the Act be truly virtuose and if an Act be truly virtuose it is conforme to right Reason or the moral Law and if such then it wants not any due circumstance wherefore if any Act wanting a due circumstance should be truly virtuose it wil then necessarily follow That it doth want and yet that it doth not want a due circumstance or That it is truly virtuose and yet that it is not truly virtuose 2. Conclus That every such Act as wants its due Circumstances is morally evil and sin It is evil because it wants its due bonitie or goodnesse namely its due circumstance For sin is nothing else but the want of a due good or voluntarily to act against the Divine Law Thus much also Suarez grants us That some conditions that are only circumstantial and accidental to an Act in esse rei as to the physic being are yet essential in esse moris as to its moral being So Suarez 1.2 Tract 2. Disp 5. pag. 169. The first opinion saith he is That an human Act may be considered in its natural or moral being and that circumstances are so called in relation to the natural not the moral being of the Act but that al these conditions are substantial Principes or proper Causes of the moral action as such He mentions this as the opinion of some Scholemen namely that there are no accidental circumstances of human Acts morally considered but that al these Circumstances are essential and properly influential on the said moral Acts. Which indeed is a great truth whereunto though not fully yet thus far he assents It is true saith he what the first opinion asserted That some conditions may be accidental to the act in esse rei as a natural act and yet essential to it in esse moris morally considered And the reason addes he is taken à priori because the esse morale or moral being of an Act primarily dependes on the order of Reason we say of the Law but now it oft happens that an act or object hath a diverse order to reason by reason of diverse conditions of those things that concur to the moral Act. Thence pag. 174. he tels us what Circumstances are essential Right Reason which must be understood objectively is the rule of human acts and their circumstances therefore the affection or reason of these Circumstances cannot be better explicated than by their order or regard to right Reason I would say the Divine Law And the same rule is to be used for the understanding when the conditions of moral Acts are not properly Circumstances but essential namely when they are such as according to right Reason are altogether necessary not only as to degrees but simply as to the honestie or turpitude of the act For when a Circumstance altogether changeth the conformitie or difformitie of an human act it changeth its Species In which he plainly grants That al those Circumstances which change the conformitie or difformitie of an human act are specific and essential Which is al that we need contend for because the Controversie is not about natural or civil Circumstances but such as belong to the act morally considered which if good requireth an integritie of Causes and plenitude of Circumstances so that if one Circumstance due to the moral bonitie of the act be defective the whole act is changed and rendred morally evil By the whole of which it is most evident that al Circumstances due to the moral goodnesse of an human act are essential and specific such as concur to formalise moral Good which requires a complete conformitie to the Divine Law not only in Mater Principes and End but also in al Circumstances morally due to the integritie of such an Act For al good as has been sufficiently demonstrated requires an integritie of Causes whereas sin ariseth from the least defect according to that knowen Effate of the spurious Dionysius Divin Nom. cap. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good is from one and complete cause but sin from many and singular defects § 4. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al moral Good Having considered moral Good in its Causes and constitutive parts we now descend to the contemplation thereof in its proper Adjuncts and Attributes which we shal deduce and draw forth in the subsequent Corollaries 1. Al moral Good Virtues and virtuose Acts have one and the same simple uniforme Idea and Nature For al moral Good and virtuose Acts flow from one and the same virtuose Principes tend to one and the same End and are formalised by one and the same conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 445. It appears to me as it were in a Watch-tower 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the face or forme of Virtue is one but that of Improbitie manifold and almost infinite His mind is that al Virtues have one and the same formal Idea or face but sins have varietie yea almost infinite deformed shapes This Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having proved that al moral Virtue consistes in a Mediocritie and Vniformitie he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Moreover we may sin many ways for as the Pythagoreans conjecture sin is infinite and boundlesse but good is terminate and bounded but there is but one way of doing good Wherein we may observe 1 That al sin is difforme boundlesse and endlesse it hath no forme measure or number 2 But Virtue and moral Good is bounded and uniforme Whence he concludes with a Verse out of some ancient Poet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For good men truly are simply and uniformely such but wicked men are difformely and variously so Thus also Aristotle Mag. Moral lib. 1. cap. 25. affirmes That al Good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 uniforme but al Vice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 multiforme Hence Plato asserted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is just is equal and uniforme Whence that Stoic Hypothesis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al moral goods are equal and uniforme i.e. conforme to the rule of Moralitie Al this is wel expressed by Augustine who makes al Good to consiste in Modo Specie Ordine in Mode Species and Order i.e. in a uniforme conformitie to the rule of Moralitie Hence 2. Al moral Good and Virtue supernatural There is no real moral Good or natural Virtue but what is supernatural This Corollarie evidently follows from the former and indeed from the whole of this discourse about moral Good For if al moral Virtue or Good requires an integritie of causes and is formalised by conformitie to the Divine Law thence it necessarily follows that moral Good or Virtue can be but one uniforme simple thing Thence Chrysostome Hom. 4. in Gen. cals Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a gift above nature overcoming nature And Cyril in Esa termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 above proper Nature as elsewhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prerogative above Nature I am not ignorant that many of the Scholemen and
too many of our Divines in imitation of them make a twofold Good and Virtue one natural and moral the other spiritual and supernatural The natural Virtue and moral Good they make to be that which a man may by the force of natural Conscience and other natural Principes attain unto The spiritual and supernatural Good or Virtue they make to be infused Albeit this distinction may with due limitations passe for orthodoxe yet in as much as it was at first framed by the Pelagians and taken up by their Sectators in the Scholes I should be glad if Jansenius's advice for the utter extirpation of it were embraced who in his August Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 14. pag. 256. gives us the origination of this Distinction which he makes to be first taken up by the Pelagians from the Gentile Philosophers specially the Peripatetics and Stoics who held that there were in men natural seeds of Virtue which being wel cultivated might arise up to perfect Virtue These natural seeds of Virtue addes he first the Pelagians and Semipelagians brought into their Heresie and afterwards the Schole-men introduced the same into the Christian Scholes to the great prejudice of our Doctrine For those Heretics held that out of those philosophic seeds true Virtues-might be educed by the alone power of the human Wil. But because the Schole-men saw that this Dogme was openly contrary to the constantly received Doctrine they therefore framed a double man in one man and thence a double Charitie double Virtues double Workes some natural others supernatural of which there is not the least footstep in the whole Doctrine of Augustine As if those very Virtues which the Philosophers and Schole-men cal Natural were not by Augustine stiled Vices And Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 2. pag. 326. he assures us That he has oft greatly wondred that many of the Philosophers had more truly accurately and holily philosophised of the main Heads of moral Doctrine than many Schole-men who would fain frame two men in one the one a Philosopher and the other a Christian whence they also coined a twofold Charitie twofold Virtues twofold Workes and a twofold Beatitude the one natural the other supernatural Hence 3. The difficultie of moral Good To performe any moral Good or virtuose Act is most difficult and rare O! how difficult and rare is it for men to performe what is good from good Principes Ends in a good manner as to Circumstances and universal Conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 476. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But of such as can arrive to the first Beautie and contemplate him in himself are there not very few So Phileb pag. 16. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To explain Wisdome is not very difficult but to reduce it to practice and use most difficult So again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What way men may attain to be good is most difficult i.e. to understand and practise Again he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is difficult for a man to be made good and to continue such Whence in his Cratylus pag. 385. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 According to the old Proverbe things good are very difficult Thence also in his Epinomis pag. 973. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I say it is not possible for men to be blessed and happy here except some few only Lastly Plato in his Repub. 