modus sola for so we are to consider alwayes when any efficient is brought to argue any thing see which modus is brought with it as in the example before the effect is pressed with the modus of procreans and with the modus of conseruans as would you take away loue take away idlenesse for it is the procreant and conseruing cause of loue Now as God is the procreant and conseruing cause of all things so he is causa sola first ergo that is before causa cum aliis afterward he is causa cum aliis working together with the creatures and we finding this in the first efficient we may also finde it in the first in the second and in euery one because all things are simulacra of the first Now these belong to Logicke for there is reason in them and any thing deserueth more or lesse praise or dispraise as he doth good or euill sola aut cum aliis Earumque omnium saepe alia principalis alia adiuuans ministra That is earum omnium quae cum alijs efficiunt saepe alia principalis alia adiuuans ministra for so saepe here is part of the axiom and thus often it falls out that one among the rest in doing of things is principall and as wee say ring-leader to the rest though sometimes likewise all be haile fellowes So that as the Lord did at the first work all things alone and then with others so likewise do the creatures in nature and here againe as the Lord is principall when he worketh with others so also when creatures worke together one for the most part is principall Alia adiuuans ministra That is as it were a minister and an instrument Here we are to vnderstand there is the principall cause which is holpen and doth not helpe causa adiuuans is principally of liuing things ministra is commonly of instruments which haue not life though both of them may bee of either Virgil. 9. of his Aeneidos Nisus auocat ab Euriolo c. Me me adsum qui feci c. Nisus alone did the deed mea fraus omnis there lies the argument therefore he was sola causa ergo in me conuertite ferrum ô Rutuli Euriolus was taken Nisus escaped and he reasons not from the doing of it for so both might haue deserued punishment but from the manner of doing it mea fraus omnis and for Euriolus thus he saith nihil iste nec ausus nec potuit The syllogisme is this He that hath done this murder is to be punished But I alone haue done it Ergo I alone am to be punished The Assumption is thus proued by denying audacia to Euriolus whereby hee might haue done it and potentia whereby he might haue accomplished it Slaughter is to punishment a subiect Solitaria causa cum plerisque principalibus sociis pro Marcello varie adhibetur In the former example wee see sola causa deliuered in a strange phrase this is causa cum alijs and here dux is causa principalis militum virtus locorum oportunitas c. are the helping causes and fortune is another principall cause quae maximam partem sibi vindicat he reasons thus thou art a valiant fellow Caesar but thou hast helping causes of which fortune is the chiefe At verò huius gloriae Caesar c. here Caesar hath no companion so that Caesar in pardoning Marcellus is sola causa Nihil centurio nihil praefectus c. here he remoues the species of efficiens that should bee cum alijs and he remoues also fortune which is a chiefe helpe in warre this example belongs to Polemica Instrumenta etiam in causis adiuuantibus connumerantur That is whether they be cattle that haue life which are instruments for husbandry or whether they bee things without life they are counted among helping causes so a man writing with his pen is principall and his pen instrumentall but here wee are to know that wee must alwaies analyse as our author layes that downe which is to be analysed as when I say he did this alone though he had an instrument here he is causa sola in respect hee had not another man to helpe him he is causa cum alijs as he hath an instrument Quo argumento impius Epicurus c. The Epicure reasons thus if God had no instruments to helpe him in making the world then hee made it not but he had no instruments c. therefore this we know to bee false by a rule of Diuinity for to make the world was an infinite worke ergo nothing being finite could helpe him Now many times there are fallaces from all these as when causa non procreans is put for causa procreans non conseruans pro conseruans non sola pro sola non cum alijs pro cum alijs all which we are to determine by this rule CHAP. 5. Tertio causa efficiens per se efficit aut per accidens THe modi are of most speciall vse and indeed Ramus was long in determining about the doctrine of them but this was his last determination Now the former are more generall then these because these are more speciall in vse and againe the other belong to these these may bee where the other are but the other include these these modi per se and per accidens are more particular then the other for their reach Now natura belongs to naturall Philosophy as it were consilium to morall as it were Tertio causa efficiens c. these wee haue heard before efficit per se sua facultate that is not onely hauing it owne nature in it selfe whereby it worketh but the beginning of its motion from it selfe causa per accidens hath it from another Sua facultate By facultas here we are to vnderstand the same that vis was generally in the definition of causa but hee meanes here that which hath his principium of motus of it selfe if one doe a thing per accidens he doth it vi but not sua so sua facultate that is whose motus whereby it worketh is determinated in it selfe vt quae natura vel consilio faciunt these two names should seeme to belong to naturall and morall Philosophie but wee are to vnderstand by Nature that thing whose nature is to worke such an effect yea any thing be it naturall or artificiall which hath that principium of motus in it selfe to worke any thing Vt quae natura vel consilio faciunt Counsell is that which doth a thing by deliberation willingly and wittingly as God Angels and men onely worke by counsell causa natura is as a knife cutteth sua natura so all things are subiect to nature and when I find that a thing worketh propria vi and that beginning of motus is with the nature of it taught not from it nature that is causa natura as when another man crouds me and so I croud another and fling him downe I
he is more to be commended then if he had done it cum aliis aut contra Againe if a thing be done well natura is better then if it had beene done necessitate and more commendable when a thing is done by counsell then fortuna now because these modi doe vrge and presse the effect more or lesse ergo there is reason in them and therefore they belong to Logicke modi that is adiuncts not making these effects species but onely distinguished by accidents that fallacian non causa pro causa is generall to causa and it is also particular to efficiens making that causa efficiens which is not as the Heretickes in Diuinity were deceiued which said that the Angels did make the world Primo quod procreat aut tueatur These are first because they are more generall then the rest and also they are more in vse for we shall haue this first modus in vse twenty times for one to the other modi so we respect God as causa procreans and tueans before we respect him alone then againe this procreant cause brings the thing first to his esse and the preseruing cause is the keeper of the thing in his esse Now in reason hee that is the procreating cause should also be the preseruing cause as God is not onely causa procreans of the world but also causa conseruans and so should parents as they procreant children so should they in like sort preserue them The procreant cause is first because things must needs haue a being before they can be preserued now they are distinguished because when a thing is procreated it is not preserued aut contra and the modi are ioyned with the cause not with the effect because they are first in the efficient as essentiall for actio is before passio so that here marke that next after we see the efficient we are to looke at these modi As we are saued by faith alone here is efficiens sola Our Author brings in an example of Ouids the 4 remedii and Kickerman hath a fling at Ramus for his examples and would haue him bring his examples out of Diuinity But first Logicke being a generall Art it is therefore best to fetch his examples out of the most common and generall Writers as out of Poets and Historians which the Gentiles and Turkes may receiue these being more generally knowne to the world then are the Scriptures and againe Diuinity is the most speciall Art of all And so Ramus findeth fault but iustly with Aristotle for fetching his examples out of Geometry which is too obscure for it is a fallace to fetch examples to proue any thing if the examples be not as well or better knowne to them to whom we demonstrate any thing as to our selues As they say in Geometry A is not B c. for so they say in Geometry angulus A and angulus B c. Now Logicke is a generall Art ergo it is best to fetch examples out of Poetry c. which belongs to Rhetoricke a generall art the example is this first proper otia are proper and conseruing causes of loue then tropicall causa est procreans cibus the cherisher Otia si tollas c. Thus he reasons otia are the causes of loue for take them away and loue is gone hence it appeares they were of the essence of loue so that because causa is of the essence of the effect ergo idlenesse and you must put loue aut contra for the essence will be wanting and we haue a rule sublata causa tollitur effectum and it is generall to all causes for they are all necessary to the esseficating of the effect all the rules of causa in common Logicians you shall haue here as posita causa ponitur effectum yet not one cause but all the causes must concurre many other rules they haue all which are inwrapt in the definition of causa now it holds contingently in euery cause for if we put one cause we put all the causes and so it holds in the speciall causes that posita causa ponitur effectum contra as take away otium from Egistus and you take away loue so that sublata causa à tertio tollitur effectum so in iudgement it is also true as giue otium to Egistus and you may giue him loue which argues from the efficient Sic pater mater procreant nutrix tuetur Before he shewed vs an example out of an Author hee wills vs to looke for the vse of them out of Authors The matter of the first belongs to Ethicks the matter of the second to History Logicke is a generall Art ergo his examples are best out of Poetry and Oratory wherein the vse of all arts is Now the aliquid before is loue which we should haue heard of against which Ouid makes a medicine In this example Dido is the aliquid for here the aliquid is the causa Dardanus had two sonnes Assaracus and Anchises and of him came Aeneas now here shee takes away the true causes and sayes Caucasus begot thee so there Caucasus in duris cantibus is causa procreans and Hyrcaenetigres are preseruing causes but this is false for here is non causa pro causa Obiection But doth he well to bring fallaces Answer Yes out of Poets for here non ens or ens fictum hath the nature of ens in it neither are all fables lyes but by continued allegories they teach vs notable truths now she challengeth Aeneas with this for his manners because he forsooke her Sic Romulus conditor Romanae vrbis c. He makes examples of his owne and there is genesis teaching vs that though genesis be before analysis yet genesis imitatiua is nothing but the imitating of a former analysis Againe our Author makes choice of such examples as may be paradigmaes and whereunto any other example may be brought as in the first he makes an accident to be the cause of an accident in the second he makes a substantiall effect to be from substantiall causes naturally but fainedly in the last he brings substantiall causes working substantiall effects ordinarily in artificiall things and here we may see who first shot the arrow before wee can see where it lights or through what it flew or whence CAPVT 4. Secundo causa efficiens sola efficit aut cum aliis WEE are still in the efficient the first thing that we can see in the artificio of any thing is the efficient and the modi of it the most generall modi was procreans and conseruans before now we come to the second modi sola aut cum aliis which are more generall then per se and per accidens in vse but not so generall as the first Secundo sola c. this is next ergo next after the first sola that is where this modus efficiendi is considered and the force and vertue of this argument from the efficient cause stands in this
disioyned from the whole but inter se Enunciatum segregatiuum est discretum aut disiunctum This sâ—gregation of things is either a more easie discerning of them whereas they might otherwise agree which may appeare to our eye though it be not so palpable in the things or it is disiunct where the parts are seuered re ratione so that these axioms doe serue for the deliuerance of diuersa and opposita Discretum cuius coniunctio est discretiua Discretum of discerno so that when things are so seuered in nature as we may see them disiunct with our eye though not so plainly in the things themselues they make a discrete axiome Itaque è dissentaneis praecipuè diuersa enunciat This axiom doth enunciare dissimilia too therefore if he had said dissimilia hee had included diuersa as though there be matters which might be iudged by the outward senses yet are they to be referred to the minde too Cuius negatio contradictio est So that the denyall doth take away that discretion which was laid downe before Discretum enunciatum iudicatur esse verum legitimum si partes non solùm verae sed etiam discretae sint falsum vel ridiculum contra Now for the iudgement of this axiome it is verum legitimum so that two things are required in iudging a discrete axiome first that the parts be true else it will be a false axiome secondly that they be lawfull else they will be ridiculous because the parts will not be diuers As to say though he be a man yet he is a liuing creature here both parts are true but here is no discretion and therefore it is ridiculous CAP. 8. De axiomate disiuncto Axioma disiunctum est axioma segregatiuum cuius coniunctio est disiuncta THE discrete and disiunct seuer things but the former doth it onely ratione now the disiunct lookes at an opposition betweene the things disioyned it is called a disiunct axiome as disioyning or pulling the parts out of ioint so then the former may be compared to the laying of two things that are distinct but not pulled out of ioynt Est segregatiuum Therefore seuering the matter for the parts are so diuided that they cannot agree or be vnited because they are opposite sine vllo medio Cuius coniunctio est disiunctiua Disioyning or pulling in pieces the things disposed as there is either day or night these are priuantia ergo contraries ergo opposites De Fato Omnis enunciatio est vera aut falsa This 〈◊〉 a disiunct in like sort where veritas and falsitas are disioyned now for the iudgement of this axiome here one part onely is true and not both which ariseth from the nature of opposites Itaque eidem attribui c. but if wee consider the affection betweene the whole and the parts there both will be true as argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale but because the whole with the forme make vp the species therefore we say in effect argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale and if these composite axiomes be disposed in a simple syllogisme then the verbe will bee the band for wee haue nothing to doe with the dissention of the parts but to see how the parts of the question are disposed with the third argument Hic significatur è disiunctis vnicum verum esse In a distinct axiome one part onely is true because they are dissentanea as homo est bonus aut non bonus these parts are but contingent separated but the disiunction is necessarie Cuius negatio Non omnis enunciatio est vera aut falsa So that the deniall taketh away the contradiction Et contradictione significatur non necessario alterum verum esse So that though the parts may be contingently true yee the axiome may be necessary Veruntamen quamuis absolute vera disiunctio necessaria quoque sit tamen nihil necesse est partes separatim necessarias esse Therefore est is not the band for it doth tye but contingent truth but the coniunction is it because it ties necessary truth Itaque si disiunctio sit contingens non est absolute vera tantum opinabilis est qualis est frequenter in hominum vsu So that this disiunct contingent is not vsuall in common speech vt si quaeratur c. whereas both or neither of them might come Tantum opinabilis Because opinio is the iudgement of a contingent axiome and thus wee haue heard all the kindes of disposition on two sides CAP. 9. De Syllogismo eius partibus Atque eiusmodi iudicium est axiomaticum axiomatiâ— per se manifesti sequitur dianoeticum NOw wee come to a disposition where there are three sides so that they play as it were at three hand ruffe Now marke the reason of this distribution of dispositio into axioma and syllogismus some things there are that are laid together in nature without a meane ergo we may see them at the first hand vno intuitu some things also haue a meane which we must vse before wee can see them ergo according to the things in nature and according to the act of our reason in beholding these things so must our Logicke proceed and as the medium shall either combine or seuer them so we may conclude them affirmatiuely or negatiuely and herein stands the force of those rules though they be not alwayes true quae conueniunt in aliquo tertio conueniunt inter se contra because that medium is the holder of them two together aut contra for there the medium will be a barre to seuer them as otiosus est amator Egistus est otiosus ergo est amator because otium is as glue to pull on amor for it argues loue as causa and it pulls on Egistus as an adiunct So this rule sublata causa tollitur effectum et contra and all these rules of consecution are because the effect brings the cause with it and any other argument as well as causa may be a meane whereby two things may be glued together for this third argument is not so much a medium in regard of the other two disposed with it but in respect of our seeing them and we may see as well by any other arguments as by causa Atque eiusmodi iudicium est axiomaticum c. An axiome is such a thing as appeares to bee true at the first sight or at the second hand now our reason is to be so glued as that it may be able to see any truth ergo if the truth appeare at the first sight an axiome will serue vs else we must haue a candle to make it cleare so that here wee may see the purpose of syllogisticall iudgement is not to make things more true or more false in themselues but to make the truth or falshood more manifest vnto vs so that cleare per se belongs to an axiome but perspicuity in regard of vs belongs to a syllogisme and here we
THE LOGICIANS School-Master OR A COMMENT VPON RAMVS Logicke By Mr. Alexander Richardson sometime of Queenes Colledge in CAMBRIDGE LONDON Printed for Iohn Bellamie at the three golden Lyons in Cornhill 1629. The Preface or Entrance into the BOOKE I Suppose I am to dispute with a man and bee about to lay downe euery thing to his reason if hee grant that hee haue reason I need no further proofe of Ens for if a man haue an eye to see things there must bee an Ens which must be the subiect of it for else it should bee in vaine and as our outward eye were in vaine if there were not some things to bee seene thereby so were our inward eye of reason to no purpose if there were not an ens to be seene Now I will stand more vpon ens because I will ground my Rules of Art vpon it but that Reason is the proper adiunct of ens wee shall see more plainely hereafter Yet let vs know in the meane time that if there be reason it must either see something or nothing now it cannot see nothing but per accidens because it properly seeth ens as I see a man not to bee in such a place because I see him not True it is that ens is the subiect of all Arts but more specially of Logicke Grammar and Rhetoricke as they are generall for indeed Reason first seeth both it selfe and the other Arts. Ens est quod est Now hauing found that ens is it is requisite that wee should know what it is and I say ens est quod est If wee shall looke at the Grammatical notation of ens it is a participle of the present tense and therefore is as much as quod est euen as legens and qui or quae legis are the same or as in Greeke 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verberans or qui verberat are all one and that the very particle doth shew For if it be of the present tense it is the same with the verbe of the present tense so that ens and quod est are the same Againe if there be ens as we haue already proued then vel est quod est vel non quod est vel quod non est at neque non quod est nec quod non tst ergo quod est For when I say non quod est then I put ens fictum impossibile ergo this can no way bee ens no not in our phantasie when I say quod non est then I put ens sictum impossible and to that I giue a quod but non est so that in the end I say ens est quod est that is neither ens fictum possibile nor ens fictum impossibile and therefore if wee will define ens fictum impossibile it is non quod est if wee define ens fictum possibile it is quod non est Now if neither ens fictum possibile nor ens fictum impossibile be entia then ens est quod est And againe when I deny non quod est I deny est and when I deny quod non est I deny est ergo ens est quod est Againe ens and bonum are all one therefore non ens and malum are all gone therefore si ens non sit then it is bonum and malum ergo ens est quod est Ens est primum vel à primo If ens bee it must bee either first absolutely which is not from another or it must be from a first that is from another which is not from another againe contradiction sheweth it for it is as if I should say ens is non aliunde or aliunde that is it is of it selfe or not of it selfe and this is contradiction But obiection may be made that in the continuall generation of things one thing is before another as my father begot me and another begot my father and so in infinitum ergo it is not necessary that ens should bee absolutely first or from a first Answ This is nothing for am I from my father This then hee was before I was and I am after him ergo here is prius and posterius therefore here cannot bee eternitie ergo this ens is not eternall Againe is not my fathers case as well as mine to bee from another and so all men till they come to ens primum Yes ergo all men are from others till wee come to this first absolute being which is not from any other for then he should not bee primum ergo ens est primum vel à primo Ens absolute primum est quod est seipso First if there be ens primum or à primo there must bee ens primum of necessity for if there be ens primum ye grant it me if there be ens à primo ye must also grant ens primum therfore ens primum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primum and maximè intelligibile therefore Atheists are here to be confuted for they may sooner doubt whether they themselues bee then whether God bee for if they bee entia à primo they must first know him that is primum before they can know themselues for the cause is before the effect Quod est seipso it must be being either seipso or aliunde if aliunde ne primum for that from which it is is prius vnto it ergo est seipso Obiect Bellarmine saith that God is not seipso neither any creature whatsoeuer for then he saith the same thing would be the cause of it selfe and the effect Resp. It is a meere sophisme or rather an Amphibolia of the phrase For when we say God is seipso we doe not meane that he hath causes but we meane priuatiuely that he is not aliunde and est seipso and est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are the same it is quod est and so est seipso Ens primum est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If he be seipso thē he is without causes that that is absolutely first must haue no causes for then it is not absolutely first ergo there can bee no scientia of him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for tunc scire dicimur cum causas scimus Againe first if he haue no causes hee hath no end ergo hee is not made for an end ergo there can be no art of him to guide him to an end So that wee finde in this respect that ens primum cannot bee the subiect of Art Euery art is to guide the thing whereof it is an art to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Againe it euery art doth lay forth the causes effects subiects and the proper adiuncts of a thing for if it haue no causes it can haue no qualities and God hath none of these ergo hee is not the subiect of Art Hence againe as this ens is beyond our reason so hee is beyond our speech either Grammar or Rhetoricke so that concerning this ens primū whatsoeuer we thinke or speak it is
