pleases because I have obliged my self to it by compact and I am obliged to follow this Mans will because he can enjoyn me thus by his supreme Authority But supreme and absolute are not one and the same thing for that denotes the absense of a Superiour or an Equal in the same order or degree but this a faculty of exerciseing any right by a Man 's own Judgment and Will but what if there be added a Commissary clause that if he shall do otherwise he shall forfeit his Kingdom as the Arogonians of Old after the King had sworn to their Priviledges did promise him Obedience in this manner Vid Hotomani Frarcogallia C. 12. We who are of as great Power as thou do Create thee our King and Lord on this condition that thou observe our Laws and Priviledges if otherwise not Here it is certain that an absolute King cannot be He to whom the Kingdom is thus committed under a Commissary Clause or Condition but that this King may have for all this a regal Power though limited I see no reason to the contrary for although we grant a Temporary Authority cannot be acknowledged for Supreme because it depends upon a potestative condition and which can never be in the Princes power Yet a King of this sort above-mention'd is not therefore subject to the power of the People with whom the cognizance is whether he keep his Oath or not for besides that such a Commissary Clause is wont to comprehend only such plain things which are evident to any Mans sences and so are not liable to dispute So that this power of taking cognizance does not at all suppose any Jurisdiction by which the Actions of the King as a Subject may be judged but is nothing else than a bare Declaration whereby any Man takes notice that his manifest right is violated by another See Grotius Lib. 1. Cap. 3. § 16. And Baecler upon him who are both of the same Opinion Grotius indeed in the same place speaks more obscurely when he says That the Obligation arising from the promises of Kings does either fall upon the exercise of the act or also directly upon the very power of it if he act contrary to promises of the former sort the act may be called unjust and yet be valid if against those of the latter it is also void as if he should have said Sometimes a King promises not to use part of his Supreme Authority but after acertain manner and sometimes he plainly renounces some part thereof concerning which there are two things to be observed first that also some acts may be void which are performed contrary to an Obligation of the former sorts as for example if a King swear not to impose any Taxes without the consent of the Estates I suppose that such Taxes which the King shall Levy by his own will alone to bevoid Secondly That in the latter form the parts of the supreme power are divided But that the Nature of limited Kingdoms may more thoroughly be understood it is to be observed that the affairs which occur in Governning a Common-wealth are of two kinds for of some of them it may be agreed beforehand because whenever they happen they are still but of the same Nature but of others a certain Judgment cannot be made but at the time present whether they are beneficial to the Publick or not for that those circumstances which accompany them cannot be forseen Yet concerning both that People may provide that he to whom they have commited this limited Kingdom should not depart from the Common good in the former whilst it prescribes perpetual Laws or Conditions which the King should be obliged to observe in the latter whilst he is obliged to consult the assembly of his People or Nobility Thus the People being satisfied of the truth of their Religion and what sort of Ecclesiastical Government or Ceremonies do best suit their Genius so it is in Sweden may condition with the King upon his Inauguration that he shall not change any thing in Religious matters by his sole Authority So every Body being sensible how often Justice would be injured if Sentence should always be given by the sole Judgment of the Prince ex aequo hono without any written or known Laws and that Passion VI. Tacit An. L. 13. 4. 2. Interest or unskilfulness would have too great a sway for avoiding this inconvenience the people may oblige their King that either he shall compose a Body of just Laws or observe those that are already extant and also that Judgment be given according to those Laws in certain Courts or Colledges of Justice and that none but the most weighty Causes should come before the King by way of Appeal This is likewise the Law of Sweden So likewise since it is well known how easily Riches obtained by the Labour of others may be squandered away by Luxury or Ambition therefore the Subjects Goods should not lie at their Princes mercy to sustain their Lusts Some Nations have wisely assigned a certain Revenue to their Prince such as they supposed necessary for the constant Charges of the Common-wealth but if greater expences were necessary they would have those referred to the Assembly of Estates And since also some Kings are more desirous than they ought to be of Military Glory and running themselves into unnecessary Wars may put themselves and their Kingdoms in hazard therefore some of them have been so cautious that in the conferring the regal Dignity they have imposed this necessity upon their Kings that if they would make offensive Wars upon their Neighbours they should first advise with their great Council and so likewise it might be ordained concerning other matters which the People judged necessary for the Common-wealth lest that if an absolute power of ordering those things were left to the Prince the common good of the People would perhaps be less considered And since the people would not leave to this limited King an absolute power in those Acts which are thus excepted but that an Assembly either of the whole people or of those that represent them divided into their several Orders it is further to be observed that the power of this Council or Assembly is not alike every where For in some places the King himself though every where absolute may have appointed a Council or Senate without whose approbation he will not have his decrees to be valid Which Senate without doubt will only have the Authority of Councellors and though they may question the Kings Grants or Decrees and reject those which they judg inconvenient for the Common-wealth yet they do not this by any inherent Right but by a power granted them from the King himself Who would this way prevent his decreeing any thing through hast imprudence or the perswasion of Flatterers that might prove hurtful to his State to which may be referred what Plutarch mentions in his Apothegms ' That the Aegyptian Kings
these Patriarchs â—ere For this will serve toward the solving those â—xamples he puts of Abram's power of Peace and â—ar and of Judah's power of Life and Death over 〈◊〉 Daughter-in-law Thamar We will first then conâ—er the power of a Father by the Law of Nature â—er his Children and then that of a Master of a Faâ—ly over his Wife Servants or Slaves To begin â—…th that of a Father as the most worthy I shall deavour to search into the Original of the Father's â—wer over the persons of his Children and how far extends It is evident that this Power of Fathers over their â—ildren can only take place in the state of Wedlock 〈◊〉 as to Children got out of Marriage it is uncertain â—o is their Father who can only be known by the declaration of the Mother and she sometimes cannot certainly tell her self So that no man is obliged to take care of or breed up a Bastard because the Mother if she had her liberty of keeping what company she pleased can never morally assure him that the Child is his therefore unless he take upon him the care and education of this Child it belongs to the Mother and not to him to provide for it So that the Right of the Father over his Child commences by vertue 〈◊〉 the Marriage which is a mutual Compact between a Man and a Woman for their Cohabitation the generation of Children and their joint care and provision for them So that though by the Law of Nature which is confirm'd by the Law of God the Woman as the weaker vessel is to be subject to the Man as the stronger stouter and commonly the wiser creature 〈◊〉 whose care and courage she must owe