though it cannot perceive God who is the prima veritas in as perfect a manner as it did in the State of Innocence yet having some small degree of Natural Light still remaining it possesses some imperfect perceptive knowledge of that Sun of Righteousness who is the objectum intellectualis visûs fortissimè motivum Having thus dispatched my First Assertion that there is a Natural Knowledge of God I come now to my Second concerning the Quality and manner of this Knowledge and it is this Assertion II. This Knowledge which we have of God by the Light of Nature is not acquir'd by any Demonstration à priori and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as they call it That is such a Demonstration as proves the Effect by its Natural Causes This Conclusion is so evident that it needs no probation For since God is the first cause of all things where can we find a principle or cause prior to him whereby to demontrate his Existence a priori Besides what kind of cause would that be which is demonstrative of God's Existence a priori An Internal Cause it cannot because God who is simplicity in the abstract admits of no Natural or Formal Causes Neither is it external because God who is the first efficient and ultimate final cause of all things can have none such prior to himself For he who is eternal can have no principium prius to himself else he would not be eternal since aeternitas dicit negationem principii And if we should assign him any prior cause all his infnitude should quickly fall to the ground since it is inconsiâ—â—ent that an Infinite Being should any manner of way depend upon another Obj. Objicit Suarez Though we cannot demonstrate God a priori by his quidditie or essence as such yet we may know him by his attributes which though really identificate are by our reason conceived as distinct from and in some manner prior to his Essence Answ The proving of God by his Attributes is so far from being a demonstratio à priori that it is rather a posteriori for all Attributes are posterior to the essence neither can we feign an Attribute unless we suppose an Essence to which it should be an Attribute so that if the attribute be only ratione distinctum from its Essence it is ratione posterius if it be re distinctum it is à parte rei posterius Assertion 3. That knowledge of God which is acquir d by natural light is not so comprehensive or adequate as to include all the perfections of the Godhead And that for these Reasons Reason I. Because a finite faculty or power such as the understanding of Man is cannot comprehend an infinite being there being no such proportion betwixt finitum and infinitum as could allow an adequate comprehension II. Adam in the state of innocence could not by his natural light adequately comprehend God and all his perfections for the reason already assign'd much less we the Posteâ—â—ty of fallen Adam who have but a small remainder of that light left us III. If the natural understanding of Man could comprehend God adequately then God could not know more of himself than Man does who knows him adequately sed hoc est absurdum Ergo illud ex quo sequitur IV. Our natural knowledge of God is drawn from the Contemplation of the Creature but the Creature is not an effect adequate unto the power of God for he could have created many more Worlds than this if he would Therefore it cannot furnish us with an adequate knowledge of God V. We do not perfectly know the nature of the least Herb or pile of grass how can we therefore pretend to know and comprehend fully the infinite and incomprehensible God Assertion 4. The knowledge of God by the light of Nature being so imperfect as that it cannot comprehend and be adequate unto the nature of God is not of it self sufficient to inform us of the way and manner of that Worship which we his Creatures owe unto him For the understanding of this we are to Observe Note 1. That Natural light teaches us indeed in the general that God is to be Worshiped but since it is God that requires and is to be honoured by this Worship it must depend upon his will what manner of worship we perform unto him for if we should worship God in any manner or way that he has not prescribed or wherewith he is not well pleased it were better for us not to worship him at all because this is only the meer privation of the Worship due by us to God but the other is not only the privation of the due Worship but likewise a superaddition of an idolatrous and superstitious performance Note 2. That we cannot better know the will of God concerning what worship he requires at our hands than by the Covenant he hath made unto Mankind Because therein God hath given promises unto Man upon condition of his performance of that Worship which he justly required of him and for which we stand indebted to God by vertue of that Covenant we have entred into with him Note 3. There being but two Covenants betwixt God and Man viz. the Covenant of Works or Nature and the Covenant of Grace I assert that the light of fallen Nature is not sufficient fully and exactly to direct us in the compleat performance of that Worship which is justly required of us by God in either of these two Covenants And that for these following Reasons Reason I. This Light of Nature is not sufficient to direct us in performing that Worship which we owe to God by vertue of the Covenant of Works or Nature because the Worship that is due unto God by the Covenant of Nature is a full and compleat obedience to the Law of Nature But our natural light cannot fully discover unto us what the Law of Nature is without the knowledge of which we cannot perfectly obey the same for by the fall we have lost the greatest and best part of our Natural Light and so have lost our knowledge of the Law of Nature as cannot but be evident unto any that considers how the Heathen Nations have err'd in Worshipping God according to the Law of Nature yea the most polish'd and civiliz'd amongst them have run into the greatest depths of Idolatry and Superstition in offering up Sacrifices even to the Devil himself and that not only the generality and commoner sort but the 〈◊〉 Men and Sages amongst them such 〈◊〉 â—ristotle Plato Socrates Pythagoras 〈◊〉 have joyned issue with the same ridiculous way of Worship concluding that thereby they performed acceptable service to the Gods Reason II. The light of Nature which Adam had in the state of innocence was no more than sufficient to direct him in the performance of that service he often unto God for the gifts wherewithal God endowed Adam were not supersâ—â—â—es but necessary and no more than sufficient for compassing their respective endâ— so