imperfect Now bring it to our Logicke after another sort and we shall see this ens to be beyond Art Our Logick bringeth vs first to a first efficient in the resolution of any thing we go so far as in the end we find a first efficient Now this first efficient hath nothing before it ergo that is beyond our reason therfore what that is wee cannot tell and therefore if wee shall make him an effect to looke out his causes we shall not make him first ergo hee is beyond all art then againe there is no art but is an eternall rule in the Idea of God as a precept of that thing whereof it is an art to guide it to its Eupraxie therefore if there should be an art of him there must bee a former ens which must haue the Idea of it to shew how this ens primum was made and whereby it must bee gouerned so that he is not the subiect of our reason so that whereas I said before that ens was the subiect of our reason here I recall it and say that primū ens is beyond our Logick and therfore he being beyond all art wee will goe them ouer more briefly till we come to ens à primo First then he is without efficient for he is without causes ergo hee is vncreated for the first matter though it were without matter and forme yet it had an efficient and an end ergo was created then againe he is seipso ergo he must be vncreated hence also hee cannot be annihilated neither generated nor corrupted againe hence he is independens aliunde and therefore supremum againe hence he is without matter Now if hee bee without matter therefore he is without genus ergo is not a species either subalterna or specialissima Againe if hee bee without forme as without genus then he cannot be defined ergo he must bee without limitation of essence ergo without limitation of quantity ergo without limitation of place and because he is without beginning from any other thing therfore he is without any duration and because hee is without any matter ergo hee is truely spirituall for so wee account things spirituall according to the subtlenes of their matter but he hath no matter at all againe he being without matter and forme ergo can be no membrum because euery member containeth a portion of matter and forme neither can he be an integrum because that consisteth of members which containe part of matter and forme Now in that he is absolutely first therefore he can be but vnum for else there should be more againe if there should bee more then one then the one would say as well as the other I am as forward as thee and so none could be absolutely first Againe he is no genus for that is an vniuersall or Synopsis of many together whereas he is but one so that now he is not properly an ens but an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and aboue our Logicke againe in that hee is absolutely first he must needs bee without accidents to vse their terme without adiuncts for they are second things arising from their substances and in absolutè primo ente there must be nothing but that which is absolutè primum so that here we see his most simple being and that he is beyond our Logicke Now if he be without all potentia both essentialis and accidentalis hee is pure act so that this act now of his must needs be his essae because he is pure act for if he bee agere then his esse and agere are the same so that if any one doth any thing as euery ens à primo doth by potentia it is not pure act some say the Angels doe agere per essentiam but it is false vnlesse they meane that they act first by potentia now indeed there is nothing but it doth act per facultatem essentiae First the forme that is the beginner of act and when it acts vpon matter internall that is habituall or a faculty when it acts by the matter vpon some externall obiect that is an act for first there is the essence the matter and the forme thē the faculty the formes act vpon the matter internally lastly the act which is of the forme by the matter externally now these are not in God but are his very essence Now we find then that this primū ens must be actus purus actus because there is no potentia in him at all ergo it must needs bee that he is primus actus ergo optimus actus for primus actus and optimus actus are all one Againe hence it must needes follow that if there bee any act of other things it must needs bee from him and therefore if there be any thing actu it must be from him so then thus we haue found him absolute in euery thing Ens a primo Now to returne to the first Syllogisme If there be reason there must bee an adaequatum subiectum of it ergo ens à primo for we haue heard that ens primum is beyond our reason so that there must be ens à primo which is adaequatum subiectum rationi and that now is liable to all our Logicke for it hath causes effects subiects adiuncts c. and thus we will goe on and see all the subiects of the arts in the concretion of ens à primo which the Philosophers say cannot bee demonstrated That we might dig deepe and lay our foundation of Arts sure I haue shewed that there is a being and that it is double the one from whom art is the other in whom it shines now we heard that ens est quod est which is nothing but the true notation of ens resolued by Grammar quod est Now for the continuall succession of things which some dreame of this it is if all things bee effects there must bee so many causes ergo in the end wee shall come to a first cause that is not effectum Further wee heard that ens primum was quod est seipso that is without any other so that in propriety hee is neither essentia nor ens but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hence he neither hath causes neither is any argument that doth arise from causes ergo is an indiuiduum but not a species hee is without end ergo he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hence he therefore was neuer made ergo he made all things hee is without definition distribution and properties because he is without causes ergo there can be no art of him but he must bee the Author of art as wee shall heare hereafter He is merus actus because hee is without all potentia both substantialis and accidentalis againe hee is primus actus ergo optimus actus ergo whatsoeuer is well done of any thing is first from him againe he is infinitus actus ergo able to doe any finite thing yea and infinite Ens à primo est
receiued in an axiome we call it scientia It is our sapiētia as we can discourse with it syllogistically as we apply it rightly in time and place so it is prudentia And it is Ars as we can execute it and practise it in Analysi or Genesi as Ars is rightly an intellectual vertue as we teach it to another it is doctrina and his learning is disciplina lastly as we set it downe in writing or printing it is liber And euery rule of Art is true as when I say Rosa est flos Socrates est homo though there be neuer a Rose or Socrates in the world because the rule is eternall for it is in the eternall Idea of God though the thing be not Now some Meta-Phisitians not distinguishing aright hereof say the thing is eternall that is say they the thing was in Gods eternall Idea nay the Idea of God is eternall but not the thing I but Kickerman saith the thing is eternall quoad essentiam not quoad existentiam but that is false for existere belongs to effectum in Logick and euery effect must haue all the causes ergo matter and forme and these are not eternall Primè For there is no rule of Art but is a necessary Axiome in its owne place and so is firstly true Now deductions are true but at the first second third or fourth hand according as they are drawne from the first rule at the second third or fourth hand and are so far forth true as the first rule is true therefore when we dispute with any Aduersaries we bring our controuersie to a rule of Art and if they deny that wee say contra negantem principia non est disputandum though there is no rule of Art but may be demonstrated and is first because it deliuereth the first causes of the things verissimèque Euerie rule of Art as it is prima scientia so it is verissima but for deductions as they are secundae or tertiae scientiae according as they arise from the first rule so they are secundo or tertio true to wit so farre forth as the first is true concinnatis rei Here is the subiect of Ars and as praecepta were the matter and primè verissiméque scientificis were the qualities before I doe not say fabricae for that is but one thing whereas the rules of Arts are many Againe Art is the rule of the gouernment of the thing as well as of the frame of it therefore here is ens or res in generall I doe not say concinnatis to any one thing because as Ars in genere is to all the speciall Artes so is ens in genere to all the speciall entia Now if you aske me what res is I told you before in the definition of ens so that it was defined before but here I take it as a subiect of Art Concinnatis I had not a better word and therefore was faine to take this though it doth not fit my purpose as I would for the thing indeed is made to the rule and not the rule to the thing though we first see the thing and by the Act therof obserue the rule Concinnatis to fit together or to sing in parts so that euery thing must be placed in order and fitted each to other for nothing can bee wisely done if the precepts of Art be broken Ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For euery thing is made and gouerned to an end and Art is the rule of the making and gouerning of things to their end therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of euerie Art and is not to be taught in any particular Art Artis est praxis prattomenon We haue heard what encuclopaidia is qua Artes comprehenduntur pro subordinatione finium and what Ars is Now we come to the common affections belonging to Art and they are praxis and prattomenon That Art hath his praxis and prattomenon I thus proue it If the end of things bee an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 then as there is that actio or motus so there must be a res motu facta the prattomenon But the end of euery thing is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 therefore I proue it is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because laus rei est in actione and if there should be any thing made that had not an end it were in vaine Againe euery thing is Gods worke and he is pure Act therefore euery thing must agree to him and so agere And if there be a praxis and a prattomenon of the thing there must needs be a praxis and prattomenon of Art because the thing is fitted to the rule of Art and not Art to the thing Now the reason why some haue dreamed that euerie Art hath not his praxis and prattomenon is that false distinction of Arts into theoreticall and practicke they call them theoreticall which they doe onely contemplate practicke when wee can by art agere But there is no art but is both theoreticall and practicke for as we heard before that wee might both scire sapere and intelligere c. so we may contemplate and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ergo this distribution is fallacia accidentis for they doe not distinguish art as it is in the thing but from their owne knowledge of it Obiect But we cannot guide Astronomy neither can we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with naturall Philosophie but onely contemplate them Answ It is ars as it is in fabrica rei not as it is in homine but there is Praxis and prattomenon in euery thing as in the Sunne we may see his motion is praxis his course that he makes is Prattomenon againe man doth not contemplate onely but also worke by the rule of Astronomy and by nature as in the sowing of corne and planting of trees c. Now for practicke they say they are such as doe only practiue and leaue no worke behinde them or they are also poieticke and leaue a worke behinde them Of the first sort they make Ethickes Oeconomickes Politicks Musicke Optickes and others Why doth not the Ethician worke a good morall action or vertue by his rule of Ethickes and hath not the good husbandman in working by the rule of Oeconomicks his prattomenon as well as his praxis and so of the rest Is not the Common-wealth the prattomenon of a good Politician to be gouerned by him according to the rule of the Politickes so for Musicke is there not a song sung as well as the singing of it and when they set their song we see it plaine that there is an opus as well as a motus Now they had these from Aristotle but they are false and it is not commendable in the Creator that euery thing should haue his praxis and prattomenon Againe it doth not resemble the Creator who is purus actus vnlesse there be a motus in it and a res motu facta as the rule of Logicke teacheth in the doctrine of effectum
he see the inuention it is a fallace and a preposterous course So argumentū is artificiale or inartificiale they breake this rule that will giue testimony of a thing whose artificiall arguments they haue not seene so do the Papists in their implicite faith when they beleeue as the Church beleeues not knowing what the Church beleeueth So schollers that take any thing that their authors deliuer them without any examination at all of the things they reade Kickerman saith an inartificiall argument may be receiued before an artificiall I doe not deny it but yet you must examine it afterward Gods testimonies onely are vndenyable because he cannot lye but no mans Artificiale est primum aut ortum We are farther to looke at this glue whereby a thing is put to another thing in artificio rei it is there firstly or secondly this affection or going to the act is there at the first hand or at the second hand now it is the same still but is looked at as it is originally or as it is arising from the first as to make vp me there goes a soule and a body and of the formes of the foure elements is the forme of my body made and of their matter the matter of my bodie made now the elements are firstly there as making my body and secondly my body is in me as a part in me so a man is first consisting of body and soule and then is animall now this wisedome of God is wonderfull to consider how he makes things first of causes effects c and then ranketh them vnder a generall head And if we goe to the Creation we shall see them euidently first he made a first matter then the first formes and then mists that had their complements and did differ one from another then they might be compared together then they had names and were ranked vnder generall heads as a part to a whole c. and then they might be defined and their limits shewed how farre they reach for here our Author leads vs to see euery thing there and to see how it is there the reason of this distribution we shall see in euery thing whatsoeuer as in an inke-horne there must be the matter of it then it selfe and it must haue his adiuncts c. and then will it hold your inke then when it is this it is not a tree or a stone though it may be compared and be equall or vnequall like or vnlike so that first we see what is in it firstly then we may call it round deepe made of horne then range it vnder a head then lay it out in it limits and then giue testimony of it Primum quod est suae originis This definition doth somewhat stick in my teeth before it come out for it is a far fetched trope and onely one is suae originis namely God but he meanes this clamminesse or glue that is suae originis is first there the ortum is not as the son hath the nature of his father but is another thing then his father but first argumentum est quod affectum est ad arguendum then artificiale est affectum ex sese so primum is argumentum artificiale primitus so that we must look at the argument as it doth argue not as it is suae originis but quod originaliter arguit he meanes that is there first as we shall see by the nature of the thing as homo iustus here iustitia is firstly in homine as an adiunct for he must first haue that vertue before he can be denominated iustus then secondly it is in him as he is denominated from it so a chest is made of wood here is the cause and effect and this is firstly then from hence I may say a woodden chest and this is secondly arising from the first Quod est suae originis As if he should haue said that hath this affection to argue ex se primitus now then we may goe wonderfull deep if we will goe by these degrees what may we not see if we would make a breefe Argumentum est quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est artificiale ex se primum primitus The fallacians are many as they that thinke they are coniugates that are in name as he hath vertue ergo he is studiosus so homo dormit quia somnit here is nothing but causes and effects and so synonimies for coniugata are nomina so againe when orta are taken for prima or taught before aut contra so do the common Logicians in the predicables when they teach genus species differentia proprium accidens First see the orta containe the prima whence they arise symbolicè as it were in a cognizance Here we learne this we must first looke at the affection of an argument then we must be ex se then primitus now ortum containes the same nature that primum doth and some say the effect ariseth from the causes and the subiect and adiunct from the effect But doth the effect argue with the affection of causa it doth not or doth the subiect or adiunct argue with the affection of an effect No. Estque simplex aut comparatum We haue heard what the end of Logick is and all shoots at this marke to reason well that is that we may handle our reason well now that we may doe thus we must haue inuention first afterward iudgement Inuention teacheth vs to finde out simples Iudgement teacheth vs how to lay them together we may compare inuention or arguments to the hookes and nayles in a thing iudgement to the fastning of them together Now inuention beholds arguments Argumentum in Logick is a concrete as the Schools call it signifying the thing together with the affection that is in it to argue another thing as a Taylor is a Taylor quatenus he hath that affection in him to make a garment so that inuention intends immediately the affection and mediately the thing for ens quatenus ens is generall to ars quatenus ars but ens quatenus it is affected ad arguendum so it belongs to Logicke alone and thus we goe by degrees for the Lord doth not let vs see any thing immediately now the very name inuention tells vs what we must doe namely seeke out it tells vs the Lord hath hid things secret in nature and we must labour for the simples and so finde them now we seeke argumentum which we heard to be of two sorts artificiale or inartificiale artificiale is that which is in artificio rei whereas the inartificiale doth but cary to vs what other men haue seene by the artificialls and because none can testifie of a thing before he haue seen it himselfe ergo artificiale is before inartificiale and also because he that seeth inartificialiter can but testifie so farre forth as he sees the thing which is not at all ergo they that giue testimony of that thing whose artificiall arguments they haue not seene are
