and there is not the least contradiction or shew thereof in it § 8. This one would thinke you readily granted when you say God infallibly knowes all that is past present or possible to be for no man demands any more yet you deny it again in these words meer contingents which with equall possibility may be or may not be have no being in act and therefore can cast no reflection or objective being into the mind of God To which I reply First that you ought to advert 1. That what may be or may not be may be 2. What may be is possible and 3. You your self confesse that God knowes all that is possible Secondly that the having no being in act which seemes to be your stumbling block is a phrase proportioned to the thing and to our finite understandings to which the thing is future onely and so hath no being yet but when God is considered as infinite then whatsoever shall ever be in act that actuall being of it is the object of Gods sight and hath been so from all eternity and is no more removed from him then that is removed from me which is present with me And if you say God sees before what in after time shall hang in the ballance of humane indetermination i e. what he may do deliberates and is free to do or not to do but hath not yet done I demand why may he not also foresee which end of the ballance doth at length overpoise Is not one of these as truly future as the other when the man is not yet borne And so again which end doth not overpoise and never will although he see it might if the man should choose so and that the man may so choose but still that he doth not This is it wherein you say the contradiction is and now it is visible there is none nor the least approach towards any § 9. Here you add which is your second main objection that it is a mistake to call that possible which God foresees shall never be for if God foresees the contrary i. e. that it shall never be it is indeed impossible But 1. I pray is nothing possible to come to passe but what actually comes to passe If so nothing that is is contingent But if some things be possible to come to passe which yet do not come to passe why may not God see they will not come to passe And if he can then that is no mistake which you say is 2. Do but change the word foresight into which is the same seeing from all eternity and then it is plain that God from all eternity may see that thing will never actually be which yet is free for the agent to do or not to do and God sees that too and so is possible every way save onely ex hypothesi on supposition that it will never be And as the bare hypotheticall necessity is no absolute necessity so the bare hypotheticall impossibility is no absolute impossibility 3. God sees every thing as it is and it 's being or not being such is in order of nature antecedent to Gods seeing it Therefore it infallibly followes that if it be possible to be though it shall never be God sees it is possible to be and if God sees it possible it unavoidably followes that it is possible § 10. And it is not fit here to interpose that though it seem to us possible in respect of second causes yet if God foresee the contrary it is indeed impossible For what I am by God left free to do or not to do that not onely seemes but is indeed possible and so it is though in event I never do it and being so in it self God's seeing it will never be hath no least influence upon it so as to make the least change in it for that is the work of his will not of his knowledge and so it cannot from possible convert it into impossible § 11. When therefore you say no cause can effect that which God sees shall never be this is onely true in sensu composito that in case it shall never be and so God sees it shall never be no cause shall effect it but in sensu diviso it is most false for I am truly able to write more lines to you then I shall ever write or consequently then God foresees I shall write and even this that I am thus able God equally foresees § 12. By this you see how far I am from being convinced or by any reason forced to grant that future determinations of free agents are not foreseeable and what the inconvenience is of affirming they are not even no less then derogating from Gods Immensity and Infinity and judging the perceptions of an infinite Creator by our finite created measures his more then unfathom'd Ocean by my span and feigning contradictions where there are none § 13. Now to the Inconveniences which you enumerate I shall reply also as oft as I perceive I have not prevented or answered them already The first is that the sight can be no more certain then the things are which are seen and therefore there cannot be a certain knowledge of those things which in their causes are uncertain I answer that all the certainty of the knowledge of any thing depends upon its being first and then of its being known to be and not onely upon the certainty of its causes I do now as certainly know that I have written nine pages to you as I know that the fire burns therefore that may be known certainly which is not certain in its causes And as that which is present to me is certainly known by me so are all things to come from all eternity present to an immense Creator be they contingent or not And in this case there is not more in the effect then in the cause for what is contingently come to pass being done is certain and cannot be undone and God sees it as it is therefore he sees it as done and so certain yet as done contingently and so as that which might not have been the being certain the manner of its coming to act uncertain The being then being the cause of the seeing or in nature antecedent to it and the seeing the effect or consequent of the being the certainty of the effect is but proportionable to and exceedeth not the cause § 14. The second Inconvenience is that of saying that every thing that happens was certain to be before it happens But I say not so unless by certain you mean ex hypothesi certain to be in case it be for in case it should not be God should see it would not be and then it should be as certainly otherwise § 15. The short is All Exhortations Industry Preaching c. are founded in the liberty of our actions and if they be free till they be actually determined and then are past freedome and become necessary so consequently must Exhortations c.
