may be known by Natural and Metaphysical Reason which by Analogy to things created though there be nothing in God but is of his Essence for quicquid in deo est deus est yet in a peculiar manner we shall here handle as Faculties and Operations and not as those which are of his Essence That in God there is Knowledge is so plain and evident by Natural light that none of the Philosophers who acknowledge a God hath ever denied it Aristotle in his Metaphysicks and Ethicks affirms it proving it further from the Immateriality of God the more Immaterial any thing is the more Intellectual as we have formerly said now God is summè immaterialis therefore is he summè cognoscitivus Again from the Effects and Works of God in this World the order and beauty that is in them manifesteth they were produced both by an Intellectual and free Agent Vnus hic mundus satis superque de monstrat deum esse summè bonum quiá sponte id fecit quod non tenebatur facere summè potenteÌ„ quia potuit ex nihilo facene quod voluit summè sapientem quia tam admirabiliter sapienter omnia fecit which opinion was generally received of all Philosophers after Anaxagoras and Hermotinus Clazomenius who were the first that taught it as Plato and Socrates yea and Aristotle in 1 Metaphys cap. 3. affirm This Knowledge in God according to himself must needs be Infinite for so in the precedent Chapter hath been proved the Knowledge the Object known are Adaequate and Proportionate the one to the other the Object is Infinite such therefore must the Knowledge be and this is called Gods Knowledge Essential Besides there is a Knowledge of God External and this is also Infinite intensivè extensivè as the Schoolmen term it by which is set forth unto us that Infinite perfection which this Knowledge hath even in all the conditions and properties incident to perfect Knowledge for first it is most clear and evident secondly most certain thirdly most infallible with a most perfect and simple aspect beholding every truth as it is in it self and judging of every truth though in themselves not equal according to the measure of Verity that is in every of them some being Increate truths some Create some Mediate others Immediate some Necessary some Contingent truths yet all these Varieties fall within this Infinite Knowledge which seeth every Verity according to the state in which it hath Determination and Certitude and judgeth thereof according to the measure and degree of truth that is in every of them And this resolves the doubt which some have made how a Future Contingent which may or may not be can be foreknown since till it come to pass it is not determined to a being or no being till which there can be no determinate truth in either proposition which was Aristotles argument from whence is concluded that even God himself could not foreknow either part to wit the Affirmative or Negative of such Future Effects as determinately true for what is not true is not knowable for truth is the Object of Knowledge and therefore what is not determinately true cannot be known as determinately true so God hath no certain and infallible Knowledge of such Contingencies future For this doth not hinder but that such Contingencies may be certainly known even before they have any being at least with that Knowledge which according to its all Infinite and Eternal verity comprehends all times and every Object knowable and beholds them as they are in themselves in the self same manner and according to the measure of truth they have in them Neither doth this certain and Infallible Knowledge of Future Contingencies destroy the Nature of a Contingent for God doth infallibly know Contingent Effects under the notion of Contingencie as well as necessary Effects under the notion of necessity without the destruction of either without any change or Alteration of the Object otherwise that Knowledge is grossly deceived that knoweth any thing to be Contingent when by the very Knowledge such Contingent Effects cease to be Contingent and forthwith become Necessary Besides Knowledge is not a Cause but rather a Consequent of a future Event for scientia nil ponit in re it adds no necessity to the being of the thing known though it may add certitude to it self for that 's the perfection of Knowledge the ground of Science is not necessity but certainty And for the Will which is in God by the like argument it may be proved for God is an Intellectual Agent so hath been said and there is no Intellectual Agent but worketh for some end and is also determinate to that work by some Appetite will and desire hereupon the antient Philosophers laid it down for a rule mentem amorem esse causam mundi efficientem according to those Verses quoted by Aristotle 1 Metaphys cap. 4. out of Hesiod and Parmenides to prove this Assertion Aristotle besides every where affirming that God worketh intelligendo volendo God as he is an Intellectual so is he a a free Agent all his Operations ad extra are freely and willingly done not driven on by any necessity of Nature True