loving p. 21 22 25 c. usque ad 42 73 74 75 76 77 115 116 117 118 120 121 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 211 212 113 214. But first suppose though not grant that there were such a term of the immanent action of loving yet this cannot be the actual Divine love which Dr. H. speaks of For 1. The actual love which he speaks of is the matter of that Commandement Deut. 6.5 Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart c. Now that the supposed term of the immanent action of love is not in any probability For 1. That is most likely to be the matter of this precept whose being is most undeniable and uncontroverted but the existence of immanent actions is less questioned then that of their terms The existence of these hath been much questioned by many subtil Philosophers and setting aside Philosophers the most of men never so much as dâ—camt of them Take ten rational and knowing men that never heard of this Question An omnis actio habeat terminum and demand of them whether they think that by the immanent actions of their senses their understandings and wills they preduce within themselves certain qualities of the same name with the actions themselves and I am confident that most if not all of them will return a negative answer 2. The matter of this precept is of a very important general an necessary obligation and therefore it must be obvious and evident unt all that have the use of their reason so that the knowledge of it ma be gained without any great difficulty but now the pretended terme of the action of loving is a very dark and abstruse thing and it will be a very difficult matter to make unlearned men understand it Nay I believe many great Scholars are yet strangers to what the Schoolmen say about the nature of it 3. We may and ought to examine the sincerity of that love of God in us which is commanded Deut. 6.5 But it would be new Divinity to say that we are to examine the terms of the immanent actions of divine love whether they be in us or no men may with some certainty review and reflect upon the habit of love and the immanent actions thereof but their reslex knowledg of the terms thereof can be but conjectural 2. The Love of which Dr. Hammond speaks is by the Defendant such wherein there is exercised that freedome of the will which is usually called a freedome of indifferency But there is no freedome of the will exercised in the supposed terms of the immanent action for they presupposing the actions are supposed to be necessary and unavoidable and therefore the will hath no indifferency unto them the will indeed is a free cause of the action of loving but this action if it be the cause of a terme it is the natural and necessary cause thereof 3. The Terme of the immanent action of loving is called love saith the Defendant for want of sufficient words but to affirm this of that actual love which Dr. Hammond speaks of is very very ridiculous For of that love saith he love is predicated as a genus and so in primo modâ— dicendi per se the love therefore that Dr. Hammond meant cannot be the terme of the immanent action of loving But secondly It is denyed also by many great both Philosophers and Divines that there is any such terme as the immanent action of loving and they say the same of all other immanent actions Indeed our Defendant takes notice of no Diffenters but my self and my poor Master Scheibler But this bewrayes his gross ignorance in the School-men many of whom lead the way unto Scheibler into this his opinion and go herein a great deale farther then he Durand is very express for it Lib. 1. dist 27. q. 2. Capreolus l. 1. dist 27. q. 2. quotes also Aureolus Petrus de Pallude Gerar. de Carmâ—lo as of the same judgment unto these I may add Scotus upon the same Dist quaest 3. and two Eminent Scotists Philip. Faber Favâ—ntinus lib. 1. disp 21. and Reda l. 1. Controvers 7. represent this to be the Common opinion of the followers of Scotus Unto all these let me farther subjoyn Raphel Aversa Philos tom 2. q. 58. Sect. 3. And Franciscus bonae spei in lib. de animâ Disp 2. dub 3. who mentions others of the same perswasion Oviedo though he blame Cajetan and other Thomists for denying actual intellection to have a terme because every action he thinks is productive of some terme or other yet he thinks this opinion may be so interpreted as to be drawn into a good sense and that is done he supposeth by making the terme not to be really distinct but the same with actual intellection Haec opinio jure ab omnibus rejecta si loquendi modum attemperaret mea quidem sententia optime posset defendi Existimo enim tantum in modo loquendi discedere à sententiâ quam poste à omnibus