valere voluit praescivit ideò quicquid valent certissime valent quod facturae sunt ipsae omnino facturae sunt quia valituras atque facturas esse praescivit cujus praescientia falli non potest our wills can do as much as God will'd and foreknew they were able and therefore whatsoever they can do they most certainly can do and what they will do they altogether will do because he foresaw they could and would do it whose prescience cannot be deceived Next in Vives's comments you have Non res futurae ex scientia Dei manant sed scientia potius Dei ex illis quae tamen futurae non sunt Deo ut est error multorum sed praesentes Quocirca non recte dicitur praescire nisi relatione ad actiones nostras dicendus est scire videre cernere Quod si indignum videtur c. Things future do not flow from Gods science but rather Gods science from them which yet are not future to God as the error of many is but present wherefore he is not rightly said to foresee unlesse it be in relation to our actions he must be said to know to see to perceive which if it appeare unworthy c. There come in the words by you recited of Gods science coming from his will which you say is Calvinism but is not set by Vives to interpret S. Augustin's sence that way no nor to assert it as his own but to recite another opinion that hath lesse impiety in it then the denying of prescience would have Thus you see what that Chapter in the Father or his Commentator gaines you Mean while I take you at your word that you grant with S. Augustin the prescience of God and if you grant it with him you must grant it not onely in things which come to passe necessarily as all that God decrees do but simply in all things and particularly in those wherein voluntatis arbitrium retentum freedom of will retained is concerned for to those you see he thorow out the IX and X. Chapters applyes it and if you grant prescience in them you grant as much as I desire if not you deny it which yet you again say you do not more then S. Augustin § 74. What you here add as your conclusion from S. Augustine in his confessions lib. II. c. 18. videri non possunt sed praedici possunt ex praesentibus quae jam sunt videntur they cannot be seen but they may be foretold from those things that are present and are now seen and from Origen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 viz That Gods knowledge of future contingents is meerly hypotheticall this being supposed that will follow c. I shall now proceed to examine 1. By a view of your two Testimonies then of your conclusion from them And first for S. Augustin's words they are not spoken of Gods prescience or predictions but of ours and that of things coming from natural causes Intucor auroram saith he oriturum solem pronuncio c. I behold the morning I pronounce the Sun will rise Look and you will see it manifestly so then it is nothing to Gods prescience of future contingents and you can conclude nothing from it § 75. And for the Chapter in Origen's Philocalia it cannot be but you must have noted in it the weight that he layes on the prediction of Judas's treason the general resolution that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every thing that is future God sees it will come to passe and yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the foreknower is not cause of all that are foreknown citing from Susanna 42 43. That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the knower of secrets that knowes all things before they are then he proposes the question 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how God from all eternity foreknowing those things that are thought to be done by every man our free will may be retained Which he treats against the heathen that say Gods foreknowledge takes away all praise and dispraise c. and maintain it just as you do as you will see if you compare your and their arguing Now to these his answer is that God from the beginning of the creation of the world nothing being without a cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the progresse of his mind thorow all things that are future sees them that if this be that will follow c. and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proceeding to the end of things he knowes what shall be Which he doth expresse to shew that he sees the dependence of all things not from his own will who by knowing them as it followes causes them not but in a concatenation of humane acts and choises as when by temerity one walkes inconsiderately and meeting with a slippery place falls which he that sees is no way the cause of his fall saith he adding that God foreseeing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how qualified every one will be sees also the causes that he will be so mean while his foreseeing is not the cause of their being what they are but though strange saith he yet 't is true 