it is the love wherewith he loves himself is necessary arising from the dignity of the Object and necessity of it God as he is summum so is he necessarium bonum which being the Object of his Will cannot but be willed necessarily ex necessitate naturae himself being the Object of his Will necessitates his Will to love him voluntas divina etiam naturaliter ac necessario vult suum principale objectum saith Suarez But there is not the like necessity in any created Object to compel Gods good-will unto it but so to love it as he may also not love it Though it was the opinion of certain Philosophers of the Sect of the Stoicks who held That all things here below were Ruled and Governed by a certain Fate and though they denied not that the Order of these Secundary Causes proceeded from the good-will of God Yet they Attributed thereunto a necessity altogether Inevitable even in respect of God because they supposed that God did order and work all things ex necessitate naturae * Deum liberè nec ex necessitate naturae agere liberimè hunc mundum produxisse rationi humanae contrarium non est cum enim deus sit ens perfectissimum à nullo dependens nullius indigens sibi ipsi sufficiens 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quam vocem pulchrè excogitavit Scal. ex 365. sect 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nullam creaturam dei voluntas necessario appetet nullamque neâ—â—ario producer nec ulla re cogetur ejus potestas sed ipse liberimè vult poâ—uisâ—etque sivolâ—â—sset mundum hunc vel longè ante producere vel post vel planè non Sennertus But clear it is by Natural Reason that as God works knowingly so he Acts
willingly and freely for is freedom of Will an Essential and necessary Concomitant of all created Intellectual creatures whether Angelical or Humane and shall we deny it in God This freedom of Will in God may be proved from the effects of Divine Power Ask we therefore why God made no more Worlds than one or the Angels wherefore he Created in such a number and not in a greater or lesser multitude and the like the resolve must be either that he could not or he would not to say he could not must exceedingly Derogate from Gods Power which we have heretofore sufficiently manifested to be Infinite to say he would not is to grant him freedom of Will and that whatever he doth he doth not necessarily but freely Nor is not God therefore free because he is Immutable as some would thence conclude so for Immutability and freedom of Will in God will very well stand together and it is no more than to say God is Immutably free for that necessity which comes from Gods Immutability thwarts not Gods VVill but necessarily inferrs this perfection of Will which we call freedom to be as unchangable as his other Attributes of VVisdom Goodness Power and Eternity are nam ineo quod deus semel liberè decrevit immutabilis permanet saith Suarez so to speak in reference to this present time and according to our capacities God necessarily willeth now what formerly he did VVill but this is necessitas ex supposi ione or immutabilitatis though to speak properly there is neither time past nor time future with God to say he hath willed or shall VVill But God doth Will and Will freely from Eternity and to Eternity abideth in the same freedom Immutably This Metaphysical Science of Gods free Will in all things agreeth with the Faith which Holy Church professeth the Scriptures every where are plain and full not Metaphorical but Literal and proper and so are understood by the Fathers He doth what ever pleaseth him and again Who worketh all things according to the Counsel of his own Will whereby it is evident that the Power and Will of God are two distinct things he doth not what ever he can do but he doth whatever he pleaseth so that the Effects of God are the Effects of his Will God willeth what he doth and doth what he willeth to do which is an Act Extrinsecal is an Effect of his Will and love which is Intrinsecal Though there are and have been some Stoicks in the Church of Christ as well as in the School of Nature who have maintained that all things fall out by such an Intrinsecal necessity that even God himself could not have made things otherwise than they are made nor Govern otherwise than he doth Govern And however few have been so bold as to call thus in question the Infinite Power of the Supreme Cause yet have many laid an Inevitable necessity upon all Secundary Causes and Effects even the Liberal Actions of men and Angels saying all things are Necessary in respect of Gods decree nothing can fall out Contingently It is impossible for ought that is not to have been for ought that hath been not to have been for ought that is not to be for ought that shall be hereafter that shall not be But there are Contingencies in Nature some things that might have fallen out otherwaies than they do or shall as well as there are some things which could not fall out otherwaies than they have done we speak not onely of those Extrinsecal Contingencies which proceed from