Nothing more obstructs the way to Natural Science than the doctrin of Vulgar Philosophers That Qualities are certain Kinds of little Entities which of themselves have a diminutive sort of Being and are able to produce such and such Effects For example Ask them how a Bell works that effect upon my Ear which we call Sound they 'll tell you there is a Quality in the Bell call'd Sonoreity whose nature it is to make a Sound Ask how a Green thing makes such a pleasing Impression on my Eye they 'll answer There is a certain Quality in it call'd Greenness whose nature 't is to work such an Effect and so of the rest Which ridiculous Method explicates nothing but makes the Silliest old wife as good a Philosopher as the most Learned Naturalist if she can but name the Word that Signifies that Quality Next it makes Learners rest easily contented and well appay'd with a meer Word whence they will grow Negligent and Careless to take pains to look into the Natures of the Things or else if they have any wit in them to despair of all knowledge of Nature by seeing their Masters so profoundly Ignorant and so Superficially Learned And lastly it hinders Learners from Seeing or even endeavouring to see the Natural Proportion and Alliance between Proper Causes and their Effects and inclines them to take purely upon trust the whole Administration of Nature and all Consequence of one thing from another which renders all natural Science precarious For 't is not Science unless we use our own Eyes and see the point Demonstrated Jurare in verba is in such cases the Fool 's Oath and is in plain terms to swear the Devoting or giving up our Reason to a Slothful Contentedness never to grow Wiser LESSON VII Of the Common Head of Relation 1. THE Notion of Relation being what one Individual Thing is if compar'd to another there must be some Real Ground of it in the thing Referr'd which is the Reason of our Referring it and by which formally we do thus Refer it For otherwise Relation would be a Chimerical and Fictitious Notion and not a Real or Natural one common to all Mankind and held by them to be such which yet we experience by our daily Converse with them it is 2. This Ground cannot be their having Disparate or Disagreeing Notions in them or their being of Disparate Orders which have nothing to do with one another For we find that we cannot Refer or compare Green and Hard Youthful and Transparent Hot and Triangular nor any other disparate Notions nor yet a Writer and a Plough-share a Father and a Mill-stone a Brother and a Handsaw c. because they are in Disparate Orders and have no Respect to one another grounding our Referring them or Comparing them together as have a Writer and a Writing a Father and a Son a Baker and Bread c. 3. Wherefore the Ground of Relation must either be some Notion agreeing to both the things related that is found to belong to both either Intrinsecally or Extrinsecally or else their having Communication with one another by way of natural Action and Passion This is prov'd by the former Section and is evident because there can be no other Considerations by which they can be order'd to one another or be of the same Order but their having some Intrinsecal Notion common to both or else their Acting and Suffering upon and from one another which is an Extrinsecal Consideration 4. Relations of the first sort which have one and the same Notion in them are of as many kinds as there are Heads of Notions since all these have a kind of Nature or Notion in them and so some kind of Transcendent Unity Thus if they have the same Nature or Essence in them which belongs to the Common Head of Substance the Relation between them is call'd Identity which is their being of one and the same kind of Entity If of one and the same Notion of Quantity 't is call'd Equality which is their being of one and the same Quantity If of Quality 't is call'd Likeness if of Action singly consider'd they are call'd Co-actors as Fellow-Souldiers Fellow-Servants c. If of Passion singly consider'd Fellow-Sufferers Fellow-Martyrs c. If of Place or Vbi Bed-fellows Chamber-fellows Townsmen Country-men c. If of Time Contemporaries Co-eve or born at the same time If of Habit Fellow-Mourners Fellow-Curassiers Fellow-Souldiers of the Blew or Grey Regiment If of Situation Fellow-Assessors or Sitters tho' such as this seldom occur Nay there may be a Relation grounded on having the same notion even of Relation in them as Parents or Fellow-begetters 5. Of the second sort grounded on Action and Passion not singly consider'd but with an Order to one another or as Inferring one another are such as these viz. Father and Son Master and Servant Prince and Subject Tutor and Pupil which are grounded on the Actions and Passions of Begetting and being Begotten Commanding and being Commanded Governing and being Governed Teaching and being Taught c. 6. In both these sorts of Relations the things Referr'd must have their Correlates that is there must be a mutual Relation on both sides In the former of them because there is the selfsame Ground or Reason of Referring in one as in the other viz. that one same Notion Common or Belonging to Both to wit the same Essence same Quantity same Quality same Relation same Place same Time same sort of Action and Passion same Situation and the same Habit. 7. This Agreeing and Corresponding of the two things thus Related in those of the former kind of Relation must be meant to be their Agreeing in the same Abstracted and Common or Specifical Notion and not in the same Individual one For otherwise two Men could not have Identity in their Individual Essence since then they would be the same and not the same that is Vnum and Non-unum And for the same reason Intrinsecal Accidents being Identify'd with the Subjects in which they inhere and having no Entity but theirs they can have no Individuality but by them and so the same Individual Intrinsecal Accident cannot be Common to two Subjects or Substances but must be Individually Two as They are Whence the Relations grounded on them must be upon their being the same in Species or Kind and not Individually Which reason holds equally for those Relations that are grounded on Action Passion and Situation and the rest For two things cannot be in one Individual place that is in a place capable to hold but one Individual thing without Penetration of Bodies Nor is it possible in the course of Natural Causes that two should be born or dye at the same precise Time that is in such a portion of Time as is terminated by the same Instants Nor can Two wear the same Individual Arms c. at once Wherefore it must be meant that the Notion common to both must be an abstracted or specifical Notion and
't is evident that Rarefaction and Condensation import no more in their Notion but the altering the Subject according to some Quality whereas Division imports directly the taking away the Vnity of the Thing and consequently its Entity Again meer Rarefaction does not change the Substance but the Degree of it when it comes to great height and every Body admits Rarefaction a long time without losing its former Essence whereas Division consists in an Indivisible so that the Divisum esse is esse aliud or esse duo ex uno whereas the Rarefactum esse may be without any such Effect following it 5. Rarefaction and Condensation are the next Actions in Dignity For since as was proved above Rarity and Density are the First Intrinsecal Differences of Quantity as it affects Body in order to natural Action and Passion it follows that those natural Actions that cause Rarity or Density are the next in dignity to Division which works more upon Divisibility their Genus 6. These three sorts of Action take up the whole Head of Natural Action For since the Genus and its two Differences must needs comprehend all under any common Head as being Adequate to it and Division answers to Divisibility the Genus and Rarefaction and Condensation to the Intrinsecal Differences of more or less thus Divisible it follows that these three sorts of Action do take up all that Head so that there cannot be any kind of Natural Action which is not reducible to some of these or not comprehended under them Besides all the First and Second Passible Qualities which generally are the Immediate Objects of Natural Actions are comprehended in or spring out of Rarity and Density as will be seen in Physicks 7. The Formal Virtue of Acting or working any Effect which we call its Causality is the Agent 's being what it is or its very Existence apply'd by Motion to the Patient and Communicated to it or as it were imprinted on it For since no particular Agent in Nature can do every thing whatever the reason why such particular Causes work such particular Effects must spring hence that the Effect has something in its Nature that is like the Cause comes from it and is Communicated to the Patient or partak'd by it Whence come those Vulgar Axioms Operari sequitur esse Every thing acts as it is An Effect is a participation of the immediate Caâ—se c. Thus the Cause or Reason why Water moistens is because it is moist in it self and imparts that Quality to another thing The reason why a Seal makes such an Impression is because it self is of such a stamp The reason why God Creates or is the Cause of Being is because Being is Essential to him Corol. II. Hence Motion is only requisit to apply the Virtue or Existence of the Agent to the Matter or Patient but the Substance of the Effect springs from the Cause's being what it is Whence it happens that the Effect from the same Causes is more or less perfect according as the Existence of a Cause which is of such a Nature or Essence or more or fewer parts of it are apply'd better or worse to the Patient or to more or fewer parts of it by a feebler or smarter Motion 8. It follows from this discourse that there must be Four Sorts of Causes necessarily belonging to every Effect in Nature viz. There must be an Acter which we call the Efficient Cause a Subject for the Acter to work upon called the Material Cause The Effect wrought in that Matter or Receiv'd in it which makes it otherwise than it was before and therefore has the Notion of some Form newly accruing to it which constitutes the Formal Cause And since Corporeal Action is Motion and no Body can move it self and therefore all Motion in Nature must be caus'd either Mediately or Immediately by something that is not a Body that is by a Spiritual or Intelligent Being and such Agents do design or act for an End therefore there must also be a Final Cause to make those Agents to move Bodies and make them act as they do in every particular Action tho' never so minute which grounds our Notion of Providence adequately Governing the World even as to the least circumstance of it Wherefore there are to every Action in Nature Four Causes necessarily requisit which will afford Reflecters ample occasion for Speculation and Contemplation For example When I write a Letter the Efficient Cause is my Self the Material Cause Paper which receives the Effect of my Writing The Formal Cause the Characters received in the Paper the Final Cause to gratify my Friend treat of Business or acquaint him with News 9. There is no Fifth Cause call'd an Idea as Plato affirms For either that Idea is conceiv'd as introduced in the matter and Receiv'd there and then 't is clearly a Formal Cause or as 't is in the Mind of the Artificer and then it concurrs to make him an Efficient Cause for without such an Idea he could not produce such an Artificial Effect 10. Operation has not the same Notion with Action but is Indifferent to Action and Passion or rather a kind of Neutral Notion made up of both For example Notions or Simple Apprehensions are said to be the First Operation of our Understanding tho' the Soul in having them is purely Passive So also my Acts of Discoursing Willing c. are call'd Operations tho' they be both perform'd by my Soul and Receiv'd in it Whence they have a kind of Neutral Notion such as have Curro ardeo and such-like taking such words not in a Grammatical but in a Philosophical and Natural Sense Of which kind are all Immanent Actions or Acts And therefore these are not so properly call'd Actions as Operations in order to what they have of Effective in them or else Acts because they Actuate or Inform the Subject in which they are as well Received as they are Produced by it Whence Action in the Proper and Obvious Sense signifies the Efficience of a Natural Cause which has a Transitive Notion and inferrs Passion and consequently some Effect in the Extrinsecal Subject it lights on Note That since Action inferrs Passion and referrs to it hence whatever is discoursed here of Action may by turning the Tables as it were or considering Motion in order to its other Term be understood likewise of Passion for which reason we treat of both those Heads in the same Discourse LESSON IX Of the Common Head of Ubi or Where 1. UBI or Where signifying in what Place the Notion of Place must first be rightly understood e're we can have a right Notion of the Common Head call'd Ubi And the word Place being no Artificial Term but a Natural one and us'd by all Mankind we are to learn the true and proper meaning of it from the Users of it that is we must take the Notion of Place not from men of Art or Speculaters but from the Vulgar
propositions are directly opposit to Contradictions since Man's Wit cannot invent a proposition directly Opposit to what runs runs not but what runs runs which is perfectly Identical Add that all Fault consisting in this that 't is a Privation of the Opposit Good Contradictions would not be at all Faulty but that they violate the Truth of Identical propositions as has been now proved since there are no other Truths which they directly and formally Oppose or destroy 12. Again as will be seen hereafter to Conclude is to shew the Terms of the Conclusion to be Connected by their being Connected with a Third or Middle Term in the Premisses But how can we shew that Middle Term is really connected with those Two other Terms in the Premisses By finding still another Middle Term to be connected with the Terms of the proposition to be proved And how far must this go on Endlesly or no If Endlesly it is impossible any thing should ever come to be prov'd if not then we must come to some proposition whose Terms are so Connected that no Middle Term can come between them that is such as cannot be Connected by means of Another that is which cannot be prov'd or made evident that is which are self-connected or self-evident that is which are formally Identical To enforce this we may observe that the more Remotâ— the Terms of a proposition are from Formal Identity the less evident they are and the more prooâ— they require as also that they grow still nearer to Evidence according to the degree of their Approaching to be Formally the same Wherefore since all Approach of Distant things ends in their Conjoyning and Centering in the same 't is manifest that all Approach of Distant Notions ends in their being the same in Notion or in a proposition Formally Identical as in a First and Self-evident Principle 13. Besides all Causality or the whole Course of Nature is finally refunded into this Self-evident Principle that Things are such as they are that is are what they are For since an Effect is a Participation of something that is in the Cause and the Cause as such is that which imparts or communicates something it has to the Matter on which it works its Effect Again since the Effect is such as the Cause is as to that which is imparted to it and if the Cause be of another sort the Effect still varies accordingly there can be no doubt but that Causality is the Imprinting the Existence of that Essence or Thing which is the Cause upon the Matter Whence follows evidently that the very Notion of Natural Causality and the whole Efficacy of it consists in the Causes existing that is being what it is Only Motion is added as a Common Requisit to apply that Existing Cause better or worse which is refunded into a Nature Superiour to Body as will be shewn hereafter 14. Lastly God himself has exprest his own Supreme Essence by this Identical Proposition Ego Sum qui Sum that is I exist or am Existence Which is the same in a manner with Self existence is Self-Existence Which therefore is the First Increated Truth as 't is the First Created one that what is is or A thing is what it is which is therefore True because God is what He is or because Self-existence is Self-existence From which Divine and Soveraign Verity all our Created First Principles derive their Truth For were not This True all our Identical Proposition and First Principles would all be False in regard they have their Verity from the Natures of the Things and of our Vnderstanding neither of which could have their Metaphysical Verity nor consequently could they ground or be capable of any Truth at all if Self-Existence their Cause were not Self-Existence and thence Unlimited in Power Wisdome and Goodness to Create and Conserve those Beings which are the Foundation of all the Truth we have or can have The Reader is desired to referr this Section to the Third Corollary and to consider them well together because they mutually give Light to one another And if we rightly consider it as the Proposition Homo est Homo is onely the reducing the Metaphysical Verity of Homo into a Formal Truth so Self Existence is self-Existence is the same in respect of the Soveraign Metaphysical Verity of the Divine Nature Corol. IV. Hence is seen that an Atheist can have no perfectly Certain Knowledge or Evidence of any thing but that by denying his Maker he deservedly comes to lose the best Perfection of his own Nature For if a Sceptick should put him to prove that things have any Metaphysical Verity in them grounding our first Principles and consequently all our Knowledge and object that for any thing he knows Things are Chimerical and so contriv'd as to beget in us False Judgments he is utterly at a loss through his denying a First Cause whose Unchangeable and Essential Truth and Goodness has Establisht their Natures to bee Unalterably what they are whence onely any Certain and Evident Knowledge of them is possible to be attain'd 15. Definitions tho' very useful to Science are not Self evident nor are those Propositions that Predicate the Definition of the Notion Defin'd First Principles For Self-evident Principles by force of their very Terms do oblige the Understanding to assent which such Propositions do not Again Art is requisit to make such Definitions as are Proper and Adjusted to the Thing Defin'd whereas First Principles must antecede all Art and be known by the Natural Light of our Understanding Besides the Possibility of being defind goes before the Definition which Possibility the Thing has from its Metaphysical Verity determining it to be This and no other For if the thing were not truly what it is it could not be exexplaind to be what it is were it not One that is Undivided in its self and Divided from all others it could not be compriz'd in one Definition and if it were not Determinately of this or that Nature it 's certain Bounds and Limits could not be drawn which is done by the Definition Whence 't is manifest that that proposition which affirms that a Thing is what it is is the First Principle and Ground to all Definitions and therefore Definitions themselves are not First Principles 16. This is further evinc'd because Words being liable to Equivocalness where there are more words as there are in Definitions there is more room for Equivocation which Inconvenience appears no where more than in the known Definition of Man For there wants not many Witty or rather half-witted Discoursers who Distinguish that is makes Ambiguous the Word Rational and do not stick to maintain that Man is Rational or Concluding being the Proper Act of Reason can Conclude Evidently in Lines and Numbers but not in Logick Physicks Ethicks or Metaphysicks much less in Theology and by this means they cramp the Definition to less than half the sense the words contain There are others
but must be made so by Proof Yet since all Deduction or Proof is made by Connexion of Notions and those Notions or what corresponds to them must be Connected in the Thing e're they can be so in our Understanding and Properties are more nearly ally'd to the Essence than other Accidents as resulting necessarily from it or being immediately Connected with it hence they are by consequence most easily Proveable to belong truly to the Thing and therefore very fit to be made use of in Demonstrations 14. Of this sort are all Propositions whose Predicates are Proper Causes and Effects and more immediately the Powers or Virtues by which they Act on others or Suffer from others as will be seen when we come to treat of Demonstration 15. Propositions whose Predicates belong to the last Predicable are utterly Inevident and as such not easily Evidenceable For since as was shewn above such Predicates do belong to the Subject but by chance or as their very name imports by Accident and Chance signifies a Cause which we do not see or know it follows that the Connexion of such Predicates with the Subject can never be known by Reason or prov'd that they must belong to it because we can never know alâ— the Causes that concur'd to make them belong to it Wherefore such Propositions are utterly Inevident nor as they are Accidents or Unconnected with the Essence easily Evidenceable by way of Reason that they must belong to them however they may be known to belong actually to them hic nunc by Sense or Experience Such Predicates are mostly those of the six last Predicaments and many Quantities Qualities and Relations 16. Notwithstanding those Propositions which have such Accidental Predicates were all the Causes by which they hap to belong to the Subject perfectly known might be perfectly Evident and Demonstrable For as we can Demonstrate one Effect that needs but one Cause to put it from that single Cause so did we know all the Causes that concur'd to any Effect which is brought about by many Causes we could certainly conclude and know such an Effect would follow in which case the Predicate would be no longer an Accident but the Proper Effect of that Complex of Causes nor would the Proposition it self be any longer meerly Accidental Corol. VI. Hence there is nothing Contingent or Accidental to God but all Events tho' never so minute or so odd are Equally Certain to him as the most Immediate Effect of the most Proper and most Necessary Causes because he lays and comprehends the whole Series of Causes that concur to bring about every least Effect LESSON IV. Of the Generating of Knowledge in us and of the Method how this is perform'd HItherto of Knowledges or Judgments according to their Dependence on one another and their being Resolv'd Artificially into First Principles Our next task is to consider them according to the Order they are instill'd into us Naturally 1. The Soul or the Understanding is at first void of all kind of Knowledge or Rasa Tabula For since the Author of Nature does nothing in vain nor acts needlesly he puts no Effects immediately or without Second Causes when there are Causes laid by him to produce them and since we experience that Causes are laid by Him apt to imprint Notions in us and that the Nature of our Soul being evidently Comparative we can compare those Notions and can see how they Agree or Disagree which is to know Hence in case the Soul had any Notions or Knowledges infus'd into her otherwisâ— than by those Causes it would frustrate and make void that Course of natural Agents which is apt to beget Knowledge in us and make Nature contradict her self Again since we experience that we know no more than we have Notions of and that we can compare those Notions and can know all things we have Notions of and do thus rightly Compare and that both those effects do follow naturally from the Impressions of Objects and from the nature of the Soul it falls into the same Absurdity to affirm that those Causes do only Excite and not Beget Knowledge in us Lastly the contrary Opinion supposes the Soul to be an Ens before the Body or at least distinct from it and then 't is both Unconceivable and Inexplicable how they can ever come to be Vnited so as to compound one Ens. For this cannot be done Quantitatively as is evident nor by their Acting together as the Cartesians hold both because all Action presupposes the Being of a thing whence they must be one Ens before they can Act as one Ens as also because the Line or predicament of Action is distinct from that of Ens and Extrinsecal to it and so cannot Intrinsecally constitute those Joynt-Acters One Ens or Thing Nor can it be conceiv'd that the Body if it be not one Ens with the Soul can act with it otherwise than as its Instrument and it would be most Absurd to say that my Hand and Pen are oâ—e thing because they jointly concurr in their different ways to the Action of Writing Wherefore the Soul has no Antecedent Knowledge but is a Rasa Tabula capable to receive such Impressions as beget Knowledge in her 2. The First Judgment in order of Nature the Soul has is that its self or the Man exists For since as was shewn the First Notions the Soul has are of the Man himself and of his Existence and all Judgmenâ—s are made by Compounding or Comparing of Notions it follows that the most Obvious most Easie most Natural and consequently the First Judgment in priority of Nature that a Man has when he is ripe to judge is that Himselâ— is or I am 3. The next Judgment is that He is struck or affected by some Object without him for since the Course of Nature is Motion and therefore Objects are continually moving where the Man is and so do light and act on his Senses that is do work Experimental Knowledge in him that he is acted upon or struck by them it follows that he must after he comes to frame Judgments necessarily and frequently know and consequently Judge he is struck Nor can this be the first Judgment both for the Reason lately given Sect. 2. as also because in this Proposition I am struck the Proposition I am is most Simple and manifestly antecedes I am struck the Notion of struck being clearly superadded to it 4. The next Knowledge or next Judgment to the former in order of Nature is I am struck thus or Affected after such a manner For the Notion of I am struck is more Simple and so antecedes I am struck thus which superadds to it Whence this proposition is prov'd by the same reason that was brought for the third Section 5. These Judgments had we are furnish'd by Nature with Means of Knowing in some measure the Distinct Natures of all things that affect us For since we get all our Notions
it The Objecter then slides over the Certainty of this proposition I think as compar'd with the proposition I am and other Judgments experimentally known and compares it with other propositions subsequent to I think Wherefore he first supposes it to be most Certain that is more Certain than they are and prefers it before all others without Comparing it with those others which is to suppose it so gratis and which is yet more strange he grounds all Knowledge whatever upon it 13. 'T is yet a worse Error that whereas Ens or Being is the Basis of all other Notions so that if no Thing be They cannot be the Alledger by arguing thus Cogito ergo sum does by a strange Hysteron proteron put an Operation to be Antecedent to Being it self and that to be Thinking is a more Simple Clear and Distinct Notion than to be And then from an Operation found out or suppos'd he concludes the very Notion of Being it self to be in the Thing Nay which is yet more odd he supposes the Notion of Knowledge of Himself imported by the Word Ego and supposes that Ens or Ego to be as is signified by the Copula Sum nay more he supposes that Ens or himself not onely to be â—ut moreover to be such viz. Operating or Thinking which most evidently speak or imply Existence and when he has done all this he Infers thence contrary to our 3d. 4th Sect. the simple being of that which he had not onely put to be and be known but which he had over and above put to be or be known to be such that is to be Operating or Thinking 14. Hence this Method of Generating Science is Unnatural Preposterous and Self-contradictory T is Vnnatural first because the way Nature takes to Beget Knowledge in us is not by divesting our selves of all other Knowledges to find out what 's most Certain but she at first instils Knowledge into us by a Natural way of Imprinting Notions in our Mind and our Conparing them and thence letting us See whether they Agree or Disagree 2 ly because it strains Nature to fancy our selves Ignorant of many Clear Truths which the goodness of the same Nature forces us to assent to as Evident And 3 ly because I am is according to the Order of Nature Antecedent to I am Thinking T is Preposterous because it argues from Compound Judgments which are less known to inâ—er what 's more Simple and so more known And lastly t is Self contradictory because it supposes that to bee or to be known which as yet according to that doctrine is not or is not known but is to be Concluded that is made known as is shewn Section 13th 15. Hypothetical Philosophy which is grounded on Suppositions and beggs that such and such things may be yielded and then it will explicate alâ— Nature is built on meer Fancy and is unworthy the name of Philosophy For since it belongs to a Philosopher to Resolve all Truths into their Principles and all Natural Effects into their Proper Causes and finally if need be into their first Principles or First Causes and a Hypothetical Philosopher can never perform this Duty which is most Essential to a Philosopher in regard the First Grounds he layes are barely begg'd or Supposed that is neither self-Evident nor made Evident by way of Proof Hence Hypothetical Philosophy is utterly unworthy the name of Philosophy since all its Assertions and Conclusions if driven home are resolved finally into Precarious Suppositions Again since all Speculation is Aiery and Fantastical that is not grounded on the Things as they are found in Nature and such Discoursers do not finally build their Discourses on the Natures of the Things as they find them to be but on their being such as they suppose them or would have them to be it follows that the whole Scheme of their Doctrine and all the speculations they advance how Ingenious so ever they may appear are far from Solid and in reality Groundless Aiery and Fantastical 16. Hence follows that who ever supposes any Principle or Proposition that influences his Explication of Nature or of Natural Effects which arâ— apt to be produced by Natural Causes and demonstrated by them whether that Principle be that Matter is divided into such or such parts or that it is moved in such a manner That it continues its motion without a Natural Motive Cause continually acting on it notwithstanding that it still meets with Rubbs from other parts of Matter which it â—reaks asunder That there are such Figures of it's Parts or such Qualities affecting the Subject and giving it a Virtue of Operating thus or thus That â—here are multitudes of little Entities brought in â—o serve a present turn when the Discourser is at 〈◊〉 plunge or Atomes pursuing and over taking â—heir fellows and clinging together conveniently â—or his purpose without giving a reason why and 〈◊〉 they must do so as is the manner of the Epiâ—ureans or what ever other useful Expedient he â—upposes to carry on the Clockwork of his Scheme such a man is no true Philosopher 17. Likewise who ever layes for his Ground â—hat neither is nor can be viz. Vacuum Imaginary Space Subsistent Dimensions Infinit Expansion of Continu'd Quantity Infinit Number of Atomes and suchlike can be no true Philosopher since they as do the former Resolve things finally into their own Unprov'd and Ridiâ—ulous Suppositions and would have us accept their Groundless Fancies for First Principles when as many â—imes the contrary to these is clearly demonstrable 18. Whoever proceeds meerly upon Experiments and Induction and cannot assign Proper Causes for the Effects or Matters of Fact they see â—one how ever their Inquisitiveness into Nature may merit Commendation and oblige Artificers and Practical men by many useful Observations and in some measure help Speculative Men also who do make use of Principles to find out more easily the Proper Causes of many Effects from which Industrious Researches into Nature such men may deserve the name of Virtuosi or Curious and Ingenious persons yet since as will be shewn hereafter they cannot by that Method alone without making use of Principles refund Effects into their Proper Causes nor give the true reason of the Effects they Experience nor Deduce so much as one Scientifical Conclusion they cannot in true speech be call'd Men of Science or Philosophers 19. Those of the Vulgar who have good Mother-witts and addict themselves to think much and attentively of some certain Natural Objects may by Practical Self-evidence well improv'd arrive to such a true Knowledge of the Causes of things as may rank them in the next Class of Knowers to Scientifical Men or true Philosophers For such Men by an Innate or Casual Addiction of their Thoughts to some particular sorts of Natures and by industrious and frequent consideration of them joyn'd with a natural Sagacity to penetrate them and natural Logick to discourse them in their thoughts are furnish'd with