rights of the People 3. The Elected King at his Inauguration Swears to observe Faithfully those pacta conventa 4. Amongst those Capitulations to which he Swears this is one That if he do not according to his Oath keep those Capitulations then the Archiepscopus Guintisnensis Primate of Poland is privately to admonish him then if he do not mend he is to admonish him more publickly before the great Lords And if he continue incorrigible the Archbishop may send out an Edict to prohibit the Nation to give him Obedience or any part of his Revenue in short to depose him I am Your Affectionate Friend and Servant Thom. Lincolne Coll. Oxon. Aug. 23. 1675. The Bishop being writ to on occasion of a Friends desiring to know whether the Famous saying of Res nolunt malè Administrari of which a Gentleman in London pretends himself to be the Author had not its Origine from Aristotles Metaphisicks to which Venerable Bede in his Philosophical Axiomes refers in his citing the saying his Lordship return'd the following Answer Sir FOR that Axiome of Bede which you mention Entia nolunt malè disponi I have Bedes works and I find amongst his Axiomata Philosophica this Axiome in these words Nolunt entia malè gubernari (b) Beda inter Axiomata Philosophica Tom. Operum 2. pag. 151. litera N. But for the second Book of Aristotles Metaphysicks to which it seems your Book refers there is no such Axiome there Nor any thing that may give any ground for it unless they may relate to one passage in that second Book where speaking of the difficulty to understand some things he says (c) Aristotelis Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the cause of that difficulty is not in the things themselves but in us We through the weakness of our understandings may mistake and several Men may have several Opinions of the same things but the nature of the things is fix'd and the same though Men by mistake may think otherwise Whereas you say that there is a Gentleman in your great Town who pretends to be Author of that Axiome I do confess you have in your Town many Errors more impious but hardly more ridiculous For venerable Bede dyed in the Year 735. that is 949. since and Bede as by his Works is evident has that Axiome in terminis so unless that Gentleman be Older than Bede which I believe he is not he cannot be Author of that Axiome I shall say no more save that you may and I hope will believe that I am July 29. 1684. Your Faithful Friend and Servant T. L. A Letter of the Bishop about Natural Allegiance and of Kingly Power being from God and Confuting my Lord Shaftsbury's Speech in the House of Lords for the contrary c. Sir IN your Letter you desire some things of me which jure tuo you may command 1. That I would name to you some of our Divines who have ex professo writ of natural Allegiance To this I would say 1. That what our Lawyers say I doubt not but you well know yet let me commend to your perusal if you have not met with it before Spelmans Glossary who was neither professed Lawyer nor Divine yet a very learned Antiquary and has said some things of Allegiance which are considerable in his last Edition Printed Anno. 1664. under the word Fidelitas For though he have the word Allegiancia in his Glossary yet he has nothing upon it there 2. For Divines it belongs to them to speak of Kings and the Allegiance due to them only so far as they have Scripture for their Rule Now which of our Divines have writ of the Natural Allegiance due to Kings I do not at present remember nor in the extraordinary trouble and business I now am have I time to inquire Sure I am 1. That no Common-wealth or any such popular Government is ever heard of or once nam'd in Scriptures Though the Author of Oceana I think Harrington was his name and his party say That God by Moses Established his People in a Common-wealth But this they say in contradiction 1. To the Learnedst Jews Josephus Philo c. who say it was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Government wherein God himself was King a Theocratia or a Divine Monarchy Wherein God himself was King not only in a general way as he is King of all the World but to the Jews particularly as much and as particularly as the Kings of England or Spain are to their Kingdoms For 1. God (a) 1. Sam. 8.7 himself says he was their King 2. And Samuel (b) 2. Sam. 10.19 and 12.12 tells them so too 3. God was a particular Lawgiver to the Jews not so to any other Nation he personally gave them all their Laws 4. He did personally appoint his Viceroys and Deputies Moses Josua c. 5. God did receive all their appeals and personally answered them by Urim c. Again Divines may evidently conclude out of Scripture That Kings and their Royal Power is 1. A Deo jure divino 2. Non a Populo no not in Elective Kingdoms as in Poland for in the Elective Kingdoms designatio personae may be in the People Yet Collat. Authoritatis Regiae est a solo Deo 3. Non a Papa 4. Non a Lege My Lord 〈…〉 House in a long Speech to prove Kings were not jure divino told us that Kings were A lege it was the Law that made them Kings which was Seditious and Ridiculous For I would gladly know who made that Law which made the Kings Certainly the King did not make it for that Law which made the King must of necessity precede and be before the King who had his Royal Power and Kingly Office from that Law Nor was there ever in this Nation any other Power to make such a Law For this Nation so far as we have any History that mentions it was ever Governed by Kings So in the times of the Brittains Romans Saxons Danes and Normans Kingly Government was Established here Sed transeat cum caeteris erroribus I am Sir Your Affectionate Friend and faithful Servant Tho. Lincolne A Letter answering some Queries about Abby-Lands and about the Opinions of Calvin and Luther of the punishing of Hereticks SIR AS to your first Question about the value of Abby-Lands your Calculation is ingenious and if the Revenue was no more than that your Author says the poor Monks had very short Allowance But he who says the whole Revenue of all the Abby-Lands was no more than 261100 l. per Annum is much mistaken for undoubtedly it was far more Weaver in his Antiquities of Canterbury has something of it and Sir William Dugdale in his Monasticon but I neither remember what they say nor have I time to consult them 2. As to your Query What Calvin's Opinion was of burning a whole City for Idolatry in his Commentary on Deut. 13.15
