in this life to fly vice and to embrace vertue from whence all good actions doe spring Logically thus Euery man shall render account at the last day of all his deeds both good and bad and shall receiue a iust reward according to the same Ergo Euery man whilest he liueth in this world ought to fly vice and to embrace vertue From the cause efficient SIth Man was created by God the Creator of all things and Author of all goodnesse excellencie and vertue and was formed according to the very Image and likenesse of God it behoueth man therefore to imitate his Creator and by leading a godly and vertuous life to shew that hee is somewhat like him though not able in all things to attaine to the perfection of so perfect a patterne Logically thus God the cause efficient is good therefore Man being the effect ought to be good From the End THe Prophets and Apostles inspired with the Holy Ghost Author of all Truth by many their writings doe testifie that the greatnesse and excellencie of that blessednesse wherunto Man is created is such as no man is able to expresse with tongue nor in his heart or minde to conceiue the same wherfore sith Man is created to such exceeding great blessednesse it behoueth him to embrace vertue which is the very meane and way to bring him to that blessednesse Logically thus Sith most glorious blessednes is the end of Man Man therfore ought to embrace vertue that he may attaine to that end What arguments are to be gathered on the behalfe of the Predicate and from what places These that follow and such like and first from the definition thus From the Definition of the Predicate SIth Vertue is a morall habite whereby Mans will and all his actions are alwayes directed to God and gouerned according to true iudgement and thereby are made most acceptable both to God and Man Man therefore ought to embrace Vertue from whence such noble fruits doe spring Logically thus Man ought to loue that habite from whence all honest actions doe spring therefore man ought to loue Vertue From the Description MAn ought with all endeuour to follow that thing wherby he may attaine not a vaine and transitorie glory but a true and euerlasting glory and thereby to be made acceptable both to God and Man Wherefore Man ought to embrace Vertue from whence such glory springeth Logically thus That thing is worthy to be beloued of Man which getteth him euerlasting glory Therefore Vertue is worthy to be beloued From the Etymologie SIth Vertue if you diligently consider and weigh the signification of the word is none other thing but a Noble affection of the minde of great excellencie and most meete for Man it is not to be doubted but that those which leauing so precious a thing doe set their whole delight in seeking after worldly riches and bodily pleasure are much deceiued and doe greatly offend Logically thus Such excellencie as is most meet for Man becommeth Man best Therefore Vertue becommeth him best From the generall Kinde SIth it is well knowne that Man ought with all diligence to seeke after those habites whereby humane nature is best adorned and made most perfect And that Vertue amongst such habites is the chiese because that thereby the minde of Man is taught to know what truth is and his will thereby is alwayes inclined to honest and laudable actions Man therefore ought with al his power and endeuor to embrace Vertue Logically thus Man ought chiefely to loue those habites whereby his nature is made perfect Therefore man ought to loue Vertue From the speciall Kinde IT is most meete yea most necessarie for all men to loue fortitude and temperance for by temperance Mans wil is bridled and kept from all euill lusts and affections and by fortitude he is made free from feare of death and as without temperance mans life cannot be honest so without fortitude his death cannot be commendable wherefore it plainly appeareth how necessary a thing it is for a man to embrace Vertue as that which chiefely maketh his life honest and laudable and his death glorious and honorable Logically thus A man ought to loue fortitude and temperance Ergo He ought to loue Vertue From the corruption of the Subiect THe destruction of Vertue is the cause of most grieuous euils for the light of Vertue being extinct the minde is immediately wrapped in such darkenesse as it cannot see nor discerne what is honest what is profitable or what is hurtfull by meanes whereof man falleth into most filthie vices which doe so infect and corrupt the life of man as it becommeth most detestable both to God and Man whereby it plainely appeareth how noble a thing Vertue is and with what loue and diligence it ought to be embraced of all men Logically thus The destruction of Vertue is euill therefore Vertue is good and worthy to be beloued From the vse of the Subiect THe vse of Vertue maketh mans