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A64510 The third part of Modern reports being a collection of several special cases in the Court of Kings-Bench: in the last years of the reign of K. Charles II. In the reign of King James II. And in the two first years of his present Majesty. Together with the resolutions and judgments thereupon. None of these cases ever printed before. Carefully collected by a learned hand.; Reports. 1660-1726. Vol.3. England. Court of King's Bench. 1700 (1700) Wing T911; ESTC R222186 312,709 406

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and that before the Pardon for these Reasons it cannot be revested in the party Serjeant Pemberton and Mr. E contra Finch contra The Question is what Interest the King hath by this Verdict for as to the Offence it self 't is within the Body of the Pardon for all Misdemeanours and Offences are pardoned and the Exception doth not reach this Case for that excepts Misdemeanours in answering of the Revenues Now that which arises by a Forfeiture can never be taken to be part of the King's Revenue because the Revenue is properly a stated Duty originally setled on the King and the Penalty to be inflicted for this Misdemeanour cannot be a Revenue because the Court have not yet given Iudgment so that 't is incertain what Fine they will set and this appears more plain because the King may assign his Revenue but cannot grant over a Penalty The Information is not grounded upon any Act of Parliament which establishes the Revenue but for concealing of a thing forfeited to prevent the Seisure thereof which indeed may be a casual Revenue as all Fines are so that if this should be taken as an Offence committed against the King in deceiving him of this Revenue then the first part of the Pardon dischargeth all such Offences and the Exception pardons none 'T is for these Reasons that the Case cannot fall under any of the words in the Exception no not under these Words viz. Mony due or to be due to the King because no Mony is yet due to him 'T is true the Iury have found it a Misdemeanour which is finable but until the Fine is set no Mony is due because the Court may set a greater or less Fine as they shall see cause And if any other Construction should be made of this Exception then every thing for which a Fine may be set is excepted and this will be to make the Pardon signifie nothing for what is meant by Offences and Misdemeanours if they should be pardoned and yet the Fine arising thereon should not But admitting that all Offences relating to the Concealment of collecting of the Revenue are excepted then this Revenue must be either antecedent or it must arise by the Fine 'T is no antecedent Revenue this appears by the Book of Rates wherein the King 's stated Revenue is set down and no mention of this so that the Revenue to which this relates must arise upon the Offence and what an absurd thing is it to say that all Offences are pardoned by one part of this general Pardon and by the Exception none are pardoned Besides the Information is not grounded upon that part of the Statute which inflicts a Penalty upon the person who exposeth prohibited Goods to Sale for then they would sue for the 50 l. therefore it must be upon the Forfeiture which is expresly pardoned and though there is a Conviction yet nothing is vested in the King before Iudgment because it may be arrested and therefore Tooms's Case is in no wise applicable to this for the Debt which was due to him was actually vested in the King by the Inquisition returned here which found him to be Felo de se Adjornatur Anonymus A Libel in the Admiralty against a Ship called the Sussex Ketch A Ship was pawned for necessaries and a Libel was exhibited in the Admiralty though the pawning was at the Land setting forth that the said Ship wanted Necessaries super altum Mare and that the Master took up several Sums of the Plaintiff at Roterdam for which he did hypothecate the said Ship and upon a Suggestion that this Contract was made at St. Katherines infra Corpus Comitatus Council moved for a Prohibition upon which a Question did arise whether a Master of a Vessel can pawn it on the Coast for Necessaries and the person to whom 't is pawned shall sue for the Mony in the Admiralty here By the Common Law a Master of a Ship had neither a general or special property in it Sid. 453. and therefore could not pawn it but by the Civil Law in cases of necessity he may rather than the Voyage should be lost and if any such cause appear 't is within the Iurisdiction of the Admiralty but then the pawning must be super altum Mare Now the Statute of 28 H. Cap. 15. H. 8. which abridgeth the Iurisdiction of the Admiralty in Trials of Pyrates and which appointeth Offences committed on the Sea to be tried by a Commission under the great Seal directed to the Admiral and others according to the course of the Common Law and not according to the Civil Law gives a remedy in this very Case Molloy de Jure maritimo 62. for it provides that it shall not be prejudicial to any person for taking of Victuals Gables Rapes c. in cases of necessity upon the Sea paying for the same So that this is an excepted Case because of the Necessity and 't is like the Cases of suing for Mariners Wages in this Court The Service was at Sea so that the Admiralty hath no proper Iurisdiction over this Matter 'T is true Prohibitions have been denied for Mariners Wages the first is reported by Iustice Winch Winch. f. 8. but the reason seems to be because they proceed in the Admiralty not upon any Contract at Land but upon the Merits of the Service at Sea and allow or deduct the Wages according to the good or bad performance of the Services in the Voyage Besides there is an Act of Parliament which warrants she Proceedings in the Court of Admiralty for Mariners Wages Cotton Abr. f. 340. nu 37. For in a Parliament held in the 14th year of Richard II. the Commons petititioned for remedy against great Wages taken by Masters of Ships and Mariners to which the King answered that the Admiral shall appoint them to take reasonable Wages or shall punish them Now the reason of the Civil Law which allows the pawning of a Ship for necessaries upon the high Sea seems to be plain because there may be an extraordinary and invincible necessity at Sea but not at Land So that this being a Contract beyond Sea and at Land the Court of Admiralty cannot have any Iurisdiction over it 4 Inst 134. Cro. Car. 603. Latch 11. 2 Brownl 37. for where the Common Law cannot relieve in such Cases the Admiralty shall not because they are limited to Acts done upon the Sea and in cases of necessity for if the Law should be otherwise the Master may take up as much Mony as he will Mr. Pollexfen contra 1 Rolls 530. That things arising upon Land may be sued for in the Admiralty is no new thing for so it is in all Cases of Stipulation Mariners Wages are also recoverable in that Court not by vertue of any Act of Parliament Exton Mant. Diraeologiae f. 192. but because it grows due for Services done at Sea which is properly a Maritime Cause though the
computation of the price of Provisions and other Necessaries in 2 H. 5. and how they encreased in Value from that time till the Queen's Reign it may be reasonably affirmed that 40 s. per Annum about the time when that King lived would bear an equal proportion to 40 l. a year in her Reign and if so it may as reasonably be said that 4 l. per Annum in her days would almost bear the like proportion to 80 l. per annum now because of the vast encrease of Riches by Commerce and otherwise in this last Age and such an Estate doth now qualifie a Man to be of the Grand Jury The 40 s. per annum in King H's Reign was esteemed a sufficient Estate to supply all the common Necessities of Life Wheat being then sold for 12 d. per Quarter and good Gascoign Wine for 40 s. per Tun. It was an Age when 20 Marks per Annum was a very good Allowance to maintain a Student at the Inns of Court but too great a Charge for a Commoner to bear and therefore the Lord Chancellor Fortescue tells us that none but the Sons of Noblemen in Hospitiis illis Leges addiscebant The Jurors in those days were all Knights but are now mean and illiterate persons for 't is a very poor Estate which qualifies them for that Service How can Matters of Fact which often require great Examination be tryed by Men of such narrow Capacities which are generally found amongst Men of 10 l. per Annum for so it will be so long as the Degrees of Fortune make such a vast inequality amongst us Experience teacheth us that Men of such low Fortunes and whose Education is generally amongst the Beasts of the Plow have not the same sense of Honour and Vertue with Men of more elevated Qualities and Conversation there must be danger of Subornation and Perjury among such Jurors And what will the villanous Judgment in Attaint signifie I mean in respect to their Estates viz. That their Goods be confiscate their Lands and Possessions seised into the King's Hands their Houses demolished their Woods felled and their Meadows plowed This is a very dreadful Sentence to a Man of a good Estate which by the very Form of this old Judgment every Juror was supposed to have but 't is an empty sound to a Man of 10 l. per Annum who cannot have all those Possessions and but a very small proportion of either It may be therefore thought necessary that a farther Provision be made that none should be impanelled to try such Issues but Men of 40 l. per Annum or at least such as like the Jurors in Attaint qui multa majora habent Patrimonia than what will qualifie a Petty Juror at this day Gentlemen The following Collection is the Product of your Labours It was borrowed from you at the Bar and 't is but just to restore it I know Men have generally very faint Inclinations to approve any Writings beside their own and seldom declare in favour of a Book till they hear what success it has in the World and even then are biassed by the Multitude who very often condemn without reading or read without Understanding I have heard it often objected though I am still to learn upon what accompt that we have too many Printed Books of the Law already and that it was more certain and intelligible when fewer Volumes of it were published I must confess some of the late Reports are collected with very little Judgment But still there is a necessity of new Books tho' not of such for I would feign know how any Lawyer can now be able to advise his Client with the help and direction only of the Old Books 'T is true we have but few of them but 't is because in former Ages all Causes where the thing in demand did not exceed 40 s. were tried either in the County Court in the Hundred Court or in the Court Baron of the Mannor In those days the great Courts of Record at Westminster were not so full of Suitors as now When Bracton wrote the Justices in Eyre who had the same Power with our Justices of Assise went their Circuits but once in seven years and a long time afterwards even in the Reign of King Henry the Eighth the Judges would often rise from the Bench in Term-time without hearing a Motion or trying of a Cause and I think the Practice did not much encrease till this last Age for Anno 10 Eliz. there was but one Serjeant at the Common-Pleas Barr for a whole Term together and that was Serjeant Bendloes and I do not read that he had any Business there Nay at that time the Court of Chancery had no greater share of Practice than the Courts of the Common Law for in the two and twentieth Year of King Henry the Eighth Sir Thomas Moor being then Lord Chancellor did usually read all the Bills which were exhibited into that Court but Business is now so much encreased that all the Council can scarce find time enough to read the Briefs of such Bills which are filed every Term. But the Law hath now its Residence in Westminster-Hall most Causes of Value are there determined and the great Number of Country Attornies in our days who according to my Lord Coke's Opinion by dayly multiplying Suits have so wonderfully encreased the Business of those Courts that it seems very necessary that the judicial determinations there should by new Books be transmitted to future Ages And though some Cases in this Collection which were adjudged in the late Reign may not have the Authority of Presidents because they taste a little of the Times wherein the Administration of Justice was not so nicely regarded as the Dispensation of such things which were then thought Political Rights yet the Reader will find some good Arguments of Learned Men then at the Bar who endeavoured to support our sinking Laws I do acknowledge that if Men were just honest and impartial to themselves and others there would be no occasion for Books of this nature and because they are not so I will not make an Apology for the Publishing of this I think the Book being done with so much Care may be of good use to the Professors of the Law but submit it to your Judgments I confess I am led by my Profession to Affairs of this nature though my Circumstances disingage me from the suspicion of being an Author Vale. A TABLE OF THE CASES Contained in the THIRD PART OF Modern Reports A. ALdridge versus Duke 110 Ashcomb versus Inhabitants Hundred de Eltham 287 Ayres versus Huntington 251 B. BAxter's Case 68 Baldwyn versus Flower 120 Ball versus Cock 140 Barker Mil ' versus Damer 336 Barnes versus Eggard 39 Beak versus Tyrrwhite 194 Banson versus Offley 121 Bishops their Case 212 Bisse versus Harcoutt 281 Blaxton versus Stone 123 Boyle versus Boyle 164 Boson versus Sandford 321 Bowyer versus Lenthal 190
the said Master c. for the use of the Company and that no Member of the Company should buy rough Horn within four and twenty miles of London but of those two Men so appointed under a Penalty to be imposed by the said Master Warden c. That the Defendant did buy a quantity of rough Horn contrary to the said Law c. There was Iudgment in this Case by default And for the Defendant it was argued that this was not a good By-Law 1. Because it doth restrain Trade 11 Co. 54. Hob. 210. for the Company are to use no Horns but such as those two Men shall buy and if they should have occasion for more than those Men should buy then 't is plain that Trade is thereby restrained 2. The Master c. hath reserved a power which they may use to oppress the Poor because they may make what Agreements they will amongst themselves and set unreasonable prices upon those Commodities and let the younger sort of Tradesmen have what quantity and at what rates they please To which it was answered by Serjeant Thompson First This By-Law is for the encouragement of Trade because the Horns are equally to be distributed when brought to the Hall for the benefit of the whole Company But the material Objection was that this being a Company incorporated within the City of London they have not Iurisdiction elsewhere but are restrained to the City and by consequence cannot make a By-Law which shall bind at the distance of four and twenty miles for if they could make a Law so extensive they might by the same reason enlarge it all over England and so make it as binding as an Act of Parliament and for this reason it was adjudged no good By-Law Sir John Wytham versus Sir Richard Dutton ASsault and False Imprisonment 14 Octob. 36 Car. 2. c. The Defendant as to the Assault before the 6th day of November pleads Not-Guilty and as to the False Imprisonment on the said 6th day of November in the same year he made a special Iustification viz. That 28 Octob. 32 Car. 2. c. the King by his Letters Patents did appoint the Defendant to be Captain general and Chief Governour of Barbadoes and so sets forth the Grant at large by which he appoints twelve Men to be of the King's Council during pleasure of which the Plaintiff Wytham was one that the Defendant had also power by the advice of that Council to appoint and establish Courts Iudges and Iustices and that the Copies of such Establishments must be sent hither for the King's Assent with power also to establish a Deputy-Governour that by vertue of these Letters Patents the Defendant had appointed Sir John Wytham to be Deputy-Governour of the said Island in his absence and that he being so constituted did male arbitrarie execute the said Office That when the Defendant returned to Barbadoes viz. 6 Novemb 35 Car. 2. he called a Council before whom the Plaintiff was charged with male Administration in the absence of the Defendant viz. That he did not take the usual Oath for observing of Trade and Navigation that he assumed the Title of Lieutenant Governour and that Decrees made in Court were altered by him in his Chamber Vpon which it was then ordered that he should be committed to the Provost Marshal until discharged by Law which was done accordingly in whose Custody he remained from the 6th day of November to the 20th of December following which is the same Imprisonment c. To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred and the Defendant joyned in Demurrer Mr. Pollexfen argued for the Plaintiff and Serjeant Thompson for the Defendant 1. It was said for the Plaintiff that the Causes of his Commitment if any yet were such which they ought not meddle withal because they relate to his Mis-behaviour in his Government for which he is answerable to the King alone But supposing they might have some cause for the committing of him this ought to be set forth in the Plea that the Plaintiff might answer it for to say he did not take the Oath of Deputy Governour in what concerned Trade and Navigation is no cause of Commitment because there was no Body to administer that Oath to him for he was Governour himself Then to alledge that he did alter in his Chamber some Decrees made in the Court of Chancery that can be no cause of Commitment for the Governour is Chancellor there Besides the Defendant doth not shew that any Body was injured by such alterations neither doth he mention any particular Order but only in general so 't is impossible to give an Answer to it 2. He doth not alledge that the Plaintiff had made or done any of these things but that he was charged to have done it and non constat whether upon Oath or not The Governour hath a large power given by these Letters Patents to make Laws such as he by consent of a general Council shall enact Ex parte Def. The Fact is set forth in the Plea the Plaintiff was committed by vertue of an Order of Council until he was brought to a general Court of Oyer and Terminer by which Court he was again committed That the Court had power to commit him is not denied for the King is not restrained by the Laws of England to govern that Island by any particular Law whatsoever and therefore not by the Common Law but by what Law he pleaseth For those Islands were gotten by Conquest or by some of his Subjects going in search of some prize and planting themselves there Calvin 's Case The Plaintiff being then committed by an Order of Council till he should be discharged by due course of Law this Court will presume that his Commitment was legal The Court were all of Opinion that the Plea was not good so Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff but afterwards 5 Willielmi Mariae this Iudgment was reversed by the House of Peers Sir Robert Jefferies versus Watkins THIS was an Action brought for a Duty to be paid for weighing of Goods at the Common Beam of London Verdict cures a defective Declaration setting forth that the Lord Mayor c. time out of mind kept a common Beam and Weights and Servants to attend the weighing of Goods That the Defendant bought Goods c. but did not bring them to the Beam to be weighed per quod proficuum amisit Vpon Not-Guilty pleaded there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and it was moved in arrest of Iudgment that the Plaintiff had not brought himself within the Prescription for he doth not say that the Defendant sold the Goods by Weight and this is a fault which is not helped by a Verdict This had been certainly naught upon a Demurrer and being substance is not aided by this Verdict This is Substance for the Duty appears to be wholly in respect of the Weights which are kept now Weighing being the Principal and it
Commitment and that for two reasons 1. Because the persons committing had not any Authority so to do for upon the Return it appears that they were committed by several Lords of the Council whereas it should have been by so many Lords in Council or by Order of Council 2. They ought not to be committed for this Fact which is only a Misdemeanour The Bishops are Peers and therefore the Process ought to be a Summons by way of Subpoena out of the Crown Office and not to commit them the first time If a Man comes in voluntarily he cannot be charged with an Information neither can a person who is found in Court by any Process be so charged if it be illegal as if a Peer be committed by Capias Iustice Allybon replyed that when a Commitment was made by the Lord Chief Iustice of this Court his Name is to the Warrant but not his Office 't is not said Committitur per Capitalem Justiciarium Angliae c. for he is known to be so and why should not a Commitment by such persons Dominos Concilij be as good as a Commitment by Sir Rob. Wright Capitalem Justiciarium That it was enough for the Officer to return his Warrant and when that is done the Court will presume that the Commitment was by the Power which the Lords in Council had and not by that Power which they had not To which it was answered by Mr. Finch that the Lord Chief Iustice always carries an Authority with him to commit where-ever he goes in England but the Lords of the Privy Council have not so large a Power for though they be Lords of the Council always yet they do not always act in Council Then the Statute of 17 Car. 1. cap. 10. was read in which there is mention made of a Commitment by the Lords of the Privy Concil c. But it was answered that that Statute was to relieve against illegal Commitments and those enumerated in that Act were such only and none else And it was strongly insisted that Peers of the Realm cannot be committed at the first instance for a Misdemeanour before Iudgment and that no President can be shewed where a Peer hath been brought in by Capias which is the first Process for a bare Misdemeanour The constant Proceedings in the Starr-Chamber upon such Informations were Crompt Jurisdiction 33. Dyer 315. 4 Inst 25. Regist 287. viz. First the Lord Chancellor sent a Letter to the person then if he did not appear an Attachment went forth The Kings Council answered Sir Baptist Hick's Case Hob. that a Peer may be committed for the Breach of the Peace for which Sureties are to be given and can there be any greater Breach of the Peace than a Libel against the King and Government 'T is certainly such a Breach of the Peace for which Sureties ought to be demanded for where there is any seditious Act there must be a Breach of the Peace and if Sureties are not given then the person must be committed The Objections were over-ruled by three Iudges Then the Information was read which in Substance was viz. That the King by vertue of his Prerogative did on the 4th day of April in the third year of his Reign publish his gracious Declaration for Liberty of Conscience which was set forth in haec verba That afterwards viz. 27 Aprilis in the fourth year of his Reign the King did publish another Declaration reciting the former in which he expressed his care that the Indulgence by him granted might be preserved c. that he caused this last Declaration to be printed and to manifest his favour more signally towards his Subjects on the 4th day of May 1688. it was Ordered in Council that his Declaration dated the 27th day of April last be read on two several days in all Churches and Chappels in the Kingdom and that the Bishops cause the same to be distributed through their several Diocesses c. That after the making of the said Order c. the Bishops naming them did consult and conspire amongst themselves to lessen the Authority and Prerogative of the King and to elude the said Order and in further prosecution of their said Conspiracy they with Force and Arms did on the 18th day of May c. unlawfully maliciously c. frame compose and write a Libel of the King subscribed by them which they caused to be published under the pretence of a Petition Then the Petition was set forth in haec verba In contemptum dicti Domini Regis c. The King's Council moved that the Defendants might plead instanter for so they said is the course of the Court when a Man is brought thither in Custody or appears upon Recognizance But the Council on the other side prayed an Imparlance and a Copy of the Information and argued that the Defendants ought not to plead instanter because their Plea ought to be put in Writing and that they ought to have time to consider what to plead that it was impossible to make any Defence when they did not know the Accusation and that the Practice of the Court anciently was with them 'T is true when a Subpoena is taken out and the Party doth not appear but is brought in by Capias he shall plead instanter and the reason is because he hath given delay to the Cause So 't is likewise in Cases of Felony or Treason but not to an Information for a Misdemeanour Then the Clerk of the Crown informed the Court that it was the Course to plead instanter in these following Cases viz. when the person appears upon a Recognizance or in propria persona or is a Prisoner in Custody upon any Information for a Misdemeanour where no Process issued out to call him in As to the Objection that the Defendants cannot make any Defence without a Copy of the Information the Vsage is otherwise even in Cases where a Man's Life is concerned and what greater difficulty can there be to defend an Accusation for a Misdemeanour than a Charge for High-Treason certainiy the Defendants all know whether they are innocent or not These Points being over-ruled by the Court the Archbishop offered a Plea in writing the Substance of which was that they naming all the Defendants were Peers of Parliament and ought not to be compelled to answer this Misdemeanour immediately but they ought to appear upon due Process of Law and upon their Appearance to have a Copy of the Information and afterwards to imparle and because they were not brought in by Process they pray the Iudgment of the Court. This Plea was offered to the end that what was denied before upon a Motion might be settled by the Opinion of the Court but it was over ruled Then they pleaded severally Not-Guilty and were tried at the Barr a Fortnight afterwards by a Middlesex Iury and acquitted Anonymus In the Common-Pleas AN Action of Debt was brought upon a Bond against the Defendant
