being or Welbeing such is the Universalitie of the last End in requiring and calling for the emprovement of al. Neither doth man pay the homage due to his first Cause farther than his regresse thereto answers his progresse therefrom God as the first Principe gives Being and as the last End terminates and sixeth the Being conferred Wherefore the Creature that dependeth on God as the first Cause must tend to him as his last End 3. Prop. The last End of althings can be but one This Hypothesis both Plato and Aristotle concord in And the reason is most apparent because althings desire their utmost perfection which consistes in their tendence to the most perfect Being Now the most perfect Being can be but one For if there should be more than one most perfect then the one would have somewhat which the other hath not and so neither would be most perfect Every good by the addition of some other good is made better and more perfect except the most simple and perfect Good by the participation whereof al other goods are made better Hence 4. Prop. Every man in every human Act virtually if not actually intends some last End This is manifest because in every human Act something is desired for it self which cannot be referred to any other thing and what is this but some last end Again man naturally desireth the complement of al good and albeit there may not be an actual elicite intention in every man as to his last end yet there is a natural propension thereto whence procede al Acts about particular goods 5. Prop. The last End is desired infinitely without end or termes Thence Aristotle following Plato herein in his Magn. Moral lib. 1. cap. 1. defines the last End thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The perfect End is that which being obtained we neither desire nor need any thing beyond it So the Stoics who were akin to the Platonists define the last End 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That for the sake of which al offices are performed but it for nothing else So that the last End gives termes and bounds to althings but admits no termes or measure As to take away the first Cause of our Being supposeth us not to be so to take away the last End supposeth a confused infinitie as to acting Therefore something must be simply desirable for it self and for no other For that which a man desireth in order to a further end the same he desireth in such a measure as is most conducible to that end but what he desireth for it self towards that his desire is infinite for the better it is the more desirable therefore if infinitely good infinitely desirable without termes or bounds The only measure of loving our last End is to love it without measure for the last End being the terme of the appetite it may not receive termes or limits from any other thing but by how much the more it is loved by so much the better is the love In althings appetible the last End gives measure but receives none because the proper reason of althings we desire is taken from the End Hence 6. Prop. The last End is the terme and measure of althings What
Dulcius est amare quà m amari Sen. A Soul thus inspired with the flames of divine Love has a little Heaven in it The Stoic thinkes it sweeter to love than to be beloved Certainly divine Love is most unitive and perfective it has a violence and pain which is most sweet and delicious The Soul by loving its last end possesseth enjoys and lives in it Have not althings a desire of union and communion with what they love And the more vehement our love is if it be of the chiefest good the sweeter our fruition thereof is This love gains strength by opposition it makes the most difficult service sweet The only limits this victorious divine Love proposeth to it self is to have no limits Where ever the Soul turnes it cannot but feel dolors if it acquiesce not in God but so far as it adheres to God it feels no pain Augustine that great Doctor of Love to God comprised al Christian Morals in Love which is the plenitude of the Law and our best Instructor in every Dutie It is a luminous fire that discovers things most secret and penetrates things most profound it is an incomparable Antidote against human corruption Whence also Augustine termed al Virtue but the order of Love and its admirable efficace is seen in this that it doth lift the heart above al things create and yet at the same time depresse it at the lowest centre of self-nothingnesse Al the labors of this Love are ful of divine suavities and carrie their rewards in them Afflictions blunt not its edge cast it into an ocean of miserie and it swims above al it estimates its miserie only by the losse and its Beatitude only by the fruition of its last end Mediocritie which in other things is estimed Vertue is a Vice in Love to God which admits no excesse These and such like are the Acts of the Soul in Communion with God as our last end This Communion with God the Romans in their manner and according to their obscure sentiments expressed by their Lectisternia or Beds placed in their Temples whereon they conceited they feasted and had communion with their Gods Of which see Lud. Vives in August Civ lib. 3. cap. 17. § 6. Lastly Delectation and Joy Fruition of the choicest Good carries with it satisfying Pleasures Suavities and Delights No one properly enjoys a thing who hath not some joy in the Fruition thereof Frui est cum gaudio frui August The Quietation Delectation and Satisfaction which the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end is greatly illustrated by Plato in his Philebus where he treats professedly of this subject So pag. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He that being young having tasted thereof like one overjoyed as if he had found a treasure of wisdome leaping for joy and as it were under a divine Enthusiasme or rapture he moves every discourse chearfully and orderly This Transport of divine Joy is proper to no act but the Fruition of our last end Thence Phileb pag. 40. he thus distinguisheth between true and false pleasures There are in the minds of wicked men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 painted pleasures but such as are altogether false Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wherefore wicked men for the most part are glutted with false pleasures but virtuose men with such as are sincere and genuine Wicked mens pleasures are sucked from some dirtie terrene goods and therefore only imaginarie and spurious but the virtuose mans pleasures are formed out of the chiefest good and therefore genuine and satisfying But to philosophise more distinctly of that Delectation Joy and Pleasure which attends the fruition of the chiefest Good we shal examine and inquire into 1 The Causes 2 The proper Adjuncts 3 The Effects thereof and that according to Plato's Philosophemes 1. 1. The Causes of Delectation Three things are essentially requisite to the constitution of true Delectation and Joy 1 A sweet Good 2 Possession of that Good 1 A sweet Good 3 Actions consequent to that possession 1 There must be a sweet Good out of which al true pleasure is formed and by how much the more sweet and pleasant the good is by so much the more perfect is the delight Satisfying joy is formed out of nothing but the most amiable best good This Plato frequently inculcates Thus Phaedr pag. 251. treating of the Contemplation of the chiefest Good he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whom when it shal see and instil the desire of him into it self it shal then break al bounds of modestie and having got libertie of breathing it shal cease to be exagitated by pricking dolors This most sweet pleasure it enjoys in the presence of its sweetest good so that it can never depart from its embraces neither doth it value any thing more than its beloved Such infinite pleasure flows from the presence of the sweetest Good Perfect Joy cannot forme it self out of any inferior good it springs only from the best sweetest good which infuseth its divine suavities into the Soul What but the first essential universal Soul-satisfying good can feed immortal Souls with perfect delights 2 Another Spring of Delectation is Possession 2 Possession which as it is essential to al Fruition so in a particular manner to Joy that attends the same for every one is delighted in the obtainment of what he loves and by how much the sweeter the object beloved is and the possession more intimate by so much the greater is the delight Generatio voluptatis ex copulatione finiti infiniti Thence it is a great Philosopheme with Plato That true Joy issueth from the copulation of finite and infinite i. e. to speak nakedly from the Vnion of the Soul with God This Plato according to his allegoric mode expresseth Conviv 206. Al men saith he in their manner conceive and are pregnant and when they have gone their time Nature desires to bring forth Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore as oft as that which is pregnant adheres to the first Beautie or sweetest Good it is affected with joy hilaritie and pleasure and brings forth and generates but on the contrary when it adheres to what is base and fordid it is contracted by sorrow and grief and thence being not able to bring forth it is tormented with pains and dolors By which he describes to the life the different effects which follow on the Souls adhering to God and to inferior Goods upon the Souls adherence to God follows the generation of Soul-ravishing pleasures but upon adherence to base worldly good no true pleasure follows but vexatious dolors and torments This pleasure that follows on adherence to and possession of God is wel expressed by David Psal 25.13 Psal 25.13 His Soul shal dwel at ease Heb. loge in goodnesse When God dwels in the Soul it then doth loge in goodnesse or dwel at ease where there is want there can be no perfect
which follows the enjoyment of the chiefest Good rejoiceth in a twofold Puritie 1 Objective as it is fed and maintained by pure objects whereas al the pleasures of sense are but seculent and dirtie in that their mater is only sensible terrene good but the joys and pleasures which flow from the sweetest original good partake of the crystalline puritie of their object which is most pure 2 Effective as it doth banish al sorrows and grief So Plato Phileb 53. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al pleasure so far as it is free from grief it is more pleasant true and fair Thus Repub. 9. he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pleasure to be the cessation of grief and grief the cessation of pleasure So also Phileb pag. 66. he avoucheth true pleasures to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without mixture of sorrow and pure Which is the peculiar privilege of those pleasures that attend the fruition of the sweetest Good for al other pleasures are mixed with much grief and sorrow they being indeed but bitter-sweets yea more bitter than sweet 5 The Delectation which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good are most intense and strong Thus Plato 5 Strong Pleasures Phileb p. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must look not to the least pleasures but to such as are supreme and most vehement if we wil make a true judgement of pleasure For the stronger any pleasures are the better they are and the more pure they are the stronger they are Sensual pleasures are feeble and impotent because impure and mixed but spiritual joys are most potent and vehement because most pure Again the vehemence and intensnesse of any pleasure is proportionable to the energie power and activitie of the subject which is assected with such pleasure and to the Pondus Bent or Impetus that it hath to the object it takes pleasure in Now how vehement is the Pondus Impetus and Energie of the Wil whereby it shooteth it self into its sweetest Good which when it enjoyeth what an ecstasie rapture and transportt of joy is it affected with Doth not Plato stile this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The best and strongest of al Ecstasies 6 The Delectation which attends the fruition of our last end is infinite and without excesse 6 Joys without Excesse Thus Plato Phileb pag. 27. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For pleasure is not al good unlesse it partake of an infinite nature His designe is to prove that pleasure is not the chiefest good because it is not in its nature infinite so as to partake of al good yet so far as it is a consequent that attends the fruition of the chiefest good so far it is infinite For as the chiefest good admits of no excesse in our fruition because it is in it self infinite and al good so by a paritie of reason the joy and pleasure that attends the fruition of the chiefest good is infinite without excesse because the object is infinitely sweet and amiable The pleasure the Soul takes in the fruition of inferior goods soon admits excesse which it endeavors to cure by change of objects Thus Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 33. Art 2. Corporal delectations when augmented and continued do excede the natural habitude and therefore become nauseous as it is evident in the delices of food whence the appetite desires change and varietie But spiritual delectations never excede the natural habitude but perfect nature whence the more they come to a consummation the more they delight us How soon are men glutted with the best of pleasures that sense can afford And what remedie have they but intermission or exchange of objects But now in the fruition of the sweetest Good there can be no excesse either in the act of fruition or in the pleasures that attend it and therefore there is no need either of intermission or exchange § 8. 3. The Effects of Delectation Having explicated Delectation in its Causes and proper Adjuncts we now procede to the Effects thereof thereby to demonstrate that the most perfect delectation is that which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good There are two great Effects of this divine Delectation 1 Amplitude and Enlargement 2 Quietation and Satisfaction 1. 1. Enlargement The Delectation that attends the fruition of the sweetest Good brings with it Amplitude and Enlargement Indeed al delight and joy brings Enlargement which ariseth from the Sympathie between the object and the subject or sacultie specially if the object be ample how doth the facultie spread it self to enjoy the same When the animal or vital Spirits are recreated what enlargement follows thereon How diffusive are they Whereas Grief and Sorrow contracts and coarctates the Spirits This is in an higher degree verified of that spiritual Joy which attends the fruition of the best Good There is a twofold Enlargement that follows spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the chiefest Good 1 There is an Enlargement of the Facultie or Subject The more pleasure the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end the more its desires are enlarged Thus Plato Phileb pag. 45. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But what are not those pleasures most excellent whereof the greatest desires are kindled in us Whereby he shews that those are the greatest and best pleasures that most enlarge the heart in desires after them Indeed there is an intime connexion between true joy and enlargement and therefore in sacred Philosophie one word is expressive of both So Psal 4.1 Thou hast enlarged me when I was in distresse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both to exhilarate and dilate or to dilate by exhilarating His spirit was straitned narrowed and confined by distresse but dilated and enlarged by spiritual joys from Gods presence This Dilatation or Enlargement which follows on spiritual Delectation is wel explicated by Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 33. Art 1. Dilatation is a motion unto Latitude and it agrees to Delectation both in regard of its apprehensive and appetitive virtue for as man apprehends the conjunction of some convenient good so his Soul is dilated towards it in order to its perfect fruition thereof and satisfaction therein c. 2 Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the sweetest good brings with it also enlargement in Operation and Acting Al joy is vigorous and active as it is the effect of precedent so the cause of subsequent operation Delight is the Spring of motion it puts the Soul into a continual agitation for by how much the more we delight in any object by so much the more vehement and strong are our operations about it Delectation makes us ardently and vehemently to move in the fruition of our sweetest good and in al acts that tend thereto What divine suavities doth it infuse into al our acts Thus Plato Conviv pag. 210. The mind that converts its eyes to that so great amplitude of the first Beautie doth no longer regard human affairs but is as it were captivated thereby c. 2. The Delectation which
indifferent in individuo No Action considered in individuo in its individual nature is morally indifferent i.e. every individual action considered as clothed with its Circumstances and in relation to its Principes Manner and End is either good or evil That moral Indifference hath place only in specie in the specific nature of Acts not in individuo in their individual nature is generally avouched by the Orthodoxe yea among the more sober of the Schole-men This was one of John Husse's Articles condemned in the Council of Constance Art 16. Quòd nulla sint opera indifferentia sed haec sit divisio immediata humanorum operum quòd sint virtuosa vel vitiosa That there are no workes in individuo indifferent but this is an immediate division of human workes that they are either virtuose or vitiose This indeed we may argue from Plato's Placites who strongly proves That al our Acts ought to tend to some good end So Gorg. pag. 499. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It seems that althings must be done for good c. So elsewhere he saith That God is the marque and scope unto which al our Acts as so many arrows ought to tend This is wel determined by Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. It happens sometimes that an Act is indifferent as to its Species which yet considered in individuo is either good or evil and that because every moral Act receives its Bonitie not only from its object but also from its circumstances And it 's necessary that every individual Act hath some circumstance by which it is drawen to good or evil at least as to the intention of the end For in as much as it belongs to Reason to order al human Acts if any Act be not ordered to its last end it is so far evil if it be ordered to its last end it is then good c. Thus Gibieuf de Libertat pag. 74. We most evidently gather from the subordination of our Wil to its last end that there are no human Acts indifferent in individuo but al are good or evil for it is not lawful for a rational Creature so long as he is such not to returne that back to God which he received from God Again p. 77. Every thing ought to act according to its nature and he that doth otherwise is deficient because nature is the measure of other things If therefore man puts forth an human Act he ought thereby to be converted towards God Indeed Indifference can no more be found in individual Acts than it can be denied as to some Acts considered in their Species Al Acts of Man in Innocence were good al the Acts of man under the dominion of corrupt Nature are evil al the Acts of man in Glorie shal be good al the Acts of man under Grace are either good or evil not one of al these indifferent Were al our actions regulated by the Divine moral Law they would be al good Yea our very natural and civil Acts as to their manner so far as they are morally good or evil are al regulated and determined by the moral Law For albeit the Divine Law be not as it ought not to be a general sum of Arts and Sciences nor yet a particular Directorie for the Government of States or Politic Acts yet the particular determination of al our Acts fals under the Divine Law so far as they are moral and Christian according to the nature of al Professions and Sciences coincident for the most part in the mater but distinct in the manner of consideration Thus much Petrus à Sancto Joseph that late compilator of Schole-Divinitie Thes 167. acknowledgeth There is not saith he any Act indifferent in individuo but every such Act if it procede from sufficient deliberation is either good or evil although not as to its object yet in regard of its circumstances The scratching of the head or the taking up of a straw is either good or evil This seems a Paradoxe to some that are ignorant and disgustful to Libertines who would be so yet generally granted by Philosophers and Divines yea scarce ever professedly denied by any save some sew who distinguish between Acts proceding from mere Imagination and such as are deliberate That no Acts in individuo are indifferent see the Commentators in Sent. lib. 2. dist 41. and in Thomam 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. 2. A virtuose Wil the Principe of moral Good Having discussed the Mater of moral Good we now procede to its next efficient Cause or Principe which is the Wil or rather Soul clothed with supernatural Habits of Virtue or Grace The moral Law requires that to the constitution of an Act morally good there concur a good Principe now the Wil or Soul as willing being the fountain of al moral efficience and operation its rectitude is necessary to constitute an Act morally or spiritually good Such therefore as the disposition of the Wil is such wil the action prove as to its goodnesse or pravitie The bent of the Wil is as a Pondus that carries the whole Soul either to good or bad when the deliberation and intention of a bended Wil concurs in a good mater for a good end the action is good And what bends the Wil in this manner Actio recta non erit nisi recta fuerit voluntas ab hac enim est actio but virtuose habits So many degrees as there are of a sanctified Wil in any Act so many degrees there are of moral Good therein Moralitie as wel as Divinitie is in a more special manner conversant in ruling the Wil which is the measure of good and evil The bent of the Wil makes a good or bad man as also act Thus Plato Meno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is to wil and to be able to performe good Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If he wil not to do unrightcously this is sufficient he shal not do unrighteously But more particularly Plato Leg. 3. thus philosophiseth This is not to be desired 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that althings follow his Wil but that his Wil follow Reason i.e. that it prosecute what is good This is wel expressed by Simplicius in Epich c. 1. pag. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For when the Wil is free and pure in the power of Reason it self on which our nature dependes then it is carried to things truly eligible yea to truth it self Wherefore the proper good of the Soul is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly desirable and attained by real election Simplicius here in imitation of Plato whom he much follows asserteth 1 That the moral Goodnesse of human Acts dependes on the puritie and goodnesse of the Wil. 2 That moral Good is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because most eligible Which derivation he borrowed from Plato What Virtue properly is and how it disposeth the Wil to what is morally good wil hereafter § 4. and sect 3. §
with greater dexteritie facilitie and alacritie in acting than virtuose Principes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Alacrite is defined Definit Platon pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A manifestation of practic election and who manifest more free practic election than such as act virtuosely Frequence of exercices both in Nature and Virtue give a great facilitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Customes are defined by Galen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superadded Natures and Arist Rhet. l. 1. c. 11. pag. 57. saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Custome is akin to Nature whence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Custome makes every thing sweet Now virtuose exercices frequently repeted breed a divine spiritual custome which is attended with divine suavitie and delight The frequent repetition of the same exercice makes it more facile dexterous and sweet Experience teacheth us that whatever is long customary turnes into our natures even diseases and poisons How much more then spiritually natural and sweet are divine customes and habits attending virtuose acts Thence Heb. 5.14 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Heb. 5.14 Virtuose customes and habits make the exercices of spiritual senses most familiar pleasant and sweet and therefore most free for the freedome of an act is much to be measured by the delight and pleasure that attends it And what acts of the Soul have more of true pleasure and delight attending of them than virtuose exercices O! what sweet inspirations what divine suavities are infused into the Soul upon virtuose actings Frequence of acts makes bitter things sweet and is not the bitter crosse sweetened by virtuose exercices are not the most difficult services made facile hereby Doth not every act of Virtue carry some degree of pleasure and therefore of libertie in it And by how much the more pure and spiritual any virtuose act is by so much the more pure is that joy which attends it For al joy and pleasure is the effect of some operation and the more raised and spiritual the operation is the more refined and strong the pleasure and joy is The purest and strongest pleasures are such as attend the Souls actual adhesion to its first cause and last end for the nearer things come to their first Principes the more joyful and free they are and what brings the Soul nearer its first Principe than virtuose Acts Is not then a virtuose life the sweetest and most free Do not acts of Virtue bring with them the most judicious real solid pure spiritual strong self-sufficient and permanent pleasures and delights as Psal 119.14 16 20 35 3. The Libertie of moral Acts consistes much in their Vitalitie Virtuose Exercices most lively The more excellent and noble the life is the more free the acts are and the more virtuose the acts are the more of the divine life they carry in them Thus Plato Charmid pag. 171. Sin being banisht from the Soul and Rectitude presiding in every act it 's necessary that those who are thus disposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 do act wel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that those who act wel do live happily The same pag. 173. But rather let us endeavor discretely to lead our lives and act that so we may live blessedly Whereby he intimates that virtuose Acts are always blessed and free no man that acts virtuosely can live miserably Thus also Aristotle Eth. l. 1. c. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To live wel is to act wel The life of every living Creature exerts and manifests it self most in that operation which is most proper to it and unto which it is most naturally inclined and are not virtuose Acts most proper and natural to man considered in his best state What is life but the Actuositie of the Soul informing the bodie And what more promotes this Actuositie than exercice Is not also the life and Actuositie of the Soul morally considered improved by virtuose exercices Where there is natural life there wil be some pulse and motion of the Spirits So where there is a moral life of Virtue there wil be exercice Quantò perfectiùs quis à se movetur tantò perfectior est modus vivendi Aquin. By how much the more perfectly any thing is moved by it self by so much the more perfect it mode of living is and are not those who act virtuosely most perfectly moved by themselves Plato tels us Phaedr pag. 245. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By which he shews That it is proper to life to move it self by it self And when doth the Soul most freely move it self by it self but when it acts virtuosely And as al life consistes in action even the life of God in a pure Act of understanding and willing so in like manner the divine moral life in virtuose actions A virtuose Soul as it has Principes of life above Nature so also actings for by how much the more noble and excellent the life is by so much the more excellent is the operation The life and motion of virtuose hearts is upward like that of fire which is of al the most noble active and free life Thence in facred Philosophie Life is frequently put for a noble comfortable free blessed condition of life Psal 34.12 13. consisting in virtuose exercices So Psal 34.12 What man is he that desireth life i. e. a blessed free sweet life And how may such a life be acquired That he tels you vers 13 14. Depart from evil and do good c. The like Psal 22.26 69.33 Psal 119.77 Eccles 6.8 1 Pet. 3.10 And Augustine gives us the true reason of this facred Phraseologie namely because there is no true life but what is virtuose blessed and free So that as there is no moral libertie without a divine life so there is no divine life without virtuose exercices Whence by how much the nearer the Soul comes to God by virtuose Acts by so much the more divine and free its life is 4. Virtuose Exercices most ample The moral Libertie of human Acts may be much measured by their Amplitude and Magnitude And are not virtuose Acts of al most ample and great Actual adhesion to God and his divine Law importes not only subjection but also enlargement and libertie Thence Psal 119.96 the divine Law is said to be exceeding broad or ample and why because it is the expression and Character of the divine Sanctitie and Wil which is most ample Whence the Soul by actual adherence to the divine Law rejoiceth in the divine Amplitude and Libertie Thus Psal 119.165 Great peace have they who love thy law Or Psal 119.165 ample peace with libertie as to walking Thence it follows and nothing shal offend them Or they shal have no stumbling block ie They shal walke in the Kings high-way according to the royal Law of Libertie with al manner of libertie and boldnesse Liber ab infinito ad infinitum super infnitum