the greatest parâ— of her provision and protection yet she is not without an Interest in the Children since she is under 〈◊〉 obligation to perform her part and that the most 〈◊〉 borious and troublesome in their Education thougâ— her Power and Right in them be still subordinate 〈◊〉 that of the Man to whom by force of the Marriage shâ— hath already subjected herself Some Writers therâ— fore think they have done sufficiently when they 〈◊〉 us that the Father hath an absolute Dominion ovâ— his Child because he got it and is the cause of it being By this Argument the Mother hath greatâ— Right over the person of the Child since all Natâ— ralists hold the Child partakes more of her than of 〈◊〉 Father and she is besides at greater pain and troubâ— both in the bearing bringing it forth nursing anâ— breeding it up But if it be answered that the Maâ— being Master of his Wife is by the Contract so likâ— wise of her Issue Then it follows that this power 〈◊〉 the Father does not commence barely from Geneâ—… tion but is acquired from the Contract of Marriage which till I meet with some reason to the contrary I see not why it might not be so agreed by the Contracts that the Father should not dispose of the Children without the Mothers consent Since we see it often so agreed in the Marriages of Soveraign Princes Vid. Articles of Marriage between King Philip and Queen Mary in Godwin's Annals An. 1554. Thuanus Lib. IX So likewise where a Subject marries his Queen as the Lord Darnley's Marriage with Mary Qu. of Scotland the Soveraignty and consequently the Power over the Children to be born remained entirely in Her who are always supposed to be in the state of Nature in respect to each other Yet though I will not deny but some Gratitude and Acknwledgment is due from Children to Parents even for this that they did enter into the state of Marriage for their generation and were the occasion of their Being Yet I do not see how by this alone a Father acquires an absolute power and dominion over the person of the Child to dispose of it as he thinks fit Since Parents acting here only as Natural and not Moral Agents they are not the voluntary Causes of its generation Therefore I cannot found so great a Right as that of an absolute perpetual Dominion over the Children upon so slight a foundation We must therefore trace this Right of Fathers over his Children to a more true original than any of these Since then all the Laws of Nature or Reason are intended for one end or effect viz. the common good and preservation of Mankinde and that Marriage is no otherwise a Duty than as by the propagation of our Species it conduces to without the help and assistance of others and that the Parents entred into this state of Marriage for the procreation of Children both the Instinct of Nature and Law of Reason dictate that they are obliged to take care of and provide for that Child which they as subordinate Causes have produced as being those on whom God hath imposed this Duty which is much greater than that of Generation for now the world is sufficiently peopled it may be doubted whether any person is obliged to Marry further than it may consist with their conveniency or course of Life But Parents when they are Married are tyed by the Laws of Nature to take care of the Children Therefore I suppose the highest Right of Parents in their Children doth arise merely from their discharge of this great Duty of Education as may appear from this Instance Suppose the Parents not being willing to undertake the trouble of breeding up the Child do either expose it or pass over their Right in it to another assoon as it is born I desire to know if the person that finds this Child or he to whom it is assigned breed it up until it come to have the use of Reason what Duty this Child can owe his Parents if they are made known to him Certainly all the obligation he can have to them must be upon the score of their begetting him which how small that is you may observe from what hath been said before nor can the Parents claim any further Right in this Child since by their exposing and granting it away they renounced all the Interest they could have in it so that the Duty and Gratitude he should have owed them had they taken upon them the care and trouble of breeding him up is now due to his Foster-Father or Mother who took care of him until he was able to shift for himself From whence it is evident that the highest Right which Parents can have in their Children is not meerly natural from generation but acquir'd by their performance of that nobler part of their Duty And so the highest Obedience which Children owe their Patents proceeds from that Gratitude and Sense they ought to have of the great obligation they owe their Parents for the trouble and care they put them to in their Education Having now I hope found out the Original of Parents Right and Interest in their Children and the chief ground of their Gratitude and Duty to their Parents we will now proceed to
reason why these distinctions of Grotius may not be well enough defended against all the Reasons which the Authour gives us to the contrary For he only tells us He cannot conceive how in any case Children can ever naturally have any power or moral faculty of doing what they please without their Fathers leave and that naturally the Power of Parents never ceaseth by any separation c. but gives us no other reason than that they are always bound to study to please them As if this obligation of Gratitude and Complacency did likewise comprehend a full and perfect propriety of all Fathers in the persons of their Children and an absolute power over them in all cases whatsoever so that Children shall have no Right left to consult their own good or preservation in any case whatsoever Vid. Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 4. farther than the Father pleases As for Bodin and divers others that have writ on this subject they do no more than follow others who have asserted this Absolute Power upon no other grounds than the Jewish or Roman Municipal Laws but have never troubled themselves to look into the true Original of Paternal Authority or Filial Subjection according to the Laws of Nature or Reason And most Treatises of this subject being commonly written by Fathers they have been very full in setting forth their own Power and Authority over their Children but have said little or nothing of the Rights of Children in the state of Nature towards their Parents Loc. sup laudat Therefore Bodin thinks he hath done enough in supposing that if a Father is wise and not mad he will never kill his Son without cause since he will never correct him without he deserve it and that therefore the Civil Law supposes that the Will of the Parents in managing the concerns of their Children is void of all Fraud and that they will rather violate all Divine and Humane Laws than not endeavour to make their Children both rich and honourable And from those instances out of the Roman Law supposes that Parents cannot so much as will any thing to their Childrens prejudice or so much as abuse this Fatherly Power of Life and Death And therefore thinks he hath sufficiently answered the Objection he makes that there have been some Parents who have abused this power so far as to put their Children to Death without cause He says They give us no Examples to the contrary And supposing this to have sometimes fallen out must therefore Legislators alter a wholsome Law because some persons may abuse it But if we consider what Bodin hath here said we shall finde every one of his Suppositions false For 1. he supposes it to be the Right of all Fathers by the Law of Nature to have an absolute power over the lives and persons of their Children 2. That the Jewish and Roman Law are most agreeable to the Laws of Nature in this point 3. That Fathers do seldom or never abuse this power 4. That if they do abuse it yet it is better to leave it in their hands than to abrogate it or retrench it The falseness of all which Assertions I either have already or else shall hereafter make manifest Only I shall remark thus much at present That upon Bodin's principle women that murder their Bastards would have a good time on 't because having no Husbands they have full power over the Life