an Inn-keeper or common Carrier 't is usual to declare secundum legem consuetudinem Angliae for 't is not a Custom confined to a particular place but 't is such which is extensive to all the King's People The word Consuetudo might have been added 1 Inst 182. but it imports no more than Lex for Custom it self is Law If the Custom of Merchants had been left out the Defendant had then pursued his Covenant for if a Man agrees to pay Mony to such a person or his Assigns and he appoints the payment to another a tender to that person is a good performance of the Covenant But the Court were of Opinion that this was not a good Plea Panton versus the Earl of Bath A Scire Facias to have Execution of a Iudgment obtained in the Court of Oliver late Protector of England and the Dominions and Territories thereunto belonging Where the Pleading is good in substance tho' there is a small variation it will not hurt and in reciting the Iudgment 't is said that it was obtained before Oliver Protector of England and the Dominions thereunto belonging leaving out the word Territories And upon a Demurrer Mr. Pollexfen held this to be a variance Yelv. 212. Orde versus Moreton and like the Case where a Writ of Error was brought to remove a Record in Ejectment directed to the Bishop of Durham setting forth that the Action was between such Parties and brought before the said Bishop and seven other persons naming them and the Record removed was an Ejectment before the Bishop and eight others so that it could not be the same Record which was intended to be removed by the Writ E contra E contra It was said suppose the word Scotland should be left out of the King's Title would that be a variance The Iudicature in this Case is still the same and the Pleading is good in Substance and of that Opinion was the whole Court Hyley versus Hyley HYley had Issue W. Where the Reversion in Fee shall pass in a Will by the words viz. Remaining part of my Estate his eldest Son who had Issue Peter Charles John He by Will devised 1000 l. to his eldest Son and several parcels of Land to other Legatees Then he gave to Peter Lands in Tail Male To John a Mansion House now in question in Tail Male He devised another House to his Grandson Charles in like manner And all the rest and remaining part of his Estate he devised to his three Grandsons equally to be divided amongst them that only excepted which he had given to Peter Charles and John and to the Heirs of their Bodies whom he made Executors Then by another Clause he devised viz. That if either of his Executors die without Issue then the part or parts of him so dying shall go to the Survivor or Survivors equally to be divided John the youngest Grandson dyed without Issue and the question was whether the Reversion of his House shall be divided between his surviving Brothers or descend to his Heir And it was adjudged that the Exception in the Will did comprehend the Reversion in Fee and that it did not pass but without such an Exception it had passed * Allen 28. as where a Man devised his Mannor to another for years and part of other Lands to B. and his Heirs and all the rest of his Lands to his Brother in Tail it was held that by these words the Reversion of the Mannor did pass Anonymus NOTA. An Infant having entred into a Statute brought an Audita Querela to avoid it he was brought into the Court and two Witnesses were sworn to prove his Age and then his Appearance and Inspection were recorded he was bound in this Case with two other persons for 1600 l. and had no more than 200 l. for his share Lydcott versus Willows IN Ejectment A special Verdict was found viz. Devise of an Hereditament carries the Reversion in Fee that the Testator being seized in Fee of certain Houses in Bedfor-Bury and in Parker's Lane did by Will devise his Houses in Parker's Lane to charitable Vses then he gave several specifick Legacies to several persons named in the said Will and then he devised his Houses in Bedford-Bury to Edward Harris and Mary his Wife for their Lives then follow these words viz. The better to enable my Wife to pay my Legacies I give and bequeath to her and her Heirs all my Mesuages Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in the Kingdom of England not before disposed of c. The Question was whether this Devise would carry the Reversion of the Houses in Bedford-Bury to his Wife Adjudged that it did not but that it ought to go to the Heir of the Testator who was Plaintiff in this Case It being found that Harris and his Wife were dead and that the Wife who was Executrix had sufficient Assets to pay the Legacies without the Reversion But Iustice Powel was of another Opinion for that the word Hereditament imports an Inheritance and if it had devised thus viz. the Inheritance not before disposed of the Reversion had passed Afterwards a Writ of Error was brought in the Exchequer-Chamber upon this Iudgment 2 Vent 285. and according to the Opinion of Iustice Powel the Iudgment was reversed Nota. A Rule of Court was made that no Certiorari should go to the Sessions of Ely without Motion in Court or signing of it by a Iudge in his Chamber But Mr. Pollexfen insisted that the Sessions there did not differ from other Courts and Franchises for the inferior Courts in London are of as large a Iurisdiction as any and yet a Certiorari goes to them and so it ought to go to Ely for 't is the Right of the Subject to remove his Cause hither Their course in the Royal Franchise of Ely is to hold the Sessions there twice a year viz. in March and September in which two Months the Iudges are seldom in Town and if this Court should deny a Certiorari the Court of Common Pleas would grant it Attorney General contra This Franchise of Ely is of greater Priviledge and Authority than any inferior Court for it hath many Regalia though 't is not a County Palatine A Certiorari will not lie to the Grand Sessions nor to a County Palatine to remove Civil Causes 't is true it lyeth to remove Indictments for Riots and this Franchise being truly called Royal hath equal priviledge with a County Palatine and therefore a Certiorari will not lie But no Rule was made Osborn versus Steward TRespass Distress for an Heriot where it may be taken The Case upon the Pleadings was this viz. A Lease was made of Land for 99 years if Margery and Dorothy Upton should so long live reserving a yearly Rent and an Heriot or 40 s. in lieu thereof after the death of either of them Provided that no Heriot shall be paid after the death of Margery living
sell them so that a Retorn could not be made to the Party distraining therefore it directs that the Sheriff shall take Pledges for returning the Beasts if a Return should be awarded which would be to little purpose if such Pledges were not liable upon the Retorn of Elongar Now as to the removing of the Pleint by Certiorari that makes the Case more strong in the Plaintiffs behalf because the Record it self una cum omnibus ea tangen is removed but by an Habeas Corpus the person is only removed and the Court hath thereby a Iurisdiction over his Cause which the inferior Court hath lost because it hath lost his Person 2. This Scire Facias is not brought too soon as hath been objected for 't is in vain to bring an Alias Pluries after the Sheriff had returned Elongat ' 't is like the common Case where a Scire Facias is brought against the Bail and Non est inventus is returned after which there never was an Alias or Pluries Capias And afterwards in Michaelmas-Term following Iudgment was given that the Pledges are liable Palmer versus Allicock BY the Statute of Distribution of Intestates Estates 't is provided 22 23 Car. 2. cap. 10. That in case there be no Wife then the Estate of the Husband dying intestate shall be distributed equally amongst the Children and if no Child then to the next of Kin of the Intestate in equal degree and to those who legally represent them A Man died intestate having no Wife at the time of his death and but one Child who was an Infant afterwards Administration was granted of the Fathers Estate durante minore aetate of the Child who died before the Age of seventeen Then Administration was granted by a peculiar to the next of Kin of the Infant and an Appeal was brought in the Arches by the next of Kin of the Father to revoke that Administration In a Prohibition the Question was Whether Administration de bonis non c. of the first Intestate shall be granted to the next of Kin of the Father or the Child Mr. Pollexfen argued this Term for the Plaintiff in the Prohibition viz. That the Statute gives a power to the Ordinary to take Bonds of such persons to whom Administration is committed the Forms of which Bonds are expressed in the Act and the Conditions are to make a true and perfect Inventory and to exhibit it into the Registry He hath also a power to distribute what remains after Debts Funeral Charges and Expences Thus the Law stands now Then as to the Case at the Barr three things are to be considered 1. If a Man dies intestate leaving two Sons and no Wife each hath a Moiety of his personal Estate immediately vested in him so that if one Brother should afterwards die intestate the other shall have the whole 2. If an Interest be vested in two then by this Statute the like Interest is vested in one so that if he die Intestate his Administrator shall have the Estate 3. If so then the consequence will be that in this case Administration de bonis non of the first Intestate shall go to the next of Kin of the Infant By Interest is meant a Right to sue for a share after Debts paid which Interest every person hath in a chose in action As if a Man doth covenant with two that they shall have such an Estate after Debts paid an Interest vests in them by this Covenant and if they die it goes to their Executors such also is the Interest of every Residuary Legatee Now if any of them die before the Residue can be distributed the Wife or Children of him so dying shall have it And to make this more clear it will be necessary to consider how the Law stood before the making of this Act. At the Common Law neither the Wife Child or next of Kin had any Right to a Share of the Intestates Estate but the Ordinary was to distribute it according to his Conscience to pious Vses and sometimes the Wife and Children might be amongst the number of those whom he appointed to receive it but the Law entrusted him with the sole disposition of it 2 Inst 399. Afterward by the Statute of Westm 13 E. 1. c. 19. 2. he was bound to pay the Intestate's Debts so far as he had Assets which at the Common Law he was not bound to do and an Action of Debt would then and not before Pl. Com. 277. Greisbrook versus Fox lie against him if he did alien the Goods and not pay the Debts Then the Statute of * 31 E. 1. c. 11. 31 E. 1. was made by which he was impowred to grant Admstration to the next of Kin and most lawful Friend of the Intestate 1 Inst 133. b. 2 Inst 397. 9 Co. Hensloes Case and by this Statute the person to whom Administration was committed might have an Action to recover the Intestate's Estate for at the Common Law he had no remedy But then afterwards the Statute of 21 H. 8. cap. 5. Enacts That the Ordinary shall grant Administration to the Widow or next of Kin of the person deceased or to both and this was the first Law which gave any Interest to the Wife to whom Administration being once granted the power of the Ordinary was determined Hob. 83. 1 Cro. 62 202. and he could not repeal it at his pleasure as he might at the Common Law But after the making of this Statute many mischiefs did still remain because the Administration being once committed the person to whom it was granted had the whole Estate and the rest of the Relations of the deceased were undone and therefore if his Children were under Age or beyond the Seas and a Stranger had got Administration it would have been a Bar to them And thus it continued many years the Ordinary still making distribution as he thought fit taking only a Bond from the person to whom he granted Administration for the purposes aforesaid and sometimes to dispose the Surplus after Debts and Legacies as he should direct and no Prohibition was granted to remedy these inconveniences till about the 12th year of King James the First Hob. 83. But now by this Act a good remedy is provided against these mischiefs and 't is such which takes away the Causes thereof which is that the Administrator shall not have the whole Estate but that a Distribution shall be made The Title of the Act shews the meaning thereof to be for the better Settlement of Intestates Estates and the Body of it shews how Distribution shall be made so that such Bonds which were usually given by the Administrator before this Law to make Distribution as the Ordinary should direct are now taken away and other Forms are prescribed and there can be no remedy taken upon such new Bonds till the Ordinary hath appointed the Distribution so that in effect this Act makes the Will
and Lodington cited in Mathew Manning's Case which was A Man being possessed of a Term for years devised it to his Wife for life and after her death to her Children unpreferred and made her Executrix and died she married again and had but one Daughter unpreferred and after the death of the Mother this Executory Devise was held good to the Daughter though it was by the Name of Children and she enjoyed the Term. 3. Object That this Act should be construed according to the Spiritual Law Answ That cannot be for all Statutes ought to be expounded according to the Rules of the Common Law and not according to their Law for they have no Law which gives power to sue nor to distribute to the Wife or next of Kin but the usual course was for the Ordinary to dispose of Intestates Goods to pious uses Then admitting this to be an Interest vested the consequence will be that it shall go to the Administrator and then Administration must be granted where the Estate legally ought to go The Administration of the Husband to the Goods of the Wife is grounded upon this reason 4 Co. 51. Ognel's Case 1 Cro. 106. because the Marriage is quasi a gift to him in Law It was not the only mischief before this Law that the Administrator run away with the whole Estate for if a Man died intestate leaving but one Son then beyond Sea and Administration was granted to a Stranger he who had right could not appeal after fourteen days which the Son could not do at that distance and so by this means a wrongful Administrator was entituled to the whole and he whose right it was had no remedy to recover at his return But now this inconvenience is likewise redressed by the Statute of Distributions for when the Son returns he may put the Bond in suit and for these reasons it was prayed that the Prohibition might stand Mr. E contra Williams argued for the Defendant in Easter-Term 2 Jacobi the substance of whose Argument was that though the Plaintiff had gotten Administration yet no Interest was thereby vested in him but that the Appeal was proper and for this he cited the Case of Beamond and Long Cro. Car. 208. which was Baron and Feme Administratrix of her former Husband recover in Debt the Feme died the surviving Husband brought a Scire Facias to have Execution and upon a Demurrer all the Court but Hide agreed that the Scire Facias would not lie for the Husband alone because it was a debt demanded by the Administratrix in auter droit This Statute hath not wholly altered the Common Law in this matter it only limits the Practice of Ecclesiastical Courts and makes provision for particular purposes viz. That Distribution shall be made to the Wife and Children and their Children which is so far introductory of a new Law but no farther so that the Right of Administration is as it was before and therefore must be granted to the next of Kin of the Father This Court hath no power to grant a Prohibition in such a Case and if it should 't is the first which ever was granted of this kind for it ought not to be determined here but in an Ecclesiastical Court which hath an original Iurisdiction of this Cause and the Appeal is in proprio loco To which Mr. Pollexfen answered that the contrary was very plain for here have been many Prohibitions granted even upon this very Act and the Question now before the Court is not concerning the manner of Distribution but the Right of Administration whether any Interest is vested in the Son or not 'T is true the Estate in Law goes to the Administrator but the Interest and Right to sue for and to recover the Estate goes to the Son so that if he should die before he is in actual possession his Administrator shall have it to pay Debts and to distribute c. In the Case of a Will if a Man should devise his Estate to his Wife and Children after Debts and Legacies paid an Interest vests in those Children which doth not differ from the Case at the Bar but that in the one Case the Testator makes the Will and in the other 't is made by an Act of Parliament Some Inconveniencies have been already mentioned if the Law should be otherwise taken but there be many more for if no Interest should vest in the Child till actual Distribution he could neither be trusted for his Education or Necessaries whilst living and no body would bury him if he should happen to die before the year and a day for the Funeral Charges would be lost It will likewise occasion delays in Administrators to make Distribution in hopes of gain neither will any honest man take an Administration upon himself because he can neither pay Mony safely or take a Release for if the Infant die before distribution it is void But notwithstanding these Reasons the Court gave Iudgment in Michaelmas-Term following That a Consultation should go the Chief Iustice being absent DE Termino Paschae Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Coram Georgio Jefferies Mil ' Capital ' Justic ' Francisco Wythyns Mil ' Justiciariis Richardo Holloway Mil ' Justiciariis Thoma Walcot Mil ' Justiciariis Rex versus Marsh and others JAmes Marsh Information for a Forgery John W. and John L. were indicted upon the Coroners Inquest for the Murder of R. D. at H. in Kent and upon this Indictment they were arraigned and tried at the Barr this Term. The Fact upon the Evidence appeared to be that the Prisoners were Custom-House Officers who suspecting that some Wool would be transported went to the Sea-side in the Night time where there happened an Afray and the Prisoner Marsh was twice knocked down and recovering himself shot the deceased they were all acquitted of the Murder and then upon complaint made that Marsh was only found guilty upon the Coroners Enquest two of the said Iury were now sworn in Court who deposed that they upon the Coroners Enquest found the Indictment against Marsh alone which Indictment was in English but that one J.D. who was then Mayor of H. and who by virtue of that Office was also Coroner took the Indictment and told the Iury it must be turn'd into Latin which was done and he then inserted the Names of the two other Prisoners now at the Barr whereupon the said Mr. D. was now called and he appearing was bound in a Recognizance to answer this matter and the two Prisoners who were acquitted were likewise bound to prosecute him and the Iury Men were ordered to put their Affidavit in writing and swear it in Court An Information was afterwards exhibited against Mr. D. which was tried at the Barr in Trinity-Term following and he was found guilty but having spoke with the Prosecutor in the long Vacation he was only fined 20 Nobles in Michaelmas-Term Roberts versus Pain IN a Prohibition to