consentit cum re therefore this is cleerly in artificio rei and so is dissentaneum too that consentit hence we see consideration to bee generall betweene things and they are made so for else they would neuer make vp one whole as all creatures make vp the world for it is concordia discors and discordia concors that makes all things Now as there is consention in all things so also there is dissention for else all things should be one thus the Lord made all things to shew forth his wisedome and mightie power that all things should consent together and yet be many Consentaneum est absolute aut modo quodam For some things agree absolutely others but after a sort absolutum is absolutely required for the being of the thing the other is but complementall so that here hee tells vs if wee would see any thing first looke what is in artificio rei then looke what is primitus there then what is absolute then what is consentanie then what is simply required to the being of the thing Absolute that is so agreeing to the thing that if the one be not there the other will not be there et contra as if any one cause be wanting there will be no effect if there be a concurring of all the causes then an effect if no cause no effect et contra if an effect then all the causes if no effect no concurrence of causes so that this absolute agreement doth put a necessity of each others being now absolute and modo quodam are definitions of themselues for hee wanted words and therefore deliuered the definitum by the definitio so that to aske a definition of absolute or modo quodam is as if one should aske a definition of animal ratione Absolute vt causa et effectum The causes giue esse to the effect therefore without these esses the thing cannot existere ergo they are absolutely required In like sort in the existere of the effect you may see the concurrence of all the esses of all the causes therefore these are absolute consentanea Hence wee learne that all the causes must goe to the making vp of the effect And againe if any effect then there must be all the causes so then wee see how the ones being depends necessarily vpon the other vt causa et effectum therefore the cause must first be looked at as if I would looke at ens or any thing whatsoeuer therefore our author taking this course takes the very way of God in his creatures Can any man see any thing throughly and not see the causes first he cannot and is there any thing to bee seene in a thing before the causes there is not therefore that is alwayes first in nature and therefore first also in reason Now here are fallacians as to thinke an effect may be from some causes and to thinke the causes may bee remoued from the effect which is a common fallace Aristotles organon Tullies offices c. here is Aristotles and Tullies causality still though they bee dead Now we see how orderly we goe to worke if wee had not done so we could not haue come to causa all the arguing of them before as of artificiale primum absolutum consentaneum simplex are here in causa and effectum So that there are many claspes as it were as the cause is in artificio of the effect it is also there primitus and absolutè and consentanie and simpliciter so that this discent doth very much cleare truth we haue our flesh blood bones from causa then afterward we haue our complements from modo quodam consentanea then we may see we are not this or that See an imperfect garment at the Taylors and you may aske what it is but let the Taylor make it vp compleat with all its cuts and iagges then you may see it your selfe and need not aske what it is for further knowledge of it De efficiente procreante et conseruante CHAP. 3. Causa est cuius vi res est REmember the purpose of Logicke is to direct man to see the wisedome of God which that reason may doe well it acts doubly first by taking at simples then by laying them together that which we take with the first eye is argumentum that is any thing so farre as it hath the affection to argue first as it is in artificio rei which therefore is in an Art now it is firstly there or secondly first it is there absolutely by way of consention respecting the thing wherein it is or dissenting from the thing wherein it is not those that consent are absolutely consenting or modo quodam absolute as the causes and effect that proceeds from the causes here wee must begin because the first thing that commeth to mans reason is the cause so if wee take the world or any part thereof let vs resolue it and in the end wee shall come to the first causes a first efficient c. So God is the first cause of all things and himselfe without all causes ergo the cause is first of all things then the first matter is first in his kinde the first forme in his kinde and the first end in his kinde So Aristotle saith God is primum intelligibile so then if we will see the wisdome of God in the creatures we shal see the cause the beginner then againe Aristotle doth confesse that causa is primum motus Againe what is the initium of euery thing but his being and that is from the causes therefore they are first againe the next cause is the farthest thing we can goe vnto as if we worke any thing now if we take causes and looke into them then we make them effects not causes as if I looke at the causes of a garment I find the taylor to be the cause but if I looke at his causes I make him an effect yet I cannot make the first efficient an effect c. The Greekes call causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 peto because it is that which is first granted or required as the Geometricians require a petitum or as our author should say there can bee no demonstration of the first cause Est argumentum absolutè consentaneum c. causa est if a cause be absolutely required for the effect then there is a cause then againe Logicke serues vs to behold the wisedome of God and himselfe also through the creature now all things but God are made and are composed ergo they must haue causes est absolutè consentaneum because they are essentiall to the effect No shipwright no ship no wood no ship no forme no effect no end no effect and all these together an effect et contra Cuius vi res est First here he tells vs of a vis then he sayes it is vis essendi then vis essendi rei so that as there are foure words so foure things causa
is here a concrete signifying the thing causing as argumentum was before signifying the thing arguing for our Logicke that brings vs to the first cause doth but shew him as he argueth not as he is in his being causa is the thing arguing cuius that is est res causans cuius vi this vis and vertue is of the thing but Logicke looks at it as it is in the thing and then at the thing for if the thing had not vim esseficandi an effect it could not bee a cause as wood will not make a gowne so that it is here secondly required that the thing causans haue vim causandi and against this word is that common fallacian of non causa pro causa as he that will lay to the charge of a childe that which a man onely can doe so when wee ascribe to nature that it cannot doe as the making of a world which is peculiar to God est Est Esse is a generall terme and may signifie the essence of a thing or the tying of some thing to some thing that is not of the essence as first when I say vir est secondly vir est doctus where I doe not respect homo from his causes but as he hath this adiunct doctrina and the reason why est is so generall is because this esse is from the causes which are most generall for nothing can be sayd to bee this or that before it be which is from the causes by this vis wee must vnderstand that power and faculty in the thing that causeth another thing as if he should say the cause is affected to argue the effect forcibly for vis is here the sme that affectio is in argumentum Esse indeed is generall to all the causes and existere is from them all which appeares by this we say mundus est à Deo est ex nihilo est formata c. so that est is nothing but the act of the cause to make the effect so we shall see in a knife there are all the foure causes to be in it and the three former for the end and therefore if we will not be deceiued here see that whatsoeuer is de esse of a thing that is a cause res not effectum for we haue heard what res est that is the subiect of Art but if we had sayd effectum it had bene à posteriore for we haue not the effect wrought Againe wee are but yet in causa in generall by res he meanes res efficienda not yet effecta Now another fallacie is of non causa pro causa when we take that to be the cause which hath the potentia efficiendi but doth not efficere but is causa quatenus it hath an hand in that effect so that if one bring a cause that is not a cause though it haue vim efficiendi yet is it not causa Itaque primus hic locus fons est omnis scientia This is a deduction out of the first rule following this if the thing be causae vi then this is primus locus inuentionis for it is first in the cause before it bee in the effect then againe it is primus locus in respect it is the first argument we must looke at Locus here Ramus tells vs closely that the Aristotelians to picke places are these arguments the first whereof is causa Fons We know the fountaine is the first place where waters spring so all things spring from the causes yea subiects adiuncts c. Fons scientiae For if we know the causes then we know the effects because they arise from them and subiects c. and againe that is the principall part of knowledge Scirique demum creditur c. For till we know the causes we know but the outside of a thing and that which may bee remoued from the thing without destroying the thing but knowing the causes of a thing we know it as it is the things being arising from the causes and thus knowing the thing wee know it intus and in cute Here Ramus doth commorari telling vs what Aristotle meant by these words And againe too tells vs that Aristotles demonstration is nothing but the scientia of an axiome consisting of causa and effectum and he teacheth it to euery cause in generall efficient matter forme and end Now Aristotle saith that a demonstration concludes the propertie of a subiect by the definition because that layes forth the essence of a thing but it doth not tell vs all the esse ergo not all the scientia for the esses of the efficient and end doe not goe into a definition Vt merito dicatur a Poeta c. Here he prefers the Poets authoritie before Aristotle for Aristotle being more imployed in this doctrine might speake of it as a priuate man but the Poet as a publike man foelix meaning a contemplatiue happinesse not a practicke Causa est efficiens materia aut forma finis Euery cause yeelds an esse but al together make the effect now it is of two sorts efficiens materia aut forma finis for he cannot giue it to vs in two words but makes a distinct axiome and couples the parts with a coniunction copulatiue by reason whereof they haue a communitie but where lyes it this it is I may call the two first potentiall causes the other two acting causes this the Schooles tells vs when they call materia potentia and the forme actus and this is Ramus meaning as wee shall see in many examples as when a Taylor sets buttons on a doublet with thread they are not done till all the causes are there so a house is not an house so soone as it hath an efficient and matter but when it hath also a forme and end Now our author would not vse potentia and actus first because they are barbarous words secondly they are improper because they cannot be called potentia and actus but potentiating and acting then againe the forme and end are potentia as well as efficiens and materia contra therefore he makes two couple of causes for so we see the efficient is the first mouer mouing quite through with the matter singly and the forme and end moue them inseparably together therefore they are thus distinguished efficiens est motus à quo in a line the matter ex qua and forme per quem finis ad quem but because there is a scope at matter therefore there is a distinction For as the efficient and end terminate the thing so the forme and matter mediate the thing running quite through the same So God made a matter and gaue it a forme and so an end ergo reason must see them thus The same order there is also in Gods prouidence so man also doth imitate God when he doth any thing orderly the first care is for a workman then a matter then a forme and then an end though we may haue cloth before
a taylor yet it is not a matter till it beginne with the Taylor to bring an effect to passe So then the efficient is in nature before the matter and the matter before the forme for the forme is an adiunct to the matter and the forme before the end the end being an adiunct to the forme and again a thing must be formed before it can haue an end The first efficient had the first matter and formes effect to him the second formes are adiuncts to the matter Now the first efficient is absolutely first for it hath nothing before it the first matter is not res prima nor causa prima but first for matter ergo it is from the first efficient onely ergo neuer hath any existency in the world but is ens incompletum so the first forme is from the first efficient not of the first matter but onely in it ergo it is ens also incompletum hence our soules are not our formes for then our formes should be res incompletae Now the end is last and the first end is the last end it is first because it is most generall last because it is not made for another end ergo it followeth of necessity that the last end is not made so that the end as it is last as the thing is acted so it is first as it is most generall for all the the former causes worke to effect the end As we say in Schooles finis est primus in intentione posterius in executione so God made all things for his glorie here his glory is first in intention of him that workes by counsell but is acted last of all by all things that he made And here Aristotles bonum quo communius eo melius is true of the last end of all things which is God for he is as we may say finis communissimus ergo optimus Efficiens est causa à qua res est We haue heard of causa and of his kinds and that they are disioyned by which meanes there is made two couple of causes the two first working ioyntly euen is the other doe Efficiens materia here is a second distribution and here the efficient is first for it is first cuius vi res est againe by the rule of method it is first in nature because it giueth light to that which followeth and that the efficient moues first we see it in euery thing he layes hold on the matter which in respect of the efficient is moued and by a naturall appetite moues and runnes to make an effect of it selfe and doth effect the effect as well as the efficient and that from the naturall appetite it hath to the effect but the mouer or efficient is before the thing moued and before the effect also Efficiens Efficiens quasi exfaciens mouing quite through for besides his first mouing as being the first cause hee moueth also together with the matter forme and end and his working with the rest is the cause of his name Est Euery cause is required to the effect efficiens est causa ergo againe first there must needs be a mouer to moue the matter before there can be a table wrought this appeares plainly by the creation of the world and because euery thing is an effect therefore the efficient is the first cause for take any thing and you shall see the vis of the efficient to runne quite through the same so looke into the world and euery part therof and you shall see Gods finger in euery thing without which they could not be so that efficiens est causa and because an effect cannot be without its esse ergo it is of the esse of it à qua from whom it is as if hee should say it is terminus à quo c. so as the world began with God so in euery thing in nature the beginning of motion is first from the next cause so that efficiens est causa à qua telling vs that this is the first being the effect hath Res. Here res is generall as before to all the arts and it is the subiect of the generall Arts. Ramus doth not here breake the rule of method not defining what res is Againe if he had said à qua est we should haue had reference to res againe if he had named effectum it had beene à posteriore not hauing learned what effectum est Res est this is generall to euery cause ergo it is taught in the definition of causa in generall but that he may not be so obscure hee borroweth some thing that went before for else the perfect definition had beene efficiens est à qua Now this teacheth vs to looke first at the efficient in euery thing for Logick tells vs not onely of an esse in generall but of foure seuerall esses from which existere doth arise as efficiens est causa à qua materia ex qua forma per quam finis cuius gratia why doth he not say causa est cuius vires sit because something may be a cause and yet is not but if it doe causare then it is a cause So if I say I will doe a thing and yet doe it not yet am I an efficient for est doth here commend to vs the adsignification of time but the essence that so soone as it beginneth to moue so soone it is an efficient though the effect be not till the matter forme and end be there Cuius et si vera genera c. Here Ramus doth commorari telling vs that those many species which the Aristoteliās make are not species but modi efficientis because more of them may bee in one and the same efficient as one man may be causa procreans and conseruans sola and cum aliis per se per accidens because they may bee in the same efficient Euen as actio and passio doe not distinguish the thing but are diuers modi of the same thing Here Ramus will finde no species of efficiens neither are there any of the other three for the matter that is lowest ergo it hath nothing vnder it but examples and so is the efficient ergo he needed not say Cuius etsi vera genera c. for how could that appeare to him that is not wee know the effect is single ergo as the single matter forme and end make that so the thing efficient makes it neither hath it any species Vbertas tamen per magna c. There is great and plentifull vse of the efficient and as it is first of all so is it most generall of all for matter cannot be a matter till the efficient moue it and so of all other arguments now these make cause the efficient to be commended or discommended and according to these modi is the effect more or lesse argued as if a childe kill his father it is parricide so if it be a good thing that is wrought by one alone
doe it with my nature not from it So in a clocke the leade goes downe by a rule in nature because it is heauy and that pulls the rope and the rope pulles the wheeles c. all these moue with their natures though not from them Ventorum naturalis efficientia est In this example Vna Eurusque Notusque ruunt creberque procellis Affricus vastos tollunt ad littora fluctus Here these three Eurus Notus and Affricus are naturall causes of tempests on the Seas they are also causae cum alijs and each of them is as principall as the other Consilii exemplum est illa Ciceronis de se confessio Suscepto bello Caesar gesto etiam magna ex parte c. those things that fall vnder Logicke them doth hee define as causa per se he defines to be quae sua facultate efficit but if he should define what nature and counsell are he should run into naturall and morall Philosophie for counsell belongs to Pollicy yet for the modus of it in working an effect it belongs to Logicke for a man may take counsell of himselfe without counsellers as Kings haue Suscepto bello Caesar c. iudicio meo ac voluntate in these words lies the modus which hee proues à disparatis nulla vi coactus c. Fallaces here are very common as when we take that for causa per se which is causa per accidens contra Now the reason why hee giues these modi to the efficient and not to the effect is because they are modi mouendi and doe not belong to the thing moued Per accidens efficit causa quae externa facultate efficit vt in his quae fiunt necessitate vel fortuna Causa per accidens is that which worketh an effect but non sua facultate but is moued by some other thing and yet notwithstanding it workes after a sort sua facultate but not sua facultate if wee respect the effect as fire drieth a cloth by remouing the moysture and so leaues the cloth dry which drought is in the cloth Vt in his quae fiunt necessitate vel fortuna Necessitate cum efficiens vi cogitur ad effectum Here wee see a necessitie in inuention which is all one with coaction By fortuna we are to vnderstand the speciall prouidence of God or ignorance of the next cause for ignorance of the prouidence of God in all things and of the next cause hath caused that men say what fortune had I when they are crossed in play or such like Now necessity answereth to nature cum efficiens cogitur so that this necessity here is a coaction and yet is it efficiens though vi cogitur cogitur when as the worke of it per se is rather of some other thing now the same thing in one respect may be causa per se and in another respect causa per accidens for they are but modi vi externa ad effectum so that it doth it not natura or consilio Obiection Why saith hee effectum rather then res Answer All comes to one for he meanes res neither doth he define effectum here Here he meanes violence not that vis in causa this vis doth not worke the effect but workes vpon the cause and is that facultas whereof he spake before Qualis est Pompeianorum excusatio At mihi quidem ait Orator si proprium verum nomen c. Before he said hee was causa consilio of going with Pompey against Caesar he saith he was compelled fatali necessitate and hither belongs fatum Schooles Fortuna est causa per accidens quando praeter c. Our author before did tell vs of fortuna in the ablatiue case here he puts it in the nominatiue because fortune is a principall cause of that effect that another doth per accidens the arguing we ascribe it to fortune and say fortune did it so that our author would haue vs consider first that it was fortune did it secondly that it takes away the title of doing it from him that did it Per accidens That is working externa facultate now whereas hee saith he doth it per accidens he meanes fortune as it is commonly taken when wee make her blind not seeing what she doth for hence it doth arise when we doe not a thing by counsell but hab nab as they say that causeth vs to make fortune blinde Quando aliquid accidit That is happeneth for here it is principall the improuidence as it were he neither sees himselfe a cause neither doth he see who is the cause and therefore he saith accidit not efficit for hee saith I did it not so againe aske him who did it and he will say know not so that accidere is the speciall efficere of this modus Praeter scopum efficientis Fortune may seeme to be opposed to counsell which euermore hath a scope whereat it leuels now when any thing happeneth praeter scopum it is fortuna wee say Now things in nature may haue a scope which is beyond their nature and then it is fortuna so that praeter scopum is as much as if he should haue said praeter scopum fortunae if it bee causa fortuna or praeter scopum naturae if it be causa natura Sic Pheraeo Iasoni profuit hostis c. here his enemie going about to kill him healed him In hoc genere causarum imprudentia connumerari solet Imprudentia is one modus of fortune as here Cur aliquid vidi cur noxia lumina feci Cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi est c. I vnawares haue seene that which hath done me harm Then Ouid was causa per accidens of working that effect he should not So Acteon was causa inscius of seeing Diana washing her selfe and here Ouid reasons a simile as Acteon was torne in peices of his dogs for seeing Diana vnawares so am I banished for seeing that I would Scilicet insuperis etiam fortuna luenda est c. He meanes Augustus So if a man goe forth and a tile fall from an house and breake his head this is causa fortuna it is natura as it brake his head being harder then his head and fortuna as it hit him and consilio it breakes his head if it be flung for it hath a scope true it is nothing but counsell hath his end in its intendment yet there is no cause but hath his end of the effect it worketh Hinc sumitur deprecatio c. For our author said before accidit therefore wee are causes ergo it ought to be pardoned deprecatio is from this manner of working fortuna so they will say hee is a proper man but hath no lucke Fortunae autem nomen ignorantia causarum confinxit c. Here Ramus doth commorari in the name lest he should be mistaken it is an vnchristian word it is ignorance not onely as it is opposed to counsell but as it is vnknowne
