is such a supreme Rule of Justice as that whatever he wils is for that very reason because he wils it to be accounted just So Bradwardine de Causa Dei l. 1. c. 47. proves strongly That albeit God punisheth no man eternally without sin committed in time yet he doth not eternally reprobate any for sin as a Cause antecedently moving his divine Wil. So Alvarez de Auxil Disput 109. 3 a Conclus The positive act whereby God from eternitie would not admit some into his Kingdome was not conditionate but absolute antecedent in a moment of Reason to the il use of Free-wil And it is proved 1 Because there can be no cause of Reprobation 2 Because supernatural Beatitude is not due to any upon the account of natural improvements Therefore God could from al eternitie without any Injurie before the Prescience of the good or il use of free-wil elect some to life eternal and by a positive act wil not to admit others And our Divines generally grant That there can be no other cause assigned of Reprobation than the absolute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or good pleasure of God But none is more categoric and positive in this than judicious Davenant who yet in some points came nigh the new Methodists in his incomparable Animadversions on Gods love to mankind Wherein he doth puissantly defend the following particulars greatly conducing to the establishment of our Hypothesis 1 That Gods secret wil of good pleasure is very different from his reveled preceptive complacential wil as pag. 221 349 376. 2 That Gods reveled complacential approbative wil is the measure of our dutie but not of Gods decrees or operations pag. 222 356 391 399. 3 That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleasure is only properly his wil pag. 392. 4 That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleasure is moved by nothing but itself pag. 375 376. 5 That the absolute Decrees of God contradict not general conditional promisses of life and threats of death pag. 241 332 375 387 398. 6 That God may be said according to his wil of complacence and approbation to intend the salvation of sinners yea Reprobates by providing the means of grace conducing thereto pag. 271 376 394. 7 That the externe means and offers of grace must be measured and interpreted according to the knowen nature of the means not the unknowen wil of God pag. 353. 8 That God by his approbative complacential wil unfeignedly wils what he commands pag. 329 393 394 401. 9 That al under the means of grace are under some remote conditional possibilitie of salvation pag. 256 257. 10 That Gods evangelic providential intention of saving sinners is oft frustrated as to its events by mans sin although his decretive beneplacite intention is never frustrated p. 377 381 387 388 395. 11 That absolute Election and Reprobation may stand with a possibilitie to contrary events though not with contrary events pag. 240 333 341 360 402 253. 12 That absolute Decrees oppose not the Justice of God with its difference from that of men pag. 232 321 336 339 342. 13 That absolute Decrees oppose not Gods Holinesse pag. 240-272 14 That absolute Decrees oppose not the Mercie of God pag. 277-310 15 That mere conditional Decrees are inconsistent with Gods soverain Being and Independence pag. 226. 16 That absolute Reprobation is not repugnant to Gods Truth pag. 349-362 17 That absolute Reprobation takes not away the end and use of Gods gifts pag. 374-404 18 That absolute Reprobation leaves no man under an absolute necessitie or compulsion to sin pag. 253. 19 Let Reprobation be absolute or conditional it leaves the same possibilitie and libertie to the Agents pag. 333 340 341 351 360. 20 That the Arminians grant an absolute immutable fixed Decree of Reprobation which admits the same objections that they urge against the Calvinists p. 302 332 333 340 351 354 400 418 419. 21 Infallible Prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much necessitie on the wil and compulsion to sin as absolute Reprobation pag. 418 419 442 462. 22 Lastly he shews us What is the right use and abuse of absolute Decrees pag. 454-526 These Propositions clearly and fully explicated by our judicious Davenant give great evidence and demonstration to our Hypothesis as also distinct solution to the objections of our Opponents of which hereafter Chap. 6. § 4. Our next Argument shal be taken from Divine Concurse its Principe Nature and Efficace the explication whereof wil give us a ful demonstration of our Hypothesis which we shal endeavor to lay down in the following Particulars 1. That God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful may be demonstrated from the Principe of al Divine Concurse What is the active principe of al Divine Concurse but the Divine wil Doth not sacred Pagine expressely speak so much So Eph. 1. 11. Who worketh althings after the counsel of his own wil. And more particularly as to the substrate mater of sin it 's said Act. 4. 28. that those who crucified our Lord did acte but what Gods hand or wil and counsel predetermined to be done of which before And Strangius himself grants us lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 63. That concurse as to its prime act is in God and the same with God Now such is the Omnipotence of the Divine wil that althings must necessarily be done which he wils to be done and in that manner as he wils them as Aquinas wel determines How then is it possible but that if God wil that the substrate mater of sin existe it must necessarily existe and in that manner as he wils it Can any person or thing resiste the Divine efficacious wil And what is al active concurse but the determination of the same efficacious wil See more of Gods wil being the spring and principe of Divine concurse Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 3. 2. That God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater of sin may be demonstrated from the nature of Divine concurse as to its Totalitie Vniversalitie as to effects Particularitie as to manner of working Immediation Antecedence and soverain absolute Independence 1 The Totalitie of Divine concurse sufficiently demonstrates its predetermination as to the substrate mater of sin That Gods concurse to al second causes acts and effects is total we have sufficiently demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. pag. 417. Thus much is also granted by Strangius lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. where he assertes That the whole action dependes on God as also on the creature otherwise God should not concur immediately Though I am not ignorant that a Divine of name among us as also of the same partie with Strangius denies Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin to be total yet because he is singular therein and different from his own partie I shal take it for granted that Gods concurse is
of the new Methodists Baronius Strangius and others about Concurse fal in with those of the Jesuites for a simultaneous Concurse only albeit some of them in termes disown it 6 Lastly the soverain and absolute Independence of Gods Concurse gives us further demonstration of his predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sin That Gods Concurse is not Conditionate but absolute and independent we have copiosely proved Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 412 c. And indeed what more absurd yea impossible than such a conditionate Concurse whereby the Molinists and Arminians suppose Gods concurrence to depend on mans Is there not hereby an effectual dore opened to a progresse into infinite For if God concur on condition that man concur doth God concur to that condition or not If not is there not then some act of the creature produced without Gods concurse If God concur to the working of that condition then absolutely or conditionally if absolutely then his former Concurse is not conditional if conditionally then what an infinitude of Conditions will follow hence We take it then for granted that Gods Concurse is not conditional but absolute and independent And hence we thus argue If God concur absolutely and independently to the substrate mater of sin then he doth predetermine the wil thereto the consequence is rational and clear For where two Agents concur totally and immediately to one and the same action and effect the one must necessarily depend on the other and that which depends on another must be determined by that other for every cause that is dependent on another is so far as it depends thereon determinable thereby It 's true natural corporeous effects have some dependence on the Sun without being determined thereby because the Sun is a limited cause and has not efficace sufficient to determine the mater is workes on but is rather determined thereby and so in that respect dependent thereon But as for God the first cause whose wil the principe of his concurse is omnipotent and most efficacious it 's impossible that he should have any dependence on or be any way determinable in his concurse by the mater he workes on he being the most universal cause infinitely perfect and void of al potentialitie or passive power must necessarily predetermine al second causes to their acts but be determined by none But more of this in what immediately follows of the efficace of Gods Concurse 3. Having demonstrated Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the Principe and Nature of Divine concurse we now procede to demonstrate the same from the Efficace thereof Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 61. albeit he denies Gods general Concurse whereby he concurs to the mater of sin to be predeterminative yet he grants it is efficacious calling it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the force and efficace of God whereby he subordinates second causes to himself so that whatever they are or act they essentially depend on him in both respects And this ingenuous concession touching the efficace of Divine concurse is al that we require to build our present Demonstration on which we shal distribute into two branches 1 Gods efficacious concurse unto al natural acts and effects 2 Gods efficacious concurse to al supernatural acts and effects 1. We shal demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the efficacitie of Divine concurse as to al natural acts and effects which evidently appears in the following particulars 1 Gods concurse to al physic or natural causes motions and effects is most efficacious This Proposition the sacred Scriptures do abundantly confirme as Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Act. 17. 28. of which before Chap. 3. § 1. Thus much Strangius and those of his persuasion grant us as before c. 2. § 1. 2 The efficace of Divine concurse dependes on the efficace and determination of the Divine wil. For what is efficacious concurse considered actively but the efficacitie of the Divine wil predetermining to act so or so To presume that active concurse is any thing else but an immanent efficacious act of the Divine wil is to crosse the mind of sacred Scriptures and the most awakened Divines as we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 3. 3 Gods wil being efficacious and determinate determines al second causes to al their natural actions and effects Is it not impossible but that the wil of God being omnipotent and determined for the production of such an action of mans wil the said action or effect must necessarily follow Is not the wil of God sufficiently potent to determine the wil of man in al its natural acts Is not the efficacitie of the Divine wil so great that not only those things are done which God wils shal be done but in that manner as he wils them Doth not Strangius confesse so much lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. lib. 2. cap. 11. pag. 266. Whence if God in his own wil purpose and determine that the human wil should produce such or such an action suppose that whereto sin is necessarily annexed is not the human wil necessarily in regard of the Divine wil and yet freely in regard of its own manner of working predetermined thereto This is most evident in the crucifixion of our Lord expressed Act. 2. 23. By the determinate counsel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. by the decreed fixed determined wil of God The like Act. 4. 28. of which places before Chap. 3. § 2. Hence 4 The efficacious concurse of God modifies and according to its mode determines al actions of second causes not only necessarily but freely Doth the Divine wil determine itself to the production of every singular individual effect and may it not yea must it not then determine the human wil to al its natural acts Has mans infirme ambulatorie wil power to determine al such faculties acts and effects as are subject to its Empire and has not the Divine wil which is infinitely more efficacious power to determine al inferior powers acts and effects subject to its universal Dominion And doth it not hence follow that the soverain Divine wil doth by its efficacious concurse predetermine al the free acts of the human wil which necessarily fal under its Empire and modification See this wel demonstrated by that judicious Professor Sam. Ward Determinat de Concursu Dei pag. 118 c. Whence 5 The efficacious predeterminative concurse of God equally extendes itself to al natural good even to the substrate mater of sinful acts Strangius and others of our Opponents grant That Gods efficacious predetermining Concurse extendes it self not only to al supernatural good but also to al natural good that has not sin intrinsecally annexed to it whence we may by a paritie of reason demonstrate divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of al actions though never so intrinsecally evil for