would he expresse against the bold daring Atheists of this Age O! what an ignoble base degenerate uncomfortable thing is Atheisme how repugnant both morally and physically is it to human Nature Ought not the Atheist sooner to dout of his own being than God's For if he be God who made him must needs be Thence Padre Paul that great Venetian Politician composed a Treatise That Atheisme is repugnant to human Nature and is not to be found therein but that they who acknowlege not the true Deitie must necessarily feigne to themselves some false ones as it is mentioned in his Life pag. 71. In sum Atheisme is a proposition so disnatural monstrose and difficult to be establisnt in the mind of man that notwithstanding the insolence vanitie and pride of Atheists who endeavor by violence to rase out al notices of a Deitie in their Conscience yet stil they give us some evidences of their fears that there is a Deitie by listing up their eyes and hands towards Heaven or such like Indicia in sudden and great calamities § 2. 1. Vniversal consent for the Existence of God Plato's zelose Philosophemes against Atheisme having been discussed we descend to his Demonstration of the Existence of God First That there is a God he demonstrates from the universal consent of al Times and Nations Thus Leg. 10. pag. 887. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But now giving credit to those Traditions which together with their milke they sucked in and which they heard from their Motkers and Nurses who made it their businesse to implant these sentiments on their minds c. Wherein he shews how those that denie the Existence of God contradict the universally received Tradition which they sucked in with their mothers milke and that which is indeed engraven on their very Beings as hereafter Yea he makes this Hypothesis That there is a God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-evidencing first Principe which needs no argument for the confirmation thereof because Nature it self instructes us therein it being that which the most prostigate men cannot rase out of their Souls Thence Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 3. saith That it never came into Controversie among the most of Grecians that there was a God And he gives this reason for it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The knowlege or notion of Gods Existence is naturally insite and ingenite to us or engraven on our Natures We may draw forth the force of this Platonic Argument in Plato's own dialect thus Have not al mankind in al times and places given their assent and consent to the existence of a Deitie Doth not al the Polytheisme of the Pagan World give evident testimonie for the existence of a Deitie What made the Egyptians Grecians and Romans so fond of their base multiplied Deities but a notion engraven on their Beings fomented by universal Tradition that there was some supreme Being they owed Hommage unto It 's true their Hommage and Worship was misplaced as to its proper object but doth not the act sufficiently argue that they owned a Deitie albeit not the true God Hath not the whole World subscribed to the notion of a Deitie Was there ever any Nation so barbarous as not to pay Hommage to some supreme Being Can we give instance of any part of the habitable World where professed Atheisme gained place or habitation Has there not been an universal Tradition among the more intelligent of men that God made the World and governes the same Yea doth not this notion of a Deitie run not only through al Times Ages and Nations but even through the Principes of human Nature yea in the venes and bloud of men Wel then might Plato say That men sucked it in with their mothers milke So much for inartificial Argument 2. 2. From the subordination of Causes to a first Cause Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deitie rationally from the Subordination of second causes and effects to a first Cause Thus in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whatever is produced it is necessary that it be produced by some Cause for it cannot be that any thing should be produced or made without a Cause Then in what follows 〈◊〉 proves the World was made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The World was made because it is seen and touched and has a bodie But it is clear that such things are produced c. Whence he concludes that God was the Parent and first Cause of the Universe Plato bottomes his demonstration on these two Hypotheses 1 That the World was made 2 That it was made by some precedent Cause 1 That the World was made and not eternal was an Hypothesis generally maintained by al the Philosophers before Aristotle who asserted That the first Mater was eternal and that on a mistaken Principe That nothing could be produced out of nothing But Plato strongly proves the World could not be eternal because it is sensible and corporeous and therefore the effect of some precedent Cause And his argument may in his own interrogatorie mode be thus improved If the World be eternal must it not also be immutable and invariable Can there be any generation and corruption in that which is eternal For where there are generations and corruptions there must be causes and effects which implie prioritie and posterioritie for the cause naturally precedes the effect but can there be any prioritie and posterioritie in what is eternal If the World was from al eternitie must not the things that are generated and corrupted eternally have been and eternally not have been Must not the present way of Generation and Corruption correspond with the World's Eternitie Doth not our reason yea commun sense assure us that the Worlds present course of generation and corruption is inconsistent with its Eternitie Is it not most absurd and irrational to conceive that one man should beget another successively from al Eternitie Doth not the very conception of succession in Eternitie implie a flat contradiction Moreover doth not generation and corruption suppose an inequal succession of ascent and descent and is not this incompatible with an eternal Being Again if there were an infinite succession of generations and corruptions how is it possible there should be any effect or issue for can there be an end where there is no beginning Against the Eternitie of the World see more largely Derodone L'Atheisme convaincu pag. 5. where he proves from al the principal parts of the World the Sun Moon c. that it could not be eternal and thence makes good his Hypothesis that it was created by God See also Sr. Charles Wolseley's Vnreasonablenesse of Atheisme Edit 3. pag. 47-64 177. 2 Plato's next Hypothesis to prove God to be the first Cause The World made by some prime Cause is That the World was made by some precedent Cause For saith he whatever is produced is produced by some Cause We see nothing but what is produced by somewhat
else and therefore must rationally conclude there must be some first Producer Our reason compels us to look out for some first Cause that gave being to althings we see Doth a man beget a man and was not this man begotten by some other man and so upward til we come to some first man And how came that first man to be produced but by some first Cause In al subordinate Efficients is not the first the cause of the middle and the middle whether many or one the cause of the last If then there be not a first can there be a middle and last So that may not men as wel denie al Effects yea themselves to be as denie a first Cause to be Surely if God had not a Being nothing else could be in things subordinate one to the other take away the first you take away al the rest Therefore it must necessarily be that the World was made by some precedent first Cause This Hypothesis Plato layes down against the Antithesis of Leucippus and Democritus which Epicurus afterward espoused namely That there was an infinite vacuitie or emty space in which were innumerous Atomes or corporeous Particles of al formes and shapes which by their weight were in continual agitation or motion by the various casual occursions of which this whole Vniverse and al the parts thereof were framed into that order and forme they now are in Against this Antithesis Plato seems to have framed his Hypothesis laid down in his Timaeus pag. 28. where he asserts That the Vniverse received its origine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is in the Autographe not from any casual occursion of Atomes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but from a prudent potent first Cause who framed this Universe according to the most accurate Exemplar of his own divine Ideas So in his Sophista pag. 265 he saith Natural things were produced not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from a casual cause without intelligence but that they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fruits or workes of God the supreme Opificer of althings We may forme his Argument according to his own dialectic mode thus Is it possible that this beautiful wel-ordered Universe should emerge out of a casual concurse of Atomes in the infinite Vacuitie What! were these corporeous Particles eternally there or only introduced in time If eternally then is not necessary that they be invariable and immutable for doth not al variation and alteration belong to time the measure thereof Can any thing that is in a strict sense eternal varie are not eternal and variable termes contradictorie as before Or wil they say that these Atomes were introduced or produced in this vacuous space in time must they not then have some cause of their production And wil it not hence follow that there is a first Cause or Deitie as anon Again what a world of absurdities yea contradictions is this Epicurean Hypothesis clogged with Is it possible to imagine that such minute corporeous Particles should in this imaginarie vacuitie be invested with an eternal gravitie whereby an eternal casual motion is caused here and there without any tendence to a Centure Can it also be imagined that these poor Corpuscules should continue in perpetual motion til by chance they hit one against the other and so were conglomerated into this order we find them in the Universe Is it not a fond sick-brain conceit that phlegmatic dul mater and stupid motion should by chance produce such an harmonious Universe Alas what a systeme of contradictions would follow hereon See Sr. Charles Wolseley against Atheisme pag. 87. But to descend to the affirmative of Plato's Hypothesis That the World was made by some precedent first Cause This he also inculcates in his Theaetctus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must take it for granted that nothing can make it self Whence it is necessary that at last we come to some first Cause 1 That in the subordination of Causes there cannot be a progresse into infinite we are told by Aristotle or who ever were the Composer of that Book Metaph. l. 1. c. 2. and the reason is most evident because what is infinite is incomprehensible and impertransible as also adverse to al order for in infinites there is no first or last Again if in the subordination of Causes there should be an infinite Series then it would follow hence that there never was any Cause which was not subsequent to infinite Causes precedent whence also it would follow that there were infinite Causes before any Cause 2 That nothing ever did or can make it self is most evident from multitudes of contradictions that follow this Hypothesis for then a thing should be said to act physically before it had a being to be superior and inferior dependent and independent to exist and not to exist in the same instant and in one and the same respect 3 That this Universe was made by some Cause precedent to it self is evident because it hath a possibilitie not to be whence it follows that once it was not for whatever has a possibilitie not to be has a passive power at least metaphysic if not physic and where any passive power is there is something of the original nothing out of which althings were made by him who is pure Act and perfect Being Thus Damascene Orthodox Fide l. 1. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Al Beings are either create or increate truely if create they are altogether mutable For it 's necessary that those things which began by mutation should be always obnoxious to mutation either by being corruptible or alterable according to pleasure But if al Beings be increate then are they al immutable Thence he addes Who therefore wil not conclude that al Beings sensible yea that the very Angels may be many ways changed and altered Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore seing the Opificer of things is increate he must be also altogether immutable And what can this be other than God 4 That God made althings is strongly demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 2. c. 15. of which hereafter See also Mendoza Hurtado Phys Disp 10. Sect. 1. § 3. 3. The Existence of God from a first Motor Another Argument whereby Plato proves the existence of a Deitie is taken from the dependence of al motions on a prime Motor or first Mover Thus Leg. 10. pag. 893. being about to demonstrate the existence of a Deitie against the Atheists of his Age he makes this Preface Let us make this Preface to our Discourse sithat it is our purpose to prove there is a God we ought with greater studie and diligence to cal upon him for his aide now than at other times Wherefore being as it were confirmed by these bonds let us begin our Discourse Therefore if any shal demand of me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whether or no therefore do althings stand stil and is nothing moved or on the contrary are althings or somethings moved
and observe its regular Fluxes and Refluxes c. if we rake into the bowels of the Earth and inquire into the origine of Stones both preciose and commun mineral Juices and Metals Lastly if we destil Plants or anatomise Animals what an incomparable Harmonie Order and Perfection shal we find in each of these both in reference each to other and to the whole Universe This is wel done by Plato in his Timaus pag. 28 c. whence he concludes That there must be an infinitely wise Mind who frames al these things into such an admirable order agreable to his own eternal Ideas Thus also Joan. Damascenus Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that God who in his own nature is invisible is made visible by his operations we know by the admirable constitution and gubernation of the Vniverse Wherein he demonstrates the invisible Essence and Existence of God from his visible operations and workes as Rom. 1.20 § 5. 5. Gods Existence from the connate Idea of God in the Soul Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deitie from the Microcosme or Man specially his Soul and those innate Ideas of a Deitie loged there Thus Leg. 12. pag. 966. Do we not know that there are two things which make us believe that there is a God one which we before mentioned touching the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it is the most ancient and divine of althings made I say of those things whose motion admits generation but so as that it hath obtained an everlasting essence for it self There are two parts in this Argument which demonstrate the existence of a Deitie 1 The divine origine and nature of the Soul 2 Its Immortalitie 1 The divine origine and nature of the human Soul fully evinceth the existence of God Thus Plato Leg. 10. pag. 899. Let him who formerly denied there was a God prove that we speak not truth in giving the Soul the first place or let him believe us and so for the future order his life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he dout not of a Deitie But let us consider whether to those that thinke there is no God we have not abundantly proved there is a God So in his Phaedo p. 81. Doth not the mind thus affected go 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the divine Being whereunto it is like This Platonic Argument may be thus improved Is there not a connate Idea of a Deitie impressed and stamped on the very nature of the Soul Doth not its immaterial spirital impassible nature speak its physic cognation with some supreme Spirit that first conferred that spirital Being on it Has not the Soul a physic Amplitude yea infinite Capacitie albeit only remote and passive of contemplating some first Truth and loving some chiefest good Has not the mind an universal empire and dominion over al objects to compound things most opposite and divide things most intimately conjoined to descend from the highest cause to the lowest effect and then to ascend from the lowest effect to the highest cause Has not the Wil an infinite thirst after good yea is never satisfied without the fruition of some supreme infinite good And do not these infinite capacities albeit only natural remote and passive implie some infinite object adequate thereto Was there ever a facultie or power in Nature without an object suited thereto Cicero tels us de Nat. Deor. lib. 1. That Nature her self has impressed a notion of a Deitie on the minds of al. As if he had said according to Plato's mind Has not God stamped an Idea of himself on human Nature May we not as wel abandon our very Beings our selves as abandon the notices and characters of a Deitie engraven on our Beings Doth not every human Soul carrie the signature and marque of his Creator impressed on it self Is there not an impresse and Idea of a Deitie incorporated and contempered in the very complexion and constitution of the Soul And albeit man by sin runs away as a fugitive from his Lord and Maker yet has he not secured his claim to man by his marque and physic Idea stamped on the Soul of man The Ideas and Characters of a Deitie are more clearly and lively stamped on the Souls of men than upon any part of the sensible World 2 As for the Immortalitie of the Soul doth not this also implie an eternal object answerable thereto Thus Plato in his Symposium pag. 207. informes us That man who is mortal as to his terrene part seekes to be immortal as to his more noble part And if the Soul seekes to be immortal must there not be an immortal eternal infinite good in the fruition of which it seeks immortal Beatitude Of this see more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. lib. 3. cap. 2. sect 10. § 5. § 6. The Existence of God demonstrated by practic Arguments 1. From Conscience Plato has given us some practic and moral Demonstrations of a Deitie As 1 some moral though imperfect notices of good and evil impressed on Conscience with affections of fear and shame on the commission of sin Plato in his Minos pag. 317. makes mention of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a royal Law of Nature some notices whereof remain on degenerate human Nature These notions the Stoics terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Aristotelians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 commun and innate notions Among which they reckon up such as these That there is a God that this God was the Maker and is the Conservator and Rector of the Vniverse that he is infinitely wise just good c. That he is to be worshipped that virtue is to be embraced vice avoided c. These commun notices they make to be connate and engraven on the Soul And indeed sacred Philosophie assures us that there are such commun notices of good and evil naturally engraven on mens consciences as Rom. 2.14 15. which yet are improved by the workes of Providence as Act. 14.17 where rain and fruitful seasons are said to be Gods witnesse Now al Notions of good and evil clearly demonstrate the existence of a Deitie for the distinction of good and evil as to man refers to some principe above him were there no supreme Rector and Judge to reward good and punish evil the very notions of good and evil would vanish into smoke and vapor What can be good if there be not some Being originally and infinitely good to which it refers and by whole Law it is measured Can we imagine how the notions of good and evil should exist in mens minds if there were not a supreme Rector to give Laws for the measure thereof If man had not some supreme Lord to give Laws to him how could he be guilty of any moral transgression Can he that is his own Law be guilty of an offence Who can charge any man with doing il unlesse he break the Law of some Superior What could be just or unjust if there were not a supreme
God therefore being immaterial and not circumscribed is not in a place for he is place to himself filling althings and yet above al and containing al. Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must know that the Deitie is indivisible the whole totally existing every where and not part in part corporally distracted but the whole in al and the whole above al. Thence Chrysippus the Stoic said That the most simple and pure Reing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which also they first cal God doth diffuse himself throughout al bodies in the Air and al living Creatures and al Plants and throughout the Earth it self God is essentially and indivisibly in al Beings and space albeit al Beings are not in God as in their proper space as Derodone and others too boldly assert For if althings are in God as in their proper space how can we possibly avoid that blasphemous consequence of the Familistes who make althings but particles of God Is it possible that any thing is or can be in God which is not God If Gods Immensitie be the same with his Essence as undoubtedly it is wil it not necessarily follow that althings by existing in Gods Immensitie existe also in God I greatly value Derodone's acumen in many philosophic Contemplations but yet I find dangerous consequences attending some of his Philosophemes bordering on Theologie and therefore cannot but conceive my self under an essential obligation to premonish young Students thereof 3. The Immensitie and infinite Presence of God may be explicated and demonstrated by the infinite power and operations of God both actual and possible This Argument Plato much insistes on proving that God is an universal Spirit who diffuseth himself throughout the whole Universe conserving somenting animating and actuating althings So Leg. 10. pag. 895. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore the principe of al motions and the first motion which is in those things that are permanent and those things that move is as we must necessarily confesse he that moves himself and therefore the mast ancient and excellent Whence pag. 896. he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. God is a Soul universally ruling and dwelling in althings that are moved Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 17. having demonstrated that Angels are confined to some space he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For it is proper solely to God to be present every where according to the same operation And he explicates the mode of this divine Ubiquitie thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But God existing every where and above every thing workes differently every where and according to the same by one simple operation To draw forth the force of this Argument Gods infinite Presence and Immensitie in althings actual and possible may be demonstrated 1 From his infinite Power in creating althings that are or may be For God being able to create 100000 Worlds 100000 times greater than this World his Presence must be infinite because God workes by the Presence of his Essence Deus immediatè agitimmediatione non solùm virtutis sed suppositi neither can he worke where he is not present God workes al immediately not only by the Immediation of his Virtue but also by the Immediation of his Essence Aristotle Phys lib. 7. tels us that the mover and moved must be together and look as a particular cause is present with its particular effect so the universal cause with his universal effect Now God the universal Cause of althings hath no other way of Presence with al effects but by his Essence Hence that of Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Althings are distant from God not as to place but nature i. e. God who is infinitely distant from his Creature as to Nature is yet ever present with it in regard of the Omnipresence of his Essence 2 Gods infinite Presence is manifested in the Confervation of althings as the creatrix Essence was immediately present in making althings so the conservatrix Essence is immediately present in the supporting althings 3 Gods infinite Presence may be demonstrated from his immediate actuating al second Causes as Suarez Metaph. Disput 30. Sect. 7. § 5. Gods Incomprehensibilitie The Infinitude of the Divine Essence Duration and Presence being discussed we now are to procede to God Infinitude as to our Comprehension or his Incomprehensibilitie whereof we find bright notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie Thus Job 11.7 8 9. Job 11.7 8 9. Caust thou by searching find out God Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection This Rhetoric interrogation implies a vehement Logic negation Thence it follows It is as high as Heaven what canst thou do deeper than Hel what canst thou know The measure thereof is longer than the Earth and broader than the Sea Psal 145.3 So Psal 145.3 Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised and his greatnesse is unsearchable Where he makes the infinite magnitude of Gods Essence the cause of his Incomprehensibilitie Comprehendere propriè est arringere rem secundùm omnem modum omnem rationem quâ res est cognoscibilis c. Aquinas For to comprehend an object is to apprehend it according to every mode and reason as it is intelligible thereby to define it or give termes and bounds to it For a definition is but the boundary of an Essence he that perfectly comprehends and defines a thing gives limits and bounds to that thing in his intellect Now that which has no bounds or termes of Essence can have no bounds or termes as to our comprehension or definition Hence properly and strictly God cannot be said positively to comprehend himself though negatively this Attribute may be given to him as he knows himself perfectly Whence that Hypothesis of Derodone and some others who assert That God may be defined by himself is too presumtuous and during seing al definitions give termes and limits to the essences of things whence if God cannot be limited he cannot be defined for terms of definition follow termes of essence Much lesse can God be defined by a created intellect unto which al definitions refer as before Chap. 3. § 2. Thence it is said of God 1 Tim. 6.16 1 Tim. 6.16 That he dwels in the light which no man can approche unto The Divine Essence by reason of its Immensitie and Infinitude is infinitely elevated in Splendor and Glorie beyond the capacitie of our finite intellect Thus Plato held God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a celestial light ineffable c. So in his Timaeus pag. 28 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and truely it is very difficult to find out that Parent of the Vniverse and when he is found out to declare what he is unto al is a thing impossible So in his Parmenides pag. 134. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore Beautie it self and Bonitie it self is unknown as to us and al these things which we estime Ideas And