3. cap. 2. parag 12. pag. 188. Gal. 5.22 But before becomes to the proof of this he confesses he has the Jesuits and some Remonstrants against him such as Maldonat in Joh. 9. c. and Mart. Becan in Compend Man lib. 1. cap. 16. Quest 3. pag. 335. and in Summ. Theol. part 2. Quest 8. pag. 802. and Pet. Bertius de Apostas Sanct. pag. 42 43. Act. Synod Remonstr in Defens Artic. 5. de persever Sanct. pag. 230 231. who in order to establish a worse Errour viz. The final Apostacy of the Saints assert That this common or temporary faith is not only specifically but even gradually the same with saving faith and would justifie if persevered in whose Arguments he passes by as undeserving a confutation being so pitifully weak and because his Learned and Ingenious Adversary Mr. Baxter proceeds not so far as to assert That such a faith can justifie However by the by he tells us that he conceives that it may be manifestly evinced against those Adversaries by many Circumstances of the Text in Matt. 13.5 6 21 22. where common faith is described by four Conditions that cannot possibly agree to a saving faith that it must needs be more than gradually different from it Now proceeds he though this were sufficient to prove his abovesaid position yet he will still add some more distinct Confirmations of it which he does by the following additional Reasons viz. Reason 1. Drawn from the vast difference between the nature of the Causes and first Principles of these two sorts of Faith because the one is Heaven-born immediately from the Spirit of Christ which sows in us an Immortal seed of faith which can never die but must overcome sin in the Elect and work Regeneration And the Other is only a Humane faith wrought by Humane Means and assents to Divine Truths out of meer Humane Motives and by meer Humane Causes as false Reasonings or more forcible Temptations and Persecutions may be overthrown and extinguisht Reason 2. From the different Nature and proper acts of both Qualities saving belief being the first Spiritual Life by which a Christian lives and is justified Heb. 10.38 whereas common belief is often in them who are dead in Trespasses and Sins and neither justifies sanctifies nor saves Reason 3. Because 't is evident common faith may be in a very high degree in some Impious and Vnregenerate Persons who have acute parts and are Learned and Industrious and thrive into a Radicated Habit and a great measure of knowledge of both speculative and practical Divine Truths which by their Learning they may be able to demonstrate and may really believe and assent to and yet never proceed to pay true obedience to c. And because though there are many degrees of saving faith too from the Child to the Strong Man in Christ which include far less knowledge than some degrees of common faith yet the weakest of them is saving whereas the highest degree of common faith can neither justifie nor save a plain Evidence these two faiths are of kinds as different as Heaven and Earth Reason 4. Is because common Grace as the knowledge of several Tongues and of many Divine Truths as it is generally a Habit or Disposition acquired by our Natural Faculties improved by Industry Education c. and so depending upon mutable principles as our Will and Vnderstanding so they may be lost again by negligence or malice whereas saving faith being produced by the Eternal and Immutable Spirit of Christ is incorruptible and can never die nor be lost John 17.3 1 Pet. 1.23 Heb. 10.38 John 6.47 51 54. See Aquin. 1. 2. Quaest 51. Art 4. in Corp. Artic. which he proves further by conferring 1 John 3.9 5.1.4 8. with 1 John 5.18 Reason 5. Is because though common and saving faith may have the same material object viz. Divine Truths revealed by God in the Gospel as that Jesus is the Son of God c. yet these truths are embraced by these two faiths upon different Motives and by far different means the one being built only upon Humane Mediums and Arguments such as Vnregenerate Persons by their natural parts helpt with Learning c. may attain to which is an assent like its Principles that begot it humane and fallible whereas saving faith proceeding from Christ's Spirit and built upon his immediate Illumination and Testimony which is Divine and Infallible must of necessity be an assent differing from the former more than in degree and be like its cause Divine and Infallible likewise which proof he further illustrates by comparing the difference between Opinion and Science with that between common and saving faith and by several Scriptural Arguments besides Reason 6. Is because if common and saving faith were essentially the same then Irregenerate and Impious Persons who have common Graces may be as gracious and as true Believers as the best Saints though not in so high a degree as the smallest grain of Gold is as truly Gold as the whole Wedge but that this consequence is de facto false Ergo c. And that it is really false appears by this says he that 't is as impossible for a Christian to have any other Theological Vertues or Graces without true faith as 't is for a Man according to the Moralists to have any other Moral Vertues without Prudence which is the Root of them all And further adds he if it be true as Mr. Baxter says in Exercit. de fid c. Art 30. pag. 279. Rat. 7. and Aphoris in Explicat Thes 69. pag. 266 and 267. That the Essence of saving faith consists in accepting Christ and loving him as our Lord and Saviour then it follows that those who do not so accept and love him have not the essence of saving faith and therefore that since 't is evident that no Irregenerate Persons though somtimes full fraught with common faith yet do ever so accept and love Christ therefore it follows their faith must needs be of a very different kind from saving faith Q.E.D. Reason 7. And last is Because if common and saving grace be essentialiy the same then it would follow that a Man who has an historical Faith whilst Unregenerate by the help of Natural parts Learning c. and afterwards should become Regenerate would by the Spirit of Christ receive only a greater degree of the same faith he had before and consequently that saving Grace would not be a Gift of God's as to its essence but only as to its degree because we should owe the essence of it only to our natural parts c. and the degree only to Christ's Spirit But this Doctrine says he is contrary to express Scripture and resolved to be so by the Ancient Church and by her expresly condemned in her Councils as Pelagian and Heretical and therefore it follows that the difference between common and saving faith must needs be specifical as appears in Concil Arausicann 2 Can. 4 5 6 7 8.