to the thing that worketh by fortune Many other modi there are among other Logicians all which may be brought hither as causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is either causa necessitate or efficiens in genere and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is causa per se if hee shall say anger did it then there is a trope in it as when I say he writes I meane his pen writes if I say he writes with his pen then I make him causa cum alijs if I say he writes he is efficiens Now for the order of causes one efficient may be cause of another efficient c. and so causa causae be causa causati but this will faile as when I looke at a childe and commend him from his granfather not respecting the meane causes there is not causa causae but causa causati So when I say he came of Scipio c. Hactenus de efficiente and this we must alwayes looke at first in artificio rei moreouer obserue here in euery thing the manner of working for so God is said to doe some thing necessitate as when we say he doth that he would not though hee would it in an other sense and fortuna as mans fall was praeter scopum Legis CHAP. 6. De materia Materia est causa ex qua res est WE haue heard of the efficient cause and his manner of mouing in that worke of his now these are essentiall to Logick because in the very manner there lyeth the force of the argument and whatsoeuer hath reason belongeth to Logicke many distinctions there are among the Logicians all which may be brought to these that of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they say is that efficient cause that worketh internally the Physitians call it causa euidens and meate and drinke is causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a disease 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is that cause that worketh externally the Physitians call it causa continens but here is no distinction of cause neither haue these quatenus causae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any force to argue the effect but onely quatenus efficiens whereas we heare in euery speciall modus of Ramus that they did presse the effect strongly as Didst thou kill thy father or didst thou it alone c. so also in causa per se and per accidens there is great difference in arguing a conclusion if he did it natura there is no rebuking of that for it was from his nature if he sinned by counsell the punishment is so much the greater if he did it well consilio he deserues the more praise Fortuna indeed is such a cause as it is not a cause by Ramus definition for fortune is but Gods prouidence vnknowne now if there be any other respect of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it will fall to the same with causa cum aliis Now we come to materia that as we haue heard had a community with the efficient which community was to moue with it a great while before the forme and end come so soone as the efficient moues presently the matter moues but the forme and end moue not a good while after Now because this difference which causeth the distribution of causa appeares in greater things ergo it is also in lesse things but our Logicke tells vs that the efficient must goe before the matter and how agreeable doth our Logick goe to Gods worke in the creatures if we shall take a thing and resolue it into his causes and make them effects and looke at their causes for so when we looke at their causes we make them effects so that absurd is that definition of causa to be either going before or concomitans to the effect at last we shall come to a first efficient that hath nihil prius to him ergo he was not made ergo he euer was ergo all other things once were not for they were made ergo they now being were from the first ergo the first matter was not eternall as Aristotle dreamed but indeed hee would crosse Plato in what he could yet one may confute him by his owne rules for he grants there is a primus motor ergo he is mouens but not moued for then hee should haue some thing to moue him and so not be first ergo it is easie to make Aristotle beleeue he is immoueable because he is first ergo he must moue others only for he is infinite ergo without limits of place ergo in euery place ergo nusquam inclusus or exclusus ergo vnmoueable Now the first matter is first in his kinde namely the first matter but not the first thing and we may conclude from this that the first efficient was before the first matter for if both were first neither were first for if the one should say he were first the other would say nay I am as forward as thee and so there would be none absolutely first and againe one is before two ergo he that is absolutely first can be but one Materia For his name as efficiens was extrafaciens mouing all the rest and not moued of them but as it were pater so materia is quasi mater out of which the thing springs as out of a mother so that we may see the name to be giuen à simili but yet with very good reason as the childe is not à patre but of the mother so the effect is from the efficient but springs out of the matter Now that there is such a matter thus it may appeare there is nothing composed but its essence and it selfe are distinct for to make essentia and ens to be the same is peculiar to God Againe whatsoeuer is finite that may be limited in his essence now God onely is infinite and euery other thing finite ergo may be defined ergo it selfe and its essence are distinct ergo it must haue a matter Againe if euery thing haue not essence as they speake of Angels why are not they finite ergo they may be defined ergo their essence and themselues are distinct againe if they haue not a matter what haue they nothing but an efficient and an end then they should be imperfect and be either the first matter or the first forme againe if they haue a forme and no matter then this forme must be another thing from them and how is that possible for if the forme and they be all one then the cause and effect will be the same But Logicke is a generall Art and because euery thing hath a matter ergo materia belongs hither and the first matter had not a matter for then it should not haue beene first but was incomplete Materia est For it giues esse and as the force of the efficient was requisite for the esseficating of the thing so the matter much more for not onely its esse but its nature and selfe
couches in the effect and makes a bulke and if the vis of the efficient were essentiall because there could be no essefication of the effect without it much more must the matter bee essentiall for if we take away the matter we take away both the force and the thing it selfe Now we must vnderstand that ens and non ens are the subiect of Logicke and as argumentum was concretum and also causa so when I say materia I meane a thing that was made of a matter Ex qua That is out of which it is raised it is the mother of euery thing as we often speake of the earth because euery thing indeed is made of the foure elements but more especially nourished of the earth Now the matter doth not onely by his vertue cause the effect but is interessed in it and the effect riseth out of it as if it were a childe springing out of the mother onely it goes further in that its essence goes to the making vp of the effect now though the essence be from matter and forme yet the ens it selfe is from all the causes Res est That effect as we shall heare hereafter for in this doctrine of causa effectum is the aliquid which we must call res till we come to it Est Euery cause giues an esse to the effect and this esse is the bulke of it and from whence ariseth the greatnesse or littlenesse of the effect by the forme now it is a great question in Schooles whether the matter doth any thing indeed in respect of the efficient it is patiens but in respect of the effect it doth causare and so doth agere For if it be an effect in respect of euery cause then euery cause is after a sort the efficient of that effect and if you aske me what his action is I answer it doth materiare or substantiare the effect as the efficient did efficere the effect it is also passiue in regard of the forme but both together co-worke to make the effect though forma be principium motus in the thing by the matter Now this is the next thing to be inquired after we see who made it then whereof it was made both which we see in euery thing see them as they are done Now the common Logicians bring in distinctions of Materia As Kickerman saith it is proxima or remota but he may say so of euery argument as well as of materia he saith man is made of the first matter then of the elements which are more remote but ex semine that is nearer alas we doe not here consider priority or posteriority neither doe these any more presse the effect here is no Logick still but materia est causa ex qua ergo this will not fall in Logick and if you marke it presently when he comes to materia prima and to the elements he is in naturall Philosophy ergo here is no distinction of materia in Logick but of the particular thing that belongs to a particular Art Hoc argumento ficto apud Ouid. 2. Metam Solis domus auro pyropo ebore argento componitur Regia Solis erat sublimibus alta columnis Clara micante auro flammasque imitante pyropo c. Here Ramus brings an example out of Ouid which is a common Schoole booke and here a fained cause argues a fained effect ens and non ens are the subiect of Logicke but non ens gratia entis for so Logicke lookes at them first and giues entity to ens fictum and therefore Grammar and Rhetoricke must follow it for they are attendants on it The Regia Solis is here distributed into his parts and they are argued by their matter it had his pillars of gold for their matter and pyropus another matter of the columnes the couering or seeling of Iuory the leaues of the doores made of siluer Obserue how these causae cum aliis in the matter doe not force the effect any thing at all ergo he doth not teach them here for whether they be made of one matter or of more matters all is one ergo there is no Logicke in that ergo it doth not belong to Logicke Caesar 1. belli ciuilis Imperat militibus Caesar vt c. Here milites are the efficient causes of the ships then he distributes the ship into his parts keeles ribs Carinae primùm and statumina ex leui materia the rest was viminibus contextum lined within with leather so that here is distributio integriin membra and euery part is argued by the materiall cause CHAP. 7. Causae primum genus est in efficiente materia secundum sequitur WEE haue heard of the efficient and of the matter and this is the conclusion of it now we come to the second which is in forma fine so that whilest he saith Causae primum genus eiusmodi est c. he tells me it was a distribution before where the genus is subsistent in speciebus efficientis materiae for so genus is totum partibus essentiale and is neuer but in speciebus so that the genus of them is comprehended in the doctrine of them two parts Secundum sequitur in forma fine he doth not say Secundus est forma fine now as the efficient and matter were combined together as mouing together a while without the forme and end so the forme and end though the forme be before yet the end comes presently after and is as it were the pedissequa to the forme and indeed where we cannot finde the forme of a thing wee put the end as being next to it and best expressing it So bene disserere the end of Logicke is put for the forme of Logicke now as this distinction of the motion of the causes is seene in greater matters so is it also in lesse for there is a cooperation of the efficient and end together first then of the forme and end together also though not without the efficient and matter In forma fine for the forme is before the finall cause for before the forme be induced or ingenerated in the matter it cannot be good for his end and the end is causa in respect of the effect not of the efficient So we say a coat hath a forme before it haue an end for it may be a coat and yet not fit to serue me now then as the efficient began the motion and the motion redounded out of the matter so it runs per formam finem Forma est causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same that forma is in Latine there is but a transposition of the letters and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the face and fas and facies in Latine comes of facio because when it is made it hath the face of a thing so a thing when it hath its forme it hath a face it will seeme something so that the efficients esse is not facies res
predominant in the mist so much more the neerer you shall come to see the forme ingenerated if wee speake of the formes of the elements they were extrinsice and were ingenerated in the matter againe if we shall speake of the soule of man this is extrinsice infused but the formes of other things are within and are educed out of the matter but there is nothing new in this for the matter is so too Ingeneratur True thus farre as the forme is not made but by composition of the elements when the formes are not made but in nature there is that misture or in Art that composition that there is a new forme as in a stone by the misture is made one forme arising from the formes of the foure elements by their action and passion So in artificiall things the forme is a compound forme made of the formes of the parts and because that thing is now that which it was not ergo this forme must needs be that now which it was not ergo ingeneratum and the whole worke of the efficient whilst he doth dolare or hew a thing is nothing but his preparing of it together with the rest of the matter to make a new thing Forma is diuersly ingenerated if it be by composition then it is composed if it be of simples then it is made by shauing or cutting it Now whilst he saith simul at once it may seem by this that the forme and effect are together he meanes not together in nature for the forme must bee before the effect because it constitutes the effect and the constituter is before the thing constituted therefore how are they simul he meanes forma simul ingenerat thus I suppose two goe together yet one of them goeth before the other here is a priority and simul too he that is before goeth first the other followeth yet both moue together and as two hands laid together doe moue together and yet one before the other so is it with the formall cause and effect the formall cause moues and the effect also but the effect followes it in euery step and the finall cause followes the forme as the shadow followes the body and the effect comes last againe this is a property ergo an adiunct ergo is after the subiect for the forme is an effect before it be a subiect so that the efficient doth as it were make the forme and the effect still followes as we may see in artificiall things so that so farre forth as the forme is ingenerated so far forth the effect is accomplished Anima rationalis est forma hominis c. Here our author doth commorari and stay vpon the doctrine of forma for it is so deepe and subtill as that it can hardly bee perceiued This example is not true because anima rationalis may subsist from the bodie now as there can be no matter without a forme so there can bee no forme without a matter therefore this example will not serue his turne yet he brings that hee could get many in Schooles haue stumbled at this and haue gone about to mend it but indeed they haue marred it Some say ratio belongs to Angels ergo it is not the proper forme of homo and therefore they haue added mortale and say homo is animal rationale mortale Now if they ioyne mortale to ratio it is not mortalis Againe animal ratione mortale doth detract from man vnlesse we speake of his bodie Et distinguitur a caeteris omnibus naturis That is not so for the Angels though they bee animae and so haue not animam rationalem yet they haue rationem againe doth not the body of man distinguish him from other things so I suppose we admit of the Pythagorians metam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A mans soule in a bird will not make it a man Geometricarum figurarum in triangulis quadrangulis sua forma est He brings such examples as hee could finde and those whereof greatest question might be made it hath beene a question among Logicians that this forma is peculiar to substances not accidents and hence haue made a distincti of forma to be substantialis or accidentalis but they are deceiued for Logicke is a generall Art and euery thing that is made hath causes ergo may be defined ergo hath matter and forme for otherwise wee could not haue a perfect definition in Grammar Rhetoricke and Arithmeticke or in any other Arts that haue accidents for their subiects ergo accidents behold a forme as well as an efficient ergo he saith in Geometry take a triangle it consists of three lines with three angles which by their vnition in their angles make vp one forme as well as one matter Phisicarum rerum coeli terrae arborum piscium sua forma est He doth commorari here long for two causes first in respect the forme is deepe and needes illustration Secondly to confute other Logicians that say accidents haue no formes vnde praecipua rerum vt natura est c. if it be causa per quam res est id quod est then it is praecipua rerum natura Nature properly is res nata that is that springeth principijs that is matter and forme so that the whole nature consisteth of them and this is the proper signification of it afterward it comes to signifie the principia themselues hence is materia and forma called naturae so that in naturall Philosophy when you read of nature they tell you commonly some tale of materia or forma then againe by a metonimie of the adiunct for the subiect it signifieth the qualities naturall in things all this shewes forma to be praecipua rei natura Praecipua first because it makes the thing to be id quod est so doth not the matter againe forma why it is principium actus from whence the qualities principally arise for as the Philosophers teach though not truly in euery point materia is principium passionis forma actionis and actio is better then passio ergo the forme more excellent then the matter but both matter and forme doe agere for they are causae yet the formes begin and the matter is but the sustentation of it and the formes act is the stronger by the matter not onely as it acts internally but when it acts vpon externall things by resistance by the way Now as it hath chiefe interest in esseficating the effect so it is praecipua rei natura so also there is of it praecipua rei explicatio si possit inueniri Si possit inueniri He saith it neither can be found out nor that it cannot be found out Si possit inueniri sure it is findable I proue it thus it is lyable to Logicke if it be obiected to the eye then the eye may see it it may but hardly be found because it doth not descry it selfe to the outward senses by qualities as bodies doe againe the forme in nature is so subtill
that we can hardly finde it but see as it were the shadow of it ergo diuers haue thought the formes of things to be diuine Some haue gone so farre as to thinke them to be influences but subtile it is indeed and harder to finde out then either the efficient or matter ergo wee commonly call that the matter which containes the forme too because it is rather seene as it hath a materiall cause then as it hath a formall Vt in artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit That is the reason why he that makes natures is more cunning then any man can trace his wisedome as wee may see in the elements ergo no man can make a thing in nature man may further nature but he cannot make any thing againe the parts are so fine in the mixture of things as it is beyond the acies of mans eye to see them In artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit Why because artificiall things are the workes of men one man may trace another though euery man cannot Caesar 7. Muri autem omnes Gallici c. As for example in artificiall things this very description will declare how hard a thing it is to finde out the forme but we vse to point at it by the matter and by the position of it There stood great beames all along two foot asunder put into the earth and the distances betweene them were stuffed with great stones when these were so fastned then there was a new order begun where they layd the beams against those stones that were laid before and filled likewise the distances with stones which were against the first lay of beams but what hath he told vs now why sayth he I am a Frenchman and I will tell you the forme of a French wall where if you doe but looke at the formes of euery part and of them you shall see a composed forme so that the Logician doth not looke at the outward face of a thing but at the inward essence here he is faine to deliver the forme by many other arguments and indeed it is a description of forma Est in secessu longo locus insula portum c. Here he hath by the position of the parts of the hauen told vs the forme of it CAPVT 8. De fine Finis est causa cuius gratia res est WE haue gone through the esse of a thing we haue but heard of three when the fourth comes that makes vp the perfection of the thing namely finis Finis for the name it is borrowed from Geometry for that that is terminus there is here called finis and it is brought hither to signifie that finall cause that serueth to make vp the effect so that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if we keepe the proportion of the esses but it is not the last part and member thereof as they make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the last member of some whole as Method is the last member of Logicke Finis is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the esse of a thing not of the members of it Now it is called finis because it limits the thing for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and for his essence and it is the last thing that limits it ergo it is called finis Est causa Because with force thereof the thing is and the end though it doe not enter into the essence of the effect by it owne essence yet by it vertue it doth efficere as doth the efficient Cuius gratia Therefore the finall cause is that that graceth the effect and thence hath the thing his commendation cuius gratia for whose grace for gratia here signifieth not onely for whose sake but for whose grace as if the finall cause were that which doth grace the effect and so indeed it doth For as bonum quo communius eo melius so communior finis hath more grace then finis specialior for that cause that which is next the chiefest end is more noble and excellent then that which is more remote Hence man is more excellent then any other creature because he is made immediately for God So then the end graceth it euermore and the more excellent the end is the more excellent is that effect This then is the esse that the finall cause doth giue to the effect namely that which is good for that effect so that the goodnesse of a thing is that vis in the effect that it hath from the end As in a knife the efficient may be a slaue the matter likewise naught the form though that be something yet were it not for the end neither the efficient matter or forme would moue ergo the finall cause is said to be the happines of the thing so that a thing is not to be accounted happy till it be seruiceable to that end for which it was made A garment well made as touching the skill of the efficient and of good stuffe for the matter and fit for a garment so of a good forme yet not fitting him for whom it was made it wanteth his end or happinesse and so is not perfect Againe this shewes the difference betweene the formall cause and the end for the forme may be as we see and not the end Againe wee know there are many things that haue not their perfection but growth and yet haue all the causes yet notwithstanding the end presently followes after the forme so man was made by God here God is the efficient earth the mat er reason the forme yet here is not his end namely fitnesse to serue God And thus we haue heard the doctrine of the causes which are the foundations whereon the effect is builded Physicis rebus finis homo propositus est homini Deus Of naturall things man is the end the grace of man is God and God makes him good not as an efficient but as an end Omnium artium est aliquod summum bonum finis extremus That is that end which they reach vnto but that is not the summum bonum of all things for Logicks end is bene disserere Grammars bene loqui c. these are the furthest ends of Logicke and Grammar but not the furthest end of all they are indeed the proper end of them but not the summum bonum so that he meanes by summum bonum the outmost or farthest end of them and the end of Logick lies in the precepts of it as they act bene disserere This is the difference betweene the end and the effect A house is made to dwell in though it neuer be dwelt in so for a garment to be worne is one thing and to be fit to weare another So if I goe forth to speake with one and he be gone yet I obtaine my end they commonly say he was frustrate of his end but not frustrate of finis quatenus finis but quatenus effectum Iuno primo Aeneidos connubii finem assumit cum Aeolo Deiopeiam pollicetur solatii