God a velleitie or imperfect conditional volition which never takes effect 7. There is something in Nature which was never decreed by the God of Nature 8. God hath a general antecedent conditional love and desire of the Salvation of al men 9. Some Decrees of God may be frustrated and never come to passe 10. The reason why God hated Esau and loved Jacob must not be resolved into the 〈◊〉 or good pleasure of God but into his prescience of Esau's actual and final disobedience and Jacobs obedience 11. There is Scientia media or middle Science in God dependent on mans ambulatory wil and so only conjectural and uncertain 12. God as an idle Spectator looks on the wicked world but doth not neither can omnipotently rule dispose and order their sinful acts for his glorie 13. When it 's said that God wils the permission of sin it must be understood only of the effect 14. Al Divine Concurse is not particular total immediate and efficacious 15. The creature is in some natural acts independent and the first cause of its own acts or the second cause can act without being applied and actuated by the first cause 16. God can make a creature which by having its capacitie preserved and made habile can of itself act without immediate efficacious concurse Baron 131. 17. Supernatural good is from God but not al natural good 18. Efficacious grace in Conversion destroyeth human libertie 19. Gods efficacious Concurse is in the power of mens natural free wil either to use or refuse the same 20. God vouchsafeth to al men sufficient grace which if wel improved he wil reward with efficacious grace Strang. 229. 21. Al Predetermination impels the wil and acts it as a mere Machine 22. There is a twofold libertie one essential to the wil but lesse proper the other accidental consisting in indifference which is most proper 23. Alhuman acts ought not to be performed for Gods glorie 24. The vitiositie of sin is essential to some human natural acts as natural We do not produce the consequents here drawen from the Antitheses of Antipredeterminants as their proper sentiments at least not of al that espouse those Antitheses but only as such as may be naturally and logically deduced from their Antitheses albeit they do not formally assent to al of them FINIS ERRATES BOOK II. PAge 489. l. 31. for God read us BOOK III. Page 10. l. 33. for drive r. denie p. 22. l. 26. after elswhere put a period Item l. 36. dele by p. 23. l. 32. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 24. l. 39. dele and. p. 28. l. 1. dele and stating p. 42. l. 36. r. that God only p. 76. l. 19. r. same p. 79. l. 38. r. to Gods p. 80. l. 31. for like r. agreable p. 86. l. 7. r. Tarnovius p. 89. l. 3. for is he r. he is p. 111. l. 18. for Baronius r. Bellarmine p. 119. l. 16. r. c. 34. p. 129. l. 23. r. This he p. 142. l. 5. dele who p. 145. l. 2. r. so not p. 166. l. 26. r. Compton p. 170. l. 9. r. it workes The Origine of the Controversie The method of our procedure The explication of the Termes Of Sin 1. It s Origine 2. It s substrate mater Quod malum est per vitium bonum est per naturam Aug. contra Advers Leg. Prophet cap. 5. Absurdum esset si diceretur ullum defectum aut peccatum aut ullum peccatum aut defectum posse per se existere cùm nullum detur separatum malum sed omne malum sit in bono Strang. de Volunt l. 3. c. 19. p. 629. Al Acts in their generic nature indifferent Actio seorsim per se physicè considerata indifferens est moraliter nec minùs virtuti quà m vitio substerni potest Al moral constitution from the Divine Law Sin as to its formal nature a privation Actions modally sinful Actions intrinsecally evil The Libertie of the Wil. The new coined distinction of Libertie largely and strictly taken The True Idea of Libertie f Libertas voluntatis in genere nihil aliud esse videtur quà m 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spontaneum intellectuale Strang. l. 3. c. 14. p. 686. Moral Libertie or free-wil to good Necessitie impossibilitie and possibilite what In libero arbitrio est simultas potentiae ad opposita sed non potentia simultatis Alvarez The wil of God its distributions c. Of Divine Concurse Immediate Concurse what Efficacious and predeterminant concurse Efficacions concurse what Eph. 1. 19. Ephes 3. 7. Phil. 3. 21. 1 Cor. 12. 6 11. Rom. 7. 5. 2 Cor. 4. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 11. Eph. 1. 11. Determinative Concurse what Act. 17. 26. Heb. 4. ◠Luke 22. 22. Acts 2. 23. Predeterminative concurse what in Scripture 1 Cor. 2. 7. Rom. 8. 29 30. Eph. 1. 5 11. Acts 4. 28. Predeterminative Concurse active and passive Predetermination physic and moral Praedeterminare voluntatem est applicare voluntatem ad agendum facere ut faciat Strang. Wherein we and our Opponents agree Volitiones pure conditionales sunt alienae à sapientia prudentia Dei Ruiz de Volunt Dei Disp 20. §. 1. Wherein our Opponents differ among themselves Their differences 1. about Gods Prescience 2. The futurition of sin 3. Divine Concurse 4. Gods permission of sin 5. The nature of sin difnew 1. As to Gods Decrees 2. The Futurition of sin 3. Gods permissive Decree 4. Gods prescience of sin 5. Divine Predetermination 6. Human Libertie 7. God not the Author of Sin Scriptural Demonstrations 1. God the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. * Nam vitiorum nostrorum non est auctor Deus sed tamen ordinator est Eph. 1. 11. Psal 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Hab. 3. 4. Act. 11. 21. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. Si Dii volunt volentibus Diis Cic. in Offic. Act. 18. 21. 1 Cor. 4. 19. God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed 1 Arg. from Josephs Vendition Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Non refert in Deum peccatum fratrum sed transitum suum in Aegyptum Erasm Act. 7 9 The Objections against Josephs Vendition answered 2. Arg. from the Crucifixion of Christ Mat. 26. 24. Luk. 22. 22. Act. 4. 28. Joh. 19. 10 11 Act. 2. 23. Act. 4. 28. Our Adversarie evasions examined 1. Evasion touching active and passive Crucifixion 2. Evasion Strangius ' s Evasions Answer Quum Pater tradiderit Filium Christus Corpus suum Judas Dominum cur in hac traditione Deus est justus homo reus nisi quia in re una quam fecerunt causa non est una ob quam fecerunt August Epist 48. ad Vinc. 1. Gods punishing his sinful People by wicked Instruments Esa 10. 5 6 7. Jerem. 16. 16. 2. Gods afflicting his righteous Servants by wicked Instruments Job 1. 21. Psal 105. 25. 4. Gods immediate hand in the Acts of sin 2 Sam.
1. 13. Eph. 1. 9. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to prepare Rom. 9. 23. 1 Cor. 2. 9. By al which we evidently see what footsteps predetermination and as to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin has in the sacred Scriptures We now procede to examine this notion as used by scholastic Theologues and how far their sentiments thereof are applicable to our present Controversie 1 Some distinguish between Gods predefinition and his predetermination his predefinition they restrain to his Decrees and his predetermination to his Concurse Others distinguish the predetermination of God into extrinsec and intrinsec by extrinsec predetermination they understand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree whereby the creature is predetermined to act by intrinsec predetermination they mean the previous motion of God upon the creature which continually moves and applies it to act But I should rather distinguish predetermination as Creation and al other Acts of God ad extrà into active and passive 1 By active predetermination I mean nothing else but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil whereby al second causes persons acts effects and things receive their termes order and limitation as to power and activitie This is the same with predefinition predestination and extrinsec predetermination That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil without any impression or actual influxe on the second cause has been defended by Scotus and others of great name in the Scholes and that on invict reasons for if God wil that the second cause suppose it be the human wil act immediately on the volition of God the action of the second cause wil follow not from any previous impression on the second cause but from its natural subordination and as it were sympathie with the first cause as at the beck of the human wil every inferior facultie of man moves See Suarez de Auxil l. 1. c. 5. n. 3. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. 2 By passive predetermination I understand the concurse of God as applying the second cause to its act and not really but mentally or modally only distinct therefrom For as active predetermination is the same with the Divine wil so passive predetermination is the same with the second cause its act and effect as we have demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. § 1. 2 Predetermination is usually distinguished into physic or natural and ethic or moral This distinction dependes on that of causes into physic and moral a physic or natural cause is that which is truly efficient and so doth really influence the act and effect in a way of proper efficience or causalitie whence an Ethic or moral cause is that which doth not immediately directly or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect but only morally by proposing objects motives precepts promisses or the like moral means and influences with excitements and persuasions Thus proportionably we may distinguish predetermination into physic and moral 1 By physic predetermination we must understand not corporal or natural in a strict notion which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes but such a predetermination as really applies the Agent or second cause to its act and really yea immediately influenceth both act and effect Thus Suarez Metaphys Disput 17. sect 2. num 2. A physic cause and so predetermination in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cause acting by corporeous and material motion but it 's taken more universally for a cause that truly and really influenceth the effect for as nature sometimes signifies any essence so physic or natural influxe is that which by true and proper causalitie worketh the effect to which when a moral cause is opposed it is to be understood of such a cause which doth not of itself and truly act yet it doth so carrie itself as that the effect may be imputed to it such a cause is he that comforts beseecheth or hinders not when he may and ought Hence 2 by moral predetermination as it regardes Gods influence on the moral rational world we must understand his moral influence on man as his last end his stating mans dutie by moral precepts inviting thereto by Evangelic promisses dehorting from sin by penal comminations and al other moral influences Here we are to note that albeit physic and moral predetermination be comprehended under physic and moral causalitie yet the later is more comprehensive than the former for physic predetermination properly belongs to a superior cause as acting on an inferior but physic causalitie to any efficient as Strangius doth wel observe But to sum up the whole both the Dominicans and Calvinists agree with the Jesuites and Arminians in this That the holy God doth not morally predetermine any to sin for he neither counsels encourageth commandes or invites any one to the least sin The Question therefore must be understood of physic predetermination which I shal describe according to the explication of Strangius l. 2. c. 4. p. 159. thus By the physic predetermination of God in this place is understood the action of God whereby he moves and applies the second cause to act and so antecedently to al operation of the creature or in order of nature and reason before the creature workes God really and efficaciously moves it to act in al its actions i. e. he actes and causeth that the creature actes and causeth whatever it actes and causeth so that without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing and this premotion being given it is impossible in a composite sense that the creature should not act and do that unto which it is premoved by the first cause And more particularly though concisely as for Gods predetermination of the human wil Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus To predetermine the wil as they teach is to applie the wil to act and to make it act Which description of predetermination I do readily close with and so the Question before us wil be summarily this Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even those that have sin annexed or appendent to them Affirm I am not ignorant that a reverend and learned Divine who opposeth our Hypothesis states the question otherwise as if we held That God doth by an efficacious influence universaelly move and determine men to al their actions even those that are most wicked But this Hypothesis as proposed and intended I know no sober mind but abhors whoever said that God determines men to the most wicked actions as such were not this to make him the Author of sin which every pious soul detestes For to determine to wicked actions as such implies also a determination to the wickednesse of those actions and this determination cannot be physic because sin as sin has no physic cause or determination therefore
and our Hypothesis most true it remains on us to demonstrate Chap. 5. Thus we have given the true and ful state of our Controversie which by reason of the subtile evasions and subterfuges of our Adversaries lies under so much obscuritie and confusion and indeed it is to me a deplorable case and that which argues mens diffidence of the merits of their cause that they contend with so much passionate vehemence for their own Phaenomena and yet never explicate the termes or state the Question in controversie I have thereby given the Reader as wel as my self the more trouble in this part of our Province that so what follows may be the more facile both for him and me CHAP. III. Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis Scriptural Demonstration 1 That God is the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Psal 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. 2 That God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed 1 Joseph's vendition Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Gen. 50. 20. Acts 7. 9. 2 The Crucifixion of Christ Mat. 26. 24. Luke 22. 22. John 19. 10 11. Acts 2. 23. 4. 28. Our Adversaries Evasions taken off 3 That God makes use of wicked Instruments to punish his People Esa 10. 5 6. Jer. 16. 16. Psal 105. 25. Job 1. 21. 4 God's immediate hand in the Act of Sin 2 Sam. 12. 11. 16. 22. 2 Sam. 16. 10 11. 24. 1. 1 Kings 11. 31 37. 12. 15 24. 2 Kings 9. 3. 10. 30. 1 Kings 22 23. Rev. 17. 17. 5 Gods efficacious permission of Sin 1 Sam. 2. 25. Job 12. 16 17 20. 6 Gods judicial hardening Sinners Psal 81. 12. 69. 22-27 Rom. 11. 10. Esa 6. 10. 29. 10. 19. 11 14. 44. 18 19. 60. 2. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Thess 2. 11. The nature of Judicial Induration in six Propositions 7 Gods ordering Sin for his glorie Exod. 9. 14-16 Rom. 9. 17 18. Prov. 16. 4. Rom. 9. 21 22. 1 Pet. 2. 8. HAving explicated the termes relating to and given the genuine state of our Hypothesis namely That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men to al their natural actions even such as have sin appendent to them we now procede to the Demonstration hereof And because al demonstration must be grounded on some first principes which give evidence firmitude and force thereto and there are no proper principes of Faith and Theologie but what are originally in the Scriptures we are therefore to begin our Demonstration with Scriptural Arguments which we shal reduce to these seven heads 1 Such Scriptures wherein it is universally affirmed that God is the first Cause of al natural actions and things and more particularly of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. 2 Such Scriptures as directly demonstrate That God doth predefine predetermine and foreordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed 3 Such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his People in such a way wherein they could not but contract guilt 4 Such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those acts whereunto sin is appendent 5 Such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious permission of some to sin 6 Such Scriptures as demonstrate Gods giving up some to judicial Occecation and Obduration 7 Such as clearly evince Gods ordering and disposing the Sins of men for his own Glorie § 1. We shal begin our Scriptural Demonstration with such Texts as universally affirme That God is the first cause of al natural Actions and Things and more particularly of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. 1. The Scriptures that speak God to be the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things are many and great we shal mention some as Esa 26. 12. Thou hast wrought al our works in us or for us This Text is urged by Strangius p. 54. to prove Gods immediate concurse to al actions of the creature though it doth in a more peculiar manner regard the deliverance of the Church wherein God predetermines and over-rules many actions of wicked men which have much sin annexed to them Again this universal prime Causalitie of God efficaciously influencing al natural Acts and Effects is apparently expressed Rom. 11. 36. For of him and through him and to him are althings Of him as he frames althings By him as he operates in and cooperates with althings and for him as the final cause of althings Thus Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 multiforme energie as Cyril stiles it reacheth al manner of Natural actions and effects and if so then surely such natural entitative Actions as have sin annexed to them Is there any sin so intrinsecally evil which has not some entitative act or subject as the substrate mater thereof And if althings are of God and by him and for him must not also the entitative act of sins intrinsecally evil be so Strangius p. 342. replies thus Al that God workes must tend to his Glorie But what Glorie redounds to God from those Actions of hatred of God blasphemie c. A strange replie indeed for a Divine to make 1 Was there not much Hatred of God and Blasphemie in the crucifying of Christ And yet was there any action more conducing to the glorie of God than this Yea 2 Doth not Strangius himself and those of his partie grant that God directs disposeth and over-rules al sinful acts even such as are intrinsecally evil so as that they conduce to his glorie And how can God direct dispose and over-rule them unless he concur yea predetermine the Wil to the entitative act Again Strangius p. 561. answers to this Text thus None that is orthodoxe ever extended these words to sins as if sins were of God by God and for him c. 1 Neither do we extend these words to sins formally considered 2 But must we thence necessarily conclude that the entitative act whereto sin is only accidentally appendent is not from God nor by him nor for him Yea 3 May we not say with Divines that sin formally considered although it be not of God and by him as an Efficient yet it is for him i. e. conducing to his Glorie as wisely ordered and over-ruled contrary to the intent of the sinner Thus much Augustin once and again inculcates as De Genes ad liter lib. Imperfecto cap. 5. For God is not the Author of our sins yet he is the Ordinator of them c. And thus much indeed Strangius p. 860. confesseth Another Text that evidently and invincibly demonstrates Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to al natural as wel as supernatural Actions and Effects is Ephes 1. 11. Who worketh althings after the counsel of his own wil. We find three particulars in this Texte which greatly conduce to explicate and demonstrate Gods efficacious Concurse to al