that tho' he had performed all the service and obedience that 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 of it was no more than what was 〈◊〉 Now since the Light of Nature 〈◊〉 perfect and in the state of innocence was no more than sufficient what can we imagine of our decayed lapsed and dim light which comes so far short of the former Whereas if it could teach us how to obey perfectly the Law of Nature it shâ—uld be fully equal unto and run parallel with the same Reason III. This Natural light is much less capable to teach us the manner of that Worship which we owe unto God by vertue of the Covenant of Grace Because the Worship required therein is obedience unto God through Faith in Christ Jesus taking hold of the promises tender'd to us in his holy Gospel which Natural Reason can never conceive being ignorant both of the Object of this Gospel-Worship and the manner in which the same is to be perform'd as I shall more fully evince afterwards Assertion Fifth No Man by the sole light of Natural Reason without the help of Revelation can ever discover or comprehend that Sacred Mystery of the Holy Trinity viz. the distinct Hypostases of the Father Son and Holy Ghost one God Reason 1. Because if this Sacred Mystery had been cognoscible by the light of Nature then Pythagoras Plato Homer Aristotle c. would probably have known it But they have all past it over with a profound ignorant silence and where is the Man that hath ever discover'd it by the light of Nature Reason II. If the Mystery of the Trinity were cognoscible by the light of Nature then it would be such either as a principium unto which upon the first proposal we assent without any further probation or as a Proposition unto which we assent upon sufficient and demonstrative probation But to assert the former viz. that the Trinity is per se notum as a principium or axioma is too absurd and ridiculous to be refuted Besides many of the Schoolmen have deny'd that Deum esse is per se notum But we cannot assert Deum esse trinum unless we suppose Deum esse Ergo if the one be not of it self evident far less the other As to the other membrum viz. that it is cognoscible by us as a proposition which we assent unto upon sufficient and demonstrative probation Contrà All these propositions tho' they be not so evident as on the first proposal to gain an assent yet they are such as Nature can furnish us with sufficient media and praemissae whereby to know and prove their certainty as for Example This proposition God is infinite tho' iâ— be not of it self evident at the first proposal yet it is said to be cognoscible by the light of Nature because Nature can furnish us with sufficient means whereby to prove its certainty But this Mystery of the Sacred Trinity of the Persons in the Godhead is so far from being such as Nature could furnish us with media to prove its certainty that if it do not seemingly contradict Nature yet it far transcends its power to conceive what it is But 2. to use Aquinas's argument There is no other mean whereby we can ascend to the knowledge of God but by the Creature and all the knowledge we have of God from the Creatures is only deduc'd per modum Causalitatis as because I see such an effect therefore I conclude there must be a Cause endow'd with Power Wisdom c. Now how can the Trinity be deduced from the Creatures per modum Casaulitatis For God could have Created all the Creatures though he had not been trinus because the Divine Essence of the Father is a suppositum insinitae virtutis tho' there were no more persons in the Godhead than himself Assertion Sixth No Man can by the Light of Nature know the Works of the Second Person in the Trinity viz. his Redemption of Mankind his wonderful Incarnation Death and Resurrection c. Reason I. Because I have already proved that the three Persons of the Godhead cannot be known by Nature Light and consequently not the Second Person but if the Second Person be not known neither can the Works done by him be discovered that is quoad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to that special incommunicable manner and way that they were performed in by Jesus Christ It 's true indeed that the Redemption of the World is an opus ad extrà and competent to all the Persons of the Trinity and so may in some sense seem to be known by the help of Natural Light without the distinct knowledge of the Person of Christ But the particular and special way in which it was accomplish'd by him can never be known naturally for there were many things relating to that done in his Humane Nature such as his Death Resurrection c. which cannot be known without the knowledge of his Humane Nature whereas the Humanity and Miraculous Incarnation of one who is God is above the reach of Natural Reason to know Reas II. If any such thing had been cognoscible by Natural Reason it 's probable the Heathens would have found it but we find no such thing among them Ergo c. Reas III. It is not possible that the light of fallen Nature should know more of God and Christ than when it was in its Primitive Innocence but then it did not so much as Dream of the Death of Christ for the sins of the World Ergo c. Reas IV. The Redemption of the World by Christ depending upon and flowing from the meer good Will and Pleasure of God could never have naturally been foreseen before it came nor when accomplish'd understood by any except those unto whom God graciously reveal'd the same For how can any thing depending on God's free will be known by Natural Light since all the natural knowledge we have of God is by way of causality from the Creatures But the free Redemption of the World by Jesus Christ can never be deduced from the existence of the Creature by way of causality as though it be naturally known that Man is a sinner and miserable yet does it not follow that therefore God designs to redeem him by Christ no more than from the misery of some of the Angels can it be deduced that therefore God designs to redeem them by Christ Besides Man is fallen into this Misery by his own fault and it were just with God to leave him to wallow in that Misery that he hath purchased to himself for ever wherefore since God is no way obliged to Redeem Man how can we make the Misery of the Creature an Argument that he has or had any actual design to redeem the same yea dato non concesso that our own Miseries could demonstrate that God had a design to free us from it yet it could never discover that particular special way whereby our freedom is purchased viz. by the Blood of Christ
Psalmist occasion to say He hath not dealt so with any Nation c. For 1. The Jews had a Judicial and Ceremonial Law given unto them immediately from God which the Gentiles had not 2. They had not only a natural and inbred knowledge of the Moral Law as the Gentiles had but besides a relation from God distinctly explicating and unfolding all the parts and dictates of the same which blind and imperfect Nature could not discover 3. They had a Priesthood of God's own appointment and Prophets of his mission who might constantly reveal the Will of God unto them whereas the Gentiles had no such thing yea these same very Oracles that they had from the Sibyllae were but once in an Age so that few or none that heard of them understood what they meant as is evident from the Doctissimus Poeta Virgil his mis-applying the Sibyllick Cumean Verses to Pollio's Son So much for the Sibyllae As for the other Instances of Trismegistus Hydaspes Orpheus c. I Answer 3. That if time would allow me to examine their particular Writings I should find many things spurious and false especially in Trismegistus but this I do not stand upon Wherefore I say that though they knew many things concerning Christ yet it follows not that therefore they knew it by Natural Light but that they had it either from the immediate Revelation of God who as Justinus well observes has so well provided