of setting of so many Letters together but filling up the Blanks makes them of another nature Grants of things of less moment have been adjudged Monopolies 2 Rol. Abr. 215. pl. 5. as a Patent for the sole making of all Bills Pleas and Briefs in the Council of York for by the same reason a like Patent might be granted to make all Declarations in the Courts of Westminster Hall Curia The King hath a Prerogative to Grant the sole Printing to a particular person all the Cases cited for the Plaintiff do not reach the reason of this Case for there is a difference between things of a publick Vse and those which are publick in their Nature even Almanacks have been used to ill purposes as to foretel future Events yet they are of publick Vse to shew the Feasts and Fasts of the Church The Court enclined that the Patent was not good Jackson versus Warren A Motion was made in arrest of Iudgment Amendment for that the day when the Assises were to be held and the place where were left out of the Distringas and so a mis-tryal But the Court were of another Opinion 1 Roll. Abr. 201. for if there had been no Distringas the Tryal had been good because they Jurata is the Warrant to try the Cause which was right and therefore the Distringas was ordered to be amended by the Roll. Dominus Rex versus Sparks 'T IS Enacted by the Statute of 1 Eliz. Where a Punishment is directed by a Statute the Judgment must be pursuant 1 Eliz. cap. 2.13 14 Car. 2. cap. 4. That every Minister shall use the Church-Service in such Form as is mentioned in the Book of Common-Prayer and if he shall be convicted to use any other Form he shall forfeit one whole Years profit of all his Spiritual Promotions and suffer six Months Imprisonment And by the Statute of King Charles the II. All Ministers are to use the publick Prayers in such Order and Form as is mentioned in the Common-Prayer-Book with such Alterations as have been made therein by the Convocation then sitting The Defendant was indicted at the Quarter-Sessions in Devonshire for using alias Preces in the Church alio modo than mentioned in the said Book and concludes contra formam Statuti He was found Guilty and fined 100 Marks and upon a Writ of Error brought Mr. Polexfen and Mr. Shower argued for the Plaintiff in Error that this Indictment was not warranted by any Law and the Verdict shall not help in the case of an Indictment for all the Statutes of Jeofails have left them as they were before Now the Fact as 't is said in this Indictment may be no offence because to use Prayers alio modo than enjoyn'd by the Book of Common-Prayer may be upon an extraordinary occasion and so no Crime But if this should not be allowed the Iustices of Peace have not power in their Sessions to enquire into this matter or if they had power they could not give such a Iudgment because the punishment is directed by the Statute and of this Opinion was the whole Court The Chief Iustice said that the Statute of the 23 Eliz. 23 Eliz. cap. 1. could have no influence upon this Case because another Form is now enjoyned by later Statutes but admitted that Offences against that Statute were enquitable by the Iustices The Indictment ought to have alledged that the Defendant used other Forms and Prayers instead of those enjoyned which were neglected by him for otherwise every Parson may be indicted that useth prayers before his Sermon other than such which are required by the Book of Common-Prayer Clerk versus Hoskins DEbt upon a Bond for the performance of Covenants in certain Articles of Agreement in which it was recited That whereas the now Defendant had found out a Mystery in colouring Stuffs and had entred into a Partnership with the Plaintiff for the term of seven Years he did thereupon Covenant with him that he would not procure any person to obtain Letters Patents within that Term to exercise that Mystery alone The Defendant pleaded that he did not procure any person to obtain Letters Patents c. The Plaintiff replied and assigned for breach that the Defendant did within that term procure Letters Patents for another person to use this Mystery alone for a certain time Et hoc petit quod inquiratur per patriam And upon a Demurrer to the Replication these Exceptions were taken 1. That the Plaintiff hath not set forth what Term is contained in the Letters Patents 2. That he had pleaded both Record and Fact together for the procuring is the Fact and the Letters Patents are the Record and then he ought not to have concluded to the Country Prout patet per Recordum To which it was answered That the Plaintiff was a Stranger to the Term contained in the Letters Patents and therefore could not possibly shew it but if he hath assigned a full breach 't is well enough Then as to the other Exception viz. the pleading of the Letters Patents here is not matter of Record here is a plain negative and affirmative upon which the Issue is joyned and therefore ought to conclude hoc petit c. Curia There is a Covenant that the Defendant shall not procure Letters Patents to hinder the Plaintiff within the seven Years of the Partnership Now this must be the matter upon which the breach ariseth and not the Letters Patents so that it had been very improper to conclude prout patet per Recordum Iudgment for the Plaintiff Rex versus Hethersal THE Defendant was Felo de se Melius inquireddum not granted but for misdemeanor of the Jury and the Coroners Inquest found him a Lunatick and now Mr. Jones moved for a Melius inquirendum but it was denied because there was no defect in the Inquisition but the Court told him that if he could produce an Affidavit that the Iury did not go according to their Evidence or of any indirect Proceedings of the Coroner then they would grant it But it was afterwards quashed because they had omitted the year of the King Friend versus Bouchier Trin. 34 Car. 2. Rot. 920. EJectment upon the Demise of Henry Jones What words in a Will make a general Tail of certain Lands in Hampshire The Iury found this Special Verdict following Viz. That William Holms was seised in Fee of the Lands in question who by his last Will dated in the year 1633. devised it to Dorothy Hopkins for Life Remainder to her first Son and to the Heirs of the Body of such first Son c. and for default of such Issue to his Cousin W. with several Remainders over And in default of such Issue to Anne Jones and to her Heirs who was the Lessor of the Plaintiff That before the sealing and publishing of this Will he made this Memorandum Viz. Memorandum that my Will and Meaning is That Dorothy Hopkins
fearing that this Daughter might be stoln from her applies her self to my Lady Gore and entreats her to take this Daughter into her House which she did accordingly My Lady had a Son then in France she sent for him and married him to this Ruth she being then under the Age of sixteen years without the Consent of her Mother who was her Guardian The Question was whether this was a Forfeiture of her Estate during Life It was proved at the Trial that the Mother had made a Bargain with the Lessor of the Plaintiff that in case he recovered she should have 1000 l. and the Chirds of the Estate and therefore she was not admitted to be a Witness The Plaintiff could not prove any thing to make a Forfeiture and therefore was nonsuited The Chief Iustice said that the Statute was made to prevent Children from being seduced from their Parents or Guardians by flattering or enticing Words Promises or Gifts and married in a secret way to their disparagement but that no such thing appeared in this Case for Dr. Hascard proved the Marriage to be at St. Clements Church in a Canonical Hour and that many People were present and that the Church Doors were open whilst he married them Anonymus BY the Statute of 21 Jacobi 't is Enacted 21 Jac. c. 23. That no Writ to remove a Suit out of an Inferior Court shall be obeyed unless it be delivered to the Steward of the same Court before Issue or Demurrer joined so as the Issue or Demurrer be not joined within six Weeks next after the Arrest or Appearance of the Defendant In this Case Issue was joined and the Steward refused to allow the Habeas Corpus and the Cause was tried but not before an Utter Barrister as is directed by the Statute Curia The Steward ought to return the Habeas Corpus and they having proceeded to try the Cause no Utter Barister being Steward let an Attachment go Claxton versus Swift Hill 1 Jac. 2. Rot. 1163. THE Plaintiff being a Merchant brought an Action upon a Bill of Exchange If the Plaintiff recover against the Drawer of a Bill he shall not afterwards recover against any of Endorsers setting forth the Custom of Merchants c. and that London and Worcester were ancient Cities and that there was a Custom amongst Merchants that if any person living in Worcester draw a Bill upon another in London and if this Bill be accepted and endorsed the first Endorser is liable to the payment That one Hughes drew a Bill of 100 l. upon Mr. Pardoe paiable to the Defendant or Order Mr. Swift endorsed this Bill to Allen or Order and Allen endorsed it to Claxton The Mony not being paid Claxton brings his Action against Hughes and recovers but did not take out Execution Afterwards he sued Mr. Swift who was the first Endorser and he pleads the first Recovery against Hughes in barr to this Action and avers that it was for the same Bill and that they were the same Parties To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred and the Defendant joyned in the Demurrer Mr. Pollexfen argued that it was a good Barr because the Plaintiff had his Election to bring his Action against either of the Endorsers or against the Drawer but not against all and that he had now determined his Election by suing the Drawer and shall not go back again though he never have Execution for this is not in the nature of a joint Action which may be brought against all 'T is true that it may he made joint or several by the Plaintiff but when he has made his choice by suing of one he shall never sue the rest because the Action sounds in Damages which are uncertain before the Iudgment but afterwards are made certain transeunt in rem judicatam and is as effectual in Law as a Release As in Trover the Defendant pleaded that at another time the Plaintiff had recovered against another person for the same Goods so much Damages 2 Cro. 73. Yelv. 65. Brown versus Wootton and had the Defendant in Execution and upon a Demurrer this was held a good Plea for though in that Case it was objected that a Iudgment and Execution was no satisfaction unless the Mony was paid yet it was adjudged that the cause of Action being against several for which Damages were to be recovered and because a Sum certain was recovered against one that is a good discharge against all the other but 't is otherwise in Debt because each is liable to the entire Sum. Chief Iustice If the Plaintiff had accepted of a Bond from the first Drawer in satisfaction of this Mony it had been a good Barr to any Action which might have been brought against the other Indorsers for the same and as this Case is the Drawer is still liable and if he fail in payment the first Endorser is chargeable because if he make Endorsement upon a bad Bill 't is Equity and good Conscience that the Endorsee may resort to him to make it good But the other Iustices being against the Opinion of the Chief Iustice Iudgment was given for the Defendant Pawley versus Ludlow DEBT upon a Bond. The Condition was That if John Fletcher shall appear such a day coram Justitiariis apud Westm c. that then c. The Defendant pleaded that after the 25th day of November and before the day of the appearance he did render himself to the Officer in discharge of this Bond and to this the Plaintiff demurred Darnel for the Defendant admitted that if a Scire Facias be brought against the Bail upon a Writ of Error 3 Bulstr 191. 2 Cro. 402. who plead that after the Recognizance and before the Iudgment against the Principal affirmed he rendred himself to the Marshal in discharge of his Bail that this is not a good Plea but that the Sureties are still liable 3 Jac. cap. 8. because by the Statute they are not only liable to render his Body but to pay the Debt recovered But if a Iudgment be had in this Court 1 Rol. Abr. 334. pl. 11. and a Writ of Error brought in the Exchequer-Chamber and pending that Writ of Error the Principal is rendred the Bail in the Action are thereby discharged It was argued on the other side E contra that this is not the like Case of Bail upon a Writ of Error for the Condition of a Recognizance and that of a Bond for Appearance are different in their nature the one is barely that the Party shall appear on such a day the other is that he shall not only appear and render his Body to Prison but the Bail likewise do undertake to pay the Debt if Iudgment should be against the Principal Now where the Condition is only for an Appearance at a day if the Party render himself either before or after the day 't is not good Chief Iustice If the Party render himself to the Officer before the
day of Appearance he is to see that he appear at the day either by keeping of him in Custody or letting of him to Bail the end of the Arrest is to have his Body here If he had not been bailed then he had still remained in Custody and the Plaintiff would have his proper remedy but being once let to Bail and not appearing in Court according to the Condition of the Bond that seems to be the fault of the Defendant who had his Body before the day of Appearance Iudgment for the Defendant DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Serjeant Hampson's Case BY the Statute of Queen Elizabeth 't is Enacted 5 Eliz. c. 23. That if the person excommunicated have not a sufficient Addition or if 't is not contained in the Significavit that the Excommunication proceeds for some cause or contempt or of some original Matter of Heresie refusing to have his Child baptized to receive the Sacrament to come to Divine Service or Errors in Matters of Religion or Doctrine Incontinency Usury Simony Perjury in the Ecclesiastical Court or Idolatry he shall not incurr the Penalties in the Act. Serjeant Hampson was excommunicated for Alimony and now Mr. Girdler moved that he might be discharged because none of the aforesaid Causes were contained in the Significavit Curia He may be discharged of the Forfeiture for that reason but not of the Excommunication Anonymus ONE who was outlawed for the Murder of Sir Edmund Bury Godfrey now brought a Writ of Error in his Hand to the Bar praying that it might be read and allowed It was read by Mr. Astry Clerk of the Crown The Errors assigned were viz. That it did not appear upon the Return of the Exigent in the first Exact ' that the Court was held pro Comitatu That the Outlawry being against him and two other persons 't is said in the last Exact ' that Non comperuit but doth not say nec eorum aliquis comperuit For these Reasons the Outlawry was reversed and he held up his Hand at the Barr and pleaded Not-guilty to his Indictment and was admitted to Bail and afterwards he was brought to his Trial and no Witness in behalf of the King appearing against him he was acquitted The Mayor and Commonalty of Norwich versus Johnson A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment given for the Plaintiff in the Common-Pleas in an Action of Waste Waste lies against an Executor de son tort of a Term. The Declaration was that the Plaintiff demised a Barn to one Took for a certain Term by vertue whereof he was possessed and being so possessed died that the Defendant was his Executor who entred and made Waste by pulling down of the said Barn The Defendant pleaded that Took died intestate and that he did not administer The Plaintiff replyed that he entred as Executor of his own Wrong and to this Plea the Defendant demurred and the Plaintiff joined in the Demurrer This Case was argued by Mr. Appleton of Lincolns-Inn for the Plaintiff who said That an Action of Waste would not lie against the Defendant because the Mayor and Commonalty c. had a remedy by an Assise to recover the Land upon which the Barn stood and a Trover to recover the Goods or Materials and that such an Action would not lie against him at the Common Law because he neither was Tenant by the Curtesie nor in Dower against whom Waste only lay So that if the Plaintiff is entituled to this Action it must be by vertue of the Statute of Gloucester 6 Ed. 1. c. 5. but it will not lie against the Defendant even by that Statute because the Action is thereby given against the Tenant by the Curtesie in Dower for Life or Years and treble Damages c. But the Defendant is neither of those and this being a penal Law which not only gives treble damages but likewise the Recovery of the place wasted ought therefore not to be taken strictly but according to Equity Tenants at sufferance or at Will by Elegit or Tenants by Statute Staple 11 H. 6. c. 5. and also Pernors of Profits were never construed to be within this Statute and therefore a particular Act was made to give him in Reversion an Action of Waste where Tenant for life or years had granted over their Estates and yet took the Profits and committed Waste Then the Question will be Co. Lit. 371. what Estate this Executor de sontort hath gained by his Entry And as to that he argued that he had got a Fee-simple by Disseisin and that for this reason the Plaintiff was barred from this Action for if the Son purchase Lands in Fee and is disseised by his Father who maketh a Feoffment in Fee to another with Warranty and dieth the Son is for ever barred for though the Disseisin was not done with any intention to make such a Feoffment 1 Roll. Abr. 662. yet he is bound by this Alienation So where a man made a Lease for life and died and then his Heir suffered a Recovery of the same Land without making an actual Entry this is an absolute Disseisin because the Lessee had an Estate for life but if he had been Tenant at Will it might be otherwise But admitting that the Defendant is not a Disseisor then the Plaintiffs must bring their Case to be within the Statute of Gloucester as that he is either Tenant for life or years If he is Tenant for Life he must be so either by right or by wrong He cannot be so by right because he had no lawful Conveyance made to him of this Estate besides 't is quite contrary to the Pleading which is that he entred wrongfully Neither can he be so by wrong for such particular Estates 6 Co. 25. as for life or years cannot be gained by Disseisin and so is Heliar's Case in 6 Co. Then if this should be construed an Estate for years it must be gained either by the Act of the Party or by the Act of the Law but such an Estate cannot be gained by either of those means First it cannot be gained by the Act of the Party Moor 126. Kendrick versus Burges because an Executor de son tort cannot have any interest in a Term and for this there is an express Authority in this Court which was thus viz. A Lease in Reversion for years was granted to a man who died intestate his Wife before she had administred sold this Term to the Defendant and afterwards she obtained Letters of Administration and made a Conveiance of the same Term to the Plaintiff and Iudgment was given for the last Vendee because it was in the case of a Reversion of a Term for years upon which no Entry could be made and of which there could be no Executor de son tort though it was admitted by the Court that such an Executor might make a good sale of
' Francisco Wythens Mil ' Justiciariis Richardo Holloway Mil ' Justiciariis Thoma Walcot Mil ' Justiciariis MEmorandum That the First day of this Term Sir Thomas Jones Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas had his Quietus and Sir Henry Beddingfield one of the Justices of the same Court succeeded him in that Office Likewise the Honourable William Mountagu Esq Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer had his Quietus and Sir Edward Atkyns one of the Barons of the same Court succeeded him Sir Job Charleton one of the Justices of the Common-Pleas had his Quietus but was made Chief Justice of Chester and Sir Edward Lutwich the King's Serjeant was made one of the Justices of the Common-Pleas and Serjeant Heath was made one of the Barons of the Exchequer Okel versus Hodgkinson THE Father and Son join in a Fine in order to make a Settlement upon the second Wife of the Father who was only Tenant by the Curtesie the Remainder in Tail to his said Son One of the Cognizors died after the Caption and before the Return of the Writ of Covenant and now a Writ of Error was brought to Reverse it and this was assigned for Error Curia If it had been in the Case of a Purchasor for a valuable Consideration the Court would have shewed him some favour but it being to do a wrong to a young Man they would leave it open to the Law THE first day of this Term being the 22th day of April there was a Call of Serjeants viz. Sir John Holt of Grays-Inn Recorder of London who was made Kings Serjeant Sir Ambrose Phillips made also Kings Serjeant Christopher Milton John Powell John Tate William Rawlinson George Hutchins William Killingworth Hugh Hodges and Thomas Geers They all appeared that day at the Chancery-Bar where having taken the Oaths the Lord Chancellor Jefferies made a short Speech to them after which they delivered a Ring to him praying him to deliver it to the King They went from the Inner-Temple-Hall to Westminster and Counted at the Common-Pleas and gave Rings the Motto whereof was DEUS REX LEX Dominus Rex versus Saloway SAloway drowned himself in a Pond and the Coroners Enquest found him Non Compos Mentis because 't is more generally supposed that a Man in his Senses will not be Felo de se The Kings Councel moved for a Melius Inquirendum and that the Inquisition might be quashed for that it sets forth Quod pred Defend circa horam octavam ante meridiem in quoddam stagnum se projecit per abundantiam aquae ibidem statim suffocat emergit ' erat which is insensible Pemberton Serjeant contra Here is no Exception taken to the substance of the Inquisition and the word suffocat had been sufficient if the word emergit ' had been left out The Court were of Opinion that there being another word in this Inquisition which carries the sense 't is therefore sufficient but if it had stood singly upon this word Emergit ' it had not been good And this Fact happening about the time of the general Pardon the Court was of Opinion that where an Interest is vested in the King a Pardon of all Forfeitures will not divest it but that nothing was vested here before Inquisition found 2. It was objected that this Inquisition ought to set forth that Saloway came by his death by this means Et nullo alio modo quocunque To which it was answered by Pemberton that in matters of Form only the Iudges have sent for the Coroner into Court and ordered him to amend it Rodney versus Strode AN Action on the Case was brought against three Defendants one of them suffered Iudgment to go by default In a joynt Action the Jury may sever the Damages and the other two pleaded Not Guilty The Cause was tryed the last Assises at Exeter and it was for imposing the Crime of Treason upon the Plaintiff and for assaulting and imprisoning of him there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and 1000 l. damages against Mr. Strode and 50 l. against the other Defendant who pleaded The Plaintiff entred a nolle prosequi against him who let the Iudgment go by default and against the other Defendant for the 50 l. damages and took judgment only against Mr. Strode Serjeant Pemberton moved for a new Trial by reason of the excessive Damages which were not proportioned to the quality of the Plaintiff he being a Man of mean Fortune But it was opposed by the Plaintiff for that the Defendant pursued him as a Traytor and when he was apprehended for that Crime he caused him to be arrested for 1000 l. at the Suit of another person to whom he was not indebted so that upon consideration of the Circumstances of the Case the Court refused to grant a new Tryal Then Serjeant Pemberton for the Defendants moved in arrest of Iudgment and for cause shewed that the Iury have found both guilty and assessed several Damages which they cannot do because this is a joynt Action to which the Defendants have pleaded jointly and being found guilty modo forma the Iury cannot assess the damages severally for the damage is the same by the one as the other Cro. Eliz. 860. Austen vers Millard al' and therefore it hath been adjudged that where an Action of Battery was brought against three and one pleaded not guilty and the other two Son Assault demesne and several damages found against them it was held ill for that very reason because it was a joint offence 'T is true where there are divers Defendants and damages assessed severally the Plaintiff hath his election to take execution de melioribus damnis but this is when the Trials are at several times So 't is where they plead several Pleas Cro. Car. 239. Walsh versus Bishop as in an Action of Battery one pleads not guiity and the other justifies and both Issues are found for the Plaintiff in such case he may enter a non pros against one and take Iudgment against the other because their Pleas are several but where they plead jointly the Iury cannot sever the Damages But Mr. 1 Bulst 157. Sampson vers Cramfield al' Rast Entr. 677. b. Pollexfen for the Plaintiff insisted that even in this case damages may be assessed severally for where two Defendants are sued for the same Battery and they plead the same Plea yet damages may be assessed severally So was Trebarefoot and Greenway 's Case in this Court which was an Action for an Assault and Battery and false Imprisonment one of the Defendants pleaded not Guilty and the other justified Issue was joined and there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and damages assessed severally the Plaintiff entred a nolle prosequi as to one and took judgment against the other and upon this a Writ of Error was brought in this Court and the Iudgment was affirmed So if an Action of Trespass be brought against two for taking of 100 l.