their Identicals And the same may be said of other Qualities that affect our Senses very distinctly as Heat Cold Moist Dry c. Note that in such as these if it be too laborious to arrive at their Definitions by dividing the Common Genus as it often happens when the Dividing Members are more than Two and are not Contradictory to one another then we may frame our Definitions of them by observing the carriage of the Vulgar towards them or their Sayings concerning them For such Qualities being sensible ones are the Objects of the Senses of Mankind and do imprint Lively and Distinct Notions of themselves in all men Wherefore their Sayings being the Effect of the true Notions they have of them they if enow of them be collected must give us the true Notion of them or which is all one of what they mean by the Word that expresses them which is equivalent in Sense to a perfect Definition For example when they speak of those Qualities we call Dry and Moist we shall observe that they are sollicitous lest Moist things should squander and run about and therefore they are careful themselves to put such things in some Receptacle or Vessel that may keep them from doing so or they bid their Servants do it On the Contrary they bid them set Dry things on the Cupboard or on a Shelf and never put them in a Vessel or be at the needless labour of pounding them into a Pot or Tub out of fear they should squander about Which sayings and behaviour of theirs gives us the Definitions of both those Qualities viz. that Moist is that which difficultly keeps its own bounds or Figure and is easily accommodated to the bounds of another thing and Dry is that which easily retains its own bounds or Figure and is Difficulty accommodated to the bounds of another which are the very Definitions which that great Observer of Nature Aristotle gives us of those two Qualities Note II. Whence we may with a humble Acknowledgment and Thanks reflect on the Infinite Goodness of the God of Truth who unenviously bestows knowledge on all who will dispose themselves to receive it that where-ever Art by reason of our Shortness is at a plunge he supplies it by Practical Self-evidence or the naturally instill'd Knowledge of the Vulgar whence it is a high Pride in the greatest Men of Art to conceit that they are above being still the Children of Nature whereas 't is the best Title they have to True and Solid Learning Sus Minervam 8. All Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses For since the Premisses by Means of the Middle Term and the right Placing of it have in them the whole force of the Consequence and the Consequence cannot be of nothing but must be of some Determinate Proposition which can be nothing but the Conclusion it follows that all Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses Again since before we Conclude Determinately and Expresly we must know what to Conclude and we know what to Conclude by knowing the Premisses and the Conclusion is that Proposition which is to be Concluded it follows evidently that since we know the Conclusion e'er we Actually Inferr and Express it to be in the Premisses it is there virtually 9. All Deduced Truths are virtually in one another For since all Deduced Truths are Conclusions and the Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses and the same reason holds for all the following Conclusions as for the first or for one single one it follows that let there be never so many orderly-succeeding Syllogisms necessary to prove any point the Conclusions are still in the Premisses and the following ones in those that went before them 10. All Truths are virtually in the Identical Propositions and consequently in the Definitions For since all Truths are taken from the Nature of the Things and from their Metaphysical verity and consequently are in the Nature of the Thing fundamentally and This is Contain'd and Exprest in the whole by Identical Propositions and in all its parts by the Definitions it follows that all Truths are Virtually contain'd in Identical Propositions and consequently in the Definitions 11. From what 's lately said 't is evinced that if a Middle Term be taken which is a Proper Cause or Proper Effect the Conclusion is seen to be in the Premisses For though the Proper Causes and Effects be not the very Essence of the Thing yet since an Effect is a Participation of the Cause and so is apt to manifest the Nature of the Proper Cause that produced it and the Operation of a Proper Cause is nothing but the Existence of such a Cause which is sutable to its Essence imprinted upon the Patient hence such Mediums do Demonstrably and Mutually inferr one another and therefore nothing hinders but that the Conclusions may be seen to be in the Premisses as well in such Syllogisms as in those which have an Essential Notion for their Middle Term. 12. Hence all Natural Truths and this throughout the whole Course of Nature from the very Creation are virtually in one another For since as will be more clearly seen hereafter all those Natural Effects were Demonstrative of their Proper Causes and those Causes Demonstrative of their proper Effects and this from the First starting of Nature into Motion and so were apt to Inferr one another all along that is new Conclusions were still apt to spring from such Middle Terms Connected with the two Extremes in the Premisses and consequently the Truth of those Conclusions were all along Virtually in those several Premisses it follows that all Natural Truths are in one another and this throughout the whole Series or Course of Nature from the very Creation 13. Hence had we liv'd in every Place and in every part of Time where and when those several Causes wrought those several Effects and had been endowed with Capacity Sufficient for such a performance and not been diverted with other thoughts from Application to that work we might have actually Demonstrated those Effects by their Proper Causes or those Causes by their Proper Effects through the whole Series or Course of the World from the beginning to the end except Miracle had alter'd that Natural Course For in that case all those Subjects had afforded us Matter or fit Mediums for Demonstration as well as any single Subject does now Wherefore if we had had wit enough to demonstrate as aforesaid and that wit sufficiently apply'd in every circumstance it had been done 14. Hence every Soul separated from the Body that knows any one Natural Truth knows all Nature and this all at once at the first Instant of her Separation For since all Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes and Proper Effects and those Mutually inferr one another that is the Truth grounded on the one is seen to be in the Truth grounded on the other as being Virtually in one another and we experience that the Capacity of the Soul to know Truths is not
casually upon something in the dark or run against it tho' we neither see or know what that thing is or when we see a thing a far off we know that that thing is tho' as yet we know not what it is The Course of Nature is carry'd on by Efficient Cauâ—es and Effects For since a First Cause being suppos'd who is Infinitely Wise he Administâ—rs his workmanship the World after the wisest and best manner which is that the contexture of the whole be not loose and slack but perfectly Coherent nor can this be done among an infinit variety of Bodies by any other means so as to make up the Course of Nature but by making Effects necessarily follow from their Causes since if that were not the Course of Nature would be at a stand and need the Artificers hand at every turn to make it go on which argues an Imperfection in the Workmanship it self it follows that the Course of Nature must be carry'd on by Efficient Causes and Effects 4. The Course of Nature must be câ—â—ry'd on by such Efficient Causes and Effects as 〈◊〉 â—roper to one another For were â—ot â—â—ese â—auses and Effects Proper to one anotheâ— any 〈◊〉 might do any thing or suffâ—r from any thing v. g. Fire might both heat and cool and mâ—iâ—ten and Water might be as combustible as dry Wood and so of all the rest In whiâ—h case no man could tell how to Order his Actions or what Efficient Cause or what Matter rather than another he is to make use of to produce any Effect nor consequentlâ— sinâ—e â—uch Essences are ordain'd for such and such Ends could the Essences or Natures of things be Known or Distinguisht more than in Outward Appearance 5. Hence follows immediately that every such Proper Efficient Cause put to be Actually Causing must most necessarily produce 〈◊〉 Proper Effect For since to Causâ— is 〈◊〉 do and to do nothing is not to do what 〈◊〉 Actually causing must cause something or proâ—uce some Effect Anâ— this Effect must be a Proper one as has been prov'd § 4. 6. All the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually causing For since the Virtue or Power of working is in the Efficient Cause it self as being nothing but it's Existence and the Matter to be wrought upon is Quantitative that is of it 's own nature either Perfectly or Imperfectly Divisible and Variable innumerable Manners of ways according to it's Qualities nor can it have an Infinite Power of resisting the Efficiency of the least Cause hence it is apt to have an Impression made upon it to some degree by any Quantitative Agent provided there be but Immediate Application of the Agent to the Patient and that it is prâ—st upon it But there being no vacuum immediate Application of one Natural Body to another must needs be throughout all Nature and the Course of Nature consisting in Moâ—ion one Body must necessarily press upon that which is next it From all which it follows evidently that all the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually Causing 7. From these Discourses 't is evident that we can Demonstrate Proper Effects from Proper Efficient Causes which we call Demonstrating â priori and Proper Efficient Causes from Proper Effects which is call'd Demonstrating à posteriori For since a Cause and a Reason do onely differ in this that the word Cause speaks the thing as it is in Nature and Reason the same thing as 't is in our understanding and Proper Causes and Effects in Nature are necessarily connected to one another and consequently do Infer one another naturally it follows that those Causes and for the same reason Effects as they are in our Vnderstanding must be the Reason why one infers the other in our Understanding Whence follows that thoâ—e Causes and Effects can be uâ—'d as Proper Middle Terms to Infer or Conclude one another And that Proofs made by such Mediums are Demonstrative is clear for no Proof can be more Clear than that which is Grounded on those Notions or Natures being connected Naturally and so Connected that it is Impossible it should be otherwise as 't is shown these are § § 5. and 6. 8. This is farther confirm'd because Two Bodies that are Immediate do Act and Re-act or are in some respect mutually Causes and Effects to one another For since their Existences which is their Power of Acting are immediately Apply'd and by the Course of Nature consisting in Motion prest upon one another and no Natural Agent is of Infinite Power nor consequently can it subdue all the Resistence of the Patient in an Instant it follows that till one of them be by degrees totally subdu'd the Resisting Body must necessarily for the reason given Re-act upon it whence they will be to some degree or in some respect Mutual Causes and Effects in regard of each other Corol. I. The carrying on this Connected Course of Natural Causes is called Providence and as joyn'd with a Course of Supernatural ones Interiour and Exteriour perfecting and streâ—gthening the Will all along to the very end and ripening Souls for Bliss which we call Grace is that which is truly meant by Predestinatioâ— which sounds so terribly and is such â—â—ugbeaâ— to those that mis-understand it Corâ—â— â—I Every Step of this Order of Causes has Entity or Goodness in it For it is manifestly the Causing of Something by Something Corol. â—â—I Therefore 't is directly against the 〈◊〉 of â—â—e First Cause to cause or lay any 〈◊〉 for Sin For Sin formally as such has no kind of Entity or Goodness in it either â—etaphysical Physical or Moral but is formally a meer Privation of some Entity or Goodness which ought to be in an Intelligent Creature whence it comes that by falling-short here in using the Means that Creature falls short hereafter of attaining the End which is only attainable by such Means To explicate which high Points fully is left to Solid Divines I mean such as do not guide themselves by meer Words but by Reason and Good Sense Corol. IV. Hence follows also that were all the Efficient Causes that produce any Effect known to us we could have no Accidental Predications nor consequently any Opinions but the Effect would still be equally Demonstâ—able from the Complexion of those Causes as it is now from some one single Efficient as was hinted formerly Corol. V. Hence to one that comprehends the Complexion of all Causes there could be no Chance nor could such a Man have any Ground for such a Notion For Chance as the common use of the word tells us signifies an Vnseen or Vnforeseen Cause whereas no Cause is Vnseen to him who sees Demonstratively how all Natural Effects follow all along from the Causes and that they cannot but follow from such Causes Corol. VI. Hence tho' we know not particularly the Quid est of this Exact Order of the World or the Course of Nature because we Comprehend not all Causes nor know what Cause or Causes did
a stand or non-plust to find a Reason for the thing it admires whence it inferrs demonstratively a Power of Reasoning capable to act or exercise it self in other things Of this kind are all Passive Properties which are quarto modo as the Schools Phrase is or properly such For these springing necessarily or immediatly out of the Essence are by consequence Naturally Connected with it and the Essence with them whence they are Proper Mediums to inferr demonstratively such an Essence à Posteriori and the Essence a fit Medium to demonstrate them à priori 12. That Demonstrations may be taken from the Formal Cause or from the Subject as 't is Formally and Essentially such has been shewn above Lesson 3. §§ 7. and 8. where it was manifested that the Middle Notions in the Gradual Line giving us the parts that were included in the Definition are Proper Middle Terms to connect demonstratively the Inferiour and Superiour Notions 13. The Causality of the Final cause consiststing in this that it moves the Efficient to act this Cause can have no place but in Intelligent Beings This is Evident because only such can know an End or consequently aim at it or work for it Corol. II. Wherefore when 't is said that such an Effect v. g. the following of water in a Pump happens in Nature ne detur vacuum that Nature flies from or abhors vacuum that as Aristotle acutely speculated Entia nolunt malè gubernari and such like the true Meaning of those Sayings can only be this that 't is highly against the Nature of the First Intelligent Being who created the World and of the Inferior ones Angels who manage it under him that Ground should be laid in Nature for a Contradiction to be True or that the Course of Nature should be contriv'd in a bad method or carry'd on after an absurd manner Corol. XII Hence these sayings thus rightly understood have in them the force of a Nobler and more Solid Demonstration from the Final Cause than can be taken from any Corporeal Efficients and Effects though they be never so Proper to one another For these Sayings engage the Nature of the Supreme Cause and of the Noblest causes under him and which had they not Rectitude in their Understandings Wills and Operations all Nature would be wrong and ground or beget in us nothing but Error The Demonstration stands thus The Immediate End of those Causes is that the World should be Order'd Wisely that is so as that thâ— Things should be a Ground for Truth therefore 't is most highly Impossible there can be any Ground for a Contradiction in Things which the First Cause did make and the others do manage But were there a vacuum there would be Ground for a Contradiction Ergo c. Corol. XIII Hence we may with pity remark the Ignorance Folly or rather Phrenzy of those gross Speculators who by allowing nothing but the Course of Nature are forcâ—d by their Impious and Foolish Tenet to speak of Insensible things as if they were Intelligent 'T is something pardonable in Lovers when they speak to Trees Rivers and Mountains to vent the Passion that be-mads them but 't is shameful in Pretenders to Philosophy who are to reduce Natural Effects to their Causes and to speak of both literally as they are Yet such and so apply'd must be the Common language of meer Naturalists who look no higher than Matter and talk of Great Nature or the Soul of the World and such windy whimsies Ordering things thus and thus that is Designing an End Hating and Abhorring this thing Affecting another Which yet all the while they deny to be Intelligent things lest they should grant a First Being making Nature and Spiritual Second Causes carrying on the Course of it and Moving it regularly Nor Matters it that we had now and than to use the same Language for we do acknowledge it to be Improper and can reduce it to a Litteral Sense agreeing to the Natures of those things manag'd by such Governors which these Men cannot 14. There can be no Final Cause in respect to GOD. For End and Good being the same and GOD being Infinitely Perfect and Infinitely Happy in Himself there can no Good accrue to him from any thing out of himself or from Creatures and so they cannot have the Notion of an End in respect to him Wherefore when it is said that GOD aims at the Good of his Creatures or that to Govern the World wisely is his End the meaning of these words is only this that he acts as becomes his Wisdom or his Wisdom being his Essence he acts as he is 15. Speaking of Mankind we can demonstrate some Acts of his Will from the Final Cause supposed and a Final Cause from the supposed Acts of his Will For since the Will is a Power and all Powers are specify'd or have their particular Essence from the respect they have to such or such Objects and the Object of the Will is an Appearing Good it follows that it is Essential to the Will to act for an Appearing Good Wherefore if we can demonstrate as we may often that such a particular Object must all things consider'd appear a Good to a Man in such circumstances it will both follow â priori that if his Will acts it is for an Appearing Good and also â posteriori that if there be an Appearing Good there will follow an Act of his Will The Proof of both is plain For since the Will is a Power to Act for an Appearing Good if it did not in due circumstance act for it it would follow that the Will is not a Will or else it must follow that an Appearing Good is not the Object of the Will Whence since it can have no other Object Imaginable it would follow again that the Will is no Power and consequently no Will. Nor does this take away the Liberty of the Will which is exercis'd in Chusing one out of many but establisheth the Essence of it Corol. 14. Hence the most easie and most connaturall way to manage or treat with Mankind is to make that which you would bring them to do appear to be their Good for then they will be sure to obey And if either thro' Perversness or Delusion by others they will not be brought to see that which is for the Common Good to be their own there is no way left but to Over-awe them with fear that so at least it may appear to them a Good to avoid Punishment LESSON VI. Several Instances of Demonstration 1. THE Method of Demonstrating is two-fold the One Is perform'd by Exact Syllogisms in right Mood and Figure The other by laying first certain Maxims Axioms or Pestulatums and then proving the Theses by the Concatenation of many Propositions orderly succeeding one another which is the way Euclid takes For this later way may be full as solid as the other tho' it looks not so Artificially provided it's several Consequences
grant the Certainty of those Impressions on the Senses or they must confess all their Ideas are nothing worth For since they hold that the Objects imprint Motions on the Fibres of the Senses which making such a Report as it were to the Soul the Proper and Ingenit Ideas of such a Body are either Excited in the Soul or else are as Cartesius elsewhere expresses it Elicited that is Produced by it upon the hint given it by such a Motion in case the Impressions causing such Motions be not Sincere and do not truly inform her a wrong Idea may come to be made use of and so they can never have any certain Knowledge of any thing Having thus got rid of the Senses giving us notice of outward things by imprinting Notions in them which Experience teaches us is the Ordinary Way of Knowing any thing it follows of course that they must recurr to Extraordinary ways by Inward means or to Inward Light which is the Method of Fanaticks in Religion when they have rejected the Ordinary ways of believing their Proper Teachers And hence the Cartesians tell us they know there is a God by the Divine Idea of himself Which he has imprinted in them which is in other Terms to say that they have it ky Divine Revelation for Knowledge according to them being caus'd in them by those Ideas nay consisting formally in thoir having the Ideas of things in them and GOD giving them those Ideas without the help of Second Causes it follows that GOD is the Immediate Cause of all our Knowledge and so no thanks at all to the things in Nature or to Natural Agents These Ideas I can observe by Cartesius's Discourse are either of Propositions or else Simple Ideas Of the former they say that whatever we clearly and distinctly conceive to be is true By which if they mean no more but that whatever we know to be is or that we cannot truly know that to be which is not nothing is more certain or more Evident by Common Sense onely they run counter in their Discourse and make not the Understanding to be True because the Outward Thing is so but they argue that the Thing is therefore thus or thus because the Idea in the Understanding is such or such and so they seem to make Truth consist not in the Conformity of the Understanding to the Thing but in the Thing 's being Conformable to the Idea in my Understanding as Cartesius himself affirms in his Answer to the Instances of Gassendus How solidly he argues from Simple Ideas may be seen by his Demonstration of a Deity which he concludes to be because he has an Idea of a Being that has all Perfections in it amongst which Existence is one which Idea he contends he could never have had from the Things without us and therefore it must have been imprinted by GOD himself Immediately In making which proof passable tho' Cartesius exerts the utmost of his Great Wit yet this plain Discourse will manifest how untoward and Inconclusive it is I can have a Notien or Idea of Finis of non and of Perfection and Thing and All and lastly of Existence and had I not such distinct Ideas of all these I could not understand the Meaning of those Words for an Idea can be nothing but what 's meant by those Words Having distinct Ideas of all these I can compound an Idea pf all these or frame an Idea of a thing that has all Perfections in it and Existence among the rest And this Idea is in my Mind and the Effect purely of my Mind already imbu'd with those Simple Ideas and Compounding them for I had it not from any one Thing directly nor did I gather it by Discourse from the Natures of Things I was pre-acquainted with But how comes it or how can he argue that because I have such an Idea fram'd by my Mind it must exist without my Mind or have a Reality there unless my Mind could Coyn or Create Beings at her pleasure as oft as I have a desire to compound such Ideas together He plays wittily upon the word Existence But we may consider the Notion of Existence or which is all one know the Meaning of that Word and yet abstract whether it does actually put its Formal Effect that is whether that Existence is exercis'd or not exercis'd in the thing which consideration alone spoils his whole Argument Let us put a parallel I have a complex Idea of these Words My Debtor will pay me a Hundred Pounds to Morrow at Ten a Clock at his Goldsmiths that is I have in my Mind the Meaning of all these Words and Existence is necessarily involv'd in the Meaning of those words for they signifie Determinate Persons Time Place and Action all which involve Existence will it therefore follow that that Action of Paying me Money will be because my Idea includes the Existence of that Action so determinately circumstanc'd Yet upon his Knowledge of a Deity by this Demonstration depends by his Discourse all the Knowledge he has of any Truth except perhaps of Ego Cogito What need was there to run after Whimseys coyn'd in the Mint of our own Mind to Demonstrate a Deity when there are so many Clear Demonstrations of it from solid Grounds in Nature It may seem harsh that I should resemble tho' Cartesian Method to Fanaticism or pretend they bring a kind of Enthusiasm into Philosophy Let the so much applauded Malbranche be my Compurgator That very Ingenious and Eloquent Person who has a peculiar Talent of talking Nonsence as prettily and plausibly as any Man I ever read in his Preface to the First Volume of his Search after Truth acquaints us with many Extraordinary things which would no doubt as Bayes says very much Elevate and Surprize an ordinary Reader In Common he confounds all our Moral and Christian Knowledges which are immediately ordain'd to raise us towards Heaven and advance Virtue and Sanctity with the Speculative Knowledges belonging to meer Philosophy and most untowardly misapplies the sayings of the Scriptures and Fathers which were never meant for his purpose but in order to Devotion or Mystical Theology nay to the Beatifical State of GOD's manifesting his Divine Essence to the Saints in Heaven to the Maxims and Methods by which we are to attain Human Science In particular speaking his own sense according to the Cartesian Doctrine he tells us we must judge of things by the pure Ideas of the Mind whereas I should rather have thought that we ought to guide our Thoughts and judge of them by the Conformity they have to the Things in Nature since we are sure Creative Wisdom made them and implanted Truth in them whereas 't is Uncertain whether GOD or our Whimsical Fancies gave us our Ideas and 't is certain they are the Off-spring of the later if they be not conformable to the Things without us He tells us farther that All Sciences are learned by the Attention of
than this which is or should be the chief Subject of their Physicks I shall dare to affirm that they are in plain Terms most ridiculous and most unintelligible Fopperies as I have shown at large in my Appendix And indeed how should we make any Clear Idea of their Matter when themselves speak Contradictions concerning it as may be seen hereafter p. 417. where I shall hope I have demonstrated that their Forc'd Silence Open Prevarications and perfect Inconsistency in telling us the Intrinsecal Nature of that First Matter of theirs has render'd them utterly Incapable of explicating any Body in Nature Nor can we need any greater Confirmation that their Natural Philosophy is utterly Unprincipled and Unaccountable in the most Essential part of it than to observe that neither Cartesius himself nor Regius Rohault Regis Le Grand nor any of that School I have met with have as I must think been Able to give us any Light of it since they neither Attempt nor Mention it which shows they are at an utter Loss about the Primordial Constitution of their First Matter of which notwithstanding they acknowledge all their Three Elements and consequently all Nature was made These few Particulars omitting innumerable others I have thought fit to hint to show that the Method to Science which the Great Cartesius follows is utterly Incompetent to attain it and that the Scheme of his Doctrine is merely a piece of Wit That which gives it most Credit is that his Suppositions granted he proceeds consequently in the subsequent parts of it which are purely Mathematical But what signifies that if he neither observes True Logick in laying his Principles nor Nature in his Physicks which he cannot pretend to do unless he gives us a particular account of the Intrinsecal Constitution of his First Matter upon which all depends A Task I say again his Followers neither will ever attempt nor can possibly perform by his Principles as is shown at large in my Appendix Yet it must be confess'd that those kind of Discourses are very Plausible and Taking with the Middling sort of Readers and with such who are much pleas'd with a Melodious Gingle of Words prettily laid together with Neat Eloquence Quaint Wit and Unusual Remarks For those kind of Embellishments do divert the Reader make the Authours pass for Curious men and bear a fine Appearance of Truth till they come to be scann'd Exactly and grasp'd close by Severe Reason reducing them to Principles and Connexion of Terms Which done it will be found that they afford to the Learner who sincerely seeks for Truth nothing but certain Bright Flashes or Coruscations which do indeed for a time dazle the Fancy but they settle in the Iudgment no Constant Steady Light to direct them in their Way to true Science Farther I must declare for the Honour of our English Genius that tho' we do not match the French in the Finery Gayity and Neatness of their delivering their Conceptions a Talent in which they are very Excellent any more than we do in our Outward Garb and Dress yet that there are more Solid Productions well built Truths and more Iudicious and Ingenious Thoughts of his own in our Learned Countryman Mr. Locke's Treatise Entituled An Essay concerning Human Understanding than as far as I have observ'd is found in great Multitudes of such slight Discoursers put together We are come now to consider the Other pretended Method to Science which is the Way of Experiments or Induction Concerning which not to repeat what I have occasionally by way of Reason alledg'd against it in my following Book I need say no more but that Matter of Fact shows evidently that this Method alone and Unassisted by Principles is utterly Incompetent or Unable to beget Science For what one Universal Conclusion in Natural Philosophy in knowing which kind of Truths Science consists has been Demonstrated by Experiments since the the time that Great man Sir Francis Bacon writ his Natural History The very Title of which laborious Work shows that himself did not think Science was attainable by that Method For if we reflect well on what manner such pieces are writ we shall find that it is as he calls it meerly Historical and Narrative of Particular Observations from which to deduce Universal Conclusions is against plain Logick and Common Sense To aim at Science by such a Method may be resembled to the Study of finding out the Philosopher's Stone The Chymist lights on many Useful and Promising things by the way which feed him with false hopes and decoy him farther but he still falls short of his End What man of any past or of our present Curious Age did ever so excell in those Industrious and Ingenious Researches as that Honour of our Nation the Incomparable Mr. Boyle yet after he had ransack'd all the hidden Recesses of Nature as far as that Way could carry him he was still a Sceptick in his Principles of Natural Philosophy nor could with the utmost Inquisitiveness practic'd by so great a Wit arrive at any Certain Knowledge whether there was a Vacuum or no And certainly we can expect no Science from such a Method that can give us no Certain Knowledge whether in such a Space there be Something or Nothing which of all others should be the most easily Distinguishable and Knowable Lastly we may observe that when an Experiment or which is the same a Matter of Fact in Nature is discover'd we are never the nearer knowing what is the Proper Cause of such an Effect into which we may certainly refuâ—d it which and onely which is the Work of SCIENCE For Gassendus will explicate it according to his Principles Cartesius according to his the Noble Sir Kenelin Digby and his most Learned Master Albius whom I Iudge to have follow'd the true Aristotelian Principles according to theirs So that after all the assigning the True Natural Cause for that Effect and explicating it right must be Decided by way of Reason that is by Demonstrating first whose Principles of Natural Philosophy are True and Solid and onely He or They who can approve their Principles to be such can pretend to explicate that Natural Production right by resolving it into its Proper Causes or to have Science how 't is done and however the Experimental Men may be highly Commendable in other Respects yet onely those who can lay just Claim to True Principles and make out their Title to them can be truly held Natural PHILOSOPHERS Which sufficiently shows that the Way of Experiments cannot be a True METHOD TO SCIENCE But to leave other Men's Failings and Return home to my Self To obviate the Superficial ways of Reason so magnify'd by other Speculaters I have endeavour'd to take the quite Contrary Method and have laid my Discourses as deep as I could possibly and perhaps it will be thought I have over-done in those about Identical Propositions for which yet I shall hope the Reasons I have given there for that