is not manifest in his sight because he is present with al. Suppose there were a bodie as they fancied Argus ful of eyes or al eye would it not discerne althings round about it without the least turne or mutation of its posture So God being ful of eyes or al eye and present with al Beings is it possible that any thing should be hid from him Hence Plato held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 althings are ful of God and therefore nothing could he hid from him 3 Gods Omniscience may be argued from the Divine Ideas or Decrees Althings were the object of Gods knowlege before they were in being by reason of his Divine Ideas which were the original Exemplar of althings This Plato much insistes on both in his Timaeus and Parmenides as hereafter 4 Gods Omniscience may be demonstrated from his universal Causalitie in giving Being unto althings So Act. 15.18 Act. 15.18 Known unto God are al his workes from the beginning of the world 5 Gods Omniscience may be argued from his preservation of and providence over althings Plato Leg. 10. pag. 901 c. proves That Gods Providence extendes to the vilest and least of things whereof he has an accurate knowlege being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most wise Opificer and Framer of althings For every intelligent Worke-man must have a ful knowlege of his own worke in as much as the idea or knowlege of the Worke-man gives forme to the worke whence God being the most intelligent Framer and Disposer of althings he cannot but have an accurate knowlege of al. But to descend to the particular objects of Gods Science The Object of Gods Omniscience we may distribute althings intelligible into complexe or incomplexe Complexe Intelligibles are propositions and discourses Incomplexe 1. Complexe Intelligibles real things 1. The Divine Science has a ful comprehension of al complexe Intelligibles or propositions and discourses both divine and human mental oral and scriptural Complexe Intelligibles are either antecedent to the Wil of God or subsequent 1 Complexe Intelligibles antecedent to the Wil of God are such as belong to the Divine Essence as that there is a God That God is eternal immutable c. These God knows by his Essence alone and not by his Wil because antecedent thereto Complexe Intelligibles subsequent to the Divine Wil are al such whose truth is caused by and so dependes on the Divine Wil. These God knows not by his Essence simply considered nor by the things themselves concerning which they are affirmed or denied but by his own Wil. For as Gods Wil gives Being to althings so al propositions that belong to them depend on and are known by the same Divine Wil. In which regard that commun Saying The Reasons of good and evil are eternal if understood as antecedent to the Divine Wil it is most false For there is no natural or moral Veritie belonging to any created object or terme that can be said to be antecedent to the Divine Wil. That al complexe Intelligibles or Propositions subsequent to the Divine Wil are known thereby see Bradwardine de Caus l. 1. c. 18. pag. 200. and Greg. Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. Dist 38. Quaest 2. pag. 135. 2. 2. Incomplexe Intelligibles Create incomplexe Intelligibles are either things possible or future 1 Things merely possible to God are known in his Divine Essence 2 Things future in his Wil which gives futurition to althings Things future as to us are distinguished into necessary and contingent but things contingent as to us are necessary in regard of the Divine Wil and therefore necessarily known by God That things most contingent are necessary in regard of Gods Wil and so certainly known by him is most evident because they are al present to God For what makes a thing contingent uncertain as to us but because it is future When it is present it is certainly known what it is wherefore althings being present to God by reason of his Divine Wil which gives suturition to althings therefore they must be al even things most contingent as to us certainly known by him Even among men those that understand the causes of things and their certain coherence with the effects may have a certain knowlege of an effect long before it is in being so an Astrologer foresees an Eclipse and shal not the omniscient God who gives Being to al Causes and actuates them in al their causalities and causal influxes be allowed a perfect knowlege of al effects Thus Homer Iliad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Who knows things present to come and past There is nothing so vile so inconsiderable but it fals under the omniscient eye of God Prov. 15.3 as Prov. 15.3 The eyes of God are in every place beholding the evil and the good God knows whatever is good by his Divine Wil the productive Cause thereof and whatever is evil by its opposite good as also by the positive Entitie or Act wherein the evil is seated which also fals under the determination of the Divine Wil so far as it is a real positive Being For he that perfectly knows a thing must needs know al the accidents modes and appendents thereof now al Evil being but a privation of what is good it cannot be hid from the divine Omniscience otherwise he should not perfectly know the good whereof it is a privation Again Evil being but a privation cannot exist but in some positive subject neither can it be known but by the forme whereof it is a privation which being known to God thence the evil also must necessarily be known to him The principal object among incomplexe simple Intelligibles is the heart of man if this be known by God Gods Omniscience as to the human Soul then surely nothing can be hid Now that the human Soul and al its Principes Habits Cogitations Inclinations Ends Designes and Acts are al known to God is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for sacred Philosophie it is in nothing more positive and expresse To begin with that great series of Demonstrations Psal 139.1 c. O Lord thou hast searched me and known me Psal 139.1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thou hast searched me narrowly sifted me to the bran thou so knowest me and al that is in me as he who knoweth a thing exactly after the most diligent and accurate inquisition So much 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 importes v. 2. Thou knowest my down-sitting and uprising v. 2. thou understandest my thoughts afar off The sense is there is no part of my life hid from thee whether I sit or rise thou knowest it al mine actions and enterprises are known by thee as 2 Kings 19.27 al my thoughts are present to thee long before they are existent Lyra interprets afar off of Eternitie my thoughts were in thy Eternitie apprehended by thee before they were mine Thence it follows v. 3. Thou compassest my path v. 3. and my lying down and
art acquainted with al my ways Thou compassest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thou winnowest or huntest my paths And art acquainted with al my ways 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thou hast been accustomed or thou so knowest as one who by long custome and familiar acquaintance understandes a mater In these two verses he enumerates al the postures of the bodie sitting rising or standing going and lying whereby according to sacred Philosophie al human actions are expressed as Deut. 6.7 Then he addes v. 4. For there is not a word in my tongue v. 4. but lo O Lord thou knowest it altogether The sense is before my word is formed in my tongue thou apprehendest it in my thought v. 5. v. 5. Thou hast beset me behind and before and laid thine hand upon me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thou hast besieged me or taken hold of me with a strong hand so that I can by no artifice flie thy presence or thou hast arrested me v. 6. and seised on me as thy prisoner v. 6. Such knowlege is too wonderful for me it is high I cannot attain unto it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thy knowlege is marvellous above me i. e. this thy knowlege is so admirable and so far above my capacitie as that I can by no means reach unto it albeit I know thou knowest althings yet I am altogether ignorant of the mode how thou knowest althings by one and the same simple intuitive act without discourse or succession Thence v. 7 8 9 10. he proves the Omniscience of God from his Omnipresence v. 11 12. And v. 11. addes If I say surely the darkenesse shal cover me even the night shal be light about me v. 12. Yea the darkenesse hideth not from thee but the night shineth as the day the darkenesse and the night are both alike to thee i. e. the most obscure things are as wel known to thee as the most evident Whence he addes v. 13. v. 13. For thou hast possessed my reines i. e. my most secret thoughts and affections thou hast covered me in my mothers wombe i. e. thou gavest me being and therefore canst not but fully understand every thought of my heart How can it possibly be but that thou shouldest understand me fully seing al that I have or am was from thee Psal 7.9 So Psal 7.9 For the righteous God trieth the hearts and reines i. e. the most abstruse and hidden thoughts affections inclinations and movements of the heart Psal 33.13 15. Thus Psal 33.13 The Lord looketh from Heaven he knoweth al the sons of men And he gives the reason of this divine Omniscience v. 15. He fashioneth their hearts alike he considereth al their workes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who formeth frameth An excellent reason of Gods infinite knowlege and its extent to al the thoughts inclinations intentions and affections of the Soul As if he had said Hath not God framed the hearts of al men Can any thing then in the hearts of men be hid from God as Psal 34.5 The Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render alike properly signifies here together i. e. al of them universally none excepted neither is it to be referred to the Verbe frameth but to Hearts and so denotes Gods exact knowlege of al mens hearts and that upon this account because he made them So Psal 94.11 and elsewhere But so much for the Object of Gods Science As for the Mode of Divine Science God knows althings by his own Essence both Sacred and Platonic Philosophic informes us that God knows althings not by images or species received from externe objects but in and by himself the essential glasse of the divine Intelligence It 's true we poor mortals who have only a composite successive knowlege of things cannot apprehend any externe object but by some abstract idea or image conveighed in and by the senses and impressed on the mind as the stampe of the seal on the waxe but the Divine Essence being most simple without the least shadow of passive receptive power is not capable of such an imperfect successive mode of understanding things God being a pure Act contemplates in his own eternal omnipotent Essence the Archetype of althings possible and in his own Wil the efficient of al future evenements If Gods eternal Knowlege should arise from any intelligible species or representation distinct from himself then there must be something eternal besides God also passive Power and Accidents which to assert is a dangerous error One and the same Divine Essence is the universal Exemplar or Idea of althings For look as in Nature the more noble and perfect Beings are the exemplars of the lesse noble and perfect so the Divine Essence being most perfect containing in it in a most eminent manner the seminal Reasons or Ideas of althings it thence becomes the most perfect exemplar and glasse to the Divine Understanding wherein it sees althings It 's true al Ideas of things in us who acquire our science and knowlege by Analysis are taken from the objects understood and thence impressed first on our senses and phantasie which is as a glasse to the human understanding according to which it formes al its intelligible ideas formes or notions of things but it is not so with the Divine Intellect which understandes althings by Genesis without analysing of things and therefore has althings preexisting in himself before they existe in themselves In us the Ideate or thing understood is before the Idea and the original exemplar of al our knowlege but in God his Idea is the original Exemplar and the Ideate in the create but a Parelius and reflexe image or similitude of the Divine Idea Al perfections in the Creature flowing from the efficacious Wil of God must necessarily preexiste in the Divine Wil and Essence before they existe in themselves as the effect ever preexistes in its cause hence the Divine Intellect comprehendes in the glasse of the Divine Essence al Creatures and their proper essences perfections distinctions respects and operations and that in a way not of composition but perfect intuition These Ideas of althings in the Divine Essence considered absolutely are but one yet if we consider them in the various 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and regards they have to the several Creatures so we may look on them as many for we may conceive the Idea of a man in the Divine Essence as distinct from the Idea of any other Creature though in truth it be but the same essence Hence that famose Essate among the Pythagorcans and Platonistes mentioned by Plato in his Parmenides That God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one and many i. e. one as to his most simple Essence and yet many as to the divine Ideas considered in their relation to the particular Ideates they refer unto These divine Ideas as they are the original Exemplar of althings made and so the object of Gods Science are wel expressed Heb. 11.3 Heb. 11.3
Ideas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 immixed or pure Act without the least mixture of Act and Power Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 19. Moreover saith he it belongs to the Deitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to know althings by a simple knowlege and simply to contemplate althings by its divine omniscient and immaterial eye both things present past and future even before they are Our intellection passeth from habit or power into act but Gods intellection admits not either habit or power but is pure act Where there is habitual knowlege there is composition of Act and Power but the divine Essence and Intellection being the same there can be no such composition in either This is wel expressed by Maximus Tyrius that famose Platonist Dissert 1. where discoursing what God is according to Plato he thus describes him pag. 10. It remains that we place God in the principal Intellect as in a supreme Tower But here I see a double Intellect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For one can understand i. e. it has an habit or power of understanding albeit it doth not understand i. e. actually but the other doth understand i. e. always actually for so he explains himself in what follows who is not yet perfect unlesse he understand always and althings not one after another Wherein he assertes 1 that Gods Intellect is always in act without habit or power 2 That he understandes althings 3 That he understandes althings at once not by succession and one thing after another Hence 2. Gods Science is not discursive but intuitive 2. Gods Science 1. Intuitive not discursive For it being most simple and the same with the divine Essence it cannot admit of the least succession or discourse Our intellect takes things in not at once or together but one after the other by composition division and succession as when we contemplate a man we consider 1 his Animalitie then 2 his Rationalitie and 3 his Risibilitie So in complexe notions we 1 make a Proposition 2 then a Syllogisme thence 3 a series or method of discourses And al this we do by composition and division passing from what is more known to what is lesse known and so taking in one after another which argues much imperfection in us But now the divine Knowlege is free from al these imperfections it admits neither composition nor division nor yet the least succession but takes in al objects by one simple intuitive act This is very wel illustrated by Maximus Tyrius Dissert 1. pag. 10. thus If it pleaseth we wil illustrate what we have spoken by a similitude 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Compare the Divine Intellect to the sight but the human to speech or discourse for the cast of the eye is of althings most swist which presently even in the same moment draws its object to it but the operation of discourse is like unto a soft pace Or that we may use another comparison 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Let us compare the Divine Intellect with the irradiation of the Sun which views one whole Hemisphere of the Earth at once but the human Intellect with the motion of the Sun which visits one place after another successively and gradually Two lively Metaphors to expresse the perfection of the divine Intellect beyond the human For first as the eye doth in a moment take in the most remote objects so doth the divine Intellect whereas al discourse whereto he compares the human intellect is but successive and slow Again as the Sun doth irradiate one whole Hemisphere of the Earth in a moment but is many hours in its moving through it so the divine Intellect doth in a moment of Eternitie comprehend al objects but the human is very slow and successive in its apprehension of things To these Platonic illustrations we may adde that of Aquinas P. 1. Quaest 14. Art 13. where he compares the Intuition of God to the vision of such as are on an high Tower or Mountain who in a moment view a series of objects very remote but the human ratiocination to such as walke in an high way who see only things nigh and before them It 's true the mind of Christians hath some imperfect intuition of God here by faith as 2 Cor. 3.18 but it 's only reflexe and in a glasse but God comprehendes althings by direct intuition without the least reflexion Again Angels and glorified Souls have some kind of direct intuition of God without those imperfect glasses of instituted ordinances but yet their Intuition is only apprehensive not comprehensive and simultaneous as the divine Science Lastly Angelic and human intuition if real necessarily requires the actual existence of the object but Gods intuition requires only the intentional existence of the object in the divine Wil for things future are the object of Gods intuition not as actually existent in Eternitie as the Dominicans avouch but only as intentionally existent in the divine Decree or Wil. Of which see more fully Twisse Scientia Media pag. 41-58 That Gods Science is not discursive may be demonstrated 1 because it is not successive there is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Max. Tyrius Al discursive science or ratiocination procedes from Principes to Conclusions but God views althings in his own Essence 2 Al discursive knowlege is composed of Act and Power for the Conclusions are potentially in the Principes and drawen into act by ratiocination But Gods Science is pure Act. 3 In our mode of knowing things the more distinctly we can apprehend any thing by its own evidence and light the more evident and perfect is our knowlege as in our apprehension of first Principes wherefore Gods mode of knowing things being most perfect it must necessarily be without ratiocination 4 In al discourse the assent is the effect caused and the Argument is the cause but Gods Science is not caused 5 In al discourse there is prioritie and posterioritie composition and division which implies much imperfection and may not therefore be ascribed to God 6 In al discourse there is much of ignorance mixed with our knowlege because it is a progression from that which is more known to that which is lesse known But Gods Science hath nothing of ignorance mixed with it Hence 3. Gods Science is immutable and necessary 3. Gods Science immutable and necessary This follows on the former Characters for in as much as the divine Science is not dependent on the objects known but the same with his own Essence hence it must be necessary and immutable Al human knowlege being caused by Ideas collected from the objects is mutable and variable as the objects are at least so far as it regardes singular sensible objects for if the object be contingent and mutable the Science cannot be necessary and immutable But now the divine Science being no way dependent on the object it is not obnoxious to those laws of mutation and variation which the object necessarily fals under The Truth
of our Understanding is mutable because dependent on externe objects and Mediums but the Truth of the Divine Understanding immutable and therefore the measure of al Truth as Aquinas wel notes This is incomparably wel illustrated by Bradwardine l. 1. c. 24. pag. 244. God saith he by reason of his most infinite claritie comprehendes althings and al particles of time as they are most truely in himself for he needs not comparation or relation of things past or future to the present instant according to the manner of our human infirmitie but he understandes althings together and most clearly by his own Essence and Wil which represences althings uniformely and invariably As if there should be an immobile eye in the Centre of the Heavens which should see by extramission and actively as God seeth it would then always see uniformely without al mutation every part of the Heavens turning round and the same part now in the East and anon in the South and then in the West Thus God in like manner sees al variable objects and parts of time with their distinct vicissitudes and successions without the least variation or succession because he sees althings not passively by species and impressions received from the things themselves but actively in his own Essence and Wil the active Principe of al. We poor mortals by reason of our infirmitie cannot distinctly apprehend al the particles of time always fluent and succeding each other and therefore we take the present instant which of al time is most actual and best known to us and make it the measure of past present and future time whence our knowlege also is successive and mutable but God who knows althings in his own Eternitie is not liable to such succession and mutation his Science being a pure necessary Act must needs be immutable and invariable albeit it terminates on objects in themselves most mutable and variable the mutation of the object makes no mutation in the divine Science because the mutable object is only the secundary object of Gods knowlege the primary object is the divine Essence which is immutable and therefore the divine Science such also Should Gods knowlege depend on the objects known then it would be mutable as they are but not otherwise God necessarily knows every Entitie both actual and potential wherefore 1 he can never know any thing that he is ever ignorant of 2 He can never be ignorant of what he ever knows 3 He cannot know more of fewer things than he knows 4 He cannot begin to know what he before knew not or not to know what before he knew because nothing begins to be future This immutabilitie of the divine Science as to things future arising from the determination of his own soverain Wil and not from any thing in the object is nervosely demonstrated by pious and learned Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne in his elaborate MSS. De Libero Arbitrio which lies buried in Exeter College Librarie Oxon. Wherein he copiosely demonstrates That the Causes Origines and Reasons of althings future though in themselves never so instable are most stable immutable necessary yea eternal in the divine Decree and Wil whence also the Divine Science is most certain necessary and immutable This he confirmes by Plato's Ideas which are immutable and invariable exemplars of althings future as before That the Divine Science is immutable and necessary so Greg. Ariminens Sent. l. 1. Dist 39. pag. 130 140. Hence 4. The Divine Science is most certain and infallible 4. Divine Science most certain Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 382. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I judge no mortal would be really willing both to deceive and be deceived or to be ignorant of supreme Beings much lesse God The Science of God being necessary ad immutable it cannot but be most certain and infallible To know things certainly is to know them in their causes now Gods Wil being the Cause of althings he thence knows them perfectly Gods Science is as certain as the future events for where there is a determinate effect there must be a determinate cause and where the cause is determinate there the science also may be determinate The knowlege of things future in God is as certain as the knowlege of things present for every future compared to God the first Cause and his Science is necessary and necessarily future albeit as compared to the second causes some effects may be contingent or contingently future The primary object of the divine Science being infinitely perfect namely the divine Essence it cannot but be most certain and infallible if there be any certaintie and infallibilitie in human Science how much more in divine Science which penetrates al Essences and Truths with the most perfect light and most simple intuition contemplating every Being and Truth as it is in it self in the glasse of the divine Essence The divine Intellect sees althings as existent in themselves by the infinite light of the divine Essence and therefore most certainly and infallibly as Esa 40.13 14. Hence 5. The Dâ—â—â—â—e Science is absolute and independent not conditionate and dependent on any create Object Thus Plato 5. Gods Science absolute and in dependent in his Parmenides pag. 134 c. makes his divine Ideas to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-subsistent and independent as to al externe objects and condition For otherwise saith he God should not have a certain knowlege of and soverain dominion over human affaires It 's impossible that any effect should be or be understood as future in any case but dependently on its efficient cause Now what is the first and universal Essicient of al effects but the Decree of the divine Wil on which every effect dependes more than on its proxime cause Therefore as nothing is antecedent to the divine Wil so no Hypothesis or condition is cognoscible or knowable antecedently thereto Gods knowlege as it dependes not on the existence of created objects so neither on any Hypotheses or conditions that are appendent unto such objects placed in such circumstances For al futures whether absolute or conditionate are known by God not from the determination of second causes but from the determinatin of the divine Wil which is the first Cause For whence springs the futurition of things but from the determination of the divine Wil And must not then the determination of the divine Wil be precedent to the determination of the second CAuse And if so may we not then hence conclude that Gods Science arising from the determination of his own Wil dependes not on the existence of or any conditions that belong to future objects If the divine Essence be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent must not the divine Science which is identified therewith be also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent Or if the divine Science should depend on the mutable conditions of its object can it be any other than conjectural Where any science dependes on its
every facultie is by so much the more extensive by how the more immaterial it is hence the human Intellect by its act of understanding is said to become althings how much more true is this of the Divine Intellect which is in the highest degree spiritual The Divine Science albeit it be one most simple Act in it self yet it is most universal and infinite as to its object Thus Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 78. proves that Gods knowlege extendes to an infinitie of things because God perfectly knows his own Virtue and Power which is infinite Again by how much the more efficacious and clear any Intellect is in knowing by so much the more able it is from one to gather many things But now the Divine Intellect being infinitely efficacious it must therefore necessarily extend to an infinitude of objects So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 1. pag. 7. proves That the Scientivitie of God and his Intellect is never satisfied with any finite or infinite number of existent singulars of any one species or al but infinitely excedes each of them yea a whole multitude of al if they could be congregated together That the Science of God is most perfect essentially intensively and extensively see Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. Sect. 15. pag. 121. Having largely discussed the essential Modes or Characters of the Divine Science we now procede to its distinctions Gods simple Ditelligence with relation to its objects For albeit the Divine Science be in it self one simple Act identified with the Divine Essence yet this hinders not but that we may by some inadequate conception of reason distinguish this Science by reason of its object into different kinds The commun distribution of Gods Science is into simple Intellience and Science of Vision 1. Gods Science of simple Intelligence is of althings possible which he contemplates in the Alsufficience of his Essence For God being in the highest degree Intelligent he must necessarily understand althings that are intelligible but now whatever may be may also be known where-ever there is a possibilitie of existence there is some intelligibilitie Again God perfectly knows his own Essence and Power therefore he perfectly knows not only what is future but also whatever is possible Not that the existence of things possible is known by God but only their Essence which he contemplates in his own EssEnce Hence this Science of simple Intelligence is called by some Abstractive because it abstractes from the actual existence of its object 2. Gods Science of Vision Gods Science of Vision as to things future is that whereby he knows things as future in and upon the Decree of his Wil. Here we must premit that when we say Gods Science of Vision terminates on things as future the conjunctive Particle As must be taken not formally as if it denoted any reason of the Divine Cognition taken from the futurition of the thing but only materially and so it denotes only thus much that Gods knows things future to be future and that by the determination of his own Wil. Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 18. pag. 220 c. largely demonstrates these Propositions 1 That God doth not know things future merely by his Essence without the determination of his Wil because nothing is in its own nature future but by the Decree of the Divine Wil. 2 That God doth not know things future by the Divine Intellect only because the Divine Intellect considered in it self is not practic but only as subsequent to the Divine Wil. 3 That God doth not know things future by the Infinitie of the Divine Science because the Infinitie of the Divine Science being supposed it doth not thence necessarily follow that this or that thing be future 4 That God doth not know things future by the knowlege of their second Causes For such a knowlege implies discourse from the cause to the effect again such a knowlege would be contingent when the second causes are such 5 That God doth not know things future by the Infinitie or Immensitie of his own Scibilitie or Scientivitie 6 That god doth not know things future by the sole permission of his own Wil because then Gods knowlege should not be certain Hence he positively concludes God knows things future by his Wil. 7 That God knows things future by that which gives them their futurition namely by his Divine Wil. For as Aristotle 1. Post 2. instructes us To know a thing is to know it by its cause and is not the Wil of God the first Cause that gives futurition to althings Again how can God certainly know future contingents such as al human acts are but in and by some necessary certain cause And what certain necessary cause can there be of future contingents but the Divine Wil We may not then search for the causes of Divine Prescience in things future but in the cause of their futurition the determination of the Divine Wil. Not as if the decree or determination of the Divine Wil whereby things become future did in any moment of Nature precede the Divine Prescience but in one and the same moment of Nature God decrees what shal be future and foresees it future Thence he takes the reason of his knowing things future not simply from his Essence or sufficience nor yet from their presentialitie to God as the Dominicans persuade us but from the determination of his own Wil. Certainly Gods Wil is most efficacious omnipotent immutable and most known to himself and therefore it is necessary that whatever he wils should be future be so and known to him to be so for he wils not only the things themselves but also al their modes and conditions of contingence necessitie libertie c. Whatever gives any thing its futurition must necessarily also give it its cognoscibilitie or intelligibilitie as future wherefore the Divine Wil giving the former it cannot also but give the later Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 12. tels us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God may be deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for nothing can be hid from God yea he is the Inspector of althings And then he gives us the mode how God comes to know althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For he beholdeth althings before they are produced eternally understanding every thing according to his voluntary eternal Intelligence i. e. his eternal Intelligence grounded on his own Wil. Thus Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 19. pag. 226. But here we must know that a thing as future in the Divine Wil and Predestination causally and not extrinsecally in its own proper nature is the cause or object of the Divine Science or Prescience For God no way needs extrinsec things as objects of his knowlege but he hath althings future with himself intrinsecally cognitivè causativè intuitivè seu scientificè cognitively causatively intuitively or scientificly from himself only and so he knows althings c. So