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the thing future is the cause that such a foreknowledge is had of it for it doth not because it was known come to passe but because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it was to come to passe it was known Then he comes to a distinction in what sence it is true that what is foreseen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shall altogether be and states it just as we do all along From all which that I may now follow you to your inferences you can with no reason conclude that it was his and the rest of the Fathers doctrine that Gods foreknowledge of future contingents is meerly hypotheticall You see most evidently from their sayings every where scattered competently by those which I have now set down that this was not their doctrine And this one passage if it were favourable to your conceit as it is not yet could in no reason evacuate all others § 76. In your conclusion that which I mislike is not the word hypothetical but meerly for that signifies God to have no other foreknowledge but that I doubt not but of all things that are God foresees as Origen's words were that if this be that will follow and so I deny not hypothetical foreknowledge But I cannot confine Gods foreknowledge to this one head for why may he not also see and as easily that this and that will both be The principall use of hypothetical foreknowledge is in things meerly possible which come not to passe as before I applyed the example of Keilah which you now mention But what can that have to do with those things which do actually come to passe and that meerly by the free will of man and by no necessity of consequences Though as I said even in
Grace and Decrees Dear Sir § 1. HAving had a sight of the Letter which you sent M. about the Antiremonstrant Controversies dated Mar. 26. and observing one of the reasons which you render of your having avoided to appear on that theme A loathness to engage in a quarrell whereof you should never hope to see an end I thought my self in some degree qualified to answer this reason of yours and thereby to do acceptable service to many who do not think fit that any considerations which have not real and weighty truth in them should obstruct that which may be so much to the common good I mean your writing and declaring your mind on any profitable subject § 2. That which qualifies me more then some others to evacuate the force of this one reason of yours and makes me willing to attempt it though not to appear in opposition to any other passage that ever you have written is the true friendship that hath passed between us and the sweet conversation that for sometime we enjoyed without any allay or unequableness sharp word or unkind or jealous thought The remembrance whereof assures me unquestionably that you and I may engage in this question as far as either of us shall think profitable without any the least beginning of a quarrel and then that will competently be removed from such as of which you cannot hope to see an end § 3. And before I go any farther I appeal to your own judgement whether herein I do not at least speak probably and then whether it were not a misprision which you are in all reason to deposite to apprehend such insuperable difficulties or impossibilities at a distance which when they are prudently approached and examined so presently vanish before you If this one reflection do not convince you it remains that the speculation be brought to practice and exemplified to your senses § 4. You set out with a mention of some positions wherein you say Divines though of contrary Judgements do yet all agree And then it is not credible that you and I should be so singular as to differ in them endlesly of this number you propose five 1. That the will of man is free in all his actions 2. That very many things in the world happen contingently 3. That God from all eternity foreseeth all even the most free and contingent events 4. That whatsoever God foreseeth shall infallibly come to pass 5 That sinners are converted by the effectual working of Gods grace Of each of these you say we have from Scripture Reason and Experience as good and ful assurance as can be desired for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or truth of them that they are so And I who fully subscribe to the undoubted truth of each of the Propositions and do it also upon the very same three grounds of Scripture Reason and Experience which you mention need not the intercession of our friendship to render it impossible to give you any the least trouble of so much as explaining your sence in any of these § 5. Next when you resolve that all the difficulty is about the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 referring that to no more then three heads 1. How to reconcile the certain futurition of what God foreseeth with the liberty of the rational creature and the contingency of casual effects as they proceed from inferiour causes 2. In what manner or measure the effectual Grace of God cooperateth and concurreth with the free will of man in the conversion of a sinner 3. How to cut so even a thread as to take the whole of what we do amiss to our selves and leave the whole glory of what we do well to his grace You are again as secure as any amulet can make you that this resolution of abbreviating the Controversies and confining them to these few heads shall never engage you in the least degree of Debate And then I shall challenge you to feign how it can remain possible without contradicting ones self which still is not quarrelling