Sublunary Motions must bear a proportion to it and be measur'd by it being perform'd while such a proportionable part of it was Flowing and Mankind is forced to need and make use of such a Measure to Adjust Proportion and Design all their Motions or Actions by and to know the determinate distance of them from known and notorious Periods hence there must be a Common Head of the time When those Motions were perform'd which we call Quando If the Extrinsecal application be conceiv'd to be made to the Subject or thing in Rest then either that Extrinsecal thing is conceiv'd to be barely apply'd to the whole that is to be Immediate to it or meerly to Contain it which grounds the Notion and answers to the Question Where or Ubi Or it denotes some certain determinate Manners how it is apply'd to the whole or to some parts of it and then either the whole or at least some Parts of the Subject or thing must be conceiv'd to be ply'd and accommodated to the parts of the Extrinsecal thing and 't is call'd its Site or Situation or else the Extrinsecal thing or its parts are conceiv'd to be Fitted Ply'd or Accommodated to the Subject or Thing and then 't is call'd Habit. 20. These ten Common Heads are call'd Predicaments that is Common Receptacles which Contain and whence we may draw all our Predicates for the Common Subject Thing which we may briefly exemplifie thus Peter 1 tho' but a yard2 and half high yet a Ualiant3 Subject4 fought5 and was wounded6 yesterday7 in8 the Field standing9 upon his guard armed10 21. All these Notions under whatever Head if they be Corporeal ones are Natural and Common to all Mankind For since they are made by Impressions on the Senses which are Common to all Mankind it follows that the Notions which are the Effects of those Impressions must be such also since the same Causes upon the same-natur'd Subjects must work the same Effects 22. Our Soul has in it a Power of Compounding those several Notions together of Considering them diverse ways of Reflecting on its own Thoughts and Affections and lastly of joyning a Negative to its Natural Notions if there be occasion such as are the Notions of Indivisible Immaterial Incorruptible Unactive Insignificant c. which particularly happens when we would strive to frame Notions of spiritual Things All which is manifest by plain Experience if we reflect never so little on what passes in our own Interiour 23. No Notions can be imagin'd that do not arise from one of these Heads For Corporeal Notions are imprinted directâ—y Spiritual Notions by Reflexion on our Mind and on its Operations or Affections or else by joyning a Negative to our Positive natural Notions And Mix'd or Compound Notions are framed by joyning our former simple Notions Wherefore since there can be nothing imagin'd which is not either Corporeal Spiritual or Mix'd or Compounded of Former Notions 't is manifest that all the Notions we have or can have do arise from one of those Heads 24. Wherefore 't is hence farther shewn that there is no necessity at all of making some Notions to be Innate and consequently that Conceit of the Cartesians is Groundless who affirm That by a Motion made on the Senses the Soul by an unknown Vertue peculiar to its self Excites or awakens such and such an Innate Idea which till then lay dormant in it because they find that that Notion is nothing like to the Idea it excites For first how do they prove that only Motion is communicated to the Brain from the Object or that that Motion does not carry along with it different-natur'd Particles or Effluviums of these several Bodies which are as it were little Models of their Nature It is certain this passes thus in the grosser Senses and no more is requisite to do it in the subtiler but that the Particles emitted be more subtil which cannot shock the Fancy or Reason of a Natural Philosopher who knows well into what almost-infinite smallness Body is Divisible And of all Men in the World the Cartesians should not be startled at it whose Principles do allow lesser Particles than those Effluviums and to pass thro' far lesser Pores than those within the Nerves or even than such as are in the substance of the Nerves themselves Now this being granted the whole contexture of this Doctrine of ours has a clear Coherence For such Particles bearing the nature of the thing along with them are apt when they are carried to the Seat of Knowledge to breed in the Mind or convey into it the Nature or an Intellectual Notion of the Thing it self To do which there can need no more than that every thing according to the Maxim be receiv'd according to the Nature or Manner of the Receiver viz. that those Effluviums by affecting the Body Corporeally do affect the Soul Intellectually Secondly How is it conceivable or any way Explicable that a Motion which they confess is utterly Unlike the Idea in the Mind should be the Proper Exciter of such an Idea Indeed were those Motions of the Nature of our Signs that are voluntarily agreed on and fore-known to the Users of them they might have a Power to make such a peculiar Excitation of those Ideas as our Words do now or as any odd and disagreeing Things are made use of by us when we practise the Art of Memory But here things are quite otherwise for we have no Fore-knowledge either by Agreement nor by our voluntary Designation that such Motions shall excite such Idea's or Notions nor as is confess'd are they Naturally alike wherefore it is altogether inexplicable how they should ever come to excite such particular Idea's Add That this hidden Virtue in the Soul to make such a particular Idea start up as soon as that Motion is made in the Nerve is both said gratis and is as Obscure as an Occult Quality and so far from Explicable that even themselves as far as I can learn have not so much as attempted to explain it but it seems to be in part taken up gratis to make good their Doctrine of innate Idea's as the Tenet of such Idea's is to prove the Soul is a distinct Thing from the Body Lastly Their Argument drawn from Experience that the Idea in the Mind is quite different from that Impression in the Senses or any Bodily Faculty is shewn to be Inconclusive by alledging as was said lately that the Nature of the Object found in those emitted Particles and the Nature of it found in the Soul Intellectually or as standing under Notion are the self-same and not so Vnlike as they imagin Add That their Argument faulters in this too that the makers of it did not duly reflect when they advanced it on that ' foresaid Axiom Quicquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis For had they done this they could not have wonder'd that an Affection of the Body which is imprinted directly and an
less Divisible or rather 't is not so properly Quantity as is the other because it has no Vnity to distinguish it from a mere Confused Multitude of Ones but by means of the Understanding conceiving it to be so many Units terminated by the last yet because Plurality and Paucity are More and Less of any one Determinate Number and that there is a Ground in Nature for our Understanding to consider many Scatter'd Ones and comprehend or bind them together into one Notion and that such Notions are useful or necessary to Mankind therefore this Order'd Multitude of discrete or shatter'd Ones call'd Number is rightly placed in the Predicament of Quantity For t is to be noted that when 't is said Quantity is Divisibilis in semper Divisibilia it was not meant of Quantity in Common or all Quantity but only of that Species of Quantity call'd Continued 4. The Unity proper to Extended Quantity is Continuity of its parts For if the parts of this sort of Quantity be Discontinu'd either Nothing or vacuum comes between them and then they are still Continu'd against the Supposition for Nothing can do nothing and therefore cannot discontinue the Parts of Quantity Or else some Body comes between them and Discontinues them and then since all Bodies bring their own Quantities along with them however the Bodies A. and B. are distanced by C's coming between them because every Body has its determinate bounds and Limits yet the Quantity of those three Bodies precisely consider'd has none but goes on Smoothly in the self same tenour thro' the whole Mass of Body whether those Bodies be Different or the Same without Notches or Nicks butting and bounding it here and there or in the least diversifying it what ever Variety is found in the Figure Colour Hardness Softness or in any other consideration belonging to those Bodies Again since this Species of Quantity has its peculiar Notion Nature or Essence it must have some kind of Vnity too peculiar to it self But none is imaginable except Continuity nor does any so directly subsume under the notion of Quantity which is Divisibility or Vnity of its potential parts or sute so exactly with it Nay were the parts of Quantity discontinu'd quantitatively they would be divided quantitatively that is not Divisible or One that is none or Not-Quantity against the Supposition Therefore the Vnity proper to this Species of Quantity is Continuity of its parts Cor. I. Therefore the Quantity of the whole World is One Vninterrupted Continuity and the World it self speaking of Quantitative Unity One Great Continuum 5. Quantity according to its precise Notion cannot be Essential to Body because it can neither be the Genus of it nor the Intrinsecal Difference that constitutes it as is prov'd above 6. Yet Quantity Materially consider'd and not according to its precise and formal notion of Divisibility may as it were per accidens contribute to the Essence of Individual Bodies For since nothing is truly and perfectly Ens or Capable of Existence but Individuals nor since Thing in common cannot exist can any thing be Capable of Existing but by being ultimately Determinated and thence compleatly fitted to be This or That and this Determination distinguishing one Individuum from all others is perform'd by means of such a particular Complexion of Accidents as fits them for their Primary Operation for which Nature ordain'd them and this Complexion of Accidents is either of Quantity or else as is shewn in Physicks of different modifications of Quantity it follows that Quantity materially consider'd and not according to its Formal notion of Divisibility may as it were by Accident contribute to the Essence of Individual Bodies 7. The Intrinsecal Differences of Quantity are more and less of the Notion of Quantity This is prov'd formerly when we treated of the Division of Substance and the reason given there holds equally here 8. The Proper Species of Quantity mathematically consider'd or as it abstracts from Motion are Longitude Latitude and Profundity otherwise call'd Linea Superficies and Corpus For it is evident that Latitude is another sort of Quantity and has more of that Notion in it than Longitude has and that Profundity is a different sort of Quantity and has in it more of Quantity thus consider'd than either of the other as containing in it self all the three Dimensions 9. Therefore the Intrinsecal Differences of each of these continued Quantities consider'd Mathematically as abstracted from all Order to Motion are Divisibility into greater or into lesser determinate parts For since the Notion of Quantity is Divisibility and Divisibility respects the Parts into which it may be divided and this respect cannot be to Indeterminate parts into which it may be divided they being as Euclid has demonstrated Infinit as well in the greatest as the least Quantities so that they cannot have any differences thus considered wherefore Divisibility into Greater and Lesser parts being the Intrinsecal Differences of all such Quantities in regard that the Greater have more of the Immediate Generical Notion or of that kind of Quantity in them the smaller less of it and Divisibility into parts which are Determinate may bear the Notion of Greater or lesser Divisibility which Divisibility into Potential parts as was said cannot it follows that Divisibility into Greater and Lesser Determinate parts are the Intrinsecal Differences of this kind of Quantity Mathematically consider'd Besides Greater and Lesser bear in their Notions some Proportion between those parts which cannot be conceiv'd unless those Parts be Determinate 10. The Proper and Intrinsecal Differences of Continued Quantity consider'd Physically or in Order to Motion that is Affecting it's subject as apt to be wrought upon by Natural Causes are more or less Divisible or capable to be wrought upon and divided by those Causes This is evident from the very same Reason supposing Intrinsecal Differences to be onely more or less of the immediate common Notion or of the Genus they are to divide 11. The More and Less Divisibility of Continu'd Quantity thus consider'd is to be more easily or less easily wrought upon or divided by Natural Agents For since Quantity thus consider'd does not respect the Parts it contains or may be divided into but the Causes in Nature and their Operation upon its Subject Body it follows that the Notion of its being more or less Divisible as thus consider'd can only mean more or less susceptive of the Efficiency of Natural Causes that is more easily or less easily Divisible by the said Causes which is to be Rare and Dense 12. The Division of Continu'd Quantity into Permanent and Successive is made by Accidental Differences and not by Essential ones as were the former Divisions of it For since to move and to stand still are Accidental to Quantity and have no respect to that Generical Notion as more and less of it as had the other Differences above mentioned it follows that these Differences are Accidental to their Generical
Manners of Working have and consequently those Relations are far more Real than those which are grounded on Corporeal Powers and their Operations 15. The Substance as it were of Relation consists in that Immediate Ground which is the Reason of our referring one thing to another For 't is Evident that 't is the Thing it self in my Mind which is Referr'd and not the Act of the Mind Referring it For example Two White things have Vnity of Form or the same Notion in them which makes them Really Alike of themselves were they in a Comparing Power that could actually Referr them and denominate them Relatively as their Nature requires so that it is not the Act of my Understanding which made the white Walls really Alike but their own Natures which are the Object of my Act by means notwithstanding of the Comparative Act of my Understanding which they inform'd as a necessary Condition to relate them actually and without which they had each of them had but the Absolute Notion of White and not the Relative one of being Alike Corol. II. Hence we have some light given us how there may be True and Real Relations in God Knowing and Loving himself and how they depend and not depend on our Understanding 16. The Intrinsecal Differences of Relation being more and less and our Act adding nothing to the Substance of the Relation they must be taken from the Greater or Lesser Ground or Reason why the thing is referr'd to another Hence our greatest Relation is to God because all the good we have or can have does entirely Referr us to him Upon which therefore is founded all our Religious Respects and our Duties of Serving Obeying and Adoring him Next follows the Relation of a Husband to a Wife who is in some manner the same Individual with himself After them comes our Relation to our Parents who concurr'd to our Being gave us Education and provided for our Subsistence Then to Mankind to whom we are Related by Identity of Nature to our Country our King and other Superiours according to their several Ranks to our Kinsfolks Neighbours c. from which Relations arise several Duties in proportion to the more or less important Reason or Ground that makes them more or less nearer or remotely Related to us LESSON VIII Of the Common Heads of Action and Passion 1. THERE are Two and but Two Common Heads of Extrinsecals conceiv'd to be apply'd to one another by way of Motion For since Motion has two Terms viz. that thing from whence it comes and that to which it reaches and these are distinct Considerations hence we have Two Common Heads of one Extrinsecal thing conceiv'd to be apply'd to another by way of Motion Nor can there be more for Motion consider'd as it were in the Midway between those Terms has no Notion but that of meer Motion whence it is the very Notion of Successive Quantity and belongs clearly to that Common Head and therefore cannot belong to another or constitute a new one 2. The Notion of Motion is the most Imperfect of all our Notions and most approaching to Non-Entity For since Motion as it superadds to the Extensive Quantity of its Subject is wholly made up of not being in this place or that or of not being still here and not being yet there nor has any thing of Permanency which is in a manner the same Notion with Actual Being it follows that besides the Common disadvantage other Accidents are liable to of having no Entity of their own but what 's borrow'd of their Subjects it has moreover this that neither it self nor any part of it self exists so much as for one Moment Wherefore Ens being a Capacity of Existence Motion seems to be in a manner incapable of Existence or a Non-Entity and this out of its own peculiar Nature or Notion Again since in every part of Motion the thing moved is in a space bigger than it self and Place as will be shewn hereafter properly such is but Equal to the thing it contains and not bigger than it hence Motion hinders its Subject to be properly speaking in any place that is any where which amongst Bodies seems next akin to not being at all Lastly Motion is destructive of Actual Being in those things that are arriv'd to their full state of perfection which shews its nature to be in some sense directly opposit to the Notion of Being which has some kind of Constancy and Stability in it Nor can it be said that it gives Actual Being or Existence to the new Entities it helps to produce for Existence is the proper Effect of Self-Existence or the First Cause Wherefore the Notion of Motion is the most Imperfect of all our Notions and most approaching to Non-Entity Corol. I. Hence is demonstrated that since every Agent produces an Effect suitable to its own Nature and therefore an Agent infinitely perfect cannot be the Immediate Cause of what 's most Imperfect therefore Motion being both most imperfect and withal most disagreeable nay directly contrary to God's Nature which is pure Self-Existence and Essentially Immovable and Vnchangable was not immediately caus'd by God but by some imperfect Agent or some Creature that is by such a Cause as of it self is a Non-Entity 3. The Notion of Action as it superadds to meer Motion is the Exercise of a Power which is Effective of something For since to Act is to Do and to do Nothing is not to do it follows that to Act is to Do something but to do something presupposes a Power to do it and this so as not to stay in the Notion of meer Power for if it stays there it only denominates the Thing Able to do which again is not to do wherefore Action is not the Notion of a sluggish Power but of a Power Exerted and Exercis'd that is Effecting something whence the Power is call'd Effective the Action Efficiency and the Something it does is term'd an Effect All which superadd to the notion of meer Motion 4. The Primary and Chief Natural Action is Division For since Substance is the Subject of all Accidents and which being changed all the Accidents do suffer a change with it hence that Action that works upon a Body according to the Substantial Notion of it has more of Action in it as working a Greater Effect But Division makes Two Things of One and so destroys the former Vnum or Ens and makes Two new ones therefore Division is the Primary and Chief of all other Natural Actions Note That this is to be understood of Perfect Division which makes the thing Divided and is therefore only properly to be call'd Division for Imperfect Division only alters the Figure It may be objected That Rarefaction and Condensation if they be in a great degree change the Substance as well as Division does Answ. This arises out of the nature of some particular sort of Bodies and not out of the precise Notion of those Actions For
fill'd by knowing many Truths but is Enlarged and Enabled to know still more and being clear of the Body she is not distracted by Objects working upon the Senses and the Fancy but intimately and necessarily present to her self and consequently to what is in her self and so is Addicted Apply'd and Naturally Necessitated to know the Nature of her Body and consequently of her self as being the Form of that Body and fitted for it and by her self to know all the Truths Connected with the Knowledge of her self that is as was shown all Nature and this not Successively one Truth after another as she did when she was in the Body and needed the Fancy and so accommodated her manner of working to its slow pace but being now a Pure Spirit and Indivisible and so not commensurable to Time or to before and after which are the Differences of Time she is to know all she could know in the first instant she was a Pure Spirit that is at the Instant of her Separation These things being evidently so it follows that every Soul separated from the Body that knew any one Natural Truth knows all Nature and this all at once in the first instant of her Separation But of this more hereafter Corol. I. Hence we may frame some imperfect Conception how our Science differs from that of Angels and how Angels must know things Intuitively For since they have no Senses they can have no Abstracted Notions by different Impressions from the Objects on the Senses nor consequently can they Compound any two Notions to frame a Proposition much less can they Discourse or Compare Two Notions to a Third and so deduce thence New Knowledges call'd Conclusions It is left therefore that they must a tone view comprehend entirely the Metaphysical verity of the whole Thing and all that is in it which we express by an Identical Proposition Whence this Knowledge or Intuition of theirs abating the Composition found in an Identical Proposition which too is the least that is Imaginable is the nearest a-kin to that which we have of these Identicals By which we see that the Supremum Infimi in respect of an Angel's and Man's manner of Knowledge is as the Order of Entities requires contiguous as it were to that which is Superiour to it Corol. II. Hence also is seen how a Separated Soul knows all things after a different manner than Angels do For though the Substance of a Separated Soul's Operation be Intuitive as is the Angels yet because her natural Genius led and forced her here to dâ—scourse and gather one Truth by another that is to see one Truth in another hence she retains a modification or a kind of tang of the Discoursiveness she had here though she cannot in that State exercise it and that though she cannot then actually deduce new Truths yet she sees all Truths as Deducible from one another or following one another by Consequence We may frame some imperfect conception how this passes by this course Similitude When we look upon a Picture call'd a Prospective all the parts of it are equally near our Eye in themselves and we see them too all at once yet they appear to us as if one of them were farther of than another even to a vast distance observing still a perfect Order and decorum in their greater Propinquity or Remoteness according as those parts are more or less Shadowed or Luminous So the Soul knows all at once whatever is Knowable by her and they are equally near the Eye of her understanding yet because of her acquiring them here by way of Discourse that is by proceeding from more-Clear to less Clear Truths she sees them as following one another or as it were beyond one another because they were not to her in this state so clear as the other in themselves but depending on the others for their Evidence LESSON V. Of other Mediums for Demonstration taken from the Four Causes 1. THere must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to every Effect in Nature For since Nothing can do Nothing it follows that Nothing can be Done unless there be something that Does or Acts that is unless there be an Efficient Cause Which Efficient must act upon something or some Patient which is the Matter on which it works or the Material Cause And it must work something in that Matter which being Received in it must be some Form either Substantial or Accidental which must consequently concurr to that Action Formally or be the Formal Cause of it And since the Orderer of all Nature or the First Cause is an Intelligent Being and not Blind Chance for whà t's Blind can Order nothing and this First Cause is the Adequate Governour of the World and being an Intelligent Being acts Seeingly or with design that is with prospect of some End in every thing that is done how great or minute soever and eâ—ery Intelligent Creature that administers the World in their several Stations under him whâ—â—her they be Angels or Men do for the same reason act Designingly too that is do propose to themselves some end Good Reason or Moâ—ive for which they Act and without â—hich 't is against their Nature to Act and since Metaphysicks do clearly Demonstrate that the Immediate action of the First Cause is only to give Being and * the Oeconomy of the World is administred Immediately by other Intelligent Beings under him hence there must be a Final cause too for every Effect that is done in the World how small and inconsiderable soever it may seem Wherefore there must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to evâ—ry Effect in Nature viz. The Efficient Maâ—â—rial Formal and Final For Example in my Action of Writing a Letter the Efficient Cause is my self the Material Cause is the Paper the Formal the Characters drawn in the Paper and the Final to gratify my friend acquaint him with News c. 2. Hence we can demonstrate the An est of those Four Causes in the whole Mass of Corporeal Nature how Remote soever it is from us and that they must concur to every Effect tho' we do not know the Quid est of them The first part of our Thesis is proved For since the An est of all those Causes or that there must be such four Causes necessarily concurring to every Effect follows out of the nature of Action from the Subjectâ—s being Quantitative and consequently variable Substantially or Accidentally and from the Supreme Agent 's being Intelligent and these are equally found in all parts of the Universe how Remote soever they be or in the whole Mass of Bodies it follows that the same Causes do concur to every Effect all over the World as they do in those Bodies near us and with whose Operations we are acquainted The Second part is evident since the knowledg of the An est or that there is something may it be known by Experience tho' we know not what that thing is as we experience when we hit
all a long produce such Effects yet since we know and can demonstrate the An est of this Order or that the Course of Nature is still carry'd on by Proper Causes and Effects hence we can demonstrate there is no such thing as that Chimerical Cause call'd Chance governing the World which Fantastick whimsy is imputed to the Epicureans Corol. 7. Hence we can Demonstrate that every the least motion of a Fly or an Insect the Figure of every leaf of a Tree or grain of Sand on the Sea Shore do come within the Compass of this Course of Nature or Gods Providence which neglects not the least of his Creatures but has a Superintendency over all Which Considerations tho' they may at first sight seem Incredible and paradoxical and Stun our Reason yet after that by recourse to our Principles we have recover'd our dazled sight and clearly see they must be True will exceedingly conduce to raise our Souls connaturally to deep Contemplations of Gods Infinit Wisdom Goodness and Providence and ground in us a perfect Resignation to his Will in all occurrences and let us see and be asham'd of our froward proud peevish and selfish humour which nothing will content but the having the Whole Course of Nature alter'd for our sakes as if the World were made meerly for us or that Causes should not have their Proper Effects Which being a Contradiction is therefore as Unreasonable and Foolish as it is in a Man that wants Money to be angry that Two and Three Shillings do not make Forty Corol. VIII Hence none can have just occasion to grumble at God's Providence for Ill Successes For since we know à priori that God he being Infinitely wise casts the whole Frame of the World or the Course of Causes in the most perfect and best Order to wish we should be otherwise after we see that no Causes can bring our endeavouring it to Effect is to wish the Whole World should be worse for the Interest of one Inconsiderable piece of it which is against Common sense and the Light of Nature to expect from a Common Governour who is to provide in the first place for the Common Good and is even against the Judgment and Generous Practice of diverse Heathens who for the Common Good of a Small part of the World their own Country have not car'd to ruine their Private Concerns nay to Sacrifice their Lives Corol. IX On this Doctrine is grounded the Duty of Gratitude we owe to God for all the Good we have of what nature soever For it is hence seen demonstratively that God is as much the Giver of that Good by laying such a steady Course of innumerable Causes to convey it to us as if he had given it by his own hand Immediately nay it ought more to increase our Gratitude to see that he has Ordered such an Infinity of Causes from the beginning of the World to be Instrumental to our Good Corol. X. Hence lastly is shewn the Wisdome of Christianity which instructs all its Followers to express in their Common Language and to put in practise all the Substance of those Truths which we have with so much labour Speculatively Demonstrated As when they say that Every thing that happens is Gods Will pray his Will may be done Resign to it Acknowledg that all the Good they have comes from God thank him for it free him from all Imputation of Injustice when any Harm lights to them and bear it with a Humble Patience c. 9. There is a certain Order or priority of Nature in our Notions taken from the same subject by which one of them or which is the same the Subject as grounding one of those Notions is conceiv'd to be kind of Efficient Cause of Another of them For it is Evident that the First Efficiency of Fire is the making that smart Impression on our Feeling Sense which we call Heating out of which if continu'd it follows that it dissipates or shatters asunder all the parts of the mixt Body on which it works To which 't is Consequent that it Disgregates the Heterogeneous parts of it and Congregates the Homogeneous ones from which latter Effects of Heating as being most obvious and discernible to Mankind Aristotle takes his Definition of Hot things Thus out of Rationality springs a Solid and Serious Content in Discovering new Truths which are the Natural Perfection of a Soul and from this Content a greater degree of the Love of seeing still more Truths Thus Risibility springs from Rationality the Object of which is not a Solid Food nourishing and dilating the Soul as is this later which causes some increase of Science in her but as it were a kind of Light Repast and Recreation to her sprung from the Observing some trifling particulars which were Odd Aukward and Sudden or Unexpected and withal not Harmful or Contristating 10. In those Subjects which have many Accidents in them we must Separate those Accidents from the Subject and consider attentively according to which of them it produces such an Effect which found we shall discover a Proper Cause and its Proper Effect For example put case we experience Aloes purges Choler we must separate its Colour Smell Hardness Bitter Tast and the rest of its Accidents and endeavour to find out according to which of them it produces that Effect and if we can find it does this precisely as Bitter we shall discover that Bitterness is the proper Medicine against Choler and thence we can gain this Certain Knowledge and establish this Universal Conclusion that Every Bitter Thing is good against Choler according to that Solid Maxim in Logick A Quatenus ad Omne valet consequentia Note That Induction in such cases gives great light to a Man already well vers'd in Natural Principles But this former Maxim must be Understood with this Provis◠that it be meant to hold per se loquendo as the Schools phrase it that is if nothing hinders as it does often in the Practise of Physick For in Mixt Bodies there is a Strange Variety and Medly of Accidents or Qualities divers of which are of a Disparate and sometimes of a Sub-contrary or Contrary nature to one another so that it requires a great Sagacity to add to them such other Mixts as may obviate their Interfering and make the intended Effect follow Thus much of Demonstration from the thing as it is Active or from the Efficient which is the first of the Four Causes 11. Demonstrations may be taken also from the Matter or Material Cause that is from the Thing or Subject as it is Passive For from the Divisibility of a Thing whether that Divisibility be Metaphysical or Physical we may demonstrate the Corruptibility of it which necessarily following out of the Thing as 't is Divisible is therefore a Property of it Thus capable of Admiring is a Property necessarily Inferring Rationality in it's Subject Admiration being nothing but a Suspension of the Rational Faculty at
