of Socraâ—es but extended to such friends as conversed with him whereof him self gives these instances Charmides Son of Glauco going to exercise in the Nemean race as he was discoursing with Socrates was by him upon notice of the voice dissuaded from going to which he answered that perhaps the voice onely meant that he should not get the victory but said he however I shall advantage myself by exercising at this time which said he went to the Games where he met with some accident which though it be not related is acknowledg'd to have iustified the counsell given him by the Daemon Tymarchus and Philemon Son of Philemonides having plotted together to murther Nicias Son of Hircoscomander were at the same time drinking with Socrates Timarchus with intention to execute what they had determin'd offer'd to rise from the table saying to Socrates well Socrates drink you on I will but step a little way and return immediately Rise not said Socrates hearing the Daemon as soon as he spake for the Daemon hath given me the accustomed sign whereupon he sate stil presently after he offer'd again to be gone Socrates hearing the voice withheld him At last as Socrates was diverted by something and did not mind him he stole away and committed the murther for which being brought to execution his last words to his brother Glitomachus were that he was come to that untimely end for not obeying Socrates Another time seeing his friend Crito's eie ti'd up he asked him the reason who answering that as he walked in the field one pulling a bough it gave a jerk back and hit him in the eye Then you did not take my advise replies Socrates for I call'd you back making use as I have accustomed of divine presage That it had likewise a great influence upon the soules of those who conversed with him and liv'd with him he alledgeth as examples Aristides Son of Lysimachus and Thucydides Son of Melissus The first leaving Socrates to go to the wars lost with his company the habit of learning which he acknowledg'd to have gained not by any verball instructions of which he had none from him but by being neer him seeing him and sitting in the same room with him The second as easily by the same means attained the same habit And not only to particular persons but to generall affairs did these predictions extend He foretold some friends the defeat of the Athenian Army in Sicily as is attested by Plutarch and mentioned by himself in Plato where he gives another fair example or rather tryall of the truth of the Daemons predictions speaking of a businesse whereof the event was at that time doubtfull You will hear saith he from many in Sicily to whom it is known what I foretold concerning the destruction of the Army and we may now have an experiment if the Daemon speak true Samionus son of Calus is gone in an expedition the sign came to me he goes with Thrasylus to war against Ephesus and Jonia my opinion is that he will either be slain or at least in much danger I greatly fear the whole design These are his words in Plato delivered as before the event of that action which fell out according to his prediction for Thrasylus was repulsed and beaten by the Ephesians the Athenians put to flight with the losse of foure hundred men of which Victory the Ephesians erected two trophies this was in the twentie one year of the Peloponnesian war We have alledg'd the universall consent of Authors that Socrates had such a spirituall attendant yet is there some disagreement concerning the name more concerning the nature of it It is commonly named his Daemon by which title he himselfe owned it Plato sometimes calls it his Guardian Apuleius his God because saith Saint Augustine the name of Daemon at last grew odious But we must observe that he did not account it a God but sent from God and in that sence affirmed the signes to come from God to wit by mediation of this spirit This besides other places we may argue from his first Epistle where he speaks of the sign it selfe he useth the word Daemon when of the advise whereof that sign was the instrument he names God Thus are we to understand these and all other places of the same nature in Plato where Socrates speaking of the Daemon saith if it please God you shall learn much and the sign from God did not offer to stay me As for the signe or manner of the prediction some affirme it was by sneezing either of himselfe or others if any chanced to sneeze standing before him behind him or on his right hand he went immediately about that which he intended if on the left hand he refrained or desisted if he sneezed himselfe before the enterprise it was applausive if in the action disswasive There needs not much argument to prove this opinion If this sternutation proceeded either from chance or his naturall constitution it could not have that provident supernaturall effect if it proceeded from some more excellent outward cause we recurre to the Genius Others confine this prescience within the soule of Socrates himself that he said his Genius advised him they interpret it as we usually say his mind gave him or so inclined him In this sense indeed Daemon is not seldome taken but this is inconsistent with the description which Socrates gives of a voice and signes ab exteriore besides this knowledge is not above humane nature Plutarch having exploded the opinion of Terpsion concerning sneezing conjectured first that it might be some apparition but at last concludes that it was his observation of some inarâ—culate unaccustomed sound or voice conveighed to him by some extraordinary way as we see in dreams This avoids not the inconvenience of the former if Socrates did first of himselfe interpret this sound it is the same with the last opinion that his soule had a Prophetick inspiration if by any help it will come at last to the Genius Some conceive it to be one of those spirits which have the particular care of men which Maximus Tyrius and Apuleius describe in such manner that they want only the name of a good Angell But there want not those who give it that appellation Lactanius having proved that God sends Angells to guard mankind addes and Socrates affirmed that there was a Daemon constantly neer him which kept him company from a child by whose beck and instruction he guided his life Eusebius upon these words of the Psalmist He hath given his Angells charge over thee that they should keep thee in all thy waies We learn out of Scripture saith he that every man hath a Guardian appointed him from above and Plato doubteth not to write in this manner All soules having chosen a condition of living they proceed in order thereunto being moved by the Daemon which is proper to every one and is sent along with them
adversary are Falsitie Paradox Soloecism and Tautologie Sophismes are solved either by distinction or negation Thus much may serve for a slight view of his Logick whereof we have but few Books left in respect of the many which he wrote upon that part of Philosophy THE SECOND PART CHAP. I. Of PHYSICK NOt to question the Method of Aristotle's Books of Physick much lesse their titles as some to make them better agree with Laertius's Catalogue have done and least of all their Authority with Patricius we shall take them in that order which is generally received according to which next Logick is placed Physick Physick is a science concerning that substance which hath the principle of motion and rest within it self The Physicall Books of Aristotle that are extant treat of these nine generall heads Of the principles of naturall things of the Common affections of naturall things of Heaven of Elements of the action and passion of Elements of Exhalation of Plants of Animals of the Soul CHAP. II. Of the Principles of Naturall Bodies THe Principles of naturall Bodies are not one as Parmenides and Melissus held nor Homoiomeria's as Anaxagoras nor Atomes as Leucippus and Democritus nor sensible Elements as Thales Anaximander Anaximenes Empedocles nor numbers or figures as the Pythagoreans nor Idaea's as Plato That the Principles of things are Contrary privately opposite was the joint opinion of the Ancients and is manifest in Reason For Principles are those which neither are mutually of one another nor of others but of them are all things Such are first contraries as being first they are not of any other as contrary not of another Hence it follows that being contrary they must be more then one but not infinite for then naturall things would not be comprensible by Reason yet more then two for of contraries only nothing would be produced but that they would rather destroy one another There are therefore three Principles of naturall bodies two contrary privation and form and one common subject of both Matter The constitutive Principles are matter and form of privation bodies consist not but accidentally as it is competent to Matter Things are made of that which is Ens potentially Materia prima not of that which is Ens actually nor of that which is non-ens potentially which is pure nothing Matter is neither generated nor corrupted It is the first insite subject of every thing whereof it is framed primarily in it self and not by accident and into which it at last resolveth To treat of forme in generall is proper to Metaphysicks CHAP. III. Of Nature and the Causes of Naturall bodies OF Beings some are by Nature as Plants others from other causes those have in themselves the principle of their motion these have not Nature is a Principle and Cause of the motion and rest of that thing wherein it is primarily by it self and not by accident Materiall substances have nature Natural properties are according to Nature Nature is twofold Matter and Form but Form is most Nature because it is in act Of Causes are four kinds the Material of which a thing is made the Formall by which a thing is made or reason of its essence The efficient whence is the first principle of its mutation or rest as a Father the Finall for which end it is made as health is to walking Causes are immediate or remote principall or accidentall actuall or potentiall particular or universall Fortune and Chance are Causes of many effects Fortune is an accidentall Cause in those things which are done by election for some end Chance is larger an accidentall cause in things which are done for some end at least that of Nature They are both efficient Nature acts for some end not temerariously or casually for those things which are done by nature are alwaies or for the most part done in the same manner yet somtimes she is frustrated of her end as in Monsters which she intends not Necessity is twofold absolute which is from Matter conditional which is from the end or form both kinds are in naturall things CHAP. IV. Of the affections of naturall Bodies Motion Place Time MOtion is of a thing which is not such but may be such the way or act by which it becommeth such as curing of a body which is not in health but may be in health is the way and act by which it is brought to health Neither is it absurd that the same thing should be both in act and power as to different respects for the thing moved as water in warming is in act as to the heat which it hath in power as to the greater heat which it is capable of Infinite is that which is pertransible without end such an infinite in act there is not not amongst simple bodies for the elements are confined to certain number and place neither amongst mixt bodies for they consist of the elements which are finite But there are things infinite potentially as in addition Number which may be augmented infinitely in division Magnitude which may be divided infinitely in time and continued succession of generation The properties of place are that it containes the thing placed that it is equall to and separable from the thing placed that the place and thing placed are together that it hath upwards or downwards and the like differences that every Physicall body tends naturally to its proper place and there resteth Place is the immediate immovable superficies of a continent body Those things which are contained by another body are in place but those which have not any other body above or beyond them are not properly in place Bodies rest in their naturall places because they tend thither as a part torn off from the whole Vacuum is place void of body such a vacuum there is not in nature for that would destroy all motion seeing that in vacuum there is neither upwards nor downwards backwards nor forwards Nor would there be any reason why motion should be to one part more then to another Moreover it would follow that it were impossible for one body to make another to recede if the triple dimension which bodies divide were vacuous Neither is the motion of rare bodies upwards caused by vacuity for that motion is as naturall to light bodies as to move downwards is to heavy Time is the number of motion by before and after Those two parts of time are conjoyned by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the present as the parts of a line are by a point Time is the measure of rest as well as of motion for the same measure which serves for the privation serves for the habit All motion and mutation is in time for in every motion there is a swiftnesse or slownesse which is defined by time The Heavens Earth Sea and other sensibles are in time for they are movable Time being a numerate number exists not without a numerant which
OF GEOMETRY ENTER HERE meant not only of the measure and proportion of lines but also of the inward Affections CHAP. VI. How he instituted a Sect. HAving thus setled himself in the Academy he began out of the Collection he had made from others and his own invention to institute a Sect called from the place where he taught Academick He mixed the Heraclitian discourses with the Socratick and Pythagorick following in sensibles Heraclitus in Intelligibles Pythagoras in Politicks Socrates Whereas Philosophy saith St. Augustine concerns either action or contemplation thence assuming two names Contemplative and Active the Active consisting in practise of morall Actions the contemplative in penetration of abstruse Physicall causes and the nature of the Divinity Socrates excelled in the Active Pythagoras in the Contemplative But Plato join'd them into one perfecâ— kind which he subdivided into three severall parts Morall consisting chiefly in Action Naturall in Contemplation Rationall in Distinction of true and false which though usefull in both the other yet belongeth more particularly to Contemplation So that this Trichotomy contradicts not the other Dichotomy which includeth all within Action and Contemplation And as of old in a Tragedy the Chorus acted alone then Thespis making some intermissions of the Chorus introduc'd one Actour Aeschylus a second Sophocles a Third in like manner Philosophy was at first but of one kind Physick then Socrates added Ethick thirdly Plato inventing Dialectick made it perfect Of these three parts as they were held by Plato and the rest of the old Academy we cannot have a generall better accompt then this of Cicero Sect. 1. Ethick The first concerning well living they sought in Nature affirming that she ought to be obeyed and that in nothing else but Nature was to be had that chief good whereto all things should be referr'd that the ultimate being of desirable things and end of all good in the mind body and life were acquir'd by Nature Those of the body they placed in the whole and in the parts Health Strength Beauty in the whole in the parts sound Sence and a certain Excellâ—nce of particular parts as in the feet swiftnesse strength in the hands clearnesse in the voice in the Tongue plainnesse of expression Of the mind were those which are proper to comprehend the power of wit which they divided into Nature and Manners To Nature they ascribed quickness of apprehension and memory both proper to the mind and wit To manners belonged study and a kind of wisdom formed partly by continuall exercise partly by reason in which consisted Philosophy it self wherein that is begun and not perfected is called progression to vertue what is perfected Virtue perfection of Nature of all things in the mind the most excellent Thus of Minâ—s The Adjuncts of life that was the third they asserted such things as conduced to the practise of Vertue Sect. 2. Physick Of Nature for that was next they so treated as to divide it into two things One the efficient the other giving it self to this that thereof might be made somthing In that they conceived to be a power in this a certain matter to be effected in both matter could not cohere unlesse contained by some power nor the power without some matter for there is nothing which is not enforced to be some where that which consists of both they called Body and Qualitie Of Qualities some are primary others arising from these the primary are uniform and simple hose which arise from these are various and as it were multiform Air Fire Water and Earth are Primary of these arise formes of living Creatures and of those things which are made of the Earth These principles are called Elements of which Air and Fire have a faculty to move and effect the other parts Water and Earth to suffer To all these there is subjected a certain matter without form destitute of quality out of which all things are expressed and formed It is capable of admitting all and of changing all manner of waies in the whole and in every part This resolves nothing to nothing but into its own parts which are divisible into infinite there being in naâ—ure no least which cannot be divided Those which are moved are all moved by intervalls which intervalls likewise may be divided infinitely and that power which we call quality being moved and agitated every way they conceive the whole matter to be throughly changed and by that means those things which they call qualitative to be produced of which in all coherent nature continued with all its parts was effected the World beyond which there is not any part of matter or body The parts of the World are all things therein kept together by a Sensitive nature wherein is likewise perfect reason It is also sempiternall for there is nothing more strong whereby it may be dissolved This power they call the Soul of the World God a certain providence over all things subâ—ected to him regarding in the first place heavenly things next on the Earth those thing which appertain to man The same they somtimes call Necessity because nothing can be otherwise then is by him ordained a fatall immutable continuation of eternall order somtimes Fortune as producing many things not foreseen or expected by us by reason of the obscurity and our ignorance of the Causes Sect. 3. Dialectick Of the third part of Philosophy consisting in reason and dissertation they treated thus Though Iudgment arise from the Sense yet the Iudgment of truth is not in the Senses The mind they affirmed to be Iudge of things conceiving her only sit to be credited because she alone seeth that which is simple and uniform and certain This they called Idea All sense they conceived to be obtuse and slow and no way able to perceive those things which seem subject to sense which are so little as that they cannot fall under sense so moveable and various that nothing is one constant nor the same because all things are in continuall alteration and fluxion All this part of things they called Opimative Science they affirmed to be no where but in the Reasons and Notions of mind whence they approved definitions of things and applyed them to all whereon they discoursed They approved likewise explications of words by Etymologies They used Arguments and marks for things to prove and conclude what they meant to explain In this consisted all the discipline of Dialectick that is of Speech concluded by Reason This accompt in generall Cicero gives of the old Academy Plutarch Laertius Apuleius and others have made collections more particular we shall make choice of that of Alcinous as most full and perfect which by reason of the length is referred as an Appendix to Plato's life CHAP. VII His Inventions HE added much to learning and language by many inventions as well of things as of words To omit Dialectick of which we treated last Phavorinus attributes to his invention discoursing by