dependes This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil the Hebrews expressed by the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai which denotes Gods Soverain Dominion over the Creature from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a pillar or basis on which the whole Fabric dependes but it dependes not on the Fabric so althings depend on the Soverain Wil of God but it on nothing Thus Plato Epist p. 312. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 About the King of althings althings are and althings are for his sake 〈◊〉 and he is the cause of althings beautiful Wherein note 1 thâ—â—e stiles God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Soveraign King or Lord of al i. e. according to the origination of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the basis of al answerably to the import of Adonai Lord. 2 He saith althings are for God i. e. to be disposed of according to his Soverain Wil and pleasure And 3 he addes the Reason because he is the cause of althings i. e. God by virtue of his prime causalitie and efficience has an universal Dominion over al things to dispose of them as he pleaseth for his Glorie The light of Nature teacheth that every one ought to be the supreme moderator of his own work Hence what ever God wils is just because he wils it This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil is lively expressed Psal 135.5 Psal 135.5 6. For I know that Jehova is Great and that our Lord is superior to al Gods Jehovah i. e. the first Supreme Being who gives being to althings but receives nothing from any Creature Is Great i. e. Infinite in being and therefore most Soverain and Independent in his Wil and Pleasure Whence it follows and superior to al Gods i. e. infinitely above Angels and Men though never so potent who al depend on his soverain independent Wil. Thence he addes v. 6. Whatsoever the Lord pleased that did he in Heaven and in Earth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whatsoever the Lord willeth which notes the Soveraintie Independence and Omnipotence of his Wil. Jonah 1.14 So Jonah 1.14 For thou O Lord hast done as it pleased thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to thy soverain independent Wil. The greatest Notions or Attributes that our shallow judgements can invent are infinitely too short to expresse the Soveraintie of the Divine Wil. But the more fully to explicate and demonstrate the Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil God independent physically and morally we are to consider that as causes so dependence on those causes is twofold physic or moral Physic Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on a superior Cause for real efficience Moral Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on its superior for moral influence And there is this commun to both as in Naturals inferior causes dependent on superiors in acting have no power to act contrary to the efficace of their superiors so in Morals But now God is neither physically nor morally dependent on any superior cause 1 He has no physic dependence on any superior cause because he is the first in the order of physic Causes Again he is superior to al Gods as Psal 135.5 and therefore cannot be influenced by any So Plato Repub. assurâ—◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That an hypocrite is neither able to hide himself from God nor yet to force him The Divine Wil receives no real efficience or influence from the human Wil but the human Wil is really influenced by the Divine Wil God wils not things because we wil them but we wil things because God wils them 2 Neither is God morally dependent on any other Moral dependence is founded in natural where there is natural independence in an absolute degree there cannot be moral dependence in any degree The rational Creature having a twofold relation to God as a Creature and as rational hence he has a twofold dependence on God one natural the other moral but God being independent as to his Essence must necessarily also be independent as to Morals Moral dependence is either Legal or Final Legal dependence is when an inferior dependes on the Laws Remunerations or Distributions of any Superior Final Dependence is when an inferior dependes on some supreme last end The Divine Wil is in neither regard dependent 1 It is not legally dependent because not subject to the law of any The Divine Wil gives Laws to al Creatures but receives Laws from none yea it hath no legal dependence on any meritorious acts of the Creature God willeth nothing without himself because it is just but it is therefore just because he wils it The reasons of good and evil extrinsec to the Divine Essence are al dependent on the Divine Wil either decernent or legislative 2 The Divine Wil has no final dependence on any superior end because it s own Bonitie is its only end The End is the Cause Reason or Motive of willing althings that conduce to the End but now nothing can move the Wil of God but his own Bonitie which indeed is the same with his Wil and Essence wherefore it cannot be properly said to be the cause of his Wil because nothing is said to be the cause of it self When Theologues affirme That God wils one thing for another they mean not that the other thing is the cause or motive of the Divine Wil but that God wils there should be a causal connexion between the things willed As God willed the Sun Moon and Stars should be for the production of fruits and these for the use of man c. Gods willing one thing for another notes a causal connexion between the things willed but no causal influence on the Divine Wil Deus vult hoc propter hoc non autem propter hoc vult hoc Ephes 1.4 5. God wils this for that yet for this he doth not wil that i. e. God wils effects and causes and that the effects are for the causes yet he doth not wil the effects for the causes as if the causes were the motives of his Wil. Thus we must understand that Text Eph. 1.4 According as he has chosen us in him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and without blame before him in love How are the Elect chosen in Christ 1 Negatively they are not chosen in Christ as the meritorious Cause of Election nor from a prevision of their Faith in Christ as the motive of Divine Election according to the Pelagian Hypothesis But 2 They are said to be chosen in Christ as their commun Head that by him they might be made new Creatures and so partakers both of Grace and Glorie Christ and Faith have no causal influence on the Divine Wil but the Divine Wil decrees that Christ and Faith should have a causal influence on Salvation Thence it follows v. 5. Having predestinated us unto the Adoption of Children by Jesus Christ unto himself according to the good pleasure of his Wil. Here
Christ is brought in as the meritorious antecedent Cause of our Adoption but as an effect and consequent of Election For so much the Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by denotes namely that Christ as Mediator is the effect of Predestination or Election but the cause of our Adoption This is strongly argued by Augustin in his Book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum And surely if the Merits of Christ have no causal influence on the Wil of God much lesse can mans Faith or Merits influence the same Thence he addes according to the good pleasure of his Wil which argues the Independence of his Wil. Thus we see how God wils Christ and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect and yet doth not wil the Salvation of the Elect for Christ and Faith as the moving causes of his Wil which is most independent So God wils both the means and the end and the means for the end yet he doth not for the end wil the means as if the end did move him to wil the means For in God the volition of one thing is not the cause of his willing another because there can no efficience of cause on effect or dependence of effect on the cause be affirmed of the Divine Wil which is but one simple indivisible act both as to end and means and therefore neither one nor t'other can be said to move or influence the Divine Wil albeit the same Divine Wil doth wil a causal connexion between the things willed in which regard Scholastic Theologues assigne reasons of the Divine Wil affirming That the passive attingence of the Divine Wil in respect of one thing is the cause of its passive attingence in regard of another thing albeit neither the cause of the Divine Wil i. e. to speak natively and properly God wils that one thing shal depend on another yet the Divine Wil neither dependes on nor is moved by either Gods soverain independent Wil is ful of reasons as to the admirable dependence of the things willed according to their subordinations yet there may not be the least reason or shadow of reason assigned as the cause or motive of the Divine Wil. Thus Ephes 1.11 Ephes 1.9 11. Who worketh althings according to the counsel of his Wil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is the highest counsel and wisdome in the Divine Wil and yet no reason or cause can be assigned of it So v. 9. Having made known to us the mysterie of his Wil according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself The Divine Wil is here said to be 1 ful of mysterious wisdome whereof no reason can be assigned without it self Thence 2 it is stiled good pleasure which denotes its Soveraintie and Independence Hence 3 it is said to be in it self i. e. no reason or cause extrinsec to it self can be assigned thereof though it be ful of mysterious wisdome and sublime reasons yet they are al within it self That there can no cause either physic or moral legal or final be assigned of the Divine Wil is evident 1 because the Divine Wil is one simple pure Act and therefore not capable of any Passion Impression and Causalitie from any extrinsec object 2 Because althings else are the effects of the Divine Wil and therefore cannot be the cause thereof because the same thing cannot be the cause of it self 3 Because the Divine Wil is eternal but althings else of finite duration and is it possible that what is temporal and finite should influence what is eternal and infinite That there can be no cause of the Divine Wil see Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 19. Art 5. contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil it immutable The Divine Wil immutable This Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil ariseth from the Independence Simplicitie and Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence with which it has an essential connexion yea identitie Plato discourseth accurately of the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil both in his Philosophemes of Divine Ideas as also in his Phaedo pag. 78. where he proves that the Divine Essence and Wil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. one uniforme Being which existes of it self and is alwayes the same without the least degree of mutation c. of which more fully before in Gods Immutabilitie cap. 4. § 5. But this Immutabilitie of the divine Wil is more clearly illustrated and demonstrated in sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 33.10 Psal 33.10 11. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the Heathen to nought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath infringed dissipated made void from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break Thence it follows He maketh the devices of the people of none effect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath broken from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break properly the mind or purpose The divine Wil delights to break and dash in pieces the strongest resolutions and most fixed purposes of proud men But then follows the Immutabilitie of the divine Wil v. 11. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever the thoughts of his heart to al generations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the fixed counsel or determinate purpose of Jehovah Standeth for ever i. e. is inviolable and immutable This verse contains the Antithese of the precedent whereby David teacheth us that the divine Wil makes void the proud wil of man but no human wil can frustrate or alter the divine Wil as Job 12.13 14. Thus Psal 119.89 For ever O Lord thy word is setled in Heaven Psal 119.89 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is fixed established R. Ezora understandes this of the decrees or purposes of the Divine Wil which are firme stablished and immutable So Malach. 3.6 I am the Lord I change not therefore the Sons of Jacob are not consumed I change not This regards the Wil of God as wel as his essence so much the subsequent inference importes for the reason why the Sons of Jacob are not consumed must be resolved into the immutable Wil of God as the original cause It 's true the things willed by God are oft under mutations and God wils those mutations but with an immutable wil the mutation reacheth not the wil of God but only the things willed by God who wils this thing shal be now and the contrary afterward without the least alteration in his wil. A wil is then said to be changed when any begins to wil that which he before nilled or to nil that which he before willed which cannot be supposed to happen but in case of some mutation in knowlege or disposition but neither of these can be affirmed of God 1 God is infinitely wise and foresees al contingences circumstances and accidents that may happen and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purposes for want of wisdome as we poor mortals frequently do 2 Gods disposition towards al objects is ever the same 3 The human wil is obnexious to mutations from impotence and want of power to accomplish what
said by Plato always 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to play the Geometer i. e. to measure out to althings their just essences virtues perfections and limits for Geometrie according to its primary notation and use among the Egyptians from whom Plato borrowed the notion signifies to measure the bounds and termes of land And it is most appositely applied by Plato to the divine Wil as it gives measures and termes to althings 3 The divine Wil is most perfect effectively 3. Effectively as it is the efficacious Efficient of al effects of which hereafter in the divine Causalitie where we hope fully to demonstrate That the Divine Wil is the prime Efficient and efficacious Cause of al effects The perfection of the divine Wil may be demonstrated either absolutely or comparatively as compared with the human wil. 1 If we consider the divine Wil absolutely so its perfection may be demonstrated from its Simplicitie pure Actualitie Eternitie Immutabilitie Omnipotence c. as before 2 If we consider the divine Wil relatively or comparatively as compared with a create human or Angelic wil so its perfection appears 1 in this that the divine Wil gives al Bonitie and goodnesse to things whereas every create wil presupposeth goodnesse in things that it wils every create wil dependes on because it 's moved by the goodnesse of its object but every create good dependes on the goodnesse of the divine Wil. Hence there can be assigned no cause of the divine Wil but what is in it self whereas every create wil has a formal reason cause and motive without it self whereby it is moved and influenced 2 In the human wil the volition of the end is the cause of its willing the means but in the divine Wil both end and means are willed by one simple indivisible pure Act. 3 In mans wil Volition and Nolition are distinct Acts not to wil in man implies a negation or suspension of the wils act but in God by reason of the pure actualitie of his Nature Nolition and Volition are the same We may not imagine that the divine Wil is capable of any suspension or negation of Act but whatever he wils not that it be that he wils that it be not also whatever he wils not that it be not that he wils that it be 4 Mans wil is circumscribed and limited by justice he may not wil but what is just but Gods Wil is not circumscribed by any Laws of Justice he doth not wil things because just but they are therefore just because he wils them Quicquid Deus non vult ut fiat illud etiam vult ut non fiat item quicquid non vult ut non fiat id ipsum etiam vult ut fiat 5 Mans wil is limited as to the sphere of its Activitie he wils what he doth but he cannot do al that he wils termes of essence suppose termes of power and activitie But God doth not only wil what he doth but also do what he wils his power is as extensive as his wil he can do what he wil his Wil is omnipotent because the same with his Essence as Psal 115.3 8. Prop. The divine Wil is most free The Divine Wil most free Libertie being one of the supreme perfections that belong to an intelligent rational Creature it may not be denied to the divine Wil. Yea nothing else could be free if the divine Wil were not free because this is the first Principe of al Libertie as take away the first Cause you also destroy al second Causes so take away libertie from the divine Wil you take it away also from al create wils Libertie in the divine Wil is absolute precedent and regulant libertie in the human wil is conditionate subsequent and regulated The first in every kind is the measure of al in that kind now the divine Libertie is the first in that kind and therefore the grand Exemplar of al create Libertie The most perfect Cause must necessarily have the most perfect mode of acting but now God is the most perfect Cause therefore he must have the most perfect mode of acting which is to act freely Yea the divine Wil is so infinitely free as that it is moved by nothing without it self it has not so much as an end extrinsec to its own Bonitie whereby it is moved which kind of independent libertie no create wil may challenge For every create wil as it has a first Cause whereby it is moved physically so a last end whereby it is moved morally but the Libertie of the divine Wil is independent in both these regards and therefore most supreme and perfect The Libertie of the divine Wil may be considered as relating to the operations ad intra or to those ad extra 1 The Libertie of the divine Wil as relating to the operations ad intra is only concomitant not antecedent for al the operations of God ad intra i. e. such as terminate on himself namely loving himself c. they are al from a necessitie of Nature not from election and choice God cannot but love himself he necessarily adheres to his own Bonitie and enjoys himself without the least indifference either of Specification or Exercice And yet even in these Acts ad intra which terminate on the divine Essence and are attended with a natural necessitie the divine Wil has a concomitant Libertie or divine Spontaneitie which is sufficient to denominate those Acts free For as the human wil adheres to its last end by a kind of natural necessitie which yet is attended with a rational spontaneitie so in like manner the divine Wil adheres to and enjoys it self by a natural necessitie and yet with a concomitant libertie or divine spontaneitie This is wel expressed by Jamblichus a Sectator of Plato de Myster Aegypt It is saith he necessary that God be as he is not by an extrinsec violent necessitie but by a natural and most voluntary seing he never would be other than he is Here we see the highest necessitie conspiring and according with the highest libertie 2 If we consider the Libertie of the Divine Wil as relating to its operations ad extra such as terminate on the Creature so it is not only concomitant but also antecedent i.e. the Divine Wil terminates on the Creature not from any necessitie of Nature but by election and choice For al Creatures as referred to the Divine Bonitie are but means wherefore the Divine Wil has an antecedent libertie either for the electing or refusing of them This some cal Libertie of Election because al election properly regards the means Again God in willing his own Bonitie necessarily wils althings so far as they participate of his own Bonitie Now the divine Bonitie being infinite there are infinite ways whereby the Creatures are participable thereof but al dependent on the election and determination of the Divine Wil. Lastly if the divine Wil should terminate on the Creatures from a necessitie of
Nature and not from free election there could nothing be contingent as Suarez and others prove But here occurs a knotty objection What indifference may be ascribed to the Wil of God which is thus urged How can the Divine Decrees admit of an antecedent libertie of election when as they are the same with the Divine Essence and so attended with the same natural necessitie This objection has greatly perplexed the acutest Wits among Scholastic Theologues Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 14. pag. 212. answers thus That between the state of possibilitie and the futurition of things in the divine Decree there is a prioritie of origination not of time but of nature But more fully lib. 2. cap. 52. pag. 834. he explicates in what sense it may be said that God could before nil what he now wils It is manifest saith he that God could not either in regard of Time or Eternitie before nil privatively or positively what he now wils but only by a prioritie of Nature or Cause namely by a prioritie of the volutive power in relation to its act By the volutive power we must understand Gods Wil as the effective Principe not that it is really a power in God So Gregor Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. Dist 45. pag. 161. answers sundry objections relating to this Hypothesis and at last concludes That the Wil of God as the first Cause of things may be said to be both necessary and contingent necessary as the same with the divine Essence and yet contingent as it might not have willed the futurition and existence of things Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. Disp 7. pag. 114. saith That we may conceive signum rationis a moment of reason before the Decree of the divine Wil determing what should be future And Disput 116. pag. 913. he distinguisheth indifference into privative and negative Negative Indifference he makes to be that which in it self is not more determined to this object than to that or to act than not to act and in this regard addes he the divine Wil was before it determined to create the world in that signo rationis moment of reason indifferent to create or not create the world c. which negative indifference importes no privation of perfection in God Al these solutions are much of the same import and may be resolved into this That the divine Decrees may be considered as they are in themselves and with respect to the divine Essence and so they are necessary or as they terminate on the Creatures and are the cause both of their futurition and existence and so we may ascribe to them a moment of reason nature or causalitie in which they might not have been And this we stile Antecedent Libertie or Libertie of Election which importes no mutabilitie in the divine Wil but only a prioritie of Causalitie which very wel accordes with the necessitie of the divine Wil. To conclude this Adjunct touching the Libertie of the divine Wil Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. S. 16. pag. 134. grantes That a necessitie of Immutabilitie agrees to the Divine Wil and no way prejudiceth the perfection of its Libertie 9. Prop. Gods Wil is most efficacious and irresistible Gods Wil irresistible This Adjunct of the divine Wil is expressely laid down in sacred Philosophie So Esa 46.10 My counsel shal stand Esa 46.10 and I wil do al my pleasure The like we find in Homer Iliad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The counsel of Jupiter was fulfilled Thus also Rom. 9.19 Who hath resisted his Wil By which the Apostle excludes al manner of resistence not only actual but also possible That the divine Wil is most efficacious and irresistible may be demonstrated 1 from Gods prime universal Causalitie God according to Plato is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most soverain Cause and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Cause of al second Causes which are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ministerial instrumental Causes of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who gives essence to althings Now the first universal Cause of althings cannot be resisted by any second particular cause For herein lies the difference between the first universal cause and second causes these may fail of their effect by reason of some other cause impeding but the first universal cause can never fail of his effect because he contains under his Jurisdiction and Soverain Power al other causes he that gives Being and Power to althings can be resisted by nothing Now how is God the first universal cause of althings Is it not by his Divine Wil We may not conceive any other causal executive Power in God but his Divine Wil he effectes and operates immediately by his wil without any distinct executive power as we shal prove anon 2 From the Omnipotence of the Divine wil. The Psalmist informes us Psal 115.3 Psal 115.3 and 135.5 6. That God doth whatsoever he pleaseth So Psal 135.5 6. Gods Soverain wil backt with Omnipotence is invincible The Psalmist shews the transcendent universalitie and efficace of the Divine wil above the human men wil what they can do but God can do what he wil because his wil is omnipotent If Gods wil were not Omnipotent he could not do whatever is possible for he workes althings by his wil neither is he on any other account stiled in the Creed Omnipotent or Almighty but because he can do what he wil. The Divine Omnipotent wil alwaies obtains its effect because its volition is its operation it s fiat is its factum esse its word its deed Thence that of Augustin Gods wil is most certain because most potent Of which see more fully Ariminensis Sent. 1. Dist 46 47. and Bradwardine l. 2. c. 29. I wil not saith he have him for my God who is not Omnipotent in Acting who has not a most Omnipotent Dominion over my infirme wil who cannot in the most Omnipotent manner make me to wil and do what he wils who hath not a wil universally efficacious infrustrable indefectible and necessary in causing yea whose wil is not to me necessitie 3 From the Beatitude of God Aristotle as reason assures us that al men do what they wil if they can because herein their Beatitude seems to consist So Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. p. 138. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. And if he could and would he hath also done it for al when they can and wil act for there is no impediment Beatitude is the supreme end of al rational Appetition therefore what men desire they do if they can as Aristotle subnectes Hence the Divine wil if it could not do what it would it should not be blessed because Beatitude is the ultimate terme of al volition So Bradwardine l. 2. c. 27. Yea I constantly and freely avouch I wil not have him for my God whose most blessed wil poor miserable sinful I can when I please pul down from the Throne of his Dignitie and subjugate c. 4 From the Infinitude of