of their Children and there is no reason that it should be retrencht by any positive Laws because some offend against it But however this Argument of Bodin's would do our Author's cause no good for if Parents are to be trusted with this absolute power over their Children because of the natural affection they are always supposed to bear them then Princes ought not to be trusted with it since none but Parents themselves can have this natural affection towards their Children Princes as the Author grants having this power onely as representing these Parents Whereas Parentage is a natural Relation and neither can be created nor assigned farther than the Civil Laws of the Country have appointed and therefore there can be no adopted Son by the Law of Nature since Adoption arises chiefly from the promise and consent of the person adopted and partly from the Authority of the Civil Law or Municipal Law of the Commonwealth So that in relation to Princes upon this Reason of Bodin's cessante causa cessat effectus But indeed Bodin never dreamt of this fine Notion of our Author's that all Monarchs were not onely Heads but Fathers of their people or else certainly we should have had this as the chief Argument to prove his French Monarchy to be Jure Divino But I shall trouble my self no farther with him at present but shall proceed to consider this point of absolute Obedience a little farther I suppose the Author as any sober man else would grant that Children are not obliged so much as to attempt to perform the commands of their Parents in case they evidently appear impossible or extravagant such as a Father may give when he is in a fit of drunkenness madness or sudden rage which is all one with madness and of this who can judge but the Children who are to perform these Commands And in this case no man will deny but it is lawful for the Children to hold nay binde their mad or drunken Parents in case they cannot otherwise hinder them from doing mischief or killing either themselves their Mothers or Brethren So that though they may do this from that natural love charity which all men in the state of nature ought to shew toward each other yet they may likewise justifie the doing of it as Children who ought to have a greater concern for the good and preservation of their Parents than meer strangers and have therefore an higher obligation to prevent their doing any mischief either to themselves or neer Relations this being for the Fathers good and preservation and that for which he hath cause to thank them when he comes to himself And if it be said that the Son may then refuse his Fathers Commands or resist them pretending he is mad drunk or in a rage when he really is not and thereby take occasion to obey his Father no farther than he pleases to this I answer That the Son is either really perswaded that his Father is in some of those evil circumstances before mentioned or else onely pretends that he thinks so when really he does not If in the first case he erre in his judgment and the ignorance did not proceed from his own fault either of passion prejudice or too slight an esteem of his Fathers understanding he is not culpable though he make such a false judgment of his Fathers actions for God considering onely the sincerity of the heart does not require of any man more than he is able to perform But if on the other side the Son play the Hypocrite and refuse
the Son hath begotten But though Children may have this Right of defending their own Lives or those of their Wives and Children from their Fathers unjust violence when they can by no means else be preserved Yet I would not be here understood to give Children this right of resisting upon any less occasion as if the Father should only go about to correct his Son though without just cause it were therefore lawful for him to resist or beat his Father For we are obliged by the Law of Christ to bear smaller Injuries from others much more from a Father neither yet would I give them any right to continue this state of War and to revenge upon their Parents the Injuries they have formerly received at their hands For all Revenge taken in this sence as a satisfaction of the minde in returning of an evil or injury already received without any respect to a mans own preservation or the good of the person that did the wrong is unlawful even in the state of Nature Therefore this returning Evil for Evil which some improperly call Revenge is only justifiable for one or both of these ends either to make the party that hath done the Injury sensible of his Errour and seeing the Follies and Inconveniences of it to alter his minde and resolve to do so no more or as it may conduce to a mans own preservation for the future and be a warning to others not to injure him in like manner since they see he will not take injuries tamely But all this is still left to a mans own prudence how far he will pass them by And he is certainly obliged to leave off returning them assoon as he can be safe without it since otherwise quarrels would be perpetual Neither ought one who hath been highly obliged to a man perhaps for his life to return him evil for evil since scarce any Injury being great enough to cancel so great an Obligation Therefore since a Father who hath truely performed his Duty is the greatest Benefactor we can imagine in this life so no man ought to revenge an Injury though never so great upon him since it is not only undutiful but ungrateful and cannot serve either of those two ends for which alone this returning evil for evil is allowable For first it cannot make the Father see his fault since this correction being from a Son whom he looks upon as one highly obliged to him and so much his inferior will rather serve to exasperate than amend him Secondly Neither can this bearing of the Injury encourage others to attempt doing the like since all that know the case will likewise consider the person that did the wrong So that Patience alone is the only lawful means to make the Father see his Errour and be reconciled to his Child who ought to embrace it assoon as the Father offers it But as for the places of Scripture brought for absolute Obedience to Parents viz. the fourth Commandment Honour thy Father and thy Mother Children obey your Parents in the Lord Ephes 6.1,2 and Children obey your Parents in all things Col. 3.20 God did not intend here to give us any new Law or Precept concerning this Duty but to confirm and explain the fifth Commandment as that was but a confirmation of the Law of Nature by which men were obliged to reverence and obey their Parents long before that Law was given Therefore since the Laws of Nature which are but Rules of right Reason for the good of Mankinde are the foundation of this Commandment and of all those commands in the New Testament they are still to be interpreted according to that Rule Neither are other places of Scripture understood in any other sence such as are those of turning the right Cheek of giving away a mans Coat to him that would go to Law and the like all which we are not to Interpret Literally See Grotius and. Dr. Hammond's Annot. upon these places but according to Reason And so are likewise these words of St. Paul to be understood Children obey your Parents in all things that is in all things reasonable and lawful And this sence must be allowed of or else Children were bound to obey all commands of their Parents whether unlawful or lawful being comprehended under this general word All. Nor will the distinction of an active or passive Obedience help in this case for passive Obedience cannot be the end of the Fathers command and consequently his will is not performed in suffering since no Father can be so unreasonably cruel as to command a thing meerly because he would have occasion to punish his Son whom he thinks must not resist him Neither do these places appoint a Son when an infant a man of full age and perhaps an old man of threescore to be all governed the same way or that the same Obedience is required of them all And this brings me to a fuller Answer to the Author's Argument and to shew that though Children are indeed always bound in Gratitude to please their Parents as far as they are able without ruining themselves and to pay a great reverence to them yet