life commendable holy glorious and acceptable both to God and Man then which nothing can bee in this world more to bee desired of man wherefore it manifestly appeareth that Vertue is so noble a thing as all men ought to bestow all their studie labour and care in obtaining the same Logically thus The vse of Vertue is good Therefore Vertue is good From common Accidents SIth all men doe greatly desire to haue their consciences quieted and their mindes free from all euill lustes affects and passions which with continuall strife doe molest the same and thereby doe cause Man to lead a miserable life Man therfore ought to refuse no paine nor labour so as he may attaine to Vertue which is alwaies accompanied with that tranquillitie of minde and conscience that is so much desired Logically thus The tranquillitie of the minde and conscience is to be desired Ergo Vertue which is alwaies accompanied with that tranquillitie is to be desired From the cause Efficient SIth true Vertue is not to be gotten by any mans labour exercise or industrie without the great grace of God who is chiefe Authour and Giuer of all good gifts it well appeareth that Vertue is a most excellent thing and most worthie to be had in admiration and therefore with feruent loue and diligence to be embraced of all men Logically thus God the chiefe Author of all good is the cause Efficient of Vertue therefore Vertue proceeding of so worthy a cause must needs be an excellent thing and worthy of all men to be embraced From the Effect TRue honor and glory hath beene alwaies had amongst all men in great admiration because it seemeth not only by mans iudgement but also by the diuine iudgement of God to be alwaies attributed to vertue wherefore sith Vertue doth yeeld such noble fruits and effects Vertue must needs be a noble thing it selfe and worthy of all men to be embraced Logically thus The Effect of Vertue which is true honor and glory is good
THE ARTE OF LOGICK Plainely taught in the English tongue according to the best approued AVTHORS Very necessary for all STVDENTS in any Profession how to defend any Argument against all subtill Sophisters and cauelling Schismatikes and how to confute their false Syllogismes and captious Arguments By M. BLVNDEVILE LONDON Printed by William Stansby and are to be sold by Matthew Lownes 1617. To the Reader MInding here to treate of the Art of Logike in our vulgar tongue for the profit of those my Country-men that are not learned in forreine tongues I thinke it no shame nor robbery to borrow termes of the said Art from the Latines aswell as they did from the Greekes and specially such termes as cannot be aptly expressed in our natiue speech and yet therewith I doe not forget plainly to shew the signification of cuery such terme so as euery man may easily vnderstand what each terme signifieth thinking it much better so to doe then to fayne new wordes vnproper for the purpose as some of late haue done And as my minde is hereby to please the vnlearned that are desirous of learning hauing both good wits and also good disposition with aptnesse to learne So my hope is not to offend the learned who I am sure doe well allow of Aristotle in saying that euery good thing the more common it be the better it is neither are they ignorant that in old time past aswell the Greekes as the Latines of what Art soeuer they wrote each one wrote the same for the most part in his owne vulgar speech Euery man is not able in these costly dayes to finde either himselfe or his Child at the Vniuersitie whom if God not withstanding hath indued with a liuely wit and made him so apt to learning as hauing some helpe at home he may by his owne industry attayne vnto right good knowledge be made thereby the more able to glorifie God and to profit his Countrey Truly I see no cause why the learned should disdayne or be miscontent that such Man or Child should be freely taught this or any other good Art without any cost or charge Wherefore arming my selfe with assured hope that with this my labour I shall greatly profit and pleasure the vnlearned and not hinder or displease the learned I will boldly follow mine enterprise and here briefly shew the order of my said Worke which is diuided into sixe Parts or Bookes for sith Logicke is chiefly occupyed in discussing of Questions and that such questions both simple and compound doe spring of wordes the first Part of my Booke shall treate of Wordes shewing which be Simple which be Compound and also which comprehend more and which comprehend lesse which be of affinitie and which be not leauing out no necessary Rules belonging thereunto that are taught either by Aristotle or by any other Moderne writer Secondly because all simple questions consisting of single wordes are to be discussed by Definition and Diuision the second Part treateth of