6. saith That Virtue hath the most perfect accurate forme and therefore it requires 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most perfect exactitude and diligence for the acquirement thereof for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Do not the greatest things require the greatest exactitude And what things greater than moral Goods and Virtues Thus Aristotle also in imitation of his Master once and again demonstrates the difficultie and raritie of moral Good So Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having shewed That there were varietie of ways wherein men might sin but one only way of doing good he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore it is most easie to offend but most difficult to do good for to erre from the scope is most-facile but to hit it is most difficult So in like manner c. 9. pag. 108. he saith Virtue consistes in mediocritie i.e. in one indivisible point of conformitie Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Wherefore to acquire Virtue is most difficult and laborious for it is an hard worke to attain to the middle of any thing As every one cannot find out the point of a Circle but only the intelligent Mathematician So to be angrie to give money or the like is easie but to be angrie to give money c. to whom and in such a measure and at such a time and for such an end and in such a manner as we ought this is not easie Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The bene or manner of doing good is difficult laudable and beautiful Wherein indeed he gives us an excellent account of the nature and difficultie of moral Good 1 He supposeth al moral Good to consiste as it were in one middle indivisible point so that the least deviation therefrom destroys it Quò enim magis strenuè currit extra viam eò longiùs à scopo recedit ideóque sit miserior Calvin 2 That it is very difficult to find out this golden mean but much more difficult to reach it by our actions True indeed it 's no difficult worke to performe the act materially good as to give almes or the like but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel doing of it i.e. from those Principes for those Ends and with those Circumstances that the Act requires in regard of its formal constitution this is most rare difficult and only laudable Hence 4. The splendid Heroic deeds of Pagans The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only and al such whose minds are not virtuosely disposed are but lesser Sins This is most evident by the confessions of the Philosophers themselves who require to moral Good an integritie of Causes and constitutive Principes so that it sufficeth not that the Mater or Office be good but there is also required a good disposition and habit the best end and al such Circumstances as essentially concur to formalise the Act or denominate it morally good Now let us inquire did ever any Pagan or man in his natural state performe any one Act thus morally good What can we produce any Pagan or natural man who had his mind so far sanctified by Faith and Love as to act by force received from God out of love to God and his Glorie Truly Augustine and Jansenius out of him are not afraid to declare that al those Heroic Acts and Exploits which the Philosophers and Schole-men honor with the title of natural or moral Virtues are indeed but more splendid sins because poisoned with pride and vain-glorie Yea they rise higher and affirme that the Stoics themselves who seemed to be the greatest admirers and sectators
that arise from evil customes and follow the wil do not constitute a sin of passion Thence Aristotle Eth. l. 3. c. 3. saith That every sin from passion is not involuntary Thus also Suarez 1.2 Tract 5. Disp 4. pag. 395. Now involuntarinesse in sins either of ignorance or of passion takes away something of their aggravation where there is real unaffected ignorance passion or perturbation there is lesse of sin Where there is involuntary Ignorance there is want of that which might help the understanding where antecedent involuntary passions hurrie men into sin there is voluntary dissent or subsequent repentance Hence the Disciples of Aristippus said That they who sin from perturbation not voluntarily deserve pardon as Laertius 2. Voluntary wilful Sins are such as procede from a strong bent of wil without ignorance or passion as the original cause thereof Such sins are of greater aggravation because of lesse provocation and excuse From a perseverance in voluntary sins and frequent repetition thereof procedes a fixed custome and rooted habit of sin touching which we find many good Philosophemes in Plato of which hereafter § 7. of the necessary servitude of Sin § 6. The Nature The moral servitude of Sin Causes and Kinds of moral Evil being laid open we may with more facilitie explicate and demonstrate what that moral Servitude is which attends it That al moral Evil or Sin is attended with the highest moral Servitude is evident from sacred Philosophie as also the Philosophemes of Plato and others There were three ways whereby men were brought under civil servitude among the Ancients some were made servants by being taken in war others were bought with a price others became such by being borne in the house of servants as Ishmael Sacred Philosophie in treating of the servitude of sin alludes to al these three kinds of service 1 Sinners are said 1 Kings 21.20 2 Kings 17.17 To sel themselves to worke evil i.e. deliberately and voluntarily to commit sin and that with a ful bent of heart which is opposed to Pauls being sold under sin Rom. 7.14 2 The servants of sin are said to be led captive by sin 2 Pet. 2.19 3 Al men by nature are said to be borne slaves of sin Ephes 2.2 5.6 Eph. 2.2 Children of disobedience i.e. addicted devoted given up to it So Ephes 5.6 Col. 3.6 This is an Hebraic Idiotisme for among them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Son being put in the state of Regiment and construed with a Noun signifying an inanimate thing is emphatically used to note that such a person or thing is addicted or given up to that which is predicated of it Thus a child of disobedience is one that is a perfect slave or devoted to it And Plato Rep. 9. pag. 575. tels us That he who is subject to the Tyrannie of his own Lusts is the greatest slave imaginable for he cannot do what he would but is shut up in the prison of his own unbridled lusts Therefore in his Cratylus as he derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 always to flow which importes libertie so he derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vice from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because a wicked man is ever fettered and chained by his lusts But to illustrate the miserable vassalage and slaverie which attends al Sinners by nature we shal consider this servitude of Sin 1 In regard of the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin 2 In the proper Adjuncts or Attributes that attend this servitude First as to the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin we shal draw them forth according to the mind of sacred and Platonic Philosophie in the ensuing Propositions 1. Al moral Evil or Sin is repugnant to human Nature The Civilian Sin repugnant to human Nature Justin Institut l. 1. tit 3. defines Civil Servitude a constitution of the Law of Nations whereby one is subject to the Dominion of another against Nature And is not this most true of the moral servitude of Sin What more against human Nature than to be subject to the tyrannie of irregular passions Yea doth not Sin make not only the Creatures an enemie to man but also himself the greatest enemie to himself That Sin is most repugnant to human Nature may easily be evinced out of Plato's Philosophie Thence he cals it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Discord and Confusion because it causeth an intestine war discord and confusion in human Nature Thus also in his Lysis he saith Al good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proper and agreable to human Nature but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 evil is aliene and repugnant to it Good albeit it slow not from Nature yet it inclines us to what is most for the perfection of human Nature whereas al Sin tends to its ruine As al moral Libertie consistes in Virtue which gives an elevation and advance to human Nature so al moral servitude arising from Sin implies a depression of human Nature Thus Psal 106.43 And were brought low for their iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies attenuated depressed Psal 106.43 Vitium contra naturam est ut non possit nisi nocere naturae Non itaque esset vitium recedere à Deo nisi naturae cujus id vitium est potiùs competeret esse cum Deo August de Civ Dei l. 11. c. 17. It 's here spoken of their being brought down from an high to a low condition Then follows the cause of this their being brought down 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for or in their iniquitie Their iniquitie was not only the meritorious cause but also the instrument or machine by which they were brought down Nothing doth so much empoverish and bring down human Nature as Sin So Psal 107.12 Therefore he brought down their heart with labor they fel down and there was none to help 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with toilsome labor The toilsome labor of Sin is most potent to bring down human Nature 1 Sin brings down human Nature and is most repugnant to it in that it importes an aversion and falling from God who is our most laudable and excellent Being our first Principe and last End This is implied in that dreadful interrogation of God to Adam Gen. 3.9 Gen. 3.9 Where art thou In this Question we may consider 1 That it regards not Adams place but state Where art thou Not in what place but in what state How is it with thee now Adam How doest thou do Is al wel What is the condition of thy Soul Art thou in that state I placed thee in 2 It 's a question not of ignorance as to God but of conviction as to Adam it is the question of a Judge making inquisition after the Malefactor Where art thou Where is now thy confidence in thine own strength Doest thou see unto what a condition thy pride thy unbelief has reduced thee Thou aimedst to be as God free from my yoke
