Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	cold_a	heat_n	hot_a	2,925	5	7.7399	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A89737	The orthodox evangelist. Or A treatise wherein many great evangelical truths (not a few whereof are much opposed and eclipsed in this perillous hour of the passion of the Gospel) are briefly discussed, cleared, and confirmed: as a further help, for the begeting, and establishing of the faith which is in Jesus. As also the state of the blessed, where; of the condition of their souls from the instant of their dissolution: and of their persons after their resurrection. By John Norton, teacher of the church at Ipswich in New England.	Norton, John, 1606-1663.	1654 (1654)	Wing N1320; Thomason E734_9; ESTC R206951	276,720	371

beings themselves as appeared but now from the instance of fire and may further be seen in the example of the Sun which whilest experience witnesseth to warm and heat us upon Earth with the presence of its virtue yet Sense and Reason shews to be far absent in respect of its body being in the Heavens Yet such is the nature of the first Cause as that wheresoever it worketh it worketh immediately both with the immediation of his virtue without which there could be no effect and with the immediation of his presence because he is in every place Although the first Cause worketh immediately in respect of the immediation of its being and virtue yet in respect of those things which it acts by means of second causes whether by the mediation of the beings themselves Ames Med. lib. 1. cap. 9. or of their virtues into which things the second agents do send their influence by virtue of their proper forms I say in respect of such things it worketh mediately whence the first Cause is said to be a mediate cause in respect of the order of the second causes Vna estactio I ei creaturae respectu operis sed non respectu modi agendi 4. Determining For though as the beings so the operations of the second causes are from the first Cause efficiently yet they are from their next causes formally God causeth the burning of the fire yet we do not say God burneth but the fire burneth God worketh repentance in the Soul yet it is not a truth to say God repenteth but man repenteth God is the next efficient Cause but not the next formal Cause 4. The first Cause so concurreth as it determineth the second cause in its operation This is readily granted in natural agents in free-rational agents it is proved thus If the futurition of the operation of the second cause is determined by the Decree of God then the operation it self is determined by the Efficiency of God 1. Because the Efficiency is adequate to the Decree 2. Because there can be but one absolute Determiner 3. If the operation of the second cause were not absolutely determined by the Decree God might suffer disappointment in respect of the Decree Either the Will is determined by God in its operation or else it would follow either that there were not an essential subordination of the second cause unto the first that is of man to God which were repugnant to the nature of the second cause it being imperfect and dependent or that the first Cause were subordinate to the second which were repugnant to the nature of the first Cause being perfect and universal If as often as the Will doth not will it therefore doth not will because God hath not determined that it should will then as often as it willeth any thing it therefore willeth because God hath determined that it should will But as often as the Will doth not will it therefore doth not will because God hath not determined that it should will Therefore the Minor appeareth in two particulars 1. As often as the Will doth not will God hath not determined it to will 2. The Non-determination or Suspension of the Determination of God is the Antecedanious Cause in respect of God this cause cannot be positive A positive cause cannot be terminated in a Non-ens such as mans Non-volition i. e. Not-willing is it must therefore be suspensive The meer Suspension or withholding of the Influence of God without any positive action sufficeth to the annihilation of the creature that is Twiss lib. 2. crim 3. therefore the Suspension of the Determination of God sufficeth to the preventing of that operation of the creature which yet is not Obj. 1. If All-efficiency be from the first cause Against the All-Efficiency of God then the second cause hath no efficiency it doth nothing neither good nor evil man neither sinneth nor obeyeth no difference between good and evil the high way to confusion Thus the Libertines Ans Causes are either co-ordinate namely such as in respect of their Efficiency depend not upon their co-working cause or subordinate namely such as in respect of their efficiency depend upon their co-working cause In co-ordinate causes the Argument holds but second causes in respect of the first being subordinate and therefore as in their being so also in their working depending upon the first cause the Argument is of no force To deny the Efficiency of the second cause Tho. Part. 1. q. 105. art 5. Calvin contra libert c. 13 14 15 16 Suarez Metaph Tem. 1. disp 17. S. 1. is to deny that which experience proclaimeth namely That the Sun shineth or the fire burneth The denyal of the proper and formal efficiency or working of the second cause is repugnant to the whole Order of Nature Things that have not life it depriveth of their first qualities which are nothing else but active principles as power to heat in the fire power to cool in the water It disinables us from collecting effects from second causes or second causes from effects because it denyeth all such causes and effects It makes void all those dispositions in several creatures that tend to action Vain is the disposition in fire to ascend or in the earth to descend if there be no motion of ascent nor descent by them It takes away all perfection from those creatures as also from all other which consists in action Lastly If action be only the first cause in the presence of such a creature and not by the second cause we can no better conclude that the fire is hot from its burning nor that the water is cold from its coolness then we can conclude that the fire is cold or that the water is hot from such operations of heat and cold The reason is the first cause can as well make hot in the presence of water or make cold in the presence of fire as the contrary It takes away all difference between things that have life and things that have no life that which takes away action takes away life Take away action from the second cause and you take away the vegetative soul and its operations from living creatures You take away the sensitive soul and its operations from the sensitive creature The reasonable soul and its operations from the reasonable creature There is no difference to be found between reasonable creatures and sensible creatures between reasonable sensible and those creatures which are vegetative only having life Between reasonable sensible and vegetative and those that are lifeless in respect of their formal and most noble difference which is a principle of action with the operations thereupon ensuing There remains indeed a difference between them in respect of their outward shape but not in regard of the respect fore-mentioned It takes away the distinction between good and evil actions for that which denyeth actions simply denyeth all kind of actions whether good or evil therefore man in all