the one took 70 l. and the other 30 l. damages shall be assessed severally It was admitted that regularly the damages ought to be entire especially where the Action is joint but where the Facts are several damages may likewise be so assessed but in this Case the Iury hath done what the Court would do had it béen in a Criminal Cause Curia This is all but one Fact which the Iury is to try 'T is true when several Persons are found Guilty criminally then the damages may be severed in proportion to their Guilt but here all are equally guilty of the same offence and it seems to be a contradiction to say that the Plaintiff is injured by one to the value of 50 l. and by the other to the value of 1000 l. when both are equally Guilty Every Defendant ought to answer full as much as the Plaintiff is damnified now how is it possible he should be damnified so much by one and so little by the other But notwithstanding this Opinion Iudgment was afterwards given for the Plaintiff Peak versus Meker IN an Action on the Case for Words the Plaintiff declared that he was a Merchant and bred up in the Church of England and that when the present King came to the Crown the said Plaintiff made a Bonfire at his Door in the City of London and that the Defendant then spoke of him these words for which he now brought this Action viz. He innuendo the Plaintiff is a Rogue a Papist Dog and a pitiful Fellow and never a Rogue in Town has a Bonfire before his Door but he The Plaintiff had a Verdict and 500 l. Damages were given A Writ of Error was brought but it was adjudged without argument that the words were actionable Joyner versus Pritchard AN Action was brought upon the Statute of R. II. Admiralty for prosecuting of a Cause in the Admiralty Court which did arise upon the Land it was tried before the Chief Iustice in London and a Verdict for the Plaintiff Mr. Thompson moved in Arrest of Iudgment for that the Action was brought by Original in which it was set forth that the Defendant prosecut fuit adhuc prosequitur c. in Curia Admiralitat now the prosequitur is subsequent to the Original and so they have recovered Damages for that which was done after the Action brought Curia These words adhuc prosequitur must refer to the time of suing forth this Original like the Case of a Covenant for quiet Enjoyment and a breach assigned that the Defendant built a Shed whereby he hindred the Plaintiff that he could not enjoy it hucnsque which word must refer to the time of the Action brought and not afterwards Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Dominus Rex versus ........ AN Information was brought against the Defendant for Forgery Forgery setting forth that the Defendant being a man of ill fame c. and contriving to cheat one A. did forge quoddam scriptum dated the 16th day of October in the year 1681. continens in se scriptum obligatorium per quod quidem scriptum obligatorium praed A. obligatus fuit praed Defend in quadraginta libris c. He was found Guilty and afterwards this Exception was taken in arrest of Iudgment Viz. That the Fact alledged in the Information was a contradiction of it self for how could A. be bound when the Bond was forged 2. It is not set forth what that scriptum obligatorium was whether it was scriptum sigillatum or not Curia The Defendant is found Guilty of the forging of a Writing in which was contained quoddam scriptum obligatorium and that may be a true Bond. Iudgment was arrested MEMORANDUM On Tuesday April the 27th Sir Thomas Powes of Lincolns-Inn was made Sollicitor General in the Place of Mr. Finch and was called within the Bar. Hanchet versus Thelwal IN Ejectment a special Verdict was found Devise What words in a Will make an Estate for Life and what in Tail in which the Case did arise upon the construction of the words in a Will Viz. The Testator being seised in Fee had Issue Two Sons and Four Daughters He made his Will and devised his Estate being in Houses by these words Viz. Irem I give and bequeath to my Son Nicholas Price my Houses in Westminster and if itplease God to take away my Son then I give my Estate to my four Daughters naming them share and share alike and if it please God to take away any of my said Daughters before Marriage then I give her or their part to the rest surviving And if all my Sons and Daughters dye without Issue then I give my said Houses to my Sister Anne Warner and her Heirs Nicholas Price entred and died without Issue then the four Sisters entred and Margaret the eldest married Thellwel and died leaving Issue a Son who was the Lessor of the Plaintiff who insisted upon his Title to a fourth part of the Houses The Question was what Estate the Daughters took by this Will whether joint Estates for Life or several Remainders in Tail If only joint Estates for Life then the Plaintiff as Heir to his Mother will not be entituled to a fourth part if several Remainders in Tail then the Father will have it during his Life as Tenant by the Curtesie This Case was argued this Term by Mr. Pollexfen for the Plaintiff And in Hillary Term following by Councel for the Defendant The Plaintiffs Council insisted that they took joint Estates for Life and this seemed to be the intent of the Testator by the words in his Will the first Clause whereof was Viz. I give and bequeath my Houses in W. to Nicholas Price Now by these words an Estate for Life only passed to him and not an Inheritance for there was nothing to be done or any thing to be paid out of it 2. The next Clause is Viz. If it please God to take away my Son then I give my Estate to my four Daughters share and share alike Now these words cannot give the Daughters a Fee-simple by any intendment whatsoever but if any word in this Clause seems to admit of such a Construction it must be the word Estate which sometimes signifies the Land it self and sometimes the Estate in the Land But here the word Estate cannot create a Fee-simple because the Testator gave his Daughters that Estate which he had given to his Son before and that was only for Lise Then follow the words share and share alike and that only makes them Tenants in Common 3. The next Clause is Viz. If it please God to take away any of my said Daughters before Marriage then I give her or their part to the rest surviving These words as they are penned can have no influence upon the Case 4. Then followeth the last Clause Viz. And if all my Sons and Daughters dye without Issue then I give c. These words create no Estate tail in the
day afterwards viz. the 10th day of August a Trust of the said Office was declared by another Deed viz. to himself for Life with Remainders over and that by virtue thereof and the consent of the Trustees he took upon him the execution of the said Office and was thereof possessed either by himself or his Deputy until the time of the Inquisition taken then he traversed that the Escapes were voluntary but did not answer the concealing of the Grant and concludes viz. per quod petit that the King Hands may be amoved c. The Attorny General demurred to the Plea of the Trustees he likewise demurred to the Plea of Mr. Lenthal and took issue that the Escapes were voluntary It was argued this Term and Trinity following by Council on both sides and as to the matter of Law they made these Points 1. That this Office cannot be granted in Trust 2. The Escapes found in the Inquisition and not answered by the Trustees are sufficient causes of Forfeiture of this Offce 3. Another Point was raised whether the assignment of this Office to Trustees admitting it could be so granted and their declaration of the Trust did create an Estate at will in Mr. Lenthal If it was a Tenancy at will 1. Then whether Mr. Lenthal had done any thing to determine his will 2. Whether he can by Law make a Deputy 3. Whether the assigning of this Trust without giving notice thereof to this Court be a Forfeiture 1. This Office cannot be granted in Trust Jones 128. because 't is a personal Inheritance and will not pass by such Conveyances as are used to convey Lands so is my Lord of Oxford 's Case in which it was held that a Covenant to stand seised of an Office is void neither can Mr. Lenthal take upon him the execution of this Office by the consent of the Trustees for that cannot be without Deed. If the Law should be otherwise this inconvenience would follow viz. Mr. Lenthal might grant the Office to another without leave of the Court and the Grantee might suffer voluntary Escapes having no valuable Interest to answer the parties injured who must then sue Mr. Lenthal and he hath no Estate in him for he hath conveyed the Inheritance to the Trustees and if they should be likewise sued no recovery could be against them because they are only nominal 'T is almost like the Grant of an Office of chief Prothonotary of the Court of Common-Pleas to two persons for Life 18 Ed. 4. f. 7. which cannot be good because the Rolls of the Court cannot be in the keeping of two persons at one time It hath been adjudged that this very Office cannot be granted for years Cro. Car. 587. Jones 437. because 't is an Office of Trust and daily Attendance and such a termor for years may dye intestate and then it would be in suspence 'till Administration is committed which is the act of another Court 2. Point That the Escapes found in the Inquisition and the non-attendance of the Trustees are sufficient cause of Forfeiture 'T is true at the Common-Law Debt upon an Escape will not lie against the Goaler that Action was afterwards given by the Statute of W. 2. For before that Act the only remedy against the Goaler was to bring an Action on the Case against him founded upon a wrong done Dyer 273. But now Debt will lie and if the party is not sufficient at the time of the Escape 2 Inst 382. respondeat superior The Marshal who executes this Office be it by right or wrong is answerable to the King and his People for Escapes If they are voluntary 't is a Forfeiture of his Office nay if a Deputy suffer such Escapes 't is a Forfeiture by the Principal unless such Deputation be made for Life and then the Grantee for Life only forfeits the Office As to the non-attendance of the Trustees if Mr. 39 H. 6.32 Lenthal be Tenant at will and hath granted this Office to another for Life this is a determination of the Tenancy at will and a Forfeiture as to him Now this Grantee for Life cannot be said to be a Deputy for such a Grantee himself cannot make a Deputy and therefore a fortiori a Tenant at will cannot do it But admitting he should be Deputy yet a Forfeiture by him is a Forfeiture by his Superior and therefore Mr. Lenthal 's tenancy at will being gone the Trustees ought to attend and their non-attendance ought to be a Forfeiture The non-attendance of an Officer Cro. Car. 491. who was only a Searcher in a Port Town was adjudged a Forfeiture much greater is the Fault of that Officer who hath the administration of Iustice if he do not give his attendance Besides 39 H. 6.34 a. 9 Co. 46. Dyer 198. Sid. 81. Dyer 150 151. if they do not attend by consequence they cannot act in the Office and non-feazance is as sufficient a cause of Forfeiture as any other mis-behaviour whatsoever But if the Trustees had given attendance they are persons inexperient and therefore incapable to execute this Office for which they may be lawfully refused by this Court Mr. Pollexfen chiefly insisted upon the point of Pleading that the matter found by the Inquisition was not answered by the Plea First he excepted that the Defendant had not by his Plea entituled himself to any Estate in this Office 1 Leon. 202. 2 Inst 695. Stamf. 62 64. 2 Leon. 123. and therefore he could not traverse the Title of the King without making a Title to himself for why should he desire that the Kings Hands may be amoved and he restored to his Office if he hath not shewen a Title to it His pleading of this Deed of Trust by which he is permitted to receive the Profits c. during Life cannot create such an Estate in him as will be executed by the Statute of Vses therefore he can have no Estate for Life for if a Man is seised in Fee of an Estate and makes a Declaration thereof in Trust for J. S. this is no colour to make an Estate for Life in J. S. The Defendant hath therefore no more than a Trust in this Office which is nothing in the Eye of the Law and for which there is no remedy but by Subpoena in Chancery so that being only a Cestui que trust he hath neither jus in re nor ad rem He cannot be Tenant at will for he is not made so by the Deed of Trust There is a great deal of difference between Evidence and Pleading for this very Deed may be an Evidence of an Estate at will but 't is not so in pleading therefore he ought to have pleaded that coram praetextu he was possessed of the Office and took the Profits c. but he having otherwise pleaded and not entituled himself to any Estate therein he ought to be laid aside as an incompetent person The Plea of Sir Edward Norris
is likewise insufficient for it sets forth the Deed of Settlement c. coram praetextu the Defendant juxta fiduciam in eo positam was possessed of the Office ad eorum voluntatem Now an Office is a thing which lies in Grant 1 Leon. 219. and cannot be transferred from one to another without Deed and here is no Deed pleaded and as no Estate at will can be granted of an Office without Deed so likewise there cannot be a deputation of such Offce without it If then there can be no Tenant at Will of an Office but by Deed and no such Deed is pleaded then Mr. Lenthal had no power to make a Deputation to Cooling but neither Tenant at will nor Tenant for Life can make a Deputy if in the very Grant made to them there is not an express Clause for the execution of the Office per se vel sufficientem Deputatum suum The substance of all which is viz. First here is no Tenant at will But admitting him to be so he hath no authority to make a Deputy and if he should appoint a Deputy he executes the Office without Authority and may suffer Escapes Lastly by pleading of this Deed he hath alledged that the Estate was in the Trustees and that they permitted him to enjoy the Office coram praetextu he did execute it and receive the Profits now this is too general and an issue cannot be taken upon such a Plea he should have pleaded positively that it was demised to him at will and that he made a Deputy and then also the authority in rolls is against him where 't is held 2 Rol. Ab … that the Marshal of the Kings-Bench may grant the Office for Life but cannot give power to such grantee to make a Deputy Now if a Tenant for Life cannot make a Deputy certainly a Tenant at will hath no power so to do But suppose a Deputy might be made his neglect in the execution of the Office shall make a Forfeiture of the Estate of the Grantee for Life It cannot be reasonably objected in this Case Rol. Abr. 155. that 't is any hardship for Mr. Lenthal to lose this Office for any defect in Pleading for admitting the Plea to be good yet there is a cause of Forfeiture because the Marshal of the King's Bench being a ministerial Officer is required by Law to be a person of such Ability as to answer all Escapes that so Men may have the benefit of their Suits for otherwise he having nothing to answer they may lose their Debts Now here by a secret Grant Mr. Lenthal hath conveyed the Estate out of himself and yet still continues Officer in possession by which means the People are deprived of the Remedy which the Law provides for them and this is a sufficient cause of Forfeiture Then as to the Trustees they have not said any thing of the Escapes 't is true Mr. Lenthal hath traversed those which are alledged to be voluntary but that signifies nothing to them because they cannot take any benefit by the Plea of another for every one must stand and fall by his own Plea If therefore their non-attendance be a Forfeiture the entruders shall not help them because they come in without any colour of Right But the Council on the other side argued this last Point first E contra which was thus Viz. A Man seised of the Inheritance of the Office of Marshal of this Court conveys it in Trust the cestui que trust enjoys it and receives the Profits the Question now is whether the non-attendance of the Trustees being never required by the Court be a Forfeiture of this Office And as incident to this Question it was debated whether Mr. Lenthal was Tenant at will T is no Forfeiture for they are not bound to attend It cannot be denied but that this Office doth concern the Administration of Iustice but 't is to be considered what Estate Mr. Lenthal hath in it He had once an Estate in Fee but if it had been for Life or in Tail it may be setled as this is done but not for years because it may then come to an Administrator If Mr. Lenthal be the cestui que use Co. Lit. 404. Godb. 64. then he hath an Estate of which the Law takes notice for he may be a Iuror at the Common Law 'T is plain that he hath an Estate created by operatian of the Law for he is Tenant at Will and for that reason the attendance of the Trustees is not necessary but if the Estate had been directly granted to them then the Office had been forfeited for Non-attendance It cannot be denied but that this Office may be granted at Will for so is Sir George Reynell's Case 9 Co. 98. now if it may be granted at Will by the Possessor it may likewise be so granted by him who hath an Estate created by the Law for fortior est dispositio legis quam hominis and in this Case no Inconveniency would happen for if the Will be determined then the Grantor is the Officer When Mr. Lenthal had assigned this Office to the Trustees and they by a subsequent Deed had declared it to be in trust for him and that he should take the Profits during life he hath thereby a legal Estate at Will for a Cestuy que Trust by Deed is a Tenant at Will It hath been objected that a Tenancy at Will of an Office is void and to prove this a Case in Jones's Rep. was cited Jones 128. but the reason of that Case is guided by the particular nature of that Office which could not be aliened without the consent of the King If this Office is not alienable in its nature then Mr. Lenthal hath still the Fee-simple but that will not be admitted But this is not only a bare Estate at Will but a Trust for Life and such a Trust which hath a legal construction Godbolt 6● for if a Feoffment be made in Trust that he should convey the Estate to another which the Feoffee afterwards refused to do the Cestuy que Trust may bring an Action against him so if he should be returned on a Iury 't is no Exception to say that he hath not liberum tenementum and therefore he is not an incompetent person to have the charge of Prisons if he may be impannelled on a Iury to try men for their Lives 1. Then as to the first Question upon the last point whether Mr. Lenthal had done any thing to determine his Tenancy at Will The Grant of this Office by him to Cooling will not amount to a determination of his Will because 't is a void Grant 'T is true this is denied by my Lord Coke in his Comment upon Littleton Sect. 71. where he saith If Tenant at Will grant over his Estate and the Grantee entreth he is a Disseisor for though the Grant be void yet it amounts to a determination of his Will What
