was found to call this into question amongst Christians All Naturalists acknowledge this difference betweene naturall agents and voluntary agents and no Christian denieth but all this proceeds from Gods inward decree and outward operation accordâ—ng to this decree But what if you have a further ayme then this and the obscurity of your expression in this particular serves onely to amuse your reader in that which is of no worth that so in the meane time his intention may overslâ—p the observation of foule things broached by you in a few words For consider I pray would you have your reader swallow sucha goageon as this that God is at this time free to decree this Why doe you not say as well that God is at this time free to decree the salvation or dammation of any man For why should not one decree of God be temporary as well as another and how contradictious is this to your owne often profession of Gods everlasting decrees and also to your present doctrine of Gods immutabilitie For if he be now free to decree this or that then may some decree of God begin to be which before was not and consequently there shall bee a change in God For as much as some act shall be found in God which before was not And if Gods decrees be everlasting and yet to this day he continueth free to reverse these decrees then is God free to change Perhaps you will say Gods liberty is eternall for otherwise I know not to what purpose you discourse here of Gods eternall liberty I answer God is still and ever shall be free but in respect of what In respect of those things that are possible and indifferent to be done by him or no. But that Gods eternal decrees should be at this time indifferent to bee made by him or no is a thing utterly impossible God alone cannot doe this as Philosophers were wont to say to make that which is done to be undone it being a thing implying manifest contradiction Againe the libertie of God is not like unto the liberty of his creatures whether Angels or men which yet notwithstanding you very confidently confound manifesting no sense of so uncouth an assertion Liberty in the creature is unto different acts of will as either to will this or to will that but no such libertie is to be found in God It was and is impossible there should bee any other act in God then there is because God is a simple act and that act is his very essence and as his essence cannot nor could not bee otherwise then it is so neither could any other act of will be in him then there is Gods liberty is only to different objects not to different acts though you passe over this without any distinction Againe in the sentence going before you told us God was free to exercise his power and to communicate his goodnesse which is most true but when in the next place you tell us he is free to decree this is nothing answerable to the former For to decree is no exercâ—se of his power nor communication of his goodnesse For if it were then seeing his decrees have beene free from everlasting from everlasting there should be an exercise of his power and communication of his goodnesse Which is as much as to say that the world was everlasting Your next sentence is as wilde as the former or rather more not to speake of the coherence of them For it seemes you have no more care of that then as if you were dictating proverbs That the course of mans life or the finall doome awarded to every man though that must be awarded to all according to the diversity of their courses should be immutable because they are foreset by an immutable omnipotent decree hath no more colour of truth then to say the omnipotent creator must needes be blacke because he made the crowes and Ebony black c. And this comparison you enlarge with multiplicity of instances as the course of your stile is to exuberate in matters of no moment You might as well have sayed that there is no colour of truth why God that made a crowe should be a crowe or that made the swanne should be a swanne And indeed there is no colour of truth in this For indeed a painter makes a fayre picture but it no way followeth herehence that he should be a fayre picture or so much as fayre And though a pewterer makes a chamber-pot yet no colour of truth that he should be therefore a chamber pott or that because a Chimny-sweeper makes a clean chimny therfore himselfe should be a cleane chimny Never was any knowne to be so absurde as to devise any such inferences Like as I think never any before your selfe was knowne to affirme that there was as litle colour of truth in collecting that things decreed by God should be immutable because his decree is immutable For I pray what proportion doe you find in these the efficient cause that is aequivocall is not of the same nature with the effect produced therefore the thing decreed is not immutable by reason of the immutability of the decree whereby it is decreed Let every Reader judge whether there be so much likenesse betweene these as betweene a foxe and a Fearne-bush Yet you give no reason but the bare proportion it selfe to beare it out Now the former inference which you denye is drawne from the cause to the effect the later inference which you denye is drawne from the effect to the cause Yet these inferences you make proportionable If you would make them suitable after some such manner as this it should proceed God makes crowes black herhence it followeth not that God himselfe is black so God decreed to damne Iudaâ— herehence it followeth noâ— and what I pray I am ashamed tâ— follow the proportion of your inference least so I should utter that which in modestie is not fit or thus God makes Iudas his damnation immutable herhence it followeth not that God is immutable or to helpe you with a proportioned case fitter for your turne God makes Iudas his damnation mutable herehence it followeth not that God or his decree is mutable This I say better serves your turne but this is not the inference whereupon you passe your denyall but rather quite cam as we say Gods decree is immutable herhence it followeth not that Iudas his damnation though foreset by God is immutable Yet as for that inference proposed which I sayd was more fitter for your turne who ever sayd that God decreed Iudas his damnation to be mutable or the damnation of reprobates to be mutable Who ever sayd that God decreed the salvation of Peter or Paul or of any one of Gods elect to be mutable And indeed it were very absurd to say so For the mutability of a thing supposeth the being of a thing Now hath God ordained that the salvation of Gods elect after they have obtayned it or the damnation
did this opinion growe common there Did that Kingdome consist of more Protestants then Papists Or amongst the Protestants was the number of Calvinists more then of Lutherans Speake playnly say the choosing of a Calvinist to be their King was the ruine of the State of the Provinces which were as members incorporate therinto say Calvinisme was the ruine of the upper the lower Palatinate And herupon let your Almanacke of Prognostications proceede be bolde to tell the States of the Lowe Countreys that this Tenet is a forerunner of their ruine allso unles they we foorthwith turne Arminians we are like to be lost fall into the handes of Papists But of what Papists Not such as Thomists the Dominicans the most learned Divines in the Church of Rome for they maynteyne that God determineth the will of Men Angells to every act of theirs whether good or evill as touching the substance of the act by influence generall over above allso unto every good gracious act such as faithe is repentance by influence speciall And as he dothe thus determine the wills of all his creatures so from everlasting he did decree thus to determine them Belike the Iesuites are they into whose handes we are like to fall unles with speede we turne Iesuits that so herafter we may comfort our selves as Themistocles did with Periissemus nisi periissemus we had bene undone if we had not bene undone that vtterly both body and soule Happy are the Lutheran Arminian party that they are acquainted with no such forerunner of their ruine They are like to holde their owne while they acknowledge a sweete disposition of the Allseeing and unerringe providence leave out All deorecing providence out of their Creede But let the Dominicans looke to it least their ruine be not at hand allso as well as ours For there is to be found such an oracle in some Mens writings that whosoever shall embrace the doctrine of Gods Alldecreeing providence let them knowe this opinion is the forerunner of ruine ito most floorishing States Kingdomes where it growes common or comes to full light And the experience of the course of these times especially in the ruine of the Palsgrave of so many Christian Provinces with him For certeinly 〈◊〉 no time or part of the world besides was any such experience to be founde so conveniently to serve your turne Is it not great pitie but that the Kinges majestie his Counsell both houses of Parliament should be acquainted with this mystery of State for why shoulde I doubt but that God will heare the affectionate prayers of his people in good time establishe a perfect vnion betweene the King his people In the meane time we will wayt upon the Lord who hath hid his face from the house of Iacob we will looke for him Yea we will give him no rest untill he restore Ierusalem the prayse of the world This I confesse is a way to supplant your Adversary opinions but of any power you have to confute them and therby to praevent the growthe of them I have founde litle evidence in other of your writings by the generall survey I have allready taken I have small hope to finde any great satisfaction in this But let us examine this point a little more narrowly You suppose that some in opposition to Arminius doe maynteyne that all thinges were so decreed by God before the Creation of the world that nothing since the Creation coulde have fallen out otherwise then it hath done and nothing can be amended that is emisse But I knowe none of any such opinion nay rather they whome I concenve you doe most ayme at doe directly teache the contrary We are willinge to professe with Austin that Non aliquid sit nisi quod omnipotens fieri velit velsinendo ut siat vel ipse faciendo Nor ought commeth to passe but that which the Allmighty will have to come to passe eyther by suffering it to come to passe or himselfe working it And with the Articles of Ireland confirmed by our State in the dayes of King Iames that God from all aeternitie did by his unchangeable counsayle ordeyne whatsoever in time shoulde come to pusic Now whatsoever God willethe he willed eternally For in God there is no variablenes nor shadowe of change And supposing the will of God that such a thing shall come to passe eyther by his operation or by his permission it is impossible in sensu compositâ— in a compound sense that it shoulde not come to passe But this impossibility is not absolute but only secundum quid in respect of somewhat to witt of Gods will decreeing it is allwayes joyned with an absolute possibility of comming to passe otherwise in sensu diviso in a divided sense As for example it was absolutely possible that Christs bones shoulde be broken as well as any of the theeves bones that were â—rucified with him For bothe his bones were breakable the souldiours had power freewill to breake them as well as the others bones but supposinge the decree of God that Christs bones shoulde not be broken vpon this supposition I say it was impossible they shoulde be broken Nay further we say that unles thinges impossible to come to passe otherwise then God hathe decreed them upon supposition of Gods decree be notwithstanding absolutely possible to come to passe otherwise it were not possible for God to decree that some thinges shall come to passe contingently For to come to passe contingently is to come to passe in such sort as joyned with an absolute possibility of comming to passe otherwise Thus we say with Aquinas that the efficacious nature of Gods decree is the cause why contingent things come to passe contingently necessary thinges necessarily his wordes are these Cum voluntas divina sit efficacissima non solum sequitur quod si antea quae Deus vult fieri sed quod eo modo fiant quo Deus ea fieri vult Vult autem quaedam Deus sieri necessario quaedam contingenter ut fit ordo in rebus ad complementum universi Seing the will of God is most effectuall it followeth not only that those thinges come to passe which God will have come to passe but allso that they come to passe after the same manner that God will have them come to passe Now God will have somethinges come to passe necessarily somethinges contingently that there may be an order amongst thinges to the complete perfection of the Universe And accordingly God hath ordeyned all sorts of second causes bothe contingent causes to worke contingently as the willes of men Angells necessary causes to worke necessarily as fire in burninge the Sunne in giving light heavy things in mooving downewards light thinges in moovinge upwardes And as he hath ordeyned them to be such kindes of Agents thus distinct so he hathe ordeyned
that they shall worke agreably he setteth them going in working agreably to their natures the one contingently the other necessarily So that whatsoever the will of God is shall fall out contingently the same falleth-out in such sort as it might have fallen out otherwise if good so as it might have fallen out woorse bene marred if ill yet so as it might have fallen out better bene amended And the eleventhe Article of Irelande having professed that God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsayle ordeyne whatsoever in time shoulde come to passe addethe herunto by way of explication that so this was ordeyned as therby no violence is offered to the wills of reasonable creatures neyther the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away but established rather So that the opinions which you make bold to supplant or prevent are opinions of your owne makinge not of others maynteyninge And to sett an ende to his owne fancyes every man may take liberty when he pleasethe without any great paynes takinge about argument to overthrowe them SECT I. IN the first Section and before the first Chapter accordinge to exact method as you professe in reference unto your former Discourse you propose two thinges to be enquired 1. How this truthe of Gods being most certenly knowne by internall experience unto some may by force of speculative argument be made manifest unto others Secondly how his nature and attributes may be fitliest resembled The latter of which two I shoulde never have expected in a Philosophicall or Theologicall discourse Yet I will prescribe to none but give every vessell leave to vent his owne humour to be delivered of such notions wherwith his braynes have bene conceaved If we have any use to make of them we may if none we are litle the woorse for that Every beinge hathe three passions denominating it For there is a truthe of it there is a goodnes of it there is an unity of it Therfore allso all these are to be founde in the beinge of God But it seemeth not to be your meaninge to speake of this truthe which is a passion of beinge a simple terme but rather of the truthe of this proposition There is a good to witt howe it may be made manifest by speculative argument you desire to inquire grantinge it to be most certenly knowne by internall experience unto some wherby unles you understande our Christian Faithe I discerne not your meanninge Vpon the first point you will not have us to looke for much as yet and the reason you give is enoughe to put us out of expectation of any thinge at all For allbeit a desperate enimy despayring of his life Is therby the more animated to sight yet an Adversary in discourse by evidence of argument brought to despayre of maynteyning his Tenet is not therby the more provoked to dispute And therfore I see no iust restraynt to hinder you from bestowinge your best ability upon this argument even in this place And your selfe confesse that notwithstandinge all this you may proceede upon such advantages as groundes of nature give you And your mayne purpose extendes no further CHAP. I. YOVR first Argument is not like to strike your enimye with any great feare or despayre Arguments weake or weakely prosecuted weakneth the cause maynteyned strengthenethe the cause oppugned And first it is not handsomly caryed thus If every particular generation hath causes then all generations have some cause implyinge that every generation hath many causes all have but one But cary it howe you will it is not capable of any sound inference It is true Every generation hath his cause therfore all generations have causes But what causes only the same causes which every one hathe a part aggregated together For as you make an aggregation of particular generations so the cause of this aggregation inferred can be but an aggregation of the particular causes of particular generations So that nothing at all is concluded here hence distinct from the praemises much lesse the being of the Godhead herby evidenced Then your second inference is as wilde when you adde Otherwise all shoulde not be of one kinde or nature For there is no congruity in affirming the whole by aggregation to be of the same kinde or nature with every particular For every particular is unum per se consistinge ex actu potentia But the whole by aggregation is unum per accidens consisting of many particulars each wherof is unum per se heaped together not by any naturall union vnited into one As we doe not say the bushel of corne is of the same kinde with every particular grayne as allso it cannot be sayde to be of a diverse kinde in any congruitie allthough there were diverse kindes of graynes therin But rather an heape of graynes whether of the same kinde or of diverse kindes Agayne you propose your argument not only of the generation of Man who is of one kinde but of all generable bodies who are well knowne to be of diverse kindes therfore why should you accoumpt it any absurdity for all these to be not of one kinde or nature Furthermore when you make shewe of such an Inference as this All must have some cause otherwise they be not of one kinde or nature you doe herby imply that All that have some cause are in a fayre way to be of the same kinde or nature which upon consideration you will finde to be utterly untrue For all creatures have some cause yet are they not any thing the more of one kinde or nature Allthoughe they have not only some cause but the same cause allso namely God Like as though thinges have different causes yet it followeth not that they are of different kindes As all mise are of the same kinde though some are bred equivocally some univocally so of lise and diverse others For although Averroes were of opinion that mise bred equivocally mise bred univocally by generation were of different kindes therupon maynteyned that such as were bred equivocall did never propagate their like by generation yet I doe not thinke you are of that opinion it being contrary to manifest experience And to us it is manifest who believe the creation that the first creatures were not produced by way of generation yet did propagate their like were of the same kinde with creatures propagated from them But Averroes was an Atheist even amongst Arabians denyed all creation I am sory you are so unhappy in defendâ—nge truthe especially such a truthe as the being of God but thâ— best is that truthe needethe no mans defense I hope you will proove nothing more happy in defending errours Yet I deny not but that the greatest Divines doe conclude that there is a first cause that is God because the progresse from effects to causes from causes infâ—rior to causes superior cannot be infinite According wherunto your argument shouldâ— have proceeded thus In
suitable to the power of so infinite an Agent And consider finite thinges are able to produce finite thinges equall unto themselves why then may not God being infinite produce something that is infinite It may be answeared that the experience of producinge equalls to the producers themselves is true only in the way of generation And so God allso in the way of eternall and incomprehensible generation producethe a Sonne equall to himselfe yea the same with himselfe as touching his nature But this is grounded upon a mystery of faithe which hathe no evidence unto reason naturall For allthoughe by reason meditation on Gods woorkes we may atteyne to the knowledge of God as touching the unity of his nature yet can we not therby atteyne to the knowledge of God as touchinge the Trinity of persons Adde unto this that diverse have not only believed but undertaken to proove allso that God is able to produce that which is infinite in extension eyther in quantitie continuall or discrete And Hurtado de Mendosa a Spanishe Iesuite and a late Writer is most eager in the mayntenance of this So farre of are your propositions from caryinge evidence in their for heads Yet you suppose an argument which is very inconsequent For you suppose that whatsoever hath cause of beinge hath allso a beginninge of beinge and that in time But this is notably untrue unto us Christians For the Sonne and Second person in the Trinitie hathe a cause of his beinge to witt the Father Likewise the H. Ghost hathe not only a cause but causes of his beinge to witt bothe the Father and the Sonn for he proceedethe from them bothe yet hathe he not such beginninge of beinge as you speake of For bothe he and the Sonne are everlasting like unto the Father Your second reason is woorst of all as when you say For omnis causa est principium omne causatum est principiatum For in the meaning of this proposition causa and principium are taken for voces synonymae woordes of the same signification not signifying two thinges the one wherof is consequent unto the other And what sober Scholer would affirme that omnis causa est principium as principium signifiethe the beginninge of beinge wheras indeede it is the cause of beginninge of beinge to its effect rather then formally to be stiled the beginninge of beinge it selfe That which followethe of the limits of thinges more easily or more hardly discerned accordinge as the cause is founde to be preexistent in time or no is an assertion as wilde as the similitude wherby you illustrate it and all nothing to the purpose to proove that whatsoever hathe cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge thoughe still you proceede ambiguously without distinction eyther of beinge or of the limits therof For first where the cause is not preexistent in time as in things risinge by concomitance or resultance yet the effects are as easily seene to be limited as when the cause is preexistent in time as for example the light of the Sunne and the light of the candle which flowe from those bodies by naturall emanation was as easily seene to be limited the first time it was as after the light is a long time hid from us and afterward appeares agayne unto us Secondly what if the limits be not seene what I say is that to the purpose Angells are invisible yet we knowe their natures are limited Thirdly what thinke you of the World hathe it limits or no You thinke no doubt it hathe yet was not God the cause therof preexâ—stent in time but only in eternitie For before the World no time had any existence Agayne suppose the Wolrd had bene made from everlasting which some Scholemen have helde to be possible in this case God shoulde have no preexistence eyther as touching time actuall or as touchinge time possible Yet I hope that limits of the World even in that case had bene as discernable to Aristotle as nowe they are to you As for the similitude wherby you illustrate it that rather sheweth howe in such cases when effects doe rise by way of concomitance or resultance they are hardly distinguished from their causes then how their limits are hardly discernable Yet what shoulde moove you thus to amplify howe hard it is to discerne such effects from their causes I knowe not For what hardnes I pray is there in discerninge light to be different from the body of the Sunne that gives it or from the body of a Candle or of a Glowewoorme or of some kinde of rotten wood or from the scales of some fishes that cast light in the darke Yet is all this nothinge pertinent to the confirmation or illustration of the last proposition propounded by you Howe farre dependance upon a cause dothe inferre limits of beinge upon the thinge dependinge I have allready spoken What meant you to distinguishe of the consideration of effects and causes accordinge to the consideration of them eyther distinctly or in grosse unles it be to puzle the Reader as much as you confound your selfe when eftsoones you manifest that you speake of them bothe as they have causes which is to consider them only as effects For that notion alone hathe reference to a cause But whether this dothe inferre that they are limited I have allready therupon delivered my minde 3. Hence you proceede to the solution of newe problemes and that as a mere naturalist Why men in these dayes are not Gyants why Gyants in former times were but men And the reason you give is because the vigour of causes productive or conservative of vegetables of man especially from which he receavethe nutrition and augmentation is lesse nowe then it hathe bene at least before the flood The latter of your two questions is wilde For what doe we understand by Gyants but men of a Gyantlike stature is it a sober question to aske howe it commethe to passe that men of an huge stature are but men For suppose men were of never so vast a proportion of parts as great as the Image that Nabucliodonosor sett up in the playne of Dura or as great as the Colossus at Rhodes shoulde not men notwithstandinge be men still and neyther Angells nor beasts much lesse eyther inferior to the one or superior to the other If the heavens were infinite as some conceave that an infinite body may be made by God yet shoulde those heavens be heavens still and a body still Neyther dothe it followe that therfore those Gyants were men still because the matter of nutrition and augmentation was finite limited For thoughe they had bene turned into Woolves or other beastes the matter of nutrition had bene limited still yet in such a case they had ceassed to be men As touchinge the stature of men so much lessened in these dayes in comparison unto former times I no way like the reason therof assigned by you First because it caryethe no evidence with it you give
affirme the other namely that whatsoever God hath not decreed it is impossible that it should come to passe wherhēce alone is derived the first abstract you speake of Nay rather if we consider the analogy of propositions aright we shall find that these propositions are onely proportionall Whatsoever God hath decreed to come to passe the same shall necessarily come to passe Whatsoever God hath decreed that it shall not come to passe it is impossible that it should come to passe These are suitable indeede and accordingly we professe that it is impossible that any thinge which is not because God hath decreed that it shall not be I say it is impossible that it should be So likewise as touching the second extract we say that every thing which hath beene so farre forth as God hath decreed the being thereof it is impossible not to have beene Your third extract is of the same nature with the first and so admitts the same answere Well I still attend the discovery of the fallacy It may be we shall meete with it in that which followeth and that is this But if it bee as I suppose very consonant to infinite wisedome altogether consonant to infinite goodnes and to decree contingency as well as necessity a conclusion quite contradictory to that late inferred will be the onely lawfull issue of the former Maxime or Major proposition matched with a Minor proposition of our owne choosing c. Is this to discover the fallacy of the former syllogisme Or are you to seeke in the solution of a fallacy If it be not concluded in moode and figure you might have signified so much but indeede no exception can that way be taken against it If any terme had beene aequivocall the answere had beene by distinction But no colour of any such just exception so that every way the forme is unquestionable And therefore no exception is here to be taken but against the truth of one of the premises And I verily beleive there is one of the premises that disliketh you though you are ashamed plainly and directly to manifest so much For so the answere had beene fayre and facile by denyinge it if not the Major because thereof you make use in your owne syllogisme wherewith you doe as it were requite this yet at least the Minor which was this But God hath decreed every thinge that is For I verely beleeve this is such a dish of lettice as fitts not your lipps This you say you might have done but now the liberty hereof is taken from you and that by your selfe For although the Pope never bindes his owne handes yet you have bound your tongue and sealed up your owne lippes from taking any such exception as this For you call the syllogisme a fallacy and that a simple one Now fallacies are such formes of argumentation as offend onely in forme of argumentation which kind of exception is to justify the matter of it and the truth of the premises especially whereas you doe not professe that it offendes both in forme and matter nor shew any forwardnes to deny either of the propositions Well we gave you a syllogisme to answere in steede of answering it you thinke to make us amends with another syllogisme I have read that when one presented Augustus with verses looking for a reward Augustus in steede of a reward gave him verses of his owne making The Poet hereupon very liberally bestowed a reward upon Augustus We expected at your handes not another syllogisme but the answearinge of our owne But though you fayle to answeare ours I will not fayle to doe my best in accommodating an answere unto yours You undertake to inferr the contradictory to our conclusion which is to outface your opposites and to cry a syllogisme downe without answearing it Yet let us see how well you performe that you undertake Your syllogisme is this Whatsoever God hath decreed must of necessity come to passe but God hath decreed contingency as well as necessity therefore of necessity there must be contingency And for the better strengthning of your discourse or argumentation you make a motion that an additionall to the Maior which is this Nothinge can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed it shall or may come to passe Now the judge or Chancelour in Logicall Courts to whome such a motion should be made would cry out shame upon it For that proposition is an universall affirmative and you desire that an universall negative should be added to it to make up an entire Maior proposition which were like a sixt finger upon an hand And indeed in that case it were neither Categoricall nor Hypotheticall For though two propositions with a copulative have place in some Hypotheticall syllogismes yet it is alwayes by way of negation thus Non dies est nox sed dies est ergo non nox Againe upon a second consideration the motion would be rejected as being altogether without witt For as much as the conclusion intended is well enough inferred without it and this additionall conferres no strength to improve the inference I appeale to every schollars judgment in this Thirdly the proposition it selfe as touching the latter clause of the disjunctive hath as little witt as the motion made for the admittance of it As where it is sayd that God hath decreed that thinges may come to passe you might as well say that God hath decreed that the World may come to passe For the possibility of the event of thinges is not from Gods decree but rather from Gods omnipotency For because he is able to produce every thinge that implyes no contradiction therfore they are denominated possible Lastly this proposition which you crave to be admitted is like a Troian horse it will doe you more harme then good as ere we part from this section shall be made manifest Yet what neede you desire more your conclusion is granted you namely that of necessity there must be contingency supposing Gods decree For Gods decrees are onely of doing or suffering some thinges as it is free for God whether he will doe them or suffer them yea or no. And therefore though God had not at all decreed contingency yet decreing any thinge of necessity there must be contingency though he had decreed nothing else but such thinges as we count most necessary in the course of nature But we graunt also that God did decree contingency and decrees necessity in respect of second causes as for example God did decree to make fire of such a nature as to heate or burne necessarily the Sunne of such a nature as to enlighten the aire necessarily heavy thinges to move downewards and light thinges upwardes and all this necessarily Necessarily I say in respect of second causes though this necessity was mere contingency in respect of the will of God For he could have chosen whether there should have beene any fire or world at all yea and can hinder the fire from burninge if it
to imprison his infinite wisedome in his selfe-fettered power to restraine the Aeternall Majestie from using such libertie in his everlasting decrees as some earthly Monarches usurpe in causes temporall or civill For the Pope never tyes his hand by any grant which is a fault in him But in that Holy One the reservation of such libertie is a point of high perfection A little before you told us very gravely that weedes grow apace and the former errour which you minced as loath to declare your mind thereon plainly touching Gods decreeing all things was soone delivered of a second to wit the ground of Gods foreknowing things to come to be the determination of his will You rather thinke that God foreknowes things to come before and without the determination of his will Whether this opinion of yours bee a tare or good corne let the Reader judge And of what nature not a second is but seconds are whereof it seemes you are soone delivered which now we come to examine To say that God foreknowes all things because he decreeth them is you say to imprison his infinite wisedome in his power Why it is nothing so for Gods decree is Gods will not his power yet how is Gods wisedome imprisoned in his will more then his power For as God knoweth more things possible to be done and fit to be done then he doeth so hee can doe more then he doeth and therefore his wisedome is no more imprisoned thereby then his power But besides this you take your aime quite amisse For the foreknowledge of what things God will bring to passe is no part of wisedome For for a man to be privie to his owne purposes is no part of wisedome for it is incident even to silly creatures Againe to know what I meane to doe what a senselesse thing it is to say that this is to imprison my knowledge and as like senselesse a thing it is to say that Gods knowledge or wisedome is imprisoned by being privie to his owne purposes Againe how is Gods power fettered by his will Seeing the power of every creature is to be ordered by his will without fettering of it you signifie that his liberty is hereby restrained wherein in his everlasting decrees A most senselesse speech Is it possible that by making an everlasting decree Gods libertie of making an everlasting decree shall be restrained Perhaps you may say by making it he cannot alter it I answer if he should alter it after he hath made it this decree by way of alteration should not be everlasting but you suppose the contrary namely that Gods decrees are everlasting Or if God should for a while suspend his decrees and not make them with the first how is it possible they could be everlasting This savoureth strongly of an affection to maintayne that Gods decrees may be not everlasting with Vorstius though you are ashamed to professe it and therfore hand over head you thrust in the denomination of everlasting upon the decrees though quite contrary to your intention For you would have God still indâ—fferent to decree this or that as the Pope is who by no graunt bindes his hands And why so is it that upon emergent occasions God might decree a newe as he thinkes fitt why but consider all these emergent occasions were from everlasting knowne to God So that if God at thâ—s time were indifferent to decree he would decree no otherwise then he hath from everlasting For from everlasting he knewe all that now he doth and at this present his will is no otherwise then from everlasting it was For with him is no variablenesse nor shaddow of change The wildernes of your inventions I well perceave is not at an end I wonder whither the wantonnes of our witts would bring us in the end Neither are Gods judgements yet at an end in giving men over to illusions to beleive lyes and that for not embracing his truth with love And who can looke for better from them who shamefully oppose the gâ—ace of God Is it marvaâ—le if God infatuate them As for the being of things absolutely necessary by reason of Gods decree this is your language not ours in the last period of your former Section We say looke what God hath decreed that of necessitie must come to passe but how not alwayes necessarily but sometimes contingently Only the workes of nature doe by the decree of God come to passe necessarily but as for the actions of men they come to passe by the decree of God contingently and freely But whether workes of nature or actions of men they of necessitie must come to passe if God hath decreed them and that after such a manner as God hath decreed them to come to passe that is necessary things necessarily contingent things contingenâ—ly 6. As a man or Angell having free power to doe this or that by producing any thing subject to the freedome of his will doth therewithall produce contingency without decreeing it for in as much as he workes freely the worke must needes be freely wrought that is contingently In like soâ—t God being free to produce any worke without him upon the producing of such a worke doth produce contingency without decreeing it For the work cannot be wrought by God but freely and consequently it must needs come to passe contingently To produce this or that is the object of Gods decree because he can choose whether he will produce this or thaâ— but to worke contingently is no object of Gods decree â—for it is not in Gods power to choose whether he will worke contingently or necessarily If he doth worke at all ad extra he must needs worke freely that is contingently For as it is of the perfection of the divine nature to bee necessarily so it is the perfection of divine nature to worke not necessarily in the producing of ought without him but freely contingently But the divine nature differeth from the nature Angelicall and humane that he not only worketh freely but also is able to create creatures herein like himselfe that can worke freely as namely Angells and men like as he can and hath produced other creatures that worke in all things necessarily Agayne considering that necessitie and contingency are but modi rerum certaine manners of bringing things to passe therfore cannot exist without the things themselves whâ—ch are sayd to exist and to be brought to passe either necessarily or contingently Therefore it cannot be sayd that God doth produce the necessitie or contingency of this or that particular unlesse he produceth the particular it selfe neither can he be sayd to decree the contingency or necessity of this or that particular except he decree the thing it selfe So that for God to decree the necessitie or contingency of this or that particular is nothing else then to decree that this particular shall necessarily come to passe or such a particular shall contingently come to passe Neyther is it reasonable to affirme that God doth
to say that our will is contingently free seeing this is as much as to say it is possible that the will of man should not be free But you give a reason and it is worthy our consideration if perhaps therby we may perceyve to what issue of tolerable sense your present discourse may be brought And the reason is this For unto every cogitation possible to man or Angell he hath everlastingly decreed a proportionate end to every antecedent possible a correspondent consequent which needes no other cause or meanes to produce it but only the reducing of possibility granted by his decree into act For what way soever of many equally possible mans will doth encline Gods decree is a like necessary cause of all the good or evill that befalls him for it I looked for an elucidation of a former assertion or two of yours namely that God is the true and principall cause of every action and deede that hath passed from you this yeere like as he had beene the cause as you say of every thought and action that might have passed from you if the frame of your thoughts and actions had beene altered The other assertion was that our will is necessarily subject unto Gods will which also is delivered in reference to the former assertion I say I looked for an elucidation of these by this following sentence wherin you pretend to give a reason of the former But this performes nothing lesse If you had done something the last yeere which you did not as you might then the whole frame of your thoughts and actions this yeare had beene altered and God had beene the cause of this alteration and of every thought and action therin And the reason is this For unto every cogitation possible God hath decreed a determinate end But I pray you consider are the thoughts and actions of men this yeare the proportioned end of somethinge that you did the last yeare Or are they correspondent consequents to our antecedent actions the last yeare Many man the last yeare was an opposite unto goodnes he is reformed this yeare and become a proselyte Is grace the proportionate end of the state of sinne The last yeare many a man was a formall professour this yeare it may be he is turned Papist or Turke is this a correspondent consequent to that antecedent Yet many continue formall professours still wiâ—hout any such alteration some have changed theyr formalitie into realitie It may be some man the last yeare hath satisfied anothers silthy lust and this yeare is advanced by it Call you this a correspondent consequent destined by God Some have prospered by impoysoning of others and proceeded in their sinfull courses so much the more without controll In a word by the last Clause it appeares that by proportionate end correspondent consequents you meane only the good and evill that doe befall men according to their former workes according to that God will rewarde every man according to his workes But by your leave this hath no proportion to prove that God is the Authour of every thought and action of man this yeare which you made to be consequent to some thing done the last yeare and God to be the true and principall cause of every one of those thoughts and actions For what Are mens thoughts and actions this yeare the rewardes and punishments of the same mens actions the other yeare What a ridiculous conceyte in this Well still we holde you engaged to maintayne that which you have plainely avouched namely that God is the true and principall cause of every action and thought of man for a yeare together yea and of every thought and action of yours for the yeare past which you have delivered without any explication I have manifested the incongruity of your whole discourse in generall In particular consider further you say that mans will is necessarily subject unto God this we understood in respect of operation in proportion to what you delivered in the sentence before going but you understand it in respecte of rewardes or punishments succeeding proportionably unto former actions whether good or bad But by your leave it is not mans will but his person rather that herin is necessarily subject unto God For no wise man useth to say that mans will is rewarded or punished but his person rather Agayne suppose God decreeth not the actions of men but the rewards of them yet you have not explicated how in this case Gods will depends not upon the will of man the true explication whereof that I know is only this that the execution of his will may depend upon mans will to witt in rewarding or punishing but not the will of God himselfe Yet if good or evill actions of men be foreseene by God before he hath decreed either to reward or punish neither have you offered to cleare Gods will in this case from dependance upon the will of man neither are you able to performe it Agayne it is false to say that God hath decreed a proportionate end to every cogitation possible For many cogitations are possible which shall never be And it is absurde to say God hath decreed an end to that which shall never bee Agayne by this proportionate end and correspondent consequent you understand rewardes or punishments But it is false to say that God hath ordayned to every cogitation a reward or punishment For to the evill thoughts and words and deeds of Gods children he hath ordayned neither reward nor punishment to befall them but his purpose is to pardon them Agayne punishments for the sinnes of men are many times inflicted by the sinnes of men So Sennacherib that blasphemer of the God of Israel was slayne by the sword of his owne children Davids adultery was punished by the filâ—hy actions of his owne Sonne Absolon deflouring his fathers Concubines If these were proportionate ends to former sinnes and correspondent consequents and everlastingly decreed by God what hindereth but that in your opinion actions notoriously sinnefull may be sayd to be decreed by God You say the producing of these consequents and proportionate ends needsno other cause or meanes but only the reducing of possibilitie granted by his decree into acte Which is plaine gibrish you instance in nothing for illustration sake not as if your discourse were so plaine that it needed it not but rather it is so unsound that you might well feare it And darkenesse is fittest for them that hate the light I will give instance for you Absalons deflouring his fathers Concubines was a disproportionate end and correspondent consequent to Davids defiling his neighbours wife for God punished David hereby and Arminius acknowledgeth that this fact of Absolon Inserviit castigandâ— Davidi Now this fact of Absolon by your doctrine in this place needed no other cause or meanes to produce it but onely the reducing of possibilitie granted by Gods decree into act Now what possibility doe you meane the possibility of Davids defiling Bethsheba
It is manifestly untrue first in generall that to produce a reward and punishment no cause is required but the producing of the fact which is to bee rewarded or punished Consequents naturall follow I confesse upon antecedents naturall but it is not so with consequents morall such as are rewards and punishments And in particular the case is cleare that something else was required to Absolons defiling Davids Concubines then Davids defilâ—ng of Bethsheba For both the counsell of Achitophel and Absolons corruption in yeelding thereto and the pâ—nishing hand of God herein were found in this and none of all these was found in Davids sinne Or doe you meane this of the possibility of Absolons sinning as he did so that to the punishing of David no other thing was required but Absolons reducing his power of defiling his father Concubines into act Now this I confesse is a truth but such a truth as might make any wise man ashamed to accommodate himselfe to the grave profession of it though he did not affect any singularity of conceit therein For t is as much as to say that to defile Davids Concubines no other thing was required then to defile them for this is to reduce possibility granted as you say by Gods decree into act and that is enough But by your leave it is not enough to salve your credit to say that a possibility hereof was granted by Gods decree For you have plainly professed that God hath decreed not a possibility of a proportionate end or correspondent consequent to every cogitation but a proportionate end and correspondent consequent And therefore if the defiling of Davids concubines by Absolon was a proportionate end or correspondent consequent to Davids former cogitations and actions then by your doctrine this deiling of Davids concubines by Absolon his sonne was everlastingly decreed by God and not the possibility of it And how absurd a thing it is to say that God decreed the possibility of any thing whereas all contingent things are possible in their owne nature without the decree of God as the whole world was possible and that not by the decree of God But it seemes you have reference to the possibility not of the punishment but of the time for which correspondent punishment is decreed as appeares by that which followes as when you say Did we that which we doe not but might doe many things would immediately follow which now doe not which though it be granted you yet herehence it would not follow that No other cause should be required to the producing of them then our producing of the antecedent But by this you justifie that upon Davids adultery Absolon his defiling Davids concubines and upon Sennacheribs blasphemy against the God of Israel Adâ—amelech and Sharezar his sonnes slaying him with the sword in the Temple of Nisroch his god did inevitably follow For these things did befall them and those things which doe befall you and us doe come to passe as you professe in the next place though not as absolutely decreed by God and in the first place yet because he decreed them as the inevitable consequents of some things which hee knew he would doe By all which it cannot be avoided but that Absolon defiling his fathes concubines in speciall and all the sinnes of man whereby God doth punish former sinnes in generall are by this your opinion decreed by God as inevitable consequents of some things which God knâ—w would be done Now let us examine this a little further You speake indifferently of good and evill that doth befall men And these indifferently you prosesse to be ordayned by God upon the foresight of some thing in man So then like as the damnation of any man is ordayned by God not absolutely and in the first place but upon the foresight of some evill thing in the person damned so the salvation of any man is not decreed absolutely by God and in the first place but upon the fore sight of some good in the person saved or to be saved which good must be eyther faith or good workes or both or which is worst of all some thing which is lesse evill as suppose naturall humilitie in the state of nature Yet you will not seeme to be an abetter of their opinion that maintayne election to be upon the foresight of faith or workes Yet let me have one bout with you more in the point of reprobation also God foreseeing some evill in man say you doth purpose to condemne him Now because like as no evill can exist without Gods permission so God could not foâ—see evill but upon presupposall of his purpose to permit it it followeth that the decree to permit sinne is before the decree of God to damne for sinne therefore permission of sinne is in Gods intention before damnation and consequently it must be after it in execution as much as to say God doth first damne men for sinne and afterwards permit them to sinne Hereupon you will reflâ—ct upon us with an interrogatorie saying Will you maintayne that God did first decree to damne men for sinne and secondly to permit them to sinne I answere If I did maintayne this I should looke to be confuted by reason and not to be cried downe without reason or contrarie to all reason Nay I had rather maintayne an harsh opinion according unto reason then a plausible opinion in contradiction unto manifest reason Secondly I answere by negation For I doe not mayntayne either of these to be subordinate unto other in Gods intention but rather coordinate because neither of these thinges decreed is the end of the other but both joyntly make up an integrall meanes tending to the manifestation of Gods glorie in the way of justice according to that of Aquinas who professeth that reprobation includeth the will of God of permitting sinne and of inferring damnation for sinne Now let us proceed to that which followes It is absurde to say we have a possibilitie to doe what we doe not but rather you should say we have an abilitie to doe what we doe not For possibilitie is of a passive signification not active And abilitie to obey God I confesse we had in Adam and in Adam we have lost it That which you call the absolute necessitie of Gods decres is not in respect of Gods act in 〈◊〉 For his decrees are most free but in respect of the event ensuing upon supposition of Gods decree So then thinges freely decreed upon this supposition must necessarily come to passe Both that which should and that which doth befall us floweth alike you say from the absolute necessitie of Gods decree Now because your present discourse is not of Gods power but of his wisedome that you might not seeme beside the text you tell us in the close that herein is seene Gods incomprehensible wisedome that nothing falls out without the circumference of it whereas that all things fall out as God hath decreed it is rather the fruit of his power
of the reprobates after they suffer it shall be mutable Hath he not rather ordained the contrary both as touchâ—ng his elect that they shall ever be with the Lord and as touching the reprobate that their Worme shall never dye and their fire never be extinguished Yet I confesse either is simply mutable in respect that God hath power to alter it But this kind of mutability is not the object of Gods decree For God doth not decreec to take unto himselfe power to doe this or that Yet it is true that by vertue of Gods decree some things come to passe contingently and some things necessarily But this is onely in respect of the agency of second causes some of them being made by God agents naturall working necessarily some agents rationall and free working contingently and freely Not in respect of Gods owne agency for whatsoever God doth work outwardly that must needs come to passe contingently or freely for it is not in the power of God to worke necessarily it is the perfection of God unalterable to be necessarily to worke freely Now the doome of any man is the work of God and so is the condemnation both of men and Angels and not the worke of second causes and therefore the contingent being thereof is not the object of Gods decree God doth not decree that to fall out contingently much lesse doth he decree that after it is it shall be mutable speake your minde plainly and tell us whether the damnation of Iudas or of the Angels that fell or of any reprobate that is departed this life is mutable I presume you dare not affirme this and what is the reason not because God wants power to alter but because his will is that it shall not be otherwise and his will can neither bee changed from within nor resisted from without because it is omnipotent In this case therefore this consequence is good God hath decreed the damnation of Iudas and his decree is immutable and omnipotent therefore the damnation of Iudas is immutable to wit supposing the foresaid decree of God Now consider wee the damnation of wicked men not yet departed this life hath God decreed it or no if no then his decrees are not everlasting the contrary whereunto you have hitherto professed in words though I feare your meaning is otherwise Againe if God hath not yet decreed it then hereafter he shall decree it for he must first will their damnation before he damnes them and consequently there shall be a change in God and something found in him which before was not contrary to that which you have delivered in this Chapter sect 2. in these words Vnto infinite perfection what can accrew If then God hath decreed it and this decree or will of God cannot be changed for you confesse it is immutable nor can be resisted for you confesse it is omnipotent will it not necessarily follow herehence that the damnation of such wicked men yet surviving is immutable This I speake in your phrase but in mine owne phrase I say onely that herehence it necessarily followeth that all such shall bee damned which necessity is meerly upon supposition of Gods decree and therefore not necessity simply so called but onely secundum quid and upon supposition So likewise concerning the salvation of Gods Elect who are yet surviving if God hath decreed it seeing his will is both unchangeable and unresistible their salvation must needs bee immutable to speake in your phrase but to speake in mine owne phrase it necessarily followeth herehence that they shall be saved There is to way to help this but by maintaining that Gods decrees are not absolute but conditionall but it seemes you dare not venture upon this assertion in plaine termes though the face of your tenet bespeakes such a course And in another Treatise of yours you talked of a certaine disjunctive decree of God It were a commendable thing in you to deliver your selfe plainly of your meaning for otherwise you will be guilty of something else besides a corrupt judgement And indeed if you would deale plainly and maintaine that God hath decreed salvation or damnation to none absolutely but to all conditionally and withall by sound arguments confirme it there should be no further question we would willingly subscribe that no mans salvation should come to passe immutably as you speake or necessarily as we speake no not so much as in respect of Gods decree if so be God hath decreed salvation to no man absolutely but conditionally and that in such sort as that he may bee either saved or damned as he will But then withall you must maintaine that God hath decreed to give no man faith and repentance more then another but left it indifferently to their free wills whether they will beleeve and repent or no. For albeit God hath ordained salvation to befall men upon ther finall perseverance in faith and repentance yet if God hath withall decreed to give some men faith and repentance and finall perseverance therein and deny all this unto others herehence it will follow that God in effect hath ordained some men absolutely unto salvation and not other and it will necessarily follow herehence that as many as to whom God hath decreed to give faith and repentance and perseveranâ—e they shall be saved and as necessarily that all others shall not be saved to whom God hath decreed the deniall of the like grace unlesse you will say that though God doth not give any such grace yet they may beleeve and repent if they will and therein persevere unto the end I see no reason to the contrary but this must be upon your opinion as before hath beene specified albeit you are not very forward in plaine termes to expresse as much And in this place you scatter somthing that seemes to me directly contrary hereunto For consider though Gods decree concerning the doome of every man be immutable yet you deny that hethence it followes their doome shall be immutable Now this of a conditionall decree is evidently untrue as I presume will appeare of it selfe For if God hath no other decree concerning Peters doome then this If thou beleevest thou shalt be saved if not thou shalt be damned the case is cleare that this doome is immutable not salvation absolutely nor damnation absolutely but either salvation or damnation disjunctively as elsewhere I have found you to discourse of a disjunctive decree of God Therefore seeing you speake of such a doome which you deny to be immutable it followeth that you cannot understand it of a disjunctive doome as salvation or damnation but you must needs understand it of a single doome by it selfâ— as the salvation of Peter by it selfe or the damnation of Iudas by it selfe And withall you doe acknowledge this doome to be forset by the decree of God which is as much as to acknowledge that it is decreed by God Now I say if it be decreed by God seeing his decrees cannot be
coaction and naturall necessitation though now you divert from this unto civill liberty which is onely liberty from subjection As touching the lawes of men it is fit there should be a Court of Chancery for mitigation because men cannot foresee all cases that may fall out and by too strict observation of lawes summum jus may prove summa injuria But this cannot without great absurdity be applyed unto the decrees of God who from everlasting was ignorant of nothing but foresaw all things that were to come And by the way what doe you manifest hereby but a strange fancy that in some respects it were fit Gods decrees should be alterable lest otherwise hee might be deprived of liberty in taking opportunity of doing good implying withall that God in course of time takes notice of something whereof from everlasting hee was not conscious And though the Pope in reserving to himselfe power and liberty to send them forth or call them in againe doth take upon him more authority then is fit because hee hath neither wisedome nor integrity answerable to so great authority yet seeing God wants neither wisedome nor integrity it seemes fit in your judgement as may appeare by the tenour of this sentence that he should make decrees and recall them at his pleasure And so though at the first entrance upon this discourse and since also you professed that Gods decrees were unalterable yet here you plainly signifie that Gods wisedome and integrity may well beare him out in exercising such authority as the Pope usurpes to wit in making grants at pleasure and at pleasure to revoke them Which I confesse the Pope doth with a great deale more ease then he doth draw in the same breath which once hee hath breathed out which if he doth yet certainly it is more then it is in his power to doe at his pleasure unlesse hee hath some extraordinary device that I know not of I doubt your mysteries are not yet full you seeme to commend the condition of mutability as a condition befitting the wisedome and integrity of God it remaines that you doe as much disgrace immutability and count it an impotent condition that so with the better grace you may reject it as unbeseeming the nature of God In the next sentence you utterly forsake your text and whereas in congruity to the precedent discourse you should shew how alteration of decrees is no signe of a fickle disposition you nothing to the purpose tell us that the alteration of awards is no signe of a fickle disposition For by the same decree may different awards be executed without any revocation or alteration of the decree It was long agoe the saying of Gregory that Deus mutat sententiam consilium nunquam But by the way you signifie that the former practice of Popes in making grants and recalling of them is no signe of mutability A manifest untruth Nay your selfe laboured to justifie such a change as to make grants and to revoke them as an apparant change but you justified it by the opportunity to doe the greater good thereby provided that wisedome and integrity bee answerable So that though it be no vicious change as you would have it yet apparantly there is a change But the administration sometimes of rewards sometimes of punishments doth argue I confesse no mutability in decrees One and the selfe same lawes of men doe cause the different administration of rewards and punishments to divers persons yea and to the selfe same persons at different times without all colour of change in the lawes themselves Of the coherence of that which followeth with that which went before I will not enquire for what doe I know whether you purpose to write quodlibets But in my judgement you doe not give a right reason why it is fitter to be grounded by lawes then by the wils of men For the corruption of man disables him as well from the making of good lawes as from governing well by will and pleasure But if men are to chuse the reason in my opinion why they will chuse to be governed by lawes is because by lawes they may aforehand know what shall be the execution of justice and accordingly judge thereof and if they like and approve it they may the better submit unto it But if executions proceed according to the will of a Prince absolute they cannot judge of executions before they come because they know them not they being left to the pleasure of men and after they are brought forth it is too late to remedy them if they prove evill And the incorruptest and wisest man that ever was is fitter to give lawes and to execute justâ—ce thereby then to bee trusted with execution of justice according unto pleasure because such men come indifferent to the making of lawes which may bee particularly interested in the manner of execution For executions are only in particular cases which particular cases may in speciall cencerne them that have the execution of justice As for example the malefactor may be a friend to the Magistrate himselfe or a brother or neare of kâ—nne which is a shrewd tentation to provoke him though otherwise vncorrupt and fit enough to mak generall lawes in this particular case to strain a good conscience and by partialitie to corrupt the course of justice Secondly in case government is by succession lawes are most necessary because the most wise and uncorrupt Prince is not sure to beget one like to himselfe or if hee should yet is it not in his power to leave it unto him at such a time as by ripenes of age and experience he shall be fit for government and by experience wee finde that many times good government in the father doth degenerate into tyrannie in the sonne And it is true that good Princes as true fathers of their countrie and people have sometimes remitted off their absolutenesse the better to enjoy the heartes of their subjects which is the best maintenance of perpetuity then by force to compell them Yet by your leave every Act wherunto princes passe their consent doth not restraine them of their former liberty or abate something of their present greatnes For unto all acts of Parliament the King consents yet in consenting to give him 5. Subsidies in a yeare or restoring and confirming unto him the customes called runnage and poundage I doe not find that hereby he either remitts of his former liberty or abates any thing of his present greatnes It is true the lawes of men can have no greater perfection then men that make them and therfore they are sayd non cavere de particularibus for it is impossible that they should comprehend all occurrences yet in this case there is an helpe in Christian states having a court of chancery established for the remedying of such inconveniences without so much as taking any notice of the Pope as the Chancelor of Christendome For if S. Peter himselfe were alive and Bishop of Rome yet what
should he have to doe with governing of States Our Saviour would not meddle with dividing of inheritances and professed his Kingdom was not of this world Peter is commanded out of his love to his Master to feede his sheepe not with any civill coercâ—tive power and authority to governe them Yet Popes have layd title I confesse to both swordes but the unfittest that ever were to manage either such abominable abuses and corruptions have beene found amongst them in the managing of both as I think are without example But that rule of the Canonists Papa â—nquam sibi ligdt manus doth much inamour you and greate zeale â—oth inflame you to applye it unto God to free him from impotent immutability as hereafter you call it and that his decrees may not oblige him and indeed they doe not for how can he be sayd to be tyed or restrayned that is confined to nothing against his will but to every thing according to his will But to free God from an impotent immutabilitie you would have his decrees not alterable for you dare not professe so much but something els I know not what which you call reservation of liberty and to be still as it were in making decrees but not having decreed any thinge till the time of execution or afterward mysterious inventions of your owne braine which if perhaps you seeme to understand your selfe I assure you I doe not but hence it is that you discourse so much of the Pope in this 3. In this Section you beginne with telling us that God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternall power of jurisdiction This is a truth and will nothing serve the turne of your reaches By the way you deliver unto us the object of Gods foreknowledge and that you say is whatsoever will be and the object of Gods decree and that you say is whatsoever may be which later is a most absurd position Looke we upon the decrees of men the wisest of men were they ever knowne to decree that a thing may be done But rather supposing many things may be done they make choyse to decree the doing of such courses as seeme most convenient Things are possible without any reference to the decrees of God but only in reference to his power That is possible unto God which God can doe or which he hath power to cause that it be brought to passe As for example before the World was made it was possible that the World should be made was this by vertue of Gods decree Did God decree it to be possible If he did seeing his decrees are free it followeth that he might have chosen whether the World should have been pâ—ssible or no. Againe was not the creation of the World is not the end of the World decreed by God the rewarding of the godly the punishing of the wicked are they not decreed by God What moves you then to make only things possible the object of Gods decree and the things that will or shall be onely the object of his foreknowledge This witt of yours is able to make us a newe World of Divinity and Phâ—losophy both if it be let alone to runne a wilde goose race at pleasure Well God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternall power of jurisdiction What of this In the next place you tell us that what grant or promise soever he makes cannot binde the exercise of his everlasting libertie for a moment of time they last no longer then Durante bene placito seeing gracious equitie and only it is his everlasting pleasure Be it so that gracious equity is his everlasting pleasure and will it not follow herehence that seeing all his promises doe proceed from his gracious equitie and this you say is his everlasting pleasure and his grants and promises must last you confesse during his good pleasure is not this enough to assure us that whatsoever grants and promises God doth make they doe so farre bind God to performance that we may assure our selves they shall stand good for ever and never be reversed Onely you discourse that they shall last no longer And what sober man would expect or desire that they should last longer then for eternity Or what wisedome is found in such discourse as laboureth to prove that Gods grant shall last no longer then during pleasure and withall confesseth that his pleasure is everlasting But no promise you say bindes the exercise of his everlasting libertie for a moment of time It is fit to consider this To my judgement Gods promises binde him as much as our promises bind us the force of which obligation is not to bind our liberty but to keepe our honestie For what promise soever he makes he is still free naturally whether he will performe what he hath promised or no but if he breaks his promise he shall be untâ—ue In like sort God if he should doe otherwise then he hath promised he should be untrue though never a whit the lesse free And in doing what he hath promised he is both true and never a whit the lesse free For even men doe freely keep their promises though not alwayes willingly because when they promised they might be of one judgement and disposition and when they come to performance they may be of another But all such change and alteration is not to be found in God Every honest Magistrate is free to recompence every man according to his evill wayes for it becomes him not to make any such promise that whatsoever he committs he will not punish him And looke what a good Magistrate resolves upon when facts are committed eyther good or evill the like may God decree from everlasting For no Magâ—strate knowes so well what man hath committed as God from everlasting knows what he will commit And more then that God knowes how to keepe man from evill courses or to expose him to evill courses by having mercy on whom he will and hardening whom he will which power and wisedome is not incident to a creature Besides all this a Magistrate is bound by duty to recompence every man according to his works But God is not bound by any such duty to any such course He can pardon one and pâ—nish another have mercy on one and deale severely with another Of many men taken in the same transgression he can give repentance to some deny repentance unto others And if he hath made any such promise as this If his children forsake my lawe and walke not in my judgements if they break my statutes and keep not my commandements then will I visite their transgressions with the rodd and their iniquity with strokes yet my loving kindnes will I not take froÌ„ him neither will I falsify my truth they to whome such promises are made may be assured hereby that God is bound to perform as much bound I say by morall obligation in such sort as it is impossible he should doe otherwise
plainly would come to this When he signified by Ionah to the Ninevites that Ninevie should be destroyed at forty daies end the meaning was but this that in case they continued in their sinnes without repentance they should be destroyed but in case they repented they should not be destroyed I find no fault in this as touching the substance of truth but I wonder not a little to see you faile in the accommodation of it both to the distinction of voluntas signi and beneplaciti as also in the reconciling of your selfe unto your selfe in respect of what formerly you have delivered concerning the meaning of Ionahs message to the Ninevites For you doe not tell us which of these doomes is Voluntas signi and which of the doomes is voluntas beneplaciti or if both be voluntas signi as indeed they are what is left for voluntas beneplaciti to be distinguished from voluntas signi in this place It seemes you distribute those doomes and make one the object of voluntas signi and the other the object of volâ—itas beneplaciti in which course there 〈◊〉 no sobriety in comparison to your owne dictates For you make voluntas signi to differ from voluntas beneplaciti in this that voluntas signi is Gods will declared voluntas beneplaciti is his will concealed According to the tenour of which distinction both these decrees are to be accounted voluntas signi for God hath declared this to be his usuall course as namely Jer. 18. 7. I will speake suddenly against a nation or a kingdome to plucke it up and to root it out and to destroy it 8. But if this nation against whom I have pronounced turne from their wickednesse I will repent of the plague that I thought to bring upon them 9. And I will speake suddenly concerning a nation and concerning a kingdome to build it up and to plant it But if it doe evill in my sight and heare not my voice I will repent of the good that I thought to doe for them Neither indeed can you in reason maintaine the one of the doomes to be the object of voluntas signi and the other the object of voluntas beneplaciti For if Ionas had delivered his message thus God seeth in what sinfull courses you are and hath determined that you continuing in the same your Citie shall be destroyed at fortie dayes end they would never have doubted but that the Lords determination was that upon their humiliation and repentance and turning from their evill waies Ninevie should not have beene destroyed and so each doome had beene the object of voluntas signi and nothing for ought I can gather out of your discourse should remaine to be the object of voluntas beneplaciti Againe this elucidation of the doubt doth contradict your former assertion when in contradictious manner you affirmed that God at the same time did both will that Ninevie should be destroyed and also intend that Ninevie should not be destroyed whereas by the interpretation which here you make of Ionahs message to the Ninivites according to the two doomes by you mentioned God was so farre from intending both the destruction and the not destruction of Ninevie as that he intended neither the one nor the other For to determine to destroy them in case they continued in their sinnes without repentance and not otherwise is to resolve neither one way nor other but to remaine in suspence which is a kinde of reservation of liberty which heretofore you have so much magnified as a point of very great perfection and therefore fit to be attributed unto God But then I pray consider did not God from everlasting know whether they would repent or no I thinke you doubt not but that God knew they would repent And I pray what need was there then of any two such doomes as you have devised when one would serve the turne and that absolute to wit that God from everlasting determined they should not be destroyed and thereupon tooke a course whereby they might be brought to repentance By the way I am glad to heare you make the repentance of the Ninevites the object of Gods will which is called voluntas beneplaciti which wee take to be all one with Gods decree but I have no cause to rejoyce to see you thus contradict your selfe for you have in divers places maintained that no contingent thing especially no act of man is the object of Gods decree but to the contrary have professed that God though he decreed the contingencie of things yet hee doth not decree the contingent things themselves You must bee driven to take the same course in respect of Gods promises of blessing as well as of his threatnings of judgement But to distinguish herein as you do between Gods word and his oath is most out of season For suppose God had sent Ionah with the same message in this manner say unto them As I live saith the Lord yet fourty dayes and Ninevie shall be destroyed might it not admit the same justification according to the doomes proposed by you thus As I live Ninevie continuing in this sinfull course wherein I finde it shall be destroyed at fourty dayes end not otherwise Or if God should have beene charged with perjury in saying this As I live yet fourty dayes and Ninevie shall bee destroyed should hee not as well bee charged with untruth in saying barely thus Yet fourty dayes Ninevic shall be destroyed Now whereas in the judgement pronounced by Ionah against Ninevic you never speake of any revoking the judgement threatned though your tenent carried you as there I signified so to speake yet here the case as you professe being all one you are bold to professe that God may revoke the blessing promised and why I pray you may hee not revoke his blessing promised upon oath as well as a blessing promised upon his bare word for if he may the one without breaking his word why may hee not doe the other without breaking his oath Or if it bee not lawfull for God to break his oath dare you say it is lawfull for him to breake his word Alas doe your wits carry you and whither would you carry us if wee should suffer our selves to be led by you You conclude with a qualification thus Yet may wee not say that the death or destruction of any to whom God promiseth life is so truely the object of his good will and pleasure as the life and salvation of them is unto whom he threatneth destruction This you say but I had rather heare what you prove By the will of God called voluntas beneplaciti we understand no other thing then Gods decree or the determination of his will And hath not God as truely willed the destruction of them that die in sinne without faith and repentance as hee wills the salvation of them that die in faith and repentance It is true God takes no delight in the destruction of any considered in it selfe
man or what is the effect of this love and I doubt not but when you say God hates them as having made up the full measure of their sinne your meaning is that God wills their damnation and that for this measure of their sin In proportion your answer should be this That God wills the salvation of all men as they are men yet here is very great disproportion for when you say God wills the damnation of men having filled up the measure of their sin I finde herein a manifest difference between the reprobate the elect as touching the cause of damnation and that on mans part namely the making up the full measure of their sin which is found onely in reprobates not in the elect But when you say on the contrary side God wills the salvation of all men as they are men I finde no difference at all betweene the reprobate and the elect as touching the cause of salvation either on mans part or on Gods part for as touching Gods will that passeth you say upon the salvation of all without difference then on mans part likewise there is no difference at all if they are considered onely as men for the reprobates are men as well as the elect To help this you rest not in this consideration of them as men but adde a clause unto it very inconfiderately as touching the forme thus Or at having made up the full measure of their sinne Now the disjunctive argues that these two considerations are equivalent which is untrue for the first consideration proceeds in abstraction from the second But I conceive the weakenesse of your cause urgeth you to take hold of all helpes and thereupon you confound things that differ for in some cases the first consideration usually hath place as when t is said God hateth nothing that hee hath made therefore he hateth not man true say some he hateth not man as man and this distinction seemes plausible to some and therefore you seemed willing to help your selfe with this by the way for it might stirre some propitious effection in a pliable reader But then finding this bed a great deale too short to stretch your selfe thereon you added by way of disjunctive another consideration which is this As not having made up the full measure of sinne And because you rest upon it I thinke good to consider it Now against this I have already excepted on the part of reprobates and in the particular of Pharaoh and argued that then Pharaoh had beene saved had he died before the seventh wonder for till then in your opinion hee had not made up the full measure of his sinne yet we doe not finde that Pharaoh before this time had either faith or repentance Now I will propose another exception on the part of Gods elect Paul never filled up the measure of his sinne for if he had then had hee beene a reprobate but hee was an elect therefore if hee had died immediately after the sâ—oning of Steven hee had beene saved though accessary to his death For he kept the garments of them that slew him as himselfe confesseth In a word all the elect though dying before ever they were called unto faith and repentance should notwithstanding bee saved also My third exception is against the disproportion that neverthelesse is found in these propositions for when t is said God wills the damnation of them that have filled up the measure of their sinne the filling up the measure of sinne is noted here as the cause of their damnation but in saying God willeth the salvation of all not having filled up the measure of their sinne the not having filled up the measure of their sinne cannot be noted as the cause of their salvation And therefore to mend this foule disproportion the Genius of your tenet drives you in conscience to proceede and professe plainely that God willeth the salvation of all men that believe and repent and accordingly God willeth the damnation of all that doe not believe and repent and such indeed alone are they that fill up the measure of their sinn Now herein wee agree with you namely in justifying the truth of both these propositions But like as from the latter it followeth not that God willeth the damnation of all but of some onely namely of those that doe fill up the measure of their sinne and breake not off their sins by faith and repentance so from the former it followeth not that God willeth the salvation of all but onely that hee willeth the salvation of those that believe and repent And if you please further to infer that because perseverance in sinne of infidelitie and impenitencie as they are the meritorions causes of damnation so they are the meritorious causes of the decree of damnation also I thinke I may with as good reason take liberty to inferre from the former that seeing faith and repentance yea and good workes also are the disposing causes of salvation therefore they are to bee accounted the disposing causes of the decree of salvation that is of our election also And so your opinion shall appeare at full and to life in his proper coulors not an haires breadth different either from the Arminian heresie of late or from the Pelagian heresie of old 8 The deductions you speake of in my judgement deserve to be called dictates rather then deductions As for moderne Catechismes you are not the first that nibble at them it is a point of imperious learning now a daies from on high to despise such performances But to speake as a free man the lesse they shall consort with these your deductions as you call them the lesse shall they differ from the truth As for your concurrence with Bishop Hooper in his preface upon the commandements which you glorie of now a second time In this place it is hard if not impossible to discerne by your text what that passage is of Bishop Hoopers which you rest upon with ostentation of your concurrence with him as if your opinions were confirmed by his martyrdome In the close of the second Section of this chapter you told us That it was not every degree of mans hatred or enmity unto God but a full measure of it which utterly exempts man from Gods love and withall that this was observed by Bishop Hooper But in stead of alledging any passage in him to this purpose you referred us there to the fourth paragraffe of this chapter which is this present section Yet concerning that sentence I see a good construction may bee made of it taking love quoad effectum as usually passions are in such sense attributed unto God and not quoad affectum and the chiefest effect of Gods love is salvation Now it is most true that nothing but finall perseverance in sinne doth bereave men of salvation of glory nothing but finall perseverance in sinne stands in opposition to the possibility of grace succeeding in the same subject Now albeit in that which followeth it
contrary where he saith Istorum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemque poenitentiam qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo sive illis ampliorum patientiam sive non imparem praebeat But to returne to the poynt with farre more reason doe they discourse that considering the infinite nature of God against whom sinne is committed doe therhence inferre the desert of infinite punishment and because a creature being but finite is not capable of infinite punishment in intention therfore make him liable to infinite punishment in duration Though I well know also this is excepted against and therfore Miranrandula whom you mention makes choyce to reply on this that as many as dye in sinne theire sinnes being never broken of continue with them in infinitum and therfore doe justly expose them to infinite punishment in duration Yet I very well consider what just exceptions may be taken against this also and the lesse we can satisfie our selves in the reason herof the more cause have we to referre all to the will and pleasure of God untill such time as the wonderfull wisedom and congruity of his actions shall be more clearly discovered unto us 5. As for Lactantius I am not apt to quarrell with him about any incommodious speeches but willing to accept any convenient interpretation of them In anger as it is in man we all know there is something materiall as the kindling of the blood about the heart and something formall which is the desire of revenge But as diverse other passions doe include imperfection in the very formall part of them so doth anger for it supposeth griefe Yet some passions in the formall part of them imply no imperfection as love and joy And accordingly the rule that Aquinas gives is this Cum nihil horum Deo conveniat secundum illud quod est naturale in eis illaque imperfectionem important etiam formaliter Deo convenire non possunt nisi metaphoricè propter similitudinem effectus Quae autem imperfectionem non important de Deo propriè dicuntur ut Amor Gaâ—dium tamen sine passione ut dictum est 1. q. 20. art 1. ad 2. And in another place Ira non dicitur in Deo secundom passionem animi sed secundum judicium justitiae prout vult vindicta facere de peccato 12. q. 47. art 1. ad 1. God you say is more deeply displeased with sinne then man as if Gods displeasure and mans differed only in degree and not rather toto genere Neyther are there any degrees of displeasure at all in God properly but attribuuntur Deo secundum similitudinem effectus as anger is when God punisheth so he shewes a grenter anger when he punisheth more severely and a lesse anger when he punisheth Iesse severely You make God unchangeable in worde yet not so allwayes neyther as where you discoursed of an impotent immutability But if you maintayne that God did for a time will the salvation of any man before he had filled up the measure of his iniquity and not afterwards or that his tender love is turned into severe wrath it cannot be avoyded but you must make change and innovation in the nature of God 6. It is true that love includes no imperfection in it as touching the formall part therof unlesse it be considered as a passion but anger doth in as much as it supposeth griefe But take love as it signifieth a will to doe good and anger as it signifeth a will to take vengeance on them that doe evill and the one is as naturall unto God as the other The truth is neither of them naturall but free Gods love to himselfe is naturall and nessary but his love to his creatures is not no more then his mercy and he hath mercy on whom he will He is neyther tyed by any naturall inclination to make the World nor being made is he bound to maintayne it but as he made it according to the good pleasure of his will so he doth maintayne it Every love of God to his creatures is not suitably opposite to his anger 〈◊〉 â—he anger of God being the will of punishing nothinge is congruously opposite herunto but his love as it signifieth the will of rewarding and rewarding presupposeth obedience as well as punishing presupposeth disobedience but the will of doing the one or the other presupposeth neither You might as well say that justice is not so naturall to God as mercy and I wonder at your unreasonable declination of this comparison in this place wheras in other places you insist so much on Gods justice as to take litle or no notice of his mercy Yet if it be true as you have hertofore discoursed that there is a justice before the will of God by which the will of God is ordered how can you make that doctrine conformable unto this It is true God condemnes no man but for sinne and it is as true that God rewards no man but for obedience only here is the difference The best obedience of mans is no meritorious cause of his salvation but only disposing therto but mans disobedience is not only a disposing cause but meritorious of his condemnation It is untrue that compassion come naturally from God it comes freely â—so doth punishment also not naturally much lesse unnaturally but freely For he could pardon sinne in allof it pleased him and doth pardon it in all his elect 〈◊〉 God when he punisheth relinquisheth the exercise of his mercyfull nature but undoubtedly he exerciseth his vindicative nature Now indeede the exercise of his merciful nature is proper to his owne people as whom he hath made vessells of mercy and for whom Christ hath made satisfaction upon the crosse And therfore when he proceedes to punishment against them he may be sayd to exercise alienum opus and is represented unto us loathe to come unto it How shall I give thee up Ephraim how shall I deliver thee Israell how shall I make thee as Admah how shall I set thee as Zeboim Myne heart is turned within me c. Gods anger is seene and felt by the effects of it but to whom only to those that know God to be the Author of the things they suffer But the Angells and Saints of God doe otherwise see God in the joyes of Heaven In this world the manifestation of Gods wrath doth not alwayes hide God from men but rather is many times a meanes to make God known unto them yea a better meanes then continuall prosperity which makes men grow proude and say Who is the Lord If anger and hate are not in God but upon supposall of sinne then they cannot be sayd to be in God but only by eternall denomination attributed unto him least otherwise we should introduce a manifest innovation into the nature of God And indeede anger sayth Aquinas is often attributed unto God propter similitudinem effectus and so as often as he punisheth and not till then is he sayd