the subiect to truth contingency is an adiunct to the truth and the iudgement of the truth of a contingent axiome is but opinio so that opinio is the iudgement of that axiome that is contingent that I sit here is but opinio for I may not sit here so that if one tell it to another he may be deceiued of it So that if a man teach contingent true axiomes in any Art hee shall be deceiued such are many of Aristotles rules and of the Aristotelians as when they say genus is praedicabile why it may be subijcibile too Quae praeteritorum praesentium homini certa esse potest futurorum per naturam non admodum potest See here that the opinio and iudgement of this axiome praeteritorum praesentium may be certa here wee learne what our opinio may be of things past present and to come so that opinio is here distributed into certa and incerta certa is duplex praesentium and praeteritorum Incerta onely futurorum Quamuis Deo tempora omnia praesentia sunt It is altogether certa to him so that in a word wee may see all Aristotles dispute that all truth is certa but not to all and here we see that notwithstanding the certainty of a thing yet it may bee contingent and not necessary so Gods decree of mans fall was certa but not necessarie either by the necessity in an axiome or by coaction in inuention Quamuis Deo tempora omnia praesentia sunt here this would be put in cui ipse reuelauit for the opinio of truth belongs hither and not to Diuinity Itaque Martialis Priscum meritò cauillatur Saepe rogare soles qualis sim Prisce futurus Si fiam locuples simque repente potens Quenquam posse putas mores narrare futuros Dic mihi si fias tu Leo qualis eris Priscus would often aske of Martiall what hee would doe if hee were made rich and mighty suddenly And Martiall would aske him what a one he would bee if hee were a Lyon he cannot tell Necessarium quando semper verum est nec falsum esse potest illud affirmatum appellatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de omni We haue done with verum contingens verum as it should happen now we come to necessarium necessarium in Logicke hath many significations we heard of it before in Inuention where it signified violence force coaction but here it is more proper and it is not opposed to nature as that before but is that which concurres with nature and commonly is true by nature Necessarium quando semper verum est nec falsum potest esse Here we obserue first that the axioma necessarium is verum secondly it is semper verum thirdly it is without all possibility of being falsum now contingens and necessarium arise firstly from the arguments which whē they are but modo quodam necessarium are so ioyned together as they may be seuered they make but a contingent axiome but when they are absolutely agreeing and so as they cannot be seuered in nature then they make a necessarie axiome Quando semper est erit aut fuit For by est we are to consider not so much the adsignification but the connexion of the arguments againe here is a perpetuity of truth required so that it must bee without all possibility of falshood a contingent axiome though it neuer be false yet it may be but a necessary cannot be so that by potentia we are to vnderstand the habit not the act Now this potentia is in the arguments as it cannot be that homo should not be animal it is not in potentia naturae that this should be false so that a necessarie axiome requiring a potentia and that potentia is in the things we must be carefull to discerne it It is a common opinion that whatsoeuer God decreed is necessary Ans Though it be true that Gods decree shall most surely come to passe yet doth it not put a necessity for then this necessity must lye in the things not in the author of the things so when we say his decree must come to passe we meane it must be of necessity that is by coaction and this also is false for the Lord doth all things by counsell so that here wee are to looke at the potentia in the arguments and not to any externall potentia The not discerning of this necessity ex hypothesi as they call it and certainty makes them take many things for necessary which are not So that to imagine such a thing is to say that God doth not things consilio againe to say so is to make the Stoicks fatum for their fatum was this because Iupiter said so so that if they say it cannot be otherwise it is the Stoicks fatum directly Et illud affirmatum appellatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de omni Aristotle doth in his demonstrations labour much to shew that the rules of Art must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 first saith hee they must be concluded from the prima and proxima causa so that he did dreame of a demonstration in a syllogisme as when wee conclude a propertie of a subiect by the definition his meaning was that the rules of Art should be most true and arising from their immediate causes but there is no syllogisticall Art for demonstrations but as wee may dispose many arguments cause and effect subiect and adiunct c. in a simple axiome hauing one and the same doctrine so we may dispose a syllogisme either of contingent axiomes or of necessary axiomes in Barbara as he would haue and yet the doctrine of an explicate is the same ergo the doctrine of demonstration is vaine Againe he saith wee conclude from the cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whereas indeed all our concluding is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obiection But it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in respect of the third argument Answer True so also I will conclude 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from any other arguments as well as the cause so that all the doctrine of Aristotles demonstrations is here in a necessarie axiome and in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now an axiome is necessarie here not that there is any necessity in respect of the rule of Logicke but in respect of the matter of it Obiection A contingent axiome may deceiue ergo his doctrine should not be in Art as also an inartificiall argument is not in Art Answer The doctrine of them is belonging to Art as well as any other rules for they are eternall so that an axiome is contingent or necessary in respect of the matter of it ergo wee shall not need to speake of them in a syllogisme ergo to distribute a syllogisme according to the matter or forme of it as Kickerman doth is very absurd Syllogismus dialecticus is nothing but a syllogisme of contingent axiomes syllogismus apodicticus is