Principe Durandus's Objections answered Divine Concurse as to the human Wil and al create Objects Gods Concurse principal How second Causes are Instruments Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with the Divine Wil. No executive Power in God distinct from his Wil. The Divine Wil of it self omnipotent and operative Gods Concurse 1 Immediate both as to the second Cause its Act and Effect 2 Independent 3 Previous 4 Total 5 Particular 6 Efficacious 7 Connatural § 1. HAving explicated the Divine Nature and Attributes God the first Cause of althings we now descend to the explication of the Divine Causalitie and Efficience which properly belongs to metaphysic or prme Philosophie Thence Sapience which takes in the generic notion of metaphysic according to Aristotle consistes in the contemplation not only of most excellent Beings but also of the prime Cause of althings That God is the prime Cause of althings not only sacred but also Platonic Philosophie doth assure us As for sacred Philosophie it gives frequent and great demonstrations of our Hypothesis Thus Esa 66.2 For al these things have my hands made and al those things have been So Psal 104.24 of which more in Gods Creation Plato also hath left us great notices of Gods prime Causalitie and Efficience So in his Phaedo pag. 96. he demonstrates how great the ignorance and folie of such is who wholly busie their thoughts in the contemplation of second Causes but neglect to inquire after and into the first Cause who is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal supreme Cause but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Cause of causes whereas al second Causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Instruments of the first Cause Thence pag. 97. he addes But when I sometime heard some one reading and relaeting out of a certain Book as he said of Anaxagoras 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That the Divine Mind doth orderly dispose and governe althings and is the cause of althings I was indeed greatly recreated with this Cause and it seemed to me to be rightly determined namely that the Divine Mind was the Cause of althings and thus I reasoned with my self if it be so that the gubernatrix and dispositrix Mind do thus dispose althings it doth therefore place each particular in that place where it may be best constituted If therefore any one be willing to inquire after and into the cause of every thing both of its existence and corruption he must also inquire in what regard it may be best either as to being or as to suffering or doing any other thing Vpon this account there is nothing more needful for man to inquire after either concerning himself or other things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than what is best and most excellent for it is necessary that such an one also know what is worst because the science of these things is the same When I pondered these things in my mind I much pleased my self in this that I had got a Master who would instruct me in the causes of things according to mine own mind namely Anaxagoras In these great Philosophemes of Socrates we have these observables 1 These contemplations about the first Cause were some of his dying thoughts and therefore such as his mind were most intent on 2 He greedily imbibes and closeth with that great Tradition of Anaxagoras derived originally from sacred Philosophie That the Divine Mind was the first cause of althings 3 That the Divine Mind disposed ordered and governed althings in the best manner 4 That he who would inquire into the causes of this must have his eye on those two the mater and efficient For Plato makes but two Principes of things the Mater out of which things were made and the Efficient that formed the mater into shape or that particular forme or essence This Efficient he elsewhere stiles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea making 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Idea and mater the two Principes of althings So the Stoics made two Principes of althings the Efficient and Patient Plato sometimes makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Efficient and Cause termes synonymous so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficient precedes and the effect follows 5 That as to efficients we must alwaies inquire after the best and most excellent namely God the first Cause for he that knows the best i. e. God may easily know the worst i. e. second Causes So Plato Leg. 4. p. 715. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of althings Thus in his Sophista pag. 265. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Namely doth Nature by the force of some casual fortuitous cause without the efficacitie of the Divine Mind produce these things Or on the contrary shal we not determine that these things have their existence with Divine Wisdome and Science from God Wherein note 1 that he layes down an Hypothesis contrary to that of Leucippus and Democritus That things existe not by the casual fortuitous confluxe of Atomes 2 That althings existe by the Divine Mind Hence 3 That althings are framed and disposed in the best order with the highest wisdome 4 He makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word which some would understand of the second Person in the Trinitie but I should rather take it here for wisdome as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood of Science The like in his Theaetetus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must remember that nothing can be of it self therefore althings are from some first Cause of which more fully before C. 2. § 2. So Repub. 6. he makes God to be the First cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 giving essence to althings for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every thing receives essence from the efformative words of the great Opificer Again Repub 2. pag. 379. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And of good things there is no other supreme cause to be acknowledged besides God So pag. 380. he proves That God is the cause of al good whether natural or moral And Epist pag. 312. he expressely saith That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of althings good or beautiful Thus Damascene out of Dionysius Areopagita who doth much Platonise Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. God is the cause and principe of althings the essence of Beings the Life of things living the Reason of things rational the Intellect of things intellectile the Restitution and Resurrection of them that fal from him but of those things that naturally perish the Renovation and Reformation of those things which are moved with a strong impetuositie the great confirmation of such things as stand the stabilitie of those things that ascend up to him the way and reductive manuduction Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the illuminated the splendor the perfection of the perfect the Deification of the deified the peace of the discordant the simplicitie of the
simple the union of the united the superessential and superprincipal Principe of every Principe For the more distinct demonstration that God is the prime Cause of althings these Platonic Philosophemes may be thus formed into Arguments 1 That which is such by Essence is necessarily before that which is such by Participation but now God is a Cause by Essence whereas al other causes are such only by participation God gives essence to althings but receives it from nothing Thus Plato Leg. 6. pag. 509. God the supreme Good gives efficace and force to things not only for their being known but also for their existence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when yet that chief good is not properly Essence but superessential because greatly transcending the whole nature of things create both in dignitie and virtue 2 Al Imperfectes receive their origine from that which is more perfect and is not God the most absolutely perfect of al Beings Must not althings then receive their origine from God 3 That which is the last end of althings must needs be the first Cause of al For the first Cause is of equal latitude and extent with the last end nothing can terminate and bound the appetite of man but that which gave Being to him that which is last in order of final causes must needs be first in order of Efficients And is not God the last End of althings Are not althings so far good as they participate of the Divine Goodnesse Is not God to speak in Plato's language 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Idea and measure of al good And must he not then necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chiefest Good It 's true there are other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inferior derivative goods but is there any universal essential independent good but God And must not the order of Efficients answer the order of Ends If God as the last End gives blessed Being must he not as the first Efficient give natural Being Can any thing returne to God as the last end but what flows from him as the first Cause Thus Simplicius a Sectator of Plato in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Fountain and Principe of althings is the chiefest Good for that which is desired by althings and unto which althings are referred that is the Principe and End of althings Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the one first Being Principe chiefest Good and God are one and the same for God is the first and cause of althings 4 Must not every multiforme variable defectible Being be reduced to some uniforme simple invariable indefectible Being as its first Cause And is there any uniforme simple immutable Being but God Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It 's necessary that the first Being be most simple for whatever is composite as composite it is after one and multitude and so produced c. Whereby he proves that the first Cause is most simple 5 Do not al finite dependent causes need some infinite independent cause to conserve and actuate them And is there any infinite independent cause but God Can any thing be the first cause but he who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause 6 Is not the order of causes proportionable to the order of effects Where then there is an universalitie of effects must there not also be an universal first Cause which gives Being to al those effects Is it possible that the universitie of effects which are in Nature should existe but by the universal efficace of the first independent Being and Cause Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that the first cause have the highest and universal influence for there is an amplitude and abundance of efficace in him so that he can produce althings of himself § 2. Having demonstrated God to be the First Cause of althings The Object of Divine Concurse we now procede to explicate the mode and nature of his Causalitie Concurse and Efficience The prime Causalitie and Concurse of God may be considered with respect to 1 Its Object 2 It s Subject or Principe 3 Its Mode of Operation 4 Its Termes or Effects produced First we may consider the prime Causalitie Concurse and Efficience of God as to its Object and that 1 Negatively 2 Positively We shal state and determine both in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Gods concurse as to its object Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe consistes not merely in the communication of force and virtue to the second cause and conservation of the same The Antithesis hereto was anciently maintained by Durandus contrary to the Hypothesis both of the Thomistes and Scotistes in Sent. l. 2. Distinct 1. q. 5 who supposed That the concurse of God conferred nothing more on second causes than a virtue or power to act and the conservation thereof without any immediate actual influence on the second cause or its Act in order to the production of the effect The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or principal motive ground and reason of this Antithesis is this If we make God to concur immediately to the Acts and Operations of second causes he must then concur to the sinful Acts of the wil and so be the cause of sin This Antithesis of Durandus was generally exploded by the ancient Schole-men both Thomistes and Scotistes and is stil by the more sober Jesuites Only in this last Age one Nicolaus Taurelius in his Book De rerum aeternitate triumpho Philosophiae has undertaken the patronage of Durandus's Antithesis with this advance even to the subversion not only of the concurse but also of the conservation of God And since there has started up another Lud. A Dola a Capucine Friar who has taken greater pains to defend and promove this Antithesis of Durandus pretending this as the only expedient for an accommodation between the Thomistes and Jesuites And for the confirmation of this Hypothesis they give this commun instance On the supposition that a stone should hang in the air and God withdraw al his concurse for the actuating the stone yet if the force which suspendes its motion downward were removed it would notwithstanding the substraction of Divine concurse move naturally downward or to the same purpose Albeit I am no friend to those vexatious disputes which the Scholes of Theologie as wel as Philosophie now ring of yet this Antithesis being as I conceive of dangerous consequence I cannot but with modestie expresse my just aversation from yea indignation against it with the reserve of that respect and honor which is due to that learned and pious Divine among our selves who hath undertaken the defense of Durandus's Opinion I shal not now enter on the solemn ventilation and debate of this Antithesis having reserved this taske if the Lord favor my desires for another subject and stile
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
power in God distinct from his Wil. This Proposition has been already demonstrated C. 5. § 4. Yet for more abundant conviction let us examine the Origine Necessitie and Vse of an executive Power in the Creature and then we shal see what little ground there is to ascribe the same to God The great Assertors and Promotors of executive power have been Aristotle and his Sectators who on false Hypotheses presume That a substance cannot act immediately without some executive power which they make a species of Qualitie Albeit such kind of Qualitative Powers are now generally exploded by al who resolve not to serve an Opinion of Aristotle yet there stil remains a place for executive powers in nature when the principal Agent cannot reach the effect immediately Thus the Soul of Man puts forth al Acts of sense and motion by some executive powers Yet the human Soul can and doth oft act immediately specially in its immanent acts without any executive power And thus God in al his Effects actes immediately by his omnipotent wil without any executive power For he is present in and with al effects and therefore needs no executive power to supplie his absence Again the Wil of God is Omnipotent as c. 5. § 3. and we shal anon prove it more fully and therefore it needs no executive power to execute what it wils Is not the Divine Wil proposed to us in Sacred Philosophic as Irresistible and if it be so can it not then execute its own pleasure without any executive power Indeed the greatest Scholastic wits have espoused and defended this Hypothesis namely That the Wil and Executive Power of God are really the same and not so much as rationally or formally distinct Thus Joan. Major 2. Sent. Dist 1. q. 1. proves That God Created the World by his Intellect and Wil without any executive Power formally distinct of which hereafter § 5.4 Prop. Thus Bradwardine l. 2. c. 29. Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. p. 129. with others of whom in the next Proposition And indeed Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. S. 2. p. 555. doth in part grant our Hypothesis in that he acknowlegeth That the concurse of God as it regardes the effective principe is the same with the Divine Wil which concurs with the Creature to its act This he cals concursus ad intrà the interne concurse which he makes to be the principe of al Acts adextrá Yet I must confesse elsewhere namely Disp 30. S. 17. he makes mention of an executive power in God the same with his Essence containing in it eminently al create perfections And so some Divines as wel as Philosophers assert an executive power in God Thus Heereboord Select Ex Philosoph Disp 8. endeavors to prove that Gods concurse whereby he influenceth things ad extra is not simply his volition because Gods volition simply is an immanent Act but his concurse is a transient Act ad extra But this Argument seems to be of no weight because we easily grant that the concurse of God quoad Attingentiam passivam as to its passive Attingence is distinct from God and the same with the concurse of the second cause or effect but that which we are now discoursing of is the concurse of God in regard of its active Attingence as it regardes God the Principe and in this respect we only assert That the concurse of God is the same with his volition simply considered This wil be further evident by the next Proposition 3. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self Omnipotent and Efficacious The Divine Wil Omnipotent This Proposition is most evident 1 because the Divine Wil cannot be frustrated Thus Suarez 1.2 ae Tract 3. Disput 11. Sect. 2. p. 311. We must say saith he that when God wils absolutely and efficaciously that man wil somewhat the human Wil cannot discord from the Divine The reason is clear because the Divine Wil efficacious and simply absolute cannot be fruitrated seeing it is infinite So Bradward l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to shew that the Divine Wil is universally efficacious insuperable and necessary in causing nor impedible and frustrablein any manner Who knows not that it necessarily follows if God can do any thing and wils it he doth it 2 The Divine Wil being the universal first cause of althings it cannot but be most efficacious For is not this the main difference between the first and second cause the universal and particular cause that this may fail of its effect but that can never A particular cause oft comes short of its effect by reason of the interposition of some other particular cause that may impede the same but the first universal cause can never come short of its effect because there is no other cause can interpose to hinder it 3 The Wil of God is infinite therefore Omnipotent and Irresistible for where the power of the Patient doth not excede or equalise the power of the Agent there can be no prevalent resistence what then can resist the Divine Wil which is infinite 4 If the Divine Wil were not omnipotent God were not infinitely happy For every one is so far happy as his Wil is fulfilled as Aristor Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. 5 It 's a common Hypothesis in the Scholes grounded on the highest Reason That it is impossible but that the Divine Wil should attain its effect So Aquinas Part. 1. q. 19. a. 6. as others Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self operative and influential on al second causes and effects Thus Augustin De Trinit l. 3. c. 4. The Wil of God operative of it self The Wil of God is the first and supreme cause of althings Again A thing is said to be done by God acting when it is done by God willing Apud Dominum hoc est velle quod facere qura ex ejus voluntate res habent esse Augustin in Psal 144. And the reasons of this Hypothesis are most manifest For 1 if Gods Wil were not of it self Operative and Effective it were not the first principe and cause of althings 2 The wil of man is in some things Operative of it self and must we not allow the same Prerogative to the Wil of God And if it be in somethings operative of it self why not in althings May we not then hence conclude That there is no active operation or motion received from God into the Wil or any other second cause but from the simple volition of God the motion of the human Wil or any other second cause necessarily follows This is evident in the first Creation of althings for by Gods fiat or volition which is eternal althings were made in time without any other impression or concurse received and if Gods first Creation of althings was by his simple volition without any transient concurse what hinders but that al other efficience of God should in the same manner consiste in the simple volition of his wil without any transient
and dependence of al second causes Every Being by participation is limited and where there are limits of essence there necessarily are limits of Activitie and Operation A Creature can as wel give Being to it self as actuate it self independently as to the First cause whatever receives its Being by participation receives also its Operation in the same mode of Participation Dependence on God in Operation is as essental and intrinsec to the nature of a Creature as dependence on God in essence and conservation of that essence Yea it is no lesse than an implicite contradiction to say that a Creature actes without dependence on God for that act as Suarez and others prove And the reason is most demonstrative for as Aristotle tels us The mode of operating alwaies follows the mode of essence If the essence depend on God for its production and conservation so must the operation Whatever is a Being by participation must also be an Agent by participation Yea the very Act of the second cause is a Being by participation and therefore it requires the concurse and influxe of the First cause for its production conservation and promotion 3 From the nature of the First cause and its perfection If God concur not immediately to every Act of the second cause he is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent and most perfect For that very Act is a real Being or if you wil a mode of Being and so reducible to real Entitie it cannot be pure nothing because pure nothing cannot be the terme or effect of a real production If then the Act of the second cause be a real positive Entitie or Mode and yet God not the First cause thereof then it necessarily follows that God is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent because he cannot produce that real Act neither is he most perfect because there is something in nature physically perfect which he is not the cause of Dependence on God as the First cause albeit it implies something of imperfection in the Creature as a Creature yet it importes perfection in God neither can his absolute perfection as the First cause be preserved and maintained without it 4 From the Providence of God If God as the First cause concur not immediately to al Acts of second Causes how can he order direct and governe them so as they shal al determine in his own glorie Again how can he hinder such Acts as impugne his own ends and designes Doth not this Antithesis of Durandus and others who denie God to concur immediately to al Acts of second causes cut off the chiefest part of Divine Providence which consistes in the ordering and directing al human Acts for his own glorie 2. Prop. God as the First cause immediately concurs not only to the Act but also the second cause it self and its wil if it be a free Agent God immediately concurs to second Cause self This Proposition may be demonstrated 1 by al the fore mentioned Arguments which prove Gods immediate concurse to the Act of the second cause for every efficient cause producing in a subject an Act connatural to the power of he subject must needs influence and actuate that power wherefore God the First cause producing in the wil of man an act connatural thereto must necessarily actuate and influence the said wil in such a production 2 That gods immediate concurse reacheth the human Wil and not only its Act is evident because it determines the Wil to act For grant but this that the human Wil is not the First cause of its own act but dependent on God for the production thereof which the Jesuites grant it necessarily follows that it is actuated and determined by God in al its Acts. It 's true the human Wil is a free Agent and so a self-determining power but yet this hinders not but that it is also determined by God as the First cause God determines the Wil to determine it self as he moves the Wil to move it self If God did not determine and move the Wil it could not determine and move it self 3 Sacred Philosophie is expresse herein that God workes immediately on the Wil as wel as on its Acts and Effects So Philip. 2.13 God is said to worke 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to wil and to do And how can he worke to wil unlesse he worke upon the wil Can there be any way assigned how God should worke to wil and yet not immediately determine and move the wil Psal 139.9 10. So Psal 139.9 10. If I take the wings of the morning i.e. slie most swiftly as the morning and dwel in the utmost parts of the Sea even there shal thine hand lead me and thy right hand shal hold me His mind is that he cannot flie from the immediate presence of God because whereever he goes his immediate hand or concurse must lead him To lead a man by the hand and to hold him here denotes Gods immediate concurse on the Wil and its Acts. 3. Prop. God concurs immediately to the effect by one and the same act with the second cause The Act of the first and second cause the same For the explication of this Proposition we are to note that the causation of the first cause is not the same with that of the second but only the action whereby the first and second cause concur to the production of the effect For albeit the influxe of the first cause be distinct from that of the second yet the Act whereby the first and second cause produce the effect is one and the same Duo individuo opere operantes necessario agant unum idem cùm indivisa sit corum actio si autem agerent diversis actionibus oporteret operata esse divisa ficut è contrà actio indivisa non potest sacere divisa opera Grossetesle de Libero Arbitrio This is incomparably wel demonstrated by our Learned and great Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne in his Tractate De Libero Arbitrio in M. SS where he acutely proves That the Action of God and the second cause whereby the effect is produced cannot be deverse because the Effect is but one and the same which procedes totally from God as the first cause and totally from the second cause as hereafter Prop. 4. For the more ful explication whereof we must distinguish between the Active and Passive Efficience of God Gods Active Efficience is nothing else but the immanent efficacious Act of his Wil which without al peradventure differs infinitely from the efficience of the second cause yet Gods Passive efficience as it relates to the Act of the second cause is not really distinct therefrom for it 's no way incongruous or inconsistent that one and the same act procede from two different total causes of different kinds such as the first and second cause is Whence it follows that one and the same act both of first and second cause
immediately and essentially depend on both in their kind That the first and second cause immediately concur to the same effect by one and the same indivisible Act may be demonstrated 1 from the Dependence which the Act of the second cause has on the active causation of the first cause The Act of the second cause doth not as some conceive depend on any real influxe or concurse transient from the first cause and distinct from the act of the second cause but on the mere efficacious volition of the first cause which is the effective principe of al effects This is acutely demonstrated by Suarez Metaph. Disput 21. sect 3. p. 568. where he proves That the action of God is not the way or fluxe to the action of the Creature but to the effect neither is an action the terme of an action Therefore to the universal influxe of the first cause there is no more required but that the action of the second cause procede from his Wil not that it procede by another externe action but it can procede immediately by it self from the wil of God Whence when the action of the Creature is said to depend on the influxe of God either this influxe must be taken for the immanent interne Act as it influenceth the externe Act of the second cause or the manner of speech must be taken not transitively save according to some rational conception If we would speak properly it must be said that the action of the Creature is from God Whence he concludes in the same page thus By comparing the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the second cause Whence it 's said that the concurse of the first cause is before that of the second because the second cause doth not act but in the virtue of the first Hence 2 we may farther demonstrate the Identitie of the act whereby the first and second cause concur to the effect by the Independence which the act of the second cause has as to al transient acts of the first cause distinct from it self For if the action of the second cause be from God by some transient influxe distinct from it self then that influxe being a Creature wil necessarily require some other transient influxe for its production and preservation and so into infinite 3 That the action whereby the first and second cause concur to any effect is one and the same may be demonstrated from the Inutilitie and needlesse supposition of any distinction between them For if there be supposed two distinct actions one of God another of the second cause as necessarily concurring to the production of one and the same effect then the action of the second is from God or not It cannot be said that it is not from God but only from the second cause because then it would be said that the Effect of the second cause is from God but not the Act which is against the nature of a finite limited Being as we have proved in the precedent Propositions If it be said that the act of the second cause is from God then there is no necessity of supposing any other act of God distinct from this whereby he concurs to the production of the Effect Is it not every way superfluous and unnecessary to suppose two distinct actions one of the first and another of the second cause as concurring to the same effect when as it is granted and cannot rationally be denied that the very act of the second cause is from God This Argument is wel managed by Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. S. 3. p. 567. The sum of al is this Both the first and second cause concur immediately to the production of the effect by one and the same action yet the influxe or concurse of the first and second cause considered formally as to the effective principes is really distinct 2. Having dispatcht the Immediation of the Divine concurse Gods concurse Independent and Absolute we now procede to a second Adjunct or mode of operation appendent thereto namely its Independence and Absolutenesse That the concurse of God is Independent and Absolute we are assured both by Sacred and Platonic Philosophie The Absolute Independence of Divine concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently inculcated in Sacred Philosophie Psal 51.10 Hence we find a creative efficace asscribed to Independent Medicinal Grace Esa 43.1 So Psal 51.10 Create in me a clean heart Esa 43.1 The Lord that created thee O Jacob c. So Esa 57.19 as elsewhere Now what more Independent and Absolute than a Creative concurse 1 Workes of Creation are out of nothing and so their Efficient must needs be Independent as to mater 2 Workes of Creation require an infinite independent Agent which admits no social cause for Creation being the production of something out of nothing which are termes as to Efficience infinitely distant none but an Infinite independent cause can effect the same who can reconcile something and nothing but he who has al Being in himself 3 Workes of Creation are in an instant and therefore depend not on any Preparations or material Dispositions of the subject 4 Workes of Creation are Perfect and therefore require the most perfect independent absolute concurse How Independnet and absolute efficacious Grace is in its manner of working is farther evident from that Royal Prerogative which it useth in the conversion of sinners Doth it not oft let some run on in ful career til they have one foot in Hel and then snatch them as flaming torches out of that sire Thus Ezech. 16.6 Ezech. 16.6 I said unto thee when thou wast in thy bloud Live Christs Omnipotent Independent Word carries a vivisie efficace in it How many Lions has this Omnipotent Word turned into Lambes What timber or heart is there so crooked knottie and crabbed out of which he cannot frame a Vessel of Mercie What heart so stonie so rocky out of which he cannot raise up a Son to Abraham as Mat. 3.9 Mat. 3.9 Now to change one species or kind of Creature into another a Lion into a Lamb a stonie heart into a Son of Abraham doth not this argue Independent Absolute and Omnipotent Efficace So little is this gratiose concurse tied to or dependent on the least Moral Dispositions Obligations Merits Causes Conditions or moving Considerations without it self it is the freest thing in the world and therefore compared to the motion of the wind which bloweth where it listeth Joh. 3.8 Can we suppose Joh. 3.8 that any thing the Creature performes should lay the least obligation on Soverain Free Grace Is it not a childish thing to suppose that the infinite occan of Independent Grace should ebbe and slow according to the various changes and conditions of Mans Free Wil that most mutable Moon But that not only Essicacious Grace but al Divine concurse is Independent