being no where alledged that the Goods were weighed elsewhere or that they were such which are usually sold by Weight then there is no need of bringing of them to the Beam If one prescribes to a Common and doth not say for Cattle Levant and Couchant the Prescription is not good This being the consideration of the Duty it ought to be precisely alledged as in an Assumpsit where the Plaintiff declared that in consideration that the Defendant owed him 40 l. he promised to pay it ante inceptionem proximi itineris to London Yelv. 175. 2 Cro. 245. and alledged that such a day incepit iter suum ad London ' but for omitting the Word proxime Iudgment was arrested after Verdict because the Duty did arise upon the commencement of his next Iourney The true reason why any thing is helped by Verdict is for that the thing shall be presumed to be given in Evidence at the Trial. Mr. E contra Pollexfen contra Here is enough set forth in the Plea to shew that the Goods were not weighed and it must be given in Evidence at the Trial that they were sold contrary to the Custom which is the only Offence to be proved The want of Averment that the Goods sold by the Defendant were not weighed shall not vitiate this Declaration after a Verdict To prove this some Authorities were cited Cro. Eliz. 458. 2 Cro. 44. Siderfin 218. Palmer 360. Cro. Car. 497. as where in Trespass the Defendant justified for Common by Prescription for Beasts Levant and Couchant and that he put in his Beasts utendo Communia Issue was taken upon the Prescription and found for the Defendant now though he did not averr that the Cattle were Levant and Couchant yet it was held that it was cured by a Verdict And of this Opinion were three Iudges now but Iustice Allybon differed for says he if this Declaration should be good after a Verdict then a Verdict will cure any fault in Pleading Iudgment for the Plaintiff Prowse versus Wilcox AN Action on the Case for scandalous Words Words spoken of a Justice of the Peace where actionable The Plaintiff declared that he was a Justice of the Peace for the County of Somerset that there was a Rebellion in the West by the Duke of Monmouth and others that search was made for the Defendant being suspected to be concerned in that Rebellion and that the Defendant thereupon spoke these words of the Plaintiff viz. John Prowse is a Knave and a busie Knave for searching after me and other honest Men of my sort and I will make him give me satisfaction for plundering me There was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and the Iudgment being stayed till the Return of the Postea Mr. Pollexfen moved that the Plaintiff might have his Iudgment because the Words are actionable 1 Roll. Abr. 59. pl. 3. for they touched him in his Office of a Iustice of a Peace It was objected to stay the Iudgment that the Words were improper and therefore could not be actionable But admitting them so to be yet if they in any wise reflect upon a Man in a publick Office they will bear an Action Shore contra The Plaintiff doth not lay any Colloquium of him as a Justice of the Peace or that the words were spoken of him relating to his Office or the Execution thereof and therefore an Action will not lie though an * Vid. antea Rex versus Darby 2 Cro. 315. Information might have been proper against him If a Man should call another Lewd Fellow and that he set upon him in the High-way and took his Purse from him an Action will not lie because he doth not directly charge him with Felony or Robbery The Court were divided in Opinion two against two so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment Boyle versus Boyle A Libel was in the Spiritual Court against a Woman causa jactitationis Maritagii Prohibition granted The Woman suggests that this person was indicted at the Sessions in the Old-Bayly for marrying of her he then having a Wife living contra formam Statuti Godb. Rep. Can. 507. Hales 121. 1 Jac. cap. 11. Sid. 171. that he was thereupon convicted and had Iudgment to be burned in the Hand so that being tried by a Iury and a Court which had a Iurisdiction of the cause and the Marriage found a Prohibition was prayed Serjeant Levinz moved for a Consultation because no Court but the Ecclesiastical Court can examine a Marriage for in the Dower Writ is always directed to the Bishop to certifie the lawfulness of the Marriage and if this Woman should bury this Husband and bring a Writ of Dower and the Heir plead Ne unques accouple c. this Verdict and Conviction shall not be given in Evidence to prove the illegality of the Marriage but the Writ must go to the Bishop This is proved by the Case of Emerton and Hide in this Court The Man was married in fact and his Wife being detained from him she being in the Custody of Sir Robert Viner brought an Habeas Corpus she came into the Court but my Lord Hales would not deliver the Body but directed an Ejectment upon the Demise of John Emerton and Bridget his Wife that the Marriage might come in question It was found a Marriage and afterwards at an Hearing before the Delegates this Verdict was not allowed to be given in Evidence because in this Court one Iury may find a Marriage and another otherwise so that it cannot be tried whether they are legally married by a Temporal Court 'T is true this Court may controle the Ecclesiastical Courts but it must be eodem genere E contra E contra It was said that if a Prohibition should not go then the Authority of those two Courts would interfere which might be a thing of ill consequence If the lawfulness of this Marriage had been first tried in the Court Christian the other Court at the Old-Bayly would have given Credit to their Sentence But that Court hath been prohibited in a Case of the like nature 2 Cro. 535. for a Suit was there commenced for saying That he had a Bastard The Defendant alledged that the Plaintiff was adjudged the reputed Father of a Bastard by two Iustices of the Peace according to the Statute and so justified the speaking of the words and this being refused there a Prohibition was granted and so it was in this Case by the Opinion of three Iudges Dr. Hedges a Civilian being present in the Court said that Marriage or no Marriage never came in question in their Court upon a Libel for Jactitation unless the Party replies a lawful Marriage and that the Spiritual Court ought not to be silenced by a Proof of a Marriage de facto in a Temporal Court for all Marriages ought to be de jure of which their Courts had the proper Iurisdiction Sir John Newton versus Francis Creswick IN an Action on the
Release or Confirmation and then his Council should advise what sort of Conveyance is proper But here it is to make an Assignment and such as the Parties had agreed on If a Man should be bound to give another such a Release as the Iudge of the Prerogative Court shall think fit 5 Co. 23. Lambs Case 1 Rol. Abr. 424. pl. 8. the person who is so bound must procure the Iudge to direct what Release shall be given because the Condition is for his benefit and he hath taken upon him to perform it at his Peril 'T is usual for Men to have Council on both sides to put their Agreements into method but in this Case it being left generally as Council shall direct what reason can be given why the Defendants Council shall not be intended especially when it seems by the penning of the Covenant he shall For an Assignment is to be made as Council shall direct and here being a Verdict for the Plaintiff it must now be presumed that the Defendants Council was first to give the advice and then he was to make the Assignment E contra E contra It was argued that first as to the Verdict 't is not materially objected in this Case because the Plea is non est factum so that nothing of the special matter could come in Evidence Now admitting this Covenant to be general yet one of the Parties must make his choice of Council before he can entitle himself to an Action All Deeds are taken according to the general intendment and therefore by this Covenant his Council is to advise to whom the Assignment is to be made 3 Bulstr 168. for if the Council of the Defendant should advise an insufficient Deed that would not have saved his Covenant Befides the Plaintiff hath not averred that Council did not advise and therefore the Defendant could not plead any thing but non est factum Adjornatur Anonymus A Pleint was removed out of the Lord Mayors Court by Habeas Corpus the Return whereof was Exceptions to a By-Law that the City of London was an ancient City Incorporate and that time out of mind there was a Custom that the Portage and unlading of all Coals and Grain coming thither should belong to the Mayor and Aldermen c. That there was a Custom for them to regulate any Custom within the City c. Then they set forth an Act of Common-Council by which the Porters of Billingsgate were made a Fellowship and that the Meeters of Corn should from time to time give notice to the Porters to unlade such Corn as should arrive there and that no Bargeman not being Free of the said Fellowship shall unlade any Corn upon the Forfeiture of 20 s. to be recovered in an Action brought in the Name of the Chamberlain and that the Party offending shall have no Essoign or Wager of Law Then they set forth the Iudgment in the Quo Warranto and the re-grant and that the Defendant not being of the said Fellowship did unlade one hundred Quarters of Malt c. Serjeant Thompson took many Exceptions to this By Law but the most material were 1. It appears upon the Return that the City of London hath assumed an Authority to create a Fellowship by Act of Common Council which they cannot for 't is a Prerogative of the Crown so to do and they have not averred or shewed any special Custom to warrant such an Authority 2. They have made this By-Law too general for if a Man should carry and unlade his own Goods there he is lyable to the Forfeiture in which Case he ought to be excepted 3. This Act of Common Council prohibits Bargemen not being Free of the Fellowship of Porters to unlade any Coals or Grain arriving there and they have not averred that the Malt unladed did arrive c. so they have not pursued the words of the By-Law 4. They say in this Law Godb. 107. that the person offending shall have no Essoign or Wager of Law which is a Parliamentary Power and such as an inferiour Iurisdiction ought not to assume Adjornatur Beak versus Thyrwhit THere was a Sentence in the Court of Admiralty Whether Trover will lie for a Ship after Sentence in Admiralty for the same Ship concerning the Taking of a Ship and afterwards an Executrix brought an Action of Trover and Conversion for the same The Defendant after an Imparlance pleads that at the time of the Conversion he was a Servant to King Charles the Second and a Captain of a Man of War called the Phoenix and that he did seize the said Ship for the Governour of the East-India Company she going in a trading Voiage to the Indies contrary to the King's Prohibition c. And upon a Demurrer these Exceptions were taken to this Plea 1. The Defendant sets forth that he was a Servant to the King but hath not shewed his Commission to be a Captain of a Man of War 2. That he seized the Ship going to the Indies contrary to the King's Prohibition and hath not set forth the Prohibition it self It was Argued by the Council contra That it may be a Question whether this was the Conversion for which this Action is brought for it was upon the Sea and the Defendant might plead to the Iuisdiction of this Court the Matter being then under the Cognizance of the Admiralty But as to the Substance of this Plea 't is not material for the Defendant either to set forth his Commission or the King's Prohibition he hath shewed enough to entitle the Court of Admiralty to a Iurisdiction of this Cause and therefore this Court cannot meddle with it for he expresly affirmeth that he was a Captain of a Man of War and did seize this Ship c. which must be intended upon the Sea so that the Conversion might afterwards be upon the Land Cro. Eliz. 685. yet the original cause arising upon the Sea shall and must be tried in the Admiralty and it having already received a determination there shall not again be controverted in an Action of Trover The Case of Mr. 3 Keb. 785. Hutchinson was cited to this purpose who killed Mr. Colson in Portugal and was acquitted there of the Murder the Exemplification of which Acquittal he woduced under the great Seal of that Kingdom being brought from Newgate by an Habeas Corpus to this Court notwithstanding the King was very willing to have him tried here for that Fact the consideration whereof he referred to the Iudges who all agreed that he being already acquitted by their Law could not be tryed again here Adjornatur Smith versus Pierce A Special Verdict was found in Ejectment A Term for years was devised for payment of Debts the Remainder over in Tail he in Remainder enters and levies a Fine and settles the Land upon his Wife for life and dies the Wife surviving and the Debts not paid whether this Term is barred by
which he claims he ought to shew the other Will by which it must appear that nothing is contradictory to it or that it doth confirm the first but if Presumptions shall be admitted it must be in favour of the Heir for nothing shall be presumed to disinherit him Afterwards in Trinity-Term 5 Willielmi Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff and a Writ of Error was brought in the House of Peers to reverse that Iudgment but it was affirmed Anonymus A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment in the Common Pleas in an Ejectment for Lands in the County of Essex in which a Special Verdict was found viz. That R. F. What Words in a Will make Tenants in Common was seized in Fee of the Lands in question who had Issue two Daughters Frances Jane Frances had Issue Philp Frances Anne R. F. the Father devised unto Philip Frances and Anne the Children of his Daughter Frances and to Jane his other Daughter the Rents and Profits of his Mannor of Spain for thirty years to hold by equal parts viz. the three Grandchildren to have one Moiety and his Daughter Jane the other Moiety And if it happen that either of them should die before the thirty years expired then the said Term should be for the benefit of the Survivor and if they all die then the same was devised over to other Relations Afterwards he made a Codicil in these words viz. I give Power and Authority to my Executors to let my whole Lands for the Term of thirty years for the benefit and behalf of my Children Anne one of the Granchildren died without Issue Frances another of the Grandchildren died but left Issue The first Question was whether the Power given to the Executors by the Codicil will take away that Interest which was vested in the Grandchildren by the Will Mr. Appleton argued that it would not because the Executors had only a bare Authority to let it or improve it for the benefit of the Children there was no Devise of the Land to them If Power be given to Executors to sell Lands 't is only an Authority and not an Interest in them but a bare Authority only to let is of much less importance 2. After the Testator had devised the Profits of these Lands to his Grandchildren and Daughter equally to be divided during the term and had provided that if any dye without Issue that then it should survive and if all dye then to remain over to collateral Relations c. Whether Frances being dead but leaving Issue her Interest shall survive to Philip or go to such her Issue As to that he held that the Testator made them Tenants in Common by equal parts and therefore he devised it by Moieties in which there can be no Survivorship 'T is like a Devise to the Wife for life 2 Cro. 448. 1 Roll. Abr. 833. King versus Rumbal Cro. Car. 185. and after her decease to his three Daughters equally to be divided and if any of them die before the other then the Survivors to be her Heirs equally to be divided and if they all die without Issue then to others c. the Daughters had an Estate Tail and there was no Survivorship So in this Case it shall never go to the third Grandchild as long as any Issue of the second are living On the other side it was argued that they are Ioyntenants and not Tenants in Common E contra for the Testator having devised one Moiety to his three Grandchildren joyntly by equal parts that will make them Ioyntenants But the Court were all of Opinion that the words in the Will shew them to be Tenants in Common for equally to be divided runs to the Moieties So the Iudgment was affirmed Woodward 's Case THE Statute of 23 H. 8. c. 9. Church Ornaments are a personal Charge upon the Inhabitants and not upon those who live else where though they occupy Lands in that Parish Godb. 134. pl. 4. 152. pl. 29. 154. pl. prohibites a Citation out of the Diocess wherein the Party dwelleth except in certain Cases therein mentioned one whereof is viz. Except for any Spiritual Cause neglected to be done within the Diocess whereunto the Party shall be lawfully cited One Woodward and others who lived in the Diocess of Litchfield and Coventry but occupied Lands in the Diocess of Peterborough were taxed by the Parishioners where they used those Lands for the Bells of the Church and they refusing to pay this Tax a Suit was commenced against them in the Bishop of Peterborough's Court who thereupon suggested this Matter and prayed a Prohibition because they were not to be charged with this Tax it being only for Church Ornaments And a Prohibition was granted the reason given was because 't is a personal charge to which the Inhabitants only are liable and not those who only occupy in that Parish and live in another but the repairing of the Church is a real Charge upon the Land let the Owner live where he will DE Term. Sanct. Trin. Anno 4 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1688. Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices The Bishop 's Case Friday June 15th THE King having set forth a Declaration for Liberty of Conscience did on the 4th day of May last by Order of Council enjoyn that the same should be read twice in all Churches c. and that the Bishops should distribute it through their respective Diocesses that it might be read accordingly The Archbishop of Canterbury who then was together with six other Bishops petitioned the King setting forth that this Declaration was founded upon a dispensing Power which had been declared illegal in Parliament and therefore they could not in Honour or Conscience make themselves Parties to the Distribution and Publication of this Declaration who thereupon were summoned before the King in Council and refusing there to give Recognizance to appear before the Court of Kings Bench they were committed to the Tower by Warrant of the Council-Board The Attorney General moved for a Habeas Corpus retornable immediate and the same Morning in which that Motion was made Sir Edward Hales Lieutenant of the Tower returned the same and they were all brought into the Court. The Substance of the Return was viz. That they were committed to his Custody by Warrant under the Hands and Seals of the Lord Chanchellor Jefferies and also naming more of the Lords of the Privy-Council Dominos Concilij for contriving making and publishing a Seditious Libel against the King c. Then it was prayed that the Return might be filed and that the Information which was then exhibited against them for this Crime might be read and that they might all plead instanter Serjeant Pemberton Mr. Finch and Mr. Pollexfen oppsed the reading of it and moved that the Bishops might be discharged because they were not legally before the Court for it appears upon the Return that there is no lawful cause of