with you to engage you in any uneasie contention unless it be on one of these three heads and when I have by promise obliged my self which now I do not to raise any Dispute or attempt to ensnare or intangle you in any of these three you have then nothing to retract but your fears to which if I tell you you cannot adhere discerning a sure and near period to that which you apprehended endless this is all the victory I shall project or be capable of in this matter § 6. Of the first of these three Difficulties the reconciling the certain futurition of what God foresees with the liberty of the rational creature and the contingency and casual effects It falls out that you have in your shorter Letter dated Ap. 8. given that account which evidenceth it to be in your opinion no invincible difficulty your words are these That Gods praescience layeth no necessity at all upon any event but that yet all events as they are foreseen of God so shall they certainly and infallibly come to pass in such sort as they are foreseen else the knowledge of God should be fallible which certainty of the event may in some sort be called necessity to wit consequentis or ex hypothesi according as all the most contingent things are necessary when they actually exist which is a necessity infinitely distant from that which praedetermination importeth This I take to be so clear an explication of that difficulty and so solid a determining of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the manner of reconciling praescience with contingency that as I fully consent to it in every part of your period so I doubt not but the last part alone hath made it as intelligible to any ordinary understanding as whole books of Philosophers have attempted to do § 7. For Gods praescience from all eternity being but the seeing every thing that ever exists as it is contingents as contingents necessary as necessary can neither work any change in the object by thus seeing it convert a contingent into a necessary nor it self be deceived in what it sees which it must be if any thing in process of time should be otherwise then from all eternity God saw it to be § 8. I was lately advised with by a Divine to me unknown but one that seems to be a man of good learning about the distinction frequently made in this matter betwixt inevitably and infallibly and my answer and replyes to his severall objections because I would demonstrate the perfect accordance betwixt you and me in this which within this year or two is put into a very grave attire and revered as a great difficulty I will give you at large by way of Appendage at the end of this Letter having by hap a copy retained by me and though it cost you some minutes to survey them yet I know your patience of all such exercises so well that I doubt not of
not violent or irresistible or such as should by being contrary to freedome exclude rewardableness So when you say Christ could not have an intention to dye for them who he foresees would be nothing advantaged by it if by dying for them you mean so dying that they should actually be saved so 't is true he intended not to dye for those that are finally impenitent and so are not advantaged by it for sure it is no part of his Covenant or intention in dying to save such but if by dying for them you mean purchasing pardon upon supposition of repentance then that he intended thus to dye for them that make not this advantage of it and so he sees make it not appears evidently by many texts which tell us of his redeeming those that deny him that perish c. and is intimated by the very style you use of their being nothing advantaged by it for if he did not purchase those advantages for them why is that phrase used § 20. Your fifth Inconvenience is that on this supposition God could not seriously call upon such whom his prescience points out for Damnation to repent more then I could bid him take heed that he fall not whom by tumbling down I saw mortally bruised already I answer 1. that if you mean any more by that phrase his praescience points out to Damnation then he sees ab aeterno that they will not repent but dye in their sins I reject the phrase as not belonging to the question my hypothesis being far from yielding that praescience doth any other way but this or in any other sense point out any to damnation And therefore changing that obscurer for this other more perspicuous phrase I say that Gods praescience of mens not making use of his call is very reconcileable with the seriousness of his call which I inferr from Gods own words and oath as I live saith the Lord I desire not the death of him that dyes turn you turn you for why will you dye what can be more serious then this speech directed to those that dye and he sees obstinately will dye But this differs widely from my warning him to take heed of falling whom I see actually fall'n because whensoever God thus calls not to fall the man is not fall'n when he calls him to arise again being fall'n he is not irreversibly fall'n and therefore accordingly he calls him not not to fall but to rise again And what God thus doth in time God ab aeterno decreed to do and his foreseeing it would not produce the desired effect was in order of nature after the decree of doing it and therefore is in no reason to have any influence on so as to change the decree and if not so then the decree standing still in force it is most necessary that it should be performed and so that God should in time call thus seriously to repentance § 21. And indeed for God to foresee as he doth or els would not punish for it that his most serious call will be rejected and yet not to suppose his call is most serious is an absolute contradiction and so cannot possibly be supposed or imagined § 22. To my argument of Judas's sin being foreseen and foretold by God from whence I conclude that that is foreseen which is not caused by God or to which the man is not determined by any act of Gods will which you say is very pressing you answer by referring to my judgement 1. whether the Prophecies could not have been fullfilled had Judas never been born 2. whether by listning to his Master he could not have repented c. To the first I answer that the prophecy as it was terminated in him could not possibly have been fullfilled had he never been born and that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or utmost completion of the prophecy Psal 41. 