he is To things that are that which is not is not opposed as contrary for it neither existeth nor is participant of any essence nor can be understood So that if any man endeavour to expresse it in words or comprehend it by thought he is deceived because he putteth together things contrary and repugnant Yet that which is not as far as it is spoken is not a pure negation of that which is but implyeth a relation to another which in some manner is joined to Ens. So that unlesse we assume somthing from that which is to that which is not it cannot be distinguished from other things but thus as many kinds as they are of Ens so many are there of Non-Ens because that which is not an Ens is a Non-Ens Thus much may serve for an introduction into Plato's Philosophy Some things perhaps are said orderly others dispersedly or confusedly yet is all so laid down that by those which we have delivered the rest of his Assertions may be found out and contemplated After so serious a Discourse it will not be amisse to give the Reader a Poeticall entertainment upon the same Subject being A PLATONICK DISCOURSE Written in Italian by IOHN PICUS Earl of MIRANDULA In explication of a Sonnet by HIERONIMO BENIVIENI The first PART Sect. I. IT is a principle of the Platonists That every created thing hath a threefold being Causal Formal Participated In the Sun there is no heat that being but an elementary quality not of Celestiall nature yet is the Sun the cause and Fountain of all hear Fire is hot by nature and its proper form Wood is not hot of its self yet is capable of receiving that quality by Fire Thus hath heat its Causall being in the Sun its Formall in the Fire it s Participated in the Fuel The most noble and perfect of these is the Causal and therefore Platonists assert That all excellencies are in God after this manner of being That in God is nothing but from him all things That Intellect is not in him but that he is the original spring of every Intellect Such is Plotinus's meaning when he affirms God neither understands nor knows that is to say after a formall way As Dionysius Areopagita God is neither an Intellectuall nor Intelligent nature but unspeakably exalted above all Intellect and Knowledge Sect. II. PLatonists distinguish Creatures into three degrees The first comprehends the corporeall and visible as Heaven Elements and all compounded of them The last the invisible incorporeal absolutely free from bodies which properly are called Intellectual by Divines Angelicall Natures Betwixt these is a middle nature which though incorporeall invisible immortall yet moveth bodies as being obliged to that Office called the rationall Soul inferiour to Angells superiour to Bodies subject to those regent of these Above which is God himselfe author and principle of every Creature in whom Divinity hath a casuall being from whom proceeding to Angells it hath a formall being and thence is derived into the rationall Soul by participation of their lustre below which no nature can assume the Title of Divine Sect. III. THat the first of these three Natures cannot be multiplyed who is but one the principle and cause of all other Divinity is evidently proved by Platonists Peripateticks and our Divines About the second viz. The Angelick and Intellectuall Platonists disagree Some as Proclus Hermias Syrianus and many others betwixt God and the rationall Soul place a great number of creatures part of these they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Intelligible part intellectuall which termes Plato sometimes confoundeth as in his Phaedo Plotinus Porphyrius and generally the most refined Platonists betwixt God and the Soul of the World assigne only one Creature which they call the Son of God because immediately produced by him The first opinion complies most with Dionysius Areopagita and Christian Divines who assert the number of Angells to be in a manner infinite The second is the more Philosophick best suiting with Aristotle and Plato whose sense we only purpose to expresse and therefore will decline the first path though that only be the right to pursue the latter Sect. IV. VVE therefore according to the opinion of Plotinus confirmed not only by the best Platonists but even by Aristotle and all the Arabians especially Avicenna affirm That God from eternity produced a creature of incorporeall and intellectuall nature as perfect as is possible for a created being beyond which he produced nothing for of the most perfect cause the effect must be most perfect and the most perfect can be but one for of two or more it is not possible but one should be more or lesse perfect than the rest otherwise they would not be two but the same This reason for our opinion I rather choose then that which Avicen alledges founded upon this principle That from one cause as one can proceed but one effect We conclude therefore that no creature but this first minde proceeds immediately from God for of all other effects issuing from this minde and all other second causes God is only the mediate efficient This by Plato Hermes and Zoroaster is called the Daughter of God the Minde Wisdome Divine Reason by some interpreted the Word not meaning with our Divines the Son of God he not being a creature but one essence coequall with the Creator Sect. V. ALL understanding agents have in themselves the form of that which they design to effect as an Architect hath in his minde a figure of the building he undertakes which as his pattern he exactly strives to imitate This Platonists call the Idea or Exemplar believing it more perfect then that which is made after it and this manner of Being Ideal or Intelligible the other Materiall and Sensible So that when a Man builds a house they affirm there are two one Intellectuall in the Workmans mind the other sensible which he makes in Stone Wood or the like expressing in that matter the form he hath conceiv'd to this Dante alludes â—None any work can frame Unless himself become the same Hereupon they say though God produced only one creature yet he produced all because in it he produced the Ideas and forms of all and that in their most perfect being that is the Ideal for which reason they call this Mind the Intelligible World Sect. VI. AFter the pattern of that Mind they affirm this sensible World was made and the exemplar being the most perfect of all created things it must follow that this Image thereof be as perfect as its nature will bear And since animate things are more perfect then the inanimate and of those the rational then the irrationall we must grant this World hath a Soul perfect above all others This is the first rationall Soul which though incorporeall and immateriall is destin'd to the function of governing and moving corporeall Nature not free from the body as that mind whence from Eternity it was deriv'd as was the mind from
come mixt bodies differing according to the various proportion of the temperament and as they are compounded of the Elements so they resolve into the same All these mixt bodies consist of all the Elements of Earth for every things participates of the nature of that thing wherein it is produced of water because every mixt thing must be concrete and terminated which properties Water best affordeth to Earth of Air and Fire because every perfect mixt body is made by temperament of contraries such is Air to Earth Fire to Water Again the nature of all mixt bodies as well animate as inanimate as to mixture is the same but that the animate consist of all the Element is manifest in that they are nourished by them The causes and common principles of mixt bodies are three materiall fomall efficient The Materiall is the power to be and not to be by which elementary things are generated and corrupted The formall is the reason of the essence of every thing the universall efficient is the circular motion of Heaven not onely as being eternall continuall and before generation but chiefly because it bringeth nigh to us and carrieth far from us that which hath the generative power of all things that is the Sun and the other Stars which by their accession and recession are the causes of generation and corruption All these are so disposed according to the order of Nature that because no naturall being can be permanent in the same individuall state they may be at lest preserved by a continuall succession of many individuum's of the same species Whence the naturall cause of generation is onely conservation of the species CHAP. XI Of imperfect mixt bodies MIxt bodies are twofold imperfect and perfect Meteors are imperfect mixt bodies produced according to Nature but after a lesse orderly and constant manner The generall matter thereof are the Elements the efficient the celestiall bodies which act upon inferiours by a kind of coherence Heaven is highest next Heaven the Element of fire next fire air under air water and earth Clouds are not generated in the sphear of fire nor in the region of the air partly by reason of the heat which is there partly because of the motion of the Heavens which carrieth along with it the element of fire and the upper region of the air by which motion heat is produced in inferiour bodies for the air being carried along by the Heaven is heated by that motion and by the proximity of the Sunne and of the Element of fire Flames that appear in the upper part of the air are made thus The Sun by his warmth extracteth a kind of breath out of the Earth which if hot and dry is called exhalation and if hot and moist vapour Exhalation ascends higher as being higher and being got into the upper region of the air is there enkindled by the motion of the air and proximity of the fire Hence come those they call fire-brands goates falling-starres and the like Hence are also Phasmes such as are called gulses chasmes bloody colours and the like the exhalation being variously colour'd by reflection of the light but chiefly seeming purple which colour ariseth from the mixture of fire and white The efficient cause of Comets are the Sun and stars the materiall an exhalation hot dry condensed and combustible so as it burnes not much nor is soon extinguished It is called a Comet or airy starre when it is a like on every side a pogoneia or bearded starre when it hath a long train That it consists of fire is manifest because at the same time there is commonly great winde and drought It appears seldome and then single and beyond the Tropicks because starres especially the Sun dissipate the matter whereof it consists The Galaxie is not the light of many starrs together as Anaxagoras held but an exhalation hot and dry kindled by the motion of many great starrs which are in that part where the Galaxie appeareth We come next to those meteors which are in the middle and lower region of the air When the Sun and other Starres draw up vapours out of waterish places into the middle region of the air they are there kept so long untill they are condensed by the cold of that place into drops of water which if they come down very small are called misling if greater rain This thick vapour which is seen suspended in the aire and changeth from air to water is a Cloud Mist is the superfluity of a cloud condensed into water Vapour attracted by a small heat not much above the earth and descending more condensed by the nocturnall cold becometh either dew or frost Frost when it congealeth before it resolves into water Dew when it turnes into water so as the warmth cannot dry it up nor the cold freez it Snow is a congealed cloud rain dew frost and snow differ almost only in bignesse and smalnesse Haile though it be of the same nature as ice yet is seldome produced in winter as being caused by Antiperistasis As the air above the earth condensed becommeth vapour and vapour by cold becommeth water so doth it also in the caverns and receptacles of the earth by a continuall mutation first it turnes into little drops then those little into greater Hence comes all springs and heads of rivers abundantly flowing out at one part of the earth Hence great Rivers and Fountains commonly flow from great hills which have greatest caverns The parts of the earth are in continuall mutation sometimes humid sometimes dry sometimes fertile sometimes desert by new eruptions or defections of rivers or accesse or recesse of the sea according to certain periods of time Thus have the parts of the earth their youth and age as well as plants and living creatures by the heat and conversion of the Sun Time and the World are eternall but Nilus and Tanais were not alwaies for those places whence they first issued were once dry grounds The proper place of water is the concave superficies of the aire This place the Sea compassing the earth possesseth for the swift and more rare water is drawn upwards by the heat of the Sun the salt more thick and terrene setleth downwards For this reason all waters tend to the sea as to their proper place yet hereby the Sea is not enlarged for the sun draweth out of it by reason of its expansion as great a quantity of water as it receiveth from rivers The sea is as the world eternall the saltnesse thereof proceedeth from admixtion of some terrene adust exhalation From the top of the Sea is drawn up a fresh vapour from the bottom heated by the Sun an exhalation which passeth through the Sea and commeth up with the vapour but falling back into the Sea bringeth that saltnesse with it as water passed often through ashes Winds are produced by the Sun and Starrs of a hot dry
when it is present only excited by the phantasy The object of the Theoretick Intellect is true or false of the practick good or ill The rationall soul in some manner is every thing for that which actually knoweth is in some maner the same with the thing known CHAP. XXIII Of the Motive faculty BEsides the nutritive sensitive and intellective faculties there is also a motive faculty in animate creatures That it is not the same with the nutritive is manifest in as much as it proceeds from imagination and apprehension which plants have not neither have they organs fit for motion which nature would have given them if they had this power That it is not the same with the sensitive appears in that some animals which have sense have not the power as Zoophytes which have not the organs fit for this motion Neither is it the same with the Theoretick Intellect for that judgeth not as to action but progressive motion is the action of an animal flying ill or pursuing good The principles of locall motion in animals are the practick Intellect under which is comprehended phantasy and appetite These two direct and impell the motive faculty to action intellect and phantasy by directing what is to be shunned what to be embraced appetite by shunning or embracing it Appetite is the chief principle thereof for that may move without intellect as in beasts and many times in men who desert their reason to follow their pleasure But intellect never moveth without appetite that is will for appetite is the principle of all motion honest and dishonest intellect only of honest motion In man appetite is two-fold Will which followeth the judgment of reason and sensuall appetite irascible or concupiscible which followeth sense and phantasy In the motion of animals three things are considered First that which moveth and that is two-fold the appetible object which moveth the appetite as a finall cause not as an efficient and the appetite it selfe which being moved by the appetible object moveth the animall Secondly by what it moves which is the heart of the animal by which instrument the appetible object moveth it Thirdly that which is moved the animall it selfe perfect Insects are moved locally as perfect animals are and consequently by the same principles appetite and phantasy but this phantasy is imperfect diffused through the whole body as appeareth by their uncertain motion only towards present occurrent objects That they have appetite is manifest in as much as they are sensible of pain and pleasure Beasts have sensitive phantasie only rationall creatures deliberative which compareth many things conducing to some foreknown end and chooseth the most expedient Yet somtimes the sensitive appetite in man overswayeth the rationall but by the order of nature the will which is the rationall ought as being the superiour to it to oversway the sensitive Thus there are three motions one of the will commanding another of the sensitive appetite resisting and a third of the body obeying But when the sensitive overruleth there are only two motions for the will resists not but is deceived CHAP. XIV Of Life and Death GEneration and dissolution are common to all living Creatures though all are not produced and dissolved in the same manner The generation of a living Creature is the first conjunction of the nutritive Soul with the naturall heat Life is the permanence of that Soul with the said heat Youth is the encrease of the first refrigerative part age the decrease thereof 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the constant and perfect life which is betwixt both As long as an animate Creature liveth it hath naturall heat