scilicet prolisque gratia Sunt mihi bis septem praestanti corpore Nymphae c. Here Iuno perswades Eolus to let his winde out and she would giue him one of her Nymphes which she presseth vpon him by finall causes first that she may spend all her yeares with him and secondly that shee may make him the father of a faire off-spring In defensione Ligarii Cicero Tuberonem accusatorem vrget c. Et certe ait contra ipsum Caesarem est congressus armatus c. As if he should say Tubero thou hadst thy sword drawne at the battle of Pharsalio thou didst strike his side marke the variety of the phrases and so of the ends What meant thy sword what was thy minde here was the propositum What meantst thou to haue done euen to haue killed Caesar So that the finall cause is not accidentall to the thing but euen substantiall and therefore we haue it so often in the definition of Arts vsed for the forme and that for this reason because it is the next argument to it and presupposeth the forme so that this is the vse of the finall cause in the definition of Arts. As Dialectica est ars bene disserendi here bene disserere is the end and it is as if he should say Dialectica hath such a soule as that it is able to performe and execute this or that thing for which it was made So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of all Arts I but what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in generall why 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the effect of all Arts Answer But as euery thing is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of it ergo if a man will doe any Logicum opus he must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and thus wee haue heard the doctrine of the causes CAP. 9. De effectis Effectum est quod è causis existit siue igitur gignatur siue c. NOw we come to see a thing made vp it is worth the consideration to see now we begin at the farthest thing and at the first There are foure esses distinct which we must looke at distinctly and orderly if we will see things aright First the efficients then the matters c. now then let vs see effectum Effectum for the name it seemes to be nominated onely from the efficient for it comes of efficior which comes of efficio whence efficiens comes and howbeit it might be denominated materiatum formatum or finitum yet he rather names it of the efficient but we are to vnderstand that it hath reference to all the causes euen materiatum formatum finitum Obiect Why should there not be as many seuerall kinds of effects as there are of causes Answer Because no one cause alone can make an effect for it is existent from them all the causes are distinct in nature and their forces are their owne ergo their doctrine must be distinct but because effectum must he made of the composition of the foure esses ergo it can be but one so that I cannot say effectū efficientis effectū materiae effectum formae or effectū finis ergo we must see effectū alone in one lump as it is in nature Now because it hath al the esses of the causes ergo good reason that the efficient that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and worketh generally quite through with euery other cause matter forme and end should haue the effect denominated from it so that this child brought forth by the foure causes is denominated from the efficient Est All things are effects but God alone ergo effectum est therefore whereas all things are made lyable to our eye of reason it is requisite that as we see the causes that make vp the thing so the effect which is a quinta essentia arising from them Quod. He meanes argumentum absolute consentaneum now wee see plainly how the causes are absolutely agreeing to the effect but how is the effect absolutely agreeing to them yes for if the effect be from them it will vouchsafe to acknowledge it selfe to be from them and we see in nature that if an effect be then all the causes are contra again that we may see it plainly if we take away the efficient the effect will be imperfect so put the effect and we put the matter and forme substantially and the esses of the other so take away the effect and you take away them Now if the efficient be rotten yet it is an effect as this Logicke is Ramus his effect though he be dead and rotten for here we respect not time but the esse Againe he puts efficiens generally à qua materia ex qua forma per quam finis cuius gratia and here effectum quod the reason why he vsed quod so often is because he would tell vs that Logick is generall to euery thing Existit Esse is of any one cause existere is a compound of them all not that existere hath respect of time and place as some teach true it is time and place attend euery thing when it doth existere but they are not of the esse of the thing but are onely complementall est is à qualibet existere ex omnibus subsistere ex modo quodam consentaneis Existere comes of ex and sto now it doth stand vpon its feet and doth estare out from all the causes being a fift thing from them E causis Here è is as much as à ex per and gratia è causis that is ab efficiente ex materi performā gratia finis Causis not causa and therefore it is that all foure causes must absolutely concurre or else the thing cannot existere as the first matter did not ergo if Angels doe existere they must haue all the causes so the soules of men after they bee out of the body they cannot per se existere without they haue all the causes for if any one cause bee wanting they will bee incomplete Siue igitur gignatur siue corrumpatur Ramus doth here commorari vpon this doctrine of effectum because the common Aristotelians referre the doctrine of motus not to Logicke but to naturall Philosophie but Ramus teacheth it here in Logicke in the doctrine of effectum siue igitur gignatur siue corrumpatur c. whether it be made or corrupted siue modo quodam moueatur quidlibet that is whether it be augmented or diminished c. generatio and corruptio are substantiall motus augmentatio and diminutio quantitatis alteratio and loci mutatio qualitatis and all these are effects then againe whereas the Aristotelians teach that distruens causa is not causa Ramus teacheth that it is for whether a man doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the same rule he doth both ergo both of them are motus of his act to the opus ergo causa
distruens is a motus and a cause as well as opus destructum is an effect and priuations though they bee priuations in respect of their habits yet they are effects in respect of their causes ergo they are causes both alike they teach as if a man had done nothing when he did sinne whereas he spoyles the Image of God in him ergo whilst they are more nise then wise they become foolish If the Lord should bring to nothing that which he hath done it would bee his effect at least the corruption of nothing Now the effect is double motus res motu facta euery thing is made motu God onely is sine motu and doth not moue when he workes for els he should not be primus mouens but motus but if we resolue all things it must needs bring vs in the end to that which is immoueable for so Aristotle found out most things by motus now againe there are those that seuer motus and res motu facta as the Aristotelians which makes Ramus to commorari they say somethings rest motu only without a res motu facta but that is not so for there is nothing that God hath made which doth mouere but there is a res motu facta of that motus they conceit that some Arts motion hath no opus post se relictum as when one playes on the Virginalls they say there is nothing left behind Answer what care I for that Logicke lookes not to that but as there is playing so there is something playd which is res motu facta and as there is writing so there is something written These namely motus and res motu facta are neuer distinct asunder one without another but onely in that the one is not the other Huius loci sunt laudes vituperationes As if Ramus should say if you would commend a thing indeed let it be from the effect wee may commend one from his faire building but that is beggerly as Tully saith or a woman for her beauty but this is childish for the true commendation is from the effect so man is here to be dispraysed from his sinne so the Lord is to be praysed from his effects Quarum pleni sunt libri sacri prophani Why in Scripture because Diuinity stands in action not in Theorie and therefore we haue them so often commended that haue done well contra Aenei 6. facta variorum populorum c. Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera c. The Romanes are commended from their effects first regere imperio populos againe parcere subiectis c. these are compared with the acts of other people and they are made minora to the effects of the Romans Excudent alij spirantia c As the Corinthians will carue you any thing Orabunt causas melius as the Orators among the Athenians Coelique meatus c. as the Caldeans and Egyptians will doe Huc dicta scriptaque referenda sunt That is dicta and scripta in respect of Authors but if we looke at the things written or spoken so they are testimonies So Pericles and Hortensius are famous for speaking well Demosthenes and Tully for both Ad hunc locum referuntur consilia deliberationes c. Counsells and deliberations are effects of them that consult and deliberate etiam si omnino ad exitum perductae non fuerint And this appeares euidently in that Parmenio and Philotas were put to death being suspected of conspiracie against Alexander So also were Lentulus and Cethegus and other companions of Catiline Sunt etiam effecta virtutum vitiorum Quid non ebrietas designat operta recludit c. Now it is a common conceit that nothing is an effect but that which is substantiall but accidentall causes as I may call them may haue accidentall effects As drunkennesse first operta recludit secondly in praelia trudit inermem it makes a man goe to warre leauing his weapons behind him it will make a man thinke himselfe as good as my Lord Maior Faecundae calices here are cups for drinke and drinke for drunkennesse quem non fecere desertum that is a dizard he meanes a Logician contracta quem non c. it makes a man in pouerty a braue minded fellow CHAP. 10. De subiecto Argumentum modo quodam consentaneum succedit vt subiectum adiunctum c. WEE haue heard of the essentiall parts of a thing and so haue seene the thing in his essence and we see how Logicke doth direct the eye of our reason to see the most inmost thing in it Now we come to see the complementall things that belong to a thing not belonging or concurring to the existere of it so that the causes were as it were the simular parts these are as it were the blood in the sinewes c. to make them full and complementall Modo quodam consentaneum as if he should say the causes were required ad esse rei these are but required ad bene esse rei so that the causes looked at the inside of the thing and now we come to looke at the outside of it Argumentum modo quodam c. This is an imperfect transition containing onely the proposition of that which followes modo quodam as if he should say if they bee there it is well notwithstanding if they bee wanting it is no preiudice to the essence of the thing for they are but circumstances whereas argumenta absolutè consentanea are pentralia againe argumenta modo quodam consentanea come after the being of the thing for accidens inseparabilis as homini risus aequo hinnitus are but acts of the soule working in the bodies of their subiects Succedit Why because they are after those that agree absolutely we haue heard that the effect ariseth from all the causes and cannot existere without them ergo it must be a thing of necessity before it be subiect or adiunct or before it can haue a subiect or adiunct for that which hath adiuncts is a subiect contra Vt subiectum adiunctum A subiect is by nature before an adiunct and a thing is first a subiect before it be an adiunct and there must be a thing subiected to an adiunct before a thing can be adioyned to a subiect againe the subiect is more generall then the adiunct not that there are more subiects to one adiunct for it is quite contrary for there may be twenty adiuncts to one subiect but I meane it is more in vse and argues more strongly then the adiunct doth As when I say the King is there ergo the Guard is there is stronger then to say the Guard is there therefore the King and here we see as before prioritie and posterioritie Now our reason is to behold things according to the course of God for whatsoeuer wee see it was first in God and when hee hath made a thing then it is a subiect and it is capable of
which we heard of in adiuncts is res locata because it doth apply that speciall kinde of adiunct that answers to this subiect locus Now it is not essentiall to the thing ergo is but complementall againe that which is now in one place may remoue to another place ergo is not absolutely consenting to the thing and thus we see it must needs belong to Logicke as being but in respect they say onely corpus is in loco descriptiue and not spirits they are but in vbi or in loco designatione but what is this but a rule of Geometry where we heare of completio loci by corpus and therefore Aristotle brings locus to quantity Then againe they question whether the space that containes a thing bee locus or no. Answ Space belongs to nature and is nothing but the measure that doth fill the place and is nothing but that quadrangula sex complent locum or a pint will receiue a pinte and therefore to receiue is to measure the space I confesse you may name it in Nature but not define it Sic Philosophi diuinis entibus licet parte magnitudine carentibus attribuunt locum So the Philosophers giue place to the intelligences whereas he making them to moue the heauens saith they are on the superficies of them Licet parte magnitudine carentibus Here hee speakes according to the common conceits in Schooles but I maruell how hee or any other can say so Scaliger saith they are in diuine predicament of quantity but not in this grosse predicament of quantity and they haue a figure In what figure were Angels first created An. In what figure was water first made they can take any figure as water can but I think they were first made in the figure of roundness So Arist saith they were made as puncta So is fire round for that is figura capacissima ergo perfectissima I haue thought also that the Arke was made for all the world like a man and there was the proportion of length proportionable to a mans bredth and the heighth proportionable to a mans thicknesse Now for the wanting of parts it is not so for Angels may be diuided though their parts be similar so are the elements parts and as some write the wicked spirits may be strucke and so the Sun light but it will too quickly returne into it selfe and as the light may be diuided so may they And whereas they say anima is tota in toto and tota in qualibet parte they wrong God and the creature for what is the reason God can haue no parts ergo no causes other things whatsoeuer must needs haue causes ergo must haue membra ergo we cannot say they are all in euery part Yes the reasonable soule is in my little finger Content but is that very portion of it that is in my head also in my little finger There is a discontinuance and the same thing should bee here and not there which is flat contradiction but God is not in this or that finger but also betweene them The Papists absurditie appeares notably in this in that they will haue Christs body to be really in the Sacrament in the bread and in heauen also and yet not in the ayre but make a discontinuance ergo it is in the bread and not in the bread in heauen and not in heauen for if it is in heauen there it is shut vp and so in the bread Sic Geometrae locum locique differentias in rebus geometricis That is aboue and below angle and base c. At prius ignotum ferro quum scindimus aequor c. Here hee appoints seuerall places to seuerall things and here locus is but subiectum and they adiuncta Sensilia sensuum res virtutibus ac vitiis propositae subiecta vitiorum virtutum hoc modo nominantur Here are obiecta as the common Schooles teach because the sense is cast vpon them so vertues and vices though they haue their subiects themselues in one kinde yet here they are adiuncts rebus vitutibus ac vitiis propositae Now it is a fallace of non subiectum when we giue that to subiectum which is not subiectum As Tully iested with Piso his little sonne and said Who hath hanged my sonne to yonder sword Eiusmodi subiecto Cicero 2. Agrar. disputat inter Campanos nullam contentionem esse qui nullus sit honor Non gloriae cupiditate ait afferebantur c. Honour is the subiect of ambition the Campani had no honour among them ergo no ambition where there is no honour there is no ambition but inter Campanos there is no honour ergo no ambition Here the proposition containes the subiect and adiunct and by remouing the subiect he remoues the adiunct Eodem argumento a Propertio dictum est Nauita de ventis de tauris narrat Arator c. The Mariner he tells of the windes whereabout hee is occupied and vulnera are adiuncts to Souldiers yet here as he talkes of them he is adiunctum and thus haue wee heard of the first complement of a thing namely to bee a subiect or to haue a subiect CAP. 11. De adiuncto Adiunctum est cui aliquid subiicitur quod argumentum et si subiecto est leuius attamen est copiosius frequentius NOw we come to adiuncts which are after subiectum and because subiectum and adiunctum haue diuers natures ergo they must be taught distinctly and in distinct Chapters now therefore we come to adiunctum which is the outmost thing and it is called adiunctum because it is adioyned to the thing and it is put to another thing after it hath its being Now there is nothing in the world but may be a cause an effect a subiect or adiunct and therefore Logick is generall of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but in that he tells vs that it is but adioyned hee tells vs that it doth agree but quodam modo that is conditionally but many adiuncts be remoued from their subiects sith their causes are in them Answ Sure there may be an alteration of them by the hinderance of the act of the forme vpon the matter or the act externally So the Adamant stone if we put but the iuice of garlicke vpon it it will not draw iron vnto it Againe the causes may be altered in the subiect ergo the adiunct may be remoued ergo it is but argumentum modo quodam consentaneum and not absolutè requisitum Cui Because any thing whatsoeuer may haue the respect of an adiunct as any thing may be a cause Aliquid That is that that is propounded or that which we are to argue or that that is argued so that that which the adiunct is adioyned to is subiectum Subiicitur Adiunctum doth presently tell me that there is some thing cui aliquid adiungitur he rather sayes subiicitur then adiungitur because adiunctum hath reference to subiectum and it is better to define them from