them both and therewith sheweth also with what methode and order such simple questions are to be handled Thirdly because all compound questions are to be discussed by reasoning or argumentation and that euery kinde of argument doth consist of Propositions the third Part treateth of a Proposition and of all things belonging thereunto Fourthly because no sound argument can be made to proue or disproue any thing that is in question vnlesse the Disputer know from whence to fetch his proofes the fourth Part of my Booke treateth of all the places from whence any argument is to be fetched And the fifth Part treateth of Argumentation and of all the kindes thereof teaching how euery kinde is to be performed The sixt and last Part treateth of Confutation shewing how all Sophisticall arguments are to be confuted A Postscript THough I wrote this Booke many yeeres past whil'st I sojourned with my most deare Brother in Law M. William Hurnell a man of most singular humanitie and of great hospitalitie at his house in Winkborne in Nottinghamshire not farre from Southwell yet notwithstanding vpon diuers necessarie considerations as I thought since that time mouing me thereunto I still stayed it from the Presse vntill now of late that I was fully perswaded by diuers of my learned friends to put it in print who hauing diligently perused the same and liking my playne order of teaching vsed therein thought it a most necessary Booke for such Ministers as had not beene brought vp in any Vniuersitie to many of which Ministers though God had giuen the gift of vtterance and great good zeale to set forth in good speech the true Christian doctrine yet if they should haue to deale with subtill Sophisters and caueling Schismatikes whereof in these dayes the more is the pitty there are too many they were not able without the helpe of Logike to defend the truth of Gods Word and orderly to confute such false Conclusions as peruerse Schismatikes and Heretikes are wont to gather out of the very wordes of holy Scripture wherefore through my said friends perswasions I haue now at length committed my said Booke to the Presse praying all those that shall vouchsafe to reade it as thankefully to accept the same as of my part it is friendly offered Vale. The Contents of the Chapters contayned in these sixe Bookes of LOGICKE THE FIRST BOOKE Treating of a Question and of Wordes both Singular and Vniuersall WHat Logicke is of what parts it consisteth and whereto such parts doe serue Which be the two chiefe offices of Logicke and wherein Logicke is chiefly occupyed that is in discussing of Questions which is done by Definition Diuision and Argumentation Chap. 1. What a question is and that euery question is either simple or compound also of what parts a compound question consisteth that is to say of two parts called the Subiect and the Predicate and what those termes doe signifie Because all questions doe consist of wordes either simple or compound in this Chapter are set downe three principall diuisions of wordes First which be simple and which be compound Secondly which be of the first intention and which be of the second intention and thirdly which be singular called in Latine Indiuidua and which be universall Chap. 2. What Indiuiduum is and all the foure kindes thereof that is Indiuiduum determinatum Indiuiduum demonstratiuum Indiuiduum vagum and Indiuiduum ex hypothesi that is to say by supposition Chap. 3. Of universall wordes whereof some are called Predicables and some Predicaments and first of the fiue predicables that is Genus Species Differentia Proprium and Accidens and how euery one is diuided and to what vses they serue but first of Species and then of the rest Chap. 4. Of Predication and of the diuers kindes thereof Chap. 5. Of the ten Predicaments in generall which be these Substantia Quantitas Qualitas Relatio Actio Passio Vbi Quando Situm est and Habere Chap. 6. Of the fore-predicaments and shewing
with the good thou shalt be good and with the froward thou shalt learne frowardnesse What bee the Maxims of this place If one thing being put to another endueth the same with any quality that thing must needes haue the same qualitie it selfe I doe place this place next to action because it seemeth to me that it appertaineth to action Of common Accidents WHat cast yee common Accidents I call those common Accidents such things as are either alwaies or for the most part so knit together as the one goeth before or after the other or els accompany each one the other whereof some are necessarie and some probable How may we reason from the Necessarie Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely and first affirmatiuely by the latter part thus This Appletree hath flowers Ergo it hath budded It hath fruit Ergo it hath both budded and flowred This woman is brought to