praeferam asserente intellectionem consistere in qualitate immediatè per se-ipsam nullâ interjectâ actione à principio dimanaute vel in actione identificatâ cum termino quod sic ostendo utraque opinio constituit intellectionem in entitate quadam immediatè ab intellectu dimananâ—e per suammet entitatem ex vi cujus intellectûs in actu secundo constituitur formaliter intelligens Ergo tantum differunt hae duae opiniones ex â—o quod una entitatem hanc essentialiter per suam entitatem ab intellectu dependentem nullum distinctum terminum respicientem vocat actionem sine termino altera â—andemmet entitatem vocat actionem â—um termino identificatam Neutra â—nim barum opinionum novam formalitatem concedit vel negat quam altera opinio diverso modo deâ—endat De anima Controv 6. punct 1. S. 1. It were an easie matter to produce many other testimonies But the matter must not be carried by the number of voices but by the weight of Arguments And therefore I shall next propound the Arguments on both sides The Arguments for the Negative may be ranged into two sorts the first prove that some immanent actions have no terms the second that no immanent actions have any terme The 1. That some immanent actions have no terms Cajetan as it is said determineth that intuitive intellections have no term and such are the Beatifical Vision of the Saints in Heaven the Angels intuitions of themselves And the reason which he giveth is Because the Objects of such intellections are per se present unto them and intimately conjoyned with them But omitting Cajetan I shall insist onely upon the Arguments of Scheibter which I referred unto in my refutation of Dr. Hammond's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Defendant is pleased in derision to call him my Master But where the wit of the Sarcasme lieth is best if not onely known unto himself If his meaning be that I have no Metaphysicks
Passe on to the fâ—urth and last Evasion of Dr. Creed I shall from what hath been said in impugning the Pretended Termes of Immanent Actions inferre the impertinency of all that he faith p. 72.73.74.75.76.77.115.116.117.118 In defence of this pro-Position Position in Dr. Hammond the word Love is a Genus equally comprehending the two Species habitual and actual Love or the Acts of Love For Dr. H. by actual Love or the Act of Love understands as hath been shewn the Action of Loving and not as the Defend most vainly pretends any quality Produced by that Action which is its Term and Product His Proposition then notwithstanding all Doctor Creeds Defence is still chargeable with that absurdity which I objected against it viz. that it makes Love as a Genus equally to comprehend as Species primo diveâ—sa things put in several Predicaments For habitual Love is in the Predicament of Quality and the action of loving in the Predicament of Action For further disproof of Dr. H. his preposition I shall add what I said touching the habit of Love and the sincere and cordial expressions thereof No one word can as a Genus equally comprehend the efficient and the effect viz. as species but the habit of Love is the efficient and the acts of Love are the effects thereof the habit of Love saith the Defend effectively concurres with the Will to the production of the inward Acts of Love therefore Love as a Genus doth not comprehend habitual Love and actual Love as Species The Major of this Syllâ—gisme the Defendant will say is most ridiculously false as appeares by what he saith to the like Syllogisme that I framed concerning the habit of Love and the Expressions thereof His Answer is very remarkable for the transcendent and matchless both ignorance and impudence of it and therefore I shall crave the Readers patience for a while to consider it Dr. CREED YOur third to begin with that for I shall not tie my self to your Method is most ridiculously falfe You say not to trouble our selves about the Moâ—d and Figure 3 No one word can as a Gerus equally comprehend the efficient and the effect The habit of Love is the efficient cause and the sincere and cordial expressions of Love are the effect Therefore Love is not predicated of them equally as a Genus Your Major Sir your Major by all meanes have a care of your Major For what think yâ—u Sir of all Vnivocal prâ—ductions When Fire produces Fire and Corn brings forth Corn when a Man begets a Man and one Heat makes another does not one and the same word as a Genus comprehend the efficient and the effect And is it not in these a certain maxime thaâ— Qualis est causatalis est effectus such as the Cause is in nature such also is the effect And I hâ—pe you will think it lawfull for things of the same nature to be comprehended