with argumentum so that he meanes they differ but onely in some logicall respect they are the subtlest of all arguments because of their little dissention Sola ratione ergo they do not of necessity make a denyed axiome Quo de genere sunt illa frequentissima Non hoc sed illud quanquam tamen This is not a rule of Art but a commoration as if hee should say these arguments haue not beene in Schooles before but I haue obserued them by my experience and then againe they are subtill ergo I will helpe you when you find ergo these notes commonly commend vnto you diuersa so forma and facundia are made to disagree in their adiunctiue nature in respect of Vlisses so that they differ not in their nature but onely in logicall respect as if he should say they may both be adiuncts to one subiect but yet differ in Vlisses Priamus was ready to perish and yet with-held not his hands a man perishing should hold his hands but Priamus did not so that causa and effectum which might consent are here diuersa not in respect of Priamus but of thēselues Paula secus in Eunucho He meanes there is a difference of modus Suppose I be worthy of this reproch yet thou shouldst not tell me of it here is subiectum and adiunctum the diuersitie is in respect of the cause they are diuersa in respect of him that offered it Item alia aliusmodi Scelus tu illud vocas Tubero Here is a little difference too this fact was called scelus by Tubero Tullie tells him others gaue it other names alij enim errorem appellant alij timorem c. but no man besides thee call it scelus Here these names are made diuers in respect of him that called it scelus as if he should say call it any of the rest but call it not scelus and thus we haue heard diuersa If I say though he be rich or poore yet he is honest here is a diuersitie for so a discreet axiom may be affirmed they are diuers because riches commonly make vnhonest and also pouertie so wee may make diuersitie betweene the cause and effect or in giuing many causes to one effect aut contra or one subiect to an adiunct aut contra or many subiects to one adiunct aut contra and according to these wayes also there may be seuerall modi thereof CAP. 13. De disperatis Opposita sunt dissentanea quae ratione re dissentiunt IN looking at things wee first see the causes that giue esse then the complements that giue bene esse to the thing then we see what it is not and easily doe by seeing them arguments that giue esse and first we are to see the diuersitie which though they be conformable yet they doe diuert somewhat one from another and they are first because they giue light to all the rest that follow Now we come to see their opposition that is those things which haue their causes effects subiects and adiuncts are not onely dissenting in a logicall respect but are distinct realls Opposita gaine sets it commeth of ob and pono as it were set against ob is as it were a bolt to barre one thing from another so that their nature is to be barred not onely ratione but it is principally in their realtie and herein doe diuersa differ from opposites Diuersa are made to disagree in that wherein they might agree whereas opposites dissent in their nature Sunt dissentanea We heard they were called dissentanea by reason of their disagreeing they doe not sentire idem but quot capita tot sensus sunt among them whereas consentanies are of the same iudgement and these names doe well fit arguments because they are as it were the senses of things Dissentanea that is such as thinke asunder are seuered and distract our thoughts Quae ratione re dissentiunt Ratione that is as diuersa did because they doe not onely disagree quatenus argumenta that is as they haue logicall respect in them but quatenus they are res as blacke is not white they are opposites and there is a barre that blacke cannot be white contra which opposition is in their dissention being cleane of another iudgement so that there is dissention betwixt them in sensu nostro in beholding of them Re. As if we say blacke is not white we say not onely that blacke is not the cause not the effect subiect or adiunct of white but that they are diuers things in nature ergo this must be obserued that the barre is not onely the barre of rationall respect but of reality Itaque eidem attribui secundum idem ad idem c. Surely if they be bard from comming one at another and that in nature then non possunt eidem attribui As first when I say blacknesse is not whitenesse and againe when as I say blacknesse and whitenesse cannot be giuen to the same subiect here the one dissention is in essence the other is in accident ergo this idem must bee vnderstood of the essence it selfe and likewise the subiect Non possunt takes away all possibility of ioyning in one ergo whatsoeuer makes them consent breakes this rule for whereas this rule saith sunt dissentanea they make them consentanea and againe whereas this rule saith non possunt eidem attribui they say they may Attribui The attribute is alwayes the consequent part of the axiome so that if we giue them to subiects they cannot be giuen to one and the same subiect they may bee the consequent but not the antecedent part so that contraries must be attributed for when I say homo est animal aut brutum I giue them both to animal but not eidem Now antecedent contraries will haue contrary consequents est enim par ratio now they doe dissentire ratione re ergo cannot any waies be consentanies ergo cannot bee made by any meanes to agree Secundum idem According to the same diuers thinke this is put in in respect of relates because of the example that followes pater filius eiusdem but it hath a more generall respect of opposites in their whole nature else it should haue beene taught more specially in the doctrine of relates Now two contraries may be giuen eidem but not secundum idem ad idem eodem tempore eidem that is eidem genere not eidem specie as a man may be well and a man may be sicke but not the same man so that secundum idem hath respect to the same indiuiduality as it were or species so homo may be ager and sanus but not secundumidem for that identity cannot be now ratio is giuen homini secundum idem for herein omnis homo est idem ad idem still there is idem for if we consider them not about idem they are not opposites then againe there must be the same respect and also ad idem that is
definition of Dialectica an example of definitio so that as I say if relation were a common affection to all arguments all examples also should be relates which they are not againe if causa and effectum were relates then they must bee together for relates must be simul natura ergo this is fallacia accidentis they thought the words of Art as they call them were relates ergo the doctrine of relates must goe generally with all arguments We know againe that the causes efficient matter forme and end and the effect are distinct things and doe not constare è mutua alterius affectione ergo are not relates againe causa est cuius vi res est and the effect quod è causis existit Now each relate containes the efficient matter forme and end of his fellow ergo if they should be taught generally then in the efficient alone in the matter alone in the forme alone and in the end alone there should bee all the causes Some would haue relates taught as consentanie arguments because they doe agree it is true but they doe disagree also and if they should be taught in consentanies their dissentio also should bee taught there or else they should make a double doctrine of one thing and this kinde of teaching had beene à posteriore againe where should they haue beene taught they are mutuall causes ergo not causa and effectum but both causes and effects againe the doctrine of causa efficiens materia forma and finis are distinct here they are confounded together in one Now the Aristotelians haue a predicament of relates and haue also their series but their gradus of them will not stand for relates haue no species but are lowest saue onely examples and they goe cleane out and say relates are of this nature or that nature as if they shold say relates whose species are in this Art or in that Art As in Oeconomie in a familie they are free or bound free husband and wife bound children and seruants c. but now the husband and wife are not relates because the bound and free are relats all these are speciall examples of relates containing nothing vnder them so that relates cannot possibly bee a predicament according to their owne doctrine no more then causa and effectum and by that course that they take I can proue that Socrates est genus in going backward and saying he is substantia he is genus c. Now because the whole relation stands in their mutuall causation for that cause they are called relates Vt pater qui filium habet c. So we say is he such a mans sonne here is a metonimie of the adiunct for the subiect son put for man when I say Paul is a seruant of Christ here I meane Pauls calling seruant hath a double respect in it one as it is in Oeconomie another as it hath logicall relation which we may see thus for if he be Christs seruant then Christ is his master Relata dicuntur simul esse natura The reason stands in this the whole being of the one relate is contained in the other ergo they are simul for if they be mutuall causes they must bee mutuall effects ergo as one is the cause so the other is the effect contra ergo they must be simul Natura Because their nature springs from them mutually for nature is arising from causes here we may see in the Trinitie that one person is not before another there is no respect of priority or posteriority in the rest of contraries because there is no force of arguing from thence we heard before that all of them were aequè manifesta that is aeque intelligibilia and not as consentanies where the cause cleareth the effect more then contra because the causes are more simple and single so likewise the subiect is not beholding to the adiunct but contra againe the cause and subiect did more argue the effect and adiunct then contra Againe from hence it is that qui alierum perfectè norit norit reliquum for they are mutuall causes and our scientia est è causis Pro Marcello Ex quo profectò intelligis quinta in dato beneficio sit laus cum in accepto tanta sit gloria Dare and accipere are relates as if he should say if it bee glorious to receiue then it is much more glorious to giue now his principall drift of arguing is à minore but yet the arguments are relates so that a thing is not giuen till it be receiued and againe hee that knowes the one knowes the other Tum seruum sis te genitum blandéque fateris Cum dicis dominum Sosibiane patrem Sosibian is a seruant to his father because he is his master Sic portorum Rhodiis locare honestum est Hermacreonti conducere If it be honest to let out then it is honest to hire for they are mutuall causes and in vsurie I thinke both taking on vsurie and letting out to vsurie are vnlawfull by reason of this relation as Ieremy speakes So discere and docere are relates Iam illa inquit matura vxor generi nouerca filii filia pellex Here he playeth with the names and indeed all names of kindreds are relates Ouidius 1. Metamorphosios Non hospes ab hospite tutus Non socer à genero fratrum quoque gratia rara est c. Atque argumentum talis relationis contrarium nihil habet c. Indeed here is no contrarietie in these examples neither consention in that respect but they are paria happely he could find no example of them in their disagreeing nature and so would here commend vnto vs their vse to be more often in the consentanie affection then in their dissentany nature as when we say how could that be why he was his sonne CHAP. 15. De aduersis Aduersa sunt contraria affirmantia quae inter se veluti è regione perpetuò aduersantur WEE haue heard what a thing is that is what goes to the being and what to the well being of it and how thereby it dissenteth from other things by a diuersitie or opposition diuers might consent betweene themselues but they are made to diuert one from another Againe for opposition it is re ratione dissenting either by a disparate nature or by a contrary nature Contraries are either of one thing to another thing or of one thing to nothing the former kinde also is of things that might agree or of them that will neuer bee at peace now therefore wee come to aduersa and these haue their name of turning not aside as diuersa or as one to many as disparats neither as relates which haue a double aspect a coniunct aspect being set face to face and an opposite aspect being set backe to backe But aduersa are in an opposite aspect hence a line drawne from the point of the one aspect through the center to the point of the other aspect will
louer cannot be free here the thing libertas is not the cause of liber but cur tu sis liber looking at the effect together with liber Now coniugates arise onely from argreeing arguments ergo there is nothing that goes to the causality effectity subiunctity or adiunctity of a thing as wee may say but we may denominate from it As I may call a chest made of wood a woodden chest for indeed the reason of the name coniugata is from yoaking the thing vnto the man or vnto the act Cicero 3. de natura Deorum cum Dionysio tyranno loquitur Iam mensas argenteas de omnibus delubris iussit auferri c. Dionysius comming into Greece robbed their Temples they vsed to haue fine things in their Temples dedicated to their Gods which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thence came 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 accursed because they dedicated them to their Idols now he tooke these things and there was engrauen in them bona Deorum ergo he said he would bee so bold as vti eorum bonitate I will not vse him as a Consull because he vsed me not as a consular that is as one that hath beene a Consull The cause was consularis and senatoria ergo hee needed the helpe of the Consul and the Senate res consularis and senatoria are the adiuncts to consul and to senatus CAP. 24. De Notatione Notatio est nominis interpretatio nomina siquidem sunt nota rerum c. NOw we come to notatio coniugata did nominate the thing from some thing that was in it but did not name it properly but so as it might agree to another thing that had the same consentanie argument in it from which that name was fetched but notatio is the name of a thing that is proper to it he called the first coniugata for as we were taught by them to giue the thing a name which may bee common to some other thing so here notatio teacheth vs to giue the thing a name arising from some property in it so that it be not common to other things neither is the name and the thing the same as wee heard in coniugates Iustitia iustus iustè were the same onely they were deliuered diuersly Est nominis interpretatio That is not the laying out of the name but the reason of the name so that the arguments arguing are nomen and notatio nominis Notatio is after coniugata because it ariseth from dissentanies also and comparats whereas coniugates arise onely from consentanies Nomina siquidem sunt nota rerum So saith our Grammar vox est nota qua vnumquodque vocatur Now as there are nomina so ratio reddi potest si vera notatione fiant The denomination comes from something as homo ab humo for as humus signifieth the fieth the earth so homo names not man earthy but it is a new name drawne from humus So terra is called vesta à vi stando And fire is called focus à fouendo Cicero 4. in Verrem O Verrea praeclara Quo enim accessisti quo non attuleris tecum istum diem Etenim quam tu domum quam vrbem adiisti quod fauum denique quod non euersum atque extersum reliquiris c. They made a holy day in Sicily for the honour of my Lord Boare-pig now he was a sweepe-stake ergo his holy day was named of his manners Verres à verendo because he swept all where he came Ouid. 1. Fastorum Prima dies tibi Carna datur dea cardinis haec est c. Carna was so called quasi dea cardinis because she was conuersant about doores and hinges Tuae coniugis bonae faeminae locupletis quidem certè Bambalio quidem pater c. As Bambalio was so called because he vsed to stammer and stutter in his speech Ex dissentaneis autem est notatio Vt Lucus quia vmbra opacus parum luceat ludus qui est longissime à lusu Dis quia minime diues E comparatis autem est notatio Vt Pyropus quod flammam ignis imititur Est vero vt notationi ad suum nomen sic nomini ad notationem sua affectio Ramus doth commorari here and shewes how the name may argue the notation as well as the notation may the name though that be not so common as animi plenus ergo animosus contra And thus we haue heard how nomina belong to Logicke CAP. 25. De distributione Reliquum est ex ertis aliunde argumentis argumentum distributionis definitionis NOw we come to second orta which arise manifoldly from more arguments and this hee desired to deliuer vnto vs when he said distributio and definitio Now distributio must come after coniugata and notatio in respect of his double arising then againe it is requisite that after we haue seene the first arguments in things that wee next name them from some thing in them and then that wee see a thing as it is common with another and againe when we see the distribution of it into his parts we may soone see the limits of it and how farre it reacheth and so giue testimony thereof Now a distribution doth arise from any consentany arguments or common because that a cause may be common to more effects contra and a subiect to more adiuncts contra hence it comes to passe that a thing may be distributed a common cause into speciall effects aut contra a common subiect into speciall adiuncts contra And this we see to be very true in nature by many examples so that distributio is nothing but taking a common cause or subiect and diuiding it into speciall effects or adiuncts aut contra Reliquum est c. This is an imperfect transition and indeed containeth a distribution as if he should say ortum is reliquum or primum A distribution is from common causes and a speciall cause and that is perfect or from some conflux of other arguments which the Schooles call properties and that is descriptio In qua vtraque pars affectio reciprocationis est That is this is a property to them Now he saith affectio because argumentum est quod affectum est ad arguendum As if hee should say these arguments are affected to argue with a mutuall receiuing of themselues as the whole containes iust as much as the parts contra the definition as the definite contra So that this reciprocation for all the world is like vnto two Iuglers pots where the one will hold iust as much water as the other and neither more nor lesse so then the whole is not the parts nor the definitum the definitio onely there is this mutuall affection of reciprocation betwixt them that is they haue that affection as that the parts simul sumptae will reach no further then the totum aut contra the definition then the definite aut contra as when I say a man is
sicke or well here the parts may agree to other things then to man Answer True but we must vnderstand it as if it were said homo is either homo aeger or homo sanus now this reciprocation in a distribution is of all the parts together with the whole Distributio est cum totum in partes distribuitur Hauing shewed the generall affection he now comes to tell what distribution is it is called distribution in the actiue signification in respect of the parts now distribution is the categoria and the parts and the whole are the categoremata Cum totum in partes distribuitur Here is first a totum which shewes that it is alwaies some common thing and the parts are speciall things contained in the whole so that that which is new here is common as a common cause a common effect subiect or adiunct c. and here this common is called a totum as it containes the parts then againe this distribution is as it were a pulling the parts in peeces and not a ioyning or gathering of them together though inductio be an inuersa distributio but he rather vseth this word distributio because it is more generall and more in vse and the arguing from the whole to the parts is more in vse then contra Totum est quod continet partes It is that which holdeth together the parts continet because all the parts are in the whole as in one as being the common head wherein they are Pars est quae continetur a toto For the container is the totum and the parts the contained so that the doctrine of distributio is but to teach vs how to range and cary euery thing to his home It is a great question among the Physitians whether a wen be a part of a mans body or no. Answer It is morbus ergo no part it is in toto but not contained à toto for the whole containes the members by reason of its forme if we speake of integrum but the forme reacheth not to this Atque vt distinctio totius in partes distributio sic collectio partium c. Many Logicians haue made this to belong to argumentatio but they are deceiued for they belong hither and it is the same to doe and vndoe to diuide the whole into parts and to colligere the parts to make vp the whole Distributio sumitur ex argumentis toti quidem consentaneis inter se autem dissentaneis Here hee sheweth from whence distribution ariseth namely from consentanies in respect of the parts with the whole and also from dissentanies either disparats or contraries in respect of the parts betweene themselues Itaque tanto accuratior erit quanto partium c. This is a deduction from that that went before for if the former be true then this also now the greatest dissention is of contraries and the greatest of all is betweene something and nothing ergo to distribute into tricotomies and quadricotomies c. is to skip ouer some thing that should bee taught And thus much for distribution in generall CAP. 26. De distributione ex causis Distributio prima est ex absolute consentancis causis nempe effectis COncerning this doctrine of distributio we haue heard the generalitie the ground from whence a distribution doth arise is for that the first arguments are common as a common cause may bee distributed by the effects in like sort a common effect may bee distributed into speciall causes and so for the subiect and adiunct so that beside that community there is nothing new in this second inuention In a distribution we obserued a whole and a part the whole containes the parts and the parts are contained of the whole ergo if either the whole containe not all the parts or all the parts be not contained of the whole there will be no distribution Now these arguments did arise from consentanies in respect of the whole but from dissentanies inter se Itaque tanto accuratior erit c. ergo a distribution into a dicotomy which is of contraries is the best yet if it cannot be had wee must be faine to make a tricotomy now we come to the species of distribution Distributio prima est ex absolute consentaneis causis nempe effectis A distribution is a deriuatiue argument from cause or from modo quodam consentaneorum vt subiectorum adiunctorum Now the vse of distribution is this that wee may range euery thing in his owne order and place for when we haue seene a thing in his esse and bene esse and then that it is not this or that and haue also compared it with other things to see whether it be equall or vnequall like or vnlike and likewise haue giuen it a name in the next place it is requisite that we set it in his ranke for so the Lord hath ranged euery thing in the world as man vnder his genus animal for the Lord hath made all things lyable to our Logicke ergo they must bee ranged vnder some head that wee may see how they agree and how they disagree Distributio prima est c. Distributio is double as I sayd before ex absolute consentaneis modo quodaÌ„ consentaneis so that he cals that distribution which ariseth from a generall cause and a generall effect Distributio prima It is prima in a double respect first because causa and effectum are prima secondly as they are before subiectum and adiunctum Hee takes distributio here in the actiue signification and according thereunto must the species be prosecuted for he doth define them from the parts diuiding For the notation of the word which giues great light it comes of tribuo and dis as if it signified that distribution that iustice giues it is a terme belonging to Law as many of our logicall termes doe and here it signifieth a seuering of the parts and a giuing to euery part his due as when a common cause is distributed and then to euery speciall effect his owne cause is giuen so that here is nothing in this new inuention but this distribution the rest is the first inuention as when I say a man is sicke and a man is well here are two subiects and two adiuncts but when I say of men some are sick some are well here is a distribution Now the reason why he ioyneth both causa and effectum together saying ex absolute consentanâ—is causis nempe effectis is because that in a distribution as there are parts so there is a whole distributio being both actiue and passiue though it bee principally denominated from the parts so that where the cause is the whole there the effects must be parts Distributio ex causis est quando partes sunt causae totius So that here the effect is the whole and the causes are the parts now he prosequutes the doctrine of distribution by the parts because he goes according to the act of things