quarrel about termes without just ground and therefore can easily admit this distinction though it make neither for nor against either party But that which more immediately concerns our present controversie is 1. To give the true Idea and Notion of Immediate Concurse as generally asserted and stated in the Scholes which we shal endeavour to explicate both negatively and positively 1 Negatively Immediate concurse to an Act consistes not in the preservation of the principe or rendring of it apt and habile for any congenerous action I know a learned and pious Divine who seems in termes to grant immediate Concurse as to the substrate mater of sinful actions yet in the close placeth it only in this That God as the first Mover so far excite and actuate those powers as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action to which they have a natural designation and whereunto they are not sinfully disinclined But al this as I conceive no way reacheth the true notion of Immediate concurse neither is it consistent with it self For 1 If God as the first mover excite and actuate those powers then are they necessarily by him drawn or applied to act which is more than being apt and habile for any congenerous action certainly to excite and actuate a power is more than to render it apt and habile for an action 2 If the Powers by Gods exciting of them are rendred only apt and habile for any congenerous action then where is immediate concurse as to the Act Did or would any terme this immediate concurse so far to excite and actuate those powers as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous Action 3 What this Aptitude and Habilitie is which the Powers receive by being thus excited and actuated by God I cannot divine Are not the powers of the soul as powers apt and habile for natural actions such as the substrate mater of sin is What other Aptitude or Habilitie doth God give unto the natural faculties as to sinful acts but merely the facultie of acting Need sinners any other facultie power Aptitude or Habilitie to sin but the rational faculties depraved It 's true God applies those faculties to the entitative act of that which is sinful but yet doth not adde any aptitude or habilitie to sin 4 Doth not Durandus and his Sectators grant al this and yet denie immediate concurse as to the entitative act of sin The Hypothesis of Durandus doth no way exclude any kind of Aptitude or Habilitie but rather include the same it only excludes the immediate application of the power to its act which also is excluded by this laxe notion of Immediate concurse 5 Lastly if they who oppose Gods concurse to the substrate mater of al sinful acts do indeed and in truth assert and owne an immediate concurse to any one entitative act that is sinful al those black and direful consequences which they cast on the assertors of Predetermination may with as much facilitie be retorted on them as we shal demonstrate chap. 5. § 4. Hence 2 Affirmatively Immediate concurse as to its formal Idea not only gives an Aptitude or Habilitie to act but also immediately produceth the very act it self That this notion of immediate concurse is universally received in the Scholes is most evident I shal desire the Reader to consult our Countrey-man Compton Carleton a learned and acute Jesuite who had his first education in Cambridge and is more moderate than most of that faction He saith Philosoph Disput 28. de Causa prima Sect. 3. p. 319. God therefore concurs with al his Creatures immediately to al their actions not only by the Immediation of Virtue but also of Supposite i. e. that action whereby the creature operates doth also flow immediately from God himself and not from any other substituted in his place A clear explication of Immediate concurse so far as it regards its Immediation Whence Disput 29. Sect. 2. he determines thus touching Gods Immediate concurse to the act of Sin We must say therefore that God doth physically and immediately concur to the act of sin together with the create Wil. And he confirmes this Hypothesis by Arguments out of Aquinas Suarez Vasques Anselme Tanner Zumel Montesinus Mulderus Arriaga and Oviedo So that this notion of Immediate concurse seems to have been generally entertained by al parties both Thomists Scotists and Jesuites as that which is most rational and self-evidencing 2. But the principal point in controversie is touching the Efficacitie and Predetermination of Divine Concurse wherein the Jesuites and Arminians oppose the Dominicans and Calvinists I must confess when I first undertook the explication of Divine Concurse specially as to the substrate mater of Sin I studiosely avoided the terme Predetermination although it be frequently fathered on me as is intimated Court Gentiles P. 4. B. 2. c. 11. § 7. partly to avoid needless countests about words and partly because I would not professedly espouse the interest of any one Sect but adhere to Scriptural termes but since upon a more accurate inquiry finding the terme expressely laid down in Scripture and that as to the very mater in controversie touching Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin I see no reason why we may not make use of it notwithstanding the prejudices some endeavor to load it with Therefore for the more ful explication of this terme I shal endeavor to shew 1 What efficacious concurse notes and 2 How this efficacious concurse may be termed Predeterminative 1. Divine Concurse is termed efficacious as it doth most potently and invincibly produce its effect The Grecanic terme whereby the efficacitie of Divine Concurse is expressed in the Scriptures is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 efficacitie or energie which notes the puissant force of any operation So Ephes 1. 19. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 acccording to the energie or efficacious working of the might of his power Here is 1 Power or force 2 Might of power or most potent power and 3 The efficacious working of this most potent power Which note the puissant efficacitie of divine concurse Thence the Syriac renders it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the efficace So Ephes 3. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the energie or efficace of his power The like Phil. 3. 21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the efficacious working whereby he is able even to subdue althings unto himself So Col. 1. 29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to his efficacious working which worketh in me mightily In al these Texts we have mighty power yea omnipotence joined with the efficace of divine Concurse which demonstrates its invincible manner of working in the production of al its effects So that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies Gods intime presence with al second Causes and efficacious concurring with and actuating of them in al their operations The like import may be applied to its conjugate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which notes to effect any thing in the most efficacious manner so as to overcome al resistence made against the force of the Agent So 1 Cor. 12. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who efficaciously worketh althings The like v. 11. of which hereafter This efficacious concurse as it cooperates with the second cause is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cooperation or concurse and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cooperate So Mark 16. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Lord cooperating or efficaciously concurring So elsewhere that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as applied to God notes his actuose efficacious and predeterminative concurse in and with althings is evident from the use of the word both in sacred and profane Authors So with Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work readily It 's rendred by the Syriac sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work as 1 Cor. 12. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where it notes not only an universal general concurse but a particular present certain efficacious force or efficacitie of Divine Concurse exerting it self in al individual acts and effects Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is rendred by the Syriac Rom. 7. 5. and 2 Cor. 4. 12. by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work to act with diligence to be efficacious as Boderianus And 1 Cor. 12. 11. it is rendred by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to act to work to perform to effect as Boderianus Lastly it is rendred by the Syriac Ephes 1. 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who hath efficaciously wrought althings Which sufficiently demonstrates the predetermination of Gods concurse as to al second causes and acts Hence 2. This efficacious Concurse as it determines and applies the second cause to act is both in sacred Scripture and by scholastic Theologues termed Determinative and Predeterminative We find both these termes in Scripture applied to Divine Concurse Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a terme or limit 1 primarily and properly signifies to termine set bounds or limits to any cause effect or thing So Acts 17. 26. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation i. e. God has determined or predetermined to every Man Nation and Kingdome their fixed termes of duration and life So Arrian Epictet lib. 1. cap. 12. speaking of God he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And Virgils Song is remarquable Stat sua cuique dies Every ones day stands fixed or determined which Servius understands of the fixed determined period of human life So that we see that not only sacred Philosophie but the very Pagans by their dim light asserted a fixed period of Divine life as determined by God albeit some that professe themselves Christians denie the same Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the bounds or the position of termes for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the position of termes or limits to any cause action effect or thing God by his eternal Decree has predetermined or set termes and limits to al second causes their actions effects and events there is nothing so contingent in nature but it is predetermined by the Divine wil. We find the Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 applied to times and places as wel as to causes and acts So Heb. 4. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines or limits a day Thence in the Glossarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a stated or determined day and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I termine or limit as to place Whence Hesychius makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines to be the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he gives terme or limit Thence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the LXX answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to termine determine or constitute termes to any place or thing Num. 34. 6. Josh 13. 27. 15. 11. also to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be bounded or determined Whence lastly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies a definition which is the terme or boundary of an essence according to Cicero who renders it the circumscription of a thing 2 From this primary notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 follows a secondary namely to decree destine to a certain end predestine predetermine In which sense it signifies the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to predetermine and so it is transferred to predestination predetermination or the decree and purpose of the Divine wil even about the substrate mater or entitative act of sin as Luke 22. 22. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it was determined or predetermined decreed Our Lord speaks of his Crucifixion which was the greatest of sins and intrinsecally evil and yet lo as to the substrate mater or entitative act predetermined and decreed by God The same Acts. 2. 23. Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by that defined determined or predetermined counsel of which more Chap. 3. § 2. Hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to decree deliberate determine is expounded by Theodotion Job 22. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And Hesychius makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which when applied to the Divine wil note predefinition and predetermination As the simple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so also the composite 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to predestine or predetermine is used six times in the N. T. 1 of things appertaining to salvation 1 Cor. 2. 7. 2 of persons elect Rom. 8. 29 30. Eph. 1. 5 11. 3 of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin yea that which was intrinsecally evil So Act. 4. 28. For to do whatsoever thine hand and thy counsel determined before or predetermined to be done For so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may more properly be rendred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily signifies to predefine predestine predetermine to set limits bounds termes to persons or things Thence as to this present text and point when it is said here that those who crucified Christ did what Gods hand and counsel predetermined to be done it must be understood of the substrate mater or entitative act which was predetermined by God as in what follows Chap. 3. § 2. The Syriac version interprets 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to seal constitute or make firm any thing which is rendred by the LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to order dispose constitute institute The Divine Wil and Decree gives order constitution limitation determination yea predetermination to althings al persons and things times and places ends and means receive termes limits destination and predetermination from the Divine Wil and Decree Hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the N. T. is made synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to foreknow 1 Pet. 1. 20. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to preordain Act. 17. 26. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to propose or purpose Rom.