Indivisible added to Another can make Quantity but la All Infinit Number of Indivisibles Consists of or is One Indivisible added to Another Therefore rent-No Infinit Number of Indivisibles can make Quantity 10. The Minor is Evident for all Number tho' Infinit consists of Ones that is of One added to another Add that 't is demonstrated above that all Infinit Number is Impossible Proposition III. If any two parts of Quantity be Actually distinct All the parts must be Actually distinct also Bar-What ever springs out of the precise nature of Quantity must be equally found where ever there is Quantity or throughout all the parts of Quantity by Axiom 3 d. But ba-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity if put in any two springs out of the precise Notion of Quantity therefore ra-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity if put in any two must be equally found wherever there is Quantity or throughout all the parts of Quantity 11. The Minor is proved for all Unity and Distinction in any Line follows out of the Entity to which it is peculiar that is in our case out of the Entity or Essence of Quantity Again this Actual Distinction of Quantitative parts cannot spring from Substance for this has no Distinction of parts but that of Matter and Form Nor out of any other Line for all those do presuppose Quantity and spring from it as the Primary Affection of Body therefore if any two parts of Quantity be actually Distinct that Distinction must proceed from the Nature of Quantity it self 12. Now that all the parts of Quantity should be Actually Distinct destroys the Nature of Quantity and is Contradictory is thus proved Da-Whatever makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles contradicts the Nature of Quantity But ri-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity Actually Distinct makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles therefore i-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity actually Distinct contradicts the nature of Quantity 13. The Minor is Evident For those things which are Actually Distinct quantitatively may be Divided quantitatively or rather are already so as those which are Actually Distinct in the Line of Substance are Distinct Substances or Distinct things in that Line Wherefore since the Nature of such a Subject as they put Quantity to be does bear it let us suppose Quantity divided into all it's Actual parts it can be divided into that is into All they being all of them suppos'd Actually Distinct it is manifest there could remain only Infinit Indivisibles They must be Indivisible because it is supposed to be Divided into all it could be Divided into and they must be Infinit for Divisibility that is but Finite would contradict Euclid's Clear and most Approved Demonstration Besides it would follow hence that if all the parts of Quantity were Actually Distinct each of them must be Determinate in the line of Quantity Wherefore they being also Infinit in Number for a Finite Number of parts makes Quantity not to be Divisible Infinitly against Euclid's Demonstration it would follow that each least Quantity would be of Infinit Extension for the least Determinate Quantity Infinit times repeated makes an Infinit Extension 14. Hence is evinced our Main Demonstration that since Continu'd Quantity is neither compounded of a Finit nor of an Infinit Number of Indivisibles nor of Actual parts it is made up of Potential parts that is there is but One Actual Whole in the Line of Quantity and this Whole is Divisible without end Corol. I. Hence is farther demonstrated the Unity of the whole World as to it's Quantity or which is the same the Continuity of the whole imaginable Mass of Body Corol. II. Hence is demonstrated likewise that all Vacuum and Epicurus's Scheme of Plenum and Vacuum are Contradictory As likewise that there cannot possibly be more Worlds than One the very Nature of Quantity being but One whole Divisible still into its Potential parts or parts still farther Divisible Thesis III. 15. Successive Quantity or Motion and consequently the Course of Nature could not have been ab Aeterno but must have had a Beginning Demonstration IV. Bar-All Infinit Motion or Time is Impossible but ba-All Duration of Motion ab Aeterno must have been for an Infinit Time therefore ra-All Duration of Motion ab aeterno is Impossible The Minor is Self-evident The Major is thus prov'd Bar-All Infinit Time must be an Infinit Number of Determinate Parts of Time v. g. Infinit Hours but ba-All Infinit Number of the Determinate parts of Time is Impossible Therefore ra-All Infinit Time is Impossible 16. The Major is clearly Evident for were the Number of the Determinate parts of Time Finite then all the Parts which are equivalent to the Whole being Finite the Whole must likewise be Finite The Minor is prov'd above Demonstration 1. and 2. where it was demonstrated that all Infinit Number is Impossible 17. Whence is Demonstrated our main Thesis that Time Motion or the Course of Nature had a beginning Whence many useful Conclusions may be drawn against Heathens and Atheists Note that 't is the same as to our Argument whether there be an Infinit Number of parts of Time which are Actually Determin'd and Measur'd or no 't is sufficient the Subject Infinit Motion or Infinit Time bears the having such a Determination made by having that in it which corresponds to all those Infinit Determinate parts for this necessarily induces and enforces a Contradiction Thesis IV. There are Spiritual Beings which we call Angels Demonstration V. Axiom 1. What acts is 2. Every thing acts as it is and à fortiori cannot act directly contrary to what it is especially as an Immediate Agent 3. Motion is Change 4. There are no Created Beings but either Divisible or Indivisible ones that is Body or Spirit 5. The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable Da-Whatever must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect acts and consequently is but ri-An Angel must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect viz. of the First Motion in Nature therefore i-An Angel acts and consequently is The Minor is thus prov'd Da-Every Effect that can neither be caused Immediatâ—ly by the First Cause noâ— by a Body must have been caus'd immediatly by a Created Spirit or an Angel But ri-The First Motion in Nature is an Effect which could not have been caus'd Immediatly by the First Cause nor by a Body Therefore i-The first Motion in Nature must have been caus'd Immediatly by an Angel and consequently an Angel acts is The former part of thâ— Minor viz. that the first Motion could not be caus'd immediately by the First Cause is thus demonstrated 19. Fe-No being that is Essentially Vnchangeable and whose Nature is directly contrary to the Nature of Change can be the Immediate Cause o Change or Motion nor consequently of the First Motion in Nature but ri-The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable and his Nature is directly
contrary to the Nature of Change or Motion therefore i-The First Being cannot be the Immediate Cause of Motion or Change nor consequently of the First Motion in Nature 20. The latter part of the former Minor viz. that a Body could not have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature is thus prov'd Ce-Nothing that antecedently to the First Motion was not-Moving or in Rest could have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature but la-Every Body antecedently to the First Motion in Nature was not-Moving or in Rest therefore rent-No Body could have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature Note that this Demonstration supposes a First Motion in Nature which was prov'd Demonstration 4. LESSON VII Other Instances of Demonstration Thesis V. THere is a First Self-Existent Being or a Deity Demonstration VI. Proposition I. The Notion or Nature of Ens and of Existent in Creatures and consequently of Essence and Existence are Distinct. Da-Every Notion of which Existent and not-existent may be truly predicated is Different from the Notion of Existent But ri-The Notion of Ens in its First and Proper Signification taken for an Individual Substance is a Notion of which Existent and not-existent may be predicated therefore i The Notion of Ens thus understood is dâ—fferent from the Notion of Existent and consequently the Notions of Essence and Existence are also Distinct. 2. The Minor is Evident For we can truly say that Petrus est while he is Living and as truly say of the same Peter that Fuit or non-est when he is Dead 3. The Major is no less Evident For when we say Petrus est or Peter is Existent were the notion of the Predicate Existent the same with Peter the Subject the Proposition would be in sense formally Identical and the same as 't is to say what 's Existent is Existent Wherefore when we say Petrus non est or Peter is not-Existent Peter Signifying the same as Existent it would be the same as if we said what 's Existent is not Existent which is a Contradiction Proposition II. 4. The Notion of Ens Abstracts from Existence or is Indifferent to it and to Non-existence This needs no farther Proof For in the two Propositions lately mention'd Existent and not Existent are truly predicated of the same Ens viz. Peter which could not be unless the Subject Peter did Abstract from both or were Indifferent to both Besides all the Words which we use to express the Notions or Natures of any Created Ens whatever do so perfectly Abstract from Existence that it is neither Exprest Imply'd nor in the least Hinted in them as appears in the words Lapis Quercus Bucephalus Petrus Raphael which give us not the least light or intimation that they are Existent or not-Existent Proposition III. 5. Were there any Inclination in Created Entities to one more than to the other it seems to be rather to Not-being than to Being For since Peter even tho' possest of Actual Being is still no less capable of Not-being it seems as if he had a particular Natural Tendency to Not-being because tho' supported Formally as it were by it's Opposit Actual Existence he is notwithstanding no less a Capacity of Not-existing his Original nothingness being so radicated in his Nature as he is a Creature that it sticks to it and inclines him to it even while he is Proposition IV. 6. Existence is no ways Intrinsical to any Created Ens either Essentially or as an Affection springing out of it's Essence This has been demonstrated Prop. 2 d. and 3 d. Because Every nature requires all it's Intrinsicals and what follows out of them or is Connected with them and is not Indifferent to have them or not have them as Ens is to have or not have Existence Proposition V. 7. All Created things have their Existence from something that is Extrinsical to them For whatever has any thing and not from it's self or from it's own Intrinsical Nature must have it from Another or from something that is Extrinsical to it there being no Third sort of Cause imaginable which is neither Intrinsical nor Extrinsical that is which is neither it's self nor Another Proposition VI. 8. No Created Ens can give Existence to another For tho' as was shown formerly the virtue by which the Ens operates be the Existence of that Ens yet it can work no otherwise than as the Thing it self is or according to the Nature of the Thing which has that Existence whose Nature it actually Imprints as it were on the Subject as we find in Fire heating in Water moistning and in the whole Line of Universal Causality Again since the whole Line of Causality also bears that no Cause can act unless it be first Determin'd and as it were Appropriated to work such an Effect whence come those establisht Maxims that the Course of Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes to Proper Effects and Ex indifferente nihil sequitur Therefore seeing Prop. 2. The Created Ens to which such an Existence belongs and consequently the Nature or Essence of that Ens Abstracts from all Existence and is perfectly Indifferent even to it 's own and much more to the Existence of any other Ens it follows demonstratively that no Created Ens can give Existence to another or be the Proper Cause of it Therefore Proposition VII 9. There must be some Vncreated Cause that gives Existence to all Created Entities This is already Evident since no Created Entity can have it's Existence either from it's own Intrinsical Nature or from any other Creature Proposition VIII 10. This Vncreated Cause of all Existence must be Self-Existent that is his Essence must be his Existence For were his Essence Indifferent to Existence or Existence Accidental to him and not Essential he would need Another Cause to give him Existence for the same reason Creatures do and so He would not be Vncreated Therefore there is a First Self-existent Being or a DEITY Corol. III. Hence it is seen that all that Created Causes operate upon Entities grown to maturity is to dispose to the not being of the things they work upon by Altering the Matter so that out of those Alterations brought to such a point the Body ceases to be any longer of such a Nature or Kind and consequently loses it's Existence At which Instant the Providence of the First Being so Orders his World that those Determinations of Matter which were Inconsistent with the Former Ens should be Proper for the New Ens that is to succeed to which in the very First Instant the other ceases to be and this new one is Ultimately Determin'd to be this He by his Bountiful and Steady Emanation of Being gives it such a peculiar Existence as is Commensurated and Proper to it's Essence Thesis VI. An Angel cannot undergo any Change after the First Instant of it's Being Demonstration VII Axiom 1. If Agent and Patient be perfectly fitted
money to morrow will be Where Omitting the Former at present the Medium what 's Promis'd is a Common Notion in respect of Paying whence we use to say All Promises are either Broken or Kept Besides 't is far from being Proper or Immediate to the Effect of Paying in regard that multitudes of cross-Cross-causes may intervene hindering that Effect from following tho' never so really intended whereas taking a Proper Effect viz. my Chambers being Enlightn'd prov'd by it's Proper Cause the Suns darting it's Rayes in through my Window at which rate all the Course of Nature and all the Demonstrations that might be fram'd of it all along do hang together nothing can intervene to hinder it the Efficiency of the Cause being still the Putting the Effect 3. Common Mediums not being immediate but Remote are not in true Speech Mediums apt to Connect the Extremes For since what Connects two others must it self be Connected with them both and what is Connected to two things must be Immediate to them both it follows that a Common Notion not being Immediate to the Two Extremes cannot Connect them and so cannot be in proper Speech or Univocally a Middle Term with that which is Immediate 4. Wherefore all Assent to a Conclusion from a Common Medium is a Deviation from Humane Nature and consequently Opprobrious Whence comes the Proverb Turpe est opinari 't is Shameful to Assent upon Uncertain and Inconclusive Mediums such as are Common ones To which agrees that saying of Holy Writ Qui credit citò levis est corde He that assents hastily is light of heart that is Inconstant or Unsteady in his Thoughts and Actions Whence also he that adheres stiffly upon Opinionative Grounds incurrs the Note of being an Opiniatre The reason is becauâ—e Reason being Man's Nature so that as Brutes are led by Sense so he is led by some Reason good or bad in all his Actions and True Reason being a Power to draw True Conclusions out of True Premisses hence every Assent Involves as it were practically that the thing is True for such a Reason which Proposition is False if that Reason for which he assents does not Conclude it True as Common Mediums do not Wherefore Reason being the true Nature given us by GOD and Truth the Perfection of that Nature all Assents upon Incompetent or Inconclusive Grounds do doubly injure our Nature First as to its Essence by Concluding unduely next as to it's Perfection in making it embrace a Falshoâ—d and such a Falshood as makes it liable to fall into many others by imbuing the understanding with a wrong Method of Reasoning whence he lies expos'd by leaving the paths of Right Reason to the Disrepute of being either Passionate or Ignorant 5. They who do Assent upon such an Inconclusive Medium notwithstanding that they see it is Inconclusive are convinc'd to be Deserters of Humane Nature and led blindly by Passion For since all Reasoning is built upon First Principles they who come nearest the Denyâ—ng First Principles do radically as it were put off and abdicate their Whole Nature But such Assenters come as near as is possible to the Denying First Principles for they Assent that is they Judge or say interiourly the Conclusion is True or that the thing is and yet they see at the same time that the Reason on which only they relie for that Assent does not Conâ—lude it to be that is they see it may not be notwithstanding that Reason which is to Assent or Judge that to be which yet at the same time they Judge may not be which is in Substance though not in Direct Terms Nature not permitting such a palpable Contradiction to settle in a Subject made to see Truth as 't is to Deny the First Principle what it is or It is Impossible a Thing should be and not be at once Corol. I. Hence such Men are convinc'd to bely their own knowledge to be False to themselves Self-condemn'd highly Passionate Prejudic'd and Govern'd by meer Will that is to be blindly Willful which is the Greatest and most Unnatural Depravation that a Spiritual or Knowing Nature is capable of Wherefore they are Justly held to be disposed for any Ill that a Depraved Soul can desire Which ought to make every prudent Man wary in his Conversing or Negotiating with them if he cannot well avoid them totally since having renounced the Conduct of Evident Reason no Reason can manage them nor the wisest Man give any guess at what they will do or whether the blind Impulse of Ungovernable Passion will hurry them 6. Whatever Allowance may be made for Weak or Ignorant People there can be no Excuse for a Learned Man if he Assents upon a Common or Inconclusive Medium Because there can be no Necessity Imaginable that can compel him to Interiour Assent as perhaps there may be to force him to Outward Actions in regard God has given us a Faculty of Suspending our Assent till we see Evidence lest our Weakness or Carelessness should at every turn precipitate us into Error 7. From what has been said 't is seen that Common Mediums can at most but prove a thing Probable or likely to be which may consist with it's not-being or being False The Former part is prov'd because Proper Mediums only make the Conclusion Certain and therefore such as these can only render it Probable or Likely The Second part is prov'd by every days Experience which shows us how often we are Deceiv'd in Likelihoods or Probabilities even though Great ones and that the Contrary frequently happens to what such slight Grounds made us expect 8. When those who are Invincibly Ignorant do assent upon such Common Mediums it leaves no Note upon them more than that of Weakness and Ignorance For since such Men do as is suppos'd use the best of their Understanding their Erring does not spring from the Obliquity or Byass of their Wills perverting their Light of Reason which secures their Morality Untainted 9. Tho' we ought not to Act thus Interiourly or Assent upon Inconclusive Mediums yet Probability is very often enough to make us act Exteriourly when those Actions are Necessary to be done even though they be subject to great hazard Thus Merchants venture their Effects to Sea even in the time of War because their State of life requires it yet even then they must have Evidence that 't is best to venture otherwise their Reason is some way Defective So that Humane Nature still Obliges all Men to Act upon some Evidence 10. In Cases of Conscience and Law-suits which are only Probable and in which Interest is concern'd the safest way is first to purge our Affections from Coveting that which is perhaps our Neighbours next not to trust to Casuists whom we apprehend to have Large Cases favourable to our Interest nor to make choice of a Lawyer who is a Crafty Knave but rather one who is reputed Honest so he be Intelligent For while we proceed thus the
Mediums taken from the Nature of the Thing and those must be also Conclusive ones For their Knowledg and Veracity must either be made known by Intrinsical Mediums or by Extrinsical ones that is by Another Authority and the same question recurrs How we are Certain of the Knowledg and Veracity of that other Authority and so in infinitum Whence we must come to be certain of the Knowledg and Veracity of Authority by Intrinsical Mediums or we can have no Ground at all to believe any Authority Moreover the proper work of Reason is to Demonstrate which is done by Intrinsical Mediums and unless they be Conclusive they prove nothing and so are good for nothing 21. The Knowledg of the First Attesters is ascertain'd by what has been prov'd § § 15.16 Their Veracity must be prov'd by shewing there could be no Apparent Good to move their Wills to deceive us and the best proof omitting the Impossibility of joyning in such an Universal Conspiracy to deceive the Certain loss of their Credit to tell a Lie against Notorious Matters of Fact c. is the seen Impossibility of Compassing their Immediate End which was to Deceive Which reason is grounded on this that no one man who is not perfectly Frantick acts for an End that he plainly sees Impossible to be compassed For example to fly to the Moon or to swim over Thames upon a Pig of Lead Thus it is Demonstrable that all England could not Conspire to deceive those born since in asserting to them that there was a King Charles the First or a Long Parliament which rais'd a Civil War here because they must see it is impossible to gain Belief of it which was their Immediate End whatever farther End they might propose to themselves So many Records Practices Laws and other Consequences Issuing thence giving them the Lie besides the Histories of our own and other Countries and the Concatenation of Causes and Effects in the Political part of our Neighbouring Nations all conspiring unanimously and appositly to detect the Cheat. Wherefore the End being Evidently Impossible to be atchiev'd it could never be an Apparent good to them in such a case to act for such an End or to attempt to deceive us by Attesting it and therefore they could not tell such a Lie in such a Case therefore they were Veracious while they Attested it 22. Tho' both the Knowledg and Veracity of the Attesters be Demonstrated and Consequently the thing Attested by them be most Certainly and necessarily True yet our Assent to the Truth of that thing is neither Science no◠Opinion It cannot be Opinion because the Medium that begets Opinion is not Necessarily Connected with the Extremes as is found here Nor can it be Science because our Knowledg of the thing is not taken from the Thing it self that is attested causing such a Notion or Impression in us directly by it's self or by Reflex Knowledges upon those Direct ones on which kind of Impressions all Science is built but it is a Knowledg Reflected to us from Anothers Knowledg of it or a kind of Second-hand Knowledg Nor is the Knowledg which even the Attesters had of the Object at First-hand a Proper Effect of the Ens or Thing which is the Object of that Knowledg Nor is the Thing as an Object the Proper Cause of that Knowledg only which can beget Science For a Proper Cause has a Real Order or Relation to it 's Proper Effect whereas the Objects have no Real Relation at all to the Senses or our Knowing Power as was shown above where we treated of Relation By which we may farther more clearly discover the Essential Differences between Science Faith and Opinion It may be objected that Intelligibility is a Property of Ens therefore every Ens is a Proper Cause of Knowledg 'T is answer'd that it is only a Property of Ens Negatively as it were in regard nothing can be understood but Ens Non Ens not being able to cause any knowledg in us Or it may mean that 't is only a Property of Ens in order to an Extrinsical thing not a true Property Perfecting it Intrinsically as Properties due to a thing by Nature and Springing from their Essences do It may be objected farther that all Natural Powers are true Properties tho' they respect Extrinsical things on which they are to work 'T is answer'd that they perfect those Entities Intrinsically or give them some perfection in their Intrinsical Nature which Intelligibility does not for nothing is Intrinsically better or otherwise than it would be for being Known or Vnderstood To explicate this better we may consider that every Entity being a Part of the World has some Office or Place there and some part which it is to act on the Stage of Nature And accordingly Metaphysicks teach us that every Body is constituted such by it's having some Primary Operation which 't is fitted to produce as Fire to heat Water to Cool c. Whence what ever fits it for such an Operation is either Essential to it or a Property immediately Connected with it's Essence such as are those Natural Powers objected Now 't is Evident that those Powers do perfect each Nature Intrinsically since without them it would be Imperfect and Impotent to perform that which it was Essentially Ordain'd for and so the whole course of Nature carry'd on by such Proper Causes to Proper Effects would be quite out of frame and Order whereas 't is manifest it would suffer no detriment at all in it self whether those Proper Causes or Effects were Vnderstood or no. Which shows that their being Known by the First Attesters or made known to us by their Knowing them is not a Proper Effect of those Causes nor Intrinsical to them as they are parts of Corporeal Nature but Accidental to them as such but yet so Accidental that it is Inseparable from them and so does Necessarily infer the Conclusion 23. Testimony on which Human Faith relies is adequately divided into Living and Dead that is into such Attesters as speak vivâ voce and those that speak by Writing Because there is no Common or Ordinary way but Speech and Written or Printed Characters by which Men can relate Matters of Fact to others or testify to them their Knowledg of such things 24. Matters of fact done long a go if very Concerning to have the Knowledg of them Continu'd and that they were known at first by the Experience of a great portion of Mankind may be made known to us who live now by a Delivery of them down from the foregoing Age to the succeeding One Which Continued Testimony or Delivery of them is call'd Tradition For since the Generality of First Attesters who liv'd in the same time when they happen'd could not but know them and the Continual Concern of them could not but still prompt and provoke Foregoers to speak of them to their Descendents it follows that the Continuance of those Causes may still
to the Cause to Expose him to Contempt by Baffling him 8. To reflect that tho' the Words in Common have the same Sence yet as standing in the Context it may have diverse Constructions and so cause that Fallacy we call Amphibology 9. That not only Single words and Sentences may be Ambiguous but there may lurk an Equivocation even in the Connexion it self as when the Middle Term is Accidentally joyn'd to one Extreme by is and Essentially to another Thus far of Disputation when the Defendent holds a False Tenet which is the only Method an Honest Man whose sole End is to evince Truth and beat down Error ought to take The following ways are more becoming vain Sophisters whose aim it is to combat Truth on any Fashion Yet 't is fit that Honest Men should know them that they may know how to avoid the Ambushes and Snares of Truth 's Enemy 5. The second Case then is when the Defendent holds a True point v. g. that there are Angels and yet holds a False one Inconsistent with it v. g. that That which is no where or in no place is not The Disputant if crafty may make use of this False Thesis to overthrow the True one Thus Nothing that is in no where or in no place is but All Angels are no where therefore No Angels are 6. The Third Case is when the Defendent does not hold an Inconsistent Thesis yet he is Ignorant of the Antecedents and Consequents of his Tenet In which case if the Defendent can be brought to deny some Truth necessarily Connected with his Thesis he will be forc'd to deny the Thesis it self As put case the Defendent holds that GOD our Creator is Infinitly Perfect in himself yet through want of Logick is Ignorant that GOD has no Real Relation to Creatures and therefore that the word Creator apply'd to him is meerly an Extrinsecal Denomination and no ways Intrinsecally perfecting Him or affecting him such a Man may be in danger of foregoing his Christian Tenet by this Argument Fe-Nothing that depends on another for some Perfection is Infinitly perfect in it self but ri-GOD depends on Creatures for his being a Creator which is some Perfection in him therefore a-GOD is not Infinitly Perfect in Himself 7. The Fourth is when the Defendent Understands only his own Thesis and is in a manner Ignorant of all others For example Let us suppose that some Defendent by the Language of Christianity with which he is imbu'd or by some Solid Discourse he has accidently heard and though not Learned yet having a good Mother-wit is made well Understand does hold that GOD is Vnchangeable but yet being not us'd to Disputes or Speculative Reflexions he is little verst in other points as in the Nature of Christian Language in Spiritual Points of which consequently we have no Natural Notions and therefore is not aware that all our Words we use when we speak of them are Equivocal and Improper and especially when we speak of GOD highly Metaphorical Such a man no better qualify'd may be stumbled and perhaps made forego that Evident and True Tenet by a Contentious alledging things very Forrein which he not skilful in and then backing them with Authority on this manner What is not GOD Pleas'd when we do well and when we Sin becomes displeas'd that is changes from being Pleas'd to be Angry and when we repent is he not Pleas'd again Will or dare you deny that which Scripture Fathers Catechisms Prayer-books and Sermons do so often inculcate and the Consent of all good Christians does Unanimously and Constantly avow Why are we afraid of Sinning but for fear of losing GOD's Favour and of a Friend making him become our Enemy Will any but a Heretick deny this Again is not GOD Omnipotent cannot he do all things 'T is an Article of our Creed he both is and can since then to change Himself is to do Something will you stint GOD's Omnipotence and say there is Something he cannot do Such Insulting Talk as this tho' there be never a wise word in it working upon the Weakness of half-witted People may hap to make them forego their True Tenet and even fright them to renounce their Faith out of Fear of renouncing it Corol. I. These three last Cases inform us how dangerous it is that any man be allowed to be Truth 's Champion and to undertake her cause unless he be thorow-pac'd in Logick and such other knowledges as are requisit to defend her lest Truth it self Suffer for the Confident Weakness of the Unable Undertaker Corol. II. This last Case belongs to such Disputants who to maintain Absurd and Impossible things do use to argue from Divine Omnipotence by alledging and magnifying which they hope to fright the Piety of a well-meaning but weak Defendent to admit any thing though never so Senseless or Ridiculous The way to answer these men is to show the Effect to be contrary to our Natural Notions and consequently to the Wise Conduct of the World which was the Cause of those Notions And therefore what GOD can do or cannot do is nothing to the purpose unless the thing in question be Agreeable to his Wisdom and Goodness which determin his Power to act and without which it cannot be that he should act Whence it is generally more Safe more Edifying and more Proper to say in such Cases that it cannot be that GOD should will to do such a thing than bluntly to say GOD cannot do it For This flatly limits Omnipotency That only restrains its exerting it self hic nunc because of some Attribute of the Divine Nature to which 't is Disagreeable I say Generally For oft times such Discourses would havâ— GOD's Power to do perfect Contradictions that is to undo the Natures of things Establisht by himself which is not to do As in the Instance of his Changing Himself which is the same in Effect as not being Himself Or when they say GOD has a Power to Annihilate For since Powers are specify'd by their Objects and Non-ens which can do nothing in any kind nor consequently specify a Power is the Object of Annihilation a Power to Annihilate is to be no Power And 't is as ill to say GOD can suspend his Action of Conserving for this takes away from GOD his Goodness or the Redundancy Exuberancy or Communicativeness of Being which is Essential to him and was the Sole Cause of the Creation Thus far of Disputation it self or True Syllogisms The Faults of it come next to be consider'd which are call'd Fallacies or Paralogisms 8. Fallacies are of two sorts Those which arise out of Words which happens when the Ambiguity of some Single word or of some Words put together do lead us into a Mistake of the Thing And those which are not in the Words but arise out of the Thing or the Sense and thence make us mistake the Thing and the Words too 9. Those of the Former sort are almost all little