under the same Genus Nay are not these distinguished from equivocal productions because in these Effectum est ejusdem ratiâ—nis cum efficiente but in the other efficiens non convenit cum effectu in eadem forma sed eminenter illam câ—ntinet Nay does not your own Scheibler as well as Suarez both whom you so seriously commend to the Doctor 's perusall tell you that Causa univoca est quae prâ—ducit effectum similem in specie But methinks Sir if since your more noble more serious employments in the Study and writing of Scholasticall and Practicall Divinity you had thought sit to neglect such Vulgar Authors and to forget the Common Notions and Maximes delivered by them yet you should at least have observed this in your reading of Aquinas that in his Sums does frequently deliver this doctrine and makes very good use of it And now Sir I hope you will think it lawfull for things of the same Nature to be comprehended under the same Genus For where I pray will you rank the several individualls of the self-same Species for such are all Vnivocall Causes and Effects as is plain from Sense and Experience if not under the same Genus I might prove the grosse and palpable falshood of your Major Sir by divers instances drawn from equivocall productions where the Cause and Effect must be placed in the same predicament and consequently under the same remote Genus at least which is sufficient to destroy your Major When the Sun and Stars produce Gold and Silver and Brasse and other Mineralls when they produce Sâ—ones of all sorts and kinds in the Bowâ—lls of the Earth are not the cause and the effect at least as species subalternae placed under the siâ—ne Genus of substantia Corporea When an Asse begets a Mule or a Man produces Wormes and Vermin in his Head and Entrailes and when a Woman brings for mâ—nstrâ—ous births instead of Lâ—gitimate issues as Serpâ—nts Moles and Froggs and other such like of which among Physitians there are maâ—y true stories I pray Sir must not the cause and effect be both ranged under the same immediate Genus proximum which is Animal So when light produces Heaâ— are not the Cause and the Effect both put in the same Predicament under the same Genus of Patible Qualities To keep closer to the business more immediately in controversie The habit of Love effectively concurrs with the will of to the production of the inward Acts of Love and yet I say that love as a Gâ—nas is Equally predicated of the habit and the inwaâ—d Acts of Love as has already been demenstrated and may in due time bâ— further proved notwithstanding any thing you have or can say to the contrary And this is abundantly more than sufficient to shew the faâ—shoâ—d of your Major when you say that no one word can as a Genus whether proximum or remotum sâ—mmum or subalâ—eâ—um for you â—bsâ—lutely deliver it equally comprehend the Efficient and the Effect The Major which you say Is most ridiculously false and against which you make so horrible an Out-cry I shall fortifie by three reasons The 1. Is because Genus Analogum non praedicatur aequaliter dae speciebus But now Analogy viz. Attributionis Intriâ—secae consists in dependency from which Effective dependency is not excluded as is maintained by the generality of the ancient Thomists by my Master Scheibler Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 1. art 3. cap. 3. tit 5. art 1. And by Scheibler's Master Suarez Mâ—taphys di p. 28. s 3. disp 32. s 2. n. 11 12 13 14 15. By â—â—enâ—us a Frier Ca melite Discep in Univers Logic. p. 113. Martinus Exercit. Metaph. p. 521. And by divers others as you may see in Stalio Reg. Philosoph p. 397. And upon this account is it that Ens is made to be Gerus Analogum to Ens creatum and increatum to substantia and accidens And I have read in the Manuscript of a Great Philosopher of the Vniversity of Oxford that for this reason Qualiâ—as is geâ—us Analogum because of the
Dependency that Habiâ—â—s hath upon Potentia I know this is to be understood with many Limitaâ—ions with which I shall not now Cumber the Reader and besides I am not Ignorant that 't is Opposed by many Moderne Philosâ—phers But however it hath so Great and Learned Patrons and they brâ—ng so good Reaâ—ons for this their Opinion as that no modest man will Censure it to be a mâ—st Ridiculus Proposition Seâ—ondly No word that is predicated of things Secundum prias et pâ—sterius is predicated of them equally as genus univâ—cum of its species for the equality that distinguisheth genus univocum from analogium * Pro hac Sententia vidâ—tur militare quâ—d habet Aâ—istotles in cap. de â—â—dis simul eâ— dicens quae ex eâ—dâ—m gâ—nere in diviâ—ione sibi invicem opponuntur esse natura simul