and the parts here constitute the whole againe a whole the very name doth deny a distribution for if it be whole it is not distributed but the parts shew a whole ergo wee must apply distribution to the parts hence distributio ex causis is not when the cause is a whole but when the causes are parts hence a distributio ex integro is before a distributio ex genere because there the parts are effects Distributio ex causis is here the first inuention in that he saith ex causis the second inuention in that he saith distributio Againe there is the first inuention when he saith quando partes sunt causae the second inuention when hee saith quando partes sunt causae totius so that take the common effect and make it a whole the causes and make them parts and this is the second inuention Hîc distributio integri in sua membra praecipuè laudatur This now is a speciall modus of distributio ex causis there may be a distribution of the effect by the efficients by the materialls by the formalls and from the end but he doth not stay vpon them but presently comes to the distributio integri in membra because it is of greater vse and of more practise Hic That is in the distributio ex causis so that membra are parts but all parts are not membra and integrum is totum but euery totum is not integrum Praecipuè laudatur Why first because it is of so great vse secondly because it is more secret the other more familiar Integrum est totum cui partes sunt essentiales The integrum the entire as wee call it is totum that is quod continet partes ergo the membra must be contained of the integrum giuing thereunto both portion of matter and portion of forme hence nailes and hayres are not membra of a mans body because they giue not a portion of matter and forme to it Cui partes sunt essentiales So then if the members be essentiall to the whole they giue essence to it that is they afford causa now essentia stands principally in the matter and forme ergo he meanes these parts giue matter and forme to the whole Membrum est pars integri Therefore it is contained of the whole ergo giues essence but how giues it essence thus which few Logicians shew as for example in a mans body euery member hath his owne matter and forme and all the members together make vp a common matter and a common forme of the whole so that a man is made of a soule and a body then the soule is made of matter forme the body also is made of organicall parts and they giue matter and forme to it then the simular parts containe the matter and forme of the organicall and the simular parts are made of a portion of the matter and of the formes of the elements so that we may see the forme of mans body ariseth from a manifold comparison now the integrum is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hoc aliquid yet is it totum though it be alwayes singular Why is integrum before membrum seeing it giues essence to it Answer Integrum is made of the parts and is a totum ergo must goe before Againe it is here before in this new inuention because it doth here continere partes ergo is the agent againe when wee consider distributio because the whole doth distribute the parts are distributed ergo it is requisite that we first see the whole hence it is rather called distributio then inductio because it is more frequent to dispute from the whole to the parts then from the parts to the whole Now if integrum be cui partes sunt essentiales and membrum be pars integri then whatsoeuer is true of a part is true of the whole not contra because membrum is essentiale toto non contra And by this rule it stands that Christs sufferings are to be giuen to him as he is whole Christ both God and man then againe by this rule we see that that which he hath felt being head the whole hath felt which if we consider well we may see how Christs righteousness is made ours because he is the head and that which the head suffers the whole suffers ergo that is the wholes that the head hath done Sic Grammatica in etymologiam syntaxin c. For why Grammatica is the whole Art Etymology and Syntax are the parrs thereof Dialectica in inuentionem iudicium diuiditur Kickerman cannot away with this example for saith he Dialectica is the habit inuention and iudgement are Arts now the parts must be of the same nature with the whole because they constitute the whole Alas poore man this it is the rule of Logicke is the rule of mans reason ergo the rule must run along not according to the nature of reason for that belongs to naturall Philosophy but according to the act of it Now by inuention and iudgement I doe not meane the act but the rule of the act that teacheth me inuenire inuenire is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of this part of inuention now Dialectica is the whole ergo inuention and iudgement must consist of precepts containing the matter and forme of the whole Bene disserere is the end of Logicke ergo these two parts must shoot at this marke then againe the forme of Dialectica bene disserere ariseth from the parts so that as our author teacheth them they containe a portion of the matter and a portion of the forme of Logicke This it is Logicke lookes at the motus of reason and inuention and iudgement containe the motus ergo they are the parts Haec distributio principalis est cum rei longioris explicatio suscipitur You haue heard what is required in a perfect definition of the integrum into the members and here are many yea most fallaces of any arguments as if wee leaue out any part in a distribution againe in distributione ex integro if the parts doe not containe a portion of the matter and forme of the whole againe when we distribute in Grammar vox est litera aut syllaba it is not a perfect distribution because these parts are not dissentany inter se for a letter containes portion of the matter and forme of a syllable and so is essentiall to it Haec distributio principalis est si rei longioris c. if you meane to make any long discourse of any thing diuide it for it giues great light and helpe to your owne memorie and to the people hence distributions are the chiefe things in Art hence many call their bookes partitions Kickerman calls his systema which belongs to distributio and the respect of a distribution is but from a part of the Art ergo his name is to strait ergo remember this rule by any meanes for it is of great vse both for the good of the teacher and
of the learner Virgilius 1. Georg. Quid faciat laetas segetes quo sidere terram Vertere Maecenas vlnusque adiungere vites c. Here Virgil distributes his whole worke this is a distribution of the integrum into the members not of the subiect into his adiuncts as some will haue it for it is a distribution of his booke First hee will teach how to plow then how to set vines then how to order cattle then how to order Bees Cicero pro Mureno Intelligo iudices tres accusationis partes fuisse earum vnam in reprehensione vitae c. His oration was diuided into three parts first the reprouing of Murenus for his life Secondly his seeking of honour Lastly the accusing of him of ambition so Preachers diuide their speech not their text Quin etiam aliter tractatur hoc argumenti genus vel à partibus ad totum vel a toto ad partes Catullus Quintia formosa est multis mihi candida longa Recta est haec ego sic singula confiteor c. Againe he shewes another modus when we bring in an induction of the parts to make vp the whole or when we argue from the whole to proue all the parts As Quintia was faire to many here is the totum to me she is candida longa recta but there other things wanting in her to make her beautifull namely venustas mica salis wit to make merry iests without offence and good cariage so here we see how he by withdrawing a part denies the whole Lesbia formosa est quae cum pulcherrima tota est Tum omnibus vna omnes surripuit Veneres Here now contrarie to the other example he gathers all the parts of beauty in one and so concludes the whole CAP. 27. De distributione ex effectis vbi de genere specie Distributio ex effectis est quando partes sunt effecta THe originall of a distribution is from firsts arguments comming to haue a generality because they are common to many distributio ex effectis est c. that is when speciall causes may be giuen to one common effect for as integrum though it bee singular yet is it totum because it is made of the portions of the matter and forme of the members so here the effects are made of their genus Now he sayes distributio ex effectis because it ariseth ex effectis for there are the causes distributing and the parts distributed so that here we may see why these arguments are rightly called orta quando partes sunt effecta so as the whole doth symbolicè containe the causes so the parts doe symbolicè containe the effect as if he should say effecta we heard of in the first inuentio but effecta here sunt partes this is the second inuention God as he made all things so hath he ranged and ordered them one vnder another so that in this definition this is all the parts are the effects and the cause is the whole Marriners are generall causes but they haue speciall effects for some climbe the shroud some runne vp and downe some pumpe c. here are the effects of the efficient cause so we may distribute from the matter as of wood is made a woodden chest or table or stoole c. so from the forme as we may from the genus but this alwayes consider in generall that the parts bee part of the whole and that they be homogenie parts for if we shall diuide a whole into parts and particles there will be no distribution as if a mans body bee anatomized because the particles will agree with the parts Distributio generis in species hic excellit He doth here hasten to genus as being the principall thing in this place and it is as if he should say that distribution which we vsually heare of and which we haue so often in schooles of genus and species they are but modi of a distribution ex effectis and it is true and whilst the common Logicians see not this they know not the truth of them nor their originall and this makes them to begin with genus and species in their Logicke so they know them not in their cause but onely in their second nature Hic excellit As if he should say this is the chiefest modus in this distribution Genus Genus signifieth firstly a stocke or kinred now because all the species come from one roote as a family commeth from one stocke ergo it is called genus or as the parents are causes of their children so is genus cause of the species so the Hiraclides are they that come of Hiracles Species This signifieth in the originall the countenance of a thing now we come to see nothing but singulars ergo indiuidua and species infimae are properly species it comes of an old verbe specio or spicio species it is that which is looked on excellit that is of principall vse and this is the reason thereof the Lord hath ranged all things vnder his owne generall but this kinde of ranging is more generall then the rest and the genus giuing essence to the species it draweth the species with it wheresoeuer it goeth hence it is that whersoeuer the genus of any thing is taught there also must the species be taught and this was the father of praedicaments so that there is nothing but is vnder a genus but genus generalissimum Genus est totum partibus essentiale Totum est quod continet partes for the parts wee heard were holden together in the whole for before whilst the members did contribute euery one a portion of matter and forme they made vp the whole now genus is totum but contrary to integrum for there the integrum had his whole matter and forme from the members but the genus comprehends the species in a common matter and in a common forme Totum essentiale By this wee are to vnderstand that which giues essence that is matter and forme so that integrum did containe all that the members had but the genus doth not containe all that the species haue so that though all the essence of the genus be in the species yet the whole essence of the species is not in the genus when I say totum essentiale I say two things first that genus is a totum secondly that there is nothing in the genus but is also in the species Obiection But how can it bee said that genus giues essence to the species whereas they haue more in them then the genus Answer To containe is to hold together now because the species agree in one common matter and a common forme as in vno puncto ergo genus doth containe them so that reciprocation here is to bee vnderstood so farre forth as by their hypostaticall vnion the species are made one in their genus hence it is that whatsoeuer is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the genus must agree with the species therefore
if any in distributing shall make any part as large as the genus as Logicians distribute genus into perfectum and imperfectum they make species totum and not genus so ens is substantia or accidens will not come into any Art for the parts are consentanies inter se being subiectum and adiunctum Partibus Pars est quae continetur non in toto sed à toto totum est quod continet as being the common punctum wherein the parts meet together he saith also partibus non parti Species est pars generis Pars we heard before generis so that as membrum was pars integri not generis so species est pars generis not integri so that they which diuide parts into integrall or simular vnderstand not Logicke for a part simular is nothing but species which is pars generis as a pan of water and a drop of water is genus and species a bone and a part of a bone is also genus and species now they call it simular because they haue the same denomination why so genus doth predicarere nomine as they say pars generis here obserue that species hath reference onely to genus and so genus to species euen as causa is effecti causa and subiectum adiuncti subiectum for they are relates ergo can repeat no other thing but one another so againe genus is totum not speciei but specierum ergo when we giue a double face to him we make him like Ianus with a double forehead for they make the same species to be species to two things species therefore is generis species as one sonne is but sonne of one father Now this is their trouble that they cannot distribute a species into indiuidua because say they indiuidua doe but differre numero what is that differre numero is properly to reckon vp or make an induction of the indiuidua to make vp the species againe when we distribute that species into all his indiuidua there is a distribution for there is a totum and parts distributed Obiection But in a distribution we should haue but two species Answer Why is it not requisite that there should alwayes be a dicotomie for indeed if we could finde it out euery thing is dicotomised but the Lord hath not reuealed it vnto men but hath kept it secret to himselfe Obiection Singulars haue no differences but are distinct onely by a conflux of common accidents Answer Then singulars should not differ in essence ergo I should be the same with you and you with me the first matter indeed was imperfect but euery thing else is an effect ergo hath all the causes ergo the forme If they aske me what it is I answer them that my soule is my forme as they hold or else thus as my members are not anothers mans members so my forme arising from the parts of my body is not another mans forme but is really distinct from it Obiection But say they the reasonable soule is generall to all men Answer There indeed may be some scruple but when we consider that the formes of the body and the soule make vp the forme of a man we shall see euery man to haue a distinct forme by which wee shall know them each from other Sic animal genus hominis bestiae dicimus He meanes that genus is a generall totum and comprehendeth the species vnder it for as a henne couereth her chickens with her wings so genus couereth the species with his essence then againe make an axiome as homo est animal and you shall see the species to be the subiect more often then the genus ergo he saith subiecta Genus est generalissimum aut subalternum Here he distributes genus vnto vs shewing vs that there are two kinds thereof the one is generalissimum for so indeed euery genus is generall and hath his subsistencie onely in singularibus and because all genera doe subsist in singularibus ergo all but singularia are genera hence it is that they say in Schooles ens and vnum confunduntur Species subalterna aut specialissima Genus generalissimum cuius nullum est genus Generalissimum is so called because it is most genus because that can be nothing but genus Subalternum genus is genus but not onely genus nor alwaies genus Cuius nullum est genus There must needs bee an end for as there is a lowest whereat we must begin so there must be an highest aboue which we cannot go for there cannot be an infinitus motus in creatures so the Lord hath in great wisedome ranged things in their order So the common Logicians haue made ten predicaments or genera generalissima but the first foure haue Logicks vse in them the rest are arguments but if we would know the genera generalissima euery Art will tell vs them best now we may ascend to ens too so that ens is the definitum indeed God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so in Logicke argumentum is genus generalissimum vox in Grammar c. and all these are species of ens Nullum genus Here he denies any genus to stay our reason that so wee may not goe too farre for since genus ariseth from the matter we shal at last come to that which is no genus but a matter onely ergo we must distribute this into his matter and forme Subalternum genus vt subalterna item species quod species huius illius autem genus est Subalternum genus may also be subalterna species so that these being one and the same onely differing in respect therefore one definition may serue for them both Species specialissima quae est indiuidua in species alias vt materia forma singulares Species as before signifies firstly a singular thing and other species are called species at the second hand but indiuidua are properly called species quae speciuntur Now hee saith specialissima that is indeed and properly as generalissimum had no genus aboue it so species specialissima hath no species vnder it indiuidua is here an adiunct to species specialissima now he saith indiuidua because he speakes of diuision ergo here he tells vs that we can goe no further to finde any inferiour species wee may onely diuide it into members if we will Genus vero species notae sunt causarum effectorum He doth commorari here because the Schooles haue not commonly receiued that genus containes the matter and common forme of the species but we know a perfect definition layes out the quiddity of a thing that is the matter and the forme now the forme is there but where is the matter why the genus containes the quiddity the essence the causes ergo it is an argument vnanswerable that the genus containes the matter Hinc vniuersale est insigne ac praestabile quia causam declarat The common Logicians neuer lookt after any distribution but of the integrum