for his Church that out of the Heathens their own Writings there may be Weapons taken to discomfit and refute them or from the Jews to whom they are beholden for many things Clem. Alex. copies a great many things out of Deuteronomy concerning Goâ— and says that Plato did the same Basil Magn. says that they stole a great many things from the Scripture and adopted them for their own Diodorus Siculus talks of Moses having his Laws from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yea the Name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was so common among them that one time recourse being had to the Oracles of Apollo to know who of the Gods it was that was Named 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it was answered them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jao is the chiefest of all the Gods The Heathens did commonly borrow the Names of their Gods from the Hebrew as Bacchus was called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the Hebrew word Jah which with the Greek Termination and Pronunciation added is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and their exultation word at his Feasts was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 corresponding to the Jewish Hallelujah Many such Instances might be given that the Gentiles borrowed many things from the Jews so that it is not probable they had the knowledge of these Divine Mysteries by Natural Light which I have already proved to be impossible but either by immediate Revelation from God or by their knowledge of the Jewish Constitution and Customs I come now to the Second thing proposed viz. What are the Media whereby we arise unto this knowledge of God For the better resolving of which we are to know that these Media are either inartificial viz. such as depend upon no Art of Man or artificial viz. such as are invented or found out by some Humane Art or Science Wherefore I Assert 1. God is naturally cognoscible by inartificial means By inartificial here I do not mean as they are proposed and made use of by Metaphysicians for they can propose inartificial things in an artificial method but in regard of an Ignorant Man who though destitute of the knowledge of Arts and Sciences can yet make use of this medium inartificiale by which he attains to the natural knowledge of a God and this Assertion is plain and evident if we consider Reason That the most Barbarous Nations and unpolite People who knew no Arts nor Sciences and consequently no Artificial Media have known acknowledged and Worshipped a God As Tully in his lib. 1. de Nat. Deorum lib. de Legibus hath sufficiently demonstrateâ— But Acosta Benzonius de rebus Indicis have put this beyond all doubt where in the description of the lately discovered West-Indies they shew that this most Barbarous and rude People yea scarcely Men except in their Visage had their Gods Temples and â—ests and amongst their many Gods they had one whom they imagined above all the rest who was omnipotent and infinite and unto whom all their Thoughts Words and Actions tendered the highest Reverence and Adoration imaginable Now since they were so rude and ignorant and not capable of having Artificial means How came they to know a God but by Inartificial means competent even to the most Illiterate and Ignorant sort Assertion II. Since God is naturally cognoscible by Inartificial means much more by Artificial For Arts are the improvement and perfecting of Nature so that what may be without Art cannot but be more perfectly accomplished where the subsidiary help of Art is made use of These Artificial Media or Arguments whereby the Learned Artists demonstrate the Natural Knowledge of God and his existence are various and many Yea so great is the variety of these made use of by the Ancients that some of them seem rather suasory than cogent Wherefore I shall select only those that are most forcible and urgent which are Arg. I. All Entities in the World are either made or not made non datur medium But all and every one of them cannot be made because they must either be made by themselves or by another but not by themselves for then the cause and the effect would be the same and as all causes are at least natura priores and praeexistent to the effect which they produce so this which made it self would be prior to it self quod est absurdum Wherefore those that are made must be made by another and that other which made them if it be not made at all then there is a being increated independent c. Which we call God Ergo c. But if it be made too it cannot be made by it self 〈◊〉 the Reason above assign'd so it must be made by another but if by another then the same difficulty arises about that other and so forth in all the rest till at length ye come to one above the rest which is not made at all the which if there were not there would be a progressus in infinitum Arg. II. If there be any Independent being there is a God for whatever is independent is simple as wanting any internal cause to depend upon for its composition and likewise eternal as wanting an external cause upon which to depend for its Original and whatever is simple and eternal is God 〈◊〉 that there is such a being is evident Because otherwise all things whatsoever would be dependent and that is impossible For then there would be nothing left upon which all these things should depenâ— since whatever is dependent depends upon another For a thing dependent only upon it self is the
same as independent and 〈◊〉 dependent being depended upon another dependent being there would be 〈◊〉 Prâ—â—ressus in Infinitum since no independent being can be to stop at where 〈…〉 are dependent or else a circular making 〈…〉 to depend mutually upon one another 〈◊〉 by this means one being which is dependent upon another is posterior to that other upon which it depends and in the mean time prior to that same other being which has likewise a mutual dependence upon it For whatever depends upon another is either an Accident or a Substance but 〈◊〉 Acâ—ident is naturally posterior to the â—â—â—stance upon which alone it can depend and one substance cannot depend upon another substance except by way of causality which plainly imports a natural priority in the one and posteriority in the other So that these consequences which are both equally absurd of a progress in Infinitum and making one and the same thing both prior and posterior in the same respect since all the dependence is either by the w y of accident or substance ut supra do necessarily follow upon this supposition that all things are dependent Wherefore an independent being must be acknowledged and that is what We call God Arg. III. There must be a supream Cause of all things which is caused by none otherwise there would be a Progressus in Infinitum in the causes of things as is evident but this progressus is absurd and impossible Therefore there is an independent Cause above all the rest which is God Obj. 1. These arguments may perhaps prove that there is an increated independendent first cause of all things yet they cannot prove that there is but one only and consequently cannot demonstrate the existence of the true God who is unus solus Ergo c. Answ I. Dato non concesso that they are not sufficient to prove the unity of God yet they are sufficient to infer the negatum viz. That there is some increated independent being cognoscible by the light of Nature which is called God But I Answ II. By the same very force that they prove the existence of a Deity they likewise infer the unity of the same for if there be a being omnimode perfectum it is impossible that there should be any more than one because there can be nothing to distinguish them one from another and distinct they must be else they could not be a plural but all one and the same entity Now what ground of distinction can there be betwixt two beings all perfect It cannot be any thing equally lodged