he is more to be commended then if he had done it cum aliis aut contra Againe if a thing be done well natura is better then if it had beene done necessitate and more commendable when a thing is done by counsell then fortuna now because these modi doe vrge and presse the effect more or lesse ergo there is reason in them and therefore they belong to Logicke modi that is adiuncts not making these effects species but onely distinguished by accidents that fallacian non causa pro causa is generall to causa and it is also particular to efficiens making that causa efficiens which is not as the Heretickes in Diuinity were deceiued which said that the Angels did make the world Primo quod procreat aut tueatur These are first because they are more generall then the rest and also they are more in vse for we shall haue this first modus in vse twenty times for one to the other modi so we respect God as causa procreans and tueans before we respect him alone then againe this procreant cause brings the thing first to his esse and the preseruing cause is the keeper of the thing in his esse Now in reason hee that is the procreating cause should also be the preseruing cause as God is not onely causa procreans of the world but also causa conseruans and so should parents as they procreant children so should they in like sort preserue them The procreant cause is first because things must needs haue a being before they can be preserued now they are distinguished because when a thing is procreated it is not preserued aut contra and the modi are ioyned with the cause not with the effect because they are first in the efficient as essentiall for actio is before passio so that here marke that next after we see the efficient we are to looke at these modi As we are saued by faith alone here is efficiens sola Our Author brings in an example of Ouids the 4 remedii and Kickerman hath a fling at Ramus for his examples and would haue him bring his examples out of Diuinity But first Logicke being a generall Art it is therefore best to fetch his examples out of the most common and generall Writers as out of Poets and Historians which the Gentiles and Turkes may receiue these being more generally knowne to the world then are the Scriptures and againe Diuinity is the most speciall Art of all And so Ramus findeth fault but iustly with Aristotle for fetching his examples out of Geometry which is too obscure for it is a fallace to fetch examples to proue any thing if the examples be not as well or better knowne to them to whom we demonstrate any thing as to our selues As they say in Geometry A is not B c. for so they say in Geometry angulus A and angulus B c. Now Logicke is a generall Art ergo it is best to fetch examples out of Poetry c. which belongs to Rhetoricke a generall art the example is this first proper otia are proper and conseruing causes of loue then tropicall causa est procreans cibus the cherisher Otia si tollas c. Thus he reasons otia are the causes of loue for take them away and loue is gone hence it appeares they were of the essence of loue so that because causa is of the essence of the effect ergo idlenesse and you must put loue aut contra for the essence will be wanting and we haue a rule sublata causa tollitur effectum and it is generall to all causes for they are all necessary to the esseficating of the effect all the rules of causa in common Logicians you shall haue here as posita causa ponitur effectum yet not one cause but all the causes must concurre many other rules they haue all which are inwrapt in the definition of causa now it holds contingently in euery cause for if we put one cause we put all the causes and so it holds in the speciall causes that posita causa ponitur effectum contra as take away otium from Egistus and you take away loue so that sublata causa à tertio tollitur effectum so in iudgement it is also true as giue otium to Egistus and you may giue him loue which argues from the efficient Sic pater mater procreant nutrix tuetur Before he shewed vs an example out of an Author hee wills vs to looke for the vse of them out of Authors The matter of the first belongs to Ethicks the matter of the second to History Logicke is a generall Art ergo his examples are best out of Poetry and Oratory wherein the vse of all arts is Now the aliquid before is loue which we should haue heard of against which Ouid makes a medicine In this example Dido is the aliquid for here the aliquid is the causa Dardanus had two sonnes Assaracus and Anchises and of him came Aeneas now here shee takes away the true causes and sayes Caucasus begot thee so there Caucasus in duris cantibus is causa procreans and Hyrcaenetigres are preseruing causes but this is false for here is non causa pro causa Obiection But doth he well to bring fallaces Answer Yes out of Poets for here non ens or ens fictum hath the nature of ens in it neither are all fables lyes but by continued allegories they teach vs notable truths now she challengeth Aeneas with this for his manners because he forsooke her Sic Romulus conditor Romanae vrbis c. He makes examples of his owne and there is genesis teaching vs that though genesis be before analysis yet genesis imitatiua is nothing but the imitating of a former analysis Againe our Author makes choice of such examples as may be paradigmaes and whereunto any other example may be brought as in the first he makes an accident to be the cause of an accident in the second he makes a substantiall effect to be from substantiall causes naturally but fainedly in the last he brings substantiall causes working substantiall effects ordinarily in artificiall things and here we may see who first shot the arrow before wee can see where it lights or through what it flew or whence CAPVT 4. Secundo causa efficiens sola efficit aut cum aliis WEE are still in the efficient the first thing that we can see in the artificio of any thing is the efficient and the modi of it the most generall modi was procreans and conseruans before now we come to the second modi sola aut cum aliis which are more generall then per se and per accidens in vse but not so generall as the first Secundo sola c. this is next ergo next after the first sola that is where this modus efficiendi is considered and the force and vertue of this argument from the efficient cause stands in this