perfecta aut imperfecta but they are much deceiued for when a perfect definition may be had wee vse no description ergo it serues onely where a perfect definition cannot be had it is not so here for if wee haue a perfect definition either integri in membra or generis in species we must not therefore leaue out these if they be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aut contra as we see axioma is affirmatum and negatum must come into Logicke though it haue his species afterward Againe these distributions cannot be reduced to the perfect ones either of integrum or genus CAP. 29. De distributione ex adiunctis DIstributio ex adiunctis est quando partes sunt adiuncta ergo the whole is subiectum Vt hominum alij sani alij aegri c. This distribution will not be distributed as I said before into genus and species Sic Virgilius 1. Georg. Quinque tenent coelum zonae quarum vna corusco c. The heauen is distributed by his adiuncts it is temperate or intemperate to dicotomize it intemperate is hot or cold hot is the middle zone cold are them betweene the Tropickes temperate are the other two Caesar 1. belli Gallic Gallia est omnis diuisa in partes tres c. Caesar diuides the Country of France into three parts according to the inhabitants thereof CAP. 30. De definitione Definitio est cum explicatur quid res sit eaque vicissim definitio argui potest HItherto we haue heard of a distribution now we come to a definition for hauing heard what a thing is and how it differs from others notwithstanding it may be compared with them and be equall or vnequall like or vnlike and then be named lastly be ranged vnder some head hauing I say seene all these things clapt close together in the thing now it remaines that we shold lay out the limitation of it and circumscribe it This is the last of all because it may arise from any of the arguments going before and also from orta which follow Definitio est cum explicatur quid res sit We heard that the arguments arising manifoldly were distribution and definition now definition ariseth as it shall fall out either from agreers or disagreers comparates or orta ergo it arising from more arguments then any of the rest it is requisite that it should be after all the rest though in laying downe an Art it will haue the first place because if it be a perfect definition it layes out the essence of a thing immediately if it bee a description it layes downe the quantity c. A definition is as it were a box that layes vp all the rules following in the Art euen as the body doth the members Definitio For the name we know finis is terminus and belongs to Geometry we heard it borrowed from thence into Logicke to signifie a cause here it signifies the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so that definire is to set downe the extreme or vtmost points of a thing ergo it must bee reciprocall with the thing defined else can it not define it for if the definitum bee larger then the definitio then it outreacheth the limits of the thing if it be lesse then it layeth not out the essence fully Cum explicatur So that definitio doth lay abroad explicatio is a laying abroad the quidditie of a thing In that hee saith definitio doth explicare hee meanes all the arguments before were clapt together in the thing confusedly but the definition doth lay them abroad as in this word Dialectica there is a Synopsis of all Logicke but when I say it is ars bene disserendi here the definition layes out all more at large the definite is like a Pedlers packe wherein his points pinnes kniues c. are shut vp altogether and the definitio is like the laying of them out or shewing of them to the end that he may sell them The one may likewise bee compared to a garment folded vp the other to a garment spread abroad at large Quid. That is the essence for as in a perfect definition wee may gather the other arguments of a thing from the causes so in a description wee may gather the causes from other arguments this entity therefore or essence the definition alwaies lookes at another difference of the definitum and the definitio is that the definitum is ens and the definitio is essentia Res. That is the ens the subiect of the generall Arts that is Aliquid in the definition of argumentum Eaque vicissim definitio argui potest As the definite called before res may be argued à definitione so contra though the definitio be more often brought to argue the definite then contra ergo it hath the name definition not from definitum but from the definitio Obiection Kickerman saith Ramus will haue definitio both an argument and an axiome Answer No we make it an argument when wee speake properly we make it an axiom when we speake Synecdochichos Definitio est perfecta aut imperfecta This distribution is now to good purpose for the schooles haue not agreed at any time of any perfect definition as they say homo est animal rationale this is not a perfect definition ergo some doe adde mortale some capax disciplinae some both so that indeed we cannot giue a perfect definition of any thing ergo because it is so hard to find the speciall forme it is requisite to haue an imperfect one to grope out the forme thereby else we should be vndone if wee could no way looke at the essence of things and here by the way we see the quiddity laid out perfectly by a perfect definition and imperfectly by an imperfect definition Illa propriè definitio haec descriptio dicitur Where we may see that perfecta definitio is properly the species of this definition and that the definition before was synecdochicall now that explicatio of the thing is perfect or imperfect the one called definitio the other descriptio the one containing the limitation of the essence the other the limitation of the quantity so that whatsoeuer hath an essence distinct from it selfe must be limited ergo may be defined ergo haue their perfect definition though we cannot see what their forme is Definitio perfecta est definitio constans è solis causis essentiam constituentibus The reason is because it stands of more parts namely the genus and forme laying out the composition of the thing E causis As if he should say they doe giue existere to the definite Solis Because no other arguments come in a perfect definition Essentiam constituentibus That is materia and forma but materia is included in genere so that definitio is ortum doubly now there are foure causes which giue esse but two of them onely giue essence so that the effect hath his substance from the matter and forme not from the other causes Quales causae
a man may beare false witnesse when he speaks the truth and likewise because the simple man may sometimes speake the truth as well as the prudent man THE LOGICIANS SCHOOL-MASTER The second Booke De Iudicio CAP. 1. Quid Iudicium Adhuc prima Dialecticae artis pars fuit in Inuentione pars altera sequitur in Iudicio WE haue hitherto heard of simples which simples may be composites but yet wee respect them as one ioyned to another as man is made of many arguments but may be considered as a simple now we come to consider how one thing is ioyned with another thing The giue which we heard of before was that affection of one argument to another which the common Logicians call categoria but when they are put together in disposition they belong to iudgement so that here we shall heare of nothing but laying of simples together that is of arguments with arguments and that is either of two sides of one argument to one as in a simple axiome or of three sides together as in a syllogisme or lastly of axiomes one after another for the helpe of memory which is methode so that when we haue seene this we may see the reach of our reason and the rule of it Adhuc prima Dialecticae artis pars fuit c. This is a perfect transition for it is long since we heard this distribution our author saith in Inuentione and then sequitur Iudicium so that he teacheth vs that the first part of Logicke is conuersant about the inuention of arguments and shewes vs that the first part of Logicke came to be called inuention by a metonimie of the subiect for the adiunct so iudicium came to name the second part of Logicke by a metonimie of the subiect for the adiunct or if you will Inuention and Iudgement came to bee the parts of Logicke by a metonimie of the effect for the cause for so inuenire and iudicare are acts performed by the first and second part of Logicke which if Kickerman had well considered he would not haue reproued Ramus for this distribution Sequitur Iudicium Iudicium is properly the act of our vnderstanding as it doth discerne and determine truth and falshood for it comes of iudex a iudge and when an axiome is made our iudgement comes to iudge it so that the name will in the end hardly be found large enough for this part of Logicke I would rather distribute it thus Dialecticae partes duae sunt Inuentio Dispositio and then Dispositio est iudicium aut methodus and iudicium est axiomaticum aut syllogisticum My reasons are these first because in method I see no more iudgement then in inuention but it is properly of the order of axiomes Againe iudgement is for truth and falshood and that is the drift of axiomaticall and syllogisticall iudgement ergo they two are to bee coupled together Againe I obserue this in nature that there are there internall senses fancie cogitation and memory for the common sense is all one with fancie Now these serue reason as the two affections loue and hatred serue will for as there is the affection of loue to embrace that which will willeth and the affection of hatred to hate that which will nilleth so there is to serue reason first a fancy that serues inuention cogitation and memorie that serue disposition Now these three are distinct in nature because their organs and instruments by which they worke are distinct for the organ or instrument of fancy is heat the instrument of cogitation is drith and moisture of memory Now the opposite to heat is cold therefore cogitation and memory communicate in cold then cold is a dry or moyst cold the dry cold is the instrument of cogitation the moist cold is the organ of memory but this cold must be but in a degree for if it be too cold all is mard Now then cogitation and memory communicating together in cold there must be a genus wherein iudgement and method must also cōmunicate that is dispositio So that as these organs are by nature seuered in man so nature must seuer our reason into inuention disposition dispositiō into iudiciū and methodus and that these are distinct in nature many reasons doe shew for when a man is first borne then is his inuention best his iudgement is best when he is past iuuenis hee remembers best when he is a child and then best for inuention because his head is then hottest afterward best for iudgement because then his braine is dryest first of all best for memory because his head then is moystest againe man in the morning remembers best because then his braine is moyst by reason of the fumes that ascend to the braine when he sleepeth at noone hee is fittest for cogitation because his braine is then dryest at night he inuents best because then his braine is cold and as in the Sunnes course her heat is moystest in the morning dryest at noone and coldest at night so is it with mans reason so that the internall senses are thus diuided yet here doe we rather admit of a dicotomie because else wee should leaue out a genus namely dispositio Againe because the ends of inuention and iudgement are various now it may seeme strange that Logicke teacheth these parts thus diuided for if it bee true that a childe hath his memory first best then his cogitation and then his fancy why should not method be taught first then iudgement and lastly inuention The reason is this indeed if a childe should haue vse of his disposition first it would hinder his growth for a child hath least vse of his reasonable soule for a long time because it is an hindrance of the acts of the vegetatiue and sensitiue soule by reason hereof if he should be moystest hee could not grow to that stature which is fitting or if he should bee dry it would not extend his moysture againe afterward that his fancy is moystest it is for the bene esse of the body for moysture is most praedominant in him till hee come to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of his age and then his moysture cannot extend it selfe by reason of his heat and then hee becomes most iudicious so that these are conararie to the order of method for the good of man Againe a childe hath his faculty of memory principall that then he may gather things into a storehouse and afterward he must come to iudge them ergo it is necessary that he should haue the best memory first not so much for the act of his reason as for the growth of his body he is for anima vegetatiua a plant for sensitiua an animal and yet there is no one act of any of these faculties aboue but al act together yet so as one is predominant ergo wee say old age brings wisedome Now wisedome is sapientia that is syllogisticall iudgement or prudentia that is the application thereof vpon
nothing but a syllogisme consisting of necessarie axiomes and syllogismus sophisticus is so called from the forme of it and here obserue euermore that if the sophistry lye in any of the arguments alone that are disposed syllogistically then it is a fallace of the arguments in inuention as non causa pro causa non effectum pro effecto c. If the sophistry lye in forme of the syllogisme disposed then it breakes some rule in the doctrine of syllogismes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a necessary axiome affirmed so that this is the difference in generall of a necessary axiome and an axiome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the axiome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is alwayes affirmed so that an axiome necessary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath three things in it first it must be semper verum secondly it must be without all potentia of being false which are generall both to contingens and necessarium Lastly it must be affirmatum which is peculiar to it selfe He calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is omnino verum and de which includes not onely a necessary truth but also affirmation for if we praedicate an adiunct vpon his subiect negatiuely it will not be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies omnino 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies affirmed so that it doth not require that an axiome should be generall for a proper axiome may be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as if we would define the Sunne Moone and Starres so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 requires that it bee verum that is verum necessarium and that it be de that is affirmatum Impossibile contra quod de nullo vnquam verum esse potest This axiome is opposed to necessarium and also to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and it is contrary to that quod de nullo c. so that because he saith de therefore it is opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither is it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are contrary Impossibile Impossibile is a false axiome and here wee may see how falsum still runnes along with verum Possibile and impossibile are not species of falsum axioma for both contingens and necessarium are possibilia and it is generall to them both so that this is quod verum esse potest vnquam de nullo not that this axiome is alwayes denyed as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is affirmed but it is contrary to an axiome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because that is alwayes affirmed and contrary to it marke the contrariety it is nunquam verum opposed to semper verum againe nunquam verum esse potest is opposed to nec falsum esse potest here it is contrary to a necessarie one lastly it is de nullo opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de omni here it is contrary to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now affirmatum and negatum verum falsum contingens necessarium possibile and impossibile c. are as they call them words of Art for indeed they belong to Logicke but these when any thing is brought as an example to them it is nothing but an application of the species to the genus now they call these modalls because the modus is the genus and the axiom is the axiom When I say homo est animal est necessarium why here are two axioms which they are not aware of and in this syllogisme Qui dicit te esse animal dicit verum qui dicit te esse asinum dicit te esse animal ergo c. both the proposition and assumption may bee denyed for in the proposition he disputes from a species to the genus in the assumption he will proue hic homo est asinus because that homo est animal verum est here againe the assumption is false for he disputes â specie ad genus Axioma artium sic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse debent sed praeterea homogenia catholica Here he makes a speciall application of homogenie and catholike axiomes vnto the axioms of Art as if they did belong onely to them and it is true for though the doctrine of axioms be generall to euery thing as Logicke is yet these lawes are peculiar to the axioms of art and they are generall because they belong to all axioms of Art and there is no rule of Art but it must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contra if it be all of these then is it a very rule of Art if it be onely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 then it is in a rule of Art and is but a piece of axiomata artium therefore euery rule of Art must first bee true because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the rule of truth ergo a contingent axiome cannot bee a rule of Art for it may deceiue vs as often as teach truth and it must be affirmed because it must teach for a negatiue axiom tells vs onely what a thing is not for though this axiome lapis non est animal will neuer faile yet not teaching me what lapis is I may take it for a sticke or any other thing Axioma homogenium est quando partes sunt essentiales inter se vt forma formato subiectum proprio adiuncto genus speciei Axioma a rule of Art which must be worthy credit aboue all other rules homogenium that is belonging to that Art yea and to that particular part of that Art and to that particular point of that Art as inuention is not homogeny to iudgement ergo homogeny here must be considered not as it is in the same Art but as it is in the same rule Quando partes sunt essentiales inter se That is when the arguments are essentiall inter se so that here is required an essentiality as the causes are essentiall to the effect what all of them no onely the materiall and the formall so that integrum and membra genus and species the subiect and proper adiunct because the causes of it are to be found in the causes of the subiect why these because they arise from matter and forme are essentiall both as it is actiue namely as the causes giue essence to the effect and also as it is passiue namely as the effect is essentiated of the causes Vt forma formato subiectum proprio adiuncto genus speciei He saith forma formato not materia materiato because though the matter giue his essence yet the forme is but one which makes the thing one whereas there may bee many matters Genus species marke how that the genus and forme make a definition ergo the definitio and definitum are essentiall inter se ergo that makes a rule of Art here he leaues out integrum and membra which I much maruell at for had he put in them then we had had all the arguments that could make these rules of
seeing Aristotle say in his Ethicks that he must proceed à generalioribus ad specialiora did imagine that euery Art must haue his praecognita but Aristotle meanes that hauing spoken de summo bono which was the most generall end hee was to speake of things more speciall tending to that end and alas what is absolute primum in an Art but the first rule ergo can there be any thing to be praecognitum Againe his praecognita are either the Art it selfe confusedly taught or the exposition of some speciall rules thereof and for postcognita why the examples are infimae species ergo lowest ergo we cannot goe further then examples for postcognita Hac enim sola vnica via proceditur ab antecedentibus omnino absolute notioribus ad consequentia ignota declarandum camque solam methodum Aristoteles docuit So that things are to goe before or after by their nature and this Aristotle and euery one doth consider for when a man cloatheth himselfe first he is to couer his head then to put on his doublet hose c. and it is preposterous if a man should first put on his shooes then his stockins or breeches and in making himselfe vnready he must analyse that is first put off his shooes then his stockins c. CAP. 18. De prima methodi illustratione per exempla artium Sed methodi vnitatem exempla doctrinarum artium praecipue demonstrant praecipueque vindicant OVr Author stayes long vpon method his reasons are because all Logicians are very silent in the doctrine of method and they that haue spoken of it are mistaken therein for they make method to be nothing but genesis and analysis whereas they are the practice of a rule or of as many rules as are in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a thing ergo they are not method though there may bee a genesis and an analysis of the rules of method as well as of any other rules of Logicke or other Arts. Now whilst other Logicians knew not this they haue runne into many questions about the multiplicity of method whereas it is but one as may easily bee shewed by reason For if all things are made one by the rule of method though there are many things in the world then there cannot be more methods for then there should be more worlds Exempla doctrinarum artium praecipue demonstrant praecipueque vindicant Ramus saith that method as it is true is not better seene to be one then in the rules of Arts for as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are onely belonging to rules of Art so method is almost and principally of the rules of Arts though their order may be in many other things Quibus quamuis omnes regulae generales sint vniuersales c. In the rules of Art all are vniuersals not that there may not be proper axiomes in an Art but hee meanes such as are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 otherwise if hee should not meane thus this generality would bee onely true of the rules of the generall Arts not of the speciall Arts but though all be generall earum tamen gradus distinguntur as they are compared one with another as the definition of Logicke is before the distribution being more generall then it and so the distribution is more generall then the next and so for the rest Againe the most generall rule in disposition is more speciall then the last rule of inuention because inuentions vse is more generall then iudgements though the rule of disposition may containe more in it then the rule of inuention containeth in it Quantoque vnaquaeque genelarior erit tanto magis praecedet That is as it is pro naturae suae claritate praeponendum so must it be placed Generalissima loco ordine prima erit quia lumine notitia prima est This being the course of nature to proceed from the highest to the lowest for so wee must place things the reason followeth now indeed Ramus himselfe tooke no great paine about Art in generall and therefore imagined that euery definition in Art was absolutely first whereas in very truth none of them are absolutely first but onely that rule of Encyclopaedia Subalternae consequentiae sequentur quia claritate sunt proximae atque ex his natura notiores praeponentur minus notae substituentur tandemque specialissimae constituentur Among subalterns some are more generall and some are more speciall Ramus here speaks Allegorically alluding to genus and species subalternae and specialissimae in Inuention and here special rules are all one with others in themselues though not in comparison with them Definitio itaque generalissima prima erit Ramus meanes the definitio and the definitum not definitio the argument now this must be first why one would thinke it should rather be last because a perfect definition intendeth to lay downe the whole essence of a thing and before a man can know a peece of a thing hee must know it in the whole as it is comprised in a briefe from the neerest causes thereof Distributio sequitur quae si multiplex fuerit c. For so we heard that a definition was manifold integri in membra generis in species c. because as the definition layd out the whole in one lumpe at once from the causes which are the vtmost things so in a distribution there is the whole but laid out distributiuely in his parts so that this is the difference of them and the following rules doe prosecute euery part according to their place Praecedit in partes integras partitio c The reason of this is because the membra make vp the whole and are causes thereof as the definition was of the thing defined Againe the distributio of generis in species is from the effects and they are after the causes ergo distributio ex causis must goe before them againe a distribution of the integrum into the members in an Art is common to a distribution of the genus into the species as for example in Grammar vox is diuided as integrum into litera and syllaba and both letters and syllables are generall to vox numeri and sine numero which are the species of vox Sequitur diuisio in species c. But if there be a distribution of the subiect into the adiuncts they must goe before distributio generis in species as affirmatum and negatum axioma must goe before simplex and compositum because the adiuncts are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with an axiome in generall Againe if we set a distribution of the genus into the species before a distribution ex adiunctis we must handle the species distinctly ergo there would be no roome for distributio ex adiunctis to come in but wee must know that we seldome haue these distributions of the same Art for where there is distributio integri in membra there is seldome