Atqui species immediate unum genus respicientes ex codem genere in divisione sibi in vicem opponuntur â—ut albedo nigredo in quas color dividitur Sunt igitur natura simul Quod si natura simul iunt nâ—n potest una ab altera dependere in participando genere Stallio Reg. â—bilosoph p. 397. is aeâ—ualitas ordinis not dignitatis But whatsoever is predicated of the Efficient Cause and the Effect is predicated secundum prius and pâ—sterius Ergâ— nothing that is predicatâ—d of the Efficient and the Effect is predicated of them equally as genus un vicum Thirdly Species totius generis univoci are simul natura but the Efficient Cause and the Effect are not simul natura And therefore they are not species of the same genus And thus have I sufficiently provided for my Major as for your Arguments against it they had need be very strong and convincing for otherwise indifferent Readers will judge your Vociferation against it being with so full a mouth to be Frontlesse But let them be what they will let us hear them Dr. CREED For what think you Sir of all univocal Productions When Fire produces Fire and Corn brings forth Corn when a Man begets a Maâ— and one heat make another does not one and the same word as a genus comprehend the Efficient and the Effect When I Read this passage I was about I confesse with a just indignation to throw away your book as unworthy mine or any other Schollars further perusal I desire to have low and humble thoughts of my self but yet I cannot think him a dompetent Adversary for me to Encounter who is so Ignorant in Logick as to say that Man and Fire are genera I propounded the Question to a Fresh maâ— an 〈◊〉 sit genus and he answered no and readily confirmed his Negative thus Nulla species infima est genus homâ— est species infima Ergo homo non est genus I make no doubt but that our Defendant hath great abilities in other learning but I shall never acknowledge him to be a Philosopher or School-man that thus trespasseth against the very A. B. C. of Logick I shall give him this friendly advice for the future that before his next attempt in Scholastical Divinity he first con over Smith Breerwood Sanderson or some other such compâ—ndium of Logick that so he may be able to avoid such mistakes as this which will Expose him unto the Derision of every Boy If any shall Object in the Defendants behalf that the Ramifts hold that every species is genus and that individuum is spâ—cies infima as may be seen in Scheiblers Tâ—picks c. 28. n. 77 78 c. usque ad 85. This yet can be no staâ—ting hole for the Defendant for this proposition every genus is predicated equally of its species is a Maxime of the Aristotelians delivered by them long before ever Ramus saw the light and there is no doubt can be made that they take genus and species in a Peripatâ—tical and not Ramistical senâ—e If it be said again secondly that even Dr. Sanderson in his Logick l. 3. c. 24. confesseth that Topically species infima is genus Why this can as little availe the Dâ—fendant as the former shift for t is undeniable that we speak of genus as praedicabile and the Maxime Genus pâ—aedicatur aequaliter de speciebus is delivered by Pâ—â—phyâ—y in his Isagâ—ge where he handles the Doctrine of the Predicables In a third place it may be replyed that in that Interrogation of our Defendant does not one and the same word as a genus comprehend the Efficient and the Effect He is not to be Interpreted of any of the words imediately preceding Fire Corne a Man Heat but of some words that are to be understâ—â—d and Supplied as Elementum which as a genus comprehends the Fire producing and the Fire produced and planta or corpus animatum which in like manner is predicated of the Corne bringing forth and the Corne brought forth as a genus and animal which is predicated in the same manner as a genus of the man bâ—getting and the man begotten and qualitas patibilis prima which in the same way is predicated of the Heat making and the Heat made But First what Reason have I to make this Supply in your Words Secondly We cannot Supply or understand these words Elementum Corpus animatum animal qualitas patibilis prima For Elementum is predicated of the Fire producing and the Fire produced Corpus animatum of the Corn bringing forth and the Corne brought forth c. and so Animal of the Father and the Son onely as of Individualls whereas the comprehension and predication of the Genus that we speak of is onely concerning its Species Unto all this I shall adde Ex abundanti out of Irenaeus a Modern Thomist that which will answer your Objection And 't is the more pertinent because it speaks of one of your Instances viz. Fires producing Fire Cave tamen putes quamlibet