Principe Durandus's Objections answered Divine Concurse as to the human Wil and al create Objects Gods Concurse principal How second Causes are Instruments Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with the Divine Wil. No executive Power in God distinct from his Wil. The Divine Wil of it self omnipotent and operative Gods Concurse 1 Immediate both as to the second Cause its Act and Effect 2 Independent 3 Previous 4 Total 5 Particular 6 Efficacious 7 Connatural § 1. HAving explicated the Divine Nature and Attributes God the first Cause of althings we now descend to the explication of the Divine Causalitie and Efficience which properly belongs to metaphysic or prme Philosophie Thence Sapience which takes in the generic notion of metaphysic according to Aristotle consistes in the contemplation not only of most excellent Beings but also of the prime Cause of althings That God is the prime Cause of althings not only sacred but also Platonic Philosophie doth assure us As for sacred Philosophie it gives frequent and great demonstrations of our Hypothesis Thus Esa 66.2 For al these things have my hands made and al those things have been So Psal 104.24 of which more in Gods Creation Plato also hath left us great notices of Gods prime Causalitie and Efficience So in his Phaedo pag. 96. he demonstrates how great the ignorance and folie of such is who wholly busie their thoughts in the contemplation of second Causes but neglect to inquire after and into the first Cause who is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal supreme Cause but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Cause of causes whereas al second Causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Instruments of the first Cause Thence pag. 97. he addes But when I sometime heard some one reading and relaeting out of a certain Book as he said of Anaxagoras 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That the Divine Mind doth orderly dispose and governe althings and is the cause of althings I was indeed greatly recreated with this Cause and it seemed to me to be rightly determined namely that the Divine Mind was the Cause of althings and thus I reasoned with my self if it be so that the gubernatrix and dispositrix Mind do thus dispose althings it doth therefore place each particular in that place where it may be best constituted If therefore any one be willing to inquire after and into the cause of every thing both of its existence and corruption he must also inquire in what regard it may be best either as to being or as to suffering or doing any other thing Vpon this account there is nothing more needful for man to inquire after either concerning himself or other things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than what is best and most excellent for it is necessary that such an one also know what is worst because the science of these things is the same When I pondered these things in my mind I much pleased my self in this that I had got a Master who would instruct me in the causes of things according to mine own mind namely Anaxagoras In these great Philosophemes of Socrates we have these observables 1 These contemplations about the first Cause were some of his dying thoughts and therefore such as his mind were most intent on 2 He greedily imbibes and closeth with that great Tradition of Anaxagoras derived originally from sacred Philosophie That the Divine Mind was the first cause of althings 3 That the Divine Mind disposed ordered and governed althings in the best manner 4 That he who would inquire into the causes of this must have his eye on those two the mater and efficient For Plato makes but two Principes of things the Mater out of which things were made and the Efficient that formed the mater into shape or that particular forme or essence This Efficient he elsewhere stiles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea making 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Idea and mater the two Principes of althings So the Stoics made two Principes of althings the Efficient and Patient Plato sometimes makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Efficient and Cause termes synonymous so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficient precedes and the effect follows 5 That as to efficients we must alwaies inquire after the best and most excellent namely God the first Cause for he that knows the best i. e. God may easily know the worst i. e. second Causes So Plato Leg. 4. p. 715. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of althings Thus in his Sophista pag. 265. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Namely doth Nature by the force of some casual fortuitous cause without the efficacitie of the Divine Mind produce these things Or on the contrary shal we not determine that these things have their existence with Divine Wisdome and Science from God Wherein note 1 that he layes down an Hypothesis contrary to that of Leucippus and Democritus That things existe not by the casual fortuitous confluxe of Atomes 2 That althings existe by the Divine Mind Hence 3 That althings are framed and disposed in the best order with the highest wisdome 4 He makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word which some would understand of the second Person in the Trinitie but I should rather take it here for wisdome as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood of Science The like in his Theaetetus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must remember that nothing can be of it self therefore althings are from some first Cause of which more fully before C. 2. § 2. So Repub. 6. he makes God to be the First cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 giving essence to althings for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every thing receives essence from the efformative words of the great Opificer Again Repub 2. pag. 379. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And of good things there is no other supreme cause to be acknowledged besides God So pag. 380. he proves That God is the cause of al good whether natural or moral And Epist pag. 312. he expressely saith That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of althings good or beautiful Thus Damascene out of Dionysius Areopagita who doth much Platonise Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. God is the cause and principe of althings the essence of Beings the Life of things living the Reason of things rational the Intellect of things intellectile the Restitution and Resurrection of them that fal from him but of those things that naturally perish the Renovation and Reformation of those things which are moved with a strong impetuositie the great confirmation of such things as stand the stabilitie of those things that ascend up to him the way and reductive manuduction Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the illuminated the splendor the perfection of the perfect the Deification of the deified the peace of the discordant the simplicitie of the
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
the concurse of God be only General and Indifferent it then hangs in suspense and has not efficace enough to reach its effect unlesse it be so or so disposed Whence also it follows that it is in the power of the second cause to resist or frustrate the concurse of God so that it shal not reach its effect Hence lastly it follows that the concurse of God is not efficacious and omnipotent which we shal anon prove 3 That the concurse of God as to its manner of working is not general but particular is asserted and demonstrated by some of the most acute of the Scholastic Theologues So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 4. and l. 3. c. 7. Joan. major in Sentent 2. Dist 28. q. 1. p. 122. Alvarez de Auxil Disput 23. with several others But here it is objected 1. by Burgersdicius and others Objections against Gods particular concurse 1 If God concur by a particular concurse to the specification of the action then he may be said to walke discourse eat c. To this Objection we respond 1 by denying that God concurs to the specification of the action albeit he concurs by a particular concurse for an action is specified from its particular cause not from the first universal cause So that here is that which they cal a fallacie of many interrogations whereof one is true the other false Or we may cal it a begging of the Question in that they suppose That if God concur by a particular concurse he concurs also to the specification of the action which is an inconsequent consequence 2 Those Animal acts of walking eating c. ascribed to the second cause cannot be ascribed to God the first cause albeit they more principally belong to him because they procede not from pure efficience but from information to use the Aristotelean phrase or a bodie so organised Those actions signifie a relation to the particular subject whence they slow and therefore cannot be properly attributed to God as Bradward l. 1. c. 4. p. 178. and Suarez Metaphys Disput 21. S. 3. acutely replie shewing that ambulation eating c. do not denote pure efficience but a subject informed by such motions which are therefore proper to the said subject 2 But the main objection of Burgersdicius and others against Gods particular concurse is taken from sinful actions unto which say they God cannot be said to concur by a particular concurse unlesse we make him the author of sin This objection makes a great noise but has little of weight in it For 1 The deordination of any sinful act can only be ascribed to the second cause who is the Author of it not unto the first cause who only produceth the physical entitative Act. 2 That which is most sinful in regard of the second cause is so ordered by God as that it shal conduce to the greatest good as before and hereafter in the providence of God 6. Gods Concurse Efficacious Gods concurse is most Potent and Efficacious This Adjunct and Mode of operation is most expresse in Sacred Philosophie specially as to gratiose Influences which are most potent Sin is a mighty strong poison ay but medicinal Grace is a much stronger Antidote The powers of darkenesse and Hel are very strong but Christ the Captain of our Salvation hath Samson-like carried away the Gates of Hel upon his shoulders and led captivitie captive His Grace is most potent irresistible and victorions Thus Jansenius Augustin Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. p. 43. having in what precedes sufficiently refuted the Conditional Grace of the Molimstes he addes This therefore is the true reason why no medicinal Grace of Christ ever wants its effect but al workes both to wil and to do because