that it need not be proved for it is frequently found in Scripture The Lord converteth the Lord gives repentance that God circumciseth and takes away the stony heart and gives a heart of flesh Lastly That God doth regenerate and by his owne power raise from the death of sin I let passe the force of the similitude as no man can contribute any thing to his owne generation or resurrection so neither to his spirituall regeneration or resurrection God I say doth all these things but they could not be attributed to him alone if he had any cause so co-operating with him as that if it refused no such effect could follow I adde that of the Schoole-men is most true That God is the cause of the whole Being that is although God be not the efficient cause of sinne which is not a being but rather a defect of what should be in a faculty or act but rather a deficient will but of every good work of which kinde our first conversision is a chiefe one if it be most full of Being or if it be a whole Being as it is of such a whole work I say it is necessary that God should be the cause for God alone is the cause of the whole Being wheresoever it is found Yea all Divines acknowledge that so farre as Sinne it selfe is a Being God is the cause of it Wherefore although the Will be the secondary and subordinate efficient cause of conversion from whence it is that the Scriptures doe exhort us to turne our selves and circumcise our hearts and so forth Yet as a co-ordinate cause it no way can resist the quickning grace of God and receive it in vaine as Arminius speaks I adde although God would admit of a Partner in this work yet the will which is wholly depraved and dead in sinne can no more co-operate with exciting and moving grace than a carkasse prepared and disposed by rubbing can revive it selfe and put forth vitall acts But that I may conclude this reason Let it be supposed that the Will may work together with the grace of God or not according to its liberty yet if this opinion stand how much more than is meet will bee arrogated unto man and derogated from the glory of God Man may well boast that his will contributed so much to regeneration that if he had not willed it had never been produced For as he who being admonished by another gives an almes doth attribute the work more to himselfe than to him that perswaded him or stirred him up to it so he whose will being onely moved or admonished by assisting grace turnes it selfe unto God doth more or at least equally ascribes his conversion to himselfe than to Divine Grace which had never produced that effect unlesse he himselfe had consented unto it and made its perswasions effectuall whereas it was in his power to have rendred them frustrate The fourth reason is taken from hence That the Decree of Election by which God determined with himselfe to save some persons selected from the common Masse is absolute and therefore doth necessarily and inâ—â—â—libly attaine its effect That the Decree of Election is absolute so that the Lord looked upon nothing foreseen in the persons chosen but absolutely decreed to work in them all conditions required to salvation is so clearelâ— manifest from many places of Scripture that it scarce needes any proof for if we chuse not God but he us Ioh. 15. if we are chosen that we might be holy not holy that we might be chosen If he chose Iacob rather than Esau when both were of like and equall condition Rom. 9. If effectuall vocation and justifying faith are the fruits and effects of predestination not the foregoing conditions Rom. 8. Lastly If Gods meer good pleasure be the onely reason of the Decree He hath mercy on whom he will and hardeneth whom he will It necessarily followes that God hath absolutely decreed to save some and to that purpose to bestow upon them Grace Faith and Holinesse Granting these things it appeares that God converts all the Elect after a manner by them irresistible on this manner Because if they could resist that Grace which is fit to convert them being also given to this end that they might be converted then this absolute and peremptory Decree of God might be disappointed by the creature which must not be imagined Neither is there ground that they should now object that by the same reason those whom God hath rejected do sinne irresistibly For we deny that there is the same reason of both for although Faith be the effect of predestination yet infidelity is not the proper effect of Reprobation Whereas Faith requires a cause of it selfe efficient which hath a true and proper influence into its effect But there is no efficient cause required to unbeliefe but deficient because it followes upon the meere defect and absence of that cause by which Faith should be wrought As to the illumination of the aire there is required the Sun or some other efficient cause having influence into that effect but the absence of the Sunne is enough to cause darknesse In like manner although the sinnes of Reprobates do infallibly follow from the determinate counsell of God who hath decreed their event yet Conversion and Faith doe follow the absolute Decree of God after a much different manner sinnes do follow infallibly indeed but onely by a necessity of consequence that is God not at all causing or effecting but onely permitting but Faith and good Works follow by a necessity of the consequent as of which God must most properly be called the Author according to all Divines For no man ever said that men did believe were segenerate and turned to God did good works God onely permitting but causing and working But if this be granted to us as needs it must that Faith and Conversion do follow the absolute decree of God by a necessity of the consequent that is a necessity causing and co-working I see not how it can be denyed that it is wrought in us after an irresistble manner For when any Agent so