ought to be left out and of that Opinion was the Court and therefore a Rule was made that he might discontinue this Action without Costs Mordant versus Thorold Hill 1 2 Gulielmi Rotulo 340. THE Plaintiff brought a Scire Fac. upon a Iudgment The Case was thus Viz. Ann Thorold recovered in Dower against Sir John Thorold in which Action Damages are given by the Statute of Merton 20 H. 3. c. 1. Sir John Thorold brought a Writ of Error in B. R. and the Iudgment was affirmed Then the Plaintiff in Dower brought a Writ of Enquiry for the Damages and married Mr. Mordant and died before that Writ was executed Mr. Mordant takes out Letters of Administration to his Wife and brought a Sci. Fa. upon the Iudgment and the question was whether it would lie This depended upon the construction of the Statute of King Charles the II. which enacts That in all personal Actions 17 Car. 2. c. 8. and real and mixt the death of either party between the Verdict and the Iudgment shall not hereafter be alledged for Error so as such Iudgment be entred within two Terms after such Verdict Serjeant Pemberton insisted that this was a judicial Writ and that the Administrator had a right to it though the Wife died before the Profits were ascertained by the Writ of Enquiry 't is no more than a plain Sci. Fa. upon a Iudgment which an Executor may have and which was never yet denied though this seems to be a Case of the first Impression The Council on the other side argued that 't is true an Executor may have a Scire Facias upon a Iudgment recovered in the life of the Testator by reason only of such Recovery but this Scire Facias is brought for what never was recovered because the Wife died before any thing was vested in her for the Iudgment will stand so as to effect the Lands but not for the Damages Curia When a Statute which gives a remedy for mean Profits is expounded it ought to be according to the Common Law Now where entire Damages are to be recovered and the Demandant dies before a Writ of Enquiry executed the Executor cannot have any remedy by a Scire Facias upon that Iudgment because Damages are no duty till they are assessed Sed adjornatur DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 2 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1690. Shotter versus Friend Vxor ' Hill 2 Willielmi Rot. 39. THE Plaintiff and his Wife declared upon a Prohibition setting forth Proof by one Witness good in the Spiritual Court that John Friend on the 13th of October 22 Car. 2. made his Will by which he bequeathed to Mary Friend 10 l. to be paid to her within two years after his decease and that he made Jane the Wife of the Plaintiff Shotter Executrix and dyed that the said Executrix whilst sole and unmarried paid the said Legacy to Mary Friend who is since dead that Thomas Friend the Husband of the said Mary did after her death demand this Legacy in the Consistory Court of the Bishop of Winton that the Plaintiff pleaded payment and offered to prove it by one single Witness which Proof that Court refused though the Witness was a person without Exception and thereupon Sentence was given there against the Plaintiff which Sentence was now pleaded and upon Demurrer to the Plea The Question was whether upon the whole matter the Defendant should have a Consultation or whether a Prohibition should be granted because the proof by one Witness was denied by that Court. It was argued that the Defendant should not have a Consultation because Matters Testamentary ought to have no more favour than things relating to Tythes in which Cases the Proof by one Witness hath been always held good So 't is in a Release to discharge a Debt which is well proved by a single Testimony and it would be very inconvenient if it should be otherwise for Feoffments and Leases may come in question which must not be rejected because proved by one Witness A Modus decimandi comes up to this Case upon the Suggestion whereof Prohibitions are never denied and the chief reason is because the Spiritual Court will not allow a Modus to be any discharge of Tythes of Kind The Courts of Equity in Westminster-Hall give Relief upon a Proof by one Witness so likewise do the Courts of the Common Law if the Witness is a good and credible person 'T is true a Prohibition shall not go upon a Suggestion that the Ecclesiastical Court will not receive the Testimony of a single Witness If the Question is upon Proof of a Legacy devised or Marriage or not or any other thing which originally doth lie in the Cognizance of that Court but payment or not payment is a matter of Fact triable at the Law and not determinable there if therefore they deny to take the Evidence of a single Witness a Prohibition ought to go 2 Inst 608. 2. The Sentence is no obstacle in this Case because the Plaintiff had no Right to a Prohibition until the Testimony of his Witness was denied and Sentence thereupon given and this is agreeable to what hath been often done in cases of like nature As for instance Cro. Eliz. 88. Moor 907. Prohibitions have been granted where the Proof of a Release of a Legacy by one Witness was denyed So where the Proof of payment of Cythes for Pidgeons was denied upon the like Testimony Cro. Eliz. 666. Moor 413. 2 Rol. Rep. 439. 2 Rol Abr. 300. pl. 9. 299 pl. 14 17. Yelv. 92. Latch 117. 3 Bulst 242. Hutt 22. So where a Suit was for Subtraction of Cythes and the Defendant pleaded that he set them out and offered to prove it by by one Witness but was denied a Prohibition was granted And generally the Books are that if the Spiritual Court refuse such Proof which is allowed at the Common Law they shall be prohibited There is one Case against this Opinion which is that of Roberts in 12 Co. 12 Co. 65. Rep. but it was only a bare Surmise and of little Authority Those who argued on the other side held that a Consultation shall go E contra and that for two Reasons 1. Because a Prohibition is prayed after Sentence 2. Because the Ecclesiastical Court have an original Iurisdiction over all Testamentary things As to the first Point 'T is plain that if that Court proceed contrary to those Rules which are used and practised at the Common Law yet no Prohibition ought to go after Sentence but the proper remedy is an Appeal 2. It cannot be denied but that that Court had Cognizance of the principal matter in this Case which was a Legacy and Payment or not is a thing collateral Now wherever they have a proper Iurisdiction of a Cause both that and all its dependences shall be tried according to their Law which rejects the Proof by a single Witness
Occupant and let the Land to the Plaintiff until c. Et hoc paratus est verificare The Defendant demurred to this Replication and had Iudgment The Matter now in Debate was upon Exceptions to the Barr. 1. For want of a Traverse that Sir Peter Werburton was seised in Fee at the time of the taking c. 2. For want of a sufficient Title alledged in the Plaintiff for that by the Statue of Frauds all Occupancy is now taken away It was argued that the Replication was good without a Traverse Co. Ent. 504. for where the Plaintiff hath confessed and avoided as he hath done here if he had traversed likewise that would have made his Replication double He confesseth that Sir P. W. was seised in Fee of the Mannor but afterwards the Seisin was expresly alledged to be in Sir George the Father and that the place where was parcel thereof which is a Confession and an Avoidance The Avowant should have traversed this Lease but the Traverse of the Plaintiff upon him had made it a worse Issue Agreeable to this Case in reason is that which was adjudged in this Court in Michaelmas-Term 10 Car. 1. It was in Trespass Cro. Car. 384. the Defendant pleaded that the locus in quo was the sole Freehold of John c. and justified by his Command The Plaintiff replyed that the Land was parcel of the Mannor of Abbots Anne and that W. was seised in Fee and levied a Fine to the use of himself and Wife for their Lives the Remainder to E. for 100 years if he lived so long who after the death of the Cognizors entred and made a Lease to the Plaintiff And upon a Demurrer to this Replication the same Exception was then taken as now viz. that the Plaintiff did not confess and avoid the Freehold of John but the Plaintiff had Iudgment for the Barr being at large and the Title in the Replication being likewise so too the Plaintiff may claim by a Lease for years without answering the Freehold The not concluding with a Traverse is but a form and the Court will proceed according to the Right of the Cause without such form 27 Eliz. c. 5. 't is a defect which after a Ioinder in Demurrer is expresly helped by the Statute of Ieofails which enables the Court to amend defects and want of Forms other than such for which the party hath demurred The Case of Edwards and Woodden is in point Cro. Car. 323. 6 Co. Heyley 's Case Dyer 171. b. 1 Leon. 77 78. contra it was in Replevin the Defendant made Cognizance as Bailiff to Cotton for that the place where c. was so many Acres parcel of a Mannor c. that Bing was seised thereof in Fee who granted a Rent Charge out of it to Sir Robert Heath in Fee who sold it to Cotton c. The Plaintiff in Barr to the Conusance replied and confessed that the Land was parcel of the Mannor c. and that Bing was seised in Fee prout c. and granted the Rent to Sir R. H. but that long before the Seisin of Bing c. one Leigh was seised thereof in Fee who devised it to Blunt for a Term of years which Term by several Assignments came to Claxton who gave the Plaintiff leave to put in his Cattel c. And upon a Demurrer to this Replication an Exception was taken to it for that the Plaintiff did not shew how the Seisin and Grant of Bing to Sir R. H. was avoided for having confessed a Seisin in Fee prout c. that shall be intended a Fee in possession and notwithstanding he had afterwards set forth a Lease for years in Leigh by whom it was devised to Blunt c. and so to Claxton it may be intended that the Grantor was only seised in Fee of the Reversion and therefore the Plaintiff ought to have traversed the Seisin aliter vel alio modo But three Iudges seemed to encline that the Replication was good and that the Plaintiff had well confessed and avoided that Seisin in Fee which was alledged by the Defendant for he had shewed a Lease for years precedent to the Defendants Title and which was not chargeable with the Rent and his pleading that the Grantor Bing was seised in Fee must be only of a Reversion expectant upon that Lease But if his Confession that Being was seised in Fee prout c. shall be intended a Seisin in Fee in possession yet the Replication is good in substance because the Charge against the Plaintiff is avoided by a former Estate and in such Case 't is not necessary to take a Traverse But after all it was held that if it be a defect 't is but want of a Form which is aided by the Statute and that is this very Case now in question The want of a Traverse seldom makes a Plea ill in substance but a naughty Traverse often makes it so because the adversary is tied up to that which is material in it self so that he cannot answer what is proper and material and therefore in Ejectment upon a Lease made by E. I. Yelv. 151. Bedel versus Lull the Defendant pleaded that before E. I. had any thing to do c. M. I. was seised in Fee after whose death the Land descended to his Heir and that E. entred and was seized by Abatement The Plaintiff replied and confessed the Seisin of M. but saith that he devised it in Fee to E. I. who entred absque hoc that E. I. was seized by Abatement and upon a Demurrer this was held to be an ill Traverse for the Plaintiff had confessed the Seisin of M. and avoided it by the Devise and therefore ought not to have traversed the Abatement for having derived a good Title by the Devise to his Lessor 't is an Argument that he entred lawfully and it was that alone which was issuable and not the Abatement therefore it was ill to traverse that because it must never be taken but where the thing traversed is issuable Then it was said that the Conusance was informal because the Avowant should have said that the Locus in quo c. contains so many Acres of Ground c. he only saith that it was parcel of a Mannor besides he neither prays Damages nor Retorn ' Habend ' 2. As to the 2d Point it was said that the Statute of Frauds doth not take away all Occupancy it only appoints who shall be a special Occupant Besides here is a Title within the Statute for a Lease for Lives is personal Assets so is a Term in the Hands of an Executor de son tort and in this Case the entring of one Brother after the death of the other made him an Executor de son tort More 126. Sid. 7. and it was never yet doubted but that there may be such an Executor of a Term. Whereupon it was concluded that the Barr was good both as to the Form
the Neglect in this Case was in the Servant the Action may be brought against all the Owners for it is grounded quasi ex contractu though there was no actual Agreement between the Plaintiff and them And as to this purpose 2 Sand. 345. Hob. 206. Hutt 121. 1 Mod. 198. 't is like the Case where a Sheriff levies Goods upon an Execution which are rescued out of the hands of his Bailiffs this appearing upon the Retorn an Action of Debt will lie against him though there was no actual Contract between the Plaintiff and him for he having taken the Goods in Execution there is quasi a Contract in Law to answer them to the Plaintiff 2. As to the second Point it was ruled that Not-Guilty was a good Plea to any Mis-feazance whatsoever and that a Plea in Abatement viz. that the rest of the Owners super se susceperunt simul cum Defendente absque hoc quod Defendens super se suscepit tantum had been no more than the general Issue 3 Cro. 554. Vering versus More but he hath not pleaded thus Iustice Dolben agreed that the Action ought to be brought against all the Proprietors it being upon a Promise created by Law but he was Opinion that this Matter might have been pleaded in Abatement Gold versus Strode AN Action was brought in Somersetshire and the Plaintiff recovered and had Iudgment and died Intestate Gold the now Plaintiff took out Letters of Administration to the said Intestate in the Court of the Bishop of Bath and Wells and afterwards brought a Scire Facias upon that Iudgment against the Defendant to shew Cause quare Executionem habere non debeat He had Iudgment upon this Scire Facias and the Defendant was taken in Execution and escaped An Action of Debt was brought by the said Gold against this Defendant Strode who was then Sheriff for the Escape and the Plaintiff had a Verdict It was moved in arrest of Iudgment and for Cause shewen that if the Administration was void then all the dependencies upon it are void also and so the Plaintiff can have no Title to this Action Now the Administration is void because the entring upon Record of the first Iudgment recovered by the Intestate in the County of Middlesex where the Records are kept made him have bona notabilia in several Counties and then by the Law Administration ought not to be committed to the Plaintiff in an inferior Diocess but in the Prerogative Court Curia The Sheriff shall not take advantage of this since the Iudgment was given upon the Scire Fac. and the Capias ad satisfaciendum issuing out against the then Defendant directed to the Sheriff made him an Officer of this Court and the Iudgment shall not be questioned by him for admitting it to be a Recovery without a Title yet he shall take no advantage of it till the Iudgment is reversed 'T is not a void but an erronious Iudgment and when a person is in execution upon such a Iudgment and Escapes and then an Action is brought against the Goaler or Sheriff 8 Co. 141. and Iudgment and Execution thereon though the first Iudgment upon which the party was in execution should be afterwards reversed yet the Iudgment against the Goaler being upon a collateral thing executed shall still remain in force The Ca. Sa. 21 E. 4. 23. b. Cro. El. 164. Moor 274. 2 Cro. 3. 1 Rol. Abr. 809 God b. 403. 2 Leon. 84. was a sufficient authority to the Sheriff to take the Body though grounded upon an erronious Iudgment and that Execution shall be good till avoided by Error and no false Imprisonment will lie against the Goaler or Sheriff upon such an Arrest Coghil versus Freelove In the Common-Pleas DEBT for Rent was brought against the Defendant as Administratrix of Thomas Freelove her late Husband deceased Debt for Rent incurred after an assignment by an Administrator for the privity of Contract is not determined by the death of the intestate 2 Vent 209. in which Action the Plaintiff declared That on the 1st of May 21 Car. 2. he did by Indenture demise to the said Thomas Freelove one Messuage and certain Lands in Bushey in Hertfordshire Habendum from Lady day then last past for and during the term of 21 years under a yearly Rent that by virtue thereof he entred and was possessed That on the 7th of March 1685. the said Thomas Freelove died Intestate and that the next day Administration of his Goods and Chattels was granted to the Defendant and that 78 l. was in arrear for Rent due at such a time for which this Action was now brought in the Detinet The Defendant confessed the Lease prout c. and the death of the Intestate and that the Administration was granted to her but saith that before the Rent was due she by Articles made between her of the one part and Samuel Freelove of the other part did assign the said Indenture and all her right title and interest thereunto and which she had in the Premisses unto the said Samuel Freelove who entred and was possessed that the Plaintiff had notice of this Assignment before he brought this Action but nothing was said of his acceptance To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred and the Defendant joined in Demurrer And Iudgment was given by the Opinion of the whole Court for the Plaintiff against the Authorities following Viz. Cro. Eliz. 555. 'T is true in Overton and Sydal 's Case it was resolved that if an Executor of Lessee for years assign his Interest Debt for Rent will not lye against him after such Assignment the reason there given was because the personal privity of the Contract is determined by the death of the Lessee as to the Debt it self and for the same reason the Executor shall not be lyable to the Rent after the death of the Lessee if such Lessee doth make an assignment of his Term in his life-time My Lord Coke mentioning this Case 3 Co. 24. a. in his third Report affirms that it was resolved by Popham Chief Iustice and the whole Court that if an Executor of a Lessee for years assign his Interest Debt will not lye against him for Rent due after such an Assignment Pop. 120. but my Lord Popham himself in Reporting that very Case tells us he was of another Opinion which was that so long as the Covenant in the Lease hath the nature and essence of a Contract it shall bind the Executor of the Lessee who as well to that as to many other purposes represents the person of the Testator and is privy to his Contracts T is true my Lord Popham held in that Case that the Action did not lye but because it was brought by the Successor of a Prebendary upon a Lease made by him in his life-time who being a single Corporation the personal Contract was determined by his death But the same Case reported by others Moor 251.