with Augustin Grace and the good worke are so reciprocated that as from Grace conferred the effect of the worke may be inferred so on the other hand from the defect of the worke it may be inferred that Grace was not given By which manner of reasoning it appears that Grace as the cause and the operation of the Wil as the effect are as the Philosophers speak convertible and mutually inseparable each from other For so Augustin speakes of the Conflict against Tentations Agis si ageris bene agis si à â—bono ageris so efficacious is medicinal Grace Yea Jansenins a voucheth that there is no manner of speech among the Scholastic Theologues so efficacious to expresse that the determination or predetermination of the Wil is from the Grace of God but Augustin assumes the same to demonstrate that the Grace of Christ is not such that the effect should be suspended or dependent on any condition to be performed by the human Wil but that the effect is most potently produced by it not if the Wil willeth but by working and determining the Wil to wil. So Habak 3.4 Habak 3.4 And his brightnesse was as the light he had bornes coming out of his hand and there was the hiding of his power And his brightnesse was as the light The brightnesse of Christ was exceding gloriose even like the brightnesse of the Sun in its meridian glorie Thence it follows he had hornes coming out of his hands 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies to send forth beams as hornes to irradiate and shine forth Beams and hornes have some analogie and ressemblance and therefore the same word among the Hebrews signifies both Hence the vulgar Version renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exod. 34.29 hornes whereas it signifies there beams as here Whence it follows out of his hands Hands here denote Christ's power as Act. 11.21 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hand signifies power the hand being the instrument of the bodie whereby it puts forth its power Thence he addes There was the hiding of his power i. e. his secret power lay wrapt up in his efficacious rays or concurse which is exceding influential and potent like hornes We find something analogous hereto in Plato Repub 6. pag. 509. where treating of God as the first Cause of al good he compares him to the Sun and his concurse to the rays thereof in this manner Thou wilt say I presume that the Sun doth not only cause that things are seen but also that they are generated do grow are nourished although it be not the generation of those things Thus therefore determine that the chiefest good namely God doth give to those things that are known not only that they are known 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but also force and efficace for their existence c. Wherein he compares the efficacious Concurse of God to the spermatic potent influxe of the Sun which gives life sense motion nutrition angmentation and vigor to al manner of Insects Whence those blind Gentiles made the Sun under the fictitious names of Apollo and his Son Esculapius the supreme God of Medicine because the Virtues of Plants depend on the Sun See Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. §. 11. its heat
Gubernative Conservation and Gubernation are usually estimed the proper adequate species of Providence Providential Conservation is that Act of Gods Wil whereby he makes things to persist and persevere in their individual Existence Vigor Acts and specific Essences or Species As for the particular Ideas of providential Conservation we shal draw them forth in the following Proposition 1. Prop. God is the necessary Conservator of althings No Creature is sufficient to conserve it self or any thing else no particular Agent as such can be properly stiled a conservant Cause because conservation is but a kind of continued Creation That no Creature is sufficient to conserve it self without the immediate conservative influxe of God is evident 1 because every Creature has but a fluid transient nature wherefore it needs the conservative concurse of the first cause to fixe its fluxible Being It was a great and good Effate of Heraclitus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Althings are in fluxe nothing is permanent i. e. the natures of things create are like a river the parts whereof are always in fluxe neither doth the same part ever returne again but emties it self into the Sea where it is swallowed up so al Creatures are in continual fluxe and if God who alone is pure Act and immutable did not fixe their Beings by his conservative influxe they would soon drop into their primitive nothing 2 It implies a contradiction that a Creature should persevere in its being without Gods conservative concurse Doth it not implie a contradiction to say that God made a thing and yet that thing was not made and caused by God Now to say God hath made a Creature which needs not his conservative influxe what is this but to say that God made a Creature which yet was not made by him So essential is Divine Conservation to the very essence and existence of a Creature as Bradwardine pag. 162. Thus also Aquinas 1. Quaest 104. demonstrates That it is not a thing communicable to any Creature that it should conserve it self in Being without God 3 Whatever is Ens by participation necessarily dependes on that which is Ens by essence for its existence and subsistence Al create Beings in their very essence depend on Divine Conservation because every effect that dependes on any cause directly and of it self primarily for essence must necessarily also depend thereon for conservation But now God is so the cause of al effects that they from their very nature and by an intrinsecal necessitie depend on him for Being therefore also for conservation as Suarez Metaph. Disput 21. pag. 540 c. God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah in some sense Al Being as Exod. 3.14 I am i. e. nothing hath essence existence and persistence in Essence but from the pure Actualitie and Efficience of God 4 If God educed althings out of nothing by his efficacious Wil then it necessarily follows that the Wil of God must be the Conservatrix of althings For althings are so far and so long existent as God wils they shal be Indeed what is conservation but continued creation or the continuation of a thing made in Being Is it not necessary then that the same Divine Wil that at first gave Being to any thing conserve the same thing in Being Thence Aquinas 1. Quaest 104. proves That God conserves every thing by the same virtue and operation by which he produced it i. e. by the efficience of his Wil. 5 There is great proportion and Analogie in point of conservation between the workes of Art and Nature For look as every worke of Art doth presuppose a principe and worke of Nature as wel for its conservation as first production so every worke of Nature doth presuppose a Divine Efficience for its conservation as wel as for its first production Is it impossible that a piece of Art should conserve it self without mater and is it possible that any worke of Nature should conserve it self without Divine Efficience 6 No impression can remain on any effect longer than the vis impressa or force and action of the Agent continue and what is the essence of any Creature but vis impressa or force impressed by God thereon Al create Essences are but impressions or participations from God and therefore essentially require new force and efficience every moment for their conservation and continuation 7 Unlesse God conserve althings how can he order dispose and governe them to their respective ends Not only the operations but the very essences of things are ordered by God to his own Glorie and how can this be if the essences of things are not conserved by God That God is the necessary Conservator of althings see Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 65. Bradward l. 1. c. 2. pag. 146 c. 2. Prop. Gods conservative Influxe and Efficience is most intime and immediate in althings This Proposition is most evident Gods conservative Influxe immediate 1 From Gods power to annihilate althings For if things were conserved by God only mediately he could not annihilate them so long as that intermediate conservant Cause should concur to their conservation as it 's wel demonstrated by Ariminensis Sent. 1. Dist 45. pag. 160. 2 From the passive power or potentialitie of al Creatures For every potential or thing in power must be actuated by some Act immediately now every Creature in respect of God is but a potential Being and therefore must be actuated immediately by God who is a pure Act and that not only in its operation but also for the conservation of its Being 3 From the Omnipresence of the Divine Essence God being not circumscribed or defined to any space but immense in his Being it thence follows that he is intimately and immediately present to al Beings and by this his immediate presence and volition conserves the same As the creatrix Essence was immediately present by the Divine Volition in the first Creation of althings so the conservatrix Essence is also immediately present in the conservation of althings God is not more distant and remote in the conservation than he was in the first causation of things God is more intimate to every thing than the most intimate part of its own Essence is Thus Suarez Metaphys Disput 30. Sect. 7. pag. 70. proves That God doth not diffuse his creative or conservative Action but is intimately in every thing conserving of it c. So Bradward pag. 164. 4 From Gods prime Causalitie and the subordination of al Creatures to God Every second cause whether causant or conservant cannot cause or conserve any effect but in dependence on and subordination to God the first Cause Hence the Efficience of God must intervene between it and the effect whether it be for causation or conservation whence it follows that the Divine Efficience both in causation and conservation is more immediate than the efficience of any second cause Again the causalitie of the first Cause is more essential and necessary than that