9. was terminated in him the holy Ghost by S. Peter tells us Act. 1. To the second that I doubt not but by listning to Christ he might have repented and then God foresaw that he might yet foresaw he would not do what he might and so foretold this whereas if he would have done otherwise it is as undoubted that God should have foreseen that and might if he had pleased have foretold it also as Christ did not onely his treason but also S. Peters denyall and repentance also As for that which you suggest that the prophecy of him might be like that of Jonah conditional 1 there is little probability for it when the event hath so much otherwise interpreted it which if it had not done I should not have resisted your suggestion as far as concerned his perishing But then 2. you know my Argument was founded in Gods foreseeing his sin and no his perishing and to that his conditional foresight exemplified in Jonas to Nineveh is not applyable § 23. That which you cite from Chrysostome who gives for a reason why Christ admitted Judas to the Sacrament that nothing might be omitted that might conduce to his amendment belongs not to your first but second question and so I allowed of it as you see and am not prejudiced by it For to your concluding question I answer expresly Christ look'd on Judas's not sinning or repenting as possible till by his repudiating all the means of Grace and his measure of iniquity fill'd up he withdrew his Grace from him which whether he did before or not till his death I have no means of desining Onely this I resolve that Christs foreseeing what he would do had no least influence on the effect any more then the effect hath on the cause or the sense on the object Gods foresight being in nature consequent to and caused by his doing it not the cause of it And when you say that if it were possible then the contrary was not certain I grant it was not certain till it was done and when you inferr then it could not be foreseen I deny the consequence for those things which are not certain till they are done may by an immense Deity be ab aeterno seen to come to passe in time and so that sight or foresight be as certain as a foresight of what is most necessary in its causes and the reason is clear because of that which is done it is as certain that it is done as of that which is in causis it is certain that it is in causis and being so it may cast a reflexion on the understanding of him that is present to it and so is God to futures as well as to the present § 24 And when you say in your Postscript that it is a contradiction to say that things past or future are present and therefore all things are not nay cannot be present to God I answer 1. that you use not the right definition of a Contradiction in saying thus for future doth not contradict present but present and not present is a contradiction and
those God that sees them as they are both in their causes and most casuall or voluntary mutations and progression and all circumstances concomitant sees one thing following though but freely not necessarily out of another first this and then that and because this or upon this motive therefore that Which as it is far from asserting any necessary chain of causes contrary to the freedome of mans will which in that very place Origen largely establishes so it is far from a knowledge meerly hypothetical for that is not the knowledge of what is but what will be if somewhat else make way for it which being uncertain whether it will be or not there can be no determinate knowledge that the other will be which is quite contrary to his instances of Judas's betraying Christ c. Which were as really and determinately foreseen and foretold as they were really acted And therefore I must desire you not to think this favourable to the Socinian's opinion of Gods foreknowledge of future contingents being onely or meerly hypothetical though God foresee hypothetically yet not onely so or that this key will fit all places of Scripture which foretell things to come because it fits the case of Keilah and Jer. 38 17. and some few others § 77. I have the more largely insisted on this because it seemed so likely to mislead you there being some examples of foreknowledge meerly hypothetical from whence yet to infer that Gods foreknowledge indefinitely is meerly such i. e. that he hath no other is the same errour as from particular premisses or from one or two examples to make an universal conclusion § 78. On view of your fourth objected inconvenience you grant all I said in answer to it onely say you the former difficulty seemes to recurre how A. B. may be truly salvable when if absolute prescience be granted his damnation was as certain before he was borne as it will be when he is in Hell I answer 1. That in answer to objected