bed of a childe Ergo she hath conceiued Negatiuely by the former part thus This woman neuer conceiued Ergo she can bring forth no childe This man neuer studied Ergo he is not learned What be the maxims of this place If the latter be the former must needs goe before and if the former were not the latter cannot be Of Probable Accidents Coniectures Presumptions Signes and Circumstances HOw may we reason from Probable Accidents From Probable Accidents you may reason Affirmatiuely thus The feast of Bacehus is this day celebrated Ergo there will bee many drunken this day The generall Sessions are holden this day Ergo there will be some hanged What be the maxims of this place If the latter be it is likely that the former went before and if the former bee it is like enough the latter may sollow but you must beware in reasoning from this place that you fetch not your argument from such Accidents as chance but seldome or be indifferent for such be neither necessarie nor probable but sophisticall and fallible as to reason thus Shee is a faire woman Ergo she is vnchast Whereto serueth the place of common Accidents In the Iudiciall kinde it helpeth greatly to proue the fact In the Demonstratiue kinde to praise or dispraise In the Deliberatiue kinde to perswade or disswade and to gather together all Coniectures meete for the purpose and therefore this place is much vsed of natural Philosophers to proue things by naturall signes or by Physiognomie also of Astrologers â—…o proue dearth mortalitie and such like by wonders and monsters as by blazing starres and such like impressions Also it is much vsed of Chiromancers Southsayers and such as vse to iudge by Coniectures and therefore this place extendeth very farre and serueth to many vses Hitherto also are referred the places of circumstances and chiefely of time and place from whence good arguments may be fetched Of Time HOw are arguments fetched from time Negatiuely thus Pythag was not borne in Numa Pompilius time Ergo Numa was not Pythagoras scholler The ceremoniall lawes of Moses were made for a certaine time Ergo after that time they doe not bind What be the Maxims of this place Nothing can bee without time for if time bee taken away the thing also must needs faile Of Place HOw are arguments fetched from place Negatiuely thus Cicero was not at Rome when Iulius Caesar was slaine Ergo Cicero slew him not What is the maxime of this place No certain body or thing is without a place neither is one bodie at one time in diuers places and thus much touching inward places Of outward Places and first of Causes WHich be outward Places Outward places bee those which appertaine to the thing and yet doe not cleaue thereunto of which places the first is of Causes and Effects What is a Cause A Cause is that by vertue wherof another thing followeth How many chiefe kindes of Causes be there Foure that is to say the Cause Efficient the end matter and shape of the two last whereof we haue spoken before because they be inward places and doe belong to the Substance of the thing and therefore we haue to deale onely here with the cause Efficient and end Of the Cause Efficient WHat is that cause Efficient and how is it deuided Cause Efficient is that from whence proceedeth the first beginning of any thing that is made or done and is the maker thereof As for example the Carpenter is the Cause Efficient of the house which he maketh and so is euery Artificer of his owne worke Causes Efficient are deuided into two kinds that is to say Cause Absolute and Cause Adiuuant Cause Absolute worketh by his owne force and vertue as the fire that burneth Cause Adiuuant worketh not by himselfe but is a helper and such cause is sometime principall as vertue is a Principall Cause of blessed life and sometime not Principal as the gifts of the body and of fortune be helpers to the happy life but not Principall Causes thereof Againe of Causes some are of Necessitie without which the thing cannot be made as the Instrument or matter and some are said not to be of Necessitie as when we say The speaking of truth causeth hatred and yet not of Necessitie Also of Causes Efficient some be Vniuersall and some Particular as the Eclipse or euill Coniunction of certaine Planets is the Vniuersal cause of Pestilence but the corruption of humours in mans body is the particular cause thereof Againe of causes some bee called of the Latins Propinquae that is to say nigh vnto the Effect as the father and mother be the nighest Causes of Generation of Children And some be called Remotae that is to say remoued causes which be further of as the Grandsâ—…rs and Grandames of the said children Moreouer of Causes Efficient some work by a certaine naturall Necessity as those that lack choise and iudgement as fire that burneth and the Sun that shineth and all other