so whiles they violate one Wil and Order of Divine Gubernation they fulfil another If they wil not willingly do Gods Wil of Precept which brings happinesse with it what more just than that they suffer Gods Wil of punishment against their Wils Thus wicked men fulfil Gods providential Wil whiles they break his preceptive Wil. Yea Satan himself is under chains of irresistible Providence He is not an Absolute much lesse a Lawful Monarch but Usurper who has a restraint upon his Power though not upon his Malice He cannot Act as he would And as the persons of the wicked Gods Gubernation about sin both Men and Devils fal under the Providential Gubernation of God so also their Sins And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philosophic and Scholastic Question How far Sin fals under the Providential Gubernation of God For the solution whereof we shal first premit some Distinctions and then resolve the whole into certain Propositions As for Distinctions 1 We may consider Sin 1 in regard of its Causes Essicient and Final or 2 in regard of its Essential and Constitutive parts Mater and Forme 2 We may consider the Permission of Sin which is either merely Negative or Positive and both as belonging to a Legislator or to a Rector 3 We may consider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation These Distinctions being premissed we shal resolve our Question in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al Sin as other things has its Origine Causes and Constitutive parts The Causes and parts of Sin The Ethnic as wel as the Christian Scholes have admitted many Debates touching the Origine of Evil or Sin and we have this copiosely ventilated by Simplicius an acute Philosopher in his Commentaric on Epicterus C. 34. p. 175. c. And he seems to state it thus That Sin being a privation has no proper principe or cause though as to its substrate mater it may fal under some causalitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him denie that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any Cause or Idea of Evils because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is an irregular passion or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Being which must be understood of the formal Reason of Sin for as to is substrate mater Plato and his Followers grant that al good has its Causes Suarez Metaphys Disp 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves wel 1 That al Sin must have some Cause 1 Because nothing is Evil of it self therefore from some Cause 2 Because nothing is Evil but as it recedes from some perfection due to it but nothing fails of its due perfection but from some cause either Agent or Impedient Now 2 this being granted That al Sin has some Cause it thence necessarily follows That some Good must be the Cause of Sin For in as much as we may not procede into Infinite nor yet stop at some Sin that has no Cause we must necessarily stop at some Good which is the cause of Evil. Hence 3 to explicate in what kind Sin may be said to have a Cause we must know 1 that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cause yet it may admit the same in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent That sin formally as sin requires not a final Cause is evident because consisting in a privation and defect it is not properly and of it self intended in things Thus Simplicius in Epictet C. 34. pag. 174. tels us That al Act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does participate of Good and therefore Evil can have no end And yet that Sin may have a final Cause in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent is as evident because the Agent may intend what is Evil for some end for what is Evil in one kind may be conducible or utile in some other 2 As to the Efficient Cause al Sin has some Efficient Cause yet not per se of it self and properly but by Accident and beside the primary intrinsec intention of the Agent Man is said to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cause of Sin by producing that Action to which Sin is appendent or annexed God is said to be the Efficient not Deficient Cause of the material Act of Sin by reason of his immediate Universal Efficience to al real Entitie 4 As for the constitutive parts of Sin namely its Mater and Forme 1 Al Sin as sin has a Material Cause or Substrate Mater which is alwayes naturally Good Whence that great Effate in the Scholes Al Evil as Evil has for its fund or subject some good Thence Augustin said That Evil cannot be but in some Good because if there were any pure Evil it would destroy it self And the Reason is manifest because Sin as to its Formal Reason is not a thing purely Positive neither is it a pure Negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject to which such a perfection is due And must not this subject then be something naturally good Is not every real positive Being naturally good because the Effect of Divine Efficience Can any perfection be due to any Subject unlesse that Subject be naturally good 2 As for the Forme of Sin such as it has it consistes in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Substrate Mater or Subject Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is the privation of Good or substance So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is nothing else but a secession from Good as Darknesse is a secession from Light Of which see more B. 1. C. 4. § 1. and Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Indeed to speak properly Sin hath no Formal Reason or Cause because it is a privation Thus Plato Rep. 2. and Proclus denie that Sin has any Formal Idea as before Yet according to the commun acceptation of a Formal Cause or Reason we make its Deordination or Difformitie from the Law the formal reason thereof Hence 2. God not the Author of Sin Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin doth no way denominate him the moral cause or Author of sin Thus Plato Repub. 10. saith That God is the principal cause of al good but as to sin he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no cause thereof because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he is properly the cause of sin that chooseth it So Repub. 2. pag. 380. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We must with al manner of contention refute that opinion that God who is most good is the Author or moral cause of sin neither must we concede that any speak or hear any such opinion in the Citie if we desire to have it wel constituted and governed That this Platonic Sophisme cannot be wel understood of Gods natural Efficience to the substrate mater of sin but only of
the substrate mater may require And herein we are not without many Precedents both among the more Orthodoxe of the Fathers as also our first Reformers It 's wel known how much Justin Martyr that great Christian Philosopher delighted himself in the Studie of Platonic Philosophie even to some Intemperance in that he affirmes Apol. 1. p. 51. That the Dogmes of Plato were not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aliene from those of Christ And who knows not how much Augustin doth Platonise Augustinus noster immensas Deo gratias agit qùod ad ejus manus pervenerint libri Platonicorum Picus Mirandul Apol. p. 82. in some of his most sublime Contemplations Yea the noble Picus Earle of Mirandula assures us that Augustin gave immense thankes to God for the Platonic Books that came to his hands So great use did his humble Spiritual mind make of Platonic Philosophemes in order to the exaltation of free efficacious Grace So likewise among our first Reformers Picus Mirandulanus Savonarola Wesselus Lud. Vives Ramus c. chiefly addicted themselves to Plato in order to the Reformation of Philosophie Thus also Jansenius that great Patron of Efficacious Grace greatly prefers Platonic Philosophie before al other Yea may we not avouch that the choisest Physic or natural Philosophemes entertained by our New-philosophers Gassendus Cartesius c. are but Imitamens of Contemplations laid down by Plato This we have endeavored to make good in our Philosoph General P. 1. l. 3. c. 2. Albeit that Plato's Philosophie has been thus generally entertained by the best of Christian Philosophers yet it cannot be denied but that it has been the Prolific cause of the worst Heresies and Corruptions in the Church For whence sprang Arianisme Pelagianisme Mystic Theologie and may we not say the whole Complexum of Antichristianisme but from Platonic Philosophie professed in the Schole of Alexandria This is evidently demonstrated in the precedent Part of the Vanitie of Philosophie Al this being granted yet it follows not but that Platonic Philosophie may be greatly useful if wel managed and rendred subservient to Theologie as in Augustin Whereas Origen and his Sectators the Monkes of Egypt by their too fond estime of Platonic Philosophie and reduction of the Scriptures yea the whole of Theologie to a subordination thereto gave the first Formation yea perfect Lineaments to the Man of sin and his Antichristian Theologie I shal only adde on this Theme what Plutarch in Cleomene declares of the Stoic Philosophie If it fal on great and acute wits it becomes lubricous inordinate and incertain but if it be mixed with a serious meek and humble mind it greatly conduceth to the true and proper good So greatly useful may Platonic Philosophie be if loged in a serious humble meek believing mind which hath both Wisdome and Grace to render the same subordinate to Theologie But now having prefaced thus much touching the first Reformers of Philosophie The Designe of this Discourse to render Philosophie subservient to Christian Theologie and what Method may seem most conducible to the Reformation thereof we may not conclude without some notices of the principal designe of this Discourse and our procedure therein As for its original Designe it is too too apparent that our Theologie of late has received great damage and prejudice by the old Aristotelean Philosophie as Sophisticated by the Jesuites as also by New-philosophie as abused by Atheistic wits would it not then be a design of great moment so to Reforme Philosophie as to render it no longer opposite but subservient to Theologie How far we have attained hereto the Reader must be Judge As for our procedure herein thus much it 's hoped we may without Vanitie declare that we have sincerely endeavoured to render our Philosophemes Conformable to Sacred Philosophie and the Doctrine of the Church of England I must confesse as I grow in years so I daily grow more and more in the Admiration of the Wisdome Zele and Pietie of our first great Reformers Cranmer Jewel c. who delivered down to us the Apostolic Doctrine sealed by some of them with their own bloud O! how curiose and tenacious were they of the Forme of sound Words But Alas what a reproche is it now among wanton