the concurse of God be only General and Indifferent it then hangs in suspense and has not efficace enough to reach its effect unlesse it be so or so disposed Whence also it follows that it is in the power of the second cause to resist or frustrate the concurse of God so that it shal not reach its effect Hence lastly it follows that the concurse of God is not efficacious and omnipotent which we shal anon prove 3 That the concurse of God as to its manner of working is not general but particular is asserted and demonstrated by some of the most acute of the Scholastic Theologues So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 4. and l. 3. c. 7. Joan. major in Sentent 2. Dist 28. q. 1. p. 122. Alvarez de Auxil Disput 23. with several others But here it is objected 1. by Burgersdicius and others Objections against Gods particular concurse 1 If God concur by a particular concurse to the specification of the action then he may be said to walke discourse eat c. To this Objection we respond 1 by denying that God concurs to the specification of the action albeit he concurs by a particular concurse for an action is specified from its particular cause not from the first universal cause So that here is that which they cal a fallacie of many interrogations whereof one is true the other false Or we may cal it a begging of the Question in that they suppose That if God concur by a particular concurse he concurs also to the specification of the action which is an inconsequent consequence 2 Those Animal acts of walking eating c. ascribed to the second cause cannot be ascribed to God the first cause albeit they more principally belong to him because they procede not from pure efficience but from information to use the Aristotelean phrase or a bodie so organised Those actions signifie a relation to the particular subject whence they slow and therefore cannot be properly attributed to God as Bradward l. 1. c. 4. p. 178. and Suarez Metaphys Disput 21. S. 3. acutely replie shewing that ambulation eating c. do not denote pure efficience but a subject informed by such motions which are therefore proper to the said subject 2 But the main objection of Burgersdicius and others against Gods particular concurse is taken from sinful actions unto which say they God cannot be said to concur by a particular concurse unlesse we make him the author of sin This objection makes a great noise but has little of weight in it For 1 The deordination of any sinful act can only be ascribed to the second cause who is the Author of it not unto the first cause who only produceth the physical entitative Act. 2 That which is most sinful in regard of the second cause is so ordered by God as that it shal conduce to the greatest good as before and hereafter in the providence of God 6. Gods Concurse Efficacious Gods concurse is most Potent and Efficacious This Adjunct and Mode of operation is most expresse in Sacred Philosophie specially as to gratiose Influences which are most potent Sin is a mighty strong poison ay but medicinal Grace is a much stronger Antidote The powers of darkenesse and Hel are very strong but Christ the Captain of our Salvation hath Samson-like carried away the Gates of Hel upon his shoulders and led captivitie captive His Grace is most potent irresistible and victorions Thus Jansenius Augustin Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. p. 43. having in what precedes sufficiently refuted the Conditional Grace of the Molimstes he addes This therefore is the true reason why no medicinal Grace of Christ ever wants its effect but al workes both to wil and to do because with Augustin Grace and the good worke are so reciprocated that as from Grace conferred the effect of the worke may be inferred so on the other hand from the defect of the worke it may be inferred that Grace was not given By which manner of reasoning it appears that Grace as the cause and the operation of the Wil as the effect are as the Philosophers speak convertible and mutually inseparable each from other For so Augustin speakes of the Conflict against Tentations Agis si ageris bene agis si à â—bono ageris so efficacious is medicinal Grace Yea Jansenins a voucheth that there is no manner of speech among the Scholastic Theologues so efficacious to expresse that the determination or predetermination of the Wil is from the Grace of God but Augustin assumes the same to demonstrate that the Grace of Christ is not such that the effect should be suspended or dependent on any condition to be performed by the human Wil but that the effect is most potently produced by it not if the Wil willeth but by working and determining the Wil to wil. So Habak 3.4 Habak 3.4 And his brightnesse was as the light he had bornes coming out of his hand and there was the hiding of his power And his brightnesse was as the light The brightnesse of Christ was exceding gloriose even like the brightnesse of the Sun in its meridian glorie Thence it follows he had hornes coming out of his hands 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies to send forth beams as hornes to irradiate and shine forth Beams and hornes have some analogie and ressemblance and therefore the same word among the Hebrews signifies both Hence the vulgar Version renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exod. 34.29 hornes whereas it signifies there beams as here Whence it follows out of his hands Hands here denote Christ's power as Act. 11.21 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hand signifies power the hand being the instrument of the bodie whereby it puts forth its power Thence he addes There was the hiding of his power i. e. his secret power lay wrapt up in his efficacious rays or concurse which is exceding influential and potent like hornes We find something analogous hereto in Plato Repub 6. pag. 509. where treating of God as the first Cause of al good he compares him to the Sun and his concurse to the rays thereof in this manner Thou wilt say I presume that the Sun doth not only cause that things are seen but also that they are generated do grow are nourished although it be not the generation of those things Thus therefore determine that the chiefest good namely God doth give to those things that are known not only that they are known 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but also force and efficace for their existence c. Wherein he compares the efficacious Concurse of God to the spermatic potent influxe of the Sun which gives life sense motion nutrition angmentation and vigor to al manner of Insects Whence those blind Gentiles made the Sun under the fictitious names of Apollo and his Son Esculapius the supreme God of Medicine because the Virtues of Plants depend on the Sun See Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. §. 11. its heat
and influence whence they consecrated the Laurel to Apollo which signified with them the heat and influence of the Sun the Laurel being a Plant as they say hot and alwaies green Such a soverain efficace did the Grecian Philosophers ascribe unto the Sun in regard of its influence not only on Plants but also on animal Bodies and therefore it is deservedly made by Plato a symbolic image of Gods efficacious Concurse on al create Beings and Operations Thus in sacred Philosophie we find Christ as the first cause of al Grace compared to the Sun and his gracious influxe to the beams of the Sun So Mal. 4.2 Mal. 4.2 But unto you that fear my Name shal the Sun of righteousnesse arise with healing in his wings and ye shal go forth and grow up as calves of the stal Christ here as the first original Spring of al Grace and compared to the Sun whence he is said to arise with healing in his wings i. e. his Beams for the Beams of the Sun are its wings whereby it conveighs an healing prolific influence to althings that have life The Sun indeed vouchsafeth warme efficacious influences to al natural bodies both vegetable and animal it has an universal prolific influence on al sublunarie bodies Thence it 's said Psal 19.6 Psal 19.6 And there is nothing hid from the heat thereof i. e. it s warme benigne influxe reacheth as some conceive unto al natural effects even to the very Minerals and Metals But certain it is that Vegetables and Plants are greatly influenced by the Sun Job 8.16 Hence that Job 8.16 He is green before the Sun Whence is the beautie of Roses the delicious suavities of Fruits the medicinal virtues of Herbes the nourishment of Corne the fatnesse of Olives the cordial and heart-reviving influences of Grapes but from the Sun So for the animal life are not al Insects produced by the Sun Yea doth not the health strength vivacitie and comforts of mans bodie receive much influence from the efficacious beams of the Sun as Job 30.28 Eccles 11.7 Is not then the Sun both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie made an apt Symbol to represent the efficacious Concurse of God as the first cause of althings but more specially of supernatural effects O! what Soul-reviving influences are there in the warme beams of Divine concurse What universal inexhaustible infinite treasures of Divine light and heat are there in the Sun of Righteousnesse Are not his beams the light of life as Joh. 8.12 Psal 84.11 Such is the efficace of Divine concurse There is moreover a great emphase and elegance in that phrase Mal. 4.2 And ye shal go forth and grow up as calves of the stal i.e. as weak feeble Calves which in the winter by reason of the cold are kept in the stal at spring when they go forth and sport themselves under the warme healing beams of the Sun how greatly do they grow and thrive so the sick infirme friends of Christ when they lie under the warme refreshing corroborating influences of his medicinal Grace Yea this efficacious soverain Grace doth not only cure infirme consumtive Souls but also give life to dead Souls Thus Esa 9.2 The people that walked in darkenesse have seen a great light Esa 9.2 they that dwel in the land of the shadow of death upon them hath the light shined 1 This Prophecie refers to our Lords first Preaching among those that inhabited the land of Zabulon and Nephthali mentioned v. 1. and so applied Mat. 4.14 15 16. who were indeed at the coming of our Lord under very black Egyptian darkenesse whence they are said to walke in darkenesse 2 They are said to dwel in the land of the shadow of death 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they that dwel denotes a fixed immobile state not only of such as travel or passe throwo a countrie but of inhabitants Then 2 we have the place of their habitation the land of the shadow of death 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the shadow of death whereby we may understand either a deadly shade such as by the dampe thereof strikes dead which is very frequent in some darke cavernes of the Earth or else by the shadow of death we may understand the Grave which is the darke shadowy habitation of the dead as Job 10.21 the Grave is stiled the land of darkenesse and the shadow of death And look as dead men are loged in the darke shadowy Grave so were these dead Souls in the land of Zabulon and Nephthali loged in the Grave of sin under the darke deadly shade thereof which implies a total privation of spiritual light and life Now 3 on these dead Souls dwelling in the Grave of sin the light shined i. e. Christ the Sun of Righteousnesse arose with healing under his wings or warme beams of efficacious Grace Yea how oft doth this omnipotent heart quickening Grace picke out the worst of sinners as fit mater to exert its soverain efficace on Esa 19.18 Thus Esa 19.18 In that day i. e. when the Sun of Righteousnesse shal arise on Egypt with healing under his wings shal five cities in the land of Egypt speake the language of Canaan i. e. be converted to God and swear to the Lord of Hostes i. e. bind themselves inviorably to Christ by an Oath of Allegeance and Supremacie one shal be called the Citre of Destruction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render the Citie of Destruction is rendred by Grotius Gataker and other Critics the Citie of the Sun called by the Grecians who possessed it Heliopolis which the Hebrews expressed by Bethsenes the house of the Sun i. e. consecrated to the Sun their principal God which was with al manner of idolatric Rites worshipped in this Citie For Herodotus assures us that this Citie Heliopolis was one of the sixe unto which the Egyptians used at some solemne times to repair out of al parts to celebrate the Worship of the Sun because here was their renowned Temple of the Sun as also Mnevis one of their sacred Buls which they worshipped as God of which see Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. § 9. Now this Heliopolis so much addicted to and immersed in Idolatrie is made one of the principal objects on which the Sun of Righteousnesse should arise with healing under his wings or beams of efficacious medicinal Grace So v. 22. And the Lord shal smite Egypt he shal smite and heal it and they shal returne even unto the Lord c. What! shal Egypt yea the most idolatrous Citie of Egypt Heliopolis be healed by the soverain Grace of the Sun of Righteousnesse O! what a potent demonstration is this of the omnipotent efficace of medicinal Grace May not this Argument be further promoved by a reflexion on these Britannic Iles and their prodigiose Idolatrie when the Sun of Righteousnesse at first arose on them with healing under his wings of Evangelic medicinal Grace But for the more ful explication
and demonstration of the officacitie of Divine Concurse we are to consider that there is a twofold Concurse of God one moral the other efficacious which some terme physic Concurse because it workes according to the manner of physic Efficients For a physic Cause is that which really and properly influenceth the Effect but a moral Cause as dictinguished from physic is that which contributes not any real and proper influxe for the production of the effect yet he doth so far morally concur as that the effect is imputed to him as it 's wel determined by Suarez Metaph. Disput 17. Sect. 2. pag. 402. A moral cause doth not reach the effect immediately neither doth it properly move and determine the Agent but only objectively and remotely by Commands Arguments Incentives Motives and such like moral influences which is only a metaphoric indirect remote improper and inefficacious kind of efficience But now a physic Cause is that which alone deserves and therefore in the Scholes has appropriated to it self the name of an efficient Cause because it doth by a proper real direct and efficacious influxe or causalitie reach its effect God has both a moral and physic or efficacious concurse in and for the production of moral good He commandes propones arguments invites persuades what is good as also efficaciously workes the same in those he intendes to do good to But as for sinful acts God doth not by any moral concurse concur thereto and therefore they may not be imputed to him as the Author of them This being premissed we procede to demonstrate the efficacitie of Gods Concurse 1 From its soverain nature and omnipotent manner of working specially in supernatural gratiose effects The efficacitie of actual Grace in the Infusion Conservation Promotion and Actuation of Habitual is lively illustrated by the Grecanic Fathers of the Primitive Churches who stile this efficacious medicinal Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the superne or supernatural vocation and motion they terme it sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the operant and cooperant Grace also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Energie Aide and Assistence of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the ineffable Virtue of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the assistent Power It 's termed also by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the superne and Divine impulse or inclination also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine hand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace of protection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Spring of Energie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it self perfect and sufficiently operative Chrysostome termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a gift above nature overcoming nature also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 insuperable Assistence But none among the Greek Theologues seems more lively to describe it than Cyril Alexandr lib. 1. de Adorat Tom. 1. where he assertes That men are turned from sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not only by words injected into the Soul i. e. according to the Pelagian persuasion by moral suasion only but that God puts forth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an energetic efficacious Aide whereby the infirme Wil is led as by the hand Clemens Alexandr l. 1. Paed. c. 3. cals it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Inspiration of God also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the subtile and spirituale instructive force of Divine words And Athanas contr Gent. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the power communicated from God Again he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace of God hath overcome Whence the Greek Theologues termed it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the invincible Assistence And Chrysostome saith expressely that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 al good comes from the Grace and efficacious Virtue of God 2 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil. We have before § 3. demonstrated that the Divine Concurse supposeth not any transient influxe form God but only the act of the Divine Wil which being omnipotent it thence necessarily follows that his concurse is also omnipotent and most efficacious Whence it is worthy our notice that the Concurse of God is in Scripture expressed by his fiat or word as Gen. 1.3 c. And what is this Word of God but the omnipotent Act of his Wil Hence in sacred Philosophie the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie both Word and Thing denoting to us that there is an intimate reciprocation between Divine Words and Things whatever God speakes and sayes shal be done is done and whatever is done is but the effect of his Word or Wil every Word and Wil of God which regardes the event and issues of things is omnipotent and operative 3 From the Determination of the second cause by the first Gods Concurse is not only moral by propounding objects and persuading thereto but really operative and productive of things Now in al cooperation the causes cooperating are either coordinate or subordinate the first and second cause cannot be coordinate but the later must be subordinate to the former and if subordinate to then it must be determined by the first Cause It 's certain that either the second cause determines the first or the first the second and is it not more likely that the first cause should determine the second than that the second should determine the first to act Can we imagine that the concurse of the first cause is in the power of the second Is it not more agreable to the Nature of God and the condition of a Creature to determine that the causalitie of the second cause is subordinate unto and therefore determinable by the concurse of the first cause This argument is more fully managed by the Dominicans and Jansenistes See Bradwardine de Causa Dei l. 3. c. 7. p. 669. Alvarez de Auxil l. 3. Disp 18-21 l. 4. Disput 32. Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. 7. Gods Concurse connatural Lastly Gods concurse albeit it be most potent and efficacious yet is it also most Connatural and Congenial there is not more of force than Divine suavitie mixed therewith So Psal 110.3 Psal 110.3 Thy people shal be willing in the day of thy power Willing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 willingnesses 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nadib signifies 1 Free ready chearful spontaneous 2 Metonymically a free gift or oblation 3 Princes who ought to be free-spirited generose liberal as Luke 22.25 4 The word is here used in the abstract which carries a great emphase for abstractes speak essences 5 It is here also in the Genitive case plural of thy willingnesses which the Hebrews use as expressive of a superlative degree So that the meaning is thy people shal be in the most superlative degree free ready willing as Noble and Free-borne Princes to offer up themselves a Free-wil-offering gift or oblation unto thee Hence efficacious Grace was termed by the Greek Fathers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the interne philtrum or charme by Basil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace which is
sweetly received by Chrysostome Hom. 31. in Mat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an opportune vocation Of which see more Court Gen. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. § 12. Nihil Augustino certius est quà m in Scripturis S. Gratiam illam efficacem per quam solam operamur quicquid boni operamur nominedulcedinis suavitatis delectationis nempe spiritualis coelestis esse significatam Delectationi Dilectionem Ardorem Inflammationemque subnectit Sunt emim effectus qui immediatè ex illa coelesti suavitate germinant Jansen August Tom. 3. De Grat. l. 4. c. 1. Ubi fusiùs de suavitate hac spiriruali Gratiae Medicinalis tractat So sweetly doth Medicinal Grace Worke. And yet it workes nevertheless omnipotently for so it followeth in the day of thy power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies 1 force and strength of bodie or mind and thence 2 Metonymically richesse or militarie Forces because in them men place their strength job 21.7 Psal 49.6 We may understand it in both senses 1 of Christs powerful efficacious heart-conquering Grace which is the cause or 2 for his powerful Forces and Armies which are the effect of this Omnipotent day of Christ Thus we see what an admirable combination here is of Divine Omnipotence with human Libertie how powerfully this medicinal Grace actes and yet how sweetly it actes so Omnipotently as if there were no room left for human Libertie and yet so connaturally and so sweetly as if there were not the least dram of Omnipotence and Force in it Oh! what an omnipotent Suavitie or sweet Omnipotence is there in this Medicinal Grace Who would not come under such a silken soft sweet violence as this is Need we then fear that any prejudice can befal human Libertie so long as this Wise Soverain Soul-physician workes upon the Wil Doth he not understand perfectly what are the proper ansae or handles of the Soul and so suit his Medicinal Grace thereto Hath he not a key exactly sitted to every lock yea to every ward in the lock of the wil Is not his Medicinal Grace full of the deepest and highest reason so that the Mind sees all the reason in the world why it should embrace the offers made to it by Christ And doth not the Wil upon this Divine heart-logic infused by Christ move as freely as chearfully as connaturally as if there were no power mixed with medicinal Grace Doth not Christ take the Wil by the hand and teach it to go as he did Ephraim Hos 11.3 and doth he not also draw it with cords of a man Coelestis illa suavitas mollit viam ut voluntas ex carnaliu rerum visco emergere possit seipsam in justitiam diligendam figere Cum enim non possit morus nisi ab immobili fieri suavitas illa immobilem quodammodo reddit animum ut possit in motu liberum spiritalis voluntatis ac dilectionem erumpere Ex quo fit consequenter ut si illa desit voluntas veluti emortua sit Jans August Tom. 3. de Grat. l. 4. c. 7. and hands of love i. e. with rational arguments and moral persuasions as Hos 11.4 Thus Esa 10.21 The remnant shal returne even the remnant of Jacob to their mighty God Here is a spontaneous chearful returne of back sliding Israel and yet it is to their mighty God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the name given the Messias Esa 9.6 Christ drawes them by a mighty power and yet they returne as freely as if there were no power and efficace put forth So Esa 11.6 10 11. The like Esa 44. Having spoken v. 3. of the effusion of the spirit of Grace he addes what followed thereon v. 5. and another shal subscribe with his hand unto the Lord c. A Metaphor taken from such Volunteers as do freely and spontaneously with their own hand list and enrol themselves under a General So ineffable and admirable is the suavitie of efficacious Grace Yea may we not conclude hence that look by how much the more powerfully and invincibly this Medicinal Grace actes on the Wil by so much the more connaturally and sweetly it actes For hereby it determineth confirmeth and preserveth the Wil in its highest Libertie both of State and Act. For what more natural to the Wil than to adhere to its chiefest Good Or when doth it act more freely than when it is most peremtorily most inviolably and most immotably determined to love and enjoy its best friend and choisest Good Thus the Omnipotence and Efficace of Medicinal Grace is so far from destroying the Libertie of the Wil as that it doth most effectually preserve confirme and promote the same CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in the General Creation proper to God the production of something out of nothing Active Creation the same with the Divine Wil Passive Creation what Gods Providence demonstrated The Explication of it The Wisdome and Eternal Law of Providence Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. The Spirits Efficience in Providence Providential means Fire the create mundane Spirit The Object of Divine Providence Its Adjuncts 1 Efficacitie 2 Immobilitie 3 Connaturalitie 4 Perfection 5 Mysterious Miracles Providential Conservation immediate and mediate Ordinary and Extraordinary § 1. HAving examined Divine concurse in its object Gods Creation demonstrated and explicated effective principe and Adjuncts or various modes of operation we now descend to the contemplation of it in regard of its Effects The Efficience of the first Cause in relation to its effects is usually distributed into Creation and Providence Creation is the Efficience of the first Cause whereby he made althings at first and stil continues to make some things out of nothing What lively Notices we have of Gods Creating althings out of nothing both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie hath been sufficiently explicated and demonstrated in Plato's Physics Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Chap. 9. S. 1. Our present taske wil be to give some general Ideas of the Creation as it appertains to Gods prime Efficience 1. It 's most evident that no finite Being can be eternal or from eternitie Al the Philosophers before Aristotle generally asserted the production of althings by God but he from a confined mistaken notion of Gods infinite Effcience fondly conceited the first mater to be eternal because he could not imagine how something could be educed out of nothing But true Philosophie as wel as Divine Revelation teacheth us that althings were made by God and nothing besides himself is eternal That the world was not from eternitie we have sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes touching the existence of God C. 2. § 2. This Argument is wel managed by Derodone l'Atheisme Convaincu C. 1. And Suarez Metaphys Tom. 1. p. 536. strongly demonstrates That it is intrinsecally repugnant to Creation that it be eternal Yet the Jesuites generally grant That it is possible for the world to be from eternitie Which Hypothesis comes not short of a virtual