within it self and as soon as that faileth dieth The principle of this heat is in the heart If it be extinguish'd in any other part the Animal may live but if in the heart it cannot This heat is extinguish'd two waies first by consumption when it faileth of it self secondly by extinction from some contrary as in violent death the cause is the same in both defect of aliment which in the living Creature is its vital moisture as fire wanting refrigeration groweth more violent and soone consumeth the humidity which being gone it self must of necessity go out Refrigeration therefore is necessary to the conservation of the naturall heat Plants are refrigerated by the ambient air and by aliment their naturall heat is extinguish'd by excessive cold and dry'd up by excessive heat Animals which live in the air or in the water are refrigerated by the air or water some by breathing others without Death according to the extinction of naturall heat is two-fold violent or naturall violent when the cause is extrinsecall naturall when the principle thereof is in the animate Creature For that part wheron life dependeth the Lungs is so ordered by nature that its cannot perform its office for ever Death therefore cometh from defect of heat when through want of refrigeration the radicall humidity is consumed and dry'd up Refrigeration faileth naturally when by progresse of time the lungs in Creatâ—res that have breath the gils in fishes grow so hard that they are unapt for motion Old men die easily as having but little naturall heat and without pain because his dissolution comes not from any violent affection The lives of living Creatures as well of the same as of divers species differ in length the longest life most commonly is that of some Plants as the Palm and Cypresse that of Creatures which have blood rather then the bloodlesse that of terrestriall creatures rather then the aquatile that of those which have great bodies as of Elephants rather then those of little The causes of long life are first the quantity and quality of the vitall moisture if it be much and fat not easily dry'd up nor congealed Secondly natural hear which suffereth not that humour to be congealed Thirdly a due proportion betwixt this heat and that moisture Fourthly fewnesse of excrements for excrements are contrary to Nature and somtimes corrupt nature it self somtimes a part Salacious creatures or laborious grow soon old by reason of exiccation For the same reason men are shorter liv'd then women but more active In hot Countries animate creatures are larger and live longer then in cold Those animals which have little or no blood either are not at all produced in the Northern parts or soon dye Both Plants and Animals â—f they take not aliment die for the naturall heat when the aliment faileth consumeth the matter it self wherein it is the vitall moisture Aquatile creatures are shorter liv'd then the terrestriall and the bloodlesse then those that have blood because their humidity is more waterish and consequently more apt to be congealed and corrupted Plants live long as having lesse of waterish moisture which therefore is not so apt to be congealed The largenesse of the upper parts as well in Plants as Animals is a signe of long life because it argues much naturall
Say not ought is juster then thy Parents Procure not friends in hast nor procur'd part with in hast By learning to obey you shall know how to command What forfeiture you impose on others undergoe your selfe Advise not Citizens what is most pleasant but what is best Be not arrogant Converse not with wicked persons Consult the Gods Cherish thy friend Reverence thy Parents Make reason thy guid What thou seest speak not What thou knowest conceal Be mild to those that belong to thee Conjecture hidden things from apparent His particular sentence according to Didymus and Laertius was Nothing too much according to Ausonius Know thy selfe who ascribes these also to him Him I dare happy call whose end I see Match with thy like unequalls not agree By fortune guided none to honour raise A friend in private chide in publick praise Honours atchiev'd created far exceed If fates be sure what helps it to take heed And if unsure there is of fear lesse need Of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Laertius mentions these Of every man be carefull lest he hear A sword conceald within his breast a cleer Aspect a double tongue a mind severe CHAP. X. How be opposed Pisistratus and reprehended Thespis DUring the absence of Solon the former dissention broke forth again in the City Lycurgus was head of the country men Megacleâ— of the Maritimes Pisistratus of the Townsmen who were most violent against the rich Solon's lawes were still observed in the City but the people aimed at novelty and change not as thinking it most just but in hopes to be Masters of other mens goods and to suppresse the adverse party Solon whilst things stood thus returned to Athens where he was much reverenced and honoured by all but could not speak or act in publick through the weaknesse of his body and spirits yet privately taking every one of the Commanders apart he endeavoured to reconcile their differences wherein Pisistratus seemed the most ready to be perswaded with whom he had a very antient friendship grounded aswell upon their kindred as upon the good qualities of Pisistratus then whom as Solon used to say there could not be a person of more worth if he were cured of his ambition About this time according to Plutarch which was in the fiftieth Olympiad Thespis began to present Tragedies which Suidas erroneously accounts ten Olympiads latter as is observed by Meursius the people were much taken with the novelty of the thing for as yet there were no contentions therein Solon naturally desirous to hear and learn and by reason of his age indulging more to ease and pleasure feasting and musick went to see Thespis himself act as was then the manner the Play ended he went to Thespis and asked him if he were not ashamed to speak so many lies before so great an auditory Thespis answered it was no shame to act or say such things in jest Solon striking the ground hard with his staffe replyed but in a short time we who approve this kind of jest shall use it in earnest in our contracts and transactions In fine he absolutely forbad him to teach or act tragedies conceiving their falsity unprofitable whereto he dissimulated the deceit of Pisistratus who soon after having wounded himselfe came into the Forum in a Chariot pretending to have been so used by his enemies in the behalfe of the common-wealth and inflamed the people with much rage Solon comming near to him son of Hippocraâ—es saith he you act Homers Vlysses ill in using the same means to deceive the Citizens wherewith he whipping himself deluded the enemie Immediately the people flocked in to defend Pisistratus Aristo mov'd he might be allowed a standing guard of fiftie men Solon rose up to oppose it using speeches the effect whereof he afterwards thus exprest in verse If evill your impieties befall Gods not the Author of those mischiefs call Your selves the causes have given power to those Who in requitall servitude impose Lion whom the footsteps of the fox pursue Whose souls deceit and Vanity endue The mans smooth tongue and speech you only heed But never penetrate into the deed He also foretold them the aimes of Piâ—istratus in an elegy to this effect Vapours condens ' dingender hail and snow And thunder doth from radiant lightning flow The sea is troubled by the raging wind When not disturb'd by that nothing more kind A Citty by great persons is orethrown And taught beneath a Monarchy to groan But seeing the poorer sort much addicted to Pisistratus and tumultuous the richer afraid consulting their safetie by flight he retired saying Athenians I am wiser then some valianter then others wiser then those who understand not the deceit of Pisistratus valianter then those who understand it yet hold their peace through fear The Senate being of the same faction with Pisâ—stratus said he was mad whereto he answered A little time will to the people cleer My madnesse when ' th ' midst truth shall appear The people having granted Pisistratus his request concerning a guard question'd not the number of them but conniv'd so long at his pressing and maintaining as many souldiers as he pleased that at last he possest himselfe of the Tower whereupon the Citty being in a tumult Megacles with the rest of the Alcmaeonidae fled Solon now very old and destitute of those that might back him went into the Forum armed with a spear and shield and made an oration to the people partly accusing them of folly and cowardise partly inciting them not to forsake their libertie using this celebrious speech It had been far easier to have supprest this tyranny in the grouth but much more noble to cut it off now it is at the height No man daring to hear him he went home and taking his armes set them in the street before his door Laertius saith before the Magazâ—n saying I have helped my Country and the Law as much as lay in me or as Laertius O Country I have assisted thee both in word and deed Plutarch addes that from that time he lived retired addicted to his study and told by many the Tyrant would put him to death and demanded wherein the confided so much he answered in his age but Laertius affirmes which seemes truer that assoon as he had laid down his armes he forsook the Country and Agellius that in the raign of Scovius Tullius Pisistâ—atus was Tyrant of Athens Solon going first away into voluntary exile CHAP. XI How he travelled to Lydia and Cilicia SOlon at his departure from Athens received invitations from many by Thales desired to come to Miletus by Bias to Priene by Epimenides to Creet by Cleobulus to Lindus as is evident from their severall letters to that effect even Pisistratus pressed him to return home by this Epistle Pisistratus to Solon Neither am I the only person of the Greeks nor am I without right to the Kingdome I possesse as being descended from Codrus that
naturall Philosopher for first bringing that kind of learning to Athens but how that consists with his relation to Anaxagoras who as he acknowledgeth studied naturall Philosophy thirty years in Athens Casaubone justly questions Euripides as the writer of his life affirms son of Mnesarchus born at the first time of Xeâ—xes's expedition into Greece the same day that the Grecians overthrew the Persians was first a Painter then an Auditor of Anaxagoras but seeing him persecuted for his opinâ—ons lastly converted himself to Tragick poesy Socrates Son of Sophroniscus was according to Aristoxenus an Auditor of Anaxagoras till he left the City and thereupon applyed himself to Archelaus which Porphyrius reckons above the 17th year of his age or rather the ninteenth Democritus also is by some affirmed being younger then Anaxagoras forty years to have applyed himself to him but Laertius affirms he could not endure Democritus shunn'd his conversation Phavorinus likewise attests that because he would not admit him Democritus profess'd himself his Enemy and denyed his opinions of the Sun and Moon but said they were ancient and that he stole them as likewise his description of the world and assertion concerning the mind Meâ—rodorus of Lampsacum is likewise mentioned by Laertius as friend to Anaxagoras CHAP. V. OF his triall Death sentences and writings Of his tryal saith Laertius there are several reports Sotion in his treatise of the succession of Philosophers saith he was accused by Cleon of impiety for asserting the Sun to be a burning plate but being defended by Pericles his Scholar hee was fined five Talents and banish'd Satyrus that he was cited to the Court by Thucydides who was of the contrary faction of Pericles accused not onely of impiety but of holding intelligence with the Persians and in his absence condemned to death when news was brought him at the same time both of the death of his Sons which according to Aelian were two all that he had and his own condemnation of the latter he said Nature long since condemned both them me to death of his Sons with a calm look You tell me nothing new or unexpected I knew that I beget them mortall which some â—scribe to Solon others to Xenophon Demetrius Phalereus saith hee buried them with his own hands Hermippus he was imprison'd to be put to death but Pericles appearing before the Judges asked if they knew any thing in his life that they could accuse to which they answered nothing but I saith he am his disciple then be not tansported by Calumnies to kill the man but believe me and set him at liberty so he was dismissed but not able to brook the disgrace hee kill'd himself Hieronymus saith that Pericles brought him into the Court in poor garments extenuated with sicknesse an object â—itter for compassion then Justice And thus much saith Laertius of his Tryall Suidas that he was cast into Prison by the Athenians for introducing a new opinion concerning God and banish'd the City though Pericles undertook to plead his cause and that going to Lampsacum he there starv'd himself to death Iosephus that the Athenians believing the Sun to be God which he affirm'd to be without sense and Knowledge hee was by the votes of a few of them condemned to death But if we credit Plutarch he was neither condemned nor accused but by Pericles who fear'd the Ordinance of Diopithes which cited those that held prophane or sublime Opinions sent out of the City Yet else-where hee confesseth he was accused His departure from Athens being 30. years after his coming thither falls the third year of the 82. Olimpiad the 63. of his age Thence he went to Lampsacum where he continued the rest of his age which extended to 22. years more so little mindfull of Aâ—hens or of his Country as to one who told him that he was deprived of the Athenians he answered no but they of me and to his friends who when hee fell sick asked if hee would be carried to Clazomonae his Country no said he there is no need the way to the grave is alike every where Before he died the Magistrates of the City asked him if he would they should do any thing for him hee answered that his onely request was that the boyes might have leave to play yearly on that day of the month whereon he died which custom saith Laertius is continued to this time Those of Lampsacum buried him magnificently with this Epitaph Here lies who through the truest paths did passe O' th world Celestiall Anaxagoras Aelian mentions two altars erected to him one inscribed to the mind the other to truth Laertius concludes his life with this Epigram Fam'd Anaxagoras the Sun defin'd A burning plate ' for which to die design'd Sav'd by his Scholar Pericles But he Abandon'd life to seek Philosophie He is observed never to have been seen either to laugh or smile Being demanded if the Mountains of Lampsacum would in time become Sea he answered yes if time fail not first Beholding the tomb of Mausolus he said a sumptuous Monument was a sign the substance was turned into stone He first affirmed the poesy of Homer to consist of virtue and Justice to which Metrodorus added that the Poet was skilfull in naturall Philosophy He conceived that there are two lessons of death the time before our birth and sleep Laertius and Clemens Alexandrinus assert him first of the Philosophers that put forth a Book He writ Of Natural Philosophy out of which Aristotle cites these fragments All these things were together which was the beginning of the book and â—o be such is to be changed Plato this The mind is the disposer and cause of all things Athenaeus this what is commonly called the milk of the hen is the white of the egge Plato censures the book as not using the mind at all nor assiging any cause of the order of things but aeriall aetheriall and aquatick Natures and the like incredible things for causes The quadrature of the Circle which treatise Plutarch saith hee composed during his imprisonment There were three more of the same name the first an Oratour follower of Isocrates the second a statuary mentioned by Antigonus the last a Grammarian Scholar to Zenodotus ARCHELAVS ARchelaus was either an Athenian or a Milesian his Father Apollodorus or according to some Mylon he was Scholer to Anaxagoras Master to Socrates He first transferr'd naturall Philosophy out of Ionia to Athens But how that can be when Anaxagoras his Master taught there thirty years Casaubone justly questions and therefore was called the Natural Philosopher in him naturall Philosophy ended Socrates his Scholer introducing morality but hee seemeth also to have touched morall Philosophy for he treated of lawes of things honest and just from whom Socrates receiving his learning because he increased it is therefore thought