wits to be an Orthodoxe Divine What a world of new-coined termes of art are foisted into Christian Theologie virtually if not intentionally to the prejudice thereof Chrysostome understandes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Tim. 6.20 of Novel Termes and Formes which then began to be introduced into the Church Alas what would he say if he lived in our days and heard those vain Clamors and bablings about words which are now affected And was not this the grand crime imputed by the Orthodoxe Fathers to Origen That despising the simplicitie of the Scriptures and Christian Theologie he affected new Termes and Modes of interpreting Scriptures which his too great confidence in his own Parts and presuming himself to be wiser than others precipitated him into to the subverson of Christian Theologie as Court Gent. P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. § 8. And may we not fear the like Catastrophe as to those exotic Notions of some now-adays May not the Doctrine of the Church of England which now lyes bleeding take up that Lamentation Zech. 13.8 These are the wounds with which I was wounded in the house of my friends Have we not just cause to persuade ourselves that were there but an Uniformitie of assent and consent as to the Doctrine of the Church of England contained in 36 Articles there would not be so great a Difformitie and disagreament about Discipline contained in the other three Albeit I am no friend to those vexatiose contentiose and inutile Disputes of these Times yet I have been forced to declare my dissent from some learned and pious men of this Age and Nation with hopes that it wil not bring me under the Imputation of being Contentiose disaffected or irrespectuose towards persons of so great estime for natural Parts Learning or Pietie For I solemnely declare that it is no smal affliction to me to dissent much more publicly to declare my dissent from any who are of repute for Learning and Pietie neither could any thing induce me to offer such an apparent violence to mine one repose and retirement did I not conceive my self under an essential obligation to give my Testimonie to those great Truths and Doctrines of the Church of England which our Ancestors valued more than their bloud I shal conclude with that of profunde and pious Bradwardine in his Preface to his most excellent Book do Causa Dei where having laid open the Pride Multitude and continued Successions of the Pelagians he breakes out into this pure Flame of Divine Zele Pag. 5. Burning with Zele for the Cause of God I deliberately thrust mine hand into a terrible flame For I am not ignorant how much the Pestiferous Pelagians enraged in their spirits wil with tumultuose
which follows the enjoyment of the chiefest Good rejoiceth in a twofold Puritie 1 Objective as it is fed and maintained by pure objects whereas al the pleasures of sense are but seculent and dirtie in that their mater is only sensible terrene good but the joys and pleasures which flow from the sweetest original good partake of the crystalline puritie of their object which is most pure 2 Effective as it doth banish al sorrows and grief So Plato Phileb 53. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al pleasure so far as it is free from grief it is more pleasant true and fair Thus Repub. 9. he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pleasure to be the cessation of grief and grief the cessation of pleasure So also Phileb pag. 66. he avoucheth true pleasures to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without mixture of sorrow and pure Which is the peculiar privilege of those pleasures that attend the fruition of the sweetest Good for al other pleasures are mixed with much grief and sorrow they being indeed but bitter-sweets yea more bitter than sweet 5 The Delectation which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good are most intense and strong Thus Plato 5 Strong Pleasures Phileb p. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must look not to the least pleasures but to such as are supreme and most vehement if we wil make a true judgement of pleasure For the stronger any pleasures are the better they are and the more pure they are the stronger they are Sensual pleasures are feeble and impotent because impure and mixed but spiritual joys are most potent and vehement because most pure Again the vehemence and intensnesse of any pleasure is proportionable to the energie power and activitie of the subject which is assected with such pleasure and to the Pondus Bent or Impetus that it hath to the object it takes pleasure in Now how vehement is the Pondus Impetus and Energie of the Wil whereby it shooteth it self into its sweetest Good which when it enjoyeth what an ecstasie rapture and transportt of joy is it affected with Doth not Plato stile this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The best and strongest of al Ecstasies 6 The Delectation which attends the fruition of our last end is infinite and without excesse 6 Joys without Excesse Thus Plato Phileb pag. 27. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For pleasure is not al good unlesse it partake of an infinite nature His designe is to prove that pleasure is not the chiefest good because it is not in its nature infinite so as to partake of al good yet so far as it is a consequent that attends the fruition of the chiefest good so far it is infinite For as the chiefest good admits of no excesse in our fruition because it is in it self infinite and al good so by a paritie of reason the joy and pleasure that attends the fruition of the chiefest good is infinite without excesse because the object is infinitely sweet and amiable The pleasure the Soul takes in the fruition of inferior goods soon admits excesse which it endeavors to cure by change of objects Thus Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 33. Art 2. Corporal delectations when augmented and continued do excede the natural habitude and therefore become nauseous as it is evident in the delices of food whence the appetite desires change and varietie But spiritual delectations never excede the natural habitude but perfect nature whence the more they come to a consummation the more they delight us How soon are men glutted with the best of pleasures that sense can afford And what remedie have they but intermission or exchange of objects But now in the fruition of the sweetest Good there can be no excesse either in the act of fruition or in the pleasures that attend it and therefore there is no need either of intermission or exchange § 8. 3. The Effects of Delectation Having explicated Delectation in its Causes and proper Adjuncts we now procede to the Effects thereof thereby to demonstrate that the most perfect delectation is that which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good There are two great Effects of this divine Delectation 1 Amplitude and Enlargement 2 Quietation and Satisfaction 1. 1. Enlargement The Delectation that attends the fruition of the sweetest Good brings with it Amplitude and Enlargement Indeed al delight and joy brings Enlargement which ariseth from the Sympathie between the object and the subject or sacultie specially if the object be ample how doth the facultie spread it self to enjoy the same When the animal or vital Spirits are recreated what enlargement follows thereon How diffusive are they Whereas Grief and Sorrow contracts and coarctates the Spirits This is in an higher degree verified of that spiritual Joy which attends the fruition of the best Good There is a twofold Enlargement that follows spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the chiefest Good 1 There is an Enlargement of the Facultie or Subject The more pleasure the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end the more its desires are enlarged Thus Plato Phileb pag. 45. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But what are not those pleasures most excellent whereof the greatest desires are kindled in us Whereby he shews that those are the greatest and best pleasures that most enlarge the heart in desires after them Indeed there is an intime connexion between true joy and enlargement and therefore in sacred Philosophie one word is expressive of both So Psal 4.1 Thou hast enlarged me when I was in distresse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both to exhilarate and dilate or to dilate by exhilarating His spirit was straitned narrowed and confined by distresse but dilated and enlarged by spiritual joys from Gods presence This Dilatation or Enlargement which follows on spiritual Delectation is wel explicated by Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 33. Art 1. Dilatation is a motion unto Latitude and it agrees to Delectation both in regard of its apprehensive and appetitive virtue for as man apprehends the conjunction of some convenient good so his Soul is dilated towards it in order to its perfect fruition thereof and satisfaction therein c. 2 Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the sweetest good brings with it also enlargement in Operation and Acting Al joy is vigorous and active as it is the effect of precedent so the cause of subsequent operation Delight is the Spring of motion it puts the Soul into a continual agitation for by how much the more we delight in any object by so much the more vehement and strong are our operations about it Delectation makes us ardently and vehemently to move in the fruition of our sweetest good and in al acts that tend thereto What divine suavities doth it infuse into al our acts Thus Plato Conviv pag. 210. The mind that converts its eyes to that so great amplitude of the first Beautie doth no longer regard human affairs but is as it were captivated thereby c. 2. The Delectation which