in them both for in that they both agree it cannot be any thing lodg'd in one and not in another for that would destroy the Hypothesis viz. That they are two all-perfect beings by making one to enjoy a perfection an imperfection it is not a subject capable of which the other is deprived of and consequently cannot be omnimode perfectum Obj. 2. God is a simple and uncompounded being Therefore he cannot be known by natural light The Reason of the consequence is Because God cannot be fully comprehended and adequately known by natural light and since he is a simple being indivisible and without parts he cannot be known in part for he has no parts so he must either be known adequately or not all As it is in a point or punctum indivisibile if it be touched it cannot be touched in part because it has no parts but must be touched all over if touched at all so in our natural knowledge of God since it is confess'd that we cannot know him adequately neither can we know him at all for God is a simple indivisible being tota indivisibilis entitas and so cannot be known eâ— parte or in ordine ad unum non in oâ— ine ad aliud because there is nâ—t unum aliud in God Answ I. It does not follow that because God is an Invisible being therefore he must be known adquately and totally yea rather the contrary seems to follow because what is simple and invisible cannot be known totally or adequately since God who wants parts cannot be considered as a totum for this has always a respect to parts which God has not Answ II. God may be known totally and adequately as to his existence that is we may by the light Nature discover that there is a Being simple indivisible c. tho' we cannot know all the immense properties of that being what they are and fully comprehend the nature of the same as I may know that there is such a Man as Plato tho' in the mean time I cannot tell what he is nor what are all the truths that may be enuntiated concerning him so I may naturally know quod sit Deus tho' not quid sit secundum se totum for the Creature which is the mean by which we arise to the knowledge of God is not an effect adequate to him an omnipotent Cause who might have created many more if he wou'd and therefore it cannot give us the adequate knowledge of him yea our finite intellect can never by pure natural means comprehend an infinite Being either in Patriâ or in Viâ— as Moses testifies who tho' he was familiar with God yet could not see his fore-parts and St. Paul who tho' ravished to the third Heavens yet could not fathom the unsearchable depths of the incomprehensible God Answ III. Our knowledge of God is not sensitive like that of touching a point but intellective and by this intellective knowledge we do not know him as he is in himself but after the manner of Men and by a conception suitable to our Natures so we must conceive the Mercy Justice Omnipotence c. of God as distinct attributes while in the mean time there is no diversity of perfections in God but all are one and the same indivisible Entity And so God if considered in se and as he is in himself he is indivisible but as the object of our understanding he must be conceived in a divisible manner by forming inadequate apprehensions of him prescinding from one thing and considering another for tho' there be not unum aliud in God à parte rei and as he is in himself yet there is after the manner of our conceptions of him Objection III. God is neither cognoscible by the light of Nature nor can the bein of a God be believ'd by Faith not cognoscible by the light of Nature because his existence is an Article of Faith and so depends on Revelation as being a supernatural truth above the power of nature And it cannot be believed by Faith because the Testimony of God is the only Motive and ratio formalis why I give the assent of my Faith unto any proposition or truth so that all Faith presupposes both that there is a God and that he speaks true for upon the truth of his testimony I believe and there cannot be any faith till the existence of God be acknowledged which it
necessarily presupposes and to believe that there is a God because God said so whose existence is in the mean time call'd in question were ridiculous Answ I. Tho' the Existence of God be an Article of Faith yet it may likewise be known by Natural light since there are many things in the Scriptures which we believe by Faith that can be demonstrated by natural light such as these known Principles that God is to be honoured Parents obeyed c. And the Reason is because Faith and Natural Scientifick Knowledge do not formally differ in their material Object for both may have one and the same Object viz. one and the same proposition both proved by natural demonstration and believed in by Faith because of the testimony of God but the main and principle difference lies in that which they call Objectum formale and the formality of the Object is taken from the principal Motive or mean by vertue whereof the proposition comes to gain an assent as in Natural things the motive of my assent is evident demonstration and in supernatural things the testimony of God so that I may assent unto a proposition that is demonstrable by natural light because of the clear probation of the same and this is call'd assensus scientificus and if God confirm it by Revelation I assent unto the same proposition because of the testimony of God and this is called assensus fidei or supernaturalis not as if the proposition it self were supernatural incomprehensible by natural light but because the medium or motive upon which I ground my assent unto it is supernatural So that one and the same proposition may be in ordine ad diversa motiva both the object of Faith and of a demonstrative Natural knowledge Instatur The Object of Faith is inevident for Faith is an inevident assent But if the Existence of God can be demonstratively proved by Natural Light then it cannot be inevident Ergo c. Answ There be three things to be considered in giving an assent to a truth 1. Firmitas or the stedfastness of the person in his belief not doubting of any thing 2. Certitudo or the certainty of the truth it self for some Men may be firmly perswaded of a thing which is not in it self a certain truth as the Hereticks are of their Errours 3. Evidentia or a demonstrative perspicuous manifestation of the truth For many things such as matters of Faith are certainly true and Men are firmly persuaded of their truth who yet cannot evidently shew and demonstrate that it is a truth because they believe upon the Testimony of another And of these truths that are evident some are more evident than others as the prima principia or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are more evident than the other conclusions that are deduced tho' with evidence too by a longer series of consequences Now whatever is an Object of Faith is indeed ineâ—â—â—ent yet there are some things more inevident than others such as the principal and cardinal truths of thâ— Christian Relâ—gion viz. The Trinity of Persons in the Godhead the divinity and incâ—â—â—nation of Christ and the whole Mystery of his Redeâ—ption of the World by his blooâ— and these are evâ—ry way inevident whereas there are some other truths which tho' in so far as they are believed in by Faith are justly denominated inevident because of the motive and medium of the Belief yet may be upon another occasional respect and per accidens called evident of which Nature is this of the Existence of a God which is truly an object of Faith and in that respect inevident viz. as assented unto upon the testimony of God But it is also upon another respect evident becâ—use it per accidens so falls out that it is likewise demonstrable by natural knowledge Answ 2. It does not follâ—w that the Existence of God cannot be believed by Faith because Faith depends on the Testimony of God which presupposes that there is a God for