much malice murder and hatred of God and his People annexed Yea God did not only send Nebuchadnezar to afflict Israel but also give him a reward for his service as Jerem. 27. 6. And now have I given al these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezar the King of Babylon my servant God gives him the neighbor Nations as a reward for his service against Israel The like Jer. 43. 10. Multitudes of Texts might be added to shew how God makes use of wicked Instruments in the punishment of his sinful people and in a providential way efficaciously concurs to and predetermines al their actions materially and naturally considered and yet is no way the Cause or Author of their sin 2. To mention one or two Scriptures which speak of Gods using wicked Instruments in afflicting his innocent People So Job 1. God makes use of the Sabeans and Caldeans yea of Satan himself to afflict Job and yet he saith v. 21. The Lord taketh away He saw by faith Gods hand moving yea predetermining the hearts and hands of his adversaries to every act of theirs materially considered albeit not to the vitiositie So Psal 105. 25. He turned their heart to hate his people to deal subtilely with his servants Here it 's said expressely that God turned i. e. efficaciously moved and predetermined the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his People Israel God's turning their hearts doth expressely and formally denote his efficacious predeterminative concurse to the entitative material natural act of hatred albeit not to the vitiositie and malignitie thereof So much also the next clause importes and to deal subtilely with his servants i. e. al their subtile strategems machinations and politic contrivements for the extirpation of Israel by putting to death their Males oppressing them with hard labors c. al these were as to their substrate mater and physic entitative acts from God who turned their hearts thereto And what could be more nakedly and evidently said to demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Let us now see what our Opponents replie to these Scriptures and our Arguments drawen thence Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 791. evades the force of this last Text thus What is said Psal 105. 25. that God turned their hearts to hate his people it must be understood that God did it not by perverting the hearts of the Egyptians but by doing good to his people whence the Egyptians took occasion of hatred 1 We say not that God perverted the hearts of the Egyptians that 's the commun odiose consequence which our Adversaries impose on us But 2 We avouch that God did more than give occasion to the Egyptians of hating by his doing good to his people Is not this a strange Comment God turned their heart to hate his people i. e. gave occasion of hatred by doing good unto his people Doth not Gods turning the heart in Scripture Phraseologie always import his efficaâ—… predeterminative concurse in applying the wil to its act 〈◊〉 it 's said Prov. 21. 1. God turneth the heart whithersoever he wâ—… is it not meant of an efficacious concurse Do not also the following words Psal 105. 25. to deal subtilely with his servants clearly implie an efficacious act of God upon their hearts predetermining them to their act Certainly such Comments are very poor evasions to elude such clear Texts As for the other Texts Strangius's general answer p. 774 775. is That God is the Cause of the act in those sins but not of the pravitie of the Instruments c. And what do we say or desire more But yet there lies a sting in this very concession of his for he addes p. 774. That God hath decreed nothing by his Wil of good pleasure but what he approves as Good i. e. God hath not absolutely decreed to permit sin because he doth not approve of it Wherein note 1 How he doth with the Pelagians and Arminians confound Gods Decretive Wil with his Approbative complacential Wil. 2 We denie not but God approves of al his own Acts but the Question is touching objects Whether God approves of al objects which by his Decretive Wil he decrees to permit This we peremptorily denie and no way dout but to make good our denial in its place § 4. Another Head of Arguments contains such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those Acts whereunto sin is appendent We begin with 2 Sam. 12. 11. where God tels David by Nathan that for his folie committed with Vriah's wife and murder Behold I wil raise up evil against thee out of thine own house and I wil take thy wives before thine eyes and give them unto thy neighbour c. This threat we find fulfilled 2 Sam. 16. 22. And Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of al Israel What could be more plainly and distinctly expressed to demonstrate Gods immediate concurse to that entitative act of Absalom's Sin Here Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 789. acknowledgeth 1 That Absalom's Incest in violating his fathers bed is by God owned as his own Fact But 2 then he answers that this was acknowledged for the reason above-mentioned namely by reason of Gods efficacious Gubernation Moderation and Direction which he afforded according to the modes already explicated about the sinful Wils of Absalom and Achitophel and their actions in this wickedness which fact is related 2 Sam. 16. 20 c. For this is usual that the effect which ariseth from two causes whereof the one is effective and the other directive be ascribed to both but in a different respect c. This is the commun answer which he and his Sectators give to such Scriptures which speake Gods immediate hand in the entitative acts of sin let us therefore a little examine the force of this answer 1 Take notice that he allows Gods Gubernation Moderation and Direction of the Act whereto sin is annexed but not the production of the act This is evident by the Conclusion wherein he makes the Sinner to be the effective cause but God the directive only But I replie how can God efficaciously Govern Moderate and Direct the Act unless he be also the effective Cause thereof Take his own instance the sinful wils of Absalom and Achitophel how is it possible that God should efficaciously govern and direct those immanent acts of their sinful wils but by influencing their wils and efficaciously predetermining them to act If God did as he grants efficaciously govern moderate and direct their sinful wils in those immanent acts of Lust certainly he must necessarily produce those acts 2 Neither wil this answer at al solve the Difficultie for suppose we grant that God doth only efficaciously govern moderate and direct the sinful act not produce the entitative mater thereof yet this efficacious directive influence doth as much make God the Author of sin as our effective predeterminative concurse For Gods
of punishment so it 's necessary that the prescience of every sin be presupposed in the eternal purpose of God of damning and inflicting punishment whether temporal or eternal 4 That the particle Quia Because here used doth not alwayes denote a proper cause but a reason of consequence which may be taken from the effect and other arguments besides the cause c. Strangius here raiseth a great deal of dust to blind our eyes from beholding the Meridian light of this Text but to answer briefly 1 We say that his first answer smells too rankly of Pelagianisme in that it makes the sins of men the cause of the Divine Wil The Sons of Eli were not for their flagitiose Impieties destined by God to ruine as if their flagitiose Impieties were causative of and influential on Divine destination but the Soverain God destined by an absolute decree to leave them to those flagitiose sins and for them to destroy them What are the dangerous consequents of such a conditional Reprobation we intend more fully to shew hereafter c. 5. § 3. 2 That the Death here intended and inflicted was only temporal is too crude a notion for a Divine instructed in the knowledge of divine wrath Yea Strangius confesseth that they merited eternal wrath and how then could they be exemted from it who had rejected the Merits of their Messias 3 What he addes touching the prescience of every sin to be presupposed in Gods eternal purpose of damning men has a tincture also of rank Pelagianisme for if the prescience or prevision of actual sins yea of final Impenitence be that which moves the divine Wil to decree the Damnation of men then it wil by a paritie of reason necessarily follow that the prescience or prevision of mens Faith and final Perseverance is that which moves the divine Wil to elect men for if Reprobation be conditional Election must be so also as our Divines on Scripture-reason strongly demonstrate Davenant in his Animadvers against Hoard invictly proves p. 226. and elsewhere That Decrees purely conditional are very much unbecoming the Divine Wil. But of this more in what follows c. 5. § 3. 4 As for the Particle Quia Because 1 We grant that it doth not alwayes denote a proper Cause but a reason of Consequence and that taken sometimes from the effect But 2 that it cannot denote a reason of Consequence taken from the Effect in this Text is most evident because Gods Wil to slay them was not the effect of their disobedience but their disobedience was the consequent of Gods wil to slay them 3 Take notice that we do not say that Gods wil was the cause of their disobedience or ruine but only that the later was the consequent of the former God in his most soverain wise and efficacious purpose decreed to leave the sons of Eli to such flagitiose sins as should prove the cause of their ruine both temporal and eternal and hereupon their sin and ruine followed as Darknesse is the consequent of the Suns retirement into the inferior Hemisphere Again Gods efficacious permissive wil about sin may be demonstrated from Job 12. 16. The deceiver and deceived are his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 His or unto him is the deceiver and the deceived i. e. he doth in just judgement permit men to deceive and to be deceived as Vatablus on this Text. Which Mercer thus more fully explicates I understand this not only of false Worship but also of al errors that are committed every where although more specially in Polities and Cities to be governed where God stirs up some who draw others into error that they might follow their fallacious counsel and enter on a perniciose course for their own dammage God therefore impels and draws some into error not that the Lord is the Author of Error or Sin but that their sin and defection from God leads them thereto God not only merely permitting but also ordaining c. Whence it 's added v. 17. He leadeth counsellers away spoiled and maketh the Judges fools spoiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. of their wisdom and counsel as it follows So it 's taken Psal 76. 6. The valiant are spoiled of their heart i. e. deprived of their courage And maketh the Judges fools 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 infatuat or ad insaniam adigit as Mercer He infatuates them Again v. 20. He removeth away the speech of the trusty and taketh away the understanding of the aged 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Judgement Discretion Counsel Prudence Sense Hebr. the savor or experimental tast So v. 24. He taketh away the heart of the chief of the People of the earth and causeth them to wander in a Wildernesse where there is no way The like Deut. 28. 28. and Esa 19. 11 12 13 14. Now let us see what answer Strangius l. 4. c. 9. p. 836. gives hereto It must be observed saith he that Job in this Chapter doth in an illustrious manner discourse of Gods Providence so ordering things that nothing comes to pass casually or fortuitously nothing without his destinated counsel that nothing is done but what he wils either by permitting that it be done or by doing of it as August Enchirid. c. 95. so that God doth effect and procure whatever things are good and also wisely foreknowing the future event doth permit sins which he directs to good ends ordained by him Deservedly therefore Job among other things observes that it is from Divine Providence that some erre and draw others into error and that both as to maters of Religion and in other maters of this life not that is he the Author of seduction and errors but because God for the contemt and abuse of his light delivers them destitute thereof into a mind void of judgement and presenting objects and occasions opens a way wherein they wander c. Though this Paraphrase be far short of the mind of the Text yet there is enough in it to confirme our Hypothesis and subvert his own Antithesis For 1 he grants That nothing happens casually without Gods destinated counsel according to that of Augustin That nothing is done but what God wils c. Now certainly Gods destinated counsel or determined wil is most efficacious and irresistible so that if the permission of sin be from Gods destinated counsel it must be also determined by his efficacious wil. 2 He grants that God wisely foreknows al future events even the sins of men and how this can be without the efficacious predetermination of his own wil to permit the same neither Strangius himself nor any of his sectators could ever yet make out 3 He grants also That God directs those aberrations and sins to good ends appointed by him And how can God direct the immanent aberrations of the mind but by an efficacious predetermination of the substrate acts and permission of the vitiositie 4 He yet further grants That God delivers them unto a mind void of judgement
and what do we say more Doth not this evidently denote an active efficacious permission of sin But then 5 his last clause presenting objects and occasions c. overthrows al his former concessions for the wise God doth not only present objects and occasions and thereby open a way to mens infatuation but he also predetermines the mind to the entitative act and efficaciously permits the vitiositie without the least finger in the sin There are other Scriptures which demonstratively prove Gods efficacious permission of sin as Esa 63. 17. O Lord why hast thou made us erre from thy ways and hardened our hearts from thy fear Strangius pag. 839. grants that the Verbe in both Members being in Hiphil oft notes a double action as when we say That one makes another to do a thing though he pretends that sometimes it only notes a permission of the action But it is certain that it cannot here denote a mere naked permission but such as procedes from the efficacious wil of God The like Jer. 20. 7. O Lord thou hast deceived me and I was deceived Whereto answers Ezech. 14. 9. And if the Prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing I the Lord have deceived that Prophet Which Texts speak certainly more than a mere idle speculative permission namely such as resultes from the active efficacious directive and ordinative wil of God as Strangius lib. 4. cap. 9. pag. 840 844. grants What this permission of God is and how far it extendes see what follows Chap. 5. § 6. § 6. Let us now passe on to such Scriptures as mention Gods tradition or giving up some to judicial excecation and induration or hardnesse of heart which wil give a more evident demonstration of Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin Not to insiste on Gods hardening Pharaohs heart Exod. 4. 21. which has been already solidly and demonstratively explicated by a judicious Divine in his Letter to a Friend c. pag. 28 30. I shal begin with Psal 81. 12. So I gave them up to their own hearts lusts or to the hardnesse of their own hearts as Kimhi Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and I sent them away in the depraved cogitation of their heart LXX render it Deut. 29. 19. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Jer. 3. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whence it follows and they walked in their own counsels 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in their own depraved imaginations It 's just with God to give up men to that spirit of hardnesse which they affect his way of hardening is mysterious and invisible he delivers sinners up to the bent of their own lusts and then lets them enjoy what they lust after when men adde acquired hardnesse to natural God justly inflicts on them judicial hardnesse And oh how righteous is it with God judicially to harden such as sinfully yea voluntarily harden themselves And then the heart which is an Adamant towards God and things spiritual is as wax towards sin and Satans tentations And what is the effect of this judicial hardnesse but to seal up sinners from the darknesse of mind to the darknesse of Hel Thus God albeit he be not the Author of sin yet is the Orderer of it and the cause of the substrate act unto which sin is annexed The like Psal 69. 22. Let their eyes be darkened that they see not and make their loins continually to shake Let their eyes i. e. their minds be darkened 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be made so obscure and dark as that they may not see their way let al true wisdome be taken from them and make their loins continually to shake i. e. take from them al force vigor and abilitie of acting as they ought let them stagger and reel like to a drunken man The shaking of the loins argues imbecillitie and want of force which is chiefly seated in the loins Thus he procedes and then vers 17. brings Divine wrath to a black conclusion Adde iniquitie to their iniquitie c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which implies that God addes the punishment of judicial hardnesse to the iniquitie of their voluntary acquired hardnesse We find this piece of judicial hardnesse cited by Paul Rom. 11. 10. Let their eyes be darkened that they may not see and bow down their back alway The Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is here rendred by Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bow down the sense being the same for the bowing down of the back argues the defect of strength in the loins To these Texts we may adde Esa 6. 10. Make the heart of this people fat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 make the heart fat or grosse i. e. stupid and senselesse for the fat of animals has little sense It alludes to the heart in the animate bodie overgrowen and oppressed with fat These words are six times repeted in the N. T. Whence it follows and shut their eyes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is rendred by some dim them or make them dim by others daub them as with plaister or other like mater by others close them al which notes the efficacitie of error and blindnesse that follows on judicial hardnesse The like curse we find Esa 29. 10. For the Lord hath poured out upon you the spirit of deep sleep and hath closed your eyes LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is rendred by Aquila 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and by Theodotion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Act. 10. 11. notes a deep sleep or ecstasie and the radix 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to overwhelme with deep sleep and it 's rendred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dan. 10. 9. So that by the spirit of deep sleep must be understood such a stupor of spirit as leaves men without al sense The allusion is to some soporiferous stupifying wine or potion or medicine which being given to a man or sprinkled on him casts him into a deep sleep Hence the Prophet ushers in these words with a direful exclamation vers 9. Stay your selves and wonder they are drunken but not with wine c. i. e. the Lord hath made them drunken with a soporiferous stupifying potion As for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it is not derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to pricke Act. 2. 27. but from the ancient word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The simple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being put for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which also remains among the Latins as nuo nutus nutare Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies to nod or shake the head as they are wont to do who have drunk any stupifying potion So that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is such a spirituose stupifying potion as deprives men of their senses makes them shake the head stagger and reel as drunken men Thence it follows and hath closed your eyes When God judicially pours out a
The Decree of Reprobation is not the proper efficient or formal cause of the Sinners Induration or Condemnation but his own wilful obstinacie This sufficiently clears the Sanctitie and Justice of God 2. Prop. Yet supposing the Decree of Reprobation the sinners Induration or Hardnesse follows infallibly and in some sense necessarily i. e. by a modal hypothetic necessitie not brutish or coactive such as should destroy Libertie The holy God doth not infuse hardnesse or by any compulsion hurrie men into it but leaves them to the swinge of their own lusts which violently hurrie them into such courses as necessarily harden This also cleareth Gods Justice from the imputation of sin 3. Prop. Gods Providence in Judicial excecation and Induration is very efficacious and illustrious 1 God leaves men to the Blandishments Allurements and Ensnarements of an heart-bewitching world which insensibly harden 2 He delivers up men to the power of Satan the God of this world whose subjects and vassals they willingly become 2 Cor. 4. 3 4. and so are taken alive captive at his wil 2 Tim. 2. 26. 3 God so disposeth and orders al his Providences as that they do al accidentally by reason of mens lusts conspire to harden them Mercies become Curses to them Rom. 11. 9 10 11. Yea 4 The very means of Grace become the means of their hardening their Food and Physic become Poyson to them 2 Cor. 2. 16. Esa 28. 12 13 14 15. 5 Christ himself the chief Corner-stone of salvation becomes to them a stone of stumbling and offence Esa 8. 14. a stone of stumbling 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of smiting such as lying in the way the foot may smite against and thence stumble and receive hurt It answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 scandal in the New Testament Thence it follows and for a rock of offence Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not a bare Stumbling-stone or block such as a man may make a shift to avoid or get over or if he stumble yet recover himself again but he is a rock of offence which notes 1 The Offence to be inevitable and unavoidable as the removing of a rock 2 The ruine to be certain as that of a Ship falling on a rock Whence he addes for a gin and for a snare such as men should neither by power wit or craft escape Whence it follows v. 15. And many among them shal stumble and fal and be broken and be snared and be taken The like Rom. 9. 33. 6 God puts a period to the day of Grace and leaves men to the plague of their own heart Esa 22. 14. Surely this iniquitie shal not be purged from you til you die Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If this iniquitie be purged It is the concise forme of an Oath frequently used in Scripture as Chap. 5. 18. whereby God sweareth that their iniquitie should not be purged So Luke 19. 41 42. Heb. 3. 7. 7 God doth positively yea efficaciously concur to al that is positive material entitative and natural in judicial hardnesse without the least hand in the obliquitie or vitiositie 4. Prop. The suspension of restraining Grace in Judicial excecation is not properly a privation of any Grace due to the Creature but a negation or withdrawment of undeserved and abused Grace For the clearing whereof we are to consider the difference between Man and God in this particular No meer man may or ought to permit or deliver up another to sin or hardnesse if it be in his power to hinder 1 Because al men are under a Law and obligation of subjection to their Creator whereby they are obliged to promove his Glorie and prevent sin and rebellion against him the most they can 2 Because al men are under a communion of Natures and therefore bound to afford assistance each to other so far as they may for their natural and moral good But now the soverain Creator of man is under no such obligation and therefore may as he please dispose of his own grace or suspend it specially when abused by sinners 5. Prop. God doth not deliver up men to judicial hardnesse simply as hardnesse under that reduplication but penally as it conduceth to the vindication of his Justice For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we are to remember that there is nothing in the world of itself purely and simply evil for if there were any pure and chiefest evil in the world then God who is the chiefest good could not wil it but the greatest evil has something of good mixed with it and this God wils Thus in judicial hardnesse there is a penal vindictive good which God wils for the illustration of his Justice 6. Prop. In judicial hardnesse that which is morally evil in regard of man and his transgression is naturally good in regard of God and his Providence For albeit God doth concur with the sinner who is deficient as to his dutie yet God is no way deficient 1 Al moral evil of sin is only such to him whose it is or to whom it doth belong as the Author thereof by virtue of some Law he offends against But now this judicial hardnesse or sin doth not belong to God as the proper Owner or Author of it but only to the sinner neither doth the holy God offend against any Law 2 The specific qualitie of an effect is not to be ascribed to the universal first cause but to the second particular cause from which it receives specification 3 The sinner is only the moral cause of his own hardnesse because he is the meritorious cause thereof and also a voluntary yea wilful Agent therein Al his hardnesse is voluntarily contracted albeit judicially inflicted by God he suffers his heart voluntarily to be defloured by sinful objects God threatens to suspend his Divine influence and the obstinate sinner cries Content Satan comes and blinds his eyes and he hugges him for it So that the whole deficience or moral causalitie is on the sinners part not on Gods The sinner wants Divine influence and is willing yea glad to want it therefore his depraved wil is the sole formal vital subjective and moral efficient cause of his own hardnesse and sin § 7. We come in the last place to such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious ordering disposing and directing the sins of men unto his own glorie which evidently demonstrates his immediate concurse and predetermination to the substrate mater or entitative act thereof Thus Exod. 9. 14 15 16. God threatens Pharaoh vers 14. to send al his plagues on his heart i. e. in a way of judicial excecation and induration And why That thou mayst know there is none like me in al the earth i. e. that I may magnifie my vindictive Justice and Power on thee Whence he addes v. 15. For now I wil stretch out mine hand that I may smite thee and thy people with pestilence and thou shalt be cut off from the earth It runs in the
and the Scotists placing the whole of it in the volition of God without any force impressed on the second cause as our Country-man Compt. Carleton in his Philosophie Disp 30. Sect. 1. pag. 327. has incomparably wel stated it But 3 Scotus in 4. Sentent Distinct 49. Quaest 6. § 14. pag. 522. edit 1620. has these very words Est contra naturam ejus scil voluntatis determinari à causa inferiori quia tunc ipsa non esset superior non est autem contra naturam ejus determinari à causa superiori quia cum hoc stat quòd sit causa in suo ordine It 's against its nature namely the wils to be determined by an inferior cause because then it should not be superior but it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause because it is consistent herewith that it be a cause in its own order Wherein Scotus doth most acutely though briefly state the Controversie about Predetermination both negatively and positively 1 Negatively That the wil cannot be determined or predetermined by any inferior cause because then it were not superior for whatever cause predetermines another to act is so far superior to it it being impossible yea a contradiction that the inferior should predetermine the superior 2 Positively That it is not against the nature of the wil to be predetermined by a superior cause i. e. by God the first cause who gave it being and therefore may without violence to its libertie determine or predetermine it in its operation and Scotus's reason is invincible because to be predetermined by a superior cause is very wel consistent with the wils being a cause in its own order Yea we may raise this reason to a greater height therefore the wil is a cause in its own order i. e. a particular proper principal or lesse principal cause according to the nature of its causalitie and effect because it is predetermined to act by God the superior first Cause so that Gods predeterminative concurse to the actions of the wil even such as have sin appendent to them is according to Scotus's sentiments so far from infringing or diminishing the wils natural order and libertie in acting as that it corroborates and confirmes the same 4 Lastly Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. q. 2. saith expressely That albeit God determine the wil to the material act which is sinful yet the vitiositie of sin is not to be attributed to God but to the create wil because the create wil is under an essential obligation to give rectitude to the action but God is not bound by any such obligation c. Which is the same with the sentiments of Zuinglius and our reformed Divines albeit opposed by the new Methodists as wel as Arminians and Molinists Having laid down the concurrent testimonies of the two principal Heads of the Scholes Thomas and Scotus we now passe on to their sectators whereof we shal give the mention but of a few more illustrious To begin with Gregorius Ariminensis who was by profession a Dominican and great defendent of Augustin's Doctrine whom Bishop Vsher valued as the soundest of the Schole-men and Dr. Barlow as the acutest His invict demonstration of our Hypothesis we find in Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. where he demonstrates Gods immediate efficience in producing the entitative act of sin thus 1 Every evil act when produced is conserved by God Ergo. The antecedent he proves thus because otherwise every evil act should not in its existence immediately depend on God but be independent and so by stronger reason the wil itself which is more perfect than its act should be independent Again if it be not repugnant to the Divine Bonitie to conserve the evil act neither is it repugnant to it to produce the same 2 The wil is of itself indifferent to any act therefore it must be determined to every act by God 3 If God be not the immediate cause of the act which is evil he is not the Maker of al Beings 4 Al good that is not God is from God as the Efficient thereof but the act morally evil is yet naturally good Ergo. Hence he procedes to answer the Objections of his and our Adversaries thus 1 If God produce the same evil act which man produceth then he sins as man sins Whereto he answers by denying the consequence and that on this reason because man doth not therefore precisely sin because he doth an evil act as it is Ens or act but therefore he sins because he doth it evilly i. e. against right reason or the Law of God but now God produceth the same act according to right reason and therefore wel So the same man borne in fornication is produced by God wel but by the fornicator evilly But 2 it is farther objected by his Adversaries then as by ours now thus Thou wilt say that those things that are per se in themselves or intrinsecally evil as the hatred of God or the like can never be wel done therefore neither by God I responde saith he as we that there is or can be no entitie which may not be wel done albeit not by every Agent e. g. man envieth but God although he produce the same act of envie with man yet he doth not envie For al such acts beyond the simple production or motion of such or such a thing do connote something on the part of the Author who is so denominated which agrees not to God So to steal besides the simple translation of the thing from place to place connotes the thing stolne not to belong to him that translated it but God translating the same thing doth not translate what is not his own and therefore is not said to be the thief c. But here we are to note that whereas Gregorius Ariminensis makes God to be a partial cause of sin it is not to be understood as if God were the partial cause of the entitative act for so he makes God to be a total cause but he cals God a partial cause of sin as he produceth only the entitative act not the vitiositie whereof man only is the moral cause Thus also Holcot our Country-man super Sentent lib. 2. Dist 1. q. 1. makes God to be a partial cause of sin yet not the Author of it whereby he plainly means as he explicates himself that God is the physical cause of the substrate mater or entitative act only but man the moral cause of the vitiositie also This I mention because a reverend Divine of name among us from these expressions of Ariminensis and Holcot would persuade us that they make God the partial cause of the entitative act We might adde to these the testimonies of Altissiodorensis in Sent. 2. where he proves by strong arguments namely from the Passion of Christ c. That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil of which more in