inconveniences all that can be required of any man is to shew that that inconvenience doth not follow not to establish the principal doctrine again which before had been done by the no implicancy of contradiction which left it possible for God to foresee future contingents and then by consideration of his omniscience which qualifies him to know every thing which is scibile or the knowing of which implyes no contradiction and then by the testimonies of the Prophets who from Gods prescience foretold such futures having therefore done all that was incumbent on me I had hoped the difficulty would not still have remained when all I said was granted But seeing it doth I answer 2. That supposing Gods eternal prescience it cannot but as clearly appeare that A. B. not onely may be but is truly salvable whilst he is in Viâ as that he is damned or no longer salvable when he is in Hell For supposing A. B. in viâ to be one for whom in Gods decree Christ dyed and supposing Gods eternall prescience of all that is unquestionably of all that he himself will do as he sure will all that is under his decree It must thence necessarily follow that God foresees him salvable and supposing that at length he is damned it doth but follow that God foresees him damned These two things then by force of praescience are equally cleer that he is one while salvable another while damned and so they are equally certain and if his having been salvable do not hinder his being damned then neither will his being damned hinder his having been salvable He is truly salvable who God foresees will not be saved How so because God truly bestows upon him all means necessary to salvation and that being all that is required to make him salvable this is as truly done when the effect followes not as when the meanes are most successfull And Gods prescience of the successlessness makes no change hath no influence either on the meanes or the man any more then my seeing a thing done hath causality in the doing it Now if he be salvable though in event he never be saved but damned and Gods praescience that he is salvable be as efficacious to conclude him salvable as his prescience that he is damned to infer him damned what a palpable partiality is it to infer from prescience that his damnation is certain before he is borne and yet not to infer from the same principle that his salvability was certain before he was borne Nothing can more irrefragably prove the weakness of your inference then that it is so obvious to retort it § 79. The short is that which is future onely contingently it is certain that it is foreseen by God yet till it is it may be otherwise and if it be otherwise God sees it to be otherwise and what may be otherwise is not certain to be so and therefore his damnation is not certain before he is born which is the direct contradictory to your inference and that method which will equally infer contradictories of what force it is to establish truth I leave you to judge who propounded the difficulty § 80. Here then is the errour because God cannot erre in his foresight therefore you conclude from supposition of his prescience that the thing which you speake of is certain when yet it no way appeares to you or me that God ever foresaw it but by our supposing that it comes to pass Hence then comes all the supposed certainty from supposing it to come to pass which is the certitudo ex hypothesi a certainty that it is as long as it is supposed to be and then Gods prescience hath nothing to do with it but it would be as certain without supposing Gods prescience as now it is by supposing it And now would you have me shew you how A. B. is truly salvable whilst you retain your supposition that he is damned This if you marke is your difficulty for you have no other ground to suppose that God foresees him damned but because you suppose him damned and seeing it is you see what a taske you have set me even to make two members of a contradiction true together This I confesse I cannot do and I grant God cannot yet thus much I will do for you I will mind you that even when A. B. is in Hell the proposition is still true that A. B. when he was on earth was salvable and if it be true when he is in Hell I appeale to you whether it be not true when God foresees he will be in Hell doth Gods foreseeing him in hell impede more then his actuall being in it If not then notwithstanding Gods prescience A. B. is salvable and so now I hope you see both that and how he is so § 81. In your fifth inconvenience you still adhere that you think it scarcely reconcileable with that determinate prescience which I hold for God seriously to call those whom he foresees
ab aeterno that they will not repent But you take no heed to the place of Scripture which I demonstrated it by turne you turne you why will you dye and as I live I delight not in the death of him that dyes where it is evident God seriously if an oath be a note of seriousnesse calls those who dye and will dye Why do you not lay this to heart when it is so cleare and you yet give me your leave to say unanswerable § 82. I said when God calls to a man not to fall he is not fallen and you say true but he is fallen in Gods prescience I now ask you how you know he is Your onely possible answer is that if he be fallen then by the doctrine of prescience God must foresee him fallen and you now by way of supposition which 't is lawfull for disputations sake to make take it for granted i. e. suppose he is fallen And then as even now I said to your voluntary supposition all is due and with that I cannot reconcile the