naturall things that doe work by their own force and vertue Some againe do work by counsell reason and free-will as men Angels and most chiefely God himselfe How may we reason from the Efficient Cause to the Effect From the necessarie Efficient Cause you may reason both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely Affirmatiuely thus The Sun is lately gone downe Ergo it is twilight Negatiuely thus The Sunne was not vp when Troy was destroyed Ergo Troy was not destroyed in the day time but from the Efficient not Necessarie you can reason but onely Affirmatiuely thus He is slaine Ergo he is dead but you cannot say he is not slaine Ergo he is not dead What be the maxims of this Place The Necessarie Cause Efficient not letted the Effect must needs follow as if he hath drunken poison he must needs die But if such Cause faileth the effect also must needs faile as the Sunne is not vp Ergo it is not day He neuer studied Ergo he is not learned to which place may be referred the places of occasion Instrument Meane and Generation How may we reason
not first neither doe they shew the original cause of the Conclusion for the Maior of this Syllogisme may be proued by a former and more knowne Proposition for that which is more generall is more knowne then that which is lesse generall as thus Euery liuing body is nourishable but euery sensible body is a liuing body Ergo euery sensible body is nourishable Againe it is said to be vnperfect when we proceed from the effect to the cause as when we say it is day Ergo the Sunne is vp But that demonstration which proceedeth from the cause to the effect is the more worthier because we vse therein discourse of reason and vnderstanding and in the other we onely iudge by the outward sences wherof spring two principall kindes of Methode that is to say compendious or short orders or wayes of teaching in all manner of Sciences whereof the one is called composition proceeding forward from the first to the last and the other is called resolution proceeding backward from the last to the first as hath been said before in the 〈◊〉 Methode Lib. 2. cap. 5. CHAP. XX. Of Science Opinion Ignorance Witte and of the foure Sciencial questions WHat other things are wont to bee treated of by the Schoolemen in demonstration Diuers things as what difference is betwixt Science and Opinion also they treate of the diuers kindes of Ignorance of prompt Witte and of the foure Scienciall questions What difference is betwixt Science and opinion Science as hath been said before is that which consisteth of necessary certaine and infallible Propositions and of such things as cannot be otherwise Opinion is the knowledge of things casuall which may bee sometime false and sometime true How many kindes of Ignorance doe the Schoolemen make Two that is to say absolute which of the Schoolmen is called Ignorantia negationis and ignorance by false conception which they call Ignorantia affectionis The first is when we vtterly denie to haue any knowledge of a thing at all The other is when we thinke to know that which we know not being deceiued by some false perswasion whereunto we are affected whereof it is called Ignorantia affectionis How doth Aristotle define prompt Witte called of the Latines Solertia He defineth it to be a promptnesse or readinesse in quickly finding out the proofe or cause of any thing that is in question without any studie Which be the foure Sciential questions These whether the thing be what it is how it is and wherfore it is whereof the first enquireth of the Subiect whether it be the second of the Predicate as what it is the third how it is that is to say how the Predicate is spoken of the Subiect and the fourth asketh the cause why it is spoken of the Subiect And thus much of a Syllogisme Demonstratiue now of a Syllogisme Dialecticall or probable CHAP. XXI Of a Syllogisme Dialecticall WHat is a Dialecticall Syllogisme A Dialecticall Syllogisme is that which is made of probable and credible Propositions What things are said to be probable Things probable according to Aristotle are these that seeme true to all men or to the most part of men or to all wise men or to the most part of wise men or else to the most approued wise men whereby it appeareth that things probable may be said fiue manner of wayes Shew how First those things are probable which vnto all men aswell learned as vnlearned being in their right wits doe seeme to be true as these Euery mother loueth her childe we loue them that loue vs we must doe good to them that doe good to vs. Secondly those things that seeme true to most men as these it is better for a communalty to be ruled by one Prince then by many It is not good to serue many masters at once Thirdly those things that seeme true to all wise men as these what thing soeuer is honest the same is