concurse to the entitative act of sin for as it is granted by Strangius and others efficacious predetermination always follows as a necessary consequent of absolute predefinition if God absolutely decrees to leave men to sin it necessarily follows that he efficaciously determine men to the entitative act of sin 3 He goes higher than most of our Divines dare do in this point in asserting cap. 5. pag. 424. That damnation excecation obduration are the effects of Reprobation But yet cap. 7. pag. 427. he answers the objection of such that argue hence That God lies in wait to destroy such as are reprobated assuring us that the sinner only is the culpable criminal cause of his own damnation And cap. 10. pag. 433. he demonstrates That Reprobates are not created unto damnation i. e. damnation as such is not the end of their creation which sufficiently vindicates the holy God from being the cause of their sin or damnation As for the Jansenists that they are of the same persuasion with the Dominicans as touching our Hypothesis is evident from their concessions to the Jesuites in their Treatie begun Febr. 18. 1663. mentioned in the Refutation of Pere Ferrier Chap. 6. also Idea of Jansenisme pag. 82. The sum was this The Bishop of Comenge a friend of the Jansenists proposed this as an expedient to reconcile the two Parties That the Jansenists declare that they had no other sentiment about this mater but what was taught by the Thomists And because some of the Thomists flie higher than others the Jesuites demanded That the Jansenists should reduce themselves to the forme of speech used by Alvarez So that it seems the Jansenists in the point of efficacious Concurse are looked on by the Jesuites as indeed they are as those that went beyond the very Dominicans The Jansenists replied That the doctrine of Jansenius was not different from that of the Thomists albeit it was not his designe to render himself conforme to them but to Augustin And the true reason why the Jansenists do not maintain greater correspondence with the Dominicans is not their difference in doctrine but because many of the Dominicans have by a Spirit of Cabal or of Faction joined with the Jesuites Lastly that our Hypothesis touching Gods efficacious Concurse to al actions even to such as have sin appendent to them was generally owned not only by single Sects or Parties but by the generalitie of the Roman Church before the rise of the Jesuites is evident from the Doctrine of the Roman Catechisme published by the command of the Council of Trent where in the explication of the Apostles Creed about the end of the first Article par 1. cap. 2. § 20. pag. 23. edit 1619. we find this great testimonie to confirme our Hypothesis God doth not only preserve and administrate althings that are by his providence but also doth by an intime virtue impel those things that are moved and do act any thing to motion and action so that albeit he doth not impede the efficience of second causes yet he prevents them in as much as his most secret force reacheth unto althings and as the Wise-man testifies Wisd 8. 1. He reacheth from one end to another mightily and sweetly doth order althings Wherefore it is said by the Apostle Act. 17. 21. For in him we live and move and have our being What could have been said more clearly and fully for the asserting a predeterminative Concurse to al actions and motions of the creature even such as have sin annexed to them And by whom is this Doctrine taught By the Council of Trent which is the standard and measure of the Roman Faith and no great friend to the Doctrine of Christ Is it not strange then that Reformed Divines yea such as would be accounted Calvinists cannot allow the efficacious Concurse of God so much as Trent-Papists allow § 3. We have seen how far the Latin Fathers and those who lived in Communion with the Roman Church have openly espoused our Hypothesis let us now descend to Reformed Theologues and examine what their sentiments have been hereof And here indeed we have an ample field to exspatiate in albeit our Adversaries the new Methodists would confine us to a smal number of Adherents We shal begin with John Wiclef our first English Apostolic Reformer who following Bradwardine his Collegue in this as in many other points about Grace asserted That as God necessitates the futuritions of instants so also he necessitates al the events which in those instants are futures Art Constant damnat 278. Again he held That God necessitates al active creatures to each of their acts as Walden tom 1. cap. 21. pag. 35. cap. 23. pag. 37. also Wideford pag. 240 248. Again he asserted That to whatever Gods permission reached to that also his actual volition reached as Walden tom 1. pag. 39. which clearly demonstrates our Hypothesis But we passe on to John Calvin whom some new Methodists particularly Strangius would force into their Campe. Thus Strang. pag. 384 554. where he endeavors to take off Calvin from our Partie but he that looks into Calvins Institutions l. 1. c. 18. wil find our assertion not only nakedly owned but fully explicated and demonstrated and that by a multitude of scriptural instances Particularly he proves 1 That God wils the existence of mens sins so that things repugnant to Gods wil of precept are yet brought about by his efficacious wil of Decree and Providence 2 That Gods permission of sin is not otiose but active and energetic 3 That Gods providence moderates and orders the sins of men And he concludes the Chapter with this seasonable caution As for those to whom this Doctrine of Gods judicial induration may seem rigid let them but a little think how tolerable their morositie may be who reject a thing attested by such clear testimonies of Scripture because it excedes their capacitie and count it a crime to bring to light things which if God did not know to be profitable for our knowlege he would never have reveled them by his Prophets and Apostles So in other parts of his Works as Resp contra Pighium de Libr. Arbitr pag. 225. also Tractat. de occulta Dei providentia he clearly asserts and demonstrates our Hypothesis This is wel taken notice of by judicious Davenant in his Animadversions on Gods love c. p. 322. It is saith he Calvins opinion de occult Dei provident resp ad 2. Lapsum Adae non fortuitum esse sed occulto Dei decreto ordinatum God foresaw Adams fal he had power to have hindred it but he would not because himself had decreed otherwise This is the effect of Calvins doctrine But as for the involving of men in sin and damnation out of his only wil and pleasure these are consequents falsely inferred upon Calvins Doctrine by himself disclaimed c. How much Zuinglius favored this opinion of Gods efficacious
That infallible prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much a necessitie on the wil as absolute Reprobation asserted by the Calvinists So p 418 419 442 462. Davenant was succeeded by Samuel Ward Doctor of Divinitie and Margaret Professor of Cambridge a person of great natural acumen and deep insight into the main points in Controversie between us and the Papists as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prelections published by Dr. Seth Ward With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypothesis is fully manifest by his 24. Determination pag. 115. where he stoutly demonstrates this Thesis That the concurse of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation according to that great saying though in an apocryphous Book Wisd 8. 1. Wisdome i. e. the wise Providence of God reacheth from one end to the other mightily and yet orders althings sweetly He first states the Controversie shewing how the Remonstrants fal in with the Jesuites Bellarmine Molina Lessius c. in asserting only a simultaneous immediate concurse of God with the second cause upon its action and effect yet so that al the modification and determination of the act specially in free actions be from the second cause as pag. 116. Contrary whereto he assertes 1 That the concurse of God with second causes even such as are free is an antecedaneous influxe upon the very second causes themselves moving and applying them to their work This he demonstrates both by Scripture and Reason The Scriptures he cites are Esa 26. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 5 6. Eph. 1. 11. Rom. 11. 36. His Reasons are cogent namely from Gods prime causalitie the instrumental concurse of al second causes the dependence of the human wil c. 2 He assertes pag. 117. That this previous concurse of God the first cause doth according to its mode modifie and determine al the actions of the second causes This which is fully coincident with our Hypothesis he invictly demonstrates 1 because the Divine wil determines itself for the production of every the most special and singular effect therefore it is not determinable by any inferior cause as the influence of the Sun is 2 Because as mans free wil determines althings subject to it so much more efficaciously doth the Divine wil determine al create things subject to it 3 He demonstrates the same from the supreme Perfection of Divine Providence whereunto it belongs determinatively to wil and predefine al and singular things which are done in time and to destine the same to those ends intended by itself as also to move and applie al second causes to their determinate effects 4 Because otherwise the concurse and determination of free-wil should be exemted from the modification of Divine Providence and so God should not have a Providence over althings in particular but only in commun for as Thomas pag. 1. q. 22. teacheth The Divine providence extendes only to those things unto which the Divine causalitie extendes wherefore if God doth not determine the concurse of free-wil he wil not have a providence but only a prescience thereof in particular as pag. 118. Thence 3 he assertes and demonstrates That this antecedaneous concurse of God on second causes modifying their actions takes not away from them their proper mode of operating This he addes to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predeterminative concurse with human libertie and he doth it with a marvellous dexteritie and sagacitie withal shewing that the Molinists and Remonstrants with Cicero make man sacrilegious whiles they endeavor to make him free And Determinat 26. pag. 132. touching absolute Reprobation he saith that it is the antecedent but not the cause of mens sin Lastly what his sentiments were touching efficacious predeterminative concurse is to be seen in his most acute Clerum de Gratia discriminante From Cambridge we might passe on to Oxford and without much difficultie demonstrate that al the principal Professors of Theologie ever since the Reformation have chearfully espoused and strongly defended our Hypothesis against the Jesuites and Remonstrants Our learned and famose George Abbot in his Quaestiones sex Praelect c. cap. 6. discusseth this very Question An Deus sit Author peccati Whether God be the Author of sin And pag. 207. he gives us this distinct decision of the whole 4. In the very actions which on mans part are vitiose the divine finger plainly shines forth but so that God be the motor and impulsor marque that terme which notes the highest Predetermination of the action and worke but not of the obliquitie or curvitie in acting For God excites i. e. predetermines the spirits of wicked men to attemt some things c. And he cites for it that great Effate of Augustin de Praedest Sanctor Quòd mali peccant ipsorum est quòd verò peccando hoc vel illud agunt ex virtute Dei tenebras prout visum est dividentis c. What the Sentiments of pious and learned Dr. Holland Regius Professor of Divinitie and Dr. Prideaux his Successor were is sufficiently evident by their warm zele against the Arminians As for Dr. Barlow late Margaret Professor he has sufficiently declared his assent and consent to our Hypothesis in his Exercitatio 2 ◠de Malo Conclus 7. Rat. 3. where he proves That it is impossible there should be any finite create Entitie which is not from God the Author of al Entitie And to conclude this Head it is very evident that not only the Professors of Theologie but also the Bishops and Convocation together with King James were greatly opposite to Arminianisme and so friends to our Hypothesis Yea in Bishop Laud's time when Arminianisme began to flourish there were but five Arminian Bishops Laud Neale Buckeridge Corbet Howson and Montague who espoused that Interest as Dr. Heylin in the Life of Bishop Laud assures us By al which it appears most evident that not only Rutherford Twisse and Dominicans but the main bodie of Antipelagian and Reformed Divines have given their ful assent and consent to our Hypothesis for God's predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin § 4. Having examined the Testimonies of ancient and later Theologues that concur with us let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antithesis and who they are by whom it has been defended The Antithesis to our Thesis namely That God concurs not to the substrate mater of Sin is generally ascribed to Durandus as the principal founder thereof who denied Gods immediate concurse to actions under this pretext that hereby we make God the Author of mens Sins But to speak the truth this Antithesis is much more ancient than Durandus Capreolus in 4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. asserts That this was the Opinion of the Manichees and Aquinas in 2. d. 37. q. 2. a. 2. saith That it it is next to the error of the Manichees who held two Principes one of Good and the
