Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	contingent_a	effect_n	necessary_a	2,565	5	7.4523	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A09386	A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of the largenes of Gods grace. First written in Latine by that reuerend and faithfull seruant of God, Master William Perkins, late preacher of the word in Cambridge. And carefully translated into English by Francis Cacot, and Thomas Tuke.; De prædestinationis modo et ordine. English	Perkins, William, 1558-1602.; Cacot, Francis.; Tuke, Thomas, d. 1657.	1606 (1606)	STC 19683; ESTC S103581	116,285	285

infallibility Necessitie of compulsion is that which inferreth violence to things by some cause working without and forciblie constraineth that they doe either this or that And this indeed is the Stoicall necessitie that a man Tull. de Finibus should doe any thing against his will being compelled by force and necessitie There is also such a like kind of necessitie of the Manichees condemned by the fathers who taught that there was no violence or necessitie offred vnto the will by God nor that it was forced by necessitie to sinne The necessitie of infallibilitie is that whereby a thing according to the euent shall certainly and immutably come to passe yet so as if we consider the cause of a thing by it selfe it may either not come to passe or else come otherwise to passe Of this manner of necessitie wee must vnderstand that principle Euerie thing that is when it is is of necessity And thus is necessitie distinguished now will I shew how farre forth it is agreeable to seuerall things The euents of all things haue reference either to the second causes or to God who is the first cause Now some things in respect of the second causes are necessary othersome contingent From causes which are necessarie must needs proceede that which is necessarie from those that are free that which is free from those that are naturall that which is naturall and to bee briefe such as are the next causes aforegoing such also is the euent of things But in respect of God all things whatsoeuer are partly changeable and partly necessarie In respect of Gods libertie which doth that which it doth freely all things are contingent and mutable howsoeuer according to nature and the order of the next causes they be necessarie and immutable In respect of Gods decree the second causes and the effects of them are all necessarie howsoeuer in themselues they bee vncertaine and conti 〈◊〉 nt And yet they are not absolutelie necessarie but by the supposition of Gods decree neither are they necessarie by the necessitie of compulsion but of infallibilitie only because God ordained before that those things which should come to passe should be And this kind of necessitie taketh not away the contingencie and libertie of second causes but rather establisheth and confirmeth it For that which is free worketh freely and that which is contingent worketh contingently by the necessarie decree of God Neither doth libertie and necessitie mutually ouerthrow each other but libertie and compulsion It is manifest therefore that Gods decree causeth an immutabilitie to all things of which notwithstanding some in respect of the next causes are necessarie and othersome contingent but all of them in respect of Gods liberty mutable And as the mutabilitie which thinges haue from Gods power taketh not away the necessitie which they haue from the second causes so the necessitie of immutabilitie by Gods decree consequently comming to passe taketh not away the contingencie which they haue from the next causes and Gods libertie Moreouer wee say that Gods decree ordaineth the second causes and the verie libertie it selfe also of mans will not by compulsion as if a man should violently throw a stone but by inclining and gentlie bending them by obiects outwardlie offred to the vnderstanding euen as a sheepe is said to be drawne when grasse is shewed her being an hungry that a man August de verb. Apost ser. 2. may choose by his owne free motion or refuse that which God hath iustly decreed from all eternitie These things being granted it is manifest also what we ought to thinke concerning the fall of Adam Which truely according to the euent is necessarie by the necessitie of infallibilitie by reason of the forcknowledge and decree of God yet so as that God is not guiltie of any fault because the decree of God howsoeuer it was necessarie in it selfe yet it planted nothing in Adam whereby he should fall into sinne but left him to his owne libertie not hindring his fall when it might and the same fall in respect of mans wil which doth that freely that it doth came to passe contingently and most freely But you will say that Adam could not withstand Gods will that is his decree whereto I answere that euen as he could not so also hee would not But you will say againe he could not will otherwise Which I confesse to bee true as touching the act and euent but not as touching the very power of his will which was not compelled but of the owne free motion consented vnto the suggestiō of the diuell But to the intent that these things may more plainely bee vnderstood wee must make distinction betweene three times the time going before his fall the present time of his fall and the time after his fall In the first moment of time the fal of Adam was necessarie in a double respect First by reason of the foreknowledge of God for that which he foreknew would come to passe must needes of necessitie come to passe Secondly by reason of the permissiue decree of God that fal was according to the euent necessarie immutably Honorius Augustodunensis saith It cannot otherwise Dial. de praed citat in Catalogo Illyrici ●e but that al things must come to passe which God hath predestinated foreknowne seeing that hee onely either doth all things or permitteth them to be done Hugo de S. victore saith Sinne followeth of necessitie by Quaest. in Rom. 44. the withdrawing of grace And the reason hereof is very easie because euill permitted must come to passe and cannot otherwise come to passe than God permitteth For to permit euill is not to stirre vp the will and not to bestow on him that is tempted the act of resisting but to leaue him as it were to himselfe and he whose will is not stirred vp by God and to whō the act of resisting is not conferred howsoeuer he may haue power to withstand yet can he not actually will to withstand nor persist for euer in that vprightnesse wherein hee was created God denying him strength I confesse truly that this kinde of necessitie as touching the liberty of mans will was altogether euitable and to be auoided and yet according to the euent of the action it was ineuitable Yet I would not that any man should thinke that this necessitie did any way proceede from the decree of God which did onely follow the decree being granted and admitted and Adam in his temptation being destitute of the helpe of God cast himselfe of his own accord into this same ensuing necessitie of sinning In the second time his fall being present there was another necessitie thereof because when it was it was of necessitie In the third time man drew vnto himselfe by his fault his nature being now corrupted another necessitie of sinning insomuch that he made himselfe the seruant of sin Bernard saith I know not after what euill and strange manner the will it selfe corrupted or changed