also profitable Vertue is better then riches Fourthly those that seeme true to the most part of the wise and learned as thus the soule of man is immortall the Sunne is greater then the earth Fiftly those things that seeme true to the most approued wise men as these The world had a beginning it is better for a Prince to be loued then feared of his Subiects And generally vnder things probable are contained all true Propositions that be casuall and not implying any necessitie I say here true Propositions to exclude false Propositions whereof Sophisticall Syllogismes are made and not those which we call probable or Logicall Syllogismes and yet such Propositions be not so true in deede as those that bee required in a Syllogisme demonstratiue but onely doe seeme true ingendring a certaine opinion in mans minde doubting notwithstanding the contrary for it breedeth not a perfect knowledge as Science doth whereby the minde is of all doubts throughly resolued And note here that the Schoolemen doe make the matter whereof a Dialecticall Syllogisme doth consist to be twofold that is Materia remota in English farre off and Materia propinqua that is to say nigh or neere at hand What doth Materia remota containe These foure Dialecticall Predicates that is Definition called of the Schoolemen Terminus property generall kinde and Accident All which Predicates are before defined and are called Predicates because they are common words spoken of others But truely I see no cause why these foure Predicates should be attributed to a Dialectical Syllogisme more then to a Syllogisme demonstratiue for sure I am that as good demonstrations may be made of these as of any other Predicats What is contained vnder Materia propinqua These a Dialecticall Proposition Probleme and Position What difference is betwixt these three words Dialecticall Proposition Probleme and Position A Dialecticall Proposition is a probable question vttered with a simple Interrogatory as whether the mother loueth her childe which is no question in deede but to him that asketh A Probleme is a doubtfull question vttered with a double Interrogatory as whether the least fixed starre in the firmament be greater then the Moone or not or whether that the Sunne be bigger then the earth or not Position is a wonderfull opinion maintained by some excellent Clerke as to say that all things are but one essence or being as Melissus affirmed or that all things doe continually flowe and change as Heraclitus held or that the earth moueth and not the heauens as Copernicus supposeth onely to finde out thereby the true motions of the Planets and not for that he thought so in deed CHAP. XXII Of a sophisticall Syllogisme WHat is a Sophisticall or false Syllogisme A false Syllogisme is that which is either made of false Propositions or else of such as seeme probable and be not in deede or else of probable premisses not rightly concluding and of such Syllogismes there be three sortes the one failing in matter the other in forme the third in both When is it said to faile in
from the Effect to the Cause Efficient From the Necessarie Effect both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely thus it is day Ergo the Sun is vp it is not day Ergo the Sunne is not vp From the Effect not Necessarie you may only reason Negatiuely thus He is not dead Ergo He is not slaine but you cannot reason so Affirmatiuely as to say He is dead Ergo He is slaine What be the Maximes of this place The Effect being put the necessary Cause must needes be and the Effect being taken away the necessary Cause is also taken away When doe Arguments fetched from this place faile When the Cause is not necessary or proper Of the End WHat is End and how is it diuided The End is that for whose sake any thing is done and of ends some be chiefe and last and some not chiefe but helping The chiefe is that which is desired for it selfe sake and such is the best state of euery thing in his kinde as blessed life to Man courage and fiercenesse to a Horse of seruice heate and drynesse to Fire coldnesse and moistnesse to Water c. The helping end is that which is desired not for it selfe sake but for that it helpeth to attayne the chiefest end and of such helping ends one may be better then another as when we desire money to buy a house and the house to dwell in c. How may we reason from this place Both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely affirmatiuely thus Vertue is good because blessed Life is good negatiuely thus If Adulterie be not good to allure another mans wife To breake wedlock is not good What be the Maximes of this place That thing whereof the end is good or euill is also of it selfe good or euill Tell the vse of these places of Causes and whereto they serue The vse thereof is diuers and manifold for sith that in the Deliberatiue