contradiction for what difference can be rationally imagined between being eternal and being from eternitie Is not that which is without beginning eternal And can we imagine that to have a beginning which is from eternitie Can any effect and product of the Divine Wil be commensurate to it in point of Duration 2. To Create is the sole Prerogative of God For 1 the order of actions must be according to the order of Agents the most Noble and Supreme Action cannot agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent And is not Creation the most Noble and Supreme of al Actions Can it then agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent God Creation is the most perfect of al actions by which a participate Being may be communicated because it primarily speakes the production of the whole entitie in its ful latitude whence it is manifest that this action cannot be appropriated or attributed to any but the first cause who is Being essentially and of himself no participate being has force enough to produce the whole of Being 2 That Creation is proper to God may be argued from the Mode of Efficience For Creation supposeth an Omnipotence and Independence in the Creator in as much as he has no passive power or mater to worke on but only an objective power or possibilitie of the object to be Created which requires an infinite active power in the Agent For by how much the more remote the passive power is from Act by so much the greater ought the active power of the Agent to be whence where there is no preexistent mater to worke upon but a mere obediential objective power or nothing there the distance between the Power and Act is as to efficience infinite and impertransible by any finite power therefore nothing but an infinite power can bring the extremes Nothing and Something together 3 From the Nature of Creation which is not a successive but a momentaneous Action but al the productions of second causes as they are inferior to and Instruments of the first cause are successive motions for al Instruments act and move in a way of succession 4 From the limitation of al second causes For the most perfect of Creatures have only a precarious and Participate Being and therefore have not in themselves virtue or force enough to Create the least of Beings To Create requires a virtue of the most Supreme Order invested with an Active Power in the most universal latitude And the reason is evident because the Creative Power extendes it self to every thing creable neither doth it expect on the part of its object any thing but a non-repugnance or obediential power that the effect may be This wil more fully appear from the following Thesis 3. Creation the production of something out of nothing Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing When we say Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing the particle out of must not be understood as denoting any succession of one thing after another for Creation is but an instantaneous eduction but only the negation of a material cause Now that God Created althings without any preexistent mater may be demonstrated 1 From his Independence and prime efficience as the first cause For the first Independent Cause being a pure simple act must necessarily precede al mater and thence be the cause thereof that which is the first in Beings must necessarily be the cause of al the rest whence it follows that the first mater was produced by God out of no preexistent mater but out of nothing 2 From the universal efficience of God as the first cause Every Agent so far as it is confined to mater so far it is particular and limited for to be confined to mater in acting is to act in order to some determinate species whereunto that mater refers wherefore that Agent which is universal and commensurate to al effects possible cannot be confined to mater such is the first cause 3 From the universalitie of Effects produced by Creation By how much the more universal the effect is by so much the higher the cause is and by how much the higher the cause is by so much the more it is extended to al effects Whence the effects of Creation being of al most universal and the cause most high there cannot be supposed any preexistent mater out of which they are educed 4 Al productions out of mater suppose successive motion and Transmutation but Creation is not a successive but momentaneous motion all at once Al successive motion and mutation must necessarily precede as to Duration the effect produced by such a mutation or motion but Creation doth not by any kind of Duration precede the things created therefore it cannot be successive out of preexistent mater 4. Active Creation is nothing else but the Act of the Divine Wil Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. as the effective principe of althings This Hypothesis has been fully explicated and demonstrated Chap. 5. § 4. of Gods executive power as c. 7. § 3. And albeit it may seem to carrie a novitie with it yet it has sufficient foundation both in Sacred and Scholastic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophie its very mode of expressing Gods active efficience in creating althings plainly shews that it was no other than the Act of the Divine Wil. Gen. 1.3 Thus Gen. 1.3 and God said Let there be light Which Word or saying of God can be understood of no other than the Act of his Divine Wil. For Speech is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here and elsewhere ascribed to God thereby to expresse the efficacions efficience of his Divine Wil in the production of althings Thus Maimonides More Nevochim Part. 1. c. 65. demonstrates That this Speech or Word whereby althings were made must be understood of the Divine Wil not of any proper Speech because al Speech whereby any thing is commanded must necessarily be directed to some Being existent and capable of receiving such a command but there was no Being then existent therefore it must be understood of the Divine Wil. Thus Hebr. 11.3 The world was framed by the Word of God So 2 Pet. 3.5 By the Word of God the Heavens were of old An why is the efficience of the Divine Wil in creating althings expressed by the Word of God but to shew that as we when we wil have any thing done expresse our Wil by our word of command so God expressed what he wil have accomplisht by his Fiat or Creative Word See more of this effective Word in the Providence of God § 3. This Hypothesis of Gods Creating althings by his Wil hath found Patrons not a few among the most accurate Scholastic Theologues Thus Joan. Major Sentent 2. dist 1. q. 3. proves That God produced the World by his mere Intellection and Volition without any other productive power And his Arguments are these 1 The Human Wil doth not want any
moreover working immediately both by the immediation of Virtue and Essence in and with those means Hence Esa 28.26 God is said to teach the Husbandman to plough i. e. how to cultivate and manage his Ground as also to sow his Seed c. That no inferior Agent or second cause can execute any piece of Divine Providence No second cause can act but in subordination to God and by his Providence but in Virtue received from and subordination to God the prime Cause is most evident 1 Because where diverse Agents subserve one Supreme Agent it 's necessary that the effect be produced by them in commun as they are united in the participation of motion and influence from the Supreme Agent For many cannot produce one effect but as one Now the subservient Agents of Providence are so far one in their executions as they are subordinate to and influenced by God the Supreme Agent 2 The complement of the Virtue and Efficace of the Second Agent is from the Virtue and Influxe of the First Agent and is not God the first Agent in al executions of Providence 3 Al Operation consequent to any influence is ascribed to that which gave the influence as the proper cause thereof And do not al second Causes receive their influence from God Must not then al their Executions and Operations be ascribed to him as the prime Cause 4 Al Actions that cannot subsiste without the Impression and Influence of some Agent must be attributed to that Agent as the cause thereof Now can any executions of second Causes subsist without the impression of the first Cause must they not then al be attributed to him 5 Whatever applies the active Virtue or draws it forth to act may be said to be the cause of that Act as an Artificer by applying the virtue of any natural thing to any action is said to be the cause of that action Now is not al application of any Virtue in providential executions from God Is he not then the cause of al such executions 6 Doth not the Virtue of every inferior Agent depend on the Virtue of the Superior Agent as such And are not al second Causes in providential executions inferior Agents as to God the Supreme Agent 7 Is not every Worker by its operation ordained to its last end And who in al Providential Operations ordains things to their last end but God the first cause of al 8 As particular Causes are referred to particular Effects so the universal Cause to universal Effects and is not God the Universal Cause of al Effects 9 To substract or withdraw any providential execution from Gods Ordination and Efficience what is this but to subvert the best Order even the subordination of second Causes to the first 10 God is intimely present with and in al providential executions and therefore cannot but influence the same The mover and moved are always together God is the prime mover in al motions and therefore present with al the application of Actives unto Passives is by him That there is not the least execution of Providence but what is influenced by God see Aquinas contra Gent. Lib. 3. Cap. 67 68 70 76 77. Not to mention the various means Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit instruments and second causes which God employs in his Providential Efficience there is one which deserves a particular disquisition namely Fire which is in its kind an Vniversal Mundane Spirit the most potent Instrument of Nature and Art and that which subserves the Spirit of God the Supreme increate Universal Spirit in al material productions of Providence As for the Origine of this create Mundane Spirit Gen. 1.3 Moses gives it us Gen. 1.3 under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light or Fire part of which was dispersed among the Celestial Lights or Fires and part diffused into the bowels of the Earth for the Conservation Animation Vivification and Nutrition of al parts of the Universe Plato makes frequent mention of Fire as the most potent natural principe or Mundane Spirit whereby althings are fomented agitated animated and perfected So in his Timaeus p. 31. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Nothing seems void of Fire c. So p. 56 58. he makes Fire to be the Universal Spirit diffused throughout al parts of the Universe And elsewhere he cals Fire 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the great Opificer of various effects And not only the Chymists but also the Stoics and most of the Ancient Philosophers ascribe to Fire an Universal Efficience as to al corporeous Effects Whence do al Minerals Metals and Stones receive their Origine but from subterraneous Fires What gives rise to al Vapors and Fountains but Fire Whence procede the Fluxes and Refluxes of the Sea with its saltnesse but from Fire What gives Life and Motion to al Insects but Fire either Celestial or Terrestrial Whence springeth the fermentation of humors in the bowels of the Earth at Spring with the vegetation and fructification of Plants but from Fire What are the Animal Souls of Brutes and of Mans Bodie but a more pure aethereous Fire These things are more largely demonstrated in our Philosoph General P. 1. l. 3. in Plato's Physics May we not then hence conclude That Fire is a second Mundane Vniversal Spirit under the Spirit of God most Efficacious and Potent in al natural corporeous productions and executions of Providence § 4. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal Having finisht the principal and instrumental effective Principes of Providence we now procede to its Object which according to sacred Philosophie is of the most universal latitude according to the extension of Divine Omnipotence and Efficience There is nothing so high as to be above Divine Providence nothing so low as to be beneath it nothing so ample and extensive as that it cannot be limited by it nothing so free as to second causes but it is necessarily determined by it nothing so natural and necessary but its operation may be suspended by it as the fiery Furnace wherein the three Children were lastly nothing so evil but this Divine Providence can bring good out of it Among the ancient Philosophers there were different persuasions about the object of Divine Providence and its latitude Epicurus and some before him altogether denied the Providence of God as before Aristotle as Grotius affirmes confined the Providence of God to Celestial bodies yet Laertius saith he held That the Providence of God did reach 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. even to things celestial and that he disposed things terrestrial according to the Sympathie they have with things celestial Some among the Hebrews held that Gods Providence extended to men but not unto bestes which sentiment some impute to Pythagoras who much imitated the Hebrews Some also among the Arabians asserted a Providence about Universals or things in commun but not about Singulars which sentiment Justin Martyr in the beginning of his Colloque with
Tryphon reprehendes in some of the Grecian Philosophers as impious But Plato strongly demonstrates That the Providence of God extendes to althings even the most minute So Leg. 10. pag. 902. But what if a Physician be willing and able to cure the whole bodie if he should provide for the greater distempers but neglect the lesser would the cure be successeful No surely So in like manner neither Gubernators of Ships nor Imperators of Souldiers nor Masters of Families nor Ministers of State nor any sort of men can wel manage their affaires unlesse they provide for smal things as wel as greater Thence Architects denie that great stones can be wel cemented or joined together in a building without smal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Let us not then conceit that God is more vile than mortal Opificers who by how much the more skilful they are by so much the more exquisitely and accurately by the benefit of their own Art they consider both great and smal things in such workes that belong to their Art Thence he concludes pag. 903. It seems to me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that God doth most easily and opportunely provide for althings This also the Stoics generally asserted whereof we find an excellent account in Arrianus his Collections of Epictetus's Philosophie l. 1. c. 12. pag. 118. There are some saith he who assert there is no God others that grant there is a God but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he is slothful and negligent and provident of nothing I suppose he means the Epicureans a third sort who hold that there is a God and that he is provident but only of greater and celestial things not of terrene a fourth sort allow him a Providence over terrestrial as wel as celestial but only in commun not as to singulars and particulars a fifth sort of which number was Ulysses and Socrates asserted that a man could not so much as move without God Thence he goes on to demonstrate Gods Providence over al things That Gods Providence extendes it self universally to al and singular Beings Actions Substances Accidents Modes c. may be demonstrated 1 From the infinite Omniscience and Prescience of God which extendes it self to the most minute singulars 2 From the omnipotent Wil of God which gives Futurition Determination Limits Activitie and Operation to althings 3 From the prime and universal Efficience of God as the first cause of althings Whatever is Ens by participation must procede effectively from God who is Ens by Essence and if it procede from him it must necessarily fal under his Providence 4 From the certain Determination Futurition and Order of al effects Either althings must fal under the Providence of God or somethings must happen merely by chance without any certain cause of their Futurition 5 From the Justice of God in rewarding what is good and punishing what is evil for the executions of Divine Justice depend on his Providence That Gods Providence extendes to al singulars even to things most contingent and minute is acutely demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71 72 73 75 76. So De Potentia Dei Quaest 20. he proves that God is the cause of every action both natural and voluntary five ways 1 By giving virtue to act 2 By continued conservation of that virtue 3 By moving the Agent to act and applying the virtue to the action 4 As he is the principal Agent in every Act and al other Agents but Instruments 5 As he actes immediately in al Acts of second Agents As for the particular Objects unto which Divine Providence extendes it self they may be thus distributed The particular Objects of Providence 1 Al natural Beings even the most minute and imperceptible fal under the Providence of God Sacred Philosophie makes mention of the hairs of the head which are vile and contemtible even to a proverbe Yea al natural Generations Corruptions Alterations Motions and Actions are subject to Gods Providence Not only the Generic natures and Species of things both Substances and Accidents are determined by God but also al Individuals and Singulars with al their Circumstances and Modes yea things most minute Thus Bradwardine pag. 7 25 291. proves That the least things come under Gods Prescience and Providence 2 Althings necessary or contingent There is nothing so contingent or free as to any second cause but it is determined and fore-ordained by Divine Providence as Aquinas accurately demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71 72 73. So Bradwardine pag. 271 274. What more contingent than the Lot and yet this fals under the Providence of God as Prov. 16.33 The lot is cast into the lap but the whole disposing of it is of the Lord. 3 Althings politic Al Revolutions Alterations Advances Declinations with al other politic Concernes of State are ordered and governed by Divine Providence 4 Althings human Al mans thoughts inclinations interests designes and undertakements are subordinate to Providence Hence 5 Al sinful acts fal under the same 6 Ecclesiastic Affaires and supernatural Acts Ends and Effects are ordered by Divine Providence of which hereafter In sum Gods Providence extendes itself to al those things unto which his omnipotent Wil Efficience and Causalitie extendes i. e. unto whatever comes within the notion of real Entitie it reacheth al natural preternatural supernatural and moral actions and events When men contradict Gods Wil of Precept do they not obey or sulfil his Wil of Providence Is any thing so great that it comes not within his power or so smal that it comes not within his care I am not ignorant how much some of late as wel Divines as Physicians have essayed to exemt the period or terme of human life from the immutable determination of Divine Providence but how much this Hypothesis contradictes both Pagan and Sacred Philosophie wil be more fully evident by what follows § 5. From the effective principes and object of Divine Providence The Adjuncts of Providence as before stated there follow many essential Adjuncts and Characters thereof As 1. Providence is not merely permissive 1. It is efficacious but energetic and efficacious For 1 Divine Providence necessarily supposeth not only an intention of an end and the ordering or disposing of means but also the assecution and attainment of the end It 's true human providence as such may provide means most proper and expedient and yet by the interposition of other second causes come short of its end but Divine Providence always reacheth its end Thus Homer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gods Counsel and Decree is always fulfilled 2 Al second causes are subject unto and therefore can no way impede or hinder Divine Providence Whence ariseth al active and passive virtue in second causes but from Divine disposition Is it possible then that the executions of Divine Providence should be hindered by the force or defect of any inferior Agent or Patient Are not al natural Agents instruments of Divine Providence
And can the instrument act without the concurrence of the principal Agent What then can we suppose should impede Divine Providence 3 Al providence supposeth an Act of the Wil and are not al Acts of Divine Volition efficacious Bradwardine frequently assertes and demonstrates That God permits nothing but what he wils It 's true man oft permits things that he neither wils nor doth because he cannot hinder them but there is no mere permission with God without some Act of his Wil. This is proved from the infinite Actualitie Efficacitie and Omnipotence of the Divine Wil. Thus Bradwardine l. 1. c. 32. pag. 282 c. spends a whole Chapter to prove That althings fal out and are governed by the Providence of God not only permitting but actually disposing al. And his arguments are demonstrative As 1 Otherwise the Universe should not be disposed and ordered in the best manner 2 The Scripture gives God active names as to al parts of providence c. And then Cap. 33. he demonstrates That where-ever there is any permission of God there also is his actual Volition Hence 2. 2. Immobile and fixed Gods Providence gives to al second Causes and Events a most immobile immutable fixed and certain order things most contingent and free as to second causes are necessary and fixed as to Divine Providence Hence the Stoics as also Plato expressed this fixed order of providence by Fate which they made to be an immutable connexion or series of things determined from eternitie whereby althings are infallibly directed to their ends of which hereafter in the Gubernation of Providence That providence puts into things a fixed immutable order is evident because 1 nothing fals out but what was fore-ordained from al eternitie by infinite Wisdome and an omnipotent Wil. 2 Al particular causes and effects are contained under and subservient to the Universal Cause and therefore subject to his Order Yea this Order must necessarily be most indissoluble and certain because it is founded in the Efficacitie of the Divine Wil Efficience and Gubernation as more fully anon 3. Divine Providence is most Connatural and Agreable to the exigence and condition of the second causes or subjects it workes upon The Necessitie and Immobilitie 3. Connatural and agreable that attendes the Providence of God doth no way infringe or impair the Contingence and Libertie of second Causes but confirme the same Therefore men act freely because the Providence of God determines them so to act So that nothing more conduceth to the natural libertie of the Wil than the necessary Determination of Divine Providence because it determines althings to act according to their Natures it offers not the least force or violence to the Human Wil but sweetly though necessarily moves it to the end appointed Gods manner of ordering and conducting second Causes is without the least prejudice to their proper manner of working he guides them sweetly according to the principes and instincts he has put into them For 1 Doth not Divine Providence furnish every second Cause with its Power Virtue and Efficacitie to worke 2 Doth not the same Providence maintain and conserve that Power and Vigor imparted 3 Is not also the actuation of that Power from Providence 4 Doth not Providence also most wisely and sweetly yet powerfully order the manner of working as also perfect the same Is it not then most sweet and connatural in al its Executions Hence 4. Divine Providence is most Beautiful and Perfect 4. Beautiful and perfect al its executions are in Number Weight and Measure Doth not the Wise Man assure us Eccles 3.11 That every thing is beautiful in its season Is not every execution and particular event of Providence most beautiful and proper at the season allotted it by God What are al the travels and births of time but the Eternal and wise Decrees of Providence brought forth into light Have not al issues and events not only natural and necessary but also the most contingent and voluntary their fixed time and limits constituted by Divine Providence which renders them most beautiful and perfect Are not those very products which in their own nature seem most monstrose and deformed most beautiful in their time and place as they relate to Divine Providence Is not God infinitely wise to order althings in the best manner And is he not also infinitely powerful to execute whatever he ordaines and decrees Is not that which in regard of mans Providence and Execution is most sinful and deformed in regard of Gods Providence and Execution most beautiful as Christs Crucifixion What must we say of al that confusion that seems to be in States and Churches Persons and Things Doth it reach the Providence of God Is it not only in regard of second causes and our mistakes as to the first cause Cannot yea wil not Divine Providence bring a beautiful order out of al this confused chaos It 's true Sacred Philosophie tels us of evil dayes which should come to passe in this last Scene of the World but whence springs the evil of these later days Is it not from the Lusts of Men not the Providence of God Are not the worst of days Naturally good yea Morally also to those who are good and do good Is it not the Moral Evil of Men that makes al Times Evil If Men were better would not the Times soon prove better Yea are not those very Disorders and Confusions that arise from the Lusts of Men ordered by Divine Providence in the best manner for the good of the whole As in Nature varietie addes Beautie so in the Providence of God varietie of changes renders it more beautiful It was a great saying of a Stoic He that wil take upon him to mend things let him first take upon to mend God Certainly nothing is done by God but that which to leave undone were not so good Many things that seem disorderly and confused as to parts are not so if we consider the whole Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. having proved that God provides and governes althings according to his most wise Wil he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore God solely is good and wise by nature or Essentially As therefore he is good he provides for he that provides not for such as are under his care is not good but as he is wise he takes care to provide the best things Therefore it becomes us attending to these things to admire al to praise al to receive without curiose inquisition al the workes of Providence albeit they may seem to many injust because incognite and incomprehensible as in what follows That the Providence of God is most perfect see Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 94. Alvarez de Auxil Disput 28. p. 270. 5. Divine Providence is most mysterious and incomprehensible 5. Mysterious The Providences of God are much like his Being very ful of mysteries So Psal 36.6 The Judgements of God are said to
Gubernative Conservation and Gubernation are usually estimed the proper adequate species of Providence Providential Conservation is that Act of Gods Wil whereby he makes things to persist and persevere in their individual Existence Vigor Acts and specific Essences or Species As for the particular Ideas of providential Conservation we shal draw them forth in the following Proposition 1. Prop. God is the necessary Conservator of althings No Creature is sufficient to conserve it self or any thing else no particular Agent as such can be properly stiled a conservant Cause because conservation is but a kind of continued Creation That no Creature is sufficient to conserve it self without the immediate conservative influxe of God is evident 1 because every Creature has but a fluid transient nature wherefore it needs the conservative concurse of the first cause to fixe its fluxible Being It was a great and good Effate of Heraclitus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Althings are in fluxe nothing is permanent i. e. the natures of things create are like a river the parts whereof are always in fluxe neither doth the same part ever returne again but emties it self into the Sea where it is swallowed up so al Creatures are in continual fluxe and if God who alone is pure Act and immutable did not fixe their Beings by his conservative influxe they would soon drop into their primitive nothing 2 It implies a contradiction that a Creature should persevere in its being without Gods conservative concurse Doth it not implie a contradiction to say that God made a thing and yet that thing was not made and caused by God Now to say God hath made a Creature which needs not his conservative influxe what is this but to say that God made a Creature which yet was not made by him So essential is Divine Conservation to the very essence and existence of a Creature as Bradwardine pag. 162. Thus also Aquinas 1. Quaest 104. demonstrates That it is not a thing communicable to any Creature that it should conserve it self in Being without God 3 Whatever is Ens by participation necessarily dependes on that which is Ens by essence for its existence and subsistence Al create Beings in their very essence depend on Divine Conservation because every effect that dependes on any cause directly and of it self primarily for essence must necessarily also depend thereon for conservation But now God is so the cause of al effects that they from their very nature and by an intrinsecal necessitie depend on him for Being therefore also for conservation as Suarez Metaph. Disput 21. pag. 540 c. God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah in some sense Al Being as Exod. 3.14 I am i. e. nothing hath essence existence and persistence in Essence but from the pure Actualitie and Efficience of God 4 If God educed althings out of nothing by his efficacious Wil then it necessarily follows that the Wil of God must be the Conservatrix of althings For althings are so far and so long existent as God wils they shal be Indeed what is conservation but continued creation or the continuation of a thing made in Being Is it not necessary then that the same Divine Wil that at first gave Being to any thing conserve the same thing in Being Thence Aquinas 1. Quaest 104. proves That God conserves every thing by the same virtue and operation by which he produced it i. e. by the efficience of his Wil. 5 There is great proportion and Analogie in point of conservation between the workes of Art and Nature For look as every worke of Art doth presuppose a principe and worke of Nature as wel for its conservation as first production so every worke of Nature doth presuppose a Divine Efficience for its conservation as wel as for its first production Is it impossible that a piece of Art should conserve it self without mater and is it possible that any worke of Nature should conserve it self without Divine Efficience 6 No impression can remain on any effect longer than the vis impressa or force and action of the Agent continue and what is the essence of any Creature but vis impressa or force impressed by God thereon Al create Essences are but impressions or participations from God and therefore essentially require new force and efficience every moment for their conservation and continuation 7 Unlesse God conserve althings how can he order dispose and governe them to their respective ends Not only the operations but the very essences of things are ordered by God to his own Glorie and how can this be if the essences of things are not conserved by God That God is the necessary Conservator of althings see Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 65. Bradward l. 1. c. 2. pag. 146 c. 2. Prop. Gods conservative Influxe and Efficience is most intime and immediate in althings This Proposition is most evident Gods conservative Influxe immediate 1 From Gods power to annihilate althings For if things were conserved by God only mediately he could not annihilate them so long as that intermediate conservant Cause should concur to their conservation as it 's wel demonstrated by Ariminensis Sent. 1. Dist 45. pag. 160. 2 From the passive power or potentialitie of al Creatures For every potential or thing in power must be actuated by some Act immediately now every Creature in respect of God is but a potential Being and therefore must be actuated immediately by God who is a pure Act and that not only in its operation but also for the conservation of its Being 3 From the Omnipresence of the Divine Essence God being not circumscribed or defined to any space but immense in his Being it thence follows that he is intimately and immediately present to al Beings and by this his immediate presence and volition conserves the same As the creatrix Essence was immediately present by the Divine Volition in the first Creation of althings so the conservatrix Essence is also immediately present in the conservation of althings God is not more distant and remote in the conservation than he was in the first causation of things God is more intimate to every thing than the most intimate part of its own Essence is Thus Suarez Metaphys Disput 30. Sect. 7. pag. 70. proves That God doth not diffuse his creative or conservative Action but is intimately in every thing conserving of it c. So Bradward pag. 164. 4 From Gods prime Causalitie and the subordination of al Creatures to God Every second cause whether causant or conservant cannot cause or conserve any effect but in dependence on and subordination to God the first Cause Hence the Efficience of God must intervene between it and the effect whether it be for causation or conservation whence it follows that the Divine Efficience both in causation and conservation is more immediate than the efficience of any second cause Again the causalitie of the first Cause is more essential and necessary than that