worketh upon the patient that it necessarily overcomes it it is properly said to work irresistibly In like manner God if he so convert a sinner that he is necessarily Converted by a necessity of the consequent then he converts it irresistibly that is after such a manner as the patient must needs yeld from whence I wonder that those who deny election to depend on foreseen faith doe yet defend that conversion is wrought after a resistible manner and so as it may be frustrated Let this be the fist and last reason If conversion be wrought after that resistible manner as is described by them who follow Arminius then Divine election cannot be certaine according to their principles because it dependeth on the mutable will of man which as it is described by Arminius I dare say could not be foreseene by God himselfe for let it be supposed which they lay as the foundation of that praevision that God doth perfectly foresee all the wayes whereby the will may be turned aside or inclined unto good Let it also be supposed that God fore-knowes all objects or circumstances which may any way be offered or proposed to the will Lastly let it also be supposed that God doth perfectly know how every object or circumstance is fit to move the will and drive it this way or that way by perswasion Yet if this be the condition of the will that allowing any objects yea further allowing any fitnesse in these objects or circumstances to incline the will this way or that way it may yet by vertue of its intrinsecall liberty act or not act I see not how God can foresee what the will certainly and infallibly will doe that is whether it will turne to God or not Not that God by reason of any impotency is not able to search out what the will shall endeavour but because the thing it selfe is not knowable For there cannot be greater certainty in the knowledge than in the object from whence I thus reason If it be certaine that the will shall assent unto grace offered then it is falsly said that the Will supposing all the actions of God that are requisite may turne it selfe or not On the other side if it be uncertaine whether the will shall resist this grace or not then that foreknowledge which God hath of it cannot be certaine for that which is to be knowne is the measure of knowledge and therefore it is a contradiction to say that the knowledge is true and yet there is more certainty in the knowledge than in the thing knowne As it implyes a contradiction to say that the thing measured is greater or lesse then the measure and yet to be equall to it I adde although it be true that God knowes all the wayes according to which the will may be well or ill inclined Yet if the will be altogether undetermined admitting nothing to determine it neither within it selfe nor without it whether created or uncreated as they defend implyes a contradiction that any certaine way whereby it should fall out that the will should be ordered or disordered can be determined by God himselfe Out of all these things it is gathered that if converting grace move the will after a manner that may be resisted by it God cannot infallibly foreknow who shall believe and who not and consequently all election should be utterly taken away Therefore it remaines That converting grace is both imparted by God and received by us after a manner Irresistible FINIS
in it selfe and equally inclined unto either part whence is that facility and promptitude in working for as by evil actions the Will contracts a stain whereby it is habitually disposed unto evill so by good actions the soule is touched with a better tincture whereby it is habitually inclined unto good and that setting aside the operation of moving and exciting Grace 7. All Divines of better note acknowledge That charity or the love of God is not a meere act but a permanent habit but that habit hath no place in the understanding because it is an affection nor in the sensitive appetite which cannot be raised to spirituall love It remaineth therefore that it be peculiar to the Will and so the Will to be most properly capable of habits and of habituall Grace 8. Lastly How absurd is it to grant the whole man to be dead in sinne so that it can no way reach unto any good truly spirituall and yet to defend that the Will which is the very leader of the soule the driver of all faculties the Lady and Queene of humane acts and that principle which impaireth spirituall good or evill unto all actions which men performe How absurd I say is it to hold that this faculty was neither spirituall before the Fall nor carnall after the Fall but to be utterly void both of the corruption brought in by the first fault and of spirituall gifts infused in the regeneration of man It were easie to overwhelme this Opinion with more absurdities but these shall suffice By all these things it is apparent enough that a new quality or habit of grace is infused into or impressed upon the Will which is earnestly denyed by the Arminians as hath been before proved by their own words But who so yet doubts whether this be their Opinion let him read the Hague Conference pag. 298. of Bertius Translation where they do industriously and purposely defend that in spirituall death spiritual gifts are not separated from the will of man neither were implanted in it before that death in the state of Innocency because if by these kinde of gifts the will were inclined unto either part the liberty of it were taken away which they say consists in this That it can equally bend it self to either part when all requisites unto action are afforded It remaines now briefly to be proved that God whether immediately or mediately both by infused grace and morall perswasion turneth sinners unto himselfe after an irresistible manner But this caution is to be premised that by the word Irresistibly we doe not understand any force offered