an Inn-Keeper and that he bought Necessaries and uttered them in his House but this will not make him a Baukrupt Because Inns are of necessity and under the inspection of the publick and he cannot refuse to lodge travelling persons 2 Roll. Rep. 345. Hutt 100. 2 Roll. Abr. 64. Dalton 28. and 't is chiefly upon this account that he hath several Priviledges which other Traders have not as to detein a Horse till he is paid for keeping of it c. They are under the power of the Iustices of the Peace in the places where they are scituated for if an Inn be erected in an inconvenient place 't is a Nusance and may be suppressed by Indictment 't is the same with an Ale-house 1 Jac. c. 9. 21 Sac. c. 7. 1 Car. c. 14. and therefore several Statutes which are made to prevent Tipling and which appoint at what price Ale shall be sold have been adjudged to extend to Inn-Keepers Where a Man Buys and Sells under a Restraint and particular Limitation tho 't is for his Livelyhood yet he is not within the Statutes Inn-Keepers do not deal upon Contracts as other Traders do for a Iudge of Assize may set a price upon his Goods and if they should set a price themselves if 't is unreasonable they may be indicted for extortion what they buy is to a particular intent for 't is to spend in their Houses and tho' they get their Living by it 't is not ad plurimum for the greatest part of their Gains ariseth by Lodgings Attendance dressing of Meats and other Necessaries for their Guests Ever since the Statute of the 13th of Eliz. all the subsequent Acts relating to Bankrupts have been penn'd alike except the 21st of Jac. I. which is a little larger and takes in a Scrivener and it may still be worth the care of a Parliament to enlarge it to an Inn-Keeper but no Law now in being extends to him He is not taken notice of as a Trader within any of the Statutes of Bankrupcy he is only communis hospitator a person or Trador who buys and sells for hospitality 8 Co. Caly's Case by receiving Travellers he becomes chargable to the Publick to protect them and their Goods A Shoe-maker 1 Cro. 31. Hutt 46 47. Tanner and Baker are Trades within the Statutes but the difference between those Trades and an Inn-Keeper is plain because they use the Manufacture and thereby encrease the value as Leather is made more useful and of more value by making of it into Shoes A Farmer is not within the Statute and yet they all buy and sell for 't is necessary to their Occupation This Point was setled in Crisp and Prat 's Case but the occasion of the doubt afterwards was by the publishing of Iustice Jones 's Reports who doubted upon the particular finding of the Iury and so the Court came to be divided There is no material difference between an Inn-Keeper and the Master of a Boarding-School who buys and dresses Provisions for young Scholars and obtains Credit by his way of Living but it was never yet thought that he was within any of those Statutes Rowsby versus Manning Mich. 4 Jac. Rot. 15. DEBt upon a Bond for performance of an Award Conditional submission to an Award so as it be made by such a day and ready to be delivered to the Parties or to such of them as desire it The Defendant pleaded nullum fecerunt arbitrium c. The Plaintiff replied that after the submission and before the day appointed in the Condition the Arbitrators did make their Award by which they ordered the Defendant to pay so much Mony to the Plaintiff and so assigned the breach for non-payment c. And upon a Demurrer to this Replication Serjeant Tremaine said it was a conditional submission viz. to perform an Award so as it be made by such a day and ready to be delivered to the Parties and the Plaintiff hath not shewed that it was ready to be delivered to the Defendant which he ought to have averred If the Condition be to perform an Award between the Parties 5 Co. 103. More 642. Ita quod arbitrium praed fiat deliberetur utrique partium praed before such a day it must be delivered to all the Parties and not to one for each of them are in the danger and penalty of the Bond. E contra E contra Serjeant Thompson agreed it to be a conditional Submmission but not such as goeth to the substance of the Award it self for the conditional Words are not to the Award but to the Form of the delivering of it and therefore it should come on the Defendants side to shew that it was not ready to be delivered Curia If an Award is actually made 'tis then ready to be delivered but in this Case it must be ready to be delivered to the Parties or to such of them who desire it so it must be desired and if then denied the Party may plead the matter specially The Summission was viz. 2 Cro. 577. 2 Roll. Rep. 193. so that the Award be made ad vel antea 5 Decemb. ready to be delivered at a certain Shop in London The Plaintiff shewed an Award made at York ready to be delivered at the Shop in London this was adjudged to be a void publication and delivery because a place was appointed where it should be delivered and published viz. at the Shop in London where the Parties were to expect it and not elsewhere So it would have been if a day had been appointed on which it ought to be delivered and the day had been mistaken 2 Sand. 73. But here is neither day or place appointed for the delivery so that the Defendant ought to have desired the Award and if it had not been ready to be delivered he ought to have pleaded the Matter specially DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 2 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1690. Mr. Leigh's Case HE brought a Mandamus to be restored to the Office of a Proctor of Doctors Commons Mandamus will not lie for the Office of a Proctor of Doctors Commons The Return was that the Court was the supreme Court of the Archbishop of Canterbury who had the Government thereof that he appointed a Iudge of the said Court who had power to alter and displace Officers that the Defendant was admitted and sworn a Proctor of the Court and took an Oath to obey the Orders thereof that part of the said Oath was That no Proctor should do any thing in that Court without the Advice of an Advocate that he had done Business without such advice in a certain Cause there depending and that he refused to pay a Tax of 10 s. imposed upon him by Order of the Court towards the Charges of the House The Questions upon this Return were viz. 1. Whether a Mandamus will lie to restore a person to the Office of a
Proctor 2. Whether a sufficient cause was returned to displace Mr. Leigh As to the first It was held that a Mandamus doth lie because 't is a publick Office and concerns the Administration of Iustice and the Proctors being limited to a certain number viz. 28. if many of them should be displaced it would be a means to hinder Iustice This Court doth judicially take notice of the Ecclesiastical Courts by prohibiting them by taking notice of their Excommutions or of any proceedings when they are against the Law of the Land A Proctor doth the Business in that Court as as Attorney in B. R. and Notice is taken of his place as judicially as of any other Officer Sid. 94 152. and as to this purpose those Officers cannot be distinguished if therefore a Mandamus hath been granted to restore an Attorny why not a Proctor The Plaintiff hath no remedy but by a Mandamus because an Assize will not lie of this Office 't is admitted that an Action on the Case may be brought but then Damages only are to be recovered and not the Office and it would be very inconvenient to leave it to a Iury to give such Damages as the Party may sustain for the loss of his Livelyhood 'T is no Objection to say that there is a proper Visitor in this Case to whom to appeal viz. to the Archbishop for they have not set out any such visitatorial power in the Return or if any that he had power to restore him But if such Power had appeared upon the Return yet a Proctor ought not to appeal to the Archbishop or to the Guardian of the Spiritualties Sede vacante because ' is in effect to appeal to themselves for the Dean of the Arches before whom the Appeal must be brought is an Officer appointed by the Archbishop himself and hath the same Iurisdiction with him Besides the Proctors there are not properly under any Visitatorial Power they have a particular Iurisdiction within themselves and their Courts have been held in several places as at Bow Christchurch c. Then as to the Causes of this removal 't is returned 1. For receiving and prosecuting of a Cause without the advice of an Advocate contrary to a Statute made by the Archbishop Abbot 2. For refusing to pay 10 s. set upon him as a Tax towards the Charges of the House Now neither of these are sufficient Causes to displace him As to the first Cause if that Statute gives them any such Power 't is void because it deprives a Man of his Freehold which cannot be done but by the Law of the Land 'T is not said when this Offence was committed for it may be before a general Pardon and then 't is discharged But if it is an Offence that will not make a Forfeiture without warning and no such thing appears upon the Return 11 Co. 99. a. for if he had notice publickly he might have offered something in excuse of himself as Sickness c. which might have been allowed by the Court. 'T is as unreasonable a Law to put the Clients to unnecessary Charges to advise with an Advocate upon an ordinary Libel as it would be for an Attorny of the King's Bench to advise with Council to draw a Declaration on a Bond. 2. They do not shew by what Authority they may levy a Tax neither do they set forth what Tax was made in the whole so that it might appear that 10 s. was a proportionable part for him to pay neither doth it appear when this Tax was made or that Mr. Leigh was a Proctor when it was made E contra E contra This is not an Offence in matter of Iudgment but 't is a Misdemeanour and punishable 'T is very like the Case of Fellows of Colleges who have proper Visitors and therefore the King's Bench will not grant a Mandamus in such Cases A Proctor is an Officer of a Court different from the Courts of Law and therefore the King's Bench cannot take notice of his Office judicially they have no other way of punishing of a Proctor but by displacing of him and if this should be remedied by a Mandamus then those persons may offend without punishment 'T is not like the Case of an Attorny for he being an Officer of the King's Bench the Court doth judicially take notice of him but not of a Proctor 'T is more like the Case of a Steward of a Court Baron which is of private Iurisdiction and for which a Mandamus hath been denied 'T is like Midleton 's Case who was Treasurer of the New River Water 't is true a Mandamus was granted to restore him to that Office but it was only de bene esse to bring the Matter before the Court though that was a Corporation settled by Act of Parliament 'T is also like the Cases of Abbots Priors and Monks for whom a Mandamus was never granted because they are Ecclesiastical Corporations and have proper Visitors which is now by Law devolved upon the Archbishop So also Lay Corporations have Visitors which are their Founders and their Heirs 'T is an Objection of no force to say that this Appeal must be to the Dean of the Arches which is to appeal to the same person because though 't is true that the Dean is constituted by the Archbishop yet when once he is invested with that Office he is in for his Life and the Archbishop cannot afterwards come into that Court and execute the Office of Dean himself so he is not the same person neither hath he the same Iurisdiction Curia A Proctor is not an Officer properly speaking 't is only an Employment in that Court which acts by different Laws and Rules from the King's Bench they have an original Iurisdiction over this matter and a Mandamus is in the nature of an Appeal which will not be granted where they have such a Iurisdiction but when they exceed it and encroach upon the Common Law then Prohibitions are granted 'T is for this reason that in cases of Divorce which are of a higher nature than this case is no Appeal can be to the King's Bench for it would be an endless business for persons to Appeal ab uno ad aliud examen and therefore credit must be given to the determinations of those Courts who have such Original Iurisdiction Officers are incident to all Courts 1 Roll. Abr. 526. and must partake of the nature of those several and respective Courts in which they attend and the Iudges or those who have the supream Authority in such Courts are the proper persons to censure the Behaviour of their own Officers and if they should be mistaken the King's Bench cannot relieve for in all cases where such Iudges keep within their Bounds no other Court can correct their Errors in Proceedings Now for a Church-Warden of a Parish Clerk an Attorny or the like all these are Temporal Officers and are to be ordered by the Temporal Laws
But if any wrong be done in this Case the Party must Appeal so no Writ of Restitution was granted Rex versus Guardianum de le Fleet. AN Inquisition being found to seize the Office of Warden of the Fleet into the King's Hands Inquisition quashed the Court of Chancery assisted with three Iudges was moved that it might be Quashed The Exceptions taken were viz. 1. 'T is found that the Defendant was Warden of the Fleet but doth not say what Estate he had therein whether for Life or years or in Fee c. 2. The Offences which are the causes of the Forfeiture are laid to be committed at the Fleet by suffering Escapes and by Extortion and 't is not found where the Fleet is scituate so there being no Visne those Offences cannot be traversed 3. 39 H. 6.32 They do not find the Escape to be sine licentia contra voluntatem of the Warden the Debts being unpaid 4. Admitting it to be a Forfeiture the Office cannot go to the King but it shall go to the next who hath the Inheritance The Opinion of the Court was that there are two things which entitle the King to this Office neither of which were found by this Inquisition 1. An Estate in the Party offending 2. A cause of Forfeiture of that Estate Now here was no Estate found in the Warden but only that the Office was forfeited by suffering of Escapes c. If this had been an Office of Inheritance ● Co. 95. then it ought to be found that such a person was seised in Fee c. and so what Estate soever he had in it ought to be expresly found But as this is found 't is void because it doth not answer the end for which the finding of Offices was provided which is to entitle the King to the Offenders Estate An Indictment is but another sort of Office and here being no Estate found 't is much like an Indictment which finds no Offence therefore it must be quashed It might have been objected that no Man can tell what Estate the Warden had in this place and that not being known no Office could be found for the King But this Objection runs to the finding of all manner of Offices in general whose very nature is to find an Estate and to divest the subject thereof and vest it in the King Besides in this Case one of the Indentures by which the Office was granted to the Warden must be enrolled in the Court of Common-Pleas This cannot be helped by a Melius Inquirendum 3 Cro. 895. 9 Co. 95. Keilw 194. which never will support a defective Inquisition and this is such because it doth not appear that the Defendant had any Seisin or Estate in the Wardenship of the Fleet. Barker Mil ' versus Damer Hill 1 Rot. 635. AN Action of Covenant was brought by Sir William Barker who was Defendant in a former Action against Mr. Damer wherein he declared that William Barker his Father was seised in Fee of the Land in Question being in Ireland and made a Lease thereof to one Page for 31 years under the yearly Rent of 200 l. in which Lease Page did Covenant for himself his Executors Administrators and Assigns to pay the Rent to Mr. Barker his Heirs and Assigns That William Barker the Father by Lease and Release convey'd the Reversion to Sir William Barker the now Plaintiff that the Term was vested in the Defendant and assigns the breach for non-payment of the Rent The Defendant pleaded to the Iurisdiction of this Court that the Lands in the Declaration mentioned lay in Ireland where they have Courts of Record c. and so properly triable there To this Plea the Plaintiff demurr'd and the Defendant joyned in Demurrer The single Question was whether an Assignee of the Reversion can bring an Action of Covenant against the Assignee of a Lessee in any other place than where the Land is Those who argued that he may said that this Action being brought upon an Express Covenant is not local but transitory 2 Inst 231. Noy 142. 2 Cro. 142. ibidem Sid. 157. 2 Roll. Ab. 571. 1 And. 82. for debitum contractus sunt nullius loci and if it is a duty 't is so every where therefore it hath been adjudged that upon a Covenant brought in one County the breach may be assigned in another Tremain Serjeant Contra. E contra He admitted that Debt upon a Lease for years upon the Contract it self and Covenant between the same Parties are transitory Actions and may be brought any where but when once that privity of Contract is gone as by assignment of the Lessee or the death of the Lessor Latch 197. and there remains only a Privity in Law there the Action must be brought in the County where the Land lieth the reason is Hob. 37. because the Party is then chargeable in respect of the possession only Therefore it was held that where an Assignee of a Reversion of Lands in Sommersetshire brought an Action of Debt in London Cro. Car. 184. Jones 83. Dyer 40 b. upon a Lease for years made there reserving a Rent payable at London which was in arrear after the Assignment that the Action was not well brought for it ought to have been laid in Sommersetshire where the Lands were because the privity of Contract was lost by the assignment of the Reversion and therefore the Party to whom that assignment was made ought to maintain the Action upon the privity in Law by reason of the Interest which he had in the Land it self and that must be in the County where it lieth Curia There is a difference between an Action of Debt for Rent brought by an Assignee and an Action of Covenant for the first is an Action at the Common Law which hath fixed the Rent to the Reversion and therefore such an Action must be maintained upon the Privity of Estate which is always local But an Assigneé of a Reversion could not bring an Action of Covenant at the Common Law 1 Sid. 402. 3 Cro. 580. 1 Sand. 240. 32 H. 8. c. 34. for 't is given to him by a particular Statute viz. of 32 H. 8. but the Statute did not transfer any Privity of Contract to the Assignee but the intent of it was to annex to the Reversion such Covenants only which concerned the Land it self as to repair the House or amend the Fences and not to anner or transfer any collateral Covenants as to pay a Sum of Mony for that is fixed by the Common Law to the Reversion 'T is true At the Common Law an Assignee of a Reversion might have maintained an Action of Covenant for any thing agreed to be done upon the Land it self Privity of Contract is not thereby transferred so as to make the Action transitory but it must be brought upon the Privity of Estate for if a Man doth covenant to do any collateral thing not in the
IT lies to remove Causes and Orders from an inferior Jurisdiction where 't is not prohibited in express words by any Statute 95 2. Will not lie to the Grand Sessions nor to a County Palatine to remove Civil Causes quaere whether it lies to the Royal Franchise of Ely 230 Charter Usage shall expound ancient Charters 9 2 The Common Law doth operate with it ibid. 3. One Clause of a Charter may expound another 10 4. A Charter which establishes a Corporation must provide for a new Election in order to a Succession otherwise the Common Law will not help 13 Church See Prohibition Commitment By the Lord Chancellor and several others Dominos Concilii for a Misdemeanour whether it should not be Dominos in Concilio 213 2. Of a Peer for a Misdemeanour which amounts to a Breach of the Peace for which Sureties are to be given 214 3. When a person is brought in by a Capias for any offence he ought to plead instanter 215 Common and Commoner See Ioytenancy 4 Ioynt Action 7 Prescription 7 A Common cannot pass without Deed and if the Plaintiff sheweth a Que Estate he must produce the Deed 52 2. If a Prescription is made for a Common and doth not say for Cattle Levant and Couchant 't is not good 162 246 3. But this fault is cured by a Verdict 162 Confederacy See Indictment Condition See Infant 2. Notice 2 4. A bare denial without doing any more is no Breach of the Condition 31 2. How it differs from a Limitation 32 3. To restrain Marriage to the consent of particular persons is void ibid. 4. Where 't is of two parts in the disjunctive and both possible at the time of the Bond given and one becomes impossible afterwards by the Act of God the Obligor is not bound to perform the other part for the Condition being made for his benefit shall be taken very beneficially for him who had election to perform either part 233 5. When the Condition is but of one part 't is otherwise as if A. promise B. that if C. do not appear such a day at Westminster he will pay 20 s. C. died before the day the Mony must be paid 234 6. Condition was to pay Rent at Michaelmas or Lady-day during the Life of a Woman or within thirty days after she died after the Feast but within the thirty days the payment which was due at the Feast was discharged thereby ibid. 7. To save harmless Non damnificatus generally is a good Plea but if it be to save harmless acquit and discharge then 't is not good without shewing how acquitted and discharged 252 Confederacy See Agreement Consideration See Action on the Case Construction Where it shall be made of an Act of Parliament according to the intent of the Law-makers 33 2. Where it shall be made of an entire Sentence so as the intent of the Law may appear 220 3. Where particular words are in the first part of a Sentence and general words follow both shall stand 278 279 Contract Where an Agreement is entire to do or perform a thing for a certain Sum it shall not be apportioned pro rata for the performance of part 153 2. There must be a recompence of each side to make the Contract good 237 Copyhold and Copyholders See Baron and Feme 8 9. Lord may seize the Land of a Copyholder till a Fine is paid 222 2. A Man by Custom may assign a person to take the Profits of a Copyhold Estate during the Minority of an Infant without rendring an accompt when he comes of Age ibid. Corporation See Charter 4. In all proceedings which concern a Corporation it must be alledged that there is one and how erected whether by Grant or Prescription 6 2. Mayor hath no more Power than an Alderman in the Coporation where he is Mayor 9 3. Is not of the Quorum for electing of an Alderman 10 4. The Mayor is named in the Grant as part of the Name of the Corporation and is not of the Quorum without naming him to be so 9 10 5. He is a Mayor in respect of Reverence but not of Power 11 6. At the Common Law neither his Name or Office require his presence at the choosing of an Alderman 11 14 7. He cannot act eo nomine but by the express Power given in the Charter 12 8. Elections of Officers of a Corporation must be free 21 9. Mayor of a Corporation is no Officer at the Common Law 12 10. Original of Corporation was preservation of Trade ibid. 11. Corporation by Charter without setting forth their Duty or Office hath no Power ibid. 12. A Company in London made a By-Law that none of them should buy such a Commodity within 24 Miles of London but two Men 't is too large to bind at such a distance out of their Jurisdiction 159 Costs See Amendment 3. Trespass for breaking of a Close and impounding of Cattel and Damages given under 40 s. the Plaintiff shall have his Costs 39 2. Amendment after a Writ of Error brought Costs must be paid 113 Covenant See Local Action Where a thing is lawful at the time of the Covenant made and afterterwards prohibited by Law yet the Covenant is binding 39 2. To find Meat Drink and other Necessaries the Breach was assigned in not finding Meat Drink alia necessaria and entire Damages though this Breach was too general yet 't is good for it may be as general as the Covenant 69 3. There must be such certainty in it that if the Defendant should be sued again he may plead the former Recovery in Bar ibid. 4. Need not so much certainty in assigning a Breach upon a Covenant as upon a Bond for performance of Covenants ibid. 5. For quiet enjoyment the Breach was that a Stranger habens jus titulum and doth not say what Title for it may be under the Plaintiff himself therefore not well assigned 135 6. To make an Assignment according to an Agreement between the Partis as Council should direct whether the Council of the Plaintiff or Defendant should advise 192 7. Give grant and confirm are words at the Common Law where they shall be taken to amount to a Covenant to stand seized 237 Court Cause not to be removed out of an inferiour Court unless the Habeas Corpus is delivered to the Steward before Issue or Demurrer joyned so as 't is joyned within six Weeks after Arrest or Appearance 85 2. If the Cause is tried in an inferior Court the Steward not being an Utter Barister an Attachment shall go ibid. 3. Amerciament in a Court Leet is a Duty vested in the Lord for which he may distrain 138 4. Presentment in a Court Leet is the proper remedy when a Man is disturbed in a common Passage or Way 294 Custom See Admittance Infant 10. Prescription 8. Pleading 12. Must have nothing to support it but Usuage 133 2. 'T is made of repeated Acts ibid. 3. Must be very