Gramarical Quibbles and it would do too much honour to them to spend labour to name them being too open of themselves to need Exposing Those which are less discernable and worth Remark are such as this He that says you are an Animal says true but He that says you are an Ass says you are an Animal Therefore He that says you are an Ass says true Where as has been particularly shown above the word Animal is taken in diverse Senses for in this Proposition Peter is an Animal it is restrain'd by the Subject to signify one Individual Animal and of such a kind viz. Rational But in the Proposition An Ass is an Animal it is restrain'd to signify an Animal of Another kind viz. Irrational whence 't is no Syllogism because it has Four Terms 10. Of these Fallacies which are not grounded on the Ambiguity of the Words but are built on the Thing or the Sense the First worth remarking is that call'd the Fallacy ex Accidente which happens when the Middle Term is only Accidentally connected with the Extremes and not per se or out of its own Nature As Bar-Whatever breeds stirs in a Common-Wealth is bad but ba-All Religion breeds stirs in a Common-Wealth therefore ra-All Religion is bad The Common answer is to distinguish the Major and Minor both and to say that what breeds Stirs out of its own Nature is Bad but not that which breeds them Accidentally for otherwise a Sword and Wine must be bad because the one sometimes helps to commit Murther and the other causes Drunkenness But the more Solid way and which bears up best to Logical Grounds is to deny it to be a Syllogism because though the Form of it be Legitimate yet the Matter or the Middle Term is not so For a Syllogism being a Speech contriv'd by True Logicians to Conclude a Third Proposition out of the Premises so as by Connexion of the Medium with the Extremes we may know it to be Certainly True for that which leaves us Vncertain leaves us Ignorant it follows that the Middle Term must be either a Notion Essentially Connected with the Extremes or else as a Proper Cause or Effect of it neither of which it can be if it be but Accidentally belonging to them We may Note here how Accidental Mediums are Common and Remote ones or such as beget Opinion For between Religion and Commotions intervene Perversity of will Disregard of Virtue Irrational Assents upon Opinionative Ground Pride and Faction against Church Governours who would bind them to good Principles and Religious Duties Interest c. All which or some if not most of them are the Proper and Immediate Causes of Dissention at least nearer and more Proper Causes of it than Religion it self the Principles of which do Oblige men to the preservation of Peace and Unity 11. The Second is called Ignoratio Elenchi which in easier Language is the attempting to prove what 's not in question or putting upon our Adversary to hold a Tenet he never own'd nor held as it usually passes among Passionate Discourses and Scolds when they object to others what they neither held nor thought that they may the more easily confute them or render them Odious This is avoided in disputes by Stating the Question right and by Agreeing before-hand in the Signification of the Words in which the Question is conceiv'd as was recommended in the second and third Rule Or if this be not done before the Dispute begins it is answer'd by saying Transeat totum and forcing the Adversary weary with aiming his blows amiss to recur to the true point and to Conclude the Contradictory to the Defendents Tenet which was his only Duty and ought to have been done at first 12. The Third is Begging the Question or Supposing that which should have been Prov'd Which is manifestly faulty For the Premisses must be Clearer than the Conclusion which they cannot be if the Proof in whole or in part is as Unknown and Obscure as is the Conclusion it self as it must be if it is barely Suppos'd and begg'd gratis Of which Fallacy therefore all the whole Body of Hypothetical Philosophy is Guilty as also that Fallacy call'd An Ill Enumeration of the Parts as follows here 13. The Fourth is that of an Imperfect or Incomplete Division which happens wâ—en 't is falsly pretended that the thing in Question must be one of those which are Nominated or that it must be perform'd one of the ways Assign'd when perhaps there is Another way how that thing may be done which was never assign'd but either Unthought of or Neglected As if it should be asserted that Motion must either happen by Atoms descending in an Immense Vacuum or by the Impression of so much Motion in the Mass of Matter at First by GOD and his Continuing it ever since when as a third way may be assign'd viz. that a Created Intelligent Being Causes and all along Continues the Motion of the first-moved Bodies which move the rest This Fallacy is defeated by Denying the Proposition which contains the Enumeration of all those Causes or Manners of Action and by Obliging the Disputant to show his Division to be Adequate 14. The Fifth is called non causa pro causa That is in plain terms the bringing a Medium that does not Conclude or the pretending the Conclusion follows from a Medium that cannot necessarily inferr it This Fallacy if it must be call'd so happens chiefly to Experimental Philosophers who going by meer Induction and laying no Evident or Certain Principles of Nature a priori to guide their Thoughts by but Hypothetical ones only do hence refund all the Effects of Nature into false-pretended Causes whence every man who sets up a new Scheme does still assign new Reasons or Causes according to which he strives to Explicate Nature and into which he endeavours to Resolve all the several Productions and Effects of it But why this should be call'd a Fallacy I cannot comprehend At this rate every Argument that does not Conclude may be call'd a Fallacy For since the Premisses in a Demonstrative Syllogism are the Cause of the Conclusion whoever argues ill argues Fallaciously and assigns a wrong Cause by producing an Incompetent Medium But in case the Disputant puts it upon the Defendent to have made use of such a Ground as he never meant it is then enough to deny it and put him to prove that that was indeed his Ground as was pretended 15. The Fifth is the Arguing from what 's taken in a Divided sense as if it were taken in a Compound sense or conjoyntly or from what 's taken in a compound sense or conjoyntly to infer the same thing in a Divided sense Example of the Former is this He that is actually sitting may Walk Peter is actually sitting therefore Peter actually sitting or while he sits may walk Where the Major is False unless Sitting and Walking be taken Divisively and mean that he who sits
an Ens or Thing because it can and does Exist alone and to be a Distinct Ens from all the Other Atomes for otherwise all his several Atomes might be but One Ens or One Atome which is both a flat Contradiction and besides quite destroys his own Hypothesis Wherefore each Atome must have something in it that makes it a Distinct Ens or distinguishes it from all the rest which cannot be the Matter of the Atome for That is Common to them All and what is Common to all cannot distinguish One from Another And if there be Somewhat in each Atome that makes it a Distinct Ens then Essence being that which formally constitutes an Ens it gives it a Distinct Essence or distinguishes it Essentially which is what the Aristotelians mean by an Essential Form So that they are at unawares in despite of their own Doctrine become thus far Aristotelians 15. To proceed Therefore it is not Impossible but each Atome may be Chang'd according to the Form and not according to the Matter that is each Atome is Capable of Formal Mutation Which I thus demonstrate Whatever does not imply a Contradiction is not Impossible but The putting each Atome to be Chang'd another to the Form and not according to the Matter does not imply a Contradiction therefore The putting each Atome to be thus Chang'd is not Impossible The Minor only which can need Proof is thus Evidenc'd For since a Contradiction is no where but in our Vnderstanding there can be no Contradiction unless the Same be Affirm'd and Deny'd Secundum Idem or according to the same Notion or Respect in our Understanding But this cannot be in our case For the Notions of the Matter and Form of each Atome as has been in the last § Metaphysically demonstrated from the natures of Idem and Diversum are Distinct Notions that is Distinct Considerations Regards or Respects of the same Thing and therefore to Affirm that the Atome is Chang'd according to One of those Different Regards or Notions viz. the Form and Not-chang'd according to the Other viz. the Matter has not the least show of Affirming and Denying secundum idem nor consequently the least show of a Contradiction Wherefore it is evidently Demonstrable from plain Logick acknowledg'd by all Mankind that it is Possible each Atom should be Chang'd according to the Form or Formally Chang'd whence if there be Causes in Nature sufficient to change it it will be Actually Chang'd or Broken that is it will undergo such a Mutation as is not only Formal but Essential because the former Ens is no more when Two Entities are made of it It remains then only to examin whether there be sufficient Causes in Nature to work this Change supposing each Atom of it's own Nature Changeable as has been demonstrated 16. In order to which we are to reflect that Epicurus puts those Atomes of his to be of all imaginable Figures Wherefore there must be some of them like Needles ending in the smallest Point that can be conceiv'd Others full of Pores or very small holes into which some of these sharpest Points will light and the more bulky part of the Atome not being able to enter it that Point will remain Wedg'd in that Pore or Cavity Now this Point of the Atome may be so almost infinitely Slender that the least Impulse of other Atomes crouding and pressing upon it may be able to break it much more when it happens as it needs must that the vast weight of Mountains or a great Part of the Body of the Earth do press with a Transverse or Side-motion upon that Atome In which case it will be impossible to conceive how that smallest Point perhaps a million of times less than a Hair can be able to resist such a stupendious Pressure The same may be said of those Atomes made like our Hooks clasping with another Hooked one when a very strong Divulsive force able to rend Rocks asunder tears the Compound several ways as when Mines of Gun-powder blow up Castles or Mountains Wherefore since as has been shown the Atome is Capable of being Broken that is Capable to be Intrinsecally or Formally Chang'd and there are Causes sufficient to break it it follows that whatever Epicurus does extravagantly and against the Sense of Mankind suppose his Atomes would be de facto Broken that is Two Entities would be made anew and the Vnity that is the Entity of the Former Ens or Atome would be destroy'd and consequently there must be not only Intrinsecal but Essential that is the Greatest of Formal Mutations made in his Atomes 17. The same is Demonstrated from the Notion of Mutation it self and the Effects it causes in our Understanding I discourse thus Our Words express our Notions and our Notions unless they be Fictitious are taken from the Thing Wherefore unless there be some Change or other in the Thing our Notions and consequently our Expressions and Denominations must still be the same But when Local Motion of the Atom is made in the Vacuum we must be forced to speak of it or Denominate it diversly and to say it is now Here now There or in another place than it was before for otherwise it could not be said truly to be mov'd Locally if it did not change Place There must then be some Novelty or some Change in some Thing or other to ground this New Notion which causes this New Denomination Themselves will not say 't is in the Vacuum and should they say so it would be perfect Nonsense for the Vacuum being nothing cannot be Capable of Change Therefore this Novelty or Change must be in the Atome Otherwise did all the Causes whatever remain the Same the same Effect viz. the same Notion and the same Denomination and not a Different one must ensue or else there would be an Effect viz. this New Notion and Denomination without any Cause which is Impossible Wherefore 't is Logically Demonstrated that there must be Formal Mutation made in the Atome 17. Perhaps they will say for such Discoursers think they have given a sufficient Answer if they can but give us a New Word there is only an Extrinsical Change made by the Application of the parts in the Atom to Different parts of the Vacuum But first a Vacuum can have no parts much less any Difference of Parts Next an Extrinsical Change is a most Improper Expression and signifies a Thing may be Chang'd and yet no Change in it But suppose we should admit those Words yet themselves must say an Extrinsical Change means or implies a Change in some Extrinsical Thing which is realy and Intrinsically Changed and which by being thus Changed give an Extrinsical Denomination to Another Thing which is all they can mean by these words Extrinsical Change As when the Wall is Extrinsically denominated Seen from the Act of my Seeing Power my Eye is Intrinsically Chang'd by having that Act and thence gives that Extrinsical Denomination
to the Wall And if the words Extrinsically Chang'd have not this meaning they can have no Sense but are altogether Inexplicable To be Cloath'd is an Extrinsical Denomination to the man on whom Cloaths are put But then the Cloaths suffer an Intrinsical Change of their Figure and perhaps their Quantity by being fitted and acomodated to the Body of that man and the Air suffers the same while the Action or Motion of Cloathing is perform'd To be Mov'd Locally is an Extrinsical Denomination to the Body that is Moved but then Local Motion being a Division of the Medium through which that Motion is made there is an Intrinsical Change in the Medium Divided and a New Continuity of the parts of the thing Moved to New parts of the Medium is acquir'd which is a Quantitative and therefore an Intrinsical Mutation whence the Extrinsical Denomination of Moved accrues to the Moved Body Besides it is scarce possible in Nature where there can be no Action without some Degree of Reaction but the Body it self that is Moved must undergo some small Change But now in the Scheme of Epicurus his Philosophy all things are quite otherwise since neither the Vacuum nor the Atoms and he puts nothing else even according to his own Doctrin are in the least degree Capable of Change Wherefore he is convinced to Deny this Self-evident Maxim Idem manens idem semper facit idem while he must affirm that there can be a New Effect viz. that New Notion and Denomination without any Novelty or Change in the Cause or the Thing that is he must put a New Effect without any New Cause or which is the same an Effect without a Cause 18. But leaving him and turning our Discourse to our Modern Corpuscularians the Cartesians These Philosophers tell us the Particles of their Maâ—ter are Crumbled or Shattered by Rubbing against one another Wherefore their Matter and each Part of it was One Thing before it was Moved and now is by Motion become Many Things Nor can it be deny'd but that All of them were Entities before their Motion since both that Whole Mass of Matter and each of the first Divided Parts were antecedently to the Division Capable of Existing apart and pre-suppos'd to the Division as the Subject of it Wherefore both that Whole Bulk of Matter and each of those Parts by losing their Vnity did eo ipso lose their Entity too and consequently the respective Forms that constituted them such Entities which is the Greatest Formal and Intrinsical Mutation that can be and far Greater even by their own Doctrin than could be made afterwards according to any Accident or Modification of those foresaid Entities 19. Again since Motion cannot be made in an Instant that Mass of Matter must be granted to have been Created that is to have had Being antecedently in Priority of Nature to Motion Wherefore it had in that Instant some kind of Intrinsecal Nature and somewhat in it which made it to be of that Nature Hence I argue thus that Nature and the Form that constituted it is either Lost when it came to be Divided and then it was Intrinsecally and Formally Chang'd Or else it retain'd that Nature after it was Divided and then 't is Manifest that that Mass was Diminisht that is Chang'd according to its Extension in regard the Greater Extension of that Original Mass was now made Less and yet was Vnchang'd according to its Nature Let them take which of these they please they must unavoidably yield there was Formal Mutation in the former case of its Essence in the Later of its Extension and a Formal Divisibilâ—ty in it either of its Form from its Matter or of its Extension from its Nature or Essence in regard it was by Motion Chang'd according to the One and not according to the Other But now in case they make as they do Extension to be the Essential Form of that Matter Formal Mutation is made more Unavoidable and must be granted even by themselves 20. To understand the force of this Demonstration more Clearly it is to be noted that the Cartesians do not make their First Matter to be only an Abstracted Conception of an Ens or Body as it has in it a Power to have a Form and so to be a Thing as the Aristotelians do for which reason they rightly and acutely Define or rather Describe it as thus Abstracted by our consideration to be Neque Quid neque Quantum neque Quale neque aliquod aliud eorum quibus Ens determinatur in regard that as thus consider'd 't is a meer Power to be any of them or all of them that is none of them Actually But they put their first Matter to be Inform'd otherwise they could not put it to have Extension in it which must necessarily be granted to be a Form either Essentially Constituting it or some Accident or Modification of some Thing that has a Substantial Form Whence they must hold that their First Matter is an Ens or Compleat Thing that is Compleatly Capable of Existing which appears farther by its Terminating the Action of Creation the peculiar Effect of which is to give Actual Being which concludes it to have been Compleat under the Notion of Ens since it is Self-evident that that cannot Actually be which is not Capable to be that is which is not an Ens. This Note reflected on it is manifest it must have a Nature of its own and Somewhat in it to constitute that Nature or some Essential Form and so is Formally Mutable whether Extension be that Form or no as is deduced by our Argument § 19. 21. To come up closer to them and enforce the Evidence of our Argument to a Nonplusage of their Cause we ask Of what kind of Consistency was that Original Matter into which GOD according to them did infuse the first Motion and so Divided it The very Terms tells us that it must have been of it's own Nature either Easie or Hard to be Divided nor do we ask the precise Degree Let them say 't is either One or the Other or a Middle Degree between both we are so reasonable it shall serve the turn It being then indifferent to our Question in this perfect silence of theirs we will gâ—ess as well as we can at what they should say as most congruous to their Doctrin and so we will suppose it to be Dense We enquire next in what consists this Modification or Affection of it call'd Density or how they will explicate it Motion had not yet begun in that Instant in which it first was by the Means of which they put all Qualities and this amongst the rest to be Produced If they should say which yet I do not read they do nor so much as speak of it as 't is found in their First Matter that it consists in the Rest of it's Parts 'T is reply'd first that that Matter has as yet no Parts for these are made by
Motion which was not in that Instant begun Or if they mean only it's Potential parts or which is the same that One Actual Whole not to pose them by what virtue those Potential parts do formally cohere which without making Divisibility which is Quantitative Vnity or Continuity the Essence of Quantity is impossible to explicate the Question returns and we demand how Firmly those parts do cling together that is how Dense that Whole was and in what it's Density consisted which we affirm must have been either in it's Intrinsical Nature or such a degree of Consistency which is in it's being to such a degree more or less Divisible by Natural Causes or in Nothing Again if Density consisted in the Rest of it's Parts and there was most perfect Rest before there was any Motion then the Density of it must have surpassed all Degrees and therefore it must have been of the Nature of Epicurus his Atomes that is Insuperably and Essentially Incapable of being Divided which they must not say who make their Elements made by the Rubbing of some parts of the Matter against the others Besides in thaâ— supposition GOD as the Author of Nature had offer'd Violence to his own Creation by Dividing it immediately at first Lastly that Matter was of it's own nature Indifferent to be Mov'd or not-Mov'd that is Indifferent to Rest or Motion for Being and Extension abstract from both whereas in our case Density and the same may be said had it been Rare being Natural to it and not Adventitious or Accidental by the Operation of External Causes it could not have been Indifferent to it since every thing necessarily Requires what is Natural to it self Nor is a Thing meerly by it's being in Rest of another Nature To understand this more clearly let us consider this Proposition That Thing call'd the First Matter is in Rest 't is about the Essence or Nature or Intrinsecal Quality of the Subject of this Proposition we are Enquiring to which supervenes that Accidental Predicate of being in Rest. Wherefore to be in Rest does not alter the Intrinsecals of their First Matter but presupposes them and therefore all it's Intrinsecals must have belong'd to it of it's own nature whether it had happen'd to be in Rest or in Motion 22. Density then in their First Matter cannot be explicated by Rest nor consequently Rarity by Motion Let us search then farther in what we can conceive it to consist or how it may be Explicated Now we are to note that all Particular Natures or Notions are to be Explicated by more Common and General ones if we go to work like Philosophers for all Grounds and Principles are made up of such Notions as are Common or Vniversal ones and to Explicate Particulars by other Particulars is the way of Proceeding by Similitudes which may serve sometimes to Elucidate but never to Prove or to Resolve any thing or Notion into its Formal Cause which belongs properly to Philosophers We find then abstracting fâ—om Rest and Motion which are Accidental to that Matter no Notion or Nature in it that can be Superiour to Density and Rarity but the Essence of it that is that Thing it Self call'd the First Matter and its Quantity And Quantity may be consider'd two ways Either as affecting the Body meerly in order to its Self or else in order to the Causes that may work upon it The Former we call Extension the latter Divisibility physically consider'd Now Density cannot any way be Explicated by Extension as that in which it consists as is most Evident in regard a Body may be Equally Extended whether it be Rare or Dense nor is any thing therefore Rarer or Denser because it is Longer or Shorter Let us apply then our Consideration to Divisibility taken in the sense spoken off lately viz. as making its Subject apt to be wrought upon or Divided by Natural Causes and the Proper and Intrinsecal Differences of every Common Notion being More and Less and it being also Evident from the very Notions and from the Consent of Mankind that we call those Bodies Dense which are Less Easy to be Divided or Less Dâ—visible and those Rare which are more Divisible or more Easy to be Divided we are in a fair way to find out clearly what Rarity and Density do consist in viz. Rarity in an Excess or greater Proportion of Quantity thus consider'd to the Matter or Subject of it and Density in a Lesser Proportion of the same Quantity to the Matter that is to the Subject of it according to the Notion of it as Matter Nor does this more strain our Reason to conceive this various participation of the same Accident Quantity than it does to conceive a Thing to partake the Quality of Whiteness Vnequally and be More or Less White For that Maxim of Quantitas non suscipit magis minus is meant Evidently of Extension in regard that the least imaginable Extension being Added or Abstracted from the former must necessarily vary the Species 23. That we may bear up more directly to our main Thesis Since Rarity or else Density must necessarily be in their First Matter for it is impossible to conceive it to be at all Divisible by Natural Causes but it must be either Easily or Hardly Divisible by them if we joyn to this that Contraria according to the Maxim sunt circa idem subjectum it will and must follow that the same Matter whether theirs or ours that had a Power in it to be Less Divisible or Dense had also a Power in it to be More Divisible or Rare and this not only in the First Matter it self but also in every particular Body in Nature made of it and which has the nature of that Matter in it whence results this Conclusion that Rare Bodies are Transmutable into Dense and Dense into Rare and that therefore there is Formal Mutation in Bodies according to these two Primary Qualities and consequently according to all Secondary Qualities too which as will be demonstrated in Physicks are made up of those Primary ones So that most of the Effects in Nature are carry'd on by Formal Mutation nor consequently can Nature be ever rightly Explicated by the Deniers of such a Formal Change 24. Let it be well noted that I speak not in this last Discourse of Contradictories which have no Middle between them and therefore cannot have the same Matter or Subject or make it Changeable from one to the other as because Body is Divisible it does not follow that the same Subject can be Chang'd to Indivisible What I discourse of and from whence in part I drew my Argument was from the nature of Contraries which are two Extremes under the same kind of Quality and therefore have Middling Qualities between both by passing through which as by Degrees or Steps the Body is Transmutable from one of them into the other And the reason is because neither Extreme is Infinitely such and therefore
THE METHOD TO Science By I. S. LONDON Printed by W. Redmayne for the Author and are to be Sold by Thomas Metcalf Bookseller over against Earl's-Court in Drury-lane 1696. Book I. Of the First Operation of our Understanding Less 1. OF NOTIONS or the very First Ground on which all Science is built Less 2. Of the Distinction of Natural Notions and of the Reducing them under Ten Common Heads p. 10 Less 3. How these Common Heads of Notions are to be Divided and of the Common Head of SUBSTANCE p. 25 â—ess 4. Some Considerations belonging to those Heads of Notions or to the Ten Predicaments in Common p. 36 â—ess 5. Of the Common Head call'd QUANTITY p. 50 â—ess 6. Of the Common Head of QUALITY p. 60 â—ess 7. Of the Common Head of RELATION p. 71 Less 8. Of the Common Heads of ACTION and PASSION p. 81 Less 9. Of the Common Head of UBI or WHERE p. 89 Less 10. Of the Common Head oâ— QUANDO or WHEN p. 9â— Less 11. Of the Expressions of ouâ— NOTIONS by WORDS p. 100 Book II. Of the Second Operation oâ— our Understanding or JUDGâ—MENTS Less 1. OF the Nature of Judgâ—ments or Propositions Common Of their Parts Of 〈◊〉 Ground of their Verification 〈◊〉 of the several Manners of Predicâ—ting p. 11â— Less 2. Of Self-evident Propositions First Principles p. 1â—â— Less 3. That First Principles are Ideâ—â—tical Propositions prov'd by Instaâ—â—ces The Use that is to be made of them Also of some Other Propositions either in whole or in part Formally Identical and of the Reducing of Inferiour Truths to Self-evident Propositions p. 15â— Less 4. Of the Generating of Knowledge in us and of the Method how this is perform'd p. 163 Book III. Of the Third Operation of our Understanding DISCOURSE and of the Effects and Defects of it Less 1. OF Artificial Discourse the Force of Consequence and of the Only Right Figure of a Syllogism p. 225 Less 2. Of the several Manners or Moods of a Syllogism and of the Laws of Concluding p. 235 Less 3. Of the Matter of a Conclusive Syllogism or what Middle Term is Proper for Demonstration p. 248 Less 4. How every Truth is to be Reduced to an Identical Proposition and consequently every Errour to a Contradiction What Consequences follow thence of one Truth being in another and of the Science of Pure Spirits p. 261 Less 5. Of other Mediums for Demonstration from the Four Causes p. 272 Less 6. Several Instances of Demonstration p. 288 Less 7. Other Instances of Demonstration p. 302 Advertisement p. 316 Less 8. Of Opinion and Faith p. 322 Less 9. Of Assent Suspense Certainty and Uncertainty p. 344 Less 10. Of Disputation and Paralogisms p. 356 Appendix p. 374 The Errata's in the Preface PRef P. 26. l. 15. out of P. 28. l. 19. cast about P. 46. l. 19. the Cartesian Corrections of the Errata PAge 5. Line 8. onely which P. 18. l. 10. as is P. 21. l. 18. that Motion P. 62. l. 6. most nearly P. 69. l. 23. but their P. 75. l. 1. become P. 77. l. 6. has besides P. 106. l. 2. False P. 107. l. 17. Proposition P. 122. l. 31. A whole P. 128. l. 12. Sophroniscus P. 147. l. 18. make P. 236. l. 16. Proposition is Identical P. 245. l. 27. nunc P. 250. l. 5. that can P. 255. l. 7. Sensitivum P. 257. l. 30. 't is Evidently P. 258. l. ult Basis. P. 270. l. 31. at one P. 273. l. 33. est of P. 281. l. 27. be a kind P. 301. l. 1. Cause of P. 308. l. 20. exercise it 's P. 311. l. 25. there P. 318. l. 18. Frailty which P. 321. l. 23. all own P. 322. l. 3. main P. 326. l. 1. what is is P. 354. l. 20. Erroneous P. 362. l. 13. he is not P. 364. l. 30. Grammatical P. 369. l. 13. The Sixth P. 370. l. 34. a proud P. 381. l. 17. with no. P. 388. l. 3. to be P. 393. l. 19. gives P. 414. l. 26. very small P. 417. l. 22. Slender Flexible and. l. 24. contiguous P. 419. l. 25. Art P. 424. l. 18. Is it P. 425. l. 13. so they l. 16. do P. 427. l. 7. Lock P. 273. l. 17. and seeing P. 396. l. 21. that is ' t is PREFACE DEDICATORY TO THE LEARNED STUDENTS OF Both Our Universities REason being Man's Nature and the Proper Act of Reason the Deducing Evidently New Knowledges out of Antecedent ones it may seem Wonderful that Mankind after the using their Reason and Disputing so long time should still Disagree in their Sentiments and contradict one another in inferring their Conclusions so that those who are sam'd for the Greatest Philosophers do still remain in Perpetual and as far as it can be discern'd Endless and Irreconcileable Variance and Dissension about their Tenets It seems to shock the very Definition of Man and to lay in some sort a scandal upon Creative Wisdom it self that whereas all other Creatures do arrive at the Natural End for which they were made Mankind alone nay the Noblest Portion of that Kind who cultivate their Thoughts with the most exact care that may be should still miss of Reasoning rightly and so fall short of True Knowledge which is their Natural Perfection What Tree but bears the Fruit Proper to its Kind Or what Cause in the World but produces such Effects as are sutable to its Nature And tho' by the Interfering of Cross-Agents there happens now and then a Deficiency in some very Few Particulars yet that Defect is never found in a Considerable part of the Species for Chance would not be Chance if it did come near the reaching an Universality whereas Mankind in its whole Latitude seems to fall short of improving it self in Truth at least in gaining Certainty of it or if some have attain'd it yet the Number of those Right Reasoners is so very Inconsiderable that they are lost amongst the Croud of those who stray into Errour Nor can those Happy Few who have light on it obtain Quiet Possession of what they have Acquir'd but their Title to it is perpetually Disputed by Great Multitudes of Pretenders who put in their Claim and set up their Pleas for their Opposit Tenets Whence our First Enquiry ought to be how Man's Nature comes to be so Disabled from performing its Primary Operation or from Reasoning rightly that so we may bethink our selves by what Means it may if possible recover the true use of its Natural Faculty how it may be cur'd of the Impotency it labours under and be freed from those Impediments which hinder it from Acting as it ought 2. Divines will tell us that this mischief happens thro' Original Sin Nor can it be doubted but there is some Truth in what they alledge For questionless Passion distorts the Understanding by the Ascendent which the Depraved Will has over it in such Concerns as the Will is addicted to and has espous'd an Interest in But this