to the Will which is repugnant to its nature but onely an insuperable efficacy of Divine Grace which inclines the Will sweetly and agreeably to its owne nature but so certainely and necessarily we understand that Necessity which even now we called Certainty that it cannot be put off by the Will 1. The truth of this Opinion is manifest from hence That every where in Scripture the conversion and regeneration of a sinner is attributed to God alone and to his good will and pleasure but every even the least co-operation is taken away from man himselfe Rom. 9. It is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth but of God that sheweth mercy Hee hath mercy on whom he will have mercy and whom he will he hardeneth which could not be truly said if a man at his owne freedome and pleasure allowing all the actions of God requisite to conversion might receive the quickning grace of God in vaine and make it void as Arminius speaks And let it be observed from these words That this mans repenting and that mans hardening is not only attributed to God alone but the will and endeavours of man is utterly excluded from having any part in this businesse It is not saith the Apostle of him that willeth nor of him that runneth c. As the wheele doth not run well that it may be round but because it is first round so a man doth not therefore will or run that God might have mercy on him and regenerate him by the quickning grace of the spirit but because God first hath mercy therefore he willeth and runneth in the way of righteousnesse 2. The second reason is taken from the infallible connexion of the Effect with the Cause that is of Conversion with converting and quickning Grace For if this quickning Grace alwayes attaine its effect neither is offered to any but those in whom it is effectuall to the healing and regenerating of their soule we must necessarily attribute unto it a certaine prevalent and irresistible working But it appeares by many places of Scripture that this grace doth alwayes attain its end in those to whom it is communicated Iohn 6. 37. Whatsoever my Father giveth me cometh unto me Jer. 31. 23. Turn thou me and I shall be turned From whence it is gathered That into whomsoever grace fit for the conversion of a man is infused that man is certainly and infallibly converted otherwise a man could not thus addresse to God Turne me that is doe what thou art wont to doe by the help of thy Spirit and the infusion of thy Grace and I shall be converted for perhaps the will in whose power it is to receive or reject grace may make it void The same is evident from Iohn 6. 45. Whosoever hath heard and learned of the Father cometh unto me that is whosoever hath so heard and beene taught of God that he hath also received and drunk in the quickning Grace of the Spirit he hath certainly come unto mee Whence it appeares That Grace fit for the conversion of a man is never frustrated but it attaines its effect after an insuperable manner so that it can never be put off by the will of man Which is further confirmed from the nature of Grace and that powerfull manner whereby God infuseth it into the heart of man For if Grace be the effect of infinite power as it is and that man be regenerated by the same power wherewith Christ was raised from the dead then God in the implanting of it in the will of man puts forth that almighty power which no created faculty is able to withstand or resist 3. This Argument may also be added The grace of God is so the efficient cause of Conversion that it admits no joyn'd and co-ordinate cause although it hath a subordinate cause to wit the will of man adjoyned to it But if the Will when it is excited by assisting grace as they call it can resist it then it may also assist it if it may withstand it then it may also joyn endeavour with it to produce the same effect if it can make it void it may also make it effectuall and so may be a cause co-ordinate with the grace of God in bringing forth the first act of its conversion But that God doth convert or regenerate men by his owne and onely work excluding all co-ordinate causes is so cleare
nor voluntary for the Will is meerly passive in the receiving and therefore exercises not its freedome 2. Secondly The inclination arising or flowing from Grace is irresistible for it proceedes from the Will formed and endued with Grace not in a moral but physicall way that is not in a way of perswasion but reall operation But it is voluntary for it is produced by the Will in an active way yet it is not free because one of the requisites to freedom which is the foregoing judgement of the understanding is yet wanting 3. Thirdly The judgement of the understanding concerning this initial and imperfect Inclination is irresistible For the understanding being enlightened by Divine Grace doth irresistibly and infallibly approve this Inclination and it is so far free as the Understanding is capable of freedom 4. Fourthly When the Understanding hath put forth its last and conclusive dictate then the Will as I said puts forth a compleat and executive willing which is actuall Conversion unto God And this Willing is both irresistible and free and so Conversion it selfe is both free and irresistible 1. It is irreresistible because it necessarily followes the reall Inclination of the Will preceding and the last dictate of the Understanding approving and confirming it It is also most properly free for it hath those things which are required unto liberty seeing the Will therein is not passive but active 2. It is not brought forth but in the way of morall perswasion that is not without the preceding judgement of the understanding weighing on each part what is best to be done for every active and compleat Willing which hath had such a deliberation and determination of the Understanding concerning an object offered going before