others red others white so is it likewise consonant to reason that they who are affected according to nature by reason of the different constitution of senses are not moved alike by the same things but one way the white another way the black another way he whose eyes are blew another way he whose eyes are black whence we impose common names on things having our selves proper and particular affections Sect. 2. Of the End or chief Good TO these assertions continueth Sextus Empericus concerning the Judicatories agreeth what they assert concerning Ends. Of Affections some are pleasant some harsh and troublesome some mean the harsh and troublesome are ill whose end is griefe the pleasant good whose end which cannot be deceived is pleasure The mean are neither good nor ill whose end is neither good nor ill which is an affection between pleasure and griefe Affections therefore are the judges and ends of all things and we live say they observing evidence and liking evidence in the rest of the affections liking in pleasure Laertius saith they assert two passions or affections Griefe and Pleasure pleasure a soft smooth motion griefe a harsh motion One pleasure differeth not from another pleasure nor is one pleasure sweeter then another pleasure this pleasure is coveted by all living creatures the other shunned They assert corporeall pleasure to be our ultimate end as Panaetius saith in his book of Sects not catastematick permanent pleasure which consisteth in privation of griefe and a quiet void of all disturbance which Epicure held The End differeth from Beatitude for the End is some particular pleasure Beatitude is that which consisteth of all particular pleasures wherein are included both the past and future Again particular plâ—asure is expetible in it selfe felicity not in it selfe but for particular pleasures That pleasure is our chiefe end is manifest in that from our first infancy without any instruction of others we naturally aime thereat and having obtain'd it seek nothing else Moreover we avoide not any thing so much as its contrary griefe Pleasure is good though proceeding from the most sordid dishonest thing as Hippobotus in his Book of Sects for although the action be dishonest yet the pleasure thereof is expetible in it selfe and good Indolence which Epâ—cure held they esteem not pleasure nor want of pleasure griefe for both these consist in motion but Indolence and want of pleasure consists not in motion for Indolence is like the state of a sleeping man They hold that some men may not desire pleasure through perversity of minde All spirituall pleasures and pains arise not from corporeall pleasures and pains for from the simple prosperity of our Country or our selfe we are affected with joy But neither the remembrance of past goods nor expectation of future compleat pleasure as Epicure thought for by time and expectation the motion of the soul is dissolved Pleasure according to Aristippus is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 consisteth only in one part of time the present for the remembrance of past pleasures or expectation of the future is vain and frivolous and nothing appertaineth to beatitude but that only is good which is present With those pleasures which he received heretofore or shall receive hereafter Aristippus said he was nothing at all moved the first being gone the other not yet come and what it will prove when it is come is uncertain Hence he argued that men ought not to be folicitous either about things past or future and that not to be troubled at such things is a signe of a constant clear spirit He also advised to take care only for the present day and in that day only of the present part thereof wherein something was done or thought for he said the present only is in our power not the past or â—uture the one being gone the other uncertain whether ever it will come Neither do pleasures consist meerly in simple sight or hearing for we hear with delight those who counterfeit lamentation and those who lament truely we hear with displeasure This privation of pleasure and griefe they called mean states The pleasures of the body are much better then those of the soule and the pains or griefs thereof much worse for which reason those who offend actually are most grievously punished To grieve is more unnaturall to us to delight more naturall for which reason much more care is requisite for the ordering of one then of the other yet many times we reject things which effect pleasure as being grievous so that the concurrence of pleasures which effecteth beatitude is very difficult Moreover they hold that every wise man doth not live pleasantly nor every wicked man unpleasantly but so for the most part for it is enough that a man be affected and reduced by incidence of one single pleasure They held that Griefe is the greatest ill that griefe is not effected by every ill but by the unexpected and unforeseen that one man is more grieved then another They assert that Riches are efficient causes of pleasure yet not expetible in themselves Sect. 3. Of Vertue ALL good consisteth in Pleasure Vertue it selfe is only laudable as being an efficient cause of pleasure Nothing is just honest or dishonest by Nature but by Law and Custome yet a good man will do nothing that is evill because of the censure or esteem which would fall upon his actions and that such a one is wise Prudence is a good yet not expetible in it selfe but for the sake of those things which proceed from it A friend is to be embraced for the use we may have of him as the body cherisheth every part thereof as long as it remaineth found Of Vertues some are in the unwisâ—e Corporeall exercise conduceth to the acquisition of Vertue A wise man is not subject to Enâ—y Love or Superstition for all these proceed from the vanity of Opinion but he is subject to Griefe or Fear as being Naturall accidents CHAP. V. How he went to Dionysius his Court. ABout this time Dionysius the Sicilian Tyrant flourished to whom resorted many Philosophers amongst the rest Aristippus invited by his sumptuous magnificence Dionysius asked him the reason of his comming he answer'd to give what I have and to receive what I haâ—e not or as others when I wanted wisdome I went to Socrates now I want mony I come to you He soon insinuated into the favour of Dionysius for he could conform himself to every place time and person act any part construe whatsoever happened to the best and thus enjoying present pleasure never troubled himself for the absent as Horace Every condition habit and event with Aristippus suits with all content Of his compliance with Dionysius's humour there are these instances Dionysius at a Feast commanded that all should put on purple robes Plato refused saying I will not with a female robe disgrace My self who am a man of manly race But Aristippus took it and beginning
every name is conveniently and properly applyed to the thing For any name applyed to any thing will not signifie rightly as if wee should impose the name of horse upon man To speak is a kind of Action Not he that speaketh any way speaketh rightly but he who speaketh so as the nature of the thing requireth And for as much as expression of names is a part of speaking as Noun is a part of Speech to name rightly or not rightly cannot be done by any imposition of names but by a naturall affinity of the name with the thing it self So that he is a right imposer of names who can expresse the Nature of the things in their names for a name is an Instrument of the thing not every inconsiderate name but that which agreeth with its nature By this benefit we communicate things to one another whence it followeth that it is nothing else but an instrument accommodated to the teaching and discerning of a thing as a weavers shuttle to his Webbe It belongeth therefore to a Dialectick to use names aright for as a Weaver useth a shuttle rightly knowing the proper use thereof after it hath been made by the Carpenter so the Dialectick rightly useth that name which another hath made And as to make a Helm is the effice of a Shipwright but to use it rightly of a Pilot so he who frameth names shall impose them rightly if he do it as if a Dialectick were present who understandeth the nature of those things which are signified by the names Thus much for Dialectick CAAP. VII Of THEORETICK Philosophy WE come next to Theoretick Philosophy whereof one part is Theologick another Physick a third Metaphysick The end of Theologie is the knowledge of primary Causes Of Physick to understand the nature of the Universe what kinde of creature man is what place he holdeth in the world whether there be a divine Providence over all things to which there are other Gods subordinate how men are in respect of them The end of Mathematick is to know the nature of a superficies and a solid and to consider the motion and revolution of celestiall bodies the contemplation whereof must first be proposed in briefe Thus Plato useth to confirm the acutenesse of the minde for it sharpeneth the understanding and rendreth it more ready towards the contemplation of divine things That which considereth Numbers being likewise a part of Mathematicks conferreth not a little to the understanding of things that are It frees us from the errour and ignorance which attend sensible things and conduceth to the right knowledge of the essence of things It likewise renders a man expert in military affairs especially towards the ordering of an Army by the science of Tacticks Geometry also conferteth much towards the understanding of good it selfe if a man pursue it not only for mechanicall dimension but that he may by the helps thereof ascend to things which are not busying himselfe about those which are in continuall generation and motion Stereometry likewise is exceeding usefull for after the second accretion followeth this contemplation which holdeth the third room Astronomy also is usefull as a fourth discipline whereby we consider the motions of Heaven and the Starres and the author of night and day months and years Thus by a familiar kinde of way finding out him who made all these and by these disciplines as from certain rudiments or elements proceeding to things more sublime Likewise Musick is to be learnt which relateth to hearing for as the eyes are created for Astronomy so are the ears for Harmony and as when we apply our selves to Astronomy we are led from visible things to the divine invisible â—ffence so when we receive the Harmony of voice in at our ears from audible things we ascend by degrees to those which are perceived by Intellect unlesse we pursue Mathematicall disciplines to this end the contemplation thereof will be imperfect unprofitable and of no value We must therefore presently proceed from those things which are perceived by the eyes and ears to those which reason only discerneth for Mathematick is only a preface to divine things They who addict themselves to Arithmetick and Geometry desire to arrive at the knowledge of that which is which knowledge they obtain no otherwise then as by a dream but really they cannot attain it because they know not the principles themselves nor those things which are compounded of the principles neverthelesse they conduce to those things which we mentioned wherefore Plato will not have such disciplines to be called Sciences Dialectick method proceeds in such manner that by Geometricall Hypotheses it ascendeth to first principles which are not taken upon Hypotheses For this reason he calleth Dialectick a Science but Mathematick neither opinion because it is more perspicuous then sensible things nor a Science because it is more obscure then first Intelligibles But the opinion of Bodies the science of Primaries the contemplation of Mathematicks He likewise asserteth Faith and Imagination Faith of things subject to sense Imagination of Images and Species Because Dialectick is more efficacious then Mathematick as being conversant about divine eternall things therefore it is put before all Mathematicks as a wall and fortification of the rest CHAP. VIII Of first matter VVE must next give a brief account of Principles and those things which belong to Theologie beginning at the first and from thence descending to the creation of the world and contemplation thereof whereby at last we come to the creation and nature of man To begin with matter this he calleth the receptacle nurse mother place and subject of all Images affirming that it is touched without sense and comprehended by an adulterate kinde of reason The property thereof is to undergo the generation of all things and to cherish them like a Nurse and to admit all formes being of her own nature expert of all form quality and specieâ— These things are imprinted and formed in her as in a Table and she admitteth their figures not having of her selfe any figure or qualitie For she could not be fit to receive the impressions of severall forms unlesse she were wholly void of all quality and of those formes which she is about to receive They who make sweet Unguents of Oyle make choice of that oyle which hath the least sent they who would imprint any figures in wax first smooth and polish the matter defacing all former figures It is requisite that matter capable of all things if it must receive all formes must not have the nature of any one of them but must be subjected to all formes without any qualitie or figure and being such it is neither a body nor incorporeall but a body potentially as Brasse is potentially a Statue because then it becomes a Statue when it puts on the form thereof CHAP. IX Of Ideas WHereas matter is a Principle Plato likewise introduceth other principles besides matter One as an exemplar Idaeas another Paternall God the
Father and Author of all things Idaea as to God is the notion of God as to us the primary Intelligible as to matter a manner as to this sensible world an Exemplar as to it selfe Essence For whatsoever is made with understanding must necessarily be referred to something as if something be made from another as my picture from me the exemplar thereof must be presupposed and if there be nothing eternall every Artist conceiveth it first within himselfe then transferreth the formes thereof into matter They define Idaea an eternall exemplar of things which are according to Nature for the greater part of Platonists will not allow an Idaea to be of things that are made by Art as of a Shield or Lute nor of things which are praeternaturall as of a Feavour or unnaturall Choler nor of singulars as of Socrates or Plato nor of vile abject things as of silth or strawes nor of relatives as of greater and longer For Idaeas are the eternall notions of God perfect in themselves That there are Idaeas they prove thus Whether God be Intellect or something Intelligent he must have his Intelligibles and those eternall and immovable if so there are Idaeas For if matter it selfe be in it selfe void of measure it is necessary that it receive measure from some superiour that is wholly remote from matter But the Antecedent is true therefore the consequent and if so there are Idaeas certain measures void of matter Again if the world were not made by chance it must only be made of something but by something and not only so but after the likenesse of something but that after whose likenesse it was made what is it but an Idaea whence it followeth that there are Ideas Again if intellect differ from true opinion that which is intelligible differeth from that which is opinionable and if so there are intelligibles distinct from opinionables wherefore there are first Intelligibles as well as first Sensibles whence we conclude there are Idaeas CHAP. X. Of God VVE come next to speak of the third principle which Plato though he think it almost ineffable conceiveth may bee express'd in this manner If there are intelligibles and those neither sensibles nor coherent with sensibles but adherent to first Intelligibles then are there first simple Intelligibles as there are first sensibles the Antecedent is true therefore the consequent But men subject to perturbation of sence when they would contemplate somthing intelligible presently fall upon the thought of somthing sensible whereby at the same time they imagine magnitude or figure or colour and therefore cannot understand this sincerely But the Gods being void of corporeall mixtion understand purely and sincerely Now because the Intellect is better then the Soul and that Intellect which is alwaies in act and at once understandeth all things is better then that Intellect which is in power and of these that is most excellent which is the cause ef the other and superiour to all This can be nothing else but God whom we call the first as being the Cause that the Intellect of the Word alwaies acteth He being himself immoveable acteth upon the Intellect of the World as the Sun upon the Eye when it turn eth towards him And as that which is desired moveth the Appetite it self remaining immoveable so doth this Intellect move the Intellect of all Heaven Now this first Intellect being most fair must have the most fair Intelligible but nothing is fairer then it self therefore it alwaies understandeth it self and its own notions which Act is called Operation Moreover God is first eternall ineffable perfect in himself that is needing none and ever perfect that is absolute in all times and every way perfect that is absolute in every part Divinity Essence Truth Harmony good Neither do we so name these to distinguish one from the other but rather by them all to understand one He is said to be Good because he bestoweth his benefits upon all according to their severall capacities and so is the cause of all goods Fair because he is in his essence both more and equall Truth because he is the principle of all truth as the Sun of all light And Father as being cause of all things and adorning the mind of Heaven and Soule of the World after his own exemplar and notions For according to his own will hee filled all things with himself exciting the Soul of the World and converting it to himself for hee is cause of that Intellect which being adorned by the Father adorneth also the Nature of all this World He is likewise ineffable and as we said can only be perceived by the mind for he is neither genus nor species nor difference neither can any accident be applyed to him He is not ill for that it were impiety to affirm nor good for so he should be termed if he were meanly or highly participant of goodnesse Nor difference for that cannot be made according to the notion of him nor qualited for he is not made that which he is by quality nor perfected thereby Nor void of quality for he is not deprived of any quality that appertaineth to him Nor part of any thing nor as a whole constituted of parts nor as the same or divers for nothing can happen to him whereby he may be distinguished from others Neither doth he move or is he moved Hence the first apprehension of him is by abstraction from these things as wee understand a point by abstraction from sensibles considering first a superficies then a line then a point The second is by Analogie in this manner As the Sun is to sight and visible things himself not being sight yet affording the one to see the other to be seen so is the first Intellect to that Intellect which is in our Soule and to those things which it understandeth For it self is not the Intellect yet it perfecteth in these the Act of Intellection to those it affordeth that they are understood enlightning that truth which is in them The third way to understand him is thus when a man beholdeth that Beauty which is in Bodies hee proceedeth to that which is in the Soul then to that which is in Offices and Lawes Lastly to the vast Ocean of Beauty after which he considereth that which is good it self amiable it self expetible it self which shineth like a light and meeteth the Soul that which ascends unto it by these degrees By this he comprehendeth God himself through reason of that excellence which consisteth in adoration of him He considereth God void of parts for nothing was before him a part and that of which something consisteth is precedent to that whereof it is a part for a superficies is before a body and a line before a superficies Moreover God not having many parts can neither be locally moved nor altered by qualities For if hee be altered it must be done by himself or some other if by some other that other must be of greater power