receiued in an axiome we call it scientia It is our sapiētia as we can discourse with it syllogistically as we apply it rightly in time and place so it is prudentia And it is Ars as we can execute it and practise it in Analysi or Genesi as Ars is rightly an intellectual vertue as we teach it to another it is doctrina and his learning is disciplina lastly as we set it downe in writing or printing it is liber And euery rule of Art is true as when I say Rosa est flos Socrates est homo though there be neuer a Rose or Socrates in the world because the rule is eternall for it is in the eternall Idea of God though the thing be not Now some Meta-Phisitians not distinguishing aright hereof say the thing is eternall that is say they the thing was in Gods eternall Idea nay the Idea of God is eternall but not the thing I but Kickerman saith the thing is eternall quoad essentiam not quoad existentiam but that is false for existere belongs to effectum in Logick and euery effect must haue all the causes ergo matter and forme and these are not eternall Primè For there is no rule of Art but is a necessary Axiome in its owne place and so is firstly true Now deductions are true but at the first second third or fourth hand according as they are drawne from the first rule at the second third or fourth hand and are so far forth true as the first rule is true therefore when we dispute with any Aduersaries we bring our controuersie to a rule of Art and if they deny that wee say contra negantem principia non est disputandum though there is no rule of Art but may be demonstrated and is first because it deliuereth the first causes of the things verissimèque Euerie rule of Art as it is prima scientia so it is verissima but for deductions as they are secundae or tertiae scientiae according as they arise from the first rule so they are secundo or tertio true to wit so farre forth as the first is true concinnatis rei Here is the subiect of Ars and as praecepta were the matter and primè verissiméque scientificis were the qualities before I doe not say fabricae for that is but one thing whereas the rules of Arts are many Againe Art is the rule of the gouernment of the thing as well as of the frame of it therefore here is ens or res in generall I doe not say concinnatis to any one thing because as Ars in genere is to all the speciall Artes so is ens in genere to all the speciall entia Now if you aske me what res is I told you before in the definition of ens so that it was defined before but here I take it as a subiect of Art Concinnatis I had not a better word and therefore was faine to take this though it doth not fit my purpose as I would for the thing indeed is made to the rule and not the rule to the thing though we first see the thing and by the Act therof obserue the rule Concinnatis to fit together or to sing in parts so that euery thing must be placed in order and fitted each to other for nothing can bee wisely done if the precepts of Art be broken Ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For euery thing is made and gouerned to an end and Art is the rule of the making and gouerning of things to their end therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of euerie Art and is not to be taught in any particular Art Artis est praxis prattomenon We haue heard what encuclopaidia is qua Artes comprehenduntur pro subordinatione finium and what Ars is Now we come to the common affections belonging to Art and they are praxis and prattomenon That Art hath his praxis and prattomenon I thus proue it If the end of things bee an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 then as there is that actio or motus so there must be a res motu facta the prattomenon But the end of euery thing is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 therefore I proue it is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because laus rei est in actione and if there should be any thing made that had not an end it were in vaine Againe euery thing is Gods worke and he is pure Act therefore euery thing must agree to him and so agere And if there be a praxis and a prattomenon of the thing there must needs be a praxis and prattomenon of Art because the thing is fitted to the rule of Art and not Art to the thing Now the reason why some haue dreamed that euerie Art hath not his praxis and prattomenon is that false distinction of Arts into theoreticall and practicke they call them theoreticall which they doe onely contemplate practicke when wee can by art agere But there is no art but is both theoreticall and practicke for as we heard before that wee might both scire sapere and intelligere c. so we may contemplate and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ergo this distribution is fallacia accidentis for they doe not distinguish art as it is in the thing but from their owne knowledge of it Obiect But we cannot guide Astronomy neither can we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with naturall Philosophie but onely contemplate them Answ It is ars as it is in fabrica rei not as it is in homine but there is Praxis and prattomenon in euery thing as in the Sunne we may see his motion is praxis his course that he makes is Prattomenon againe man doth not contemplate onely but also worke by the rule of Astronomy and by nature as in the sowing of corne and planting of trees c. Now for practicke they say they are such as doe only practiue and leaue no worke behinde them or they are also poieticke and leaue a worke behinde them Of the first sort they make Ethickes Oeconomickes Politicks Musicke Optickes and others Why doth not the Ethician worke a good morall action or vertue by his rule of Ethickes and hath not the good husbandman in working by the rule of Oeconomicks his prattomenon as well as his praxis and so of the rest Is not the Common-wealth the prattomenon of a good Politician to be gouerned by him according to the rule of the Politickes so for Musicke is there not a song sung as well as the singing of it and when they set their song we see it plaine that there is an opus as well as a motus Now they had these from Aristotle but they are false and it is not commendable in the Creator that euery thing should haue his praxis and prattomenon Againe it doth not resemble the Creator who is purus actus vnlesse there be a motus in it and a res motu facta as the rule of Logicke teacheth in the doctrine of effectum