it must be called truly and properly free And for that definition of freedome whereby that is said to be free which supposing all things requisite to action may either act or not t is a definition setled only in the brains of the Jesuits and neither hath foundation among the Fathers nor the antient Philosophers nor yet among the more ancient School-men whom yet Suarez endeadeavours to wrest to the maintenance of his opinion So have you our opinion according to which a man is converted irresistibly and yet freely which that you may yet more fully understand these Axiomes follow from it which are contrary to those of the Iesuites and Arminians 1. We do not say that Free-will or the faculty of the Will as to spirituall things is half alive and half dead as the Arminians would have it Confer. Hag. p. 300. or that it is like the power of moving in one who is bound in fetters or as the faculty of seeing in one who is shut up in a dark place as the Papists say But we hold That the faculty of the Will as it respects a truly spirituall good is wholly extinct as the power of life in a dead man of motion in a slaine man of sight in him whose eyes are put out 2. They also defend That the Will is onely stirred up by morall or assisting Grace knocking at the doore of it and admonishing it not that it is changed by habituall Grace healing and renewing it For these are their words There is no reason why morall Grace that is morally perswading may not make a naturall man spirituall But we suppose that the will is quickned and renewed by the infusion of habituall Grace that is of a new quality imprinted on the Will which is as an inward principle enlivening and changing the Will from whence all good inclinations and operations do proceed 3. They hold That the Will is otherwise concerned in Conversion than in an active way We maintain that the Will in the first act of Conversion is partly passive and partly active that is first Passive then Active and so it worketh together with God not partly by a naturall ability and partly by a supernaturall strength received from grace passing by but by vertue of a power wholly supernaturall which is conferred by infused and quickning grace according to that of Augustine To will is of our selves but to will well both partly and wholly is of grace 4. The Arminians think That the quickening grace of the Spirit and whatsoever else on Gods part is required to the conversion of a man is communicated as well to the Reprobate as to the Elect and that with intention of their salvation otherwise God should deale deceitfully and hypocritically with them when he offers the Word unto them Let their own words be read Coll. Hag. p. 308. But we hold That the quickning grace of God which is fit for the healing and renewing of the Will is peculiar to the Elect and is imparted to them by vertue of the divine Decree to the end they might be saved But 't is denyed to others and that our God hath not determined to save them 5. They say That the Will stirred up by quickning grace may act or not act turne to God or not but otherwise it were not free for they hold liberty to stand in this That granting all things required or all the actings of God the Will may act or not whence is that of Corvinus against Tilenus pag. 337. Grace doth not so furnish the Will with strength but that it alwayes remaines in the power of the Will to use it or not use it We on the contrary say That the VVill cannot resist or withstand the reall motion proceeding from Grace nor the divine perswasion offered to it by an enlightened understanding but doth necessarily follow the guidance of God according to that of S. Augustine Free-will cannot resist God in the work of salvation 6. They say That the Will excited by Grace doth properly work together with God is a co-ordinate joynt-cause a partial Concomitant-cause and hath such an influence into the effect that if it be withheld the effect in no wise can follow We on the contrary say That the Will indeed doth co-operate but as a cause every way subordinate and wholly subject to the dominion of God as the principall agent insomuch that it cannot properly be called a co-worker but rather it acts as it is acted move as it is moved and being first turned into God it turnes it selfe unto God 7. They deferd That God cannot convert us in an irresistible way unless we be turned into stocks and blocks and so being driven with a continuall motion we act nothing but God all in us On the other side we say that stocks and stones have no power to act being acted but that men are free Agents and therefore have a power by vertue of which they act being acted by God and therefore may be said truly to act and turne themselves for the will being changed from evill unto good and of unwilling made willing hath in it selfe an inward principle of willing well from whence the dominion of its owne act whereby it turnes unto God may properly be given unto it for
although the grace of God is the principle by which yet the will of man is the principle which worketh all In like manner although God be the first and totall efficient cause of conversion yet the Will is the next efficient cause and totall also in the kinde of second causes therefore as the effects are wont to be attributed unto second and created causes although they act by vertue of the first cause so conversion is most properly to be attributed unto the Will although it act wholly in the strength of God and converting Grace 8. Lastly They deny That the unresistibleness of divine Grace and the liberty of mans Will can stand together But we say That Conversion is irresistible and yet free But we distinguish concerning the irresistiblenesse of Grace 1. There is one kinde of Irresistiblenesse whereby regenerating Grace infused from God is received by the Will and this irresistiblenesse of reception we confesse cannot stand with liberty 2. There is another kind whereby the inclination putting on to spiritual good doth flow from after a physicall or reall manner from the Will fashioned by Grace and this motion we say comes from the Will irresistibly and voluntarily but not freely 3. There is an Irresistiblenesse whereby the Will assents unto this Physicall motion proceeding from Grace as also to the perswasion of the Understanding approving of it and that necessarily or certainely And this kinde of Irresistiblenesse we say may very well stand with Liberty because it comprehends in it selfe those two things in which Liberty stands 1. That the Will in putting forth this last act of willing is active and not passive 2. Because the morall perswasion or judgement of the Understanding thinking that the conversion propounded that is either the taking or refusing the object offered is in the power of man hath gone before For we hold That whatsoever is done in the act of Conversion either by a meere Reception or by a physicall or powerfull Determination is not free But that every willing is only so far free as it is produced in an active way and flowes from a reasonable perswasion and that upon this ground that reason lies indifferent to things opposite that is Reason onely is the root and foundation of all Liberty from whence it followes that every act of the Will into which Reason hath its influence is most free You see now what our opinon is which we have beene the longer in opening because the explication of it is its chiefe confirmation and the confutation of the contrary Besides it is a very difficult thing to expresse what the Arminians hold in this dispute because they cover and wrap up their opinion in so doubtfull and specious words There yet remaine the Arguments by which our opinion is so to be confirmed which I shall be brief in Two things are to be proved 1. That qualityes or habits may be infused into the Will which they deny because they suppose that such an infusion doth utterly destroy and take away the nature and liberty of the Will 2. That this habituall and quickning Grace being thus infused we are converted by God in a certaine way and by us irresistible Arg. I That there is such an infusion of Grace renewing and healing the Will inclining and determining it to one of the two opposites in the act of Conversion appears by this That all Divines hold that there is in the Will an habituall aversion from God and an habituall turning to sensible and carnall things But this habituall corruption of nature cannot be healed by the sole help of Grace meerely exciting For as corporall so spirituall diseases are not cured but by contraries and therefore habituall corruption cannot be changed but by an habitual quality imprinted on the Will Prosp. therefore saith right The inward sense is not opened to doe spirituall things untill the foundation of Faith and fervour of Love is planted in the Heart 2. Unlesse it be granted That such an habituall Grace is infused into the Will by which it is inclined to good after a physicall manner there will be found no formall principle in man from whence good acts may be produced for as in corporall things no man fees unlesse he first have eyes nor heares unless he hath eares so in spirituall things no man sees unlesse God hath first given him eyes to see nor hears unlesse he hath given him eares to heare By the same reason no man can turne himselfe to God unlesse he have a new Heart that is a new Will to turne and love God For what meanes that Scripture An evil Tree bringeth forth evil Fruit a good Tree bringeth forth good Fruit But that we should thereby understand that the Will must first be made good before it can performe any spirituall work which must necessarily be done not by exciting or perswading Grace but by Grace healing and regenerating 3. Let it be supposed that the Will deformed by habituall corruption could by the meere help of exciting Grace be raised to the putting forth of spirituall acts Yet would this be contrary to that sweetnesse of Divine Providence which is acknowledged by all Divines For God should not sweetly put forward the Will so disposed but in a forced way hurry it on to its work which its own inclination is yet averse from It is therefore more meet to place in the Will a certaine habituall Propension unto spirituall good which it may performe not by vertue of exciting grace but from the infusion of habitual grace 4. It is confessed by all that the Will unrenewed hath no principle in it truly spirituall and yet they will not deny that this act of turning unto God is truly spirituall and supernaturall but how the Will onely excited by motioning Grace and not changed by Grace regenerating should be placed in the rank of supernaturall agents I understand not 5. I will aske what is that which makes a man truly holy and Godly not simply acts good and godly for as the Philosopher sayes Acts doe not denominate the subject to be such it must therefore be some habit by vertue of which a man is called godly and holy But that habit is not placed in the irrationall part of the soule for that is not properly capable of Vertue or Vice but onely by Participation to wit so farre as the rationall part of the soule redounds upon it But if it must be placed in the rationall part it must not be in the understanding for no man is good or evill onely because he understandeth good and evill things as Aquinas very well observes but therefore is one called a good or evill man because he wills those things which are good and evill It remaineth therefore that the habit of holinesse cannot be placed anywhere but in the will as being the subject most properly capable both of habituall holinesse as also of habituall corruption and rebellion which is contrary thereunto 6. If the Will be indifferent