Natural Causes for those come not from the Power but rather from a defect and weakness of the Power of their Immediate Cause which toughit work necessarily is notwithstanding unable to resist the Counter-workings of all other Causes conducing to that effect and so produceth an Effect praeter intentionem suam which therefore is called Contingâ—nt but also of those Intrinsecal Effects which flow from a Cause that of it own Intrinsecal Power and Vertue is able to give Contingencie to them as being not determinate to one Effect but is inspired with Variety of choise and this is the Praerogative of all Rational and Intellectual Agents yet none of these that fall out praeter intentionem dei besides the mind and Will of God he willeth Contingencies as well as Necessities Nor do they fall out extra scientiam dei Gods infinite Knowledge comprehends them all those which are in their own Nature absolutely Contingent are not Casual in respect of his Providence and Eternal Wisdom in that he comprehends the number of all means possible and can mix the several possibilities of their miscarriage in what degree or proportion he list he may and oftentimes doth Inevitablely forecast the full accomplishment of his proposed ends by multiplicitie of means in them themselves not Inevitable but Contingent thus Doctor Jackson And though some Theologists as well as Naturalists have or do question how there can be a certain Knowledge of a Future Contingent I answer 1. All Contingencies are Finite but Gods Knowledge is Infinite therefore must they needs be swallowed up and comprehended in that Infinite Infinite not to be Incomprehensive of them 2. Infinite and Eternal Knowledge hath Coexistence with all times therefore the Futurition is no impediment with God is no distinction of times flux of time belongs to the Creature he knoweth all things in aeternitate sua as we do in praesenti tempore our instant is Gods Eternity all things are present before him and Eternally present So Contingents future in respect of us not of God do fall within this Infinite Eternal and Infallible Knowledge and not onely Contingents future but Contingents possible though never future as in the case of Keilites Sam. 23.11 12. God did as certainly know that the Keilites would have delivered David to Saul if he had stayed in their City as that David should thence depart and be safe Therefore the prescience of God is most certain and infallible of Future Events of what kind soever but this proceeds not from a necessity of the Event but from the Infinity of his Science 3. Gods Knowledge is as large and extends as far as his Power otherwise it should not be Infinite but Gods Power extends to Contingent Effects to all that may be as to all that must be to all that never shall be as to all that necessarily will be to all possible Effects though they never come to pass as to those that are already accomplisht for Gods Power which is Infinite cannot be determined to produce all it can of it self but in that it produceth these Effects rather than other makes some entia realia others only entia possibilia is meerly by the determination of his Will and Knowledge therefore entia possibilia such are all Future Contingents fall within the prescience of God and are certainly known of him He calleth things that are not as though they were saith the text the Psalmist thou
thoughts or envious malitious thoughts or they be thoughts of gluttony and excess or thoughts of lust and carnal concupiscence or the like Let the mind and Memory be replenished with such pious Meditations and holy Contemplations the thoughts of the World will find no admittance Intus existens prohibet alienum where the strong man armed keeps the house the enemy dares not enter and whilst the soul is armed with the commemoration of Gods blessing it will not open the door to the temptations of Satan or lust of the Flesh but say with Joseph Behold my Master hath committed all into my hands and there is none greater in this house than I neither hath he kept any thing from me but thee Gen. 39.8 9. how then shall I doe this great wickedness and sin against God Praise then the Lord O my Soul and forget not all his benefits which forgiveth all thy sin and healeth all thine infirmities call to mind the loving kindness of the Lord and have them in everlasting remembrance exercise thy Memory with such heavenly meditations as may build thee up unto eternal life for this will be thy companion for ever whether in weal or in wo it dieth not with the body but is immortal as thou thy self the rest of the faculties may sleep for a while with the body but this survives to perpetuity This is that Intellectual Memory or Recordation which none but reasonable creatures enjoy which is not diminished by the bodies death but infinitely inlarged when all the thoughts words and deeds done in the flesh shall immediately in a wonderfull manner come into remembrance the secrets of all hearts shall then be disclosed and all such thoughts words and actions which in life time