dependentiam facere nostram Analogiam nam ignis generat ignem qui ambo un voce conveniunt in natura ignis quia cum illa dependentia Physica non reperitur dicta inaequalitâ—s Vel melius ista dependentia est solum quoad actualem existentiam seu positionem extra causas non autem quoad participationem secundum essentiâ—â— seu esse objectivum si enim quaeratur utrum ignis B. genitus ab igne A. et ab eo dependens ut generetur et existat ab eodem dependeat essentialiter spectatus non considerata existentia dicendum erit quod non quia ignis A. non est principium igneitatis altoqui esset principium sui ipsius At vero accidens dependet a substantia essentialiter ut sit ens Quâ—d fiet evidens comparanti singula hoc modo Leo non minus erit animal etiâ—â— si homo sit impossibilis At accidens non erit ens si substantia sit impossibilis cum enim accidens sit entis ens cujus erit ens si nulla sit substantia ergo aliter accidens participat
cast into Syllegismes what he takes to be argumentative therein But this is a thing that he dates not so much as attempt for then every Freshman will easily discover the foppery of his discourse However in the meane time I shall give the utmost strength that I can unto Dr Hammond's argument as 't is propounded by himself and as 't is reinforced by the Defendant The conclusion to be proved is that one inward act of Christs love of God was more intense then another Now this Dr. Hammond proves from the length of his prayer for paralel to a greâ—ter length there 's a greater intension of the inward actual love of God in a longer prayer compared with that which is shorter All the proofe that I can finde of this reduced into forme stands thus Where there is a multiplication of Degrees more degrees of the inward actual love of God there 's a greater intension of the inward actual love of God but in a larger prayer of Christ there was a greater multiplication of Degrees of love c. more degâ—ee of love c. then there was in a shorter And therefore theâ—e was a greater intension viz. of the actual internal love of God The Major is confirmed from the nature of intension which is nothing else but a multiplication of Degrees in the same subject an addition of one Degree unto another And then the Minor is thus confirmed by Dr. Hammend where there is a greater multiplication of the acts of love viz. inward where there are more acts of love there is a greater multiplication of the degrees of love for in every act of love there was some degree of intension but in a longer prayer of Christ there was a greater multiplication of the inward acts of love mâ—re acts of love then there was in a shorter and answerably there was a greater multiplication of the Degrees oâ— love more Degrees of love c. My Answer unto thâ—s Syâ—â—gisme shall be both unto the Major and the Minor First then I answer unto the Major by distinguishing concerning the multiplication of Degrees It is either of the same numerical forme or fo foâ—mes numerically different Where there is a greater multiplication of degrees of the same numerical forme there is a greater intension but not where there is a greater multiplication of formes numerically different for intension is an addition of Degree unto Degree in the same numerical forme The Major then if understood of the latter multiplication of degrees is false but if understood of the former is true But then thâ— Minor if understood answerably of the same will be false And Dr. Hammond's proofe of it will be most impeâ—inent For the several inward acts of Christs love of God are formes numerically different and therefore let them be multiplyed never so much this will conduce nothing unto the greater multiplication of Degrees in one act of love then there is in another So that from this it can never be inferred that one inward act of love in Christ was more intense then another But Dr. Creed very stoutly and lustily affiâ—meth the contrary p. 256. I Reply and say If the Degrees of his live are in number multiplyed as the acts are there must be a growth in their intensive perfection and the last act which has the greater number of Degrees in it will be gradually more perfect then the former Here you say that if the Degrees of Christ's love are in number multiplyed as the acts are there must be a growth in their intensive perfection and withall you suppose that the last act hath a greater number of degrees in it and here upon you conclude of it that it will be gradually more perfect then the former But good Mr. Defendant instead of saying and supposing you should have proved what you say and suppose but of such proofe there is not in all that you say any the least footsteps Bâ—t â—e