kinde two principall questions are to be discussed first whether the thing be profitable and secondly whether it may be possible and conueniently done or not Arguments to proue the first are to be fetched out of the End and Effect And to proue the second out of the Cause Efficient Also in the kinde Demonstratiue to praise or dispraise Arguments are to be fetched out of the End and Effect Thirdly in the Iudiciall kinde wherein doubt riseth of the fact and will of the doer Arguments are to be fetched from the End to proue or disproue the same Finally these places together with the other two Causes Matter and Forme before taught doe serue to make those kindes of Definitions which we cal Causall Of Opposites WHat be Opposites Things contrary one to another How many kindes of Opposites be there Foure that is to say Relatiues Contraries Priuatiues and Contradictories And first of Relatiues WHen are things said to be Opposites by Relation When according to their owne significations they haue mutuall Relation one to another as the Father and the Sonne How may we reason from this place You may reason from the Affirmation of the one to the denyall of the other thus Augustus was Octaâ—…s his sonne Ergo He was not his Father What be the Maximes of this place Sith Relatiues be alwayes together by nature if the one be the other must needes be and if the one be taken away the other is also taken away What is to be obserued in fetching Arguments from this place You must beware that you haue one selfe respect and not diuers for to reason thus is no good Consequent This man is a Father Ergo He is no Sonne or thus This man is his Superior Ergo Not his Inferior for in diuers respects he may be both a Father and a Sonne a Superior and Inferior a Superior in one respect and Inferior in another Of Contraries WHat be Contraries and how are they diuided They be two Extremes Repugnant one to another whereof some are called Mediate that is to say hauing a meane and some Immediate hauing no meane at all How may we reason from these two kindes From the first kinde you may conclude negatiuely thus He is prodigall Ergo He is not couetous from the second kinde you may reason both Affirmatiuely Negatiuely thus This man is whole Ergo He is not sicke This man is not whole Ergo He is sicke What be the Maximes of this place The Maxime of the Affirmatiue to the Negatiue is the generall Maxime to all Opposites thus Whatsoeuer agreeth with the one Opposite must needes disagree with the other Opposite but the Maxime of the Immediate is thus If one of the Contraries Immediate be not the other must needes be as the former examples doe plainely shew Of Priuatiues WHat be Priuatiues Priuatiues are two Contraries belonging to one selfe Subiect apt to receiue the same in the which Subiect when the one is wanting at such time as Nature doth appoint the other must needes be How may we reason from this place Two wayes first from Affirmation of the one to the denyall of the other which is common to all Opposites as thus He is blind Ergo He seeth not Secondly you may reason from the denyall of the one to the affirmation of the other thus He cannot speake Ergo He is dumbe But this kinde of Argument is not strong vnlesse the thing required be applyed to his proper Subiect and in such time as nature hath appointed for it were no good argument to say thus a sucking child cannot speake Ergo he is dumbe or thus a whelpe of two daies old cannot see Ergo he is blinde for nature commonly suffereth not the childe to speake before it be two yeeres old nor the whelpe to see before it be nine daies olde What be the maxims of this place If the one bee not in the Subiect apt to receiue the same at such time as nature hath appointed the other must needs be Of Contradictories WHat be Contradictories They be Contraries hauing no meane whereof the one denieth the other How may we reason from this place Both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely thus he is wife Ergo he is no foole he is a foole Ergo he is not wise What is the Maxime of this place If the one be the other cannot be for two Contradictories cannot be together at one selfe time in one selfe Subiect and in one selfe respect Of things differing in kinde called of the Latines Disparata WHat be they They are those things that doe differ in nature and kinde as a Man a Horse a Stone a Tree whereof euery one differeth from another in kinde and nature How may we reason from this place From the Affirmation of the one to the Deniall of the other as thus Peter is a Man Ergo he is no Horse What be the Maximes of this place Whatsoeuer agreeth with the one agreeth not with the other What is to be obserued in reasoning from all these kindes of Opposites That the Repugnancy consist in the Predicat and not in the Subiect for it were no