were slipt out of mind shall come again into fresh remembrance with a Conscience Chap. 8. Book 1. a Book which that day shall be opened a Book of Mans life upon Earth an account of Mans workes where they that have done well shall go into life everlasting but they that have done evill into everlasting fire Which Recordation or Intellectual memory if the Saints in Heaven whose bodies yet sleep in the grave had not how should they sing misericordias domini in aeternum the loving kindness of the Lord for ever as the Prophet David hath it which Psalm and Song saith St. Augustine made for the glory of the mercies of Christ by whose blood wee are redeemed the Saints do joyfully sing in Heaven Of which Memorative facul y more shall be said hereafter CHAP. VIII Of the Appetitive faculty and the Motive to a place WEE have done with those Sensitive faculties External and Internal which have power of Judgement Knowledge and Discerning we come now to those which have not this power in themselves but are guided by the Counsell and advice of others being moved by the Object good or evill according as Phantasie or Reason presents it the Phantasie imagineth it good the Appetite is streight moved to desire it This faculty is twofold viz. Appetitive and Motive to a place The Locall Motive Faculty is a power of the Soul moving the living creature from place to place to follow that which the Appetite coveteth as good or to shunne what it lottheth as hurtful so that this Motive faculty is but an effect of the Appetitive and necessarily follows it as the Effect doth the Cause for where the Appetitive facultie is to desire good or shun evill there must needs be this Motive also from place to place otherwise the Appetitive should be given us in vain had we not this Motive faculty to seek after that wee desire as good and pleasant and to avoid what wee conceive to be hurtful unto us Aristotle I grant adds another cause of this Motion besides Appetite to wit Intellect and under Intellect he comprehends Sense to wit Phantasie for what ever is desired or shunned is under the notion of good or evill so desired or lothed now this knowledge must either be from Reason or Phantasie for there is no knowledge but is either Sensitive or Intellectual therefore must Intellect which includes Phantasie be another cause of Motion Vide Suarez de metaphys disp 35. Sect. 5. part 15. fol. 172. neither do I intend to exclude Phantasie and Reason from being a cause for when I mention Appetite onely as the cause I do it partly because Appetite is the chief Phantasie and Intellect are but subordinate causes and partly because I take Appetite here in the largest sense as comprehending Phantasie and Reason for Appetite in general is both Sensitive and Intellectual as shall be said hereafter so this Motive faculty being but an effect of Appetite we shall be the briefer in it and insist more largely upon the cause the knowledge wherof will necessarily conduce to the knowledge of the effect Appetite is a natural desire of the Soule by which the living creature for the cause of preservation is moved either to desire that which Sense judgeth as good or to loth that which it apprehendeth evill and hurtfull so that Appetite is a necessary concomitant of Sense and follows her close for where there is Sense there is sorrow and pleasure and where these are there must be Appetite There is a twofold Operation of Sense one whereby it perceives its Object as the eye beholds colour which is the first and simple Operation of Sense the other whereby upon the preception and apprehension of the Object the Sense is affected with sorrow or pleasure this is the second and in a sort a mixt Operation in as much as with the Object is joyned sorrow or pleasure and to these are joyned Appetite and flight for things pleasant we desire after and things grievous we flie from but this last Operation belongs to Common Sense not to any of the External to perceive good under the notion of good or evill under the notion of evill and accordingly to be affected therewith is the Operation of the Internal not External Senses therefore it is this Common Sense to which the Appetite is so nearly related that Aristotle saith they differ not re nor yet in subjecto but onely ratione not re for they have no distinct being but one and the same essence nor yet subjecto they have one and the same subject for the seat of Appetite is where the Internal Sense is seated to wit in the brain this is to be understood of that Appetite which is called Sensitive and is common to man and brutes But there are three kinds of Appetite according to Arist Appetite is divided into Lust Anger and Will Lust is in that faculty which is called Concupiscible Anger in that which is called Irascible and Will in that is called Intellectual Lust and Anger follow the judgement of Sense for what Sense judgeth pleasant and good Lust desireth and what Sense judgeth grievous the Irascible faculty rejecteth and these are in brutes as well as in man but Will followeth