purpose are his many Distinctions of his Propositions especially those he calls Exponibiles Let but the Learner know certainly and liquidly what are the Subject and Predicate in any Proposition which is easie to be discover'd by the Copula that is to come between them and unite them and have a care that the words that express them are Univocal he will be furnish'd with means to see the Form of Connexion which is Essential to a Proposition and is onely Conducive to Science which wholly consists in the Connexion of Terms His chief Misfortune is that he does not seem either at the beginning or in the Process of his Book to know at least to build upon this Truth and stand to it that our Notions or as the Moderns have taken a Toy to call them Ideas are the very Natures of the Things in our Understanding imprinted by Outward Objects without which no Stability of those Notions or Ideas can be with Evidence asserted nor any Solid knowledge possibly be had of our Predications nor the true Ground of Truth or Falshood be understood nor consequently ean there be any Firmness in our Judgments or Discourses Whence I could wish that every Beginner were at first well instructed and settled in this point for without this all will be but Loose and Ungrounded Talk in the Air. And tho' I lose Credit with our late Wits I must avow that Aristotle's dry Assertion that Anima intelligendo fit omnia tho' it may seem to some a wild Paradox has more Solid Sense in it were it rightly understood and is more Useful to true Philosophy than all the other Maxims that do not proceed upon it and suppose it which yet I see the Goodness of Nature intimates to many and forces them to ground their Discourses on it Practically even tho' while they speculate they deny it or at least seem to doubt of it or disregard it Observing therefore this great want under which Philosophy which is the Study of Truth labours I have out of my true Zeal of improving Science and beating down Scepticism the profest Patron of Ignorance and covert Parent of all Irreligion hazarded the Opinion of Singularity in endeavouring to write and publish a Demonstrative Logick at least I have given such Reasons quite thorough it as I judg'd to be Clear and Conclusive in every piece of it that has any Influence upon Scientifical Knowledge What my Reader may expect from me is this I begin with our Natural Notions the Bottom-Ground of all our Knowledge I show them to be the very Natures of the Things whose Metaphysical Verity being Establish'd by Creative Wisdom does consequently give Stability and Solidity to all our Discourses that are built on them I distribute those Natural Notions under those several Common Heads and manifest why there must be so many and no 〈◊〉 show how their Definitions are to be fram'd which make our Conceptions of the◠〈◊〉 and Distinct. I lay Rules to escape 〈◊〉 Snares which Equivocal Words lay 〈…〉 way while we are Discoursing I show â—he Reason of all Truth and Falshood in Connected Notions or Propositions Which if Self-evident and Identical have Title to be First Principles as from many Heads I demonstrate I trace Nature in all those nice and Immediate steps she takes to generate Knowledge in us at First Coming to those Propositions that need Proof and the Way of Proving them I lay open the Fundamental Ground of the Force of Consequence which gives the Nerves to every Act of True Reasoning and of the Certainty and Evidence of every Conclusion which we rightly inferr To perform which I manifest that there can be but One Necessary or Natural Figure of a Syllogism and but Four Moods of that Figure I lay down and fix the Fundamental Laws of Concluding I evidence the Nature of that Third Notion or Middle Term by the Connexion of which with the Two Terms of the Thesis to be Proved they must inevitably be joyn'd with one another and so the Thesis it self must be rightly Concluded and therefore Infallibly True I show how to find out a Middle Term fit for our purpose and thence prepare the way for Demonstration I lay open how every Truth must have at the Bottom an Identical Proposition and every Errour a Contradiction as their First Principles and how they may be reduced to those Principles of theirs To do which tho' more laborious is the best Way of Demonstrating I manifest thence how one Truth is in another and what strange Consequences follow thence Also how Middle Terms Proper for Demonstration may be taken from all the Four Causes To clear better the Notion of Science I treat of the Natures of Opinion and Human Faith their Grounds and how the Former of these two last Deviates from Right Reason and when the Later does or does not Then I consider the Effects issuing from all sorts of Proof viz. Assent Suspense Certainty and Uncertainty And to put in Practise my self what I do persuade and recommend to others I add Seven Demonstrations of the most Considerable Theses in divers Sciences And lastly I lay open the Ways and Methods of Disputation and detect the weak Stratagems and inefficacious Attacques of Fallacies or Paralogisms This is the Summ of my Endeavours in common But besides these many particular Knowledges light in on the by and as I hope very Useful ones which it would be tedious to enumerate The Manner I use to carry on the Scheme of my Doctrin is not to propose my Conceptions Magisterially or to expect any one should assent to the least Tittle of what I say upon my Word But I offer my Reasons for every Paragraph I advance if it can be conceiv'd to need any by doing which I speak to the Reason of my Readers and withall I expose my self to the Severe Examination of the most Acute and Iudicious Wits of which I doubt not there are Multitudes in those Seminaries of Learning our two Famous Universities to whom I humbly dedicate this small Present I neither strive to ingratiate my self by my Style nor to surprize any by Plausible Discourses much less to Impose upon their Understandings by Voluntary Suppositions I draw now and then divers Useful Corollaries and some that will seem I doubt not Paradoxical that so I may carry on my Doctrine to farther Consequences and show withall to what Unthought-of Conclusions Reason will lead us if we follow her close and home Nor am I asham'd to declare openly that I hold that the Chief End of Science is to beget Virtue and not onely to raise us to Higher Contemplation but also to comfort and strengthen Divine Faith in us and to make it more Lively and Operative Whence I have taken occasion to excite my Reader 's Devotion out of the Reflexions on divers Points that seem'd of themselves to be but Dry Speculations making account that Good Thoughts arising upon the Spot but of Truths newly Clear'd to our
Exact Distinction and remain Unconfounded and that whoever holds otherwise and makes them two Suppositums does in the Christian Phrase Solvere Christum 1 Io. 4.3 I have not time to reckon up even hintingly the many Absurdities that spring from this ill-coherent Position of theirs But I will keep to this very Maxim of his and demonstrate that even according to that Man which must be meant by the Pronoun Ego is truly one thing consisting of Soul and Body and not a mere Mens To show this I deny that he has a Câ—â—ar and Distinct Idea of himself unless he conceives himself to be a Rational thing or as he calls himself Ratio nor can he clearly conceive himself to be a Rational Thing but he must conceive himself to be a Thing that infers new Knowledges out of foregoing ones leasurely or with succession of Time which belongs properly to Bodies and Bodily Motion Wherefore something of Corporeal Extended or Divisible is found in the Clear and Distinct Idea of Ego or Himself if he be a Ratio or Rational Thing for were he meerly a Mens or Spirit his Operations would be Indivisible Simultaneous and Unsuccessive as is abundantly demonstrated in divers places of the following Treatise particularly in my Seventh Demonstration Book 3. Lesson 7. Among the other points he brings as possible to be yet doubted of he puts this for one that a Four-squar'd thing has in it four sides and no more of which he pretends he may yet doubt because some most Powerful Agent may possibly make that appear to him to be so tho' it be not true in reality Now 't is the very Notion or Essence of a Quadratum to have but four sides and therefore the Proposition affirming that it has just four sides is perfectly Identical and the same as to say What has but four sides has but four sides It being then impossible any thing can be more Certain or more Evident than an Identical Proposition I would ask why he might not as well be Deceivable in his First Principle Cogito ergo sum as in that Self-evident Proposition Or if he pretends that Proposition Ego sum cogitans is more Evident than the other then since all Evidence of the Truth of any Proposition consists in the Close and Clear Connexion of its Terms I would demand of him or his Scholars whether there be any Connexion of Terms more Close and more Clear than there is of those found in an Identical Proposition which affirms the Same is the Same with it self Or if they say there is then to know of them in what that Evidence consists or how it comes to be more Evident To make way towards the settling his beloved and self-pleasing Ideas he falls to Doubt of the Certainty of all our Senses in order to Knowledge and that not onely as a Supposition for Discourse sake as he pretended to doubt of other things but really and seriously and his Scholar Malbranche assures us the Eyes and the same he says of the other senses are not given us to judge of the Truth of Things but onely to discern those things which may either Profit or injure us and all over he makes them improper Means to attain Knowledge by Which Tenet of theirs lies open to many Exceptions For First The Reason Cartesius assigns viz. Prudentiae est nunquam illis planè confidere qui nos vel semel deceperunt 'T is a part of Prudence not to trust them at all who have so much as once deceiv'd us is utterly unworthy so Great a Man For it discredits all Nature for some few Men's Morality which is a strange Argument for a Philosopher He that has but once deceiv'd us designedly is presum'd to have done it out of Knavery and consequently may not deserve to be trusted the second time because 't is to be fear'd he is still dispos'd to do the same again But what is this to Corporeal Nature in which taking in all circumstances things are carry'd on from Proper Causes to Proper Effects Weak men are sometimes deceiv'd by their Senses but Speculative or Learned men who penetrate the Reasons how the Senses came to misinform them are aware of those undue circumstances and by that means easily prevent the being led by them into Errour 2dly No wise man builds his Judgments barely on the Impressions made on his Senses being taught by their Reason as well as by the Senses themselves better circumstanced that is by Experience that they do sometime deceive us Whence they reserve in their Minds certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in what circumstances we may truly give Credit to their Testimony in what not Now since Exceptio firmat Regulam to say their Information is to be Excepted against in such Circumstances is to acknowledge that in all others they are to be trusted 3dly As Art does preserve the Learned from being Deceiv'd by the Shortness of the Senses in some Cases so as was said lately the Senses themselves do generally correct the False Iudgments they may have occasion'd in Weak People For example to use some of the Instances they object a Brand whirled round represents a Circle of Fire a Stick in the Water looks Crooked a Square Tower seen a far off appears Round and Great Bodies Little But when the Seer comes near the Brand the Tower and those Great Bodies or beholds the Stick out of the Water he having now a more exact View of them in better Circumstances is inform'd certainly by the same Sense and if need be by others conspiring with it that the former representations were not sincere whence he easily corrects his former Mistakes Why then must the Senses be quite discarded as Useless Servants for Knowledge and be branded for constant Lyers and Deceivers since if we apply them as we ought they are the Proper Means to make us correct these too forward Iudgments which in improper Circumstances they may have occasion'd Nay they advance our Knowledge accidentally even when they happen to misinform us by stirring us up to enquire whence it came that the right Impressions on them from the Objects which were Customary was thus perverted which doubtless has been the Cause of very many New Knowledges in Nature 4thly What is all this to Science or to our purpose For in the Method to Science we neither need nor do build our JUDGMENTS on the Senses alone All we require is that they convey into our Knowing Power right Aâ—PREHENSIONS or NOTIONS of the things in Nature And this 't is Evident they must do for tho' as they object a Large Square Steeple seen a far off seems Round and Little and therefore who Judges it such is Deceiv'd yet it imprints truly in my Mind the Notion of Little and Round and 't is on these unmistakable NOTIONS all our Science is built and our Judging right in our Speculations is chiefly grounded on other Principles as will be seen hereafter Lastly Themselves must either
the Mind which is nothing but its Return and Conversion towards God who onely can teach us Truth by the Manifestation of his Substance I am heartily glad to know that Euclid and Archimedes were converted to God and that they were so infinitely Happy as to see God's Substance which is his Essence so manifestly He proceeds Men must look within themselves and draw near unto the Light that shines there continually that their Reason may be the more Illuminated The Mind ought to examin all Human Sciences by the Pure Light of Truth which guides it without hearkening to the False and confused Testimonies of the Senses Those that hear us do not learn the Truths we speak to their Ears unless he that discover'd them to us he means GOD the Giver of Ideas do reveal them at the same time to the Mind So that all Science it seems comes by Divine Revelation To what end then are Teachers Professours Schools and Universities if when we have done what we can by all our Teaching and Learning nothing but Divine Revelation must do the business or gain us any Science But now he advances to a higher point The Mind says he is immediately and after a very strict manner United to God nay after a stricter and more Essential manner than with the Body Now if this be true I dare affirm that the Mind is more United to God Naturally than our Saviour's Humanity was Supernaturally and Miraculously For This was but United Hypostatically or according to the Suppositum or Person of the Eternal Word whereas by this new Philosophy every Human Mind is United Essentially to God that is to the Godhead it self For to be united Essentially is for one Essence to be united to another Essence that is to be one or the same Essence with the Divine Essence Was ever such Quakerism heard of among Philosophers Or plain honest Human Reason so subtiliz'd and exhal'd into Mystick Theology by Spiritual Alchymy Yet to say True this is very Consonant to the Doctrine of Ideas They slight the Instruction of Nature they scorn to be beholding to their Senses and Outwards Objects which forces them upon Introversion and to observe as the same Authour says what Eternal Truth tells us in the Recesses of our Reason that is in their Darling Ideas Now common Reason ever taught me and every Man who did but reflect upon what passes within his Understanding that the Proper and Effectual way to gain a Clear and Distinct Knowledge of our Simple Notions is to make DEFINITIONS of them and there are most Certain Rules of Art how those Definitions may be fram'd But this was too Ordinary a way to please Minds so Extraordinarily Elevated as these Gentlemen pretend to be bless'd with The highest Flights of Nature do flag it seems too low for their Supernatural pitch nor can reach the Degrees of their Elevation above our dull Horizon They are Inspir'd with Heaven implanted Ideas and so they have no more to do but retire their Thoughts into the Inward Recesses of their Mind embellish'd and guilded with these Shining Innate Ideas and their work is done without any need of Definitions made by sublunary Art Sometimes I am apt to think that they had recourse to those Spiritual Pourtraitures out of despair of explicating any other way the Essences of Things or in what they consisted and I fear two of our Learned men lately mention'd apprehend them to be Inscrutable and In-explicable Whereas speaking of Essences in Common I do assure them that nothing can be plainer and that every Clown were he interrogated orderly could give us the true Essences or which is the same the true Natures of the things he is conversant with For whatever makes Mankind call and esteem any Bodies such or such Things in Distinction from all others is truly their Essence or to speak in the Language of a Philosopher let but Matter be determin'd by such a Complexion of Accidents with that Harmony or Proportion of parts connected with that Constancy that it is fit to act a Distinct part upon Nature's stage or perform its Primary Operation that Complexion of Accidents I say is truly the Essence of that Body or the Form that constitutes it such an Ens or such a Part of or in Nature Perhaps the Cartesians will say they allow Definitions to make their Ideas Clear and Distinct. But how can this cohere Definitions are the Effects of Art whereas these Ideas are imprinted by God's Hand who gave them their Nature and Cartesius says expresly they are Ingenitae This being so and GOD's immediate Works being Perfect and those Ideas being intended to give them Knowledge they can need nothing to make them more Clear and Distinct nor consequently can the Users of them have any occasion for Definitions unless perhaps to explain their Ideas to us who think we have a firmer Basis to build them on than those Ideas of theirs Nature gives the Ground and Art the Rules to make them And they are such necessary Instruments to true and solid Science that I could wish for the Improvement of Knowledge that our Universities would appoint a Committee of Learned Men to compile a Dictionary of Definitions for the Notions we use in all parts of Philosophy whatever Monsieur de Furetiere has attempted to perform this for all words whatever in Three Volumes Out of which may be Collected those that make for our purpose which being by the Ioynt-labour and Concurrence of the Persons deputed Examined if faulty Amended and propos'd to the World it could not fail of advancing Science highly In carrying forward such a Noble Work and so Beneficial to Mandkind I should willingly contribute my Quota of Endeavours nor think my pains better bestow'd in any thing I know of For Definitions explicating or unfolding the Nature of the Thing and all Proper Causes and Effects being so nearly ally'd to the Nature of the Thing it follows that there lies involv'd in the Definitions all Essential and Proper Middle Terms to demonstrate whatever belongs to the Notion Defin'd if Right Logick and studious Industry be not wanting He blames St. Austin and wishes he had not attributed to External Bodies all the sensible Qualities we perceive by their means And why Because says he they are not clearly contain'd in the Idea he had of Matter What Idea St. Austin had of Matter is little to purpose but if he proceeded consequently to his Thoughts he could not conceive the First Matter to be such as they put theirs to be For what Man of Common Sense can frame any Idea of a Thing that has onely Extension in it but is not to any degree either Dense or Rare Easie or Hard to be Divided Fluid nor Solid Soft nor Hard c. And if their Quaint Ideas and Clear and Distinct Conceptions which seem to be the Ground of all their Witty Discourses or Divine Revelations as Malbranche calls them of Science be no Wiser or Solider
us have neither Truth nor Falshood in them formally since they do neither affirm or deny only with Speeches are capable of Formal Verity or Falsity any more than does the Thing it self as it stands in Nature or out of the Understanding 13. All the Verity they have is their Metaphysical Verity or their being truly what they are And they partake this from the Idea's in the Divine Understanding from which they unerringly flow and which are essentially Unchangeable By which we see how the God of Truth is the sole Author of all the Truth that is in us and how he does ordinarily communicate it to us viz. by Fixing unalterably the Natures or Essences of Things from which being thus Establish'd and imprinted on our Minds by our Senses all Science and Truth in us have their Certainty originally 14. All true Science being thus built on the Immovable Stability of the Essences or Natures of Created Beings it follows necessarily that all Discourses that are not Agreeable to the Natures of Things and Grounded on them are Frothy Incoherent and False and if pursued home must be found to have a Contradiction for their First Principle in regard they make the Natures of Things to be what they are not 15. Wherefore Notions being the Natures of the Things in our Understanding the Method to pursue True Science is to attend and hold heedfully and steadily to those Notions which the Things without us have imprinted or stamp'd in our Minds and to be very careful lest Imaginations which are the Offsprings of Fancy and do oft misrepresent the Thing do delude us or the Equivocation of Words draw us aside and make us deviate from those Genuine and Nature instill'd Notions COROLARIES Corol. I. Hence is seen how Unreasonable the Scepticks are who endeavour to undermine all Science by pretending that all our Notions are Uncertain For they being caus'd by Natural Impressions on our Senses those Men may as well pretend that Water does not wet or Fire burn as that the Objects work not their several Effects upon our Senses If they contend that every Man 's individual Temper being different our Notions must therefore differ to some Degree in every Man they oppose not us who say the same nor will this break any square in our Discoursing and our Understanding one another for few Men perhaps none can reach these Individual Differences nor consequently mean them or intend to speak of them when they discourse But if they say they are not the same in all Men whose Senses oâ— imagination are not disordered by some Accidental Disease substantially and in the main then besides what has been now alledged they are confuted by this that Mankind has now for some thousands of Years held Conversation with one another yet it was never observ'd that they could not understand one anothers Meaning in Discourse about Natural Objects or if any hap'd to occurr which was Ambiguous that they could not make their Notions known by Explications or if there had been some notable variation in their Notions as when to Icterical persons all things seem yellow or sweet things bitter to depraved Tasts the Mistake can easily be made manifest and corrected by the Standard of the Generality of Mankind who assure them of their Misapprehension and of Learned Men particularly who find the Cause of their Mistake to proceed from some Disease perverting Nature or some Circumstances of the unduly-proposed Object or of the Medium or from our Inability to reach to some minute Considerations belonging to its Composition Figure c. which hinder not our having Science of it in other Cases Corol. II. Hence also is shewn the Vanity of that Tenet that maintains the Pre-existence of Souls as far as it depends on this Ground That Knowledges are only Excited or Awaken'd as it were by the Objects working on the Senses and not Imprinted there by them For this Ground shakes by manifesting the Ways and Means laid by Nature to beget those Knowledges in the Soul and convey them thither from the Objects Besides which overthrows all their Hypothesis the Knowledge that I am hic nunc thus affected cannot with any sence be pretended to have been Pre-existent to the Time and Place in which that Particular Knowledge was made since neither ehat Time nor perhaps Place was then in Being Whence it follows that the Soul can gain some new Knowledges and this by the Senses and if any or some why not with equal reason all that the same Senses can receive from Objects imprinted in her which as far as it depends on this way of instilling Knowledge may reach in a manner ad Nâ—tuâ—â— and by the assistance of Reflexion Discourse and Art improving it may stretch it self much farther Corol. III. From this whole Discourse it appears that whatever other Method of attaining Science some may propose however it may seem witty and one piece of their Doctrine be consonant to the other and all of them consequent to the Principles they lay yet it will I say evideâ—tly appear that the way they take can never be that which GOD and Nature have laid to ingraft Knowledge in us Whence tho' such Discoursers may shew much Art yet in reality and if it be examin'd to the bottom all their Plausible Contexture and Explication of their own Scheme will be found no better than the running pretty strains of Division upon no Ground since their pretended Knowledges do not begin with nor grow up orderly from the Natures of the Things themselves or from our Natural Notions which are the Seeds of Science Corol. IV. Our Discourse here abstracts from that Question Whether sensible Qualities are Inherent in the Object or in the 〈◊〉 It is enough for my purpose that the Objects work upon the Senses so as to imprint by their means several Notions in the Mind Yet I do not see how Mr. Hobbs proves for he does not so much as attempt it that Light coming from the Object does not carry away with it some Particles of it since we experience that the Sun beams dry up great Ponds which they could not do unless they did when reflected dip their dry Wings in that moist Element and return with some Particles of Water into the Air which when multiply'd are condensed afterwards into Clouds And I believe it will be granted that the Sun-beams reflected from the Moon bring along with them moist Vapours Much less is it conceivable that in Smells and Tasts nothing at all of the Nature of those Objects should be convey'd by the Nerves to the Brain but only a certain kind of Motiâ—n 'T is not my task to defend the Opinions of Schoolmen nor those of vulgar Philosophers which he impugns but to mind my own business Tho' had I a mind to lose a little time it were easie to shew that he seems to mistake all-along our Pâ—â—â—eptions for what is perceiv'd of the Object And I might as easily deny that Colour for
some Body viz. to Animal as one of the Proper and Intrinsecal Differences of that Genus as is shewn above 3. Notwithstanding Man cannot be both Body and Spirit formally For then he must necessarily be Two Entities in distinct Lines of Substance the one under the Genus of Body the other of Spirit Whence he would be Vnum and non-Vnum in the same regard or according to the same Formal Notion that is he would be Ens and non Ens and consist formally of two Things as perfectly distinct as an Angel and an Ape and even be more monstrous than a Hircocervus or Chimaera because he would be formally that is essentially made up of two more-generically-opposit Things than these are conceiv'd to be Wherefore the Notion of Man being deduced by Intrinsecal Differences from the Genus of Body he is formally a Body tho' his Soul be of a spiritual Nature which makes him virtually a Spirit Whence also the manner of Existence following from what 's Formal in the Thing he has in this State a Corporeal Manner of Existence as appears by his gleaning Knowledge by the Senses his being Measurable by Quantity Alterable by Corporeal Qualities nay even his peculiar and proper Action of Discourse attends the slow pace of Fancy and Bodily Motion none of which could be competent to a Pure Spirit that exists after a Spiritual and Indivisible manner Nor does this more prejudice the Spiritual Nature of a Soul that it exists and works in some regards after the manner of a Body than it does prejudice the Nature of a Body a Stone for example that it exists in us spiritually as it does when we know it or have the Notion or Nature of it in our Understanding 4. Hence is seen what Notions do formally belong to the Line of Substance or to Ens as Ens viz. the several species of it descending downwards from the Common Head till we come to the Iâ—dividuum which therefore is a compleat Ens as including all those Superiour or partial Notions and * therefore it only is in proper speech an Ens or Thing in regard It onely being ultimately determin'd to be This or That only It is by consequence capable of existing which is the Definition of Ens. Whence all Potential or Indeterminate Notions of Ens such as are Ens Corpus Vivens or Animal in Common are for the same reason incapable of Existing otherwise than as they are Parts of the compleat Ens or Individuum and therefore they are phras'd by the Schools Substantiae Secundae and the Individuum Substantia Prima Lower than the Individuum in the Line of Ens we cannot go nor can any Notion be superadded to it that belong Properly to Ens but that of Existence of which Ens is a Capacity Whence we do not call Existence a Form or Act for This joyn'd with the Matter or Power does constitute that compound Ens call'd Body and therefore are both presuppos'd to Existence but we call it the last Formality of every created Ens because it has no Potentiality at all in that Line but is Pure Actuality and therefore most resembles GOD our Creator and the sole Giver of It whose very Essence is Self-Existence 5. All those Notions before said taking them precisely as determining the common Notion of Ens and belonging to it even to the last Actuality of it Existence inclusively are Metaphysical Notions The proper Object of which Science is Ens not taken as it abstracts from Existence but as it abstracts from all the other Predicaments or common Heads of Notions that is from all Matter and Motion and all Modes or Manners of them For which Reason Existence which more perfectly abstracts from both does more formally belong to the Object of Metaphysicks LESSON IV. Some Considerations belonging to those Ten Heads of Notions or to the Ten Predicaments in Common 1. THE last Nine Predicaments call'd Accidents are not truly Things nor of themselves capable of Existence and therefore they are onely Capable of Being by their Identity with Substance For since we cannot clearly know any thing but by framing diverse Notions or Considerations of it and all the Notions we have are divided into Ten common Heads and it hinders the way to Science if we keep not the Distinction of those Heads unmingled Wherefore it being manifest and undeniable that among those Heads there is one which is truly the Notion of Ens or Thing that is of apable of Existing viz. that of Substance Hence in case we should conceive or put all the rest to be also Entities or Things or of themselves capable of Existence we should confound and jumble all the Common Heads of our Notions together which would fundamentally destroy all possibility of Science even while we are laying it 2. Notwithstanding this the Notions or Natures of those Nine Heads are not Fictitious or fram'd gratis by our Understanding but real Affections or Modifications of the Thing For since we cannot comprehend all that is in the thing at once but are forced to make diverse Considerations of it nor could we do this unless the thing were diversly Considerable it follows that these Nine Heads as well as the First are diverse Considerabilities of the same Thing that is the real Thing it self as diversly consider'd or conceiv'd by us and therefore since they are not Things by virtue of their distinct Notions and yet are really the Thing diversly consider'd which takes nothing from their Reâ—lity it is left that they must be Real Affections Modifications Respects or Determinations of it and not meer Nothings or Fictitious but as we may say somewhat of the Thing or belonging to it which Logicians phrase to be a Thing in an Analogical or Secondary sense 3. The Distinction of these Considerabilities is partly taken from the Vnderstanding partly from Nature it self For since the diverse Considerabilities of the Thing are not so many little Entities found in it but the same thinâ— diversly conceiv'd the distinction of them cannot be taken from the Thing it self singly consiâ—â—red On the other side since our Understanding is naturally apt to make diverse Abstract Notions of the Thing nay is forced to do it because it cannot discourse clearly of more of them toâ—ether much less of the whole suppositum and that the Impressions on the Senses which cause those Notions are naturally diverse and that the Causes in Nature do often work upon the suppositum or thing according to some one Notion or Considerability of it and not according to another for example on its Figure and not on its Colour on its Locality or Situation and not on its Substance hence ample occasion is ministred to the Understanding to consider it diversly that is to make diverse Conceptions or Notions of it Wherefore the distinction of these Considerabilities is partly taken from the Vnderstanding partly from Nature it self Nature affording Ground and Occasion for the Understanding