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Virtue has for its rule a decorum or that which is most convenient i.e. agreable or conformable to the Law of Nature Hence 3 This Conformitie is stiled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Symmetrie and Symphonie Al these notions Aristotle comprehended under his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mediocritie of which more fully B. 4. C. 1. § 30. and Philos General P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect 4. § 4. Others place the Forme of moral Good in the mode or manner of doing namely that it be done wel How the Forme of Good consistes in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wel doing and we find some foundation for this Hypothesis in Plato's Theaetetus pag. 187. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's better to a little wel than much il Where he seems to make the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wâ—l doing the forme and measure of good So Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 3. pag. 83. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. He therefore shal be a Grammarian who doth what is Grammatic Grammatically i.e. according to Rules of Grammar But yet he addes by way of caution That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of Arts is not the same with that of Virtues for the perfection of Arts is included in themselves without regard to the perfection of the Artificer but the perfection of Virtue requires that the subject be so and so qualified And then he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He is a righteous and temperate man not that doth those things but doth them in such a manner as righteous and sober men do them i.e. rightcously and soberly Hence that vulgar Effate That good workes are to be judged by Adverbes for al must be done with those adverbial conditions of sacred Philosophie Tit. 2.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 soberly and righteously and piously This is in a peculiar manner true of good actions where the mater is indifferent because such have no goodnesse at al but what is from the Adverb So that it sufficeth not that the Act be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good but it must have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a right manner of being done and herein according to some the Forme of its goodnesse doth consiste even in the manner of it and any defect herein wil render the action evil according to those scholastic Maximes The forme gives being and any omission or defect therein gives millitie as to moral Good So in the Canon Law they tel us That the forme must be precisely and punctually observed And indeed this notion of the forme of moral Good amounts to the same with the former and must be resolved thereinto For a moral Act may be said then to have its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or bene factum wel done when it is in al points exactly conformable to the moral Law for al moral Good is a relation of conformitie with the rule of Morals but the least privation thereof is sin But How far Circumstances formalise moral Good to descend to particulars an human Act is then conformable to the Law and wel done when it is not only good for the mater but also clothed with al those Circumstances which necessarily attend its moral goodnesse The particular forme of moral Good consistes much in the Circumstances that attend it The Circumstances oft formalise and specisie the Act making it good or evil sometimes they only make it better or worse But the Circumstances have the greatest sway in things indifferent where the manner of doing doth chiefly specifie the Act. We find the Circumstances of human Acts wel expressed by Aristotle Eth. l. 2. c. 5. Virtue saith he consistes in the wel doing of things for we may fear trust desire hate despise be angrie pitie rejoice and grieve 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not duely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But truly to be moved with these affections when and in what things and towards whom and for what end and in that manner as we ought this is the golden mean and that which is best wherein Virtue consistes Whence also Aristotle Eth. lib. 3. cap. 10. art 5. pag. 160. assures us That a defect in any one Circumstance renders an Act evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But sins may be committed some when that is done that ought not others when not as it ought others because not at that time when it ought or the like Thence art 10. he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For a valiant man suffers and acts according to the dignitie of the mater and when and in that manner as reason or the Law of Nature dictates Thus we see how Plato and Aristotle require to the constitution of moral Good not only a right mater but that it be clothed with al due Circumstances whereby it may be rendred conformable to the Law as to manner This Hypothesis has been generally maintained among the more sound Schole-men Thus Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 7. Art 2. A Circumstance is a condition or accident of an human Act which toucheth it extrinsecally And seing human Acts are disposed towards their last end by circumstances the contemplation hereof greatly concernes Theologues For a Theologue considers human Acts as a man is thereby ordained to Beatitnde Now whatever is ordained to an end ought to be proportionate thereto But Acts are rendred proportionable to their end by a certain commensuration which they receive from due circumstances whence the consideration of circumstances chiefly belongs to a Theologue What these circumstances are he addes Art 3. In human Acts Who did it By what aides or instruments What Why How When and Abour what he did it are to be inquired into Some explain these Circumstances thus 1 Quis who must not be taken for the efficient cause but for his condition and qualitie as a private person or public c. 2 Quid what must not be understood of the mater or object but of the qualitie thereof 3 Neither must Quomodo how be taken for the forme or manner but whether it be done openly or secretly c. Greg. Ariminensis 2. Sent. Dist 38. Quaest 1. Art 1. strongly assertes and proves That no moral Act wanting its due Circumstance is morally good By an Act morally good I understand saith he no other according to the Doctors than an Act conforme to right Reason objective i.e. the Divine Law according to al circumstances requisite to this that the Act be truly virtuose When therefore a moral operation is not conforme to right Reason or the Law according to al due circumstances it is vitiose and morally evil This his Hypothesis he proves by two Conclusions 1. Conclus That no moral Act wanting any one due Circumstance is truly virtuose This he proves by shewing that the contrary implies a contradiction For if a moral Act want any one due circumstance it is not as it ought to be therefore it is evil Due circumstances are communly said to be such things as are required to this that
of Virtue did indeed come under the Apostles condemnation Rom. 8.6 c. of living after the flesh because they made their carnal Reason Free-wil and Self the only measures and springs of their pretended Virtue Lastly al moral Virtue according to philosophic Placits is but one so that the Virtues of Pagans must be supernatural or none at al as before Thence Greg. Nazianzen Orat. 3. in Julian speaking of the Platonists Stoics and peripatetics saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue to them is only a speciose name and in nothing more lasting than this life Thus Chrysostome Hom. 27. in Joan. It is not yet apparent to me that the Gentiles lived wel For if the hope of the celestial Kingdome and the commination of Hel with other such like sollicitude 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 can scarce keep men in Virtue those who are persuaded of none of these things wil not embrace Virtue But if some of them counterfeit the same this they do out of desire of Glorie c. This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated by Augustine and he grounds it on that eternal Veritie of our Lord Mat. 7.18 Mat. 7.18 Neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit So contra Julian l. 4. c. 3. The unbelieving wil as every Christian grants is an evil tree which cannot produce any other than evil fruits i.e. sins only The like Cyril in Hos 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Probitie in those that God hates is without its reward and good manners tending not to true good shal be always reprehended by him Not but that many Heathens as Christian Hypocrites may performe Acts and Offices materially good which yet may be deservedly as they are by the Ancients termed Sins as they procede not from Faith in Christ and Love to God the main Principes of al true moral Good So Chrysost Tom. 17. Hom. 17. Edit Paris 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They are good workes i.e. materially but dead because they have not Faith 5. The distrioution of moral Good or Virtue into Justice and Pietie Albeit al Virtue according to its formal Idea and Reason be but one yet according to its objective material consideration it may be variously distributed Thus in sacred Philosophie moral Good or Virtue is distributed as to its object or mater into Holinesse and Righteousnesse Ephes 4.24 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In Righteousnesse and Holinesse Righteousnesse comprehends al Second-table-duties which regard men and Holinesse al First-table-duties which regard God This distribution is most ancient and I presume was communly received among the Jews Sure I am Plato has it and as I conjecture from the Mosaic Institutes Thus in his Gorgias pag. 507. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But now he that comports himself decently towards men doth righteous things but he that behaveth himself aecently towards God doth holy or pious things but he that doth both rightcous and holy things must necessarily be righteous and holy Wherein observe 1 That he distributes al moral Good into just or righteous and pious or holy 2 That he makes Justice or Righteousnesse to regard men but Pietie or Holinesse to regard God 3 That some may seem to be righteous towards men who yet are not pious or holy towards God as on the other hand some may pretend to be pious towards God who yet are not just and righteous towards men But 4 he that is just and righteous towards men in giving them their due as also pious and holy towards God in giving him his due such is indeed a virtuose man morally good just and pious Thus also Serranus on Plato Alcibiad 2. pag. 136. takes notice how Plato distributes Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into Pietie and Justice the former relating to the Worship of God the later to men whereby our whole life is duely framed and regulated these being two seminal roots or commun heads of particular Offices and Duties Lastly Plato in his Minos pag. 319. saith That we should take diligent heed first that we offend not in word or deed against God and then that we offend not against men specially such as are divine A Golden Rule for moral Duties CHAP. III. Of Virtue and Moral Libertie Moral Virtue an habitual Perfection Moral Libertie as to state in virtuese Habits Virtue gives 1 Dominion 2 Life Health Vigor 3 Amplitude 4 Nobilitie and Dignitie 5 Beautie and Glorie Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in virtuose Acts. 1 The Contemplation of the first Truth 2 Adherence to the chiefest Good 3 Total actual dependence on the first Cause 4 Conformitie to the divine preceptive Wil as also submission to his providential Wil. 5 Vsing althings in subordination to the Fruition and Service of God Moral Libertie as to exercice the greatest because it brings 1 Order 2 Spontaneitie and suavitie 3 A Divine Life 4 Amplitude 5 Freedom from Sin 6 Stabilitie of Spirit 7 Improvement of Virtue 8 Formal Beatitude § 1. Moral Virtue an habitual Perfection THE general Idea and Nature of Moral Bonitie having been discussed we now procede to the discussion of Virtue as it is the origine and cause of moral Libertie Plato discourseth of Virtue in his Meno the title of which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue properly according to its orgination signifies a Power or Efficace it being derived from Vir which primarily signified among the Ancients a stout valiant man answering to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among the Hebrews So the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily and properly signifies warlike Virtue or Courage from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mars and this from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 arits terrible valiant potent or as Vossius from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 marats to waxe strong Hence in the N.T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used to expresse the Divine power and efficace of God as 1 Pet. 2.9 and 2 Pet. 1.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i.e. by his gloriose power Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is expounded by Hesychius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a divine power So the LXX translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies the gloriose power of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Hab. 3.3 Zach. 6.17 Neither is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used in the N. T. more than once if ever to denote a virtuose disposition of mind namely Phil. 4.8 So curiose were the sacred Pen-men in avoiding philosophic termes which had been so much abused But by moral Virtue we here understand an habitual disposition of Soul conforme to the Rule of Moralitie the Divine Law In which strict notion it has one and the same formal idea or reason with supernatural Grace as Jansenius Amesius and others understand it For that there is no real moral Virtue but what is supernatural has been sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Section § 4. Whence true moral Virtue is nothing else but a certain perfection whereby man is ordained and disposed towards God as Aquinas 1. Quaest 95. Others cal Virtue the
movetur It 's a great Saying of the Platonists That one free is moved from infinite to infinite upon infinite i.e. a virtuose man in al exercices of Virtue is moved 1 From God as the first Cause and original Spring 2 To God as the last End and infinite Good 3 Vpon or according to the infinite Wil and Law of God as the measure and rule of al his virtuose exercices Whence also they tel us That the motion of a free Soul is circular from God as the first Cause to God as the last End and by God and his divine Wil as the measure Such is the amplitude and magnitude of the Soul in al the exercices of Virtue So that it fals under no coarctation or confinement either in regard of Principe or End or Rule but partakes in its measure of that Amplitude which its Principe End and Rule rejoiceth in For such as a mans first Principe last End and Exemplar is such is he as to libertie or servitude Quantò finis altior tantò actus volunâ—â— est libeâ—â— By how much the more ample and sublime the end is by so much the more ample and free is the Act. Again the virtuose Soul adhering to and depending on God as the first Cause obteins great enlargement Whereas sin being an aversion from God our first Principe and last End puts fetters chains limits and confinement on the Soul 5. Moral Libertie as to exercice consistes in the freedome from vitiofe Inclinations Affections and Motions Plato in his Timaeus 〈…〉 persuades us That the culture and cure of every thing consistes in giving it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 its proper diet and exercices and what more efficacious to cure the Soul of its vitiose humors and maladies than to give it its proper virtuose exercices When is the Soul more vigorous and healthful than when it is most in virtuose exercitations Althings are purified by perfective fermentation and is not the Soul also purified from its noxious peccant humors by the divine fermentation of virtuose affections Thus Rom. 12.11 Rom. 12.11 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fermenting or boiling in spirit Syr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is spoken of boiling waters Job 41.22 So Job 30.27 LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 My bowels fermented or boiled The more the affections ferment and boil by virtuose exercices the more free they are to serve God and lesse obnoxious to the service of sin By how much the lesse we serve sin by so much the more free we are And who serve sin lesse than they who are most deeply engaged in virtuose exercices Plato Tim. pag. 89. tels us That the most healthful purgation is by Gymnastic exercitation What is health but the spirituose vigor of Nature And what more promotes this spirituose vigor than exercice And doth not this hold true as to the Soul Is not its most healthful purgation by virtuose exercitation Doth not this most promote the spirituose vigor and health of the Soul What makes the fire to conserve it self in its puritie but its grand and perpetual activitie Doth not also the running stream keep it self pure whiles the standing Pool gathers mud Are althings in Nature purified by motion Quantò virtus aliqua intensiùs tendit in aliquid tantò fortiùs repellit omne contrarium Aquin. and shal we not also allow the same efficace to virtuose exercices It 's true virtuose exercices do not purge out sin by their own innate force as Physic purgeth out il humors but by the divine promisse concurrence and benediction By how much the more intensely the virtuose Soul actually tends to its last end by so much the more strongly doth it repel whatever is contrary thereto 6. Virtuose Exercices most stable and permanent Virtuose Exercices are most stable firme and permanent Therefore most free Moral Libertie as to exercice consistes much in the firmitude stabilitie and permanence of such exercices Whence Plato in his Cratylus pag. 415. derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is always in fluxe or motion whence he makes it to be synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a facile and expedite progresse For saith he it always flows in an equal stable manner The Soul according to Plato is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an ever-moving Principe and therefore it ought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be always in action Now it is most certain that no acts of the Soul are more stable firme and permanent than virtuose acts Thus Arist Eth. l. 1. c. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtuose exercices are most permanent And he gives this reason of it Because blessed Souls live and dwel always in such Acts without tediousnesse or oblivion And Plato in his Cratylus tels us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sloth is the greatest bond and fetter of the Soul which obstructs al virtuose exercices The firmitie and stabilitie of every thing ariseth from its adhesion to its first Principe and last End and by how much the more the Soul departes from these by so much the more instable and sluctuating it is To stand invariable and immutable in adhering unto God under al the vicissitudes and various changes of this World argues great moral libertie as to exercice and wherein consistes the Souls adhesion to God as its first Principe and last End if not in virtuose exercices 7. Virtuose Exercices do greatly improve and advance Virtue Virtuose Exercices improve Virtue and so by consequence moral Libertie Plato in his Timaeus pag. 90. assures us That when the faculties of the Soul grow sluggish and lazy they are rendred more infirme and impotent but by continual action they are made more robust and vigorous And doth not this Philosopheme hold valid in Morals as wel as Naturals Doth any thing render the virtuose Soul more robust and vigorous than virtuose exercices So pag. 103. The Soul is nourished and corroborated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by labors and exercices And are not virtuose labors of al most nourishing and corroborative Thence saith Seneca Labor nourisheth generose minds O! Generosos animos labor nutrit Sen. then how are virtuose minds nourished by the labors of Virtue As the native heat is preserved by the Pulse or twofold motion of the heart so is Virtue by its exercices It 's a trite Saying in the Scholes Cessation from acts diminish habits but continuance therein emproves the same It 's true there is a difference in this regard between acquired habits and virtuose which come by infusion because acquired habits are the natural products of their acts but virtuose habits are not naturally produced by virtuose acts but given in by God of mere Grace God rewards virtuose exercices with farther degrees and advances of Virtue or Grace and that of mere Grace So Mat. 13.12 Mat. 13.12 For whosoever hath to him shal be given 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
not that these Sins appear in al but because they may be yea are in al although latent A man may be nocent although he do no hurt Al Sins are perfect i. e. in corrupt nature before they break forth into effect These and such like great confessions touching the Vitiositie of human Nature made Jansenius break forth into a rapture of admiration that Socrates Plato and other poor Heathens should leave us truