Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	death_n	law_n	sin_n	5,839	5	5.9889	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A44006	Of libertie and necessitie a treatise, wherein all controversie concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, merits, reprobation, &c. is fully decided and cleared, in answer to a treatise written by the Bishop of London-derry, on the same subject / by Thomas Hobs.	Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679.	1654 (1654)	Wing H2252; ESTC R20187	27,647	98

say what necessary cause soever precede an action yet if the action be forbidden he that doth it willingly may justly be punished For instance suppose the Law on pain of death prohibit stealing and that there be a man who by the strength of temptation is necessitated to steal and is thereupon put to death does not this punishment deter others from Theft is it not a cause that others steal not Doth it not frame and make their wills to justice To make the Law is therefore to make a Cause of Justice and to necessitate Justice and consequently 't is no injustice to make such a Law The intention of the Law is not to grieve the Delinquent for that which is past and not to be undone but to make him and others just that else would not be so and respecteth not the evil act past but the good to come in so much as without the good intention for the future no past act of a Delinquent could justifie his killing in the sight of God But you will say how is it just to kill one man to amend another if what were done were necessary To this I answer that men are justly killed not for that their actions are not necessitated but because they are noxious and they are spared and preserved whose actions are not noxious For where there is no Law there no killing nor any thing else can be unjust and by the right of nature we destroy without being unjust all that is noxious both Beasts and Men and for Beasts we kill them justly when we do it in order to our own preservation and yet my Lord himself confesseth that their actions as being onely spontaneous and not free are all necessitated and determined to that one thing they shall do For men when we make Societies or Common-Wealths we lay not down our right to kill excepting in certain cases as murther theft or other offensive action so that the right which the Common-Wealth hath to put a man to death for crimes is not created by the Law but remains from the first right of nature which every man hath to preserve himself for that the Law doth not take the right away in the case of Criminals who were by the Law excepted Men are not therefore put to death or punished for that their theft proceedeth from election but because it was noxious and contrary to mens preservation and the punishment conducing to the preservation of the rest in as much as to punish those that do voluntary hurt and none else frameth and maketh mens wills such as men would have them And thus it is plain that from the necessity of a voluntary action cannot be inferred the injustice of the Law that forbiddeth it or the Magistrate that punisheth it Secondly I deny that it maketh consultations to be in vain 't is the consultation that causeth a man necessitateth him to choose to do one thing rather than another so that unless a man say that that cause is in vain which necessitateth the effect he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding from it But it seemeth his Lordships reasons thus If I must do this rather than that I shall do this rather than that though I consult not at all which is a false proposition and a false consequence and no better than this if I shall live till to morrow I shall live till to morrow though I run my self through with a sword to day If there be a necessity that an action shall be done or that any effect shall be brought to pass it does not therefore follow that there is nothing necessarily requisite as a means to bring it to pass and therefore when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another 't is determined also for what cause it shall so be chosen which cause for the most part is deliberatiō or consultation and therefore consultation is not in vain and indeed the less in vain by how much the election is more necessitated if more and less had any place in necessity The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience namely that admonitions are in vain for the Admonitions are parts of consultation the admonitor being a Councellour for the time to him that is admonished The fourth pretended inconveence is that praise dispraise reward and punishment will be in vain To which I answer that for praise and dispraise they depend not at all on the necessity of the action praised or dispraised For what is it else to praise but to say a thing is good good I say for me or for some body else or for the State and Common-Wealth And what is it to say an action is good but to say it is as I would wish Or as another would have it or according to the will of the State that is to say according to the Law Does my Lord think that no action can please me or him or the Common-Wealth that should proceed from necessity things may be therefore necessary and yet praise worthy as also necessary and yet dispraised and neither of them both in vain because praise and dispraise and likewise Reward and Punishment do by example make and conform the will to good and evil It was a very great praise in my opinion that Velleius Paterculus gives Cato where he saies that he was good by nature Et quia aliter esse non potuit To the fifth and sixth inconveniences that Counsels Arts Arms Instruments Books Study Medicines and the like would be superfluous the same answer serves as to the former that is to say that this consequence If the effect shall necessarily come to pass then it shall come to pass without its causes is a false one and those things named Counsels Arts Arms c. are the causes of these effects His Lordships third Argument consisteth in other inconveniences which he saith will follow namely Impiety and negligence of religious duties as Repentance and Zeal to Gods service c. To which I answer as to the rest that they follow not I must confess if we consider the greatest part of Mankinde not as they should be but as they are that is as men whom either the study of acquiring wealth or preferment or whom the appetite of sensual delights or the impatience of meditating or the rash embracing of wrong principles have made unapt to discuss the truth of things I must I say confess that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety and therefore if his Lordship had not desired this answer I should not have written it nor do I write it but in hopes your Lordship and his will keep it private Nevertheless in very truth the necessity of events does not of it self draw with it any impiety at all For piety consisteth onely in two things one that we honour God in our hearts which is that we think as highly of his power as we

the will to forbear the forbearing also will be necessary The Question therefore is not whether a man be a free Agent that is to say whether he can write or forbear speak or be silent according to his will but whether the will to write and the will to forbear come upon him according to his will or according to any thing else in his own power I acknowledge this Liberty that I can do if I will but to say I can will if I willt I take to be an absurd speech wherefore I cannot grant my Lord the cause upon his preface In the next place he maketh certain distinctions of Libertie and saies he meaneth not Libertie from sin nor from servitude nor from violence but from Necessitie Necessitation inevitabilitie and determination to one It had been better to define Liberty than thus to distinguish for I understand never the more what he means by Libertie and though he say he means Libertie from necessitation yet I understand not how such a Libertie can be and t is a taking of the Question without proof for what is else the Question between us but whether such a Liberty be possible or not There are in the same place other distinctions as a Liberty of Exercise onely which he calls a Libertie of contradiction namely of doing not good or evil simply but of doing this or that good or this or that evil respestively and a Libertie of specification and exercise also which he calls a Liberty of contrarietie namely a Liberty not onely to do good or evil but also to do or not do this or that good or evil And with these Distinctions his Lordship saies he clears the coast whereas in truth he darkneth his own meaning and the Question not onely with the jargon of exercise onely specification also contradiction contrarietie but also with pretending distinction where none is For how is it possible that the Libertie of doing or not doing this or that good or evil can consist as he saies it does in God and good Angels without a Liberty of doing or not doing good or evil The next thing his Lordship does after clearing of the coast is the dividing of his forces as he calls them into two squadrons one of places of Scriptures the other of Reasons which allegory he useth I suppose because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship who is military man All that I have to say touching this is that I observe a great part of those his forces do look and march another way and some of them fight amongst themselves And the first place of Scripture taken from Numb. 30.14 Is one of those that look another way the words are If a wife make a vow it is left to her husbands choice either to establish it or make it void For it proves no more but that the husband is a free and voluntary Agent but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not determined to what he shall choose by precedent necessary causes For if there come into the husbands minde greater good by establishing than abrogating such a vow the establishing will follow necessarily and if the evil that will follow in the husbands opinion out-weigh the good the contrary must needs follow and yet in this following of ones hopes and fears consisteth the nature of Election So that a man may both choose this and cannot but choose this and consequently choosing and necessity are joyned together The second place of Scripture is Joshua 24.15 The third is 2 Sam. 24.12 whereby 't is clearly proved that there is election in man but not proved that such election was not necessitated by the hopes and fears and considerations of good and bad to follow which depend not on the will nor are subject to election And therefore one answer serves all such places if there were a thousand But his Lordship supposing it seems I might answer as I have done that necessity and election might stand together and instance in the actions of children fools or bruit beasts whose fancies I might say are necessitated and determined to one before these his proofs out of Scripture desires to prevent that instance and therefore saies that the actions of children fools mad men and beasts are indeed determined but that they proceed not from election nor from free but from Spontaneous Agents As for example that the Bee when it maketh hony does it Spontaneously and when the Spider makes his web he does it Spontaneously but not by election Though I never meant to ground my Answer upon the experience of what Children Fools Mad men and Beasts do yet that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by Spontaneous and how it differeth from voluntary I will answer that distinction and shew that it fighteth against its fellow Arguments Your Lordship therefore is to consider that all voluntary actions where the thing that induceth the will is not fear are called also spontaneous and said to be done by a mans own accord As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for Merchandise or out of affection he is said to do it of his own accord which in latine is sponte and therefore the action is spontaneous though to give ones mony willingly to a thief to a void killing or throw it into the Sea to avoid drowning where the motive is fear be not called spontaneous But every spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary for voluntary presupposes some precedent deliberation that is to say some consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow both upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of whereas many actions are done of our own accord and are therefore spontaneous for which nevertheless as my Lord thinks we never consulted nor deliberated in our selves As when making no question nor any the least doubt in the world but the thing we are about is good we eat and walk or in anger strike or revile which my Lord thinks spontaneous but not voluntary nor elective actions and with such kinde of actions he saies necessitation may stand but not with such as are voluntary and proceed upon election and deliberation Now if I make it appear to your Lordship that those actions which he saies proceed from spontanity and which he ascribes to Children Fools Madmen and Beasts proceed from election and deliberation and that actions inconsiderate rash and spontaneous are ordinarily found in those that are by themselves and many more thought as wise or wiser than ordinarily men are then my Lord Bishops Argument concludeth that necessity and election may stand together which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his Arguments to prove And first your Lordships own experience furnishes you with proof enough that Horses Doggs and other Bruit Beasts do demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take the Horse retiring from some strange figure that he sees and coming on again to avoid the spur And what else doth

can for to honour any thing is nothing else but to think it to be of great power The other is that we signifie that honour and esteem by our words and actions which is called Cultus or worship of God He therefore that thinketh that all things proceed from Gods eternal will and consequently are necessary does he not think God Omnipotent Does he not esteem of his power as highly as is possible which is to honour God as much as may be in his heart Again he that thinketh so is he not more apt by external acts and words to acknowledge it than he that thinketh otherwise yet is this external acknowledgement the same thing which we call worship So that this opinion fortifies piety in both kinds external and internal therefore is far from destroying it And for Repentance which is nothing else but a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way though the cause that made him go astray were necessary yet there is no reason why he should not grieve and again though the cause why he returned into the way were necessary there remained still the causes of joy So that the necessity of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of Repentance grief for the errour and joy for returning And for prayer whereas he saith that the necessity of things destroy prayer I deny it for though prayer be none of the causes that move Gods will his will being unchangeable yet since we finde in Gods word he will not give his blessings but to those that aske the motive of prayer is the same Prayer is the gift of God no less than the blessing and the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed 'T is manifest that Thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing past and that which is past is sure and necessary yet even amongst men thanks is in use as an acknowledgement of the benefit past though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude And prayer to God Almighty is but thanksgiving for Gods blessings in general and though it precede the particular thing we ask yet it is not a cause or means of it but a signification that we expect nothing but from God in such manner as he not as we will and our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray thy will not our will be done and by example teaches us the same for he prayed thus Father if it be thy will let this cup pass c. The end of prayer as of thanksgiving is not to move but to honour God Almighty in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him onely The fourth Argument from Reason is this The order beauty and perfection of the world requireth that in the universe should be Agents of all sorts some necessary some free some contingent He that shall make all things necessary all things free or all things contingent doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world In which Argument I observe first a Contradiction for seeing he that maketh any thing in that he maketh it maketh it to be necessary it followeth that he that maketh all things maketh all things necessarily to be As if a work-man make a garment the garment must necessarily be so if God make every thing every thing must necessarily be Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth though we know it not that some Agents should work without deliberation which his Lordship calls necessary Agents and some Agents with deliberation and those both he and I call free Agents and that some Agents should work and we not know how and their effects we both call Contingents but this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his election necessarily determined to one by former causes and that which is contingent and imputed to fortune be nevertheless necessary and depend on precedent necessary causes For by contingent men do not mean that which hath no cause but that which hath not for cause any thing that we perceive As for example when a Traveller meets with a shower the journey had a cause and the rain had a cause sufficient to produce it but because the journey caused not the rain nor the rain the journey we say they were contingent one to another And thus you see that though there be three sorts of events necessary contingent and free yet they may be all necessary without destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe To the first Argument from Reason which is that if liberty be taken away the nature and formel reason of sin is taken away I answer by denying the consequence The nature of sin consisteth in this that the action done proceed from our will and be against the Law A Judge in judging whether it be sin or no which is done against the Law looks at no higher cause of the action than the will of the doer Now when I say the action was necessary I do not say it was done against the will of the doer but with his will and necessarily because mans will that is every volition or act of the will and purpose of man had a sufficient and therefore a necessary cause and consequently every voluntary action was necessitated An action therefore may be voluntary and a sin and nevertheless be necessary and because God may afflict by a right derived from his Omnipotence though sin were not and because the example of punishment on voluntary sinners is the cause that produceth justice and maketh sin less frequent for God to punish such sinners as I have said before is no injustice And thus you have my answer to his Lordships Objections both out of Scripture and from Reason Certain Distinctions which his Lordship supposing might be brought to evade his Arguments are by him removed HE saies a man may perhaps answer that the necessity of things held by him is not a Stoicall necessity but a Christian necessity c. But this distinction I have not used nor indeed ever heard before nor could I think any man could make Stoicall and Christian two kindes of necessity though they may be two kindes of Doctrine Nor have I drawn my Answer to his Lordships Arguments from the authority of any Sect but from the nature of the things themselves But here I must take notice of certain words of his Lordships in this place as making against his own Tenet Where all the causes saith he being joyned together and subordinate one to another do make but one total cause if any one cause much more the first in the whole series or subordination of causes be necessary it determines the rest and without doubt maketh the effect necessary For that which I call the necessary cause of any effect is the joyning together of all causes subordinate to the first into one total cause If any of these saith he especially the first produce its effect necessarily then all the rest are determined Now