that this submission is not an absolute subjection but is to be limited according to the Rules of right Reason or Prudence And to prove this I will produce instances from the case of Adam's Children since the Author allows no Father to have had a larger authority than himself We will therefore consider in the first place Adam's power as a Father in respect of his Sons marriage Suppose then that he had commanded one of his Sons never to marry at all certainly this command would have been yoid since then it had been in Adam's power to have frustrated Gods Command to mankind of increase and multiply and replenish the Earth which was not spoken to Adam and Eve alone since they could not do it in their persons but to all mankind represented in them And likewise Adam had been the occasion of his Sons incontinency if he had lain with any of his Sisters before marriage Secondly Suppose Adam had commanded Abel to marry one of his Sisters that being the onely means then appointed to propagate mankind which he could not love can any man think that he had been obliged to do it Certainly no for it would have been a greater sin to marry a wife he knew before-hand he could not live with than to disobey his Father for else how could this be true Therefore shall a man leave Father and Mother and cleave to his Wife Since then Adam could not force his Sons affections but onely recommend such of his Sisters as he thought would best suit with his humour therefore if the Son could not live without marriage and that Adam could not force a Wife upon him it was most reasonable that he should chuse a Wife for himself And to come to that other great point that the Son can never separate himself from his Fathers Family nor subjection
and he shall find them managed much after the same rate Nor hath these differences onely divided these Monarchies where the Succession was never well settled at first but even those that have been better constituted and where one would belieev the Discent of the Crown had been sufficiently settled by a long Discent of Kings for many hundreds of years And of this Scotland hath been a famous Example where after the death of King Alexander III and his Grandaughter Margaret of Norway two or three several Competitors claimed a Right to succeed But omitting others it was agreed that it lay between John Baylliol and Robert Bruce Earl of Carick both of them drawing their Discent from David Earl of Huntingdon Great Uncle to the last King in whom they all agreed the Right to the Crown would have been had he survived Baylliol claimed as eldest Son to Dornagilla Grandaughter to Margaret the eldest Daughter of the said Earl David Robert Bruce claimed as eldest Son of Isabel the second Daughter of the said David So that if Baylliol alledged his Discent from the eldest Daughter Bruce was not behind-hand but pleaded though it was true he was descended but from the second Daughter yet he being a Grandson and a degree neerer ought to succeed whereas Baylliol was but great Grandson to Earl David And though Dornagilla Baylliol's Mother was in the same degree with himself yet he being a man ought to be preferred before a woman in the same Line and that if the Laws of Scotland would have given it to Dornagilla if it had been an ordinary Inheritance yet Discent of the Crown was not to be ruled by the Common Laws of other Inheritances In short this Dispute did so divide the Nobility into Factions and puzzle the Estates of the Kingdom that not being able to decide it they and all the Competitors agreed to refer the Controversie to Edward I. King of England one of the wisest and most powerful Princes of his time who upon long advice and debate with twelve of the learnedest men of both Kingdoms at last adjudged the Crown to Baylliol or as the Scotch Historians relate because he would do him Homage for it which Bruce being of a higher spirit refused Yet this did not put an end to this great Controversie for though Baylliol was thereupon admitted King yet falling out not long after with King Edward to whom he owed all his greatness and having the worst of it the Nobility and States of Scotland revived Bruce's Title and declared him King who after a long War with England enjoy'd the Crown quietly at last and left it to his Issue whose Posterity in our present King enjoy it to this day To this I shall adde one Example more from Portugal within these hundred years King Henry called the Cardinal dying without Issue there was a great Controversie who should succeed for he died suddenly just as the States of the Kingdom were assembled to settle the Succession for he declared himself unable to decide it So that he onely left by his Will twelve Governours of the Kingdom who should govern during the interregnum but that the Crown should descend to him that should appear to them to have the best Title Four eminent Competitors put in their claims 1. Antonio called the Bastard who nevertheless pretended that he was lawful Son to Don Lewis second Brother to Henry the last King So that he had no more to do but to prove himself Legitimate 2. Alexander Duke of Parma who claimed as Grandson to Mary eldest Daughter to Don Duarte youngest Brother to the last King Henry and Son to King Emanuel 3. The Duke of Braganza who claimed as Son to Katherine second Daughter of the said Don Duarte yet alledged his Title to be best because he was the next of the Bloud-Royal who was a Native of Portugal as the Heir of the Crown as he pretended ought to be by a Fundamental Law of that Kingdom yet it seems that Law was not then so well known or otherwise there was no reason why these Governors should not have admitted him King as soon as ever they met 4. Philip the second King of Spain who claimed as Son to Isabella Daughter of Emanuel King of Portugal and so a degree nearer than the rest to Henry the last King The States and Governours differing the States were dissolved and during their recess the Governours not agreeing among themselves the King of Spain raised an Army and entering Portugal seiz'd the City of Lisbon and consequently all the rest of the Kingdom submitted to him and so made himself King by force And yet we have seen in his Grandson's time the Estates of Portugal declare this Title void and the Crown setled in the Posterity of the Duke of Braganza who still enjoy it by vertue of this Fundamental Law And that this Fundamental Law could not be altered but by the consent of the Cortes or States appears by the late Alteration of this Constitution upon the Treaty of Marriage of the present Prince Regents Daughter with the Duke of Savoy And how much even Kings themselves have attributed to the Authority of their Estates appears by the League made between Philip the Long King of France and David King of Scots wherein this Condition was exprest That if there should happen any difference about the Succession in either of these Realms he of the two Kings which remained alive should not suffer any to place himself on the Throne but him who should have the Judgment of the Estates of his side and then he should with all his power oppose him who would after this contest for the Crown So that our Author without cause lays the fault upon the wilful ignorance of the People in not remembring or acknowledging the right Heir of the Crown when the ablest and wisest men of the Age they lived in could not by the meer Laws of Nature and Reason determine which was he And our Author should have done well to have set down some certain Rules how the People might be assured without a positive Law before made that they acknowledge the right Heir and not an Usurper to his prejudice CHAP. II. Observations on the Directions for Obedience in doubtful times and other places of his Patriarcha and other Treatises BUT since this Author rather than the disposal of a Crown shall fall to the decision of the People or States of the Kingdom will give an Usurper a good Right to it against all persons but him that hath the Right we will now examine how much of that is true which he lays down in his Directions for Obedience to Governours in doubtful times and how far men are bound in Conscience to obey an Usurper whilst he that hath Right is kept out by him First he takes it for granted that all those that so eagerly strive for an original Power to be in the People do with one accord acknowledge that originally the Supream Power was