contradictory and so still what is this to prescience § 83. Again you conclude that God sees A. B. will never rise again how do you know or imagine God sees it but because you suppose it true that he will never rise again and if it be true then it is also infallibly true whether God see it or no. And so still what have you gained your supposing it true is it to which adheres the supposition of Gods foreseeing and infallibility consequent to that but that addes no weight to that which was before supposed infallible § 84. Again you aske can God seriously call him who he sees will never repent seriously do that he sees useless and absolutely ineffectuall I have oft told you and proved to you that he may 't is certain he called Pharaoh when he had predicted he would not hearken and he most seriously doth things to salvifick ends which do not eventually attain those ends and he foresees they do not § 85. I said that what God doth thus in time he ab aeterno decreed to do this as it is apparent by the antecedent to which the relative thus belongs I spake of Gods calling men some not to fall others to rise again and you reply that it seemes to you utterly improbable that God should do whatsoever he doth by an antecedent decree I have no temptation to leave our present taske which is sufficient for the day to dispute that question with you in the latitude as your whatsoever he doth importeth It will suffice if God doth any thing by an antecedent decree or decree any thing before he do it for if any thing then sure his calls and warnings which are parts of his covenant of grace and that is sub decreto decreed by him And then what I said before is still of full force Gods foreseeing mens disobediences to his calls was in order of nature posteriour and subsequent to his decree of calling and giving them grace and being so cannot move him to change what went before or presently to disannull it and till it be disannulled 't is certain and exacted by veracity that he act according to it i. e. that he call those seriously who yet he foresees resist him Why you should here farther inlarge of the greater improbability that God should without consideration decree what afterward he perceives would be uselesse I guess not being sure no words of mine gave you temptation to think that I affixt inconsiderate decrees to our God of all wisdome or counted those calls uselesse which through our obstinacy onely faile of their designed good effect § 86. No more did I give you cause for that harsh-sounding phrase of Gods necessarily pursuing it because it was decreed I should rather have suggested to you these words instead of them that God is faithfull and just and veracious and so performes his part of the covenant of grace with men howsoever they are and he foresees them wanting to their own part § 87. What you say you understand not in my last papers I thus explaine those calls of God which the obdurate reject are most seriously meant by God to their reformation else he would not punish them for rejecting them as he doth by withdrawing them c. This God decrees to do ab aeterno which he could not unlesse he soresaw their rejection of them and yet neither could he foresee their so criminal rejecting them unlesse he foresaw the seriousnesse of them and if he foresaw that then it is as certain as any thing that God foresees that they are serious and although God do not actually inflict punishment upon bare foresight of sin yet sure he may decree to punish those whom he foresees to deserve it and that is all that is necessary to my arguing Else I might tell you that God that accepts not a temporary faith will never accept such a man as is answerable to the stony or thorny ground who in time of tryall would fall away though he should be taken away before temptations approach § 88. In that of Judas you grant that the prophecy as terminated in him could not have been fulfilled had he never been born but then your quere remaines say you whether it might not have been fullfilled in another I answer 1. it could not have been fullfilled in another without some other disciples doing what he did and 't is certain no other did so and therefore what was foretold must have been fulfilled in him or else which may not be believed of a divine Oracle had not been fulfilled But then 2. Christs words to John pointing out Judas for the Traitour he that dippeth c. was a prediction of God perfectly terminated in Judas's person and could not be fulfilled in any other and so your new quere is answered also And that gives you a farther reason if what was said before to your second quere were not sufficient that our Saviours prediction was not conditional but categorically enunciative verily I say unto you that one of you shall or will betray me and he that dippeth at that time when Christ spake it deictically i. e. Judas is that person § 89. In your view of what I said to your second question you first insist on my answer that the event proved the denunciation against Iudas was not like that against Niniveh conditional but I foresaw the small force of that which I used onely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and therefore added a second that the prediction of Iudas was of his sin as well as punishment and the prediction of his sin could not be conditional nor the prediction of the Ninivites punishment any way be applicable to it leaving therefore the weaker I adhered onely to this which when you labour also to evacuate by interpreting one of you will betray me by unlesse he repent c. he will betray me You consider not 1. that Christs