the Premisses affirms Universally the other Particularly the Conclusion must be a particular Affirmative For tho' one of the Extremes be Universally or Totally connected with the Medium yet the other Extreme is but Particularly or in part Connected with it and so it can never infer the Total Connexion of them nor can the Conclusion be an Universal Affirmative because they were not to that degree Connected with the Medium in the Premisses For Example Da Every Good Man is Charitable ri Some Rich Man is a Good Man Therefore i Some Rich Man is Charitable 14. When one of the Extremes is Universally deny'd of the Medium and the Medium particularly affirm'd of the other Extreme the Conclusion must be a particular Negative For were the Terms Totally the same in the Minor as it was in Celarent then the Terms of the Conclusion had been not at all the same but Vniversally deny'd of one another as it was there wherefore being but in part the same in the Minor they can only be in part not the same in the Conclusion For Example Fe-No harmful thing is to be used ri Some Mirth is a harmful thing therefore o Some Mirth is not to be used From these Grounds the Reason may be given for diverse Maxims or Axioms commonly used by Logicians concerning this present matter telling us when and how the Conclusions follow or not follow such as are 15. From two Vniversal Negatives nothing follows Because neither Extreme is Connected with the Medium either in whole or in part nor from this that two Notions are different from a Third is it consequent that they are or are not the same thing with one another Wherefore a Syllogism being such an Artificial and perfectly order'd Discourse that putting the Premisses to be True the Conclusion must be True also such as this and the same may be said in part of those other that follow wanting that due Connexion of the Terms which is Essential to a Syllogism are not Syllogisms but Paralogisms v. g. No Brute is Rational No Man is a Brute Therefore No Man is Rational 16. From two particular Propositions nothing follows For a Particular Proposition expressing but some part of the whole Notion of the Middle Term with which it is joyn'd and there being more parts in that whole Notion one of the Extremes may be united with it according to one part or Consideration of it and the other according to another part in which case it cannot follow they are united at all with one another in the Conclusion v. g. Some Man is a Fool. Some Wise Man is a Man Therefore Some Wise Man is a Fool Where some Man the Medium is taken for a diverse Part as it were of Man in common and so the Medium as considered according to it's Parts which are Diverse is not One it self nor consequently can it unite others by it's being one or the same with it's self which is the Fundamental Ground of all Consequence Corol. Hence follows immediatly that one of the Premisses must be an Vniversal else nothing is Concluded Which deserves Remarking this being useful to confute some Wrong Methods to Science 17. A Negative Conclusion cannot be deduced from Affirmative Premisses Because if the Extremes were the same with the Medium in the Premisses and not the same with one another in the Conclusion it would follow that the Middle Term is the same and not the same with it self or else that the Connexion or Inconnexion of the Terms in the Conclusion is not to be taken from the Connexion or Inconnexion with the Middle Term in the Premisses which utterly subverts all Ground of Discoursing 18. The Conclusion cannot be Vniversal unless the Medium be once taken Vniversally in the Premisses Because otherwise both the Premisses would be Particulars from which as was proved § 16. no Conclusion can follow 19. The Conclusion always follows the worser part that is it must be Negative or Particular if either of the Premisses be such The reason of the former is because if either of the Premisses be Negative then the Medium is not the same with one of the Terms of the Conclusion and therefore it can never be the cause of Identifying them both which is done by inferring an Affirmative Conclusion The reason of the latter is because if it be only in part the same with one of the Extremes it cannot prove those Extremes to be wholly the same which can only be done by their being united with it universally for it can give no greater degree of Connexion to the two Extremes than it self has with them as was shown § 10. These Maxims or Positions being shown to be Rational and necessarily Consequent to the Grounds of Rigorous or Syllogistical Discoursing we proceed in our intended Method 20. A Singular Proposition may supply the Place of a Particular one in the Minor of Darii and Ferio For a Singular or Individual Notion is in reality some part of the Common Notion and the words Some Man or Some Men do signify some Individual Man or Men wherefore abating the manner of the Indeterminate Expression the sense is the same in both Hence these are right Syllogisms and Conclusive Da-Every Philosopher resolves Effects into their Proper Causes ri Aristotle is a Philosopher therefore i Aristotle resolves Effects into their Proper Causes Fe-No Man who supposes his Grounds gratis is a Philosopher ri Epicurus supposes his Grounds gratis therefore o Epicurus is not a Philosopher 21. Expository Syllogisms that consist of Singular Propositions are true and perfect Syllogisms For since a Syllogism is such a Discourse as from the Clear Connexion of a Middle Notion with the two Extremes inferrs the Connexion of those Extremes with one another and Singulars have their Notions as well as Universals and may be connected with one another it follows that in case these Discourses be not Faulty in other respects they cannot from the regard of their consisting wholly of Singulars be degraded from being true and perfect Syllogisms v. g. Tom Long brought me a Letter This Man is Tom Long Therefore This Man brought me a Letter 22. Such Syllogisms do not advance Science For since we experience that our Soul is not only Capable of having Universal Notions but that 't is her peculiar Nature to Abstract that is to draw Singular Notions to Universal ones and since Notions are the Ground of all Knowledge and consequently Universal Notions of Universal Knowledges and Science is a Perfection of our Mind according to her Nature and therefore does dilate and enlarge her Natural Capacity by Extending it to the Knowledge of Vniversal Truths Wherefore since on the other side an Expository Syllogism as consisting of Singulars can Conclude or gain the Soul knowledge of no more but some one Singular it Cramps Contracts or makes Narrow her Natural Capacity whence it follows that such Syllogisms are far from Perfecting the Soul or from generating Science which is
as to the nature of Agent and Patient there needs no more to begin the Effect actually but Application 2. If Agent and Patient be perfectly fitted as to the nature of Agent and Patient and the Effect be Indivisible there needs no more to begin and end that is to Compleat the Effect at once but Application 3. An Indivisible Effect cannot be perform'd by piecemeal or by parts 4. Every thing operates as it is 5. No Change can be made without the Operation of some Cause 6. A Pure Spirit is not Quantitative a Body is Proposition I. No Corporeal Operation is without Local Motion For since Ax. 4. Every thing operates as it is what is Quantitative operates Quantitatively but nothing can operate Quantitatively or exercise 't is Quantity when it perfectly rests according to it's Quantity that is moves not according to it's Quantity It follows then that to Operate Quantitatively is to move according to Quantity Wherefore since nothing can move according to it's Quantity but either Intrinsically by having it's Quantity made greater or less or Extrinsically that is by having it's Quantity unmov'd as to it 's own parts or it's self mov'd towards Another and both these do evidently require some kind of Local Motion 't is Evident likewise that No Câ—â—poreal Operation is without Local Motion Proposition II. 13. That an Angel is not susceptible of Local Motion For since Motion is Mutation and consequently Local Motion Mutation or Change according to Place and Change of Place does necessarily require some Space and Space is Quantity it follows that Local Motion cannot be made in a Subject which has no Quantity But Angels they being Pure Spirits are not Quantitative therefore they are not Susceptible of Local Motion or capable of having Local Motion made in them Proposition III. 15. That no Body can cause a Change in an Angel For since no Operation of Body is without Local Motion and an Angel it being a Pure Spirit is not susceptible of Local Motion it follows that neither is it Susceptible of the Operation of Body But No Cause can change any thing unless that Cause operates upon it Therefore no Body can cause any Change in an Angel Proposition IV. 16. That an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant For since a Cause the self same in all respects if the Patient be likewise the self same and the Application also the self same produces the self-same Effect equally in any time assignable that is sufficient for such an Effect and an Angel put to act upon it self or change it self after the first Instant is put to be the self-same as to its being a Cause in every Instant before it acts as likewise to be the self-same Patient in all respects and the Application of it self to its self cannot but be Equal it follows that in any time sufficient for the same Effect it will produce the same Effect that is act upon it self or change it self Wherefore since an Effect in an Indivisible subject is Indivisible that is Impossible not to be all at once or in one Instant and an Angel being a Pure Spirit is an Indivisible Subject t is Evident that this Effect or the Action of that Spirit upon it self would be equally made in every Instant in case it were not already made that is can only be made in the First Instant Wherefore an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant Proposition V. 17. If there were only Two Angels Existent one of them could not act upon the other after the very First Instant of their Being Let there be only Two Angels the one whereof can work upon the other and let the Agent be A the Patient B and because they are suppos'd not to act in the First Instant but after some Duration let the Duration assign'd be C the Instant at the end of that Duration in which they first work D. Since neither A. nor B. are able to work upon themselves except in the First Instant and as is suppos'd one works not upon the other till the Instant D they must necessarily remain in all respects the same they were in the First Instant till the Instant D that is for the whole Intermediat Duration C Therefore they are equally fitted in point of Agent and Patient in each nay in the very First Instant of the Duration C as they are in the Instant D But in the Instant D in which they acted they were in all points fitted to act therefore they were also in all points perfectly fitted to act in the very first Instant of the Duration C Wherefore the Effect Begun and the Subject being Indivisible Ended in the very First Instant in case their wanted not Application of the perfectly-ready Agent to the perfectly-dispos'd Patient But there wanted not Application in the very First Instant For since Quantitative Application or Propinquity is not competent to Pure Spirits all the Application they can be imagin'd to have to one another is by Knowledg and Will But they had the same Knowledg and Will for the Whole Duration antecedent because they are suppos'd Vnchang'd and perfectly the same for that whole Duration And tho' they had not had it formerly the Argument returns with the same force that they could not have had this new Knowledg and Will from Themselves in any part of that Duration nor from a Body and therefore they must have had it from anâ—ther Spirit and this in the First Instant because that Other was then perfectly apt to give it This perfectly apt to receive it And consequently If there were only Two Angels Existent one of them could not act upon rhe other after the very First Instant of their Being Proposition VI. 18. Put any multitude of Angels how great soever all that they can work upon one another will be perform'd in the First Instant of their Being For since where there are only Two one must therefore act upon the other in the First Instant or not at all because all the imaginable Concurrents to that Action were then adequately put the rest also where there are more will for the same reason be wrought upon in the same Instant in case the Causes of that Action be then adequately put But they are all Adequately put in the same First Instant For the second Angel that acts either is a perfect Agent and perfectly apply'd by what it has of it self or by what it has from another wherefore since it can never want what it has of it self or by it's self it cannot want any thing to work upon the Third unless it be to be wrought upon by the First and so be fitted to work upon the Third but this is done in the very first Instant wherefore also the Third will for the same reason be wrought upon in the self-same Instant Again since the Third cannot be imagin'd to want any thing to enable it to work
upon the Fourth but to be chang'd by the Second and this was done as was now shown in the First Instant the Causes of changing the Fourth were adequately put in the same Instant too and consequently the Effect And since how far soever we proceed the same reason holds viz. that the Effects are still Indivisible and all the Causes of each immediately succeeding Effect still adequately put in the first Instant it will follow that the Effects will still be put in the same Instant by the same necessity that the Effect of the First up on the Second was put in the First Instant of their Being Therefore all whatever any Multitude of Angels how great soever can work upon one another is perform'd in the First Instant of their Being Proposition VII 19. That 't is Infinitly more Impossible an Angel should be chang'd by God after the first Instant than by any other Spirit For since the Angel is in the same manner capable of Change as far as concerns it's self or it 's own power to be changed whether God or any other Spirit be to change it on that side precisely there is a perfect Equality Wherefore seeing on the other side 't is infinitly more Impossible that GOD should not have Power to change her in the First Instant than that any other Spirit should not have such a Power and Infinitly more Impossible that GOD should not of himself be ultimately dispos'd to act where the nature of the thing is capable of it his Nature being Pure Actuality Also since 't is Infinitly more Impossible that GOD should after some Duration receive any Change in himself fitting him to produce that Effect than that any other Spirit should And lastly since 't is Infinitly more Impossible his Active Power should not be Apply'd to the Patient both in regard he most necessarily and comprehensively knows it and most intimately by himself conserves it in Being Wherefore since from these Considerations or Reasons however Infinitly short in Creatures it is concluded to be Impossible that even any Other Spirit if it should change an Angel at all should not change it in the First Instant and these Considerations or Reasons are found to be in GOD with Infinitly greater Advantage it is Evident that 't is Infinitly more Impossible that GOD if he change an Angel at all should not change it in the first Instant that is should change it in the Intermediate Duration than that any other Spirit should Proposition IX 20. That 't is absolutely Impossible an Angel should be Changed after the First Instant of it's Being For since no Change can be made without â—he working of Some Cause and no Body can work upon an Angel and all that it self or any other Created Spirit can work upon it must necessarily be in the very First Instant of it's Being and 't is much more Impossible GOD should work upon it unless in the First Instant than that any Created Spirit should and there can be no Cause possible or Imaginable besides GOD Created Spirits or Bodies it follows that there can be no Cause at all to work upon an Angel or to Change it after the First Instant of it's Being and therefore it can undergo no Change after that First Instant ADVERTISEMENT 1. THIS last Conclusion may seem a strange Paradox to some Readers whose Reason and Principles have not rais'd them above Fancy But not to insist farther on the Evidence of our Consequences from Undeniable Principles which have forced the Necessity of our Conclusion such men are desirâ—d to reflect that Ens being divided as by it's Proper Differences by Divisible and Indivisible and these Differences being Contradictory to one another it follows that Body and Spirit which are the Species constituted by those Differences do agree in nothing at all but in the Common and Generical notion of Ens or in this that they are both of them Capable of Being Whence 't is Logically demonstrated that they must Differ nay contradictorily disagree in every thing else so that whatever else is Affirm'd literally of the one must be deny'd of the other Wherefore since we can truly and literally Affirm that Body is Quantitative Corruptible in Place mov'd Locally Chang'd by Time or Subject to it Capable of Succession or of Before and After which are the Differences of time c. we must be forced with equal Truth Literally to Deny all these of Pure Spirits or Angels because none of these do belong to the Common Generical Notion of Ens but to that Difference which constitutes that Species call'd Body and therefore the Contradictory to all these and amongst them to be Vnsuccessive in it's Operations must be predicated of the other Species call'd Spirit It will I doubt not be much wonder'd at too that the Devils should be Damn'd in the First Instant of their being which looks as if they were Created in the state of Damnation A thing certainly most Unworthy GOD who is Essentially and Infinitly Good But their wonder will cease if they reflect that those Bad Angels had far more Knowledg and consequently more perfect Deliberation such as they can have in that one Single Instant than We could have had tho' we have been a thousand years Considering and Deliberating e'er we had made our Choice of our last End and fix our Resolution to adhere to it Finally So that it never lay in the power of any Man to have so Clear a Knowledg of his Duty and so perfect and full sight of all the Motives to continue in that Duty as the Devil and his Angels had in that one Instant Whence the Crime of Lucifer and his Adherents was a Sin of pure Malice and not mere Frailty or mixt with Frailty much less of Inadvertence Speculative Ignorance or suggested by the Soul 's deprav'd Companion the Body as are the Sins of the Generality of Mankind some Inconsiderable number of them excepted whose Souls are thorowly poison'd with Spiritual Sin 's peculiar to the Devil such as are Spiritual Pride Malice Envy or such like which wicked Sinners are therefore even while here so many Limbs as it were of the Devil and very difficult to be brought to any Repentance And this is the reason why GOD's Wisdom Goodness and Justice laid so many Miracles of Mercy to save poor weak Mankind and left the Faln Angels in the sad condition in which they had so wilfully and desperately engulft themselves Wisely and Justly placing it in the Order of Causes that that Sin which was so perfectly and in despite of all Motives to the contrary so Wilfully Resolute should be Irretractable whereas on the other side Sins of mere Frailty are not hard to be repented of when the alluring circumstance is past and gone The same Faculty which permitted them to fall leaving them likewise in a Pliableness to reform and retract what their Reason abus'd by Passion had perhaps either by surprize or after much
Will and Conscience is kept Clear however the Decision of the matter may hap to be Vnjust 11. Thus far of Opinion FAITH or Belief speaking of Human Faith to which our Circumstances determin our Discourse is built on Human Testimony or Witnessing Authority To which ere we ought to yield Assent two things are Prerequisit viz. That we be Certain it could certainly know the things it Attests and that it speaks truly when it does Attest them that is there are requisit Knowlèdg and Veracity in the Attesters 12. If we certainly know that the Attesters knew the thing and did not only fancy they knew it it is most Certain the thing is so as they knew it to be For since to know a thing is to have the thing in our Understanding as it is in it self and none can know what is not Knowable or is not it follows that all Knowledg of the Thing 's Being or of it's being thus or thus does most certainly Infer that thing to be as the Asserters knew it to be 13. Care is to be had that the Attesters did truly Know the Thing and not only fancy they knew it when they knew it not For since Mankind is often deceiv'd in thinking they know and only True Knowledg in the Attesters can ground our Second-hand Knowledg that it is grounded on their Knowing it to be it follows that we must be sure those Attesters could not err in knowing that thing ere we can Rationally beleive them 14. Wherefore no Testimony built on their Knowing Speculative Points can have any force upon our Understanding or Oblige it to Belief For since we experience that even Learned Men do often err in their Speculations either thro' Inadvertency the Obscurity or Perplexedness of the Object Ambiguity of Words Dread of some Authority which over-aws their Reason or lastly thro' want of Logick or a Right Method how to manage their Thoughts It follows that we cannot be Sure that they do not err or that they do truly know Speculative Points nor consequently can we be Certain that the thing is truly so as they pretend to know it is All the power they have over us is to make us prudently wary not to oppose such Speculaters but upon Evident Reason especially if they be many and of Repute but much more if they pretend to go upon Intrinsical Mediums in which the Mistake is both seldom and quickly discover'd if brought to the Test. Corol. II. Hence no Credit at all is to be given to such Reasoners who do not so much as pretend to Demonstrate tho never so many For such men do not so much as affirm themselves to be Knowers or that the thing is Certainly so as they deem it to be and so they can have no kind of Authority even tho' their Speculative thoughts were a thing Attestable Whence we may establish this Maxim viz. That No Reasoner precisely as such has any kind of Authority but by virtue of the Reason he produces that is the Reason which he alledges and not his Saying or Word ought to have any force at all upon our Understanding 15. Wherefore Testimony has for it's Object either Particular things or Matters of Fact necessarily knowable by Mankind using their Common and Frequent Sensations or relying on Vnerrable Experience For since Vniversal Notions are the Object of Speculation and men may err in their Speculations Vniversals cannot be the Objects of Witnessing Authority or Testimony but Particulars only Again since every Particular is not obvious to Sense but many of them are so Circumstanc'd Insensible or Remote that we can have no Certain Experience of them it follows that only suâ—h Particular Objects or Matters of Fact as make a lively and Certain Impression on the Senses are those which can be Attested or be the Object of Testimony 16. Experience may be so Circumstanced that it is Impossible the thing Experienced should be otherwise For since the Senses of Mankind in due circumstances are as apt to convey sincere Impressions of Sensible Objects into our Minds as other Natural Causes to produce their Effects they being design'd and fitted by God and Nature for that end it follows that if other Circumstances be agreeaable it is Impossible but they should give us such Experiential Knowledg of Sensible Matters of Fact or Particulars as may assure us of the things being as we Experience it The Circumstances requir'd to this Absolute Assurance is that the Object propos'd be of a thing Subject to Sense that it be within a Convenient Distance and that the Iâ—pression be not hindred or perverted by an Inconvenient Medium Hence we can be absolutely Certain what House or Street we live in of our Acquaintance or Employment who reigns in such a year and of Notable Actions Universally Knowable that happen'd in such or such a time lastly of Multitudes of Private Actions familiarly known to our selves only 17. Besides Knowledg in the Attester there is also requisit Veracity in him to ground Human Faith For let the Attester know the Object never so well if we cannot be Certain he tells us True when he sayes he knows it his Original Knowledg cannot have any Effect on us or beget a Second-hand Knowledg in us derivable from his Pretended Knowledg of that Object 18. No Authority deserves Assent farther then Reason gives it to deserve For let us take two Authorities one that of a whole Town the other of a Knight of the Post and since our Nature allows us that Privilege let it be ask'd why the Latter is not to be credited as much as the Former and the answer will be For such a Reason So that Reason in Common is the Ground of our Believing at all as well as of our believing one Authority rather than Another And this because Reason is our Nature given us by GOD and therefore every Act of our Soul that is not for some Reason and according to Reason is totally without Reason that is Unnatural that is Irrational that is Brutal or Unbecoming a Man 19. Wherefore no Man can be oblig'd to believe beyond the Motive he has to believe For that degree of Belief that is beyond the Motive or the Reason as far as it is beyond the Reason is Evidently without Reason or Irrational Whence follows that our Reason is to give us our Grounds of Belief both as to the Knowledg and the Veracity of the Attesters For otherwise our Belief would have no Reason at all for the Grounds it is to rely upon and so would be perfectly Irrational Corol. III. Wherefore since God governs his Creatures according to the Nature he has given them he does not Command us to Assent absolutely upon any Authority which may either be Deceiv'd or Deceive us For otherwise men may be led into Errour by obeying GOD's Command that is since GOD laid that Command by GOD Himself 20. Wherefore both the Knowledg and Veracity of the Attesters must be Knowable by Intrinsical
Likelihoods on which they are built are Great or Slight 10. Those Different Inclinations or Propensions of the Understanding towards the Things being or not being may be taken from Innumerable Heads viz. From the meer Frequency or Seldomness of the things Happening from Historical Relations unabetted by Tradition from Rumour and Common Talk from Writers of Uncertain Authority or proceeding upon Speculation or Opinion from the Multitude of such Authors as do not so much as pretend to know yet are of great Name or Authority from the bare Sentiments of Antiquity from relying on our Nurses Parents or Tutors from Medals Monuments Inscriptions Fables c. From Misconceits deluding our Fancy from Equivocation of words from Interest and Prejudice from ill-agreeing Observations made by our selves of the same happening in a like case from Mistakes of Proper Causes c. All which agree in this that they are Common or Remote Mediums 11. Some Degrees of Suspense are so small and Indiscernable that they are not easie to be discover'd so that they counterfeit an Assent even in the Wisest and cause a Real Assent in Weak People Such as are the Instances of Moral Certainty mention'd above 12. The way to discover whether they be Assents or Suspences is to Reflect on our own Interiour and to study better our careless thoughts by asking our selves what Certain Ground we had for them For 't is Evident that we have many Effects wrought in us by Nature which for want of Reflexion we are not aware of in regard our Thoughts and the several natures of them cannot possibly be known but by Reflexion For to use our former Example we seem to Assent Absolutely that we shall not dye this Night and even the Wisest Men if they be now in perfect health do seem to take it to be altogether Certain or to speak more properly that themselves are Absolutely Certain of it yet upon recourse to their Grounds finding themselves unable to fathom the Series of Hidden Causes and the multitude of Casualties that may occur which they habitually knew before-hand that they did not certainly know we shall find that notwithstanding this seeming Assent of theirs they yet retain'd some small Degree of Suspence whether it might happen or no which hinder'd them from truly Assenting 13. From what 's said it appears that Certainty is a Qualification of Assent giving it it 's best perfection by Securing it from Errour and making it at the same time Incapable of ever admitting the least Degree of Suspence For since our Assent may hap to be and oft-times is upon Irrational and Inconclusive Grounds which expose it when discover'd to the shame of a future Retractation but Certain Assent cannot be liable to that Hazard and Inconvenience because what 's Certain to us is True beyond all Peradventure it is evident that Certainty superadds to Assent the highest Perfection that can be 14. Certainty may either be consider'd as it is in the Object or the Thing or else as it is in the Subject or Person who is Ascertain'd by by that Object 15. Certainty on the Objects side is nothing but the Things being Determinately what it is or as it is This is in a manner Self-evident For every thing that is is Determinate and it 's being Fixt to be such is to be Certainly such of it 's own Nature independently on any thing but on the First Cause Establishing that Nature to be what it is or ordering it by Second Causes to be as it is 16. Certainty on the Subject's side is the Conformity of our Understanding to this Objective Certainty For we can neither be Certain nor Uncertain without Reasons or Motives and those must either be taken from the Establish'd or Certain Nature of the Things or they can be no Reasons 17. Wherefore when we discourse or dispute about the Certainty of any Point it can only be meant of Certainty in the Subject or of Certainty to us for of Certainty on the Object 's side or that the Thing is Certainly or Determinately what it is there can be no Dispute Corol. II. Hence Certainty being the Determination of the Vnderstanding which is to be led by Reason all Determination of our Understanding which springs from the Will and not from Reason is not to be call'd Certainty but Resolvedness or Wiliful Adhesion 18. Wherefore 't is most Irrational and a most senseless Abuse of the word Certainty to ground it on the Subjects or the Person 's own Perswasion that the thing is so and not on the Thing it self For since our Soul is of her self Tabula rasa all our Knowledg and the Firmness or Solidity of our Knowledg that is our Certainty must either be taken from the Things that are without us or since Nature can have no other Method but thaâ— it must be inspir'd Supernaturally Wherefore such a Fantastick and Catachrestical Certainty is convinc'd to be nothing in those men that are capable of weighing Reasons but a Self-conceited Resolution to hold or think thus and to Stick to it out of meer Wilfulness its true and only Ground in defiance of all Reason and of the Natures of Things which do ground all our Reason 19. Hence follows that that Certainty they Nick-name Moral is in reality Vncertainty For since all Certainty has for it's Object or Cause the Existence of the Thing on which all true Assent is grounded and this consisting in an Indivisible has no Degrees it follows that as when you step never so little out of the Notion of is which is its Object you plunge into is not so you no sooner relinguish tho' never so little the true Notion of Certainty but you fall into Vncertainty in regard the Object of it permits no degrees of passing from one to the other or Approaching to it nearer by little and little Wherefore since Moral Certainty imports some Diminution of True Certainty it must necessarily be some kind or some degree of Uncertainty Whence to say I am morally certain of a Thing is in rigour the same Nonsense as it is to say I am Vncertainly Certain or which is consequent to it I ignorantly know I suspendingly or hoveringly Assent I diffidently believe or can probably demonstrate Wherefore when in common speech men use to say they are morally certain 't is a Catachrestical phrase and signifies only that the thing is highly likely or that they Incline strongly to think 't is True 20. Hence follows that Certainty and Infallibility are all one or the self-same Notion For since Nothing sounds more contrary to the Common Sense of Mankind than to say we are Certain of any thing peradventure Certainty must be such a Fixure of the Mind as to the Existence of the Thing as is beyond all Peradventures of being Deceiv'd in that thing or beyond all Contingency that it may happen to be otherwise than we are Certain it is Again since Certainty is the Immediate Effect of our Knowledge of the