the contrary seems rather to be deducible from thence viz. That because all Faith is founded upon the Divine Testimony and because no Believer can give assent unto any truth unless he know the Testimony given unto the same to be divine therefore by that same very act of Faith whereby he believes this Testimony to come from God he likewise believes there is a God who sends it For by the same individual act of seeing I must of necessity see the colour and sensible species of a Wall as they call it that I see the Wall it self by No more can I know the testimony to the truth to be divine unless by the same very act of Faith whereby I believe the testimony to be God's I likewise believe the existence of God who gives this Testimony And this Divine Testimony is the ground of all my belief and the ratio a priori wherefore I give mine assent unto any thing yet there can be no ratio a priori given wherefore I believe the Testimony of God as when I see a Wall the ratio is because of the species but the species it self wants any ratio and is only â—â—en propter se so in all the objects of my â—aith I believe them because of the Testimony of God but I believe the Testimony of God propter se So that the Existence of God though it be sufficiently demonstrable by the light of Nature and in that sense the Object of a scientifick asâ—â—â— yet since God has confirmed it by his revealed Testimony it may well be stated as an Article of our Creed which we believe because God has testified and revealed the same and that in a more clear manner than bare Reason is capable to perform the demonstration of it Objection 4. There is no other way of knowing God naturally than by way of causality from the Creatures arising from the effect unto the cause but that we cannot do unless we can evidently know and demonstrate that the Creature is really the effect and work of God and this we cannot since the greatest Philosophers were ignorant of it and thâ—ught the World to be eternal which is also confirmed by the Apostle Heb. 11. By faith we know that the World was created intimating that the Creation of the World is a truth not comprehended by Natural Light Answer All the Philosophers have generally acknowledged that God was the Creator of the World Hence Aristotle frequently calls God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And Plato in Timaeo Tom. 2. pag. 31. asserts that God made but one World not many Plutarch commends Alexander for saying that God was the Father of all things Plutarch in Alex. Magn. pag 681. What more ordinary amongst the Poets than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I lle opisex rerum c Anaxagoras Hermotinus Pythagoras c. were all asserters of the same Doctrine so that they knew and acknowledged the Creation of the World in general though they could not condescend to the particular Circumstances
is of a Person which likewise is twofold 1. Of Christ as Man For so he was in the Number of the Elect. Math. 12.18 2. Of those United with Christ namely of the Angels who persevered in their Obedience and of Men God ordain'd and Elected some Men to Offices and Honour in this World as Saul to the Government Others he Elected to Salvation and Glory in Heaven and of these our Question is Now here we say that this Divine Election by which God chooseth Certain Men from Eternity to Salvation is not an Act of the Divine Intellect or Knowledge by which he knows but of his Will by which according to his good pleasure he determines of us The Reason is because the Divine Knowledge is Natural and necessary so that it is impossible that God should not know every object that could be known but Election is a free Act since it is a thing confessed pâ—tuisse Deum vel nullos Condidisse vel Conditos non elegisse vel plures vel pauciores vel alios pâ—oâ—suo benâ—placito jure absoluto quo in Creaturas utitur The Divine Knowledge doth equally look at all objects possible or future but not so his Election which is a Discretive Act and passeth by some to perish for ever while it prepares Grace and Glory for others Now when it is ask'd if Election be from Faith foreseen First We do not deny that Faith was foreseen from Eternity since 't is manifest that the Knowledge of God is equally Eternal with his Will For sicut quicquid est futurum erat ab aeterno futurum ita etiam ab aeâ—erno Cognitum But Secondly We enquire of the habitude that the fâ—reseeing of Faith hath to Election This habitude for foreseen Faith in order to Election is threefold and may have the Notion First Antecedentis so that God chooseth none to Heaven in whom he had not seen Faith to come or did see that Faith would come before they were actually Elected Secondly It may have the Notion Conditionis and so Faith may be consider'd as a Condition necessarily required in Election Thirdly Foreseen Faith may further have the Notion of a Cause and so not to be only an Antecedent and a Condition of Election but to have the Notion of a Cause from whence Election follows as the Effect Now when 't is enquired if Election be of Faith foreseen Historical Faith is not meant nor a Faith of Miracles the which Unregenerate Men may have but the meaning is of justifying Faith which is proper only to the Regenerate These matters being thus setled Our Principal Conclusion is this viz. In illis qui Eliguntur Praedestinantur ad gloriam non datur aliquis Actus aut qualitas a Deo praevisa aut aliud quodcunque quod sit meritum causa ratio aut Conditio vel antecedens quolibet modo ita Praesuppositum Decreto Electionis ut ex positione talis Praecedanei in Praevisione divinâ ponatur Electio ex negatione negetur Or you may take the Conclusion thus viz. Nulla datur ex parte nostrâ Causa ratio vel Conditio sine quâ non Praedestinatioâ—is seu Electionis Divinae The first Reason of this Conclusion is If Election be from Faith foreseen then Faith foreseen is some way a Cause of Election the which Consequence though the Remonstrants will sometimes deny and seem not to allow foreseen Faith as the Cause of Gods Electing as may be seen in the Collatio Hagiensis p. 103. Yet elsewhere they speak it out plainly in Writings held by them most Authentical namely in Actis Synodalibus Part. 2. p. 6. where they tell us Fidem Perseverationem in Electione Consâ—derari ut Conditionem ab bomine praestitam ac proinde tanquam Causam They add this Reason Because the Condition prescribed and perform'd doth necessario alicujus Causae rationem induere And indeed they must needs be forc'd to Confess this For if we ask them why God chose Peter and not Judas they say because God foresaw that Peter would believe So that from their Hypothesis it must needs be that foreseen Faith was the Cause that Peter was chosen before Judas Now I do subsume that foreseen Faith is not the Cause nor Reason nor Motive any way of Election First Because the Scripture allows of no Cause of Election extra Deum ipsum but refers it altogether to his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 beneplacitum For this Consult Ephes 1.11 and Rom. 9.11 On the other hand If you will believe you shall be Elected is no where to be found in Holy Writ either expresly or by equi valence There is I confess this proposition in Scripture He that believes shall be saved but not he that believes shall be predestinated because God never required Faith as antecedaneous to his decree Secondly If Faith be an effect and Consequent of Election then is it not the Cause of it or antecedaneous motive because 't is altogether impossible and implies a manifest Contradiction ut idem respectu ejusdem sit antecedens consequens causa effectus But Faith is an effect or Consequent of Election therefore 't is not a Cause or antecedent motive of it The minor I prove out of Eph. 1.4 According as he hath chosen us before the Foundation of the World that we should be Holy c. And v. 5th sheweth that God did predestinate those whom