Wil to the entitative act of sin 1 From the Futurition of althings in the Divine Decree the objections against this argument solved 2 From the certitude of Divine Prescience with the solution of objections 3 From the Decree of Reprobation Davenants Hypothesis touching absolute Reprobation and Decrees 4 From Divine Concurse 1 It s Principe and Origine 2 Its Nature Totalitie Vniversalitie Particularitie Immediation Prioritie and Independence 3 Its Efficace as to al natural and supernatural Acts and Effects Al the Arguments urged against Predetermination to the entitative act of sin strike as much against Predetermination to what is good 5 From the nature of sin its substrate mater and formal reason 6 From Gods permission of sin which is natural negative and positive 7 From Divine providence about sin both conservative restrictive gubernative 8 From the absolute immediate essential dependence of al creatures on God as the first cause § 1. HAving given a scriptural Demonstration as also the unanimous testimonie of such as undertook to defend efficacious Concurse in al Ages of the Church for the confirmation of our Hypothesis we now procede to demonstrate the same by rational Arguments grounded on scriptural principes and evidence which we shal reduce to the following Heads 1. Arg. From the Futurition of althings in and by the Divine Decree which we thus forme That which dependes on the Divine Decree for its futurition necessarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its existence But the substrate mater of al sin dependes on the Divine Decree as to its futurition therefore it necessarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its existence The major is granted by our Adversaries particularly by Strangius who oft assertes That Divine Predetermination is exactly adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition so that whatever is predefined by God in his Decree must necessarily be predetermined by him in the execution and event And what more rational than this assertion Yea what is predetermination of the event but predefinition in the Decree The difference between Gods eternal predefinition in the Decree and predetermination as to actual concurse and execution in time differ only as active and passive Creation as active Creation gives futurition to things and passive actual existence so predefinition and predetermination and therefore among the Greeks one and the same Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both to predefine and predetermine So that our major seems so clear as to carrie with it its own evidence Wherefore we passe on to demonstrate the minor which our Adversaries principally strike at and therefore needs our strongest forces This we shal endeavor to make good in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. Nothing is or can be future in its own nature without some cause of its futurition How is it possible that any thing should passe from a state of mere possibilitie contingence and indifference but by some cause Do not possible and future differ and must there not be some cause of this difference 2 Prop. Whatever is the cause of futurition to any thing must be eternal This is most evident because whatever is future was so from Eternitie for God foreknew it to be so otherwise how could his knowlege be certain Hence 3 Prop. Nothing can give futurition to things but God For is there any thing but God eternal 4 Prop. Nothing in God gives futurition to things but his wil. His Essence simply considered cannot give futurition to things because possible and future are the same as to the Divine Essence neither doth the Prescience of God give futurition to things for things are not future because God foreknows them but he therefore foreknows them because future Hence it follows that nothing but the Divine wil can give futurition to things as Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 11. § 9. whence also it necessarily follows 5 That the futurition of the substrate mater of al sin is from the Divine wil and decree For what can make sinful acts future and so the object of Divine foreknowlege but the wil of God which gives futurition to althings And if Gods predefining decreeing wil give futurition to the substrate mater of sin must not his predeterminative wil also give existence to it But let us examine what assaults our Adversaries make against this Argument by Responses and Objections 1 They replie to our minor That the futurition of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin is not from the wil of God but from the wil of man that gives existence to it Thus Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he endeavors to prove That it is not repugnant that something should be future which God hath not absolutely predefined but left to the wil of man to effect So cap. 9. pag. 628. he peremtorily assertes That God hath not decreed al futures namely the Fal of Adam or the sin against the Holy Ghost c. So pag. 631. he saith Nothing hinders but that there may be some cause of the futurition of a thing besides the Decree of God namely the create wil. The like Le Blanc Concord Libert Hum. p. 1. thes 55 57. where he endeavors to prove That what is the cause why things existe in time the same is the cause of their futurition from Eternitie but mans wil only is the cause why sin existes in time ergo c. A poor Response indeed or rather begging of the Question For is it possible that the second cause loged in time should give futurition to a thing from Eternitie Is it not an approved Maxime in Philosophie yea in Nature that the cause is ever at least in order of nature before the effect and is the second cause confined by time before the eternal futurition of its effect 2 But Le Blanc answers hereto thes 56. pag. 454. That Futurition is nothing else but a respect of reason and an extrinsec denomination of the thing which is said to be future not something really distinct from the thing future c. But the vanitie of this subterfuge is most evident for hereby it follows that the thing is not future before it is existent can a modal extrinsec denomination of a thing existe before the thing that gives it existence How many absurdities would follow hereon But our Adversaries have one grand Objection which they lay much weight on against our minor and that is this If the wil of God gives futurition to sin then sin as future hath one and the same Idea with the wil of God and so the futurition of sin must be God This objection is urged and adorned with many Trophies by Strangius Le Blanc and a Divine of name among us So Strangius lib. 3. cap. 9. pag. 631 632. having pag. 626 c. recited Twisses argument from the eternal futurition of sin he replies thus Herein saith he lies the whole force of the argument that there can be no other cause of a
total and thence endeavor to prove its predetermining the wil to the substrate mater of sin For if God totally concur to the substrate act of sin must he not also concur to the wil that puts forth that act And if God concur to the wil in the production of the act must he not also necessarily determine the wil to that act That Gods total concurse doth not only reach the act and effect but also the wil itself is granted by Strangius lib. 2. cap. 6. pag. 171. Neither faith he do we say that the Concurse of God doth reach only the effect but not the efficient cause sithat the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Energie of the second cause must be from God and the action is not lesse an effect than the work c. 2 The Vniversalitie of Divine concurse as to al effects whatsoever gives us a further demonstration of its efficacious predetermination as to the entitative act of sin That Divine concurse is universally extensive to al acts of the wil as wel as to al other objects by giving forces and assistances to faculties exciting and appling them to their acts and ordering them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. Part 4. Book 2. Chap. 7. § 2. pag. 296 297. And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin to be predeterminative Yea to speak properly is there or can there be any real efficience influxe or concurse sent forth by God as the prime universal cause of althings which is not predeterminative To talke of an universal general concurse of God which immediately influenceth the wil and al its natural acts and yet doth not predetermine i. e. excite and applie the wil to its act what is it but pure non-sense and virtual contradiction 3 The Particularitie of Gods concurse as to its manner of working doth also invictly demonstrate its predetermination as to the entitative act of sin Divine concurse albeit it be universal as to the extent of its object yet it 's most particular and proper as to its manner of working Our Adversaries generally both Pelagians Molinists Arminians and New Methodists talke much of a general indifferent concurse alike commun to al effects and determinable by its substrate mater as the general influence of the Sun is determinable by the mater it workes on But alas how unbecoming and incongruous to the Divine perfections is such a general indifferent concurse Doth not this make the first cause to be second because dependent and the second cause first because independent And doth it not hence also necessarily follow that the first cause may by the indisposition of the mater or resistence of second Agents be frustrated of its intended effect What more expressely overthrows the soverain Dominion and universal Concurse of God than such a general indifferent Concurse And yet is not this one of the most plausible subterfuges our Adversaries have to shelter themselves under They object If God should by a particular predeterminative concurse determine the wil to act in sins intrinsecally evil as the hatred of God or the like then the specification of the act and moral determination of it to its particular object would be from God and so God inevitably should be the Author of sin This is their principal and indeed their only objection worth a naming against our Hypothesis to which we intend a more ful answer in the next Chapter § 1. at present let this suffice 1 We say not that God is a particular cause but universal working in and by a particular concurse suitable to the indigence of the mater it workes on 2 We say not that this particular Concurse of God doth morally specifie or determine the sinful act to its object but only physically individuate or naturally modifie the substrate mater of the sinful act This is incomparably wel explicated by Dr. Samuel Ward that great Professor of Theologie in his Determination of Gods Concurse pag. 117. where he strongly demonstrates That the previous Concurse of God as the first cause doth in its way modifie and determine al the actions of second causes and if so then surely the substrate entitative act of sin as hereafter 3 That general indifferent concurse which our Adversaries so warmly contend for sithat they grant it to be causative and influential on the sinful act doth equally infer God to be the Author of sin as our predeter minative concurse For if it be causative and effective of the act then surely of that individual act as determined to such an object for to talke of its concurrence to the act in genere in the general and not in individuo in its individual determination to its object is such an absurditie in Philosophie that al awakened Philosophers wil decrie it for what Tyro cannot informe us that al physical acts are suppositorum of individual singular substances and so without al peradventure individual and singular and if so then must not their general concurse reach not only the action in general but also individually considered as relating to its object not morally but physically And wil it not hence follow that their general concurse is causative of the entitative act as determined to its object and so makes God the Author of sin as much at least as wel as our predeterminative concurse as more fully Chap. 6. § 1. Of the particularitie of Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. 4 The Immediation of Divine Concurse strongly demonstrates the predetermination of the wil as to the entitative act of sin thereby Our Adversaries generally both Jesuites Arminians and new Methodists excepting some very few that adhere to Durandus grant an immediate concurse to the entitative act of sin which if wel followed wil necessarily infer predeterminative concurse specially according to the concessions of the new Methodists who say That this immediate concurse reacheth not only the effect and act which the Jesuites and Arminians grant but also the very wil itself as the immediate efficient of the act Touching this immediate Concurse see Strangius lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 54 c. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163. And among the Jesuites none has more acutely demonstrated this than Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. and our Country-man Campton Carleton in his Philos Vnivers Disp 28. Sect. 2 3. pag. Disput 29. Sect. 1 2. pag. 323 324. where he demonstrates strongly against Lud. à Dola That God immediately together with the creature produceth the very act of sin Now hence we thus argue If God together with the human wil immediately produceth the very act of sin then certainly he must of necessitie predetermine the wil to that entitative act For suppose the sinful act be motus primò primus as they phrase it or a mere simple volition of the wil how is it possible that
God should immediately produce this act of the wil without applying the wil to the act Do not the very Jesuites Suarez Carleton with others grant That one and the same sinful act is produced by God and the human wil And doth not Strangius with others of the New Methodists also acknowlege further That Gods Concurse to this sinful act of the wil is previous to that of the wil not only simultaneous as Strang. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 56 Yea Strangius and those of his persuasion grant yet more That Gods immediate concurse reacheth not only the act and effect but also the wil itself as Strang. pag. 171. And is it not most evident from these ingenuous concessions of our Adversaries touching immediate concurse that God doth predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin Can we imagine that one and the same sinful act should be produced immediately by God and the human wil and yet God not applie the wil to its act which is al that is meant by predetermination Yea doth God not only concur with the wil to one and the same act but also influence the wil in the production of that act as Strangius and others grant and yet not applie it to act How is it possible that God should influence the wil in the production of any act without actuating or drawing forth the wil to act And if God actuate or draw forth the wil to act doth he not applie it to the act and so predetermine the same Again doth God by an immediate concurse not only influence the wil and its act but also antecedently and in a moment of reason and causalitie before the wil concurs to its own act as Strangius also grants and doth not this give us a more abundant demonstration that God predetermines the wil to that act Can there be any previous concurse immediately actuating and influencing the wil in its act but what is predeterminative Doth not the wil necessarily depend on the previous concurse of the first cause and if so must it not be applied and predetermined to its act thereby But more of this previous concurse in our next Argument Lastly if we allow with the Jesuites unto God only an immediate concurse to the act of the wil al those black consequences which our Adversaries cast on the Assertors of predetermination may with the same facilitie be reflected on them for if they make God by an immediate concurse to concur to the act of sin do they not make him the cause and so the Author of sin as wel as we More of immediate Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. 