is but like the advice and direction which the Kings Councel gives the King which no man says is a Law to the King Igrant this distinction provided the Author will likewise admit another that though the King is not obliged by Laws or to any Judges of them as to Superiors or as to the compulsory Power of them Yet in respect of God and his own Conscience he is still obliged to observe them and not to dispence with them in those cases which the Law does not give him a power so to do and since it is true that it is the rewards and punishments annext that give laws their Sanction therefore there are certain rewards which will naturally bless Princes that keep their Laws such as peace of Conscience Security the affections of their People c. and if I call the contrary effects to these natural punishments that are commonly the consequences of the breach of them I think I should not speak absurdly since the Author himself tells us P. 93. Albeit Kings who make the Laws are as King James there teacheth us above Laws yet will they rule their Subjects by the Law and a King governing in a setled Kingdom leaves to be a King degenerates into a Tyrant so soon as he seems to rule it is there printed in the Copy according which is nonsence contrary to his Laws and certainly a Tyrant can never promise himself security either from his own Conscience or from Men but whereas he says the direction of the Law is only like the advice which the Kings Councel gives him which no man says is a Law to him is false for the Kings Councel should never advise him to do that which he cannot whith a safe Conscience perform but the Kings Conscience can never advise him to break those Laws that are the boundaries between his Prerogatives and the Peoples just Rights and therefore though it is true in some cases where the King sees the Law rigorous or doubtful he may mitigate or interpret the Execution thereof by his Judges to whom he hath made over that power in the intervalls of Parliament and though perhaps some particular Statutes may be his Authority be suspended for causes best known to himself and Council Yet this does not extend to Laws of publick concernment and for that I will appeal to the Conscience of any true Son of the Church of England whether he thinks for Example that the Proclamation for indulgence contrary to the Statute made against Conventicles were binding or no Neither is this that follows consistent with what the Author hath said before That although a King do frame all his Actions to be according to the Laws yet he is not bound thereto but at his good will and for good Example or so far forth as the general Law of the safety of the Commonwealth doth naturally bind him For in such sort only positive Laws may may be said to bind the King not by being positive but as they are naturally the best and only means for the preservation of the Common-wealth So that if a King thinks any the firmest and most indispensible Laws that have been made suppose Magna Charta or the Statute de Tallagio non concedendo for example not to be for the safety of the Commonweal it is but his declaring that he will have them no longer observed and the work is done nor will this that follows help it though true that all Kings even Tyrants and Conquerors are bound to preserve the Lands Goods Liberties and lives of all their Subjects not by any Municipal Laws so much as the natural Law of a Father which binds them to ratifie the Acts of their Fore-Fathers and Predecessors in things necessary for the publick Good of the Subjects All which is very well but if this Monarch thus succeeding in the place of the natural Father is the sole Judge of what things are necessary for the common good what if he have a mind to keep these Children for Children and subjects slaves are all one with this Authour as some unnatural Fathers do as cheap as they can or to make the most of them will let them enjoy no more but the scanty necessaries of life and will think fair water brown bread and wooden shooes sufficient for a Farmer and 300 l. or 400 l. per annum enough in Conscience for a Country Gentleman or desiring to be absolute and therefore to have a constant standing Army to raise mony with as some Monarchs do and being resolved that for the future all the just rights and priviledges of his Clergy Nobility and People shall signifie nothing will take all the over-plus of his Childrens Estates eaving them no more then a poor and miserable subsistence he may lawfully do what he will with his own and it is all his upon the first intimation of his pleasure by Edict or Proclamation But perhaps some honest Divine may start up and tell him he will be damned for thus abusing his power or breaking his Coronation Oath what What if this Father of his people shall laugh at him for a fool and think himself too cunning to believe any such thing or what if his Son or Successor be resolved not to run his head any more into the snare of a Coronation Oath but finding himself invested in all the absolute power of his Predecessour without any unjust act of his own since we know Princes seldome loose any thing they have once got will exercise it as he pleases for his own humour or glory and thinks himself not obliged in Conscience to restore any of those rights his Predecessor hath ursuped upon his People I know not what benefit this may be to the Prince but this I am sure of it would very little mend the Subjects condition to be told their former Monarch was damned or that this may follow him when they are now slaves nor is this a mere Chimera since a Neighbouring people over against us lost their liberties by much such a kind of proceeding And therefore this Authour hath found out a very fit interpretation of the Kings Coronation Oath Vide Iuramenta Regis quando coronatur old Stat. ed 1556. for whereas he used to Swear that he will cause equal and upright justice to be administred in all his judgments and to use discretion with mercy and truth according to his power and that the just Laws and customes quas vulgus elegerit I will not translate it shall chuse to be observed to the honour of God Yet our Author will have the King obliged to keep no laws but what he in his discretion Judges to be upright which is to make the Oath signifie just nothing as I have proved already wherein he abominably perverts the sense of this Oath for that which he puts first is really last And the words by which he Swears to observe the Laws and customes granted by King Edward and other his Predecessors are absolute and without
although it look fine yet examined to the bottom signifies little for it is not true that every the least transgression of the bounds of Law is a subversion of the Government it self since if done perhaps only to one or a few persons it does not follow that therefore it must be a leading case and so bring on a prescription against publick Liberty in all cases Neither does the Subjects bearing with it not contribute otherwise then accidentally to this breach of Liberty Since he is obliged to bear it not because it is just but because he either may hope to have redress by the ordinary course of Law or else by petitioning the Assembly of Estates when they meet who are partly ordained on purpose to remonstrate the Grievances of Subjects to their Prince and thereupon to have them redressed Nor is this limited Monarch as the Author would infer less obliged to govern according to Law in smaller or private matters then in great and publick ones Only in many smaller matters Princes or their Officers may through ignorance or inadvertency sometimes transgress the true bounds of Law which they would not do perhaps if they were better informed And so likewise if the Subject bear it it is not from the Legality of the Act but from this great Maxime in Law and Reason that a mischief to some private men is better than an inconvenience in giving every private person power that thinks himself injured by the Prince or his Officers to be his own Judg and right himself by force since that were contrary to the great duty of every good Subject of endeavouring to preserve the common peace and happiness