this how it will plaine it is you say p. 257. that I do not reâ—ch the Doctor 's meaning and the force of his argument I have made the most of his words that I could but as for any hidden and invisible meaning distinct from that which his words hold forth I know not that I was obliged to search after it And therefore I shall leave that unto the Defendant who can see further into a Mill-stone then other Mortals But however let us examine this profound meaning of Dr. Hammond's The Doctor concludes and argues from the effect to the cause thus where thâ— zâ—ale is true and real and not tersonate and counterfâ—it as in Christ without doubt it was most true there a multiplication of the outward acts of prayer and a longer continuance in them argues a greater a denâ—y of inward affection and true zeale And for the truth of this assâ—rtion I appeal to the practice of the whole world Here if you supply what is to be supplyed touching the object of this inwaâ—d affection This assertion which you obtrude with such a confidence is apparently untrue I say 't is apparently untrue that a multipâ—cation of the outward acts of prayer and a longer continuance in thâ—m argues a greater ardency of inward affection to God or love â—f him And for the falshood of this assertion I appeale to thâ— bosomes of all experienced either Ministers or Christians who can tâ—ll him that their inward love of God is frequently as intense in their shorâ—es as it is in their longer prayers and that the shortnesse of their prayers many times doth not proceed from any abarement of their love of God but from regard to the infirmities of such as joyn with thâ—m and for diverse other reasons Mr. Paul Beyne was esâ—eem'd a very plous and devout man in his time and 't is said of him that his prayer in his Family was not usually above a quarter of an hour long as having respect to the weaknesses and infirmities of his Servants and Children and he used to disswade others from tediousnesse in that duty I beleive the Defendâ—nt will not deny but that a man may in putting up the Lord's Prayer have his actual love of God every way as high and intense as in the longest prayer either of a man 's own or anothers composition But not to insist longer on other men It is plaine of Christ that his shortest prayers his shortest eiaculations did proceed from an actual love of God every way as intense as the longest And for the truth of this I appeale unto the Commandement of God that enjoyned Christ and all other men to love God with all their migâ—t and strength therefore with all their habitual might and strength Now however other men may transgresse this Commandement Christ did not could not and therefore whenever Christ loved God actually he loved him with all his habitual might and strength ad extremum virium and consequently one inward Act of his love of God was not more intense then another Ninthly
p. 268 you accuse my Answer unto an Argument of Dr. Hammond's as guilty of that fallacy which is called petitio principii If this be not say you 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I know not what your great Master Aristatle mednes But this is a most ridiculous and groundlesse crimination for this as every other fallacy is a sault or defect in arguing not in answering 't is saith my â—â—rtle Master Scheibler dâ—ceptâ—o in syllogizando De Sydogism cap. 17. n. 6. 't is saith my great Master Aristotle Elenchus Sophisticus It hath alwaies been observed for a rule in dâ—sputing that when the Respondent denyes a sequel and gives a reason for it it is the Opponents part to â—â—fute the reason and the Respondent is not obliged to confirm it It is then a grosse non-sequitur to conclude me gâ—â—ltie of this faâ—lacie of petitio principii because I do not confirm the reason for which I deny Dr. Hammonds consequence But Sir if you had not falsifted it by adding must to may be it is a Proposition so plain and evident as that it needs no confirmation and can be denied by no rational man Thus it stands my reason is because in all these inward acts of Christs love of God and we may say the same of the inward acts of other vertues and graces there may be no gradual dissimilitude Mark Sir the word may be and then tell us whether there be any contradiction in this Proposition in several inward acts of Châ—â—sts love of God there is no gradual dissimilitude it there be pray discover it if there be hot then give me leave to conclude that in the multiplied acts of christs love of God there may be no gradual dissimilitude You say this is the controversie betwixt me and the Doctor But your own conscience must needs convince you that this is a faishood for you your