of the second cause there is no effect which the second cause produceth but the first cause can produce it by itself So also as to conservation The first cause workes by its own proper virtue and therefore more intimely and immediately than any second cause The virtue of an inferior cause is not conjunct with the effect but in and by the virtue of the superior 5 From the efficacitie and vehemence of Gods conservative Influxe By how much the more vehemently and efficaciously any cause worketh by so much the more penetrant intime and immediate is its influxe Now God as the first conservant Cause doth more vehemently adhere to and efficaciously influence the effect than any second cause can do Concerning the immediate Conservation of God see an excellent Discourse in Bradwardine de Caus lib. 1. cap. 2. pag. 164 c. 3. Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. Heb. 1.3 Prop. God conserves althings by the word of his Power or immediate Volition Thus Heb. 1.3 Vpholding althings by the word of his power The Apostle ascribeth unto God infinite power in and for the conservation of althings whether great or smal It is infinite power that upholdeth the Earth that stretcheth out the Heavens c. And yet the same infinite power is put forth in the conservation of the least things as also for their motions The same power that moves the Heavens is also exerted in causing a feather to move the same power that shakes a leaf can shake yea rend the mountains the same strong arme that upholds a dust or atome can and doth uphold the Earth And he saith al this is by the word of his Power i. e. by his omnipotent Volition So 2 Pet. 3. having old us v. 5. That by the word of God the Heavens were made he addes v. 7. But the heavens and earth 2 Pet. 3.7 which are now by the same word are kept in store i. e. by the omnipotent Wil of God Gods Word being put for his Wil because we usually expresse our wils by our word That Gods Word or Wil is the immediate cause of althings and their conservation we have before fully demonstrated § 3. of this Chapter 4. Prop. Albeit the conservative Influxe of God be immediate Gods Conservation by means yet in the ordinary course of Providence he makes use of means for the conservation of his Creatures at least such as are corruptible So Hos 2.21 Hos 2.21 22. 22. I wil hear the heavens and they shal hear the earth and the earth shal hear the corne and the wine and the oil and they shal hear Jezreel 1 In this gradation we have a lively description of Divine Conservation both as to the whole Universe as also in regard of the principal part thereof man and more specially the Church of God 2 Neither doth this Prosopopoeia only point out to us the Divine Conservation of althings but also their causal connexions and subordinations each to other Jezreel i. e. according to its proper origination the seed of God cals on corne and wine and oil for sustenance and food and these liquors cal on the Earth for fructifying juices and vigor in order to their production and the Earth cals on the Heavens i. e. 1 on the Aereous inferior Heaven where the Clouds Snow Rain Dew and Vapors are for moist influences 2 on the Ethereous Heaven where the Sun and Stars are for warme influences And then lastly the Heavens cal on God who gives out both vigor and heat to the Celestial Bodies and these influences to the Earth which thence gives juices and vigor to the Plants whence Corne Wine and Oil is given forth to Jezreel Such is the admirable gradation and subordination of althings as means of Divine Conservation Thus Psal 65.9 10 11 12 13. Psal 65.11 12. Thou visitest the earth c. Thence v. 11. Thou crownest the year with thy goodnesse i.e. Thoroughout the whole year thou doest abundantly do good to thy poor Creatures and so doest as it were adorne beautifie and make glad the year Whence he addes and thy paths drop fatnesse Thy paths orbitae i. e. the clouds which are the paths wherein the chariot of thy Providence moves Drop fatnesse i. e. Rain and Snow which by their sulphureous nitrose efficaces make the Earth fat and flourishing whereby Man and Bestes are conserved Whence it follows v. 12. They drop on the pastures of the wildernesse and the little hils rejoice on every side Or are girded with joy Some understand this of metallic venes which are in the bosome of the Earth and do as it were gird it with joy or metals that cause joy We find mention also of the providential provision that God makes for his Creatures Psal 145.15 The eyes of al wait upon thee Psal 145.15 and thou givest them their meat in due season 16. Thou openest thy hand and satisfiest the desire of every living thing We have here a lively Image of Gods providential conservation who is brought in as a great Master of a Familie largely distributing Food even from his own hand to al under his care Such abundant provision doth the Benigne Lord make for the conservation of his Creature Whence some derive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Shaddai the name of God from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a dug or teat that yields milk implying that God feeds al and supplies them with nourishment Others deduce Shaddai from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dai sufficient q. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Scheddai who is sufficient because God is Alsufficient to supplie al his Creatures 5. Prop. When ordinary means fail God oft provides extraordinary for the relief of his Creatures Gods extraordinary provision for some Thus God provided for Eliah and many other of his Servants in their exigences whereof we find abundant instances in Sacred Philosophie and Historie Yea how oft doth our liberal Lord make extraordinary provision for mere Brutes in their indigent cases Psal 147.9 Thus Psal 147.9 He giveth to the Beste his food and to the young Ravens which crie The last clause Job 38.41 and to the young Ravens which crie is taken out of Job 38.41 Luke 12.24 Who provideth for the Raven his food When his young ones cry unto God they wander for lack of meat So Luk 12.24 Our Lord makes mention of Gods feeding the Ravens Which places put together seem to note some more than ordinary provision that God makes for them The Rabbines Rasi and Kimhi with some others tel us that the young Ravens by reason of their white color are left by their Parents to shift for themselves whence the Providence of God in an extraordinay manner causeth flies or wormes to arise out of their dung by which they are nourished Plinie and Albertus Magnus incline much to this Opinion of the Hebrews Others refer this not to the young Ravens newly hatcht but to such as are ready to flie
or material entitative act of sin This was long ago wel observed by Aquinas who tels us that al locutions in which it is signified that God is the cause of sin or of moral evil ought to be avoided or very cautelously limited because names that implie deformitie conjunct with the act either in general or in particular it cannot be said of them that they are from God Whence it cannot be said of sin absolutely and simply that it is from God but only with this addition or limitation that the Act as it is a real Entitie is from God This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition That God is the prime efficient cause of the material entitative Act of Sin This may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Cause Whatever is produced must have some cause of its production as Plato Tim. 28. and if it have a cause must it not also have a first cause And what can this be but God unlesse we wil with the Manichees asset two first Causes one of good and the other of evil 2 From the Participation and Limitation of every finite Act and Being Must not every participate finite create dependent Being be reduced to some essential infinite increate independent Being as the prime Efficient thereof 3 From the conservation of the material entitative Act of Sin Is not the material entitative act of sin a create Being And can any create Being conserve itself Doth not Durandus and his sectators grant that the conservation of Beings is from God And if Gods providential Efficience be necessary to the conservation of the material entitative act of sin is it not as necessary to its first production What is conservation but continued production as to God This argument is wel improved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110. and by Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 4 From the Determination of the second cause of its particular effect Every second cause being indifferent to varietie of effects cannot be determined to any one individual effect but by the immediate cooperation of the first cause Thus Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 5 From the substrate Mater of al evil which is physically and naturally good There is no moral evil which is not founded and subjectated in some natural good even hatred of God albeit the highest moral evil yet as to its entitative material act it is naturally good which is evident by this that if that act of hatred were put forth against sin it would be morally good 6 From the Ordinabilitie of al evil to some good There is no act so evil but the wise God can turne it to some good the Crucifixion of our Lord which was one of the highest evils what good was by Divine Gubernation brought out of it Doth it not much exalt the skil of a wise Physician so to order poison as to make it medisinal So it exalts Divine Gubernation to bring good out of evil as it aggravates the impietie of wicked men that they bring evil out of good 7 Doth it not take from God the main of his Providence to denie his Concurse to the substrate mater of sin What more conduceth to the Amplitude of Divine Providence than to allow him a Concurse to and Gubernation of al real Acts and Events 8 To denie Gods Concurse to the material entitative Act of Sin doth it not by a paritie of Reason subvert the supernatural concurse of God to what is good For if God can make a Creature that shal be Independent as to any one natural Act why may he not also make a Creature that shal be independent as to good Acts Hence 4. Prop. The substrate mater How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. or material entitie of Sin fals under the Divine Wil. This follows on the former because the whole of Divine concurse or efficience must be resolved into the Wil of God as before once and again But more particularly 1 The Futurition of Sin as to its substrate mater fals under the Eternal Decree of the Divine Wil. Whatever Good or Evil there is under the Sun as to its real Entitie must have its futurition from the Divine Wil. Immo peccatum quatenus à Deo justè permittitur cadit in legem aeternam Augustinus de civitat Dei L. 19. C. 22. sin it self so far as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law of the Divine Wil as Augustin wel observes Sin in its own nature as Antecedent to the Divine Wil was only possible now how could it passe from a condition of mere possibilitie to a state of futurition but by some intervening cause And what can we imagine to be the cause hereof but the Divine Wil May we not then hence conclude that Sin was future because the Divine Wil determined for just ends to permit its futurition 2 The Divine Wil is not only the cause of sins futurition but it has moreover a providential Gubernation and Efficience about the actual existence of sin 1 As for the Natural Entitie of Sin the Divine Wil is the total immediate efficient thereof as Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dist 34. Ar. 3. pag. 110. 2 The Divine Wil also physically permits the moral pravitie and obliquitie of Sin as that which may conduce to the advance of Divine Glorie For this greatly conduceth to the illustration of Divine Providence to permit some defects that may render the whole more beautiful as Aquinas at large demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71. of which hereafter Hence 5. Gods wil about the Obliquitie of Sin permissive Prop. Gods Wil about the formal reason or obliquitie of Sin is not effective or defective but only permissive 1 That Gods wil about the obliquitie of Sin is not effective is evident because Sin as to its obliquitie has no effective cause 2 That the Wil of God is not a defective cause of Sin is as evident because the same act which is defectuose and sinful in regard of the second cause is not such in regard of God Man breakes a Law and therefore sins but God breakes no Law al his Actions are conforme to the Eternal Law Whence 3 Gods Wil about the obliquitie of Sin is only permissive But now to clear up Gods permissive Wil about Sin we are to consider 1 That permission properly as to men is not an action of the Law but a negation of action when any permits another to do what he might hinder but is under no obligation to hinder Hence no man may permit Sin because he is under an obligation to hinder it but God may because he is under to obligation to hinder it as also because he can bring good out of it 2 That Permission is either of a Legislator or Rector Gods permission of Sin is not as he is Legislator but only as Rector and Governer of the World God gives no man
but the increate Being in whom it hath a sufficient cause both Efficient Exemplar and Final For albeit some create Beings require other efficient causes besides God at least for their more connatural production yet the reason of a create Being as such requires them not And in what precedes he saith that the dependence of an effect on any create second cause is not so essential as its dependence on the increate first cause 2 Al Creatures depend on God for their Conservation This has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes C. 8. and it ma be further argued from the impossibilitie of a Creatures being conserved but in a way of dependence on Gods conservative influence For if a Creature should be conserved by it self or any other cause without dependence on the first cause God should not have an absolute Dominion over it neither were it in his power to annihilate the same § 10. Every Creature dependes on God as to Operation This Hypothesis though denied by Durandus Creatural Dependence as to Operation and some very few more yet it is generally owned by Scholastic Theologues and that on invict evident grounds For 1 Operation is the Index of the Essence what is dependent in Essence cannot be independent in Operation 2 Let us consider the series of causes and we shal find that every Inferior is obedient and subordinate to its Superior in acting 3 What is an Action but that special Dependence which the effect has on its efficient cause And is not God the prime efficient of althings 4 No Virtue or Efficace of any second Cause can actuate itself but necessarily requires for its actuation the Divine Concurse which gives al Virtue as also the conservation and actuation of the said Virtue The Virtue of the Inferior Agent always dependes on the Virtue of the Superior in as much as the Superior gives Virtue to the Inferior as also the conservation and actuation of the same Virtue 5 Whatever is limited in its Essence is also limited in its Activitie and Operation and where there is limitation there is subordination and dependence as wel in operation as in essence 6 If every second cause depend not on its first for al its operations then it is impossible that the first cause should hinder such operations for the exerting whereof the second cause dependes not on him Who can hinder that Action which he cannot by any influence reach And if this be granted what wil become of the Providence of God Must we not with Epicurus allow God to be only a Spectator no way a Rector or Gubernator of the most considerable part of Human Affaires and Acts That no Creature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible in operation we have demonstrated in what precedes § 4. of this Chapter 7 It implies a contradiction that the second cause should act and yet not be actuated and influenced by the first cause And here whiles under the review of these Sentiments I may not let passe without some Animadversion the Reflexion of a Learned Author in a new Piece about Gods Prescience on this Argument namely That it can never be proved that it implies a contradiction for God to make a Creature which should be capable of acting without an immediate concurse if I apprehend his meaning as laid down p. 35 36 37. But because that Learned Author gives us only his Supposition without any Demonstration thereof or solution of those Arguments which the Scholes both of Thomistes and Scotistes as also the Jesuites Suarez and others have urged against the Hypothesis of Durandus which he seems to espouse I do not conceive my self obliged to superadde any Arguments for the re-enforcement of this Hypothesis which as been already copiosely demonstrated § 5 6 7. also Chap. 7. § 2 4. and Chap. 9. I shal only adde thus much that I cannot according to the utmost extension of my narrow apprehension conceive any medium between the extremes of this disjunctive Proposition Either the Human Wil must depend on the Divine Independent Wil of God for al its natural motions and operations or God must depend on the Human Will in it self Independent for al his Prescience motives of Election and all discrimination as to Grace and gratiose operations I am not ignorant of the general replie That this Hypothesis I oppose only cuts off Gods concurse as to sinful Acts. But I would willingly be satisfied in these Queries 1 Whether there be any Action of Man on Earth so good which hath not some mixture of Sin in it And if God concur to the substrate mater of it as good must be not also necessarily concur to the substrate mater of it as sinful Is not the substrate mater of the Act both as good and sinful the same 2 Again as there is no Action in this imperfect state so good but it has some sin mixed with it so is there any Action so sinful which has not some natural good as the substrate mater thereof as we have largely proved Chap. 9. § 2 3 Lastly if we cut off the material entitie of sinful Acts from Dependence on Gods immediate concurse do we not indeed thereby cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in governing this lower world But of these sufficiently in what precedes specially C. 7. § 9. Hence § 11. The Wil of Man is necessarily subordinate to and dependent on the Wil of God in al its Operations The Dependence of the Human Wil in al its Acts. The Wil of Man cannot be the solitary cause of its own Act so as to exclude the efficience of the prime cause as C. 7. § 4. It 's true the Wil is a total cause in its own kind yet not so as to exclude the total influxe of God as the first cause Yea God is not only the total but also the immediate cause of al voluntary Acts which argues the Wils total and immediate Dependence on God in al its Acts as C. 7. § 4. Thus Aquinas Seing every mutable and multiforme must be reduced to some immobile principe as unto its cause and the Intellect and Wil of Man appear to be mutable and multiforme it 's necessary that they be reduced to some superior immobile immutable and uniforme cause Yea he saith that God is most intimely present to the Wil and as it were acting in it whiles he moves it to act And Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. Q. 2. Queries Whether the Create Wil be so far a total and immediate cause of its own Act as to exclude the immediate Efficience of God And he proves the Negative because 1 If so then it would necessarily follow that God doth not certainly know the future evenements and acts of the Wil because his knowlege of things future dependes on the determination of his own Wil as Chap. 5. § 2. 2 If so then God were not the best and most perfect Being because he should not have Dominion over the
Human Wil as chap. 5. § 3. 3 Again if the Human Wil could produce its own Act without the immediate concurse of God it could also intend the same even to the highest degree of merit without Divine assistence 4 The Understanding cannot produce its act without Gods illumination therefore neither can the Wil its without Gods concurse See this more fully in Bradwardine L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. Also Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. C. 3. S. 3. § 4. Prop. 1. p. 524. and what precedes in this Part 4. C. 7. 9. § 12. Lastly Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural Creatural Dependence as to its parts is either Natural or Moral and Supernatural Natural Dependence is that whereby al Creatures as Creatures depend on God for Essence conservation and operation Moral and Supernatural Dependence is that whereby the Rational Creature dependes on God as to Morals and Supernaturals We find both these dependences conjoined in Man for he having a double 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitude to God 1 as a Creature and 2 as a Rational Creature he hath also a double dependence on God Supernatural Dependence on Christ 1 Natural of which in what precedes 2 Moral and Supernatural And as in Naturals Inferior Causes depending on their Superiors in acting can do nothing without much lesse contrary to the efficace and concurse of their Superiors so also in Morals and Supernaturals Supernatural Elevation is the total next and formal Reason of acting supernaturally and by how much the nearer the receptive Soul is to God its supernatural influencing cause by so much the more it partakes of his influence as in Nature by how much the nearer the thing moved is to the mover by so much the more efficaciously doth it partake of its Impression God doth most potently and yet most sweetly influence the Affect Act and Effect of the virtuose Soul Phil. 2.13 Al effusions of virtuose Acts are proportionate to the Souls dependence on the efficacious infusions of God Yea the natural Wil by virtue of its Supernatural Dependence is elevated to act above Nature This Supernatural Dependence of the New Creature on Christ as Mediator and Spring of al Grace is lively illustrated in Sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 87.7 As wel the singers Psal 87.7 as players on instruments shal be there Al my springs are in thee Glassius renders the words thus And they shal sing as those that lead the Dances Al my springs are in thee The Psalmist having given us in the foregoing Verses a Prophetic Description of the gloriose Reigne of the Messias on Mount Zion or in Evangelic Churches and the great number of Converts who should sing forth his praises there he concludes with this as the burden of their Song Al my springs are in thee i. e. Al the Springs of my Divine Life are in thee O great Mediator Thou alone art the prime cause and object of my dependence The New Creatures dependence on Christ for supernatural Grace is Vniversal Total Absolute and Immediate and that both for Habitual and Actual Grace For Habitual Grace 1. Christians have an Universal and Absolute Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace So John 1.16 And of his fulnesse have we al received Joh. 1.16 and Grace for Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here signifies either the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon and then the sense is Grace upon Grace i. e. abundant Grace and that freely or it may note the Analogie which is between the Grace received from Christ and Nature received from Adam and then the meaning is this Grace for Grace i. e. as the Child receives from his Parents Member for member or as al the Sons of Adam receive from him Lust for lust for there was no lust in his heart but what was communicated to his Posteritie so the Children of Christ the second Adam receive from him Grace for Grace i. e. al manner of habitual Graces answerable to those in his Human Nature This Supernatural Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace is also wel expressed by the Disciples Luk. 17.5 Luk. 17.5 And the Apostles said unto the Lord Encrease our Faith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adde Faith to us i. e. some additional degrees of Faith The Apostles had been oft rebuked by their Lord for their Infidelitie and therefore now having by their frequent relapses gained some sense of their own insufficience they depend wholly on him for supplies their own impotence engageth them to depend on his Omnipotence Grace is a Celestial Plant fed by an invisible Root in Heaven and by Juices derived from a Principe above it self As the strength of Adam's Habitual Grace could not preserve him when he trusted thereto and did not depend on his Creator so the impotence of the New Creature cannot hurt it so long as it dependes on Christ 2. The New Creature has an Universal For Actual Grace Psal 141.8 Absolute Total and immediate Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace Thus Psal 141.8 But mine eyes are unto thee O God the Lord in thee is my trust leave not my soul destitute Hebr. make not my soul naked or emty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to evacuate or make naked So the Targum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It notes his total dependence on god We find the Churches absolute and immediate dependence on Christ for Actual Grace lively described Cant. 8.5 Who is this that cometh up from the Wildernesse leaning upon her Beloved Who is this i. e. this Woman or Church that cometh up out of the Wildernesse This shews her abandoning her own forces and strength Leaning or Cleaving to The Original word is no where else found in the Old Testament The LXX render it by a word that signifies confirming her self which denotes her dee sense of her own insufficience with absolute and total Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace Christians ought to live immediately and totally on that Grace which is in Christ and not on habitual Grace received from him Members and Branches live on life but the life of their Head and Root So Christians ought to live not in the strength of their own Graces but in the strength of that Grace which is in Christ as Paul Gal. 2.20 When men are more ready to act in the force of Grace received than in dependence on Christ they soon fal into sin This Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace is wel illustrated Phil. 2.12 13. Phil. 2.12 Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling This fear and trembling doth not implie douting as the Papists would needs persuade us but a modest humble self-abasing sense of our own insufficience with an absolute dependence on Gos Al-sufficient Grace Thence it follows v. 13. For it 's God that worketh in you to wil and to do of his good pleasure This is a strong inducement to worke the Soul to an holy self-despair and humble trembling Dependence on Divine