of his Country which ought to be preferred before any private mans Interest So on the other side if the oppression or breach of Laws be general and extend to all the People alike if the reason of the case alter why may not the practicedo so too ' But Mr. H. gives us another remedy in this case that if the Monarchs Act of Exorbitancy or Transgression be mortal and such as suffered dissolves the Frame of the Government and publick Liberty then the illegality is to be laid open and redressment sought by Petition Which is true for an Appeal to the Law from the violence of subordinate Ministers is really a Petition for Justice to the King himself who is by the Law supposed present in the persons of his Judges that represent him and this the Author himself in a better humour does confess in his Patriarcha P. 93. The people have the Law as a familiar interpreter of the Kings pleasure which being published throughout the Kingdom doth represent the presence and Majesty of the King also the Judges and Magistrates are restrained by the common Rules of Law from using their own Liberty to the injury of others since they are to judg according to the Laws and not to follow their own Opinions And because it might so happen that the King may be sometimes surprised or importuned to write Orders or Letters to the Judges to direct them to act contrary to the Law The King himself in Parliament hath declared See the Oath of the Justices 18. E. 3. what Oath these Justices shall take when they are admitted into their Office where among other things they swear thus And that ye deny no man common right by the Kings Letters nor none other mans nor for none other cause and in case such Letters do come to you contrary to the Law that ye do nothing by such Letters but certifie the King thereof and proceed to execute the Law notwithstanding the same Letters and concludes thus And in case ye be from henceforth found in default in any of the points aforesaid ye shall be at the Kings will of Body Lands or Goods thereof to be done as shall please him as God help you c. And the Lord Chief-Justice Anderson and his Fellow-Justices in the Common-Pleas who upon so great a point as Cavendishes Case was 35 El. having consulted with all the Judges of England delivered their Opinions solemnly in writing that the Queen was obliged by her Coronation-Oath to keep the Laws and if they should not likewise observe them they were forsworne Anderson p. 154 155. Which Will of the Kings is supposed to be as well declared by the House of Peers his supreme Court of Justice as by any other way See the Judgment upon Tresillian and the rest of his Brethren 21 Rich. 2. and the Impeachment of the House of Commons against the Judges that gave their Opinions contrary to Law in the case of Ship-money Vide the subsequent Act of Parliament 17 Car. 1. Chap. 14. declaring that upon the Tax called Shipmoney and the Judgment Entr. 1. H. 7. 4. b. the judicial opinions of the said Justices and Barons were and are contrary to the Laws and Statutes of this Realm and the Liberty of the Subjects c. which if it be truely observed there can never be any fear of a Civil War or popular Commotion since our Law supposes the King can do no wrong that is in his own person And therefore Sir John Markham when Chief Justice told King Edward the 4th That the King cannot arrest any Man himself for suspition of Treason or Fellony as other of his Lieges may for if it be a wrong to the party grieved he has no remedy Therefore if any Act or thing be done to the Subject contrary to the Law the Judges and Ministers of Justice are to be questioned and punished if the Laws are violated and no reflection made upon the King who is still supposed to do his Subjects Right Si factam fuerit injustum says Bracton per inde non fuerit factum Regis And thus much will serve for a further Answer to the Authors Query before mentioned Whether it be a sin for a Subject to disobey the King if he command any thing contrary to his Laws since all the Subjects both great and small are supposed to know what the Rights and Priviledges of the Subject are as well as what are the Prerogatives of the Crown nor are these reserved Cases so many or so difficult as the Anthor would make us believe but that they may be easily understood without Appealing to any other Judg then the Conscience of every honest man And though the King may for our common defence in time of War make Bulwarks upon another mans Land or command a House to be pull'd down if the next be on Fire or the Suburbs of a City to be demolished in time of War to make it serviceable though men may justify their obedience in such Cases yet it were folly and madness from thence to argue that the King were as much to be obeyed if he commanded us to pull down a whole Town for his Diversion or to take away all mens Lands or Goods at his Pleasure Since if he should be so weak as to command it it were his unhappiness
be upon the hearing of one Party only for it is impossible for a Monarch to make his Defence and Answer and produce his Witnesses in every Mans Conscience in each Mans Cause who will but question the Legality of the Monarchs Government Certainly the Sentence cannot but be unjust where but one Mans Tale is heard The first Sentence of this Paragraph is Answered sufficiently in the Observation upon the last Reason but one As for Written Laws every Body knows they are adumb Letter as they lie in Ink Paper but as they come to be from thence Copied out and fixed in Mens Memories they are not dumb neither always needs a Judg to pronounce Sentence but are able enough to speak oftentimes against the Sentence of an unjust Judg and all the Standers by can easily tell if a Judg should go about to Trie and Condemn a Man without ever Impanelling a Jury nor needs there any Defence for the Judg in this case but that a Man may safely give his Sentence in this Case without hearing the Judges Reason since it is plain there can be none given But as for the Monarch it is supposed that he hath already made his Defence by his Atturney and produced his Witnesses when the Subject Petitioned his Judges to right him in what he conceived to be an Oppression So that the Sentence cannot be unjust where but one Mans Tale is heard But if the Judges in this Case as in that of Ship-Money cannot convince the Plantiff but that he is oppressed contrary to Law It is neither his nor their Judgment that can alter the Case But if he can have no other remedy he must even go home and expect better opportunities of being righted as when there are honester Judges or the calling of a Parliament one of whose ends is to redress grievances of that kind by representing to the King the faults and transgressions of his Ministers who only are punishable and answerable for the injustice since the King in his own Person can do none as I have often affirmed as for Mr. H's conclusion that every man must oppose or not oppose the Monarch acoording to his own Conscience when he can have no other redress I do not approve of it For I will not suppose any time in which this Nation is not oppresed by a standing Army or Men of different Principles in Religion and Goverment but the Subject may find redress if not at one time yet at another But the other part of the dispute between our Author and Mr. H. whether this Power of every Mans judging of the illegal Acts of the Monarch ' argues not a Superiority of those who Judg over him who is Judged because it is not Authorative and Civil but Moral residing in Reasonable Creatures and lawful for them to execute which is not so hard to understand as the Author makes it if we take this Word Moral as it is plain Mr. H. uses it in contradiction to Civil Power which is such a right of acting as every private Man hath though he hath no Civil Authority For a Mans bare judging of the justice and injustice of all Actions that concern him or any other man are inseparable from the Nature of Man whether they are ordered by a Prince or private Man and a Princes commanding this or that to be done or giving his judgment this way or that way cannot alter these settled Rules whereby Men judg of right and wrong So that if this Author or his Friends will make use of Mr. Hobs's Arguments of the necessity of the Judgment