Erronious or False But what 's True cannot be False therefore a Fallible Testimony cannot be a Ground or Reason to prove a Thing no better Attested to be True Note that this Proposition what is True cannot be False does hold in all Truths but those which are in materia contingenti as when we say to day it Rains this Proposition may be False to morrow when it is Fair because the Matter or Subject viz. the Temper of the Air on which it is built is Alter'd But this Exception has no place in Speculative Truths which Abstract from such Contingency and are grounded on our Natural Notions or the Natures of things and their Metaphysical Verity which cannot Alter 22. Therefore no Fallible Testimony can deserve Assent to what it Attests or says For since a Fallible Testimony may attest a Falshood and Falshoods do deprave the Understanding and to Assent to a Falshood is a certain and Actual Depravation of it and therefore to Assent to a thing that may be false is to hazard to deprave it and none ought to hazard such an Injury to his Soul especially when there is no necessity of doing himself that harm or of Assenting in such a Case both because GOD and Nature have furnish'd us with a Faculty of Suspending till we have Evidence as also because no Outward Force can impel us to Assent nor any Interiour Force but that of Clear Evidence and a Motive that may be False as Fallible Testimony may cannot lay Claim to Clear Evidence either of it's self or of its Grounds It follows that such a Testimony cannot deserve our hazarding to embrace an Error nor consequently to make us Assent upon its Attestation LESSON X. Of Disputation and Paralogisms DIsputation must be fitted to the Occasions and to the Ends we aim at which may be either to clear Truth by combating our Adversary with down-right Reason or only to gain a Victory over the Defendant by Stratagem The manners of Disputing may be shown by putting Four Cases or Circumstances which vary the Method of it 1. When the Defendent holds a False Thesis the way to convince him will not be Difficult if the Doctrin deliver'd above be well consider'd and dexterously made use of For if a fit Middle Term be taken and rightly placed the Conclusion will necessarily follow against him so that he will be certainly overthrown and his Cause lost But if the Disputant be so Skilful as to Reduce his Discourse to Identical Propositions he will not have the face to own his Position any longer the First Lights of Nature standing so Evidently against him 2. To know in what Mood we are to frame our Syllogism we must take the Proposition which is Contradictory to the Defendents Tenet and by the Certain Rules given as above it will be easie to know in which of the Four Moods such a Conclusion is to be prov'd For Example suppose the Defendent holds that Some Body is Unchangeable you must take and prove the Contradictory to it viz. No Body is Unchangeable which being an Universal Negative and withal the Proposition which is to be the Conclusion it can only be prov'd in Celarent as Ce-No Divisible thing is Unchangeable but la-Every Body is a Divisible thing therefore rent-No Body is Unchangeable 3. The same Method must be taken if the Defendent absolutely denies any of the Premisses of the First Syllogism or any of the Succeeding ones or if by Distinguishing he alters the more Universal or Ambiguous Proposition to a more Determinate one Only you must not now take the Contradictory to it as you did at first for then it was your Adversary's Proposition which you were to disprove now 't is your own which you are to prove and therefore you must take your Measures now from it self For example if he Denies the Minor which was an Universal Affirmative you must prove it in Barbara thus Every Quantitative thing is Divisible but Every Body is a Quantitative thing therefore Every Body is Divisible 4. Besides the having a Middle Term and knowing in what Form to argue some other Rules must be Observ'd 1. Get an Exact Notion of the Terms of the Proposition under debate that is consider well in what Common Head they are and how defin'd which is the same as to look attentively into the Nature of the Thing For this will best furnish you with Proper Mediums 2. Agree before-hand with the Defendent about the Meaning of the Words which express those Terms which is the most Solid way of Stating the Question and of avoiding Wordish Distinctions 3. See the Mediums be Proper or Immediate otherwise not being well connected they cannot Conclude certainly although the Form be right 4. Take heed of Equivocation of Words For otherwise you will hazard to be carry'd aside from the True State of the Question and lose sight of the true Nature of the Thing by mistaking one Notion for another and so you will be certainly non-plust And the longer you dispute the farther still you will err 5. Observe well the Doctrin of Dividing right and be sure that each Member of the Distinction he brings has in it the true Notion of the Term Divided or Distinguisht Otherwise he will baffle and confound you with impertinent Distinctions introduce a new Question and put you besides your Argument For example if he distinguishes Space into Real and Imaginary and obtains of you to admit Imaginary Space for one kind of Space which is in reality Nothing he will defeat your Argument and put you to fight against the Air while by getting you to admit Non ens for Ens he may answer or say any thing You have lost all your strength when you forego Nature and suffer your Natural Notions to be perverted The same may be said of the Distinction of Ens into Positivum and Negativum which is plainly to distinguish Ens into Ens and Non Ens. 6. When the Defendent grants any thing then to lay up in careful memory his own Concessions and make use of them against him to force him to admit Truth or retract For otherwise he may perhaps in the beginning of the Dispute yield candidly to diverse things which afterwards when he finds himself pincht and reduced to streights he will flatly deny 7. To be true to your Cause and to seek the Victory of Truth over Error rather than your own over your Adversary that is to hold him still to the Point and to pursue the Eviction of that and not leaving that pursuit to catch the Adversary at advantages and follow on that game to show him Weak and Self-contradictory tho' it is not amiss to hint and then wave it as is the less-laudable way of those who fall to argue ad hominem Yet if the repute of the Person happens to weigh more with his Followers than the Strength of his Reasons and that he is held Obstinate and to want Candour it may be a Duty to Truth and
the Intire Thing consisting of Mattâ—r and the Essential Form has many Acâ—idental Forms or Modifications in it which are also truly Intrinsecal to the Thing tho' not Essential to it Which Forms are Compounded with the Intire Thing as with the Matter or Subject of them For example We say a piece of Wood is Round Hard Long Green and such like and therefore since Wood has in it besides it 's Essential Form these Accidental Forms of Hardness Length c. there is therefore a Real Composition of Wood which is a Complete Ens and their Subject with these supervening Forms because the Thing has really in it what grounds and answers to all these several Conceptions Farther say they there is consequently a Real Divisibility between the Wood and these Additional Forms in regard the Causes in Nature can work upon and Change the Wood according to it's Length Roundness Hardness c. and yet not change the Nature or Essence of Wood. Therefore say the Peripateticks the Wood which is the Subject can be Chang'd according to these Accidental Forms that is there may be Formal Mutation in it according to those Accidental Notions or Natures tho' it remains Substantially and Essentially the same And since the Form of what nature soever it be is conceiv'd to be in the Subject hence say they both these sorts of Formal Mutation are also Intrinsecal or a Change of the Thing according to somewhat that is truly conceiv'd to be in it 8. I expect that all this Discourse will look like Gibberish to the Corpuscularians whose thoughts beat upon nothing but upon Particles thus Figur'd Moved and Situated and all the while they read this they will be conceiting how dextrously all this may be explicated to be perform'd by their Hypothesis and therefore how needless it is to have recourse to such abstruse Speculations as are those about Matter and Essential Forms that are Intrinsecal and especially to such unintelligible points as Formal Composition and Mutation But I must beg their Patience to suspend their thoughts till we come to the Proof of Formal Mutation which we are not yet got to What we are now about is barely to declare and lay open the Scheme of the Aristotelian Doctrin resting confident that in the sequel of this Discourse the main point we have undertaken will be forced upon them with such Evidence that it will be unavoidably necessary to admit it In the mean time the Aristotelians with so less Assurance than they use Confidence do peremptorily challenge their thoughts and bring them as Witnesses against themselves if ever they reflected on the Common Rudiments of True Logick and they set upon them thus 9. It must be granted that we cannot have Science of any thing but by means of Discourse That the most Exact and most Evident Discourses are those we call Syllogisms That Syllogisms are resolved into Propositions and Propositions into Two Terms and a Copula that connects them That all that we can say of those Parts of a Proposition is that they are Notions or Meanings of the Words that express them That therefore all Discourse is built on the right putting together of these Notions and can be built on nothing else nor made on any other fashion That no Discourse can be Solid but what is grounded on the Natures of the Things themselves without which they must necessarily be Aiery and Chimerical and impossible to beget Knowledge That for this reason our Notions which ground all our Discourse and Knowledge are the very Natures of the Things without us existing Spiritually in our Understanding That our Operations of Apprehending Iudging and Discoursing of the Natures of Things being Immanent or Perform'd and Perfected within us the Objects of those Operations or the very Natures of the Things must be likewise within us That 't is Evident by Experience that we do make Diverse Conceptions or Notions of the same Thing that is all the Operations of our Mind are built on those Partial and Inadequate Notions of the Thing about which we are to Discourse That we can frame a great Number of these Abstracted or Partial Notions of the same Thing and many of them Intrinsecal ones That therefore that Thing must have in it what corresponds to all those several Notions which we call Formal Composition That hence there is a Divisibility in the Thing as grounding one of those Notions from the same thing as grounding Another of them by reason that Natural Causes are apt to work upon the Thing according to that in it or that part of it as it were which is thus conceiv'd and yet not work upon it according to what in it is otherwise conceiv'd or to what grounds a different Notion Whence they make account is inferrâ—d this Grand Conclusion that therefore There is FORMAL MUTATION in regard it can be wrought upon according to that in it which corresponds to the Notion of FORM and not to that in it which answers to the Notion of Matter Whence follows unavoidably that there is Formal Composition Divisibility and Mutation in it as is above explained Which Conclusion must necessarily follow if they allow as they must this Method of Discoursing each part of which has been made good in the foregoing Treatise And the Aristotelians presume it is altogether Impossible for them to assign any other that can bear the least show of Sense or Coherence 9. The Peripatetick School has yet another great Exception against the Corpuscularians which is that because their Schemes do not take their rise from our solid Natural Notions made by Impressions of the Things upon our Senses and thence convey'd to the Mind they come by this means to have little regard to the Nature of the Things or to their Metaphysical Verity the only Firm and Deep-laid Ground of all Knowledge Through which neglect having render'd themselves Incapable of laying any First on Self-evident Principles taken from our most Firm and most Radical Conceptions of the Thing and Predicated of it accordingly to which they may finally reduce their Discouâ—ses hence they are forced to coin to themselves Principles from their own Wit and Fancy Out of which they contrive certain Hypotheses which granted they hope they can make some congruous Explication of Nature By which manner of proceeding their Systems of Natural Philosophy being Grounded on such Supposed Principles is meerly Conditional or Hypothetical Whence they not only disable themselves from Concluding any thing or Advancing Science but instead of doing this which is the Duty of a Philosopher they breed an utter Despair of it and introduce meer Scepticism To pursue the Truth of which is not our Task at present nor sutes it with our intended Brevity 10. Yet to show the Justice of this Objection it may suffice to remark at present that neither does Epicurus regard the Intrinsecal Nature of his Plenum or Atomes or go about to show why they must be so Infractil
has necessarily some Mixture of the Opposit Quality anâ— is as it were Allay'd by it so that it comes to be Finite under that Notion Whence the Subject which has one of those Extreme Qualities becomes a Capacity of Admitting the other Extreme And therefore Epicurus seems to go to work more like a Philosopher in this point than the Cartesians by supposing his Atoms Essentially that is Infinitely Dense or Incapable to be Broken or Divided tho' in most other things he falls very much short of Cartesius his Clear Wit by his building in a manner wholly on Suppositions and those too the most Extravagant ones an ill-grounded Judgment could stumble into 25. They will ask how or by what means can a Dense body be chang'd into a Rare one or a Rare into a Dense or what Causes do we find in Nature Proper to produce such an Effect And it must be confest the Question is very Pertinent For to put the Operations of Rarefaction and Condensation without any Proper Agents to cause those Operations is a thing unbecoming a Philosopher We answer then that all Compressive and Divulsive Agents which we experience are Frequent and almost continually working in Nature are as Proper to work upon Quantity as such and to make the Subject of it Rarer or Denser as Dealbation is to work upon a Subject as 't is Colourable or Combustion upon a thing as 't is Combustible or any other Action to produce or inferr it's Proper Effects or to cause the Passions that correspond to it Nor can there be any Notion or Consideration found in a Body on which those two Actions of Compression and Divulsion can be conceiv'd to work properly and precisely but on it's Quantity or Divisibility in order to make the same Matter have more or less Quantity in it or to make a Body that is Compressed or Drawn several wayes to be Formally Chang'd in those respects So that we must either say that those two Common Words importing Natural Actions and us'd by all Mankind to have no sense in them or they must allow them their Proper Effects which are to Shrink or Dilate the Quantity of the thing which is to make it Rarer or Denser Granting them that sometimes and even very often those Effects are perform'd by the Intromission and Extrusion of subtil particles of other Bodies which as the very Terms show are improperly call'd Rarefaction and Condensation whenever any Natural Body is Prest or Stretched on all sides by other Bodies closely besieging it if Quantity be capable of those Effects as is demonstrated above § 15. it is the Proper Effects of such kinds of Operations must ensue and the Body enclos'd will be to some degree Condens'd or Rarefy'd 26. Now had Cartesius put these two First Qualities in the Matter Created by God in the Beginning so that some parts of it had been Created Dense some Rare Nature had been furnisht with Immediate Causes to made Division or Motion connaturally supposing them set on work or mov'd first by some Superiour Agent in regard Dense Bodies are naturally apt to Divide Rare ones and Rare ones naturally apt to be Divided by those which are Dense Nor had he then needed to assign to Essential Being whose Nature is Unchangeable and in which there is no Transmutatio aut Vicissitudinis obumbratio that is neither Change nor Shadow of Change a Drudgery so Mis-becoming his Essence as to be the Immediate Cause of Motion or Change Hence I argue Since neither to be Easily nor Hardly Divisible is the Essence of that First Matter in regard it was Compleat in the line of Ens and terminated the Action of Creation and so could have subsisted whether it had been Rare or Dense or tho' it had not been Divided at all there is manifestly a Divisibility between the Essence of that Matter and its Rarity or Density and therefore by the same argument we brought formerly against Epicurus that Matter might have been Chang'd according to either of those Qualities and not according to its Essence and yet no Contradiction ensue which demonstrates it to be Possible Again that Matter being Indifferent to either Rarity or Density had GOD Created some part of it Rare some Dense the course of Nature as was lately shown had gone on more connaturally Wherefore since GOD as the Author of Nature and abstracting from Miracle does always act most connaturally or agreeably to the Nature of Things it follows that he did actually order that some parts of the First Matter of which the World was to be Form'd should be Rarer and some Denser than Others and not of an Uniform or homogeneous Nature And accordingly we are taught by Holy Writt that in the Beginning there was Earth Water and Air. And if the Cartesians will needs make their First Matter Uniform and that GOD must move it immediately 't is justly Requir'd of them to show this Tenet of theirs most Agreeable to the Natures of the Things I mean to the nature of GOD whom they put to be the Immediate Cause of the First Motition and to the Nature of Matter the Patient and not overleap and slide over the Proof of both these main Points and suppose them and this not because they can even pretend that those suppositions do suit best with the Natures of the Things themselves but meerly because it best serves to introduce and carry on the Scheme of Doctrin they had resolv'd on 27. From Essential Mutation of Things in Nature or their losing their Substantial Form we come now to demonstrate that there is moreover Mutation in them according to those Forms which are Accidâ—ntâ—l In order to which we will premise this Consideration taught us by daily Experience that No Body becomes Another Thing in an Instant but is Alter'd or Dispos'd before hand ere it comes to Suffer an Essential Change For example A piece of Wood ere it comes by perfect Division to be made two Things of One is first Alter'd according to its Figure that is Cleft or Nick'd Before the same Wood is turn'd into Fire it is first Heated that is it has that Accidental Form call'd the Quality of Heat first introduced into it and so in all the rest respectively Which Changes not being Essential ones in regard they antecede the Change of the Eâ—tity as Dispositions to it they must be Accidental ones and this according to Quantity Quality or Relation which are all the Accidental Notions we have of the Thing that are Intrinsecal to it Now if we admit those Previous Alterations and Dispositions we cannot avoid the admitting Mutation of the Subject according to those Forms Wax by melting is Rarifi'd that is Chang'd as to its former Density A Man or Horse loses a Limb and consequently their former Quantity and Figure too and yet they are the same Individual Man and Horse A Husband loses that Relation when his Wife dies and yet is the same Man he was So
that here is most manifestly a Divisibility between the Natures of Essences of those Things and these Intrinsecal Accidents or Accidental Forms and the Subjects are evidently Chang'd by Natural Causes according to These and not according to its Essence or Nature that is the Subject undergoes so many Formal Mutations that are Accidental And let them explicate these Terms as they please after their own odd manner they shall never avoid the Conclusion if they do put the Subject or Body to be truly an Ens and that it may be otherwise than it was and yet not Immediately cease to be that Ens either of which to deny were to bid defiance to Mankind and to Common Sense 28. I know it will be repli'd that all Natural Bodies are Compound Entities or made up of many little Particles which put together Mov'd and Plac'd Commodiously do enable them to perform those several Operations peculiar to each and that these do occasion our saying in our common Speech it is such an Ens. And that therefore all our Discourse concerning Formal Mutation falls to the Ground since all may be Explicated by the Taking away Adding Ordering and Moving those Particles after such or such a manner But this comes not up to the Point nor can serve them to escape our Argument but rather plunges them into a more manifest and Direct Contradiction For admit that each Compound Ens as they are pleas'd to call those Many Entities or at least a great part of it be made up of those little Particles I am still to ask them whether those Particles do really conspire to make it One Thing or no after the Composition that is whether after the Composition there remains only One Actual Thing or Many Actual Things or Entities If the First then our Discourse proceeds with the same Force for then since this One Ens or Body is Dissolvable or Corruptible it must as was prov'd above have somewhat in it that remains in the Compound w ch is to be made out of it which we call Matter and Somewhat which Formally Constituted the Former Body to be what it was and consequently which does not remain in the New One which is what we call the Form And because it did not cease to be or was Corrupted in an Instant the Former Subject or Body admitted of Alterations first and consequently there was Mutation in it both according to those Substantial and those Accidental Forms But if they say as I fear they will because they must that after Composition there is no Ens which is truly One but Many or if they say that after Composition there is One and Many which are properly and Formally Entities then they must say that the same Thing is both One according to the Notion of Ens and yet not One according to the Notion of Ens which is a plain Contradiction for it Affirms and Denies Contradictories of the Thing acording to the same respect Whereas in the Aristotelian Doctrin there is but One Ens Actually tho' made up of Potential Parts which have a Formal Divisibility between them or which is the same One Thing apt to verify different Conceptions and Notions which as was said above partly because we cannot comprehend it all at once partly because Natural Causes do change it according to One Respect and not according to Another we are naturally forced to make of it Now to make the Subject consist of Potential parts Destroys not the Vnity of the Compounded Ens but Establishes it for to say it is Potentially Many is the same as to say it is Actually One and to Compound an Ens of Potential Parts proper to the Notion of Ens neither of which were One Actual Part before is to make that Ens truly One tho' it had no other Titlâ— to be One of its own nature For to compound an Ens of Entitatine parts neither of which is of its Self an Ens is as plainly to make One Ens as words can express 29. But to put them past this Evasion and all hopes of eluding the force of our Discourse by alledging that Natural Bodies are Compounds I have purposely drawn my Chief Arguments from the Atomes or Molicellae as Gassendus calls them of Epicurus and from that Original Mass of Matter of which the Cartesians affirm their Elements were made which the Antiperipateticks must be forced to confess are perfectly Vncompounded And I farther alledge that as Many Quantums cannot compound One Quantum unless they be Vnited Quantitatively so neither can Many Entities such those Distinct Atomes and Particles must be compound One Ens unless they be United Entitavely Wherefore those parts can be only Potentially in the Compound as our Matter and its Essential and Accidental Forms are for were they Actually there they would be Entitatively Many Whence the Ens made up of those Many Actual Entities could not be Entitatively Vnum or one Ens but it would be an Vnum which is Divisum in se and which is worst to compleat the Nonsence and make it a perfect Contradiction it would be in the same respect Divisum in se in which it is Vnum or Indivisum in se viz. in ratione Entis which is to be perfectly Chimerical 30. Thus they come off and so must every one who guides himself by the sound of Words without looking attentively into their Sense For the Word Compounded is in reality a kind of Transcendent and therefore in the highest manner Equivocal whence while out of slightness of Reasoning and not heeding where the Question pinches they take the word in an Vnivocal signification they come to apprehend that the compounding many Entities together according to some Extrinsecal respects such as are Situation Motion joynt-Action and such like is the same as to compound them according to that most Intrinsecal respect call'd Substance and is sufficient to make them One Entitatively or One Ens. 31. And let it be noted that this Discourse equally confutes their Position of the Soul 's being a Distinct Thing from the Body which leads them into Innumerable Errours And the absurdity in making These Two to be One Compound Thing is far greater than to make One Body compounded of those Particles in regard the Ranging of Particles may at least make One Artificial Compound v. g. a House tho' not a Natural one whereas a Spirit and a Body are forbid by their natures to have any such Artificial or Mechanical Contexture but must unavoidably when the Asserters of this Tenet have shifted and explicated all they can remain Two Actual Things and moreover such Two as are toto genere Distinct nor consequently can they either by the Natural or Artificial Names us'd by Mankind be signify'd by One Word or be called A Man as the former Compounds could be called a House or a Clock And I defy all the wit of Man to invent any way how Two such Actual Things can have any Coalition into One Natural thing or
Physicks to give us a piece of meer Mathematicks for bare Extension fits it for no other Science Nor are we mistaken in thinking so for he tells us expresly that Natural Philosophy is one part of the Mathematicks Tho' the Abstraction which in the place now mention'd he assigns to Quantity as a Genus is very odd and Illogical For the Abstraction of Quantity from the Thing or from Motion is an Abstraction of the Accident from the Subject or from Another Accident and therefore is quite another kind of Abstraction than that of the Genus from the species and it looks as if they hanker'd after Plato's exploded conceit of a Subsistent Vniversal and that they would have their First Matter contrary to all Logick and good sense to be a Body in Common and therefore the Genus to all particular Bodies Nor can any thing sound more awkwardly then to make a Mathematical Treatise of Physicks But Cartesius was a Greater Master of Mathematicks than he was of Physicks and therefore had a vast Design to reduce all Nature and all Philosophy within the Purlew of his own Art in which it must be confest he was very Excellent 39. But to lay yet a Greater Force upon their backwardness to admit a Formal Change in Bodies we come now to more Palpable and Plain Instances not fetch'd from Metaphysicks but from obvious Effects in Nature which every man sees and themselves cannot but acknowledg Let us then take into our consideration a young lately-planted Oak growing in a Nursery which in the space of a hundred years spreads it self into a vast Tree dilating it's large and massy Branches on all sides and over-shadowing a spacious Extent of Ground Can any man deny but that this is the same Thing or the same Tree it was at first And yet 't is most evidently not the same in Quantity it being now a thousand times Greater than it was formerly 'T is manifest then that here is a Real Divisibility between it's Quantity and it's Entity or Substance and a Real Mutation according to the Form of the Quantity and not according to the Notions of Ens or Thing The same may be said of an Infant grown up to be a Man which when 't is now Bigger in Quantity should they deny to be the same Thing or the same Man it would make mad work in the World by taking away Titles of Inheritances and altering the Right of Succession The Infant might perhaps retain his Title for some very small time but the Identity of it being lost by the accruing of new Matter and new Quantity he has forfeited his Estate e'er he comes at age to understand or manage it by losing his Essenee 41. I know that our late Philosophers will hope to evade this last Instance by alledging that the Numerical Identity of a Man springs from his having the same Soul Which Tenet were it proper to confute it here would prove as Unreasonable and ill-grounded as any of the rest I only note on the by that as it becomes God's Wisdom as he is Author of Nature to carry on the Course of Causes by fitting Dispositions to the Production of farther and more Noble Effects and consequently to sute and proportion what Supervenes to what Prae-exists and the Embryo in our case Praeexists and by having such Dispositions in it as made it fit to concur on it's part to work Rationally to such a Degree made it require to have for it's Form such a Rational Soul joyn'd with it and thence determin'd the Author of Nature to infuse it it follows that the thing is quite contrary to what they imagin viz. that the Soul was to be adjusted and proportion'd to the Exigency of the Bodily part and that therefore the Soul is Determinately such or of such a Determinate Degree of Rationality which Essentially and Numerically distinguishes Souls and Men from one another as was fit to be infus'd into and work with such a Body And were not this so it would be impossible to explicate how Original Sin is connaturally transfus'd from Adam or how the Soul becomes tainted by being united to a Body made ex immundo semine But this is not the only ill Consequence that springs from this Extravagant Tenet of the Soul 's being a Distinct Thing from the Body or that Man is in reality compounded of Two Actual Things and therefore not to be placed in any one Line of the Predicament of Ens or Substance For that odd Opinion does besides very much favour at least very well consist with the Praeexistence of Souls Because if the Soul be not proportion'd to the Disposition of the Corporeal part of Man and so be truly the Form of it but a kind of Assistant Spirit only apt to joyn with it and promote it in it's Operations it might as well Exist before the Body as after it Whence it will be very hard for them to assign any solid Reason from the Nature of such a Spirit since it might indifferently fit other Bodies or assist more of them why there might not be also a Transmigration of Souls from one Man to another for it would be in that case no more but shifting their Office and assisting now one of them then Another Not to mention how this Doctrin as is discourst in the Preface tends to introduce a kind of Fanaticism into the Philosophy Schools by making all their thoughts run upon nothing but Spiritual Conceits and Innate Ideas and having a Spiritual communication with God when they know any Natural Truth after an unintelligible manner Not considering that Man in this Mortal State here is truly one part or piece of Nature and subject to the Impressions of Natural Causes affecting him both as to his Corporeal and Spiritual Capacity according to the Different Natures of those Different Recipients 41. But to return whence we diverted Letting Man and his Individuality alone what can they say to the former Instance of a young Oak or of any other Vegetable or Animal increast to it's Full Growth which all Mankind agrees to be still the same Thing and yet not the same in Quantity It is not hence unanswerably Evident that there is a Formal Mutation according to it's Quantity and not according to it's Entity and therefore a Formal Composition and Divisibility in it according to those two Respects They cannot say they are the same Physically or the same Physical Compound For since all Natural Bodies according to their Doctrin are made solely of their First Matter or of the Particles made of it where there is incomparably more Matter there must be a New-Compound or a New Body in regard more and less must be the Differences of every Notion in the same Line as has been demonstrated Wherefore more or less of the Matter it being inform'd and so truly an Ens or a Body ought to outweigh in constituting Particular Bodies or Entities all consideration of Accidental Notions or Modifications of