5 The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse doth invictly demonstrate its predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sinful acts We shal here reassume a Principe already established and granted by Jesuites and New Methodists namely That the action of the first cause concurring with the second is not as to passive attingence distinct from the action of the second cause This is generally granted by the Molinists as Le Blanc Concil Arbitr par 3. thes 28. pag. 433. and by Jansenius August tom 1. lib. 5. cap. 20. pag. 119. It 's true the Concurse of God the first cause is really different from that of the second as to active attingence or principe because Gods concurse actively considered is the same with his wil yet as to passive attingence the action and effect produced by God differ not from the action and effect produced by the second cause This being premissed we procede to demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the prioritie and antecedence of Divine concurse and that in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. The first cause doth in order of nature or causalitie concur before the second This Proposition is potently demonstrated by the acute Dr. Sam. Ward Determinat de Concurs Dei pag. 116 c. And the arguments for it are invict for 1 where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie which is proper to every second cause there posterioritie is essentially appendent Again 2 al second causes in regard of God are but instruments as Aquinas proves yea the wil of man as dependent on God is but a vital instrument albeit in regard of the effect it may sometimes be termed a principal Agent Now doth not every instrument subserve the principal Efficient And doth not that which is subservient in order of causalitie move after that which is the principal Agent But here we are to remember that when we assert Gods Concurse to be previous in regard of its principe and independence we denie not but that it is also simultaneous in regard of the action and effect produced by the second cause as Alvarez lib. 3. de Auxil Disput 19. num 4. Twisse Vind. Grat. lib. 2. de Criminat part 3. pag. 56. But that which we denie is That Gods Concurse is solely concomitant and simultaneous and that 3 because this simultaneous concurse makes God only a partial cause and dependent on the second cause in the production of its effect Yea some of the Jesuites grant That if we consider the concurse of God absolutely without respect to this or that second cause so it is in order of nature before the influxe of the second cause So Fonseca Metaphys lib. 6. cap. 2. quaest 5. sect 13. The like Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 60 61. Thus also Burgersdicius Metaphys lib. 2. cap. 11. grants Gods concurse in supernaturals to be previous albeit in naturals he would have it to be only simultaneous which is most absurd for the active concurse of God being nothing else but the immanent act of his wil must necessarily be the same in naturals as in supernaturals More of the prioritie and Antecedence of the Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 416. Hence 2 Prop. This previous Concurse of God as the first Cause must necessarily move and applie every second cause to its act and effect For how is it possible that the second cause should act unlesse the first move and applie it to its act Can a second cause move it self to an act unlesse it be first moved thereto by the first cause Whence 3 Prop. This previous Concurse of God in applying and moving the Wil of man to the substrate mater of sin predetermines the same For if one and the same sinful action be produced by God and the human Wil and God concurs in order of nature before the wil yea premove and applie it to the act must he not necessarily predetermine the same Al the wit and subtilitie of our Adversaries wil never extricate themselves or satisfie any awakened mind in this point How God doth by a previous concurse move and actuate the Wil and yet not predetermine it to the act Indeed to speak the truth the Sentiments not only of the Arminians but also
is from the Creature 3 Between the wil of God decreeing and the wil of God commanding Whence he concludes Thes 100. p. 427. For God wils and produceth by the Creature as the first Cause by the second the Act as an Act of it self indifferent to moral Bonitie and Vitiositie and wils and effectes the same albeit depraved by the Creature as invested with his moral rectitude because he produceth it by his own power from his immaculate Sanctitie and Justice which can never be made crooked or corrupted by any second Cause Whence he addes Thes 101. And this act essentially good even as defiled by the Creature God justly and holily useth either as an Instrument of punishment or of exploration or exercice and as an ordinate convenient Medium according to his Justice for the best ends Thes 102. In this sense God is said To create evil to produce it out of his mouth to send Joseph into Egypt by the Vendition of his Brethren to rob Job of his goods to command Shimei to curse David to use Absolon for the defiling his Fathers Concubines to deliver Christ into the hands of Jews and Gentiles Thes 103. For God decreed to produce those acts as acts and to permit the depravation of them by the Sinners and to use them albeit depraved wisely and justly to ends holily ordained by him 2. Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin may be also demonstrated from the formal nature of Sin which consistes in the privation of that moral rectitude due to actions as Ch. 1. § 2. we have more fully explicated Whence we thus argue If every deflexion from the Law of God be sin then certainly God necessarily predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins and if of some why not of al even such as are intrinsecally evil That God predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins is evident and that from the concessions of our Adversaries who grant That God doth predetermine the Wil to actions imperfectly good which also according to their own confessions are modally sinful Whence we thus argue The substrate mater of the same action as good and as sinful is the same wherefore if God predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as good must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful When we say That God predetermines to the substrate mater of the same action as sinfil As here may not be taken reduplicatively but only specificatively i. e. as it specifies and distributes the same action into good and sinful which are different modes of one and the same substrate mater or entitative act so that our Opponents granting that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as imperfectly good how can they possibly denie that God predetermines it also to the same substrate mater which is modally sinful When I can see a rational solution given to this argument which I despair of I shal think our Adversaries have done much service to their Cause But they replie If God concur by determinative influence to imperfectly good actions it doth not thence follow that he concurs to actions intrinsecally and in the substance of them evil But I conceive this evasion wil soon vanish into smoke and vapor if we consider wel 1 That the least sin may not be imputed unto God as the Author of it any more than the greatest the difference between sins modally and intrinsecally evil finds no place here dare our Adversaries say that God is the Author of that modal sin which adheres to actions imperfectly good but not of that intrinsecal evil which is in the hatred of God or the like Whence 2 The force of our Argument ariseth from this paritie of reason If God doth concur yea predetermine the wil to an act only modally sinful without falling under the imputation of being the Author of sin why may he not also predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the like imputation Albeit there be a disparitie in the sins yet is not the paritie of reason for the one and the other the same Ought we not to be as cautelous in exemting the Sacred Majestie of God from having any hand in the least sin as in the greatest And if we allow our selves the libertie of making him the author of the least sin wil not that open a wide gate for atheistic blasphemous wits to impute to him the greatest sins Whence if we can prove what our Adversaries wil never be able to disprove yea what they approve of namely that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is imperfectly good but modally sinful it thence follows by necessary consequence and inevitable paritie of reason that he can and doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the least imputation of being the Author of sin annexed thereto I would fain have our Opponents weigh impartially the force of this Argument § 6. Our next Argument for Gods Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin shal be drawen from his Permission of Sin And to make way to this demonstration we must distinguish of Permission which is either legal or natural Natural Permission is either divine or human and both either negative or positive 1 God gives no legal Permission or Indulgence to sin but on the contrary severely prohibites it and that on pain of death 2 Gods natural Permission as Rector of the World is not of sin simply as sin but as conducible to the principal ends of his divine Gubernation It 's true Divine Permission regardes not only the substrate mater of sin but also sin formally considered and so sin under that reduplication as sin yet not simply considered but as it has a tendence or conducibilitie to the advance of Divine Glorie and so much is confessed by Strangius l. 2. c. 22. p. 399. If the Reduplication be joined to the terme sin it 's true that sin as sin is permitted by God physically not morally Yet I adde not simply but respectively as conducible to Gods supreme ends of Government And Lud. Crocius Duodec Dissert 8. Thes 74. pag. 415. assertes That God albeit he wils and decrees only the material of sin yet unbelieving and disobedient both Iews and Cananites c. 2. Whereas he tels us that the Mythologists say Mars was the first that invented militarie weapons and affairs c. This may as well refer to Joshua as to Nimrod For albeit Nimrod began wars in Asia the greater or Babylon yet we find no considerable wars amongst the Cananites or Phenicians till Ioshua's time who by reason of his great militarie Exploits and victories might well be reputed the God of War Mars or Hercules 3. That which may adde to this parallelizing of Mars with Ioshua is that the Mythologists whom Diodorus
Privation only An acute and excellent Decision of this Controversie were not the minds of men eaten out with Prejudices the sum whereof is this The Act of sin entitatively and substantially considered is naturally good and so wel-pleasing unto God the Author of Nature yet if we consider it morally in regard of its Vitiositie so it is infinitely displeasing to God This is as a Key to open the dore to a more ful solution to al objections against us so that at present we need say no more than this that our Hypothesis is no more obnoxious to these aspersions than that of our Adversaries Is not the Divine Sanctitie as illustrious in Gods predetermining to the substrate mater of Sin as if we held only with our Adversaries an immediate previous concurse thereto Are not those very Acts which are morally evil as to the Sinner both naturally and morally good as to God Suppose he predetermine to the entitative act of sin yet must we thence necessarily conclude that he predetermines men to sin formally considered Must not the sinful qualities of al moral effects be imputed to the second particular cause and not to the first universal cause It 's true the Sinner comes short of the Divine Law and therefore sins but doth God come short of any Law Has not his Wil the same Rectitude which his Nature is invested with and therefore whatever he wils must be right and holy even because he wils it The sin which he governs is it not only sin in regard of the Creatures wil not in regard of his wil It is confest that God and the Sinner concur to the same sinful act materially considered but yet is their Concurse the same Yea is there not morally an infinite distance between the one and the other Doth Sin as to Gods Concurse include any more than a natural act which is in regard of God and the conducibilitie it has to his glorie morally good but doth it not as to mans Concurse speake moral vitiositie Again what doth Gods permission of sin implie but a natural or judiciary Negation of that Grace he is no way obliged to give But doth not sin as to the sinner denote a moral privation or deficience of that rectitude which ought to be in his act Is there any thing in the world purely simply and of it self sinful without some substrate mater naturally good What reason therefore can our Adversaries allege why God may not predetermine the wil to the said substrate mater without prejudice to his Sanctitie § 3. We descend now to a third objection taken from the Word of God both Preceptive and Promissive which divine Predetermination of the wil to the substrate mater of sin doth according to the Antithesis of our Adversaries render uselesse impossible yea collusive and unsincere For say they Gods Precepts Promises and Comminations whereof mans Nature is capable should be al made Impertinences through his constant overpowering those that should neglect them 1. As to Gods Laws and Prohibitions they urge That our Hypothesis renders them altogether uselesse yea naturally and simply impossible This they exaggerate with many fine words and rhetoric flourishes which are the best armes they have to defend their declining cause with But having God and Truth though naked and simple on our side we no way dout but to stand our ground against al their fiery or venimous darts And in answer to the first part of their Objection from the Impossibilitie of divine Precepts and Prohibitions we answer 1 That our Adversaries greatly please themselves in their false sophistic Ideas and Notions of what is possible or impossible which we have endeavoured to clear from that ambiguitie and confusion Chap. 1. § 4. with endeavors to explicate what is possible and what impossible to corrupt Nature as to divine Commands 2 We are to know that the Laws of God in their Second Edition were primarily intended to subserve the ends of the Gospel as to the heirs of Salvation to whom they are by Grace in an Evangelic way made possible The Law is said to be given in and by the hands of the Mediator i. e. to subserve his ends which principally regard the Elect. 3 Yet we grant that the Law is also of great use even unto Reprobates 1 In that it lays a great restraint on them not only as to wicked actions but also as to lusts in some measure as Exod. 34. 24. The Autoritie and Majestie of Divine Precepts backed with many severe Curses leaves a great awe and restraint sometimes on the most debaucht spirits and so keeps their lusts from open violences 2 The Precepts are so far useful to Reprobates albeit they have no power to observe them in that they are thereby instructed how much obedience is wel-pleasing to God and how ungrateful they are in not performing of it whereby they are left without al Apologie or Excuse The Precept shews us what we ought to do not what we can do it is always imperative albeit not always operative and may not the Soverain Lord require of man the payment of his debts although by reason of his profligate bankrupt humor he hath disabled himself from the payment of them What excuse is it for the Sinner to say it is impossible for him to obey the Precept whenas the impossibilitie lies in his own wil not in any force or defect on Gods part Doth he not in that very moment wherein he is predetermined by God to the entitative act of Sin voluntarily espouse and wil that act And doth not this leave him without al shadow of Excuse Where can he loge the blame of his Sin but on his own crooked depraved wil which electively and freely determines it self to the Sin in the same moment of time though not of nature that it is predetermined by God to the entitative act 4 We affirme that Gods certain Prescience of Mens sins with the conditional Decree of Reprobation Gods immediate previous Concurse to the entitative act of sin and mans universal impotence to perform what is spiritually good which are al granted by our Adversaries bring sinners under as great impossibilitie of obeying Gods Commands as absolute Reprobation and predeterminative Concurse to the mater of Sin asserted by us This is wel demonstrated by a judicious and awakened Author in his late Letter touching Gods Providence about sinful Acts c. from p. 67. to 74. But because he is a party I shal mention only the Response of Davenant Animadv p. 341. As for Gods Law which cannot be kept without supernatural Grace we say that men are as capable of any supernatural Grace considered under the absolute Decrees maintained by S. Augustine and by the Church of England as considered under the conditional Decrees of late framed by Arminius And p. 418. he strongly proves That Divine eternal Prescience of future Actions or Events infers as absolute a necessitie of such events and impossibilitie of