of one Man in all Points whatever they must likewise take what follows that there is likewise no good or evil or right or wrong in the state of Nature but what the Monarch judges to be so and when that is done if the Authors Friends have any Religion let them see what they will get by it but the Author supposes he hath sufficient advantage over Mr H. because he hath laid it down in the Page before going ' That resistance ought to be made and every Man must oppose or not oppose according as in Conscience he can acquit or condemn the Acts of the Governour For says the Author if it enable a Man to resist and oppose his Governor without Question 't is Authoritative and Civil As for Mr. Hobs's Assertion I will not take upon me to meddle in so nice a Point though he hath in all his work supposed such resistance lawfull only in limited or mixt Monarchies and not in absolute ones and likewise then only when all other ways and means hvae proved ineffectual and of this opinion likewise the Author of the Excellent Poem called Coopers Hill seems to have been which I rather take notice of because the Author was never look't upon but as a great Friend to Monarchy and this Poem it self speaks him no Presbyterian Both the Verses and Sence are so good that perhaps it may refresh the Reader tired with Reading so much drie Arguments to run them over speaking of the King 's hunting the Stag over Runny-Mead where the great Charter was Seal'd he falls into this reflection This a more innocent and happy Chace Then when of Old but in the self same Place Fair Liberty pursued and meant a Prey To lawless Power here turned and stood at Bay When in that remedy all hope was plac't Which was or should have been at least the last Here was that Charter Seal'd wherein the Crown All marks of Arbitrary Power lays down Tyrant and Slave those Names of hate and fear The happier Style of King and Subject bear Happy when both to the same Center move When Kings give Liberty and Snbjects love Therefore not long in force this Charter stood Wanting that Seal it must be seal'd in Blood The Subjects Armed the more their Princes gave Th' advantage only took the more to crave Till Kings by giving give themselves away And even that Power that should deny betray Who gives constrain'd him his own fear reviles Not thankt but scorn'd nor are they gifts but spoiles Thus Kings by grasping more then they could hold First made their subjects by oppression hold And Popular sway by forcing Kings to give More then was fit for Subjects to receive Ran to the same extreams and one excess Made both by striving to be greater less The mischiefs of which extremes if rightly considered would make all wise Princes and good Subjects contented with their share and endeavour to keep the Ballance even and not to let it incline to either side As to Magna Charta I shall only add that the Defence which the Nobility and People made of their Antient Rights was not condemned or declared Rebellion either by Magna Charta or any other Statute but on the contrary the breakers thereof were declared ipso facto excommunicated the solemn form of which and where the King himself who had so often broke his Oath bore a part see in Mat. Paris
and if that condescent be an act of Grace doth not this condesent to a limitation come from the free determination of the Monarchs will if he either formally or virtually as the Author supposeth desert his absolute or Arbitrary power which he hath by conquest or other right Which last words of Mr. H. though I confess they are ill exprest yet I see no down right contradiction in the sence Mr. H. meant them if any man please to consult him he there says That a Monarch may either be limited by original constitution or an after condescent therefore these words the sole means of Soveraignty is the consent and fundamental contract is not meant of a limited Monarchy any more than of another but of any Soveraignty whatever So likewife though these words a secundary original constitution may seem to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and to destroy each other yet as the Author explains himself you will find they do not in sense for he only supposes that a Prince who hath an absolute Arbitrary power either by succession or election finding it not so safe and easie as he conceives it would be for him if he came to new terms with his people would desert some of that despotick power and govern by let rules or Laws which he obliges himself and his Successors by Oath or some other conditions never to make or alter without the consent of his Subjects I see not why this may not in one sense be called a second original constitution for he was at first an absolute King by which was the original constitution and his coming to new Terms with them may be termed in respect of this a secundary original constitution or agreement of the government though founded upon the former old right which the Monarch had to govern as for a King by Conquest it cannot indeed in respect of him be properly called a secundary constitution since the Conquerour had no right to clame an absolute subjection from the Subjects until they submitted to him so as that they might not drive him out again if they were able until he came to some Terms with them Thus I think no sober man but will maintain that the people of England might lawfully have driven out William I. called the Conquerour supposing he had claimed by no other title but Conquest alone which when he had sworn to observe and maintain all the Laws and liberties of the people of England and had been thereupon Crown'd and received as King and had quitted his pretensions by Conquest or force and had taken the Oaths and homage of the Clergy Nobility and People they could not then without Rebellion endeavour to do And certainly had he not thought his title by Conquest not so good as the other of King Edward's Testament he would never have quitted the former and sworn to observe the Laws of his Predecessor so likewise Henry I. Mat. Paris from whom all the Kings and Queens of England have since claim'd upon his Election and Coronation for other title he had none granted a Charter whereby he renounced divers illegal practices which Flatterers may call Prerogatives which his Father and brother had exercised contrary to King Edward's Laws and their own Coronation Oaths so that here is an Example of one of the Authors absolute Monarchs who by a right of Conquest might pretend to the exercise of an arbitrary power yet renounced it and only retained so much as might serve for the well governing of his Subjects and his own security It is not therefore true which this Author affirms that this accepted of so much power as the people pleased to give him since they neither desired nor did he grant them any more but those just rights they had long before enjoyed under their former Kings before his Father's coming into England However I conceive this wise Prince was of the opinion of Theopompus King of Lacedemon Plut. in Lycurgo who when his wife upbraided him that he would leave the royal dignity to his Sons less than he found it no rather replyed he greater as more durable and therefore Plutarch in the same place ascribes the long continuance of the Lacedemonian Kingdom to the limited power of their Kings in these words ' and indeed when Envy is removed from Kings together with excess of power it followed that they had no cause to fear that which happened to the Kings of the Massenians and Argives from their Subjects But because this Author tells Mr. H. that if we should ask what proofs or examples he hath to justify his Doctrine of a limited Monarchy in the Constitution he would be as mute as a fish we will shew two or three examples of the antiquity of such limited Monarchies though they were not of the same model with those that are at this day found among the Germanes and other northern Nations descended from thence In Macedon the Kings descended of Caranus as Callisthenes says in Arrian did obtain an Empire over the Macedonians not by force but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Law So Curtius Lib. IV. The Macedonians were used to Kingly Government but in a greater appearance of liberty than other Nations For it is certain the lives of their