self state the controversie to be whether one act of châ—â—sts love of God were actually more intense then another and yet if I had said that in the inward acts of Christs love of God there could be no gâ—adual dissimilitude this I have proved by three reasons unto which you have given but â—orrie answers and these reasons I am not bound to repeat at every turne for this would quicklie swell my book to such a Volume as yours is Tenthly he hath a passage page 272. for which he hath not in my words the least toundation And will not every man think that our Refuteâ— was a man of great judgment and parts and fit to quote Suarez against Dr. Hammond But I rather think he was misguided by some Notes and that he never consulted the Authors he quotâ—s but took them upon trust otherwise mâ—thinks it is impossible he should be so strangely deceived But pray Sir wherein wherein is the â—efuter so strangely deceived in Suarez why 't is clear and evident by Suarez though every act of Christ in respect of the person that performed it was of an infinite and so of an equal in ensive value yet in respect of the moral goodnesse that is intrinsecally inherent in Christs actions nothing hinders but that one in this respect may be better and more intensely persect then another as well as one grief and torment which he suffered was greater then another And therfore say you the same Suarez even in that very page and columne and in the section immediately preceding that passage that our Refuter has quoted expressely sayes to this purpose Primum omnium satendum esse opera Christi fuisse inequalia in prepâ—â—â bonitate intrinfecâ— essentiall vel â—â—â—ter inhaerente ipsi actai quia ut dictum est 〈◊〉 hee bonites 〈◊〉 finiâ—a poâ—â—rat ergo esse major 〈…〉 allunde unum â—pus Chrisâ—â— erut metioris objects quam aliud uâ—â—m inâ—thsâ—u's 〈◊〉 sic de 〈…〉 â—â—go 〈…〉 vol poterâ—nt esse inaequalta in hâ—c bonitate c. Why what of all this hâ—â—e I delivered aâ—y thing that contradicts this either expresly or implyedly or doth Suarez here oppose in the least degâ—ee any thing that I have said doth not †Sed haec sententia totâ— objectio procedunt ex falso principio singunt enim esse in eodem acta plures valores seu plura merita juxta varias ejus circumstâ—ntias quod patet esse falsum ex his quae paulò superiùs dicebamus de infinitate sacrisicii ex re oblaâ—a vel person a offerenâ—e sumpta Ostendimus enim reipsa non esse duas neque pertinere ad diversa merita vel satisâ— actiones quia ratio meritâ— vel satisfactionis sieut ratio bâ—nitatis non consu git ex singulis conditientbus actus pâ—rse sumpris sed ex colâ—ecâ—s ne omnâ—â—m Haec enim ratio ettam in praesente proâ—edit nam intensio octus vel obiectum out persona â—pâ—rons per se singâ—la non sâ—fficiâ—nt ad mernum ut ex singaliâ— distinctamerâ—ta in actu orientur sed omnia simuâ— necessaria â—el suâ—t vel suâ— modo concurrunt ad unum meritum quentitate â—eius Aâ—que ita cessat objectio nom stoneritum actus tantum est unum illud est infinitum aequâ—le â—â—hil est meâ—iti in que ceâ—ni possit inaequalitâ— In tertiam part Toom tom 1. disp 4. s â— 49. Suâ—rez all along assert that there is but one meâ—itotious value in one act of Christ and that in respect of meritorious value one act of Christ was not better and more intensively perfect then another Nay do not you your felâ—e p. 271. quote a place out of Suâ—rez where in he affirmuth that the moral goodnesse inherent in the actionâ— of Christ is a thing distinct from their meritorious value Therefore Suaâ—tz say you acknowledgeth in that very fection I quote Valorem hunt quem habet actus in ordine ad meritum esse quid distinctumâ—d realt boniâ—ate quae est dâ—ffe entin ipsius actû prout consâ—â—ituitur in esse viâ— tuâ—â—c â—el illi aâ—rquo 〈…〉 instâ—e inhâ—ret Now Dr. Hummond is to be understood only of a meritorious value for he is to be understood of a value that was to be rewarded and that out of debt and such a one is a meritorious value Nay do not you your selfe understand him to speak of a meritoâ—ious value p. 266. And now to shew the appâ—sirnesse of the Proof I must tell him what either he knowes not or will not observe That the Doctor â—gaine a gues à posterâ—ori from the effect to the cause and the necessary releâ—â—â—n betwâ—xt thâ— work and the reward His â—â—gument is funâ—ed upon a Maxune of dâ—sâ—ributive justice not expressed but suppesed and intâ—â—â—ted and it is thâ—â— where the reward does proceed of debt as in Christ certainly it did and is properly wages there must be a proportionable incre sâ— of thereward and the work c. By this then the Roader may sâ—e that all that you have concerning the moral goodnesse in