things nearer the sence move more powerfully than reason what followeth thence but this the sence of the present good is commonly more immediate to the action than the foresight of the evil consequence to come Fourthly whereas his Lordship saies that do what a man can he shall sorrow more for the death of his Son than for the sin of his soul makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding but it argues plainly that sorrow for sin is not voluntary and by consequence that Repentance proceedeth from Causes The last part of this discourse containeth his Lordships opinion about reconciling liberty with the prescience and decree of God otherwise than some Divines have done against whom he saies he had formerly written a Treatise out of which he repeateth onely two things One is that we ought not to desert a certain truth for not being able to comprehend the certain manner of it And I say the same as for example that his Lordship ought not to desert this certain truth That there are certain and necessary causes which make every man to will what he willeth though he do not yet conceive in what manner the will of man is caused And yet I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive seeing we see daily that praise dispraise reward and punishment good and evil sequels of mens actions retained in memory do frame and make us to the election of whatsoever it be that we elect and that the memory of such things proceeds from the sences and sence from the operation of the objects of sence which are external to us and governed onely by God Almighty and by consequence all actions even of free and voluntary Agents are necessary The other thing that he repeateth is that the best way to reconcile contingence and liberty with Prescience and the decrees of God is to subject future contingencies to the Aspect of God The same is also my opinion but cōtrary to what his Lordship all this while laboured to prove For hitherto he held liberty and necessity that is to say liberty and the decrees of God irreconcileable unless the Aspect of God which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse signifie somewhat else besides Gods will and decree which I cannot understand But he adds that we must subject them according to that presentiality which they have in eternity which he saies cannot be done by them that conceive Eternity to be an everlasting succession but onely by them that conceive it as an Indivisible point To which I answer that assoon as I can conceive Eternity to be an Indivisible point or any thing but an everlasting succession I will renounce all that I have written on this subject I know S. Thomas Aquinas calls Eternity Nunc stans an ever-abiding now which is easie enough to say but though I fain would yet I could never conceive it they that can are more happy than I. But in the mean time his Lordship alloweth all men to be of my opinion save onely those that can conceive in their minds a nunc stans which I think are none I understand as little how it can be true his Lordship saies that God is not just but justice it self not wise but wisdom it self not Eternal but Eternity it self nor how he concludes thence that Eternity is a point indivisible and not a succession nor in what sence it can be said that an infinite point and wherein is no succession can comprehend all time though time be successive These phrases I finde not in the Scripture I wonder therefore what was the design of the School-men to bring them up unless they thought a man could not be a true Christian unless his understanding be first strangled with such hard sayings And thus much for answer to his Lordships discourse wherein I think not onely his Squadrons of Arguments but also his Reserve of Distinctions are defeated And now your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question with my Reasons for it positively and as briefly as I can without any terms of Art in plain English My Opinion about LIBERTIE and NECESSITIE FIrst I conceive that when it cometh into a mans mind to do or not to do some certain action if he have no time to deliberate the doing it or abstaining necessarily follow the present thought he hath of the good or evil consequence thereof to himself As for example In sudden anger the action shall follow the thought of revenge in sudden fear the thought of escape Also when a man hath time to deliberate but deliberates not because never any thing appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence the action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm of it These actions I call VOLUNTARY my Lord if I understand him aright that calls them SPONTANEOUS I call them voluntarie because those actions that follow immediately the last appetite are voluntarie and here where is one onely appetite that one is the last Besides I see 't is reasonable to punish a rash Action which could not be justly done by man to man unless the same were voluntarie For no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation though never so sudden because it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life whether he should do that kind of action or not And hence it is that he that killeth in a sudden passion of Anger shall nevertheless be justly put to death because all the time wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil shall be held for one continual deliberation and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed frōelection Secondly I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do it that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it And to consider an action is to imagine the consequences of it both good and evil From whence is to be inferred that Deliberation is nothing else but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action or which is the same thing alternate hope and fear or alternate appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberateth Thirdly I conceive that in all deliberations that is to say in at alternate succession of contrary appetites the last is that which we call the WILL is immediately next before the doing of the action or next before the doing of it become impossible All other Appetites to do and to quit that come upon a man during his deliberations are called Intentions Inclinations but not Wills there being but one will which also in this case may be called the last will though the Intentions change often Fourthly I conceive that those actions which a man is said to do upon deliberation are said to be voluntarie and done upon choice and election so that voluntarie action and action proceeding from election