Subjects were not at their disposal as appears from the same Author Lib. VI. The Army by an antient custom of the Macedonians did judg of Capital causes i. e. in time of War but in peace it belonged to the People the power of their Kings signified litle unless his Authority was before of some force And this was by original constitution for we do not find that ever the Kings of Macedon altered any thing in their original constitution yet they had the Soveraignty in most things and their persons were sacred So likewise among the antient Romans where Romulus from a Captain of Volunteers became a King Dyonisius Halicar Lib. II. Tells us that after Romulus had made a speech to his Souldiers and followers to this effect that he left it to them to consider what Government they would chuse for whatsoever they pitcht upon he should submit to it and though he did think himself unworthy the Principality yet he should not refuse to obey their Commands concluding that he thought it an Honour for him to have been declared the Leader of so great a Colony and to have a City called by his name Whereupon the people after some deliberation among themselves chose him their King or limited Monarch since both the Senate and people had from the very beginning their particular shares in the Government the Senates making this great Counsel which yet were for the greater part of them chosen out of the Patricians by the Tribes Dyon Hal. Lib. 11. and Curiae with these he consulted and referred all business of lesser moment which he did not care to dispatch himself for be reserved to himself the last Appeal in causes and to be Pontifex Maximus or Cheif Priest and Preserver
of the Laws and Customs of their Country as also to be cheif General in War but to the people were reserved these three Priviledges to create Magistrates to ordain Laws and to decree Peace and War the King referring it to them So that the Authority of the Senate did joyn in these things though this custom was changed for now the Senate does not confirm the decrees of the people but the people those of the Senate But he added both dignity and power to the Senate that they should judg those things which the King referred to them by Major part of the votes And this he borrowed from the Lacedemonian Commonwealth for the Lacedemonian Kings were not at their own liberty to do whatever they pleased but the Senate had power in matter appertaining to the Common-wealth But because these examples may seem too stale or remote Let us now consider all the Kingdoms that have been erected upon the ruins of the Roman Empire by those Northern Nations that over-ran it and see if there were so much as one Kingdom among them that was not limited As for the Kingdoms of the Goths and Vandals erected in Italy Africk and Spain the Author confesses they were limited or rather mixt since their Kings were deposed by the people whenever they displeased them So likewise for the Successors of those Gothick Princes in Castile Portugal Arragon and Navarre and the other Kingdoms of Spain He that will read the histories of those Kingdoms will find them to have been all limited or rather mixt and to have had Assemblies of the Estates Mariana Lib. XVIII without whose consent those Kings could antiently neither make Laws nor raise mony upon their Subjects and as for Arragon in particular they had a Popular Magistrate called the cheif Justiciary who did in all cases oppose and cancel the Orders and Judgments of the King himself where they exceeded the just bounds of his power and were contrary to the Laws though indeed now since the times of Ferdinand and Isabella the Kings relying upon their own power by reason of the Gold and Silver they received from the Judges and the great addition of Territories have presumed to infringe many of their Just rights and Priviledges And as for the Kingdoms erected by Francks in Germany and Gaule which we now call German Empire and Kingdom of France As for the former any one that willread the ancient French and German Historians will find that the Kings of Germany could not do any thing of Moment not so much as declare a Successor without the consent of their Great Counsell of Nobility and Clergy and as to the latter as absolute as it seems at present it was a few ages past almost as much limited if not more than its Neighbours For the Kings of France could not anciently make Laws raise any publick War wherein the Nobility and people were bound to assist him or Levy Taxes upon their Subjects without the consent of the Estates but those Assemblies being at first discontinued by reason of the continual wars which Henry V. and Henry the VI. Kings of England made upon them Phil. Com. Livre VI. Cap. 7. to which Mezeray in his History tells us France ows the loss of its Liberties and the change of its laws In whose time they gave their King Charles VII a power to raise mony without them which trick when once found out appeared so sweet to his Successors that they would never fully part with it again and Lewis the XI by weakening his Nobility and People by constant Taxations and maintaining Factions among them bragged that he had metre les Roys du France Com. Liv. V. Chap. XVIII brought the Kings of France hors du Page or out of worship Whereas the Author last mentioned remarks that he might have said with more truth les mettredu sense hors et de la raison and yet we find in the beginning of the Reign of Charles VIII the Assembly of the Estates gave that King the sum of two Millions and an half of Francks and promised him after two years they would supply him again It seems Comines in the same place did not look upon this as a thing quite gone and out of Fashion since he then esteemed this as the only just and Legal way of raising mony in that Kingdom as appears by these words immediately after Is it toward such Objects as these meaning the Nobility and People that the King is to insist upon his Prerogative and take at his pleasure what they are ready to give would it not be more just both towards God and the World to raise mony this way than by Violence and Force nor is there any Prince who can raise mony any other way unless by Violence and Force and contrary to the Laws So likewise in the same Chapter speaking of those who were against the Assembly of the Estates at that time that there were some but those neither considerable for quality or vertue who said that it was a diminution to the Kings Authority to talk of assembling the Estates and no less than Treason against him But it is they themselves who commit that crime against God the King and their Country and those who use these expressions are such as are in Authority without desert unfit for any thing but flattery whispering trifles and stories into the ears of their Masters which makes them apprehensive of these Assemblies lest they should take cognizance of them and their manners But I suppose it was for such honest expressions as these that Katherine de Midices Queen of France said that Comines had made as many Hereticks in Politicks as Calvin had done in Religion that is because he open'd Mens Eyes and made them understand a little of that they call King-craft But however in some Provinces of France as in Languedoc and Provence though the King is never denyed whatever he please to demand yet they still retain so much of the shadow of their antient Liberties as not to be taxed without the consent of the. Assembly of Estates consisting of the Nobility Clergy and Burgesses of great Towns and Cities which however is some ease to them not to have their mony taken by Edict So Hungary which was erected by the Huns a stirp of the European Scythians by which you may judge the antient form of Government was much the same as that of the Germanes All Histories grant that Kingdom to have been limited and to be of the same form with that of the other Northern Nations nay which is more to have had a Palatine who could hinder the King from ordaining any thing contrary to the Laws and as for Poland the Author cannot deny but it is limited in many things but as he only takes notice of those things in which the King hath power so he omits most of those in which he hath none as in raising of mony or making laws without the consent of the Diet. So