before a Coroner the person having drowned himself it was suffocat ' emergit fuit if it had stood singly upon the word emergit it had been insensible but the word suffocat ' expressing the sense it was held good 100 4. Where nothing is vested in the King before Office found ibid. 5. It must always be found that there is an Estate in the person offending and a cause of Forfeiture of that Estate to vest it in the King 336 Interest in a thing See Pardon 4. Where a Man may have an interest in a Chattel without a Property 61 2. Devise to a Wife and Children after Debts and Legacies paid an interest vests in the Devisees but 't is otherwise in case of Administration for there no Interest vests till actual distribution 65 3. A Man may have a Property tho' not in himself as in the Case of Joyntenancy 97 Intestate See Administration Innuendo The proper office of it is to make the subject matter certain 53 2. It will not help insensible words 54 Joyntenancy and Tenancy in Common See Abatement 3. Baron and Feme 12. Interest 3. If one Joyntenant bring an Action against the other unless he pleads the Jointenancy in abatement the Plaintiff will recover 97 2. If two Coparceners lease a House and the Rent is arrear and one brings an Action and recovers Judgment shall be arrested because both ought to joyn 109 3. Tenants in Common must join in the personalty but 't is otherwise in real Actions for though their Estates are several yet the Damages to be recovered survive to all 109 251 4. Where one Commoner may bring an Action against his Fellow 251 Joint Action See Action for a wrong 6. Ioyntenancy 2 3. Where an Action may be joint or several at the Election of the Plaintiff 86 2. Where 't is brought against three Defendants who plead jointly the Jury may sever the Damages and the Plaintiff may take Execution de melioribus damnis as well as where their Pleas are several and Tryals at several times 101 102 3. Judgment against two and one brought a Writ of Error and assigned the Infancy of the other for Error the Writ was abated because both did not joyn 134 4. The Defendants in the original Action must joyn in a Writ of Error but it seems otherwise where the Plaintiffs bring Error 135 5. Two covenant to sell Lands and the Purchasor agreed to pay the Mony to one of them he alone ought to bring the Action 263 6 Where there are several Proprietors of a Vessel for carriage of Goods which are damaged by carrying the Action must be brought against all or against the Master alone 321 322 7 Where two Tenants in Common were sued for not setting out of Tythes the Action ought to be brought not against him who set them out but against the other who carried them away 322 8. Two are bound joyntly one is sued he may plead in Abatement that he was bound with another but cannot plead Non est factum 323 9 In all Cases which are grounded upon Contracts the Parties who are Privies must be joyned in the Action ibid. 10 Action must be brought against all where a promise is created by Law 324 Issue Must be joyned upon an affirmative and a negative by concluding to the Country 80 Iudges The making altering and displacing of several Judges Serjeants at Law and King's Council 71 99 100 104 125 143 191 239 Iustices of Peace Offences against the Statute of 23 Eliz c. 1. for not coming to Church may be enquired of by them in their Sessions 79 2. Where a Statute appoints a thing finally to be done by them yet the Court of King's Bench may take Cognizance of it 95 3. Conviction for keeping of a Gun before a Justice of Peace the time when he had not 100 l. per Annum must be precisely alledged 280 Iustification See Pleading 4 5. Where 't is pleaded by way of Excuse to an Action of Trespass for the taking of any thing the Defendant must averr the Fact to be done and set forth the Warrant to him directed and the taking virtute Warranti and not generally that he took it by a Mandate c. 138 2. In Replevin where the Defendant made Conusance in right of the Lord he may Justifie the taking generally ibid. Iudgment 1. At the Common Law no Execution could be of a Judgment after a year and a day but the remedy was to bring an Action of Debt upon Judgment 187 189 2. Now a Scire Fac. is given upon a Judgment after the year by the Statue of W. 2. 189 3. When a Judgment is once execucuted the Goods are in custodia legis and shall not be taken away by an Exchequer Process or by the Commissioners of Bankrupts 236 L. Lapse See Notice Lease A Covenant in a Lease for years that the Lessee should pay the Rent without obliging his Executors or Administrators 't is determined by his Death 231 2. For 99 yeas if three persons or any of them so long live reserving a Rent and an Herriot upon the death of either the Beast of the Assignee shall not be taken for a Herriot for the Lessee is to pay his best Beast and that shall not be carried further than to the person named 231 Libel Where a Fine and Corporal punishment was imposed upon the Offender after Conviction 68 Limitation An Estate was setled upon Trustees to the use of A. and her Heirs provided she marry with the consent of Trustees remainder over to B. This is a Limitation and not a Condition 32 Limitation of Action See 21 Jac. 16. Where a Trespass is laid with a continuando for more than six years and the Statute pleaded and entire Damages it must be intended only for that which falls within the six years and that the Jury rejected the beginning of the Trespass 111 2. This Statute relates to a distinct and not to a continued Account 112 3. It provides a Remedy when the Plaintiff is beyond Sea at the time when his Right accrews and saves it till he returns whether it may be extended in a Case where the Defendant is beyond Sea longer than six years from the time the Plaintiff was entituled to the Action 311 312 Local Actions Whether Covenant will lie by an Assignee of a Reversion against an Assignee of a Lessee in any other place than where the Land lieth 337 2. Debitum contractus sunt nullius loci ibid. 3. Debt for Rent upon a Lease for years brought upon the Contract and Covenant between the same Parties are transitory ibid. 4. If Privity of Contract is gone by making an Assignment and only a privity in Law remains the Action must be brought in the County where the Land lieth ibid. M. Mayor See Corporation Marriage See Condition 3. Evidence 7. Limitation Notice A Maid above 12 and under 16 taken from Parents or Guardian and Married forfeits her Estate to the next in
An Administrator pleaded a Judgment in Bar to an Action of Debt for 100 l. brought against him and that he had not Assets praeterquam bona non attingen to 5 l. but did not shew the certain value of the Goods and yet held good ibid. 3. A Judgment upon a simple Contract may be pleaded in Barr to an Action of Debt upon a Bond 115 4. A Possession where 't is only an Inducement to a Plea and not Substance the Defendant may justifie upon such a possession against a Wrong-doer 132 5. Where a special Justification is to an Action of Assault and false Imprisonment the cause of Commitment must be set forth in the Plea 160 6. Where the defence consists in matter of Law the Defendant may plead specially but when 't is Fact he must plead the geneal Issue 166 7. Where special matter which might be given in Evidence at the Trial and which amounts to no more than the general Issue may be pleaded ibid. 8. When a Man is brought into Court by Capias he ought to plead instanter because he hath given delay to the Court 215 9. So where he appears upon Recognizance or in propria persona or is in Custody for any Misdemeanour he ought to plead instanter ibid. 10. In Covenant to pay so much Mony to the Plaintiff or his Assigns as should be drawn upon the Defendant by Bill of Exchange he pleaded that the Plaintiff secundum legem mercatoriam did assign the Mony to be paid c. it ought to have been secundum consuetudinem mercatoriam 226 227 11. If an Action is brought against an Inn-keeper or Common Carrier the Declaration must be secundum legem consuetudinem Angliae 227 12. In Trespass the Plaintiff prescribed as to the Freehold and alledged a Custom in the Copyholders to have solam separalem pasturam c. whether he could make a joynt Title in the same Declaration by virtue of a prescription and Custom 250 13. If the Plea is double the Plaintiff ought to demurr 251 14. The Condition of a Bond was to acquit discharge and save harmless Non damnificatus generally is not a good Plea without shewing how acquitted and discharged 252 15. Mutuatus for 400 l. the Defendant pleaded an Attainder of Treason in Abatement the Plaintiff replied that after the Attainder and before the Action he was pardoned c. and concludes unde petit Judicium dampna sua for this cause Replication was held ill 281 Pledges See Replevin Replevin in an inferior Court by Pleint removed in B. R. the Plaintiff was nonsuited and a Sci. Fac. brought against his Pledges and held good 58 2. There are no Pledges of Returno Habend ' at the Common Law the Sheriff was not obliged to take Pledges in a Replevin by Plaint 75 Poor A Man had 5 l. to remove out of one Parish into another who gave Bond to repay it if he returned within forty days he stayed there so long and it was held a good Settlement 67 2. A Note in writing must now be left pursuant to the Statute to make a Settlement 247 Possession 'T is sufficient to maintain an Action against a Wrong-doer 48 Prerogative Whether a Lease was made pursuant to a Power in a Proviso to make Leases for three Lives or 21 years or for any Term upon three Lives the Lease made was for 99 years determinable upon three Lives 268 269 Power In granting of Letters Patents of the sole printing exclusive of all others 76 129 2. Where no individual person can claim a Right or Property it must be vested in the King by Law 76 3. Whether the King hath a Prerogative to restrain Trade to a particular number of Men in particular places 127 4. He may command his Subjects to return out of a Foreign Nation ibid. 5. He may regulate Trade by Letters Patents Prescription See Common 2. Pleading 12. For a way he may set forth his Estate without shewing how he came by it 52 2. Where it cannot be by a Que Estate to have Retorna Brevium 200 3. Where it may be to hold Pleas Leets and Hundreds without matter of Record 201 4. For all the Tenants of a Mannor to fowl in a Free Warren this Prescription is not too large it might not be good upon a Demurrer but 't is otherwise after a Verdict 246 5. For a Profit apprender in alieno solo the Tenants of a Mannor may prescribe by a Que estate exclusive of the Lord ibid. 6. There must be a certain and permanent Interest abiding in some person to maintain a Prescription and therefore it will not lie ratione commorantiae 290 7. To have Common sans numbre is good but ad libitum suum which is almost the same thing is void ibid. 8. It may be joyned with a Custom in the same Declaration 251 9. Where 't is laid in a discharge as to be exempted from Toll or for an easment as for a Way to a Church not only a particular person but the Inhabitants of a whole Vill may prescribe but where it relates to the Profit or Interest in the Land it self 't is not so 292 Presentment In a Court Leet which concerns the person and not the Freehold whether traversable 137 138 Privity of Contract See Local Action 4. Action against an Administratrix of a Term for Rent incurred after the Assignment of the Lease the Privity of Contract of the Intestate was not determined by his death but Administratrix shall be charged with his Contracts as long as she hath Assets 326 'T is not gone either by an Assignment of the Term or death of the Lessor neither is it transferred to the Assignee by the Statute of H. 8. for that Statute only annexeth such Covenants which concern the Land with the Reversion 337 338 Proof See Prohibition Prohibition Not to be granted because a Temporal Loss may ensue 67 2. Where some words are actionable at Law and some punishable in the Spiritual Court a Prohibition shall be granted for otherwise it would be a double vexation 74 3. Libel causa jactationis maritagii the Suggestion for a Prohibition was that he was indicted at the Old Bayly for marrying two Wives that he was convicted in a Court of that Offence which had a proper Jurisdiction c. and a Prohibition was granted 164 4. A person lived in one Diocess and occupied Lands in another where he was taxed towards the finding of Bells for that Church for which a Suit was commenced in the Bishop's Court where the Lands were and he suggested the Statute of H. 8. that no Man shall be cited out of his Diocess except for some Spiritual Cause neglected to be done there and a Prohibition was granted for this was not a Spiritual Cause neglected to be done because Church Ornaments are a personal Charge upon the Inhabitants and not upon the Land Owners who dwell else where but the repairing of the Church is a real Charge upon
the Land 211 5. Not granted for Mariners Wages 244 6. Libel for a Tax upon the Parishioners for not repairing of their Church who suggest that they had a Chappel of Ease in the same Parish the Prohibition was denied for of common right they ought to repair the Mother Church 264 7. Proof of Matter of Fact by one Witness denied to be allowed in the Spiritual Court is a good cause for a Prohibition 284 8. Where the Release of a Legacy offered to be proved by one Witness was denied in the Spiritual Court ibid. 9. Proof of Payment or Subtraction of Tythes denied and a Prohibition granted ibid. 10. Whether a Prohibition ought to be allowed after Sentence an Appeal being then the more proper remedy 284 Property See Interest Q. Quorum MUst be one Justice of the Peace of the Quorum otherwise cannot be a Sessions 14 152 Quantum meruit Will lie for Rent reserved upon a real Contract where the Sum is not certain but if a Sum in gross is reserved then Debt must be brought 73 R. Record ERror shall not be assigned against the Essence of a Record 141 Recovery Common Reversed without a Scire Facias to the Tertenants but it seems not to be good 119 2. For there must be a Scire Facias against the Heir and Tertenants when a Writ of Error is brought to reverse it 274 Relation Where an Estate shall pass by Relation where not 299 300 Release Of a Legacy by one Executor and also of all Actions Suits and Demands whatsoever those general words which follow are tied up to the Legacy and release nothing else 277 2. Of a Demand will not discharge a growing Rent 278 3. A Receipt was given for 10 l. in which there was a Release of all Actions Debts Duties and Demands nothing is released but the 10 l. 277 4. Judgment against four Defendants who all joyned in a Writ of Error and the Plaintiff pleaded a Release of Errors by one it shall not discharge the rest of a personal thing but if there had been four Plaintiffs to recover the Release or death of one is a Barr to all 109 135 249 5. A Release of all Actions will discharge an Award of Execution upon a Scieri Facias 185 187 6. Of all Actions and Demands doth not discharge a Legacy it must be by particular words 279 7. One of the Defendants who made Conusance released the Plaintiff after the taking of the Cattle this was held void upon a Demurrer for he had no Demand or Suit against the Plaintiff having distrained in the right of another ibid. Remainder See Entry 3. Fines levied 4. Must take place eo instanti the particular Estate is determined or else it can never arise 309 2. By the Conveyance of the Reversion in Fee to him who had the Estate for Life before the Birth of a Son the particular Estate is merged and all contingent Remainders are thereby destroyed 311 Replevin Where 't is brought by Writ the Sheriff cannot make deliverance without the taking of Pledges de prosequendo retorn ' Habend ' 35 Replication Where the Plaintiff confesseth and avoideth he ought not to traverse for that would make his Replication double 318 Request When a thing is to be done upon Request the time when the person requires it to be done is the time of the performance 295 Reservation Of a Rent upon a Lease for three years payable at Michaelmas and Lady-Day Debt was brought for 2 years without shewing at which of the Feasts it was due 't is good after Verdict but ill upon a Demurrer 70 Resignation See Abeiance To the Ordinary and Patron presented 'ts void if the Ordinary did not accept the Resignation 297 Reversion See Bargain and Sale Surrender 2. Tenant in Tail who had likewise the Reversion in Fee if he acknowledge a Judgment the Reversion may be extended 256 2. But a Reversion in Fee expectant upon an Estate Tail is not Assets until it comes into possession 257 3. By what words a Reversion in Fee passeth in a Will 228 Revocation A Will shall not be revoked by doubtful words 206 2. It might be revoked by Word without Writing before the Statute of Frauds 207 3. Before that Statute a Will might be revoked by a subsequent Will which was void in it self yet good to revoke the former 207 218 4. A subsequent Will which doth not appear shall not be any Revocation of a written Will which doth appear 204 205 206 5. Whether a subsequent Will which is void in it self may revoke another since the Statute of Frauds 218 6. Such a Will must be good in all circumstances to revoke a former 260 261 Riot See Information Robbery The Hundred was sued and it did not appear that the Parish where the Fact was laid to be done was in the Hundred or that it was done upon the High way or in the day time this was helped after Verdict 258 2. A Servant delivered Mony to a Quaker to carry home for his Master they were both robbed viz. the Servant of 26 s. and the Quaker of 106 l. the Servant made Oath of the Robbery and the Quaker refused the Master brought the Action it doth not lie for him 287 288 S. Scire Facias See Bail 3 4. Baron and Feme 1 4 5. Iudgment 2. Pledges 1. Recovery MUst be to the Tertenants before the Common Recovery shall be reversed by Writ of Error 119 2. Scieri Facias quare Executionem non habet recites the first Judgment but prays no new thing only to have Execution upon that Judgment 187 3. 'T is not an original but a judicial Writ and depends upon the first Judgment 187 4. 'T is suspended by Writ of Error and if the original Judgment is reversed that is so also ibid. 5. Debt will lie upon a Judgment had on a Scire Facias 188 189 6. A Judgment upon a Scire Facias is a distinct Action from the original cause 189 7. Judgment in Dower and a Writ of Enquiry of Damages the Woman marries and dies before the Writ of Enquiry executed the Husband administred and brought a Scire Facias upon the Judgment whether it lieth or not 281 Serjeants at Law See Iudges Surplusage See Inquisition Steward See Court Supersedeas See Parliament Surrender See Assent 1 2. Where it may be pleaded without an acceptance 297 2. No man can take it but he who hath the immediate Reversion 299 3. If pleaded without an Acceptance 't is aided after Verdict which shews 'tis no Substance 301 4. By one Non compos mentis 't is void ab initio 303 T. Tail DEvise to D. for Life the Remainder to her first Son and the Heirs of the Body of such first Son endorsed thus viz. Memorandum that D. shall not alien from the Heirs Males of her Body she had a Son who had Issue a Daughter 't is not an Estate Tail Male for the Memorandum shall not alter the Limitation in the Will