which more gently austere The sense of touching was formed by the Gods to discern hot and cold soft and hard light and heavy smooth and rough and to iudge the differences of each of these Yielding bodies we call those which yield to the touch resisting those which yield not this proceedeth from the bases of bodies those which have large bases are firm and solid these which have narrow bases are yielding soft and easily changed Rough is that which is uneven and hard smooth that which is plain and thick As warm and cold qualities are most opposite so they proceed from the most different causes That which cutteth by the acutenesse and roughnesse of its parts begetteth a hot affection that which is more thick in penetration a cold whilst the more rare are expelled and the more dense compelled to penetrate into their room Thence ariseth a concussion and trepidation and an affection which is from hence begotten in bodies rigor CHAP. XX. Of Heavy and Light HEavy and light ought not to be defined by higher or lower place nothing is high or low for Heaven being absolutely round and its convexe extremity even we cannot term any thing higher or lower yet may we call that heavy which is hardly drawn to a place different from its Nature light which easily or heavy is that which consisteth of most parts light of fewest CHAP. XXI Of Respiration WE breath after this manner The externall Air compasseth us round about and passeth in at our mouth nostrills and invisible Pores of the body where being warmed it floweth back again to the externall Air by that part out of which it flowed it again thrusteth the externall Air to the interiour Thus there is an unintermitted succession of inspiration and expiration CHAP. XXII Of the Causes of Diseases OF Diseases Plato alledgeth many causes The first is defect or excesse of the Elements and a change into places which agree not with their Nature The second a preposterous generation of homogeneall parts as when of flesh is made blood or choler or flegme for all these are nothing but colliquation or putrefaction â—legm is a new collâ—quation of flesh sweat and tears are a kind of Serum of flegm Flegm intercepted in the outward parts begetteth Scurse and Leprosie in the inward being mingled with Melancholy it causeth the falling-sicknesse Sharp and salt flegme engender those affections which consist in rigour for all bodies that are inflamed with choler must suffer that A world of various diseases are engendred by choler and flegm As concerning feavours Plato conceiveth that a continuall feavour proceedeth from excesse of fire a quotidian from excesse of air a tertian from excesse of water a quartan from excesse of Earth It remaineth that we here begin to speak of the Soul though not without some danger of repeating the same things CHAP. XXIII Of the three principall powers of the Soul THE Gods the makers of mortall Creatures having received from the first God the Soul of Man immortall added unto it two mortall parts yet left the immortall divine part might be infected with mortall extravagances they seated as Prince of all in the tower as it were of the body the Head in figure resembling the Universe The rest of the body they appointed as a vehiculum to serve this To each mortall part they assigned its proper habitation placing the irascible in the heart the concupiscible in the midst betwixt the Navell and the Diaphragme binding it there as a furious savage Beast They framed the Lungs in respect of the heart soft bloodlesse hollow and spungy that the heart being somthing heated with anger might thereby be refrigerated and asswaged the Liver to excite and allay the concupiscible part having both sweetnesse and bitternesse as likewise for the clearing of divinations which are given by dreams for as much as in it by reason of its smoothnesse shining and brightnesse the power which proceedeth from the mind doth shine forth The Spleen was made for the benefit of the Liver to purge and cleanse it so that those corruptions which by some diseases are contracted about the Liver retire thither CHAP. XXIV Of the distinction of the parts of the Soul THat the Soul and parts thereof according to their proper faculties are threefold every part appointed by reason their severall places is manifest from hence Those things which are separated by Nature are divers passionate and reasonable are separate by nature this being conversant in Intelligibles that in things sad or joyful to omit the passive part which is common likewise to bruit Beasts Now these two being distinct by Nature must likewise be distinguished by place because for the most part they disagree and are repugnant to one another but nothing can be repugnant to it self neither can those things which are contrary to one another consist together in the same In Medea anger seemeth to contest thus with reason I know what I intend is ill But anger over-rules my will In Laius when he ravished Chrysippus concupiscence contested with Reason for so he saith Men to this crime the Gods confine To know the ill that they decline That the rationall power is different from the Passive is evident from this that they ordered by severall means one by discipline the other by habituall practice CHAP. XXV Of the Immortality of the Soul THat the Soul is immortall Plato proveth by these Arguments The Soul to every thing wherein it is conferreth life as being naturally innate in her self but that which conferreth life to others never admitteth death but what is such is immortall The Soul being immortall is likewise incorruptible for it is an incorporeall essence which cannot be changed substantially and is only perceptible by the Intellect not by the eyes and is uniform Hence it must be simple neither can be at any time dissolved or corrupted The body is contrary for it is subject to sight and other senses and as it is compounded so shall it again be dissolved and it is multiform When the Soul adhereth to those things which are preceptible by Intellect it acquieseeth Now to that by whose presence she is disturbed she cannot possibly be like wherefore she is more like to those things which are perceptible by Intellect but what is such is by nature incorruptible and perishable Again the Soul naturally doth preside over the body not the body over the Soul but that which by nature ruleth and commandeth is of kin to Divinity wherefore the Soul being next unto God must be immortall not subject to corruption Again Contraries which have no medium not by themselves but by some accident are so ordered by Nature that they may be mutually made of one another But that which men call life is contrary to that which they call death as therefore Death is a separation of the Soul from the body so islife a conjunction of the Soul with the body praeexistent to the Body But if she be praeexistent and shall
God Hence Platonists argue the World is eternall its soul being such and not capable of being without a body that also must be from eternity as likewise the motion of the Heavens because the Soul cannot be without moving Sect. VII THe antient Ethnick Theologians who cast Poeticall vails over the face of their mysteries expresse these three natures by other names Coelum they call God himself he produc'd the first Mind Saturn Saturn the Soul of the World Iupiter Coelum imples Priority and excellence as in the Firmament the first Heaven Saturn signifies Intellectuall nature wholly imploy'd in contemplation Iupiter active life consisting in moving and governing all subordinate to it The properties of the two latter agree with their Planets Saturn makes Men Contemplative Iupiter Imperious The Speculative busied about things above them the Practick beneath them Sect. VIII WHich three names are promiscuously used upon these grounds In God we understand first his Excellence which as Cause he hath above all his effects for this he is called Coelus Secondly the production of those effects which denotes conversion towards inferiours in this respect he is sometimes called Iupiter but with an addition Optimus Maximus The first Angelick nature hath more names as more diversity Every creature consists of Power and Act the first Plato in Philebo calls Infinite the second Finite all imperfections in the Mind are by reason of the first all perfections from the latter Her operations are threefold About Superiours the contemplation of God about the knowledge of herself about inferiours the production and care of this sensible World these three proceed from Act. By Power she descends to make inferiour things but in either respect is firm within her self In the two first because contemplative she is called Saturn in the third Iupiter a name principally applyed to her power as that part from whence is derived the act of Production of things For the same reason is the soul of the World as she contemplates her self or superiours termed Saturn as she is imployed in ordering worldly things Iupiter and since the government of the World belongs properly to her the contemplation to the Mind therefore is the one absolutely called Iupiter the other Saturn Sect. IX THis World therefore as all other creatures consisteth of a Soul and Body the Body is all that we behold compounded of the four Elements These have their casuall being in the Heavens which consist not of them as sublunary things for then it would follow that these inferiour parts were made before the Celestiall the Elements in themselves being simple by concourse causing such things as are compounded of them Their formal being from the Moon down to the Earth Their participate and imperfect under the Earth evident in the Fire Air and Water experience daily finds there evinc'd by naturall Philosophers to which the antient Theologians aenigmatically allude by their four infernall Rivers Acheron Cocytus Styx and Phlegeton We may divide the body of the World into three parts Celestiall Mundane Infernall The ground why the Poets â—eign the Kingdom of Saturn to be shar'd betwixt his three Sons Iupiter Neptune and Pluto implying only the three-fold variation of this corporeall World which as long as it remains under Saturn that is in its Ideal Intellectual being is one and undivided and so more firm and potent but falling into the hands of his Sons that is chang'd to this material Being and by them divided into three parts according to the triple existence of bodies is more infirm and lesse potent degenerating from a spiritual to a corporeal estate The first part the heavenly they attribute to Iupiter the last and lowest to Pluto the middle to Neptune And because in this principality is all generation and corruption the Theologians express it by the Ocean ebbing or flowing continually by Neptune understanding the Power or deity that presides over Generation Yet we must not imagine these to be different souls distinctly informing these three parts the World her self being one can have but one Soul which as it animates the subterraneall parts is called Pluto the sublunary Neptune the celestiall Iupiter Thus Plato in Philebo averrs by Jove is understood a regall soul meaning the principall part of the World which governs the other This opinion though only my owâ—â— I suppose is more true then the expositions of the Grecians Sect. X. NExt that of the World Platonists assign many other rational souls The eight principall are those of the heavenly Spheres which according to their opinion exceeded not that number consisting of the seven Planets and the starry Orb. These are the nine Muses of the Poets Calliope the universall soul of the World is first the other eight are distributed to their severall Spheres Sect. XI PLato asserts That the Author of the World made the mundane and all other rationall souls in one Cup and of the same Elements the universall soul being most perfect ours least whose parts we may observe by this division Man the chain that ties the World together is placed in the midst and as all mediums participate of their extreams his parts correspond with the whole World thence called Microcosmus In the World is first Corporeall Nature eternall in the Heavens corruptible in the Elements and their compounds as Stones Mettals c. Then Plants The third degree is of Beasts The fourth rationall souls The fifth Angelicall minds Above these is God their origine In man are likewise two bodies one eternall the Platonists Vehiculum coeleste immediately inform'd by the rational soul The other corruptible subject to sight consisting of the Elements Then the vegetative faculty by which generated and nourished The third part is Sensitive and motive The fourth Rational by the Latine Peripateticks believ'd the last and most noble part of the Soul yet above that is the Intellectuall and Angelick the most excellent part whereof we call the Souls Union immediately joyning it to God in a manner resembling him as in the other Angels Beasts and Plants About thâ—se Platonists differ Proâ—lus and Porphyrius only allow the rationall part to be Immortall Zenocrates and Speusippus the sensitive also Numenius and Plotinus the whole Soul Sect. XII IDeas have their casuall being in God their formall in the first Minde their participated in the rationall Soul In God they are not but produced by him in the Angelick nature through this communicated to the Soul by whom illuminated when she reflects on her intellectuall parts she receives the true formes of things Ideas Thus differ the Souls of Men from the Celestiall these in their bodily functions recede not from the Intellectuall at once contemplating and governing Bodies ascend to them they descend not Those employ'd in corporeall office are depriv'd of contemplation borrowing science from sence to this wholly enclin'd full of errors Their only means of release from this bondage is the amatory life which by sensible beauties exciting in the soul a remembrance
is twofold the two Venusâ—â— celebrated by Plato Sympos and our Poet Sensible called Vulgar Venus Intellectuall in Ideas which are the object of the Intellect as colour of sight nam'd Celestiall Venus Love also is twofold Vulgar and Celestial for as Plato saith Venus's Sect. VIII VEnus then is Beauty whereof Love is generated properly his Mother because Beauty is the cause of Love not as productive principle of this act to Love but as its object the Soul being the efficient cause of it as of all his acts Beauty the materiall For in Philosophy the efficient is assimilated to the Father the material to the Mother Sect. IX CElestiall Love is an Intellectuall desire of Ideall Beauty Ideas as we said before are the Patterns of things in God as in their Fountain in the Angelick Mind Essentiall in the Soul by Participation which with the Substance partakes of the Ideas and Beauty of the first Mind Hence it follows that Love of Celestial Beauty in the Soul is not Celestiall Love perfectly but the nearest Image of it It s truest being is with the desire of Ideal Beauty in the first Mind which God immediately adorns with Ideas Sect. X. LOve saith Plato was begot on Penia by Porus the Son of Metis in Iupiters Orchard being drunk with Nectar when the Gods met to celebrate Venus Birth Nature in it self inform when it receives form from God is the Angelick Mind this form is Ideas the first Beauty which in this descent from their divine Fountain mixing with a different nature become imperfect The first mind by its opacousness eclipsing their lustre desires that Beauty which they have lost this desire is love begot when Porus the affluence of Ideas mixeth with Penia the indigence of that informe nature we termed Iupiter 1. 8. in whose Garden the Ideas are planted with those the first Mind adorned was by the Antients named Paradise to which contemplative life and eternall felicity Zoroastres inviting us saith seek Seek Paradisâ— our Divines transfer it to the Coelum Empyraeum the seat of the happy Souls whose blessednesse consists in contemplation and perfection of the Intellect according to Plato This Love begot on Venus birth-day that is when the Ideal Beauty though imperfectly is infused into the Angelick Mind Venus yet as a Child not grown to perfection All the Gods assembled at this Feast that is their Ideas as by Saturn we understand both the Planet and his Idea an expression borrowed from Parmenides These Gods then are those Ideas that precede Venus She is the beauty and Grace resulting from their variety Invited to a Banquet of Nectar and Ambrosia those whom God feasts with Nectar and Ambrosia are eternall beings the rest not These Idea's of the Angelick Mind are the first eternals Porus was drunk with Nectar this Ideal affluence fill'd with Eternity other Idea's were not admitted to the Feast nor indued with Immortality Orpheus upon the same grounds saith Love was born before all other Gods in the bosom of Chaos Because Nature full of indistinct imperfect forms the Mind replenished with confused Ideas desires their perfection Sect. XI THe Angelick Mind desires to make these Idea's perfect which can onely be done by means opposite to the causes of their imperfection these are Recession from their Principle and mixtion with a contrary Nature Their Remedy separation from the unlike Nature and return and conjunction as far as possible with God Love the desire of this Beauty excites the Mind to conversion and re-union with him Every thing is more perfect as nearer its Principle This is the first Circle The Angelick Mind proceeding from the Union of God by revolution of intrinsecall knowledge returneth to him Which with the Antients is Venus adulta grown to perfection Every Nature that may have this conversion is a Circle such alone are the Intellectuall and Rationall and therefore only capable of felicity the obtaining their first Principle their ultimate end and highest good This is peculiar to Immortall Substances for the Materiall as both Platonists and Peripateticks grant have not this reflection upon themselves or their Principle These the Angelick Mind and Rationall Soul are the two intelligible Circles answerable to which in the corporeall World are two more the tenth Heaven immoveable image of the first Circle the Celestiall Bodies that are moveable image of the second The first Plato mentions noâ— as wholly different and irrepresentable by corporeall Nature of the second in Timaeo he saith That all the Cirâ—les of this visible Heaven by him distinguished into the fixed sphere and seven Planets represent as many Circles in the Rationall Soul Some attribute the name of Circle to God by the antient Theologists called Coelus being a Sphear which comprehends all as the outmost Heaven includes the World In one respect this agrees with God in another not the property of beginning from a point and returning to it is repugnant to him who hath no beginning but is himself that indivisible point from which all Circles begin and to which they return And in this sence it is likewise inconsistent with materiall things they have a beginning but cannot return to it In many other Properties it agrees with God He is the most perfect of beings this of figures neither admit addition The last Sphear is the place of all bodies God of all Spirits the Soul say Platonists is not in the Body but the body is in the Soul the Soul in the Mind the Mind in God the outmost Place who is therefore named by the Cabalists 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sect. XII THe three Graces are Handmaids to Venus Thalid Euphrosyne Aglaia Viridity Gladnesse Splendour properties attending Ideal Beauty Thalia is the permanence of every thing in its entire being thus is Youth called green Man being then in his perfect state which decaies as his years encrease into his last dissolution Venus is proportion uniting all things Viridity the duration of it In the Ideall World where is the first Venus is also the first Viridity for no Intelligible Nature recedes from its being by growing old It communicates this property to sensible things as far as they are capable of this Venus that is as long as their due proportion continues The two other properties of Ideal Beauty are Illustration of the Intellect Aglaia Repletion of the wil with desire and joy Euphrosyne Of the Graces one is painted looking toward us The continuation of our being is no reflex act The other two with their faces from us seeming to return the operations of the Intellect and Will are reflexive What comes from God to us returnes from us to God Sect. XIII VEnus is said to be born of the Sea Matter the Inform Nature whereof every Creature is compounded is represented by Water continually flowing easily receptable of any form This being first â—n the Angelick Minde Angells are many times exprest by Water as in the Psalms The Waters above the Heavens praise God continually