he would adopt for Sons not such as were Sons But if he had chosen such as believed then he would have chosen Holy Men and Sons But Sanctity and our Sonship are not the Cause nor Antecedent Motive of Election For Rom. 8.29 For whom he did foreknow he also did predestinate to be Conformed to the Image of his Son not as if they were then so Again if Election were of Works then the Apostle might have had an Answer to his Objection in a readiness as to what he mentions in the 9th of the Romans about the Children neither having done any good or evil and in vain had the instance there been brought of the Potters power over the Clay of the same lump to make one Vessel unto Honour and another to dishonour Whereas if Election had been from foreseen Faith he had spoke more aptly thus Hath not the Potter the art to know the difference in several parts of Clay and to separate the good from the bad But the Apostles similitude is exactly pertinent if we suppose Election to be absolute and all Creatures to be in an equal State The Bishop ends his determination with another Reason for his Conclusion Namely that Infants are Eleoted but not from Faith and perseverance for they are not capable thereof Partes sub antiquo saedere per Christi Mortem salutem sunt Consecuti TO begin with the sâ—â—tinâ— of the Question 1. By Fathers here we do not understand the Patriarchs and Prophets but all the Faithful under the Old Testament All the Children of Abraham I mean not of
Officiosum is lawful as appears out of Volkelius De Verâ Religione l. 4. c. 14. And Albericus Gentilis a Learned Civilian asserts and endeavours to prove the same in his Book de Abusu mendacii And so Grotius holds in his Book de jure belli pacis And indeed some of the Fathers held so and so doth Dr. Jeremy Taylor in his Grand Exemplar But the School-men and all Divines both Popish and Reformed do condemn all kind of lying as unlawful both by the light of Nature and Scripture and as appears out of Suarez De Legibus I shall here make use of the definition of a Lie that is most generally receiv'd among Philosophers Divines and Lawyers which is Mendacium est significatio falsi cum intentione fallendi First I say 't is significatio sive per vocem sive per notas or nutus still as Grotius saith 't is significatio falsi A Lie may be not only in dictis but in factis as if Titius be to go to Rome and asks Sempronius the way thither and Sempronius saith nothing but points him the wrong way with his finger on purpose he doth digito mentiri And so a Dumb Man may be a Liar if by any sign he doth point out that which is false knowing it to be so Secondly Therefore mendacium is significatio falsi Now a thing may be said to be false two ways First 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ex parte rei So Gen. 3. Satan told a Lie when he said ye shall not surely die and in this sense it is not necessary that to make up a Lie it should be always significatio falsi And Secondly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as that which seems false to us tho' it may be true in it self The signification of falseness in this sense is always necessary to make up a Lie So that if Caius signifies the truth and thinks it to be false he Lies and signifying that which is false believing it to be true he doth not Lie Thus necessary is it to make up a Lie that he who Lies should know that to be false which he asserts and that either First Cognitione actuali when he at present knows that to be false which he asserts to another or Secondly Cognitione potentiali which knowledge tho' he hath not at present yet he might have had it and ought to have had it Paria sunt scire scire debere So some Hereticks tho' at present they think their blasphemous Opinions true and so are not formally Liars in one sense yet they are Liars interpretatively because they might have known their Opinions to be false and ought to have known them to be so False Prophets therefore and false Teachers are justly in the Scripture call'd Liars and of such the Apostle speaks 2 Thes 2.11 And for this cause God shall send them strong delusions that they should believe a Lie But Thirdly to a Lie there is not only required significatio falsi but intentio fallendi for an intention of deceiving is intrinsically included in the nature of a Lie And this intention of deceiving or cheating is twofold First If I intend to deceive or cheat at first when I make a Contract or Bargain then am I a Liar Secondly If I did not intend it at first and afterwards intended it it is the same thing as if I promising to pay a Man Money at the end of a Month intending at the time of the promise so to do but afterward intend and do the contrary tho' it were in my power to do it I make my self a Liar And from the intention of the Liar a Lie is call'd sometimes 1. Jocosum 2. Officiosum 3. Perniciosum that is hurtful to my Neighbour But I do in general conclude that every Lie is morally evil and sinful Rev. 21.8 Whoremongers Idolaters and all Liars shall have their part in the Lake which burns with Fire and Brimstone And the Devil is in Scripture call'd a Liar But to prove a Lie to be sinful by nature it is sufficient to urge that every Act morally defective is sinful but so is a Lie it is defective in its end for the end of every Lie is to deceive and to wish that any man may be deceived is to wish a thing against natural Charity and the Rule of malum ex quolibet defectu is obvious Now for the particular kinds of a Lie all do agree that mendacium perniciosum is sinful and likewise that mendacium jocosum is sinful tho' some deny the mendacium officiosum to be so Volkelius who allows of this yet condemns that The Apostle condemns the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is without this jesting Lying and therefore the Lying mixt with it is the more condemned The great Controversie is about an officious Lie and some will say that it is sinful to fright Children with fancies and to cheat melancholly People by fantastick affirmations into the taking of Physick c. But in such Cases the mendacium officiosum is allowable but not in Serious Cases Vim Institutionum Divinarum non tollit malitia neque non intentio Ministrorum THE Romanists never determin'd for the Validity of the Sacrament depending on the intention of the Priest till it was done by the Florentine Synod Anno 1439. as is to be seen in Caranz p. 867 868 and afterward by the Council of Trent in the Year 1545. Concil Trident. Sess 7. Can. 4. Now this Question contains in it a double Assertion First That the Malitia Ministrorum in respect of Sins of Commission doth not make the Sacrament invalid And Secondly That the Omission of the Priests or their not intending things aright doth not render the Sacrament invalid Now as Institution may be taken for a Law it may be two ways consider'd First In ratione legis prout obligat And the Law of God binding immutably no Impiety of Men can take away the Obligatory Power of it Secondly In ratione regulae prout dirigit And so the force of the Institution being intrinsical in ratione regulae no Impiety of Men can take away the directive power of it The wickedness of the Minister doth hinder himself from receiving benefit by the Sâ—crament but not the Persons to whom it was given And the Papists themselves say that a Sin of Commission doth not invalidate the Sacrament as appears out of a Synodical Decree à Petro Archiepiscopo Moguntino edito in Concilio Provinciali Ashaffemburgâ—nsi apud Petrum Crabb To. 3. p. 825. Statuimus saith he si quis doceat teneatve quod Sacerdos in peccato mortali existens non possit Corpus Christi Conficere subditos ligare à peccato solvere pro haeretico habeatur Cum constat Scripturae Sacrae Authoritate quod sive bonus sive malus sit minister per utrumque Deus effectum gratiae suae confert Non enim quae Sancta sunt Coinquinari possunt nec ipsa Sacramenta potest hominum malitia