no part is significant by it selfe A Verb is a voice implying time whereof no part is significant by it selfe A Speech 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a voice signifying according to institution whose parts are significant separate Of Speech the enunciative only called proposition belongs to Philosophy the precatory and imperative to Rhetorick Poetry c. Propositions are divided foure waies into simple and complex into affirmative and negative into universall particular indefinite and singular into pure and modall the modall is either necessary possible contingent or impossible Propositions have three accidents opposition consectation conversion Opposition is either contradictory of a particular to an universall or contrary of an universall to an universall or subcontrary of a particular negative to a particular affirmative Consectation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or aequipollence is the consideration of those affections of a proposition in respect whereof two propositions signify together the same thing and are together true or false Conversion is a transposition of the termes preserving the affirmation negation and verity of the proposition it is either absolute which reserves the same quantity but alters the quality or partiall which reserves not the same quantity CHAP. IV. Of Syllogisme SYllogisme is a speech in which some things being laid down another necessarily followes Perfect Syllogisme is that which requireth no other to shew its power clearnesse and efficacy Imperfect requires another to that purpose by conversion or transposition of the propositions The matter of Syllogisme is three termes the form is the right disposition of the matter according to figure and mood Figure is an apt disposition of the medium with the extreams apt for concluding aright Mood is a disposition of propositions according to quantity and quality There are three figures The first when the medium is first subject then praedicate It hath nine moods 4. usefull 5. uselesse and illegitimate of the usefull two are universall two particular The first Every A is B. Every C is A. Therefore every C is B. The second No A is B. Every C is A. Therefore no C is B. The third Every A is B Some C is A. Therfore some C is B. The fourth No A is B. Some C is A. Therfore some C is B. In the second figure the medium is praedicated of both the extreams It hath 16 Moods 4 true 12 false and illegitimate Of the true two are universall two particular The first No M is N. Every O is N. Therfore no O is M. The second Every M is N. No O is N. Therfore no O is M. The third No M is N. Some O is N. Therefore some O is not M. The fourth Every M is N. Some O is not N. Therfore some O is not M. In the third figure the medium is subjected to both extreams It hath 16 Moods 10 false and illegitimate 6. legitimate which conclude particularly The first Every P is R. Every P is S. Therfore some S is R. The second No P is R. Every P is S. Therefore some S is not R. The third Some P is R. Every P is S. Therfore some S is R. The fourth Every P is R. Some P is S. Therfore some S is R. The fift Some P is not R. Every P is S. Therefore some S is not R. The sixt No P is R. Some P is S. Therfore some S is not R. Every Syllogisme ought to be framed in one of these three Figures but those of the second and third being imperfect ought to be reduced to the first which is the most absolute and perfect There are six other formes of argument Conversion of Termes Induction Example abduction Instance Enthymem All these have their effiâ—â—cy from the power of Syllogisme and are reducible to Syllogisme As concerning the invention power and conversion of Syllogisme he is exact and curious to admiration CHAP. V Of Apodeictick or demonstrative Syllogisme ALL discursive knowledge is made by a praenotion of the things themselves whereof we discourse for ratiocination is not concerning things unknown Demonstration is a discursive knowledge and therefore requireth three praecognitions First that the subject is and what it is in a rude confused manner Secondly what the praedicate is and what it signifieth Thirdly that the principles are true To know is to understand that a thing is that this is cause thereof and that it cannot be otherwise Demonstration is a scientifick Syllogisme Demonstrative Science is from true first immediate more known causes of the conclusion First as having none precedent and being adaequate to and convertible with the effect Immediate or consectaneous as having no terme betwixt to joyne them More known as being praensises to the conclusion not to be demonstrated by any thing Demonstrative Science is of a thing necessary whence the demonstration it selfe consists of necessary propositions which necessity requireth explication of that which is praedicated of all by it selfe and which is universall Of all is that which is attributed to every one and at all times as a living creature to man By it selfe as being of essence proper competible perse and competible to it selfe for it selfe An universall attribute is that which is in every one by it selfe in as much as it is it selfe Demonstration is of conclusions of eternall truth for they are universall propositions whence it followeth that neither demonstration nor Science are of perishable things neither are definitions of such which are the principles of demonstration That there is demonstration it is not necessary to have recourse to Plato's Idaeas separate from singulars it is enough that there are common natures which are in singulars and are praedicated of them It is one thing to know that a thing is so another to know why it is so Hence there are two kinds of demonstration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first is the true and most perfect of which hitherto The other kinde of demonstration viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is more imperfect it is made two waies in the same Science First when the cause is demonstrated by the effect thus Starres which do not twinkle are nearest to the earth but the Planets do not twinkle therefore they are nearest to the earth Secondly when the effect is proved by a cause remote and not reciprocall or by an effect of the remote cause as this Every thing that breatheth is a living creature but no Wall breaths therefore no Wall is a living creature To know 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is proper to subalternat principle Sciences as Geometry and Arithmetick which contemplate the first proper causes to know 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of the subalternate and inferiour as Optick and Musick Of all figures the first is most accommodate to knowledge for that only concludes with an universall affirmative and therefore in that only is a demonstrative 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
yeeld to things that are perspicuous Although assent cannot bee made unlesse it bee moved by Phantasie yet when that phantasy hath an immediate cause it hath not according to Chrysippus this principall reason not that it can be made without any extrinsecall excitation for it is necessary that assent be moved by phantasie but it returnes to its Cylinder and Cone which move not by impulsion then of their owne nature the Cylinder seemes to rowle and the Cone to turne round As therefore he who thrust the Cylinder gave it the beginning of motion but did not give it volubility so the objected phantasy imprinteth and as it were sealeth in the soule its species yet the assent is in our power and that as we said in a Cylinder extrinsecally impelled the motion is continued by its own power and nature Phantasies wherewith the mind of man is presently affected are not voluntary or in our own power but inferre themselves by a kind of violence approbations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by which these phantasies are knowne and judged are voluntary and made according to our arbitrement So as upon any dreadfull noyse from heaven or by the fall of any thing or sudden newes of some danger or the like it is necessary that the minde of a wise man bee a little moved and contracted and appalled not through opnion perceived of any ill but certaine rapid and inconsiderate motions which praevert the office of the mind and reason But presently the same wise man approveth not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 those dreadfull phantasies that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but rejects and refuses them nor is there any thing in these which seemeth to him dreadfull Thus differs the soules of wise and unwise men The unwise when phantasies appeare cruell and difficult at the first impulsion of the mind thinke them to be truly such as they appeare and receiving them as if they were justly to be feared approve them by their assent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this word the Stoicks use vpon this occasion But a wise man suddenly changing colour and countenance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 assents not but retaineth the state and vigour of his judgment which he alwaies had of these phantasies as nothing dreadfull but terrifying only with a false shew and vain fear CHAP. VIII Of Notions FRom Sense the rule of Science Notions are imprinted in the Soul by which not only principles but larger waies to reason are found out A man when he is born hath the supream part of his Soul like unto clean paper upon which every notion is inscribed The first manner of inscription is by the Senses as for example They who perceive a thing that is white after it is taken away retain the memory thereof but when they have conceived many remembrances of one species then they say they have experience for experience is a multitude of similitudes Of Notions some are naturall which are in such manner as we we have said and without Art Others gained by learning and industry These are properly called Notions the other Anticipations The reason for which we are called rationall is said to be perfected by anticipations in the first seven years Intelligence is the phantasme of the intellect of a rationall creature for phantasm when it lighteth upon a rationall Soul is then called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Intelligence a word taken from the Intellect For to other Creatures there happen not phantasmes to the Gods only and to us these are incident Those which belong to us are Phantasmes as to their genus Notions as to their species as denaries and staters when paid for transportation are called Naula Common notions are planted in all men in which they all agree together one is not repugnant to another for who holds not that good is profitable and ought to be chosen with utmost endeavours Who holds not that what is just is fair and well-beseeming Whence then proceed contentions and differences to wit from the application of first notions to singular things These Notions and whatsoever is of this kinde which right reason conformeth in us being long examined are true and suitable to the natures of things CHAP. IX Of Science and Opinion THat which is comprehended by Sense Zeno call'd Sense and if so comprehended as not to be plucked away by reason Science otherwise Ignorance from which proceedeth Opinion which is weak and common to the false and unknown These three are joyned together Science Opinion and Comprehension which borders upon the other two Science is a firme stable immutable comprehension with reason Opinion an infirm weak assent Comprehension which commeth between both is an assent to comprehensive phantasy Comprehensive phantasy is true in such manner that it cannot be false Therefore Science is in wise men only Opinion in fooles Comprehension is common to both as being that by which truth is judged and is for this reason reckon'd by Zeno neither amongst the right 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor amongst the bad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but betwixt science and ignorance affirming that this only is to be credited CHAP. X. Of Voice Speech and Words These three are joyned to one another that which is signified that which signifieth and the contingent That which signifieth is the voice as Dion That which is signified is the thing it selfe declared by the voice it is that which we apprehend and is present in our cogitation The contingent is the outward subject as Dion himselfe Dialectick being conversant about that which signifieth and that which is signified is divided into two places one of Significats the other of Voice The place of significats is divided into phantasies and subsistents on phantasie dicibles axioms c. In the other place concerning Voice is declared literall Voice the parts of speech the nature of Solaecisms and Barbarisms Poems Ambiguities Song Musick and according to some definitions and divisions The phantasies of the minde precede speech Of these therefore we have already treated then the minde endued with the faculty of speaking declareth by speech what it receiveth from the phantasie For this reason the consideration of Dialectick by the joynt consent of all seemes as if it ought to be first taken from the place of voice Voice is aire percussed the proper sensible object of hearing as Diogenes the Babylonian in his Art of Voyce The voice of a living sensitive creature is aire percussed with appetite the voice of man is articulate proceeding from the minde at his four teenth year it is perfected Speech as Diogenes saith is a literate voice as It is day Word is a significative voice proceeding from the minde Language is a speech according to the variety of Nations whereof each useth its peculiar dialect as the Attick saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Ionick 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Voice and Speech differ in that voice is a sound but speech
in a Wildernesse abstain from any thing that is evill but that the very deformity and dishonesty thereof deterrs them Nothing therefore is more clear then that honest things are expetible in themselves and dishonest things avoidable in themselves Hence it followeth that what is honest is more estimable then those mean things which accrue by it And when we say that folly temerity injustice and intemperance are avoidable in respect of those things which are consequent to them it contradicts not the former assertion that what is dishonest only is ill because they relate not to the hurt of the body but to dishonest actions which proceed from vice All good is equall and every good is highly expetible and admits neither increase nor decrease Here commeth in a great controversy betwixt the Stoicks and the Peripateticks which though Carneades affirm to be only verball Cicero holdeth to be more in things then words The Peripateticks hold that all goods are requisite to happy life the Stoicks that whatsoever is worthy estimation compreâ—iendeth happy life Those holding pain to be an ill it followes that a wise man cannot be happy upon the rack These who account not pains among the ills hold that a wise man continueth happy in the midst of torments For if some bear those pains with greater courage for their Country or some lighter cause opinion not nature increaseth or diminisheth the power of the pain Again the Peripateticks asserting three kinds of good affirm a man to be so much the more happy the fuller he is of externall corporeall goods or in the Stoicks expression he who hath most corporeall estimables is most happy for as much as by them Beatitude is compleated On the contrary the Stoicks hold that those goods which they call of nature make not by their frequency a life more happy or are more expetible or more estimable For then wisdome being expetible and health expetible both together would be more expetible then wisdome alone whereas either being worthy estimation both are not more worthy of estimation then wisdome alone For the Stoicks who hold health to be estimable but place it not amongst the goods hold likewise that no estimation is to be preferred before vertue From this the Peripateticks dissent asserting that an honest action without pain is more expetible then the same action with pain the Stoicks otherwise For as a Taper is darkened by the light of the Sun and as a drop of water is lost in the vastnesse of the Aegean Sea and as in the riches of Croesus the accession of one farthing and one step in the way between this and India so in that end of all good which the Stoicks assert all the estimation of corporeall things must necessarily be obscured overwhelmed and perish by the splendour and magnitude of vertue And as opportunity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not made any thing greater by production of time for whatsoever is opportune hath its measure so right affection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the good it selfe placed in it that it be conformable to nature admitteth no accession of encrease For as that opportunity to those of which we speak are not made greater by production of time for which reason the Stoicks conceive that a happy life is not more to be desired if it be long then if it be short and they use this simile As it is the praise of a shoe to fit the foot neither are many shoes preferred before two nor the greater before the lesse So in those things whose good is confined to opportunity and convenience neither are the more to be preferred before the fewer nor the longer before the shorter Nor do they argue acutely who say if long health be more to be esteemed then short then likewise a long use of wisdome more then a short they understand not that the estimation of health is judged by space that of vertue by opportunity as if they should say likewise a good death or a good labour to a woman in travell is better long then short So that they see not that some things are more esteemed for their shortnesse others for their length CHAP. VI. Of Eupathies AS soon as any object is presented to us which seemeth good Nature as we said drives us on to the acquisition thereof which being done constantly and prudently is called Will imprudently and excessively Desire Moreover while we are so moved that we are in some good that happeneth also two waies when the Soul is moved quietly and constantly according to reason this is called Joy when vainly and excessively Pleasure In like manner as we desire good things by nature so by nature we decline the ill This declination if done according to reason is called Caution if without reason Fear Caution is only in a wise man of fear he is not capable Hence it appeareth that there are three kinds of good affections of the minde called Eupathies or Constancies Ioy Caution Will. 1. Ioy is contrary to pleasure as being a rationall elevation of the minde 2. Caution is contrary to fear as being a rationall declination of ill 3. Will is contrary to desire as being a rationall appetite These are the primarie Eupathies and as under the primary passions are comprehended many subordinate passions so are there secondary Eupathies subordinate to those Under Ioy are 1. Delectation 2. Cheerfulnesse 3. Aequanimity Under Caution 1. Respect 2. Cleernesse Under Will are 1. Benevolence 2. Salutation 3. Charity Notwithstanding that Eupathies and passions are contrary yet are there but three Eupathies though there are foure passions for there is no Eupathie contrary to Grief CHAP. VII Of Passions FRom falsities proceedeth a perversitie of Intellect hence spring up severall passions and causes of disorder Zeno defineth passion a praeternaturall motion of the Soul or as Cicero renders it a commotion of the Soul aâ—erse from right reason against Nature Others more briefly a more vehement appetite More vehement they call that which recedeth from the constancy of Nature and is contrary to nature wherefore all passion is an excessive stupide desire The kinds of passion arise from two opinionated goods and two opinionated evils so they are four From the good desire and pleasure pleasure from present good desire from future from the ill fear and grief fear from the future grief from the present for these things whose coming we fear when they do come grieve us Pleasure and desire arise from an opinion of good things desire is fervently transported to that which seemeth good pleasure rejoyceth when wee have obtained what we desire Thus desire and fear go formost that to apparent good this to apparent ill pleasure and grief follows pleasure when we attain what wee desire griefe when wee incurre what wee fear All passions arise from Iudgement and Opinion whence they are more strictly defined that it may appear not
may even be observed in those Praeter-office is an action which reason requireth that we do not as to neglect our Parents to contemn our Brethren to disagree with our Friends to despise our Country and the like Neuter are those actions which reason neither requireth nor forbiddeth as the taking up of a straw Of Offices some are perfect called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rectitudes actions done according to vertue as to do wisely to do justly Others not-rectitudes actions which have not a perfect office but a mediate as to marry to go an Embassy to discourse and the like Of rectitudes some are in things requisite others not Of the first kinde are to be wise temperate and the like of the second those which are not requisite to the being such In like manner are praeter-offices divided Again of Offices some are ordinary as to have a care of our selves of our limbs and the like Some extraordinary as to maim our selves throw away our goods Accordingly is it of praeter-offices Again of Oâ—fices some are continuall as to live vertuously some intermassiâ—e as to question answer walk and the like Accordingly it is of praeter-oâ—fices Office is a mean thing placed neither amongst the good nor their contraries for there is something in this approvable so as a right reason may be given for it as done approvably That which is so done is office And forasmuch as in those things which are neither vertues nor vices there is somthing which may be of use it is not to be taken away Again it is manifest that a wise man doth something in these mean things he therefore when he doth it judgeth that it is his office so to do but a wiseman is never deceived in judgment therefore there is an office in mean things Again we see there is something which we call a thing rightly done or a Rectitude but that is a perfect office therefore there is an inchoat office as if it be a Rectitude justly to restore a depositum to restore a depositum must be a simple restitution without the additionall terme is an office And since it is not to be doubted but that in mean things some are to be performed others rejected whatsoever is done in that manner is comprehended in common office whence it is manifest that all men by nature lovâ—ng themselves as well the foolish as the wise will take those things which are according to nature and reject the contrary This is therefore one common office of the wise and unwise conversant in mean things All offices proceeding from these it is justly said that to these are referred all our thoughts even the forsaking of life or continuing in it In whom most things are according to nature the office of that person is to remain in life in whom there are or are foreseen to be more things contrary to nature his office is to forsake life although he be happy and of a fool to conâ—tinue in life although he be miserable for that good and that â—ll as we have often said are things that follow afterwards The first principles of naturall appetite fall under the judgement and election of a wise man and is as it were the matter subjected to wisdome Thus the reason of continuing in life or forsaking it is to be measured by all those things we mentioned For neither are they who enjoy vertue obliged to continue in life nor they who live without vertue to die and it is often the office of a wise man to part with his life even when he is most happy if it may be done opportunely which is to live conveniently to nature This they hold that to live happily depends on opportunity for wisdome commandeth that a wise man if it be required should part with his life Wherefore vice not having power to bring a cause of voluntary death it is manifest that the office even of fooles who are likewise wretched is to continue in life if they are in the greater part of those things which we hold to be according to nature And forasmuch as going out of life and continuing in it be alike miserable neither doth continuance make his life more to be avoided We say not therefore without cause that they who enjoy most naturalls should continue in life Hitherto it appertaines to know that the love of Parents towards their Children is the effect of nature from which beginning we may track all mankinde as proceeding from thence First by the figure and parts of the body which declare that nature carefully provided for procreation Neither can these two agree that nature orders procreation and takes no care that those which are procreated should be loved For even in beasts the power of nature may be seen whose care when we behold in bringing up of their young me thinks we hear the very voice of nature her selfe Wherefore as it is manifest that we abhor pain by nature so it is likewise apparent that we aâ—e drâ—ven by nature to love those we have begotten Hence ariseth a common naturall commendation of men amongst men that it behooveth a man not to seem alienate from man for this very reason because he is man For as among the parts of the body some are made only for themselves as the eyes and ears others assist towards the use of the other parts as the thighes and hands so though some huge beasts are born only for themselves yet that â—hell fish which is called patula prima and the pinnoteres so named from keeping its shell which shutteth it selfe up so close as if it taught others to look to themselves as also Ants Bees Storks do something for the sake of others Much neerer is the conjunction of mankinde so that we are inclined by nature to Conventions Counsells Cities Whatsoever is produced upon the earth is created for the use of man but men are generated for men that they may profit one another In this we ought to follow nature our leader and to bring forth common benefit to the publick by mutuall offices by giving by receiving by arts by endeavours and by faculties to unite the society of man with man The world is governed by the power of God it is as it were a common City of men and Gods and each of us is a part of the world whence it followeth by nature that we should prefer the common benefit before our own For as Lawes prefer the safety of the generall before that of any particular so a good and wise man conformable to Law not ignorant of civill office taketh more care for the benefit of the generall then of any particular or of his own Nor is he who betraies his Country more to be condemned then he who deserts the common benefit or safety Whence it followeth that he is to be commended who undergoeth death for the Common-wealth and teacheth us that our Country is dearer to us then our selves And because that speech is esteemed
inhuman and wicked of those who affirm they care not when they are dead if all the earth were set on fire it is certainly true that we are likewise to provide for those who shall hereafter be even for their own sake From this affection of the soul whence proceed Wills and commendations of dying persons as also forasmuch as no man will live solitary in a desart even with the greatest abundance or plenty it is easily understood that we are born for conjunction congregation or naturall community we are impelled by nature to benefit others the most that we can All these are offices chiefly by teaching and communicating the reasons of prudence so that it is not easie to finde one who will not communicate to some other what he knoweth himselfe Thus we are not only inclined to learn but also to teach And as it is given to Bulls by Nature to fight even with Lyons for their heifers with great force impetuosity so they who abound in wealth and are able to do it as is related of Hercules and Bacchus are incited by nature to preserve mankind Likewise when Iupiter is stil'd Opâ—imus and Maximus Salutaris â—hospitalis Stator we hereby expresse that the safety of mankind is under his tuition But we cannot expect if we our selves are vile abject and neglected amongst our selves that we should be dear to the immortall Gods and loved of them As therefore wee make use of our limbs before that we have learnt for what cause of utility we have them so are we conjoined and consociated amongst our selves by Nature to civill community which if it were otherwise neither would there be any room for Justice or goodnesse Yet though there are mutuall Chains betwixt man and man man hath no common right with beasts by reason of our dissimilitude as both Chrysippus and Possidonius assirm for all other things saith Chrysippus were made for men and the Gods but they for community and society one with another so that men may make use of Beasts for their benefit without doing any wrong Moreover since the nature of man is such that there is a certain civill right betwixt him and all mankind he who preserveth that right is just who transgresseth it unjust But as in a Theater though it be common that room which a man possesseth is justly said to be his place so this civill right in a City and the World doth not repugne to the propriety of particular persons In order to the conservation of all society conjunction and dearâ—â—sse betwixt man and man emoluments and detriments 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which benefit or hurt must be common amongst them and not only common but equall Convenients and Inconvenients 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be common but not equall Those which benefit or hurt are either good or ill and therefore must necessarily be equall convenient and inconvenient are ranked amongst the preferred and rejected and therefore cannot be equall Emoluments and detriments are common but rectitudes and sins not common Herein Friendship is requisite as being one of those things which benefit Some affirm that a good man ought to be as much concern'd for his friend as for himself others that every man ought to be most concern'd for himself Yet these latter confesse that it is contrary to Justice whereunto we are born to take away any thing from another and assume it to our selves Neither can friendship be contracted nor Justice performed for private respects and advantages for then these advantages might overthrow and pervert them But neither could Justice or friendship be at all unlesse they were expetible in themselves Justice is by Nature it is contrary to a wise man not only to do an injury but even to hurt Neither can it be right to injure those who are our friends or have deserved well of us Equity cannot be separated from Utility whatsoever is equall and just is likewise honest and reciprocally whatsoever is honest is equal and just Panaetius who discoursed most accurately of Offices proposeth three kinds wherein men use to deliberate or consult of Offices First when they doubt whether that of which the question is be honest or dishonest Secondly whether it be profitable or unprofitable Thirdly if that which hath the shew of honesty be repugnant to that which seems profitable Next the Gods we are to reverence our Parents and Brethren As concerning the buriall of Parents Chrysippus saith it ought to be done in the most simple manner For the body as the Nails teeth or hair thereof nothing pertaineth to us and therefore ought not to be used with any curiosity or respect Flesh if it bee usefull ought to be converted into aliment though it were a part of our own body as the foot as is proper to it if uselesse put under ground or thrown into some remote place without more respect then wee have of our nailes or haire when cut off Concerning the Office of the Buyer and the Seller Diogenes the Babylonian and Antipatet his Disciple differ Antipater holds that all must be laid open that the Buyer be not ignorant of any thing that the Seller knoweth Diogenes that the Seller as far as is appointed by civill Law ought only to tell the faults and to conceal the rest for as much as he in â—elling desireth to sell to his best advantage Hecaton in his sixth Book of Offices is full of these questions as whether a good man in a dearth may give over house-keeping He disputes it on both sides but concludes that the office is directed rather by profit then humanity He questionâ— whether if at Sea a Ship be to be disburthen'd by the casting out of somthing we should rather cast over-board a horse of great price or a slave worth little In this case private interest leads one way humanity another If a â—ool in a shipwrack catch hold of a plank may a wise man wrest it from him if he can He saith hee may not for it is injurious What may the Master of the Shippe May not he take his own No no more then hâ— may throw a Passenger out of the Ship because it is his own into the Sea For untill they come to the place to which they are bound the Ship is not the Masters but the Passengers What if two Shipwraâ—k'd persons light upon one plank and both plâ—â—k at it should one give it over to the other yes but to him who it is more expedient should live either for his own sake or the Common-wealth But what if these be alike in both There will be no contention but either as it were by lot or mication with the fingers giuoco della mora one will give place to the other What if a Father rob Temples undermine the publick treasury should the Son reveal it to the Magistrates It were a great wickednesse On the contrary he ought to defend
for the Stoiâ—ks take away intellectuall substances affirming all things that are to be comprehended by sense onely differences are not subsistent A solid body according to Apollodorus is divisible three waies into length breadth and depth A superficies is the terme of a body or that which hath onely length and breadth but no depth thus Possidonius A line is the terme of a Superficies or a length without breadth that which hath length only A point is the terme of a line or thâ— least mark A body is divisible into infinite yet it consisteth not of infinite bodies CHAP. III. Of Principles THe place concerning bodies is divided into two degrees into those which produce and those which are produced the first Principles the second Elements â—Principles and Elements differ Principles are ingenerate incorruptible Elements shall perish by conflagration Moreover Principles are bodies and void of form Elements have forme There are two principles of all things the Agent and the Patient The Patient is a substance void of quality called Matter the Agent is the reason which is 〈◊〉 the Matter God Matter is sluggish a thing ready for all things but will cease if none move it The Causâ— that is the Reason â—formeth mâ—tter and moldeth it which way he pleaseth out of which he produceth various woâ—ks There must therefore be something out of which a thing is made and also by which it â—s made This is the Cause that Matter The Cause or active Reason is God In the Agent there is power in the Patient a certain matter or capacity and in both both for matter it selfe could not 〈◊〉 if it were not kept together by a power nor that power without some matter for there is nothing which is not compelled to be somewhere Both 〈◊〉 God and the World the Artist and his work they compâ—ehend within this terme Nature as if nature were God mixed through the World Sometimes they call that naturâ— which containeth the World sometimes that which generateth and produceth things upon the earth The Agent is as we said called the Cause A Cause according to Zeno is that by which there is an effect which is not a Cause 30 or as 〈◊〉 the reason of the effect or as Pâ—ssâ—donius the first Author of a thing A Cause is a body a not Cause a Categorem It is impossible that the cause being assigned the effect should not be present which is to be understood thus The Soule is the â—ause through which we live Prudence the Cause by which we are wise It is impossible that he who hath a Soule should not live or he who hath Prudence should not be wise CHAP. IV. Of Matter THe substance of all qualitative beings is first Matter according to Zeno and â—hrysippuâ— in his first of Physicks Matter is that of which every thing is made it hath two names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Substance and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Matter Substance is of all things in generall Matter of particulars Universall matter is according to Zeno wholly eternall not admitting as Chrysippus saith encâ—â—ase or deâ—rease Particular matter admitteth augmentation and diminution for it remaineth not alwaies the same but is separated and mixed so that according to Chrysippus its parts perish by separation and exist by mutuall mistion But those who call fire aire water and earth Matter assert not a thing void of forme but of a body Matter is a body and finite Possidonius saith that the substance and matter of the Universe is void of quality and form in as much as it hath not a certain figure and quality in it selfe but it is alwaies seen in some figure and quality But the substantiall nature of the Universe differs from matter intentionally only Matter is passible for if it were immutable things could not be generated of it Hence it followeth that it is divisible into infinite yet it selfe as Chrysippus saith it not infinite for nothing that is divisible is infinite but matter is continuous Through this matter Zeno affirmeth that the reason of the World which some call Fate is diffused as feed CHAP. V. Of the World OF this matter was made the World The World hath severall appellations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the World 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the â—ll 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Whole 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 World is taken three waies First for God himselfe who is properly qualified with all Essence incorruptible and ingenerate who framed the Universe after a certain period of time who resolved all nature into himselfe and again generated it out of himselfe Secondly for the starry Ornament and thirdly that which consists of both The All 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is one way taken as Apollodorus saith for the World and another way for the System of the World and the vacuity beyond it The World is finito the vâ—â—uity infinite Thus likewise they distinguish betwixt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 includeth also an infinite vacuity in which the world is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies the world without that vacuity which neither is increased nor diminished but its parts are sometimes extended sometimes contracted It began from the earth as its center for the center is the beginning of a Circle The world is that which is properly qualited with the essence of all things or as Chrysippus and ` Possidonius define it a System of Heaven and Earth and of the natures therein contained or a System of God and Men and of all things that were made for them The world was made by God for if saith Chrysippus there be any thing which produceth such things as Man though indued with reason cannot produce that doubtlesse is greater and stronger and wiser then man But a Man cannot make the Celestiall things therefore that which made them transcendeth man in Art Counsell Prudence and Power and what can that be but God The World was made for those animate â—ssences which have the use of Reason these are the Gods and men then whom nothing is better All things of which it consisteth and which it produceth within it selfe are accommodated to the use of Man The World was made in this manner God in the beginning being alone by himself converted all substance which according to Zeno was fire first into air then into Water And as in the Plant the seed is contained so God who is the prolisick reason of the World left such a â—eed in the humidity as might afford easie and apt matter for the generation of those things that were to be produced Zeno addeth that one part tending downward was condensed into Earth another part remained partly water and partly being exhal'd air of a particle of which air flashed out fire Cleanthes describeth it in this
fish its claws Sense is an apprehension by the Sensitive Organ or a comprehension Sense is taken many waies For the faculty habit act phantasie whereby the sensible object is comprehended and the Hegemonick parts of the Soul are called Sense Again the Sensories are intelligent spirits diffused from the Hegemonick to the Organs The senses are Sight Hearing Smell â—ast Touch. Sight is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the Eies Sight is made by contraction of that light which is between the eye and the object into a Cone according to Chrysippus Apollodorus saith that part of the Air which is Conicall is next the sight the Base next the Object so as that which is seen is pointed out to by the Air as by a stick Colour is the first figuration or habit of matter Darknesse is visible for from the sight there issueth a splendor which passeth round about that darknesse Neither is the sight deceived for it truly sees that it is dark Chrysippus saith that we see according to the intention of the mediate air which is struck by the visuall spirit which passeth from the Hegemonick to the apple of the eye and after that blow falleth upon the ear next extending it self in a Conicall figure Again from the eye are emitted fiery raies not black or dusky and therefore darknesse is visible Hearing is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the Ears Hearing is made when the Air betwixt the speaker and hearer is verberated in a circulation and at last by agitation passeth in at the Ears as the circles that are made in a pond by casting in a stone Smelling is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the nostrils Tasting is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the Tongue Touching is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the superficies so that it perceiveth that which is obliged to it The sixt part of the Soul is the Generative which is a spirit from the Hegemonick to the Parastatae of this part see Laertius from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Pluâ—arch de Philosoph Plac. lib. 5. cap. 4 5 9 11 12 13 15 16 17 23. The seventh and last part of the Soul is that which Zeno calls vocall commonly called the Voice It is a spirit proceeding from the Hegemonick part to the throat tongue and other proper Instruments of speech Voice is Air not composed of little pieces but whole and continuous having no vacuity in it This Air being struck by the wind spreadeth into circles infinitely untill the Air round about it be filled like the Water in a pond by throwing in of a stone only the Water moves spherically the Air circularly Voice is a body for it acteth it striketh upon and leaveth an impression in our Ear as a seal in Wax Again whatsoever moveth and disturbeth some affection is a body Harmony moveth with delight discord disturbeth Again whatsoever is moved is a body but Voice is moved and reverberated from smooth places as a ball against a Wall So in the Aegyptian Pyramids one Voice is redoubled four or five times CHAP. XVII Of God HItherto of the Material principle and that which is produced of it we come now to the other principle the Agent God This question they divide into four parts first that there are Gods secondly what they are thirdly that they order the world fourthly that they take care of humane affairs Cleanthes saith that the notions of God are imprinted in the minds of men from four causes First from Divination for the Gods afford us signes of future things wherein if there be any mistake it is not from their part but from the errour of humane conjecture The second is from the multitude of good things wee receive by the temperature of Heaven the fertility of the Earth and abundance of other benefits The third from the Terrour of Thunder Tempest Rain Snow Hail Devastation Pestilence Earthquakes and somtimes groanings showers of stones and blood Portents Prodigies Comets and the like with which men are affrighted into a belief that there is a heavenly divine power The fourth and greatest cause is the aequability of the motion and revolution of Heaven the Sun Moon and starres their distinctions variety beauty order the very sight whereof declares that they were not made by chance That there are Gods Chrysippus proveth thus If there is something in Nature which the mind reason power and faculties of man could not make that which did make it is better then Man but Celestiall things and all those whose order is sempiternal could not be made by Man there is therefore somthing which made them which is better then Man and what is that but God For if there are no Gods what can there be in Nature better then Man for in him only is reason then which nothing is more excellent But for a man to think that there is nothing in the World better then himself is a foolish arrogance Therefore there is somthing better and consequently there is a God Zeno more concisely thus That which is rationall is better then that which is irrationall but nothing is better then the World therefore the World is rationall In like manner may be proved that the World is wise that it is happy that it is eternall for all these are better then the want of these But there is nothing better then the World whence it followeth that the World is God Again he argues thus No part of an insensible thing hath sense but the parts of the World have sense therefore the World hath sense He proceedeth to urge this more strictly Nothing saith he that is void of minde and reason can of it selfe generate that which is animate and rationall but the world generates animate and rationall creatures therefore the world is animate and rationall Likewise according to his custome he concludeth his argument with a similitude IF out of an Olive-tree should come harmonious Pipes that made Musick you would not doubt but that the science of Musick were in the Olive-tree What if a Plain-tree should bear Musicall instruments you would think there were musick in those Plain-trees Why then should we not judge the world to be animate and wise that produceth out of it selfe animate and wise creatures There is nothing besides the world which wanteth nothing and which is perfect and compleat in all its numbers and parts for as the cover saith Chrysippus was made for the shield's sake and the scabberd for the swords so besides the world all other things were made for the sake of something else Fruites of the earth were made for living creatures living irrationall creatures for the use of man horses for carriage oxen for tillage dogs for hunting and defence but man himselfe was made to contemplate and imitate the world Not that he is at all perfect but only a part of that
sicknesse For this agreeth not with the Author of Nature and Parent of all good things but he having generated many great things most apt and usefull other things also incommodious to those which he made were aggenerated together with them coherent to them made not by Nature but certain necessary consequence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 As saith he when Nature framed the bodies of Men more subtle reason the benefit of the World would have required that the head should have been made of the smallest and thin bones but this utility would have been followed by another extrinsecall inconvenience of greater consequence that the head would be too weakly defended and broken with the least blow Sicknesses therefore and diseases are engendred whilst health is engendred In like manner saith he whilst Vertue is begotten in Man by the counsell of Nature vices like wise are begotten by contrary affinity CHAP. XVIII Of Nature NExt Iupiter Possidonius placeth Nature By Nature they somtimes understand that which containeth the World somtimes that which produceth things upon Earth both which as we said is to be understood of God For that Nature which containeth and preserveth the World hath perfect sence and reason which power is the Soul of the World the mind and divine Wisdom Thus under the terme of Nature they comprehend both God and the World affirming that the one cannot be without the other as if Nature were God permeating through the World God the mind of the World the World the body of God This Chrysippus calleth Common-Nature in distinction from particular Nature Nature is defined by Zeno an artificial fire proceeding in the way of generation which is the fiery spirit the Artist of formes by others a habit receiving motion from it self according to prolifick reason and effecting and containing those things which subsist by it in certain definite times producing all things from which it self is distinct by Nature proposing to it self these two ends Utility and Pleasure as is manifest from the porduction of man CHAP. XIX Of Fate THe third from Iupiter according to Possidonius is Fate for Iupiter is first next Nature then Fate They call Fate a concatenation of Causes that is an order and connexion which cannot be transgressed Fate is a cause depending on Laws and ordering by Laws or a reason by which the World is ordered Fate is according to Zeno the motive power of matter disposing so and so not much diftering from Nature and Providence Panaetius assirmeth Fate to be God Chrysippus desineth Fate a spirituall power governing the World orderly or a sempiternall and indeclinable series and chain of things it self rolling and implicating it self by eternall orders of consequence of which it is adapted and connected or as Chrysippus again in his Book of Definitions hath it The reason of the World or Law of all things in the World governed by Providence or the reason why things past have been the present are the future shall be For Reason he useth Truth Cause Nature Necessity and other termes as attributed to the same thing in different respects Fate from the severall distributions thereof is called Clotho Lachesis and Atropos Lachesis as it dispenseth to every one as it were by lot Atropos as it is an immutable dispensation from all eternity Clotho in allusion to the resemblance it hath with spinning and twisting of Threads Necessity is a cause invincible most violent and inforcing all things Fortune is a Cause unknown and hidden to humane reason For some things come by Necessity others by Fate some by deliberate Counsel others by Fortune some by Casualty But Fate being a connexion of Causes interlaced and linked orderly compriseth also that cause proceedeth from us That all things are done by Fate is asserted by Zeno in his Book of Fate and Possidonius in his second Book of Fate and Boethus in his 11th of Fate Which Chrysippus proves thus If there is any motion without a cause then every axiom is not either true or false for that which hath not efficient causes will be neither true nor false but every axiom is either true or false therefore there is no motion without a cause And if so then all things that are done are done by precedent causes and if so all things are done by Fate That all axioms are either true or false Cicero saith he labour'd much to prove whereby he takes away Possibles indeterminates and other distinctions of the Academicks of which see Alcinous Chap. 26. In answer to the sluggish reason if it be your fate to die of this sicknesse you shall die whether you have a Physician or no and if it be your fate to recover you shall recover whether you have a Physitian or not Chrysippus saith that in things some are simple some conjunct Simple is thus Socrates shall die on such a day for whether he do any thing or not it is appointed he should die on such a day But if it be destin'd thus Laius shall have a son Oedipus it cannot be said whether he accompany with a woman or not for it is a conjunct thing and confatall as he termes it because it is destin'd that Laius shall lie with his wife and that he shall get Oedipus of her As if we should say Milo shall wrastle at the Olympick Games and another should infer then he shall wrastle whether he have an adversary or no he were mistaken for that he shall wrastle is a conjunct thing because there is no wrastling without an adversary Thus are refelled all sophismes of this kinde you shall recover whether you have a Physician or not for it is no lesse determined by fate that you shall have a Physician than that you shall recover They are confatall Thus there being two opinions of the old Philosophers one that all things are so done by Fate that Fate inferreth a power of Necessitie as Democritus Heraclitus Empedocles and Aristotle held the other that the motions of our souls were voluntary without any Fate Chrysippus as an honourable Arbitratour took the middle way betwixt these but inclining most to those who conceived the motions of our souls free from necessitie The Antients who held all things to be done by Fate said it was by a violence and necessitie those who were of the contrary opinion denyed that Fate had any thing to do with our assent and that there was no necessitie imposed upon assents They argued thus If all things are done by Fate all things are done by an antecedent cause and if appetite then likewise those things which follow appetite therefore assents also But if the cause of appetite is not in us neither is the appetite it selfe in our power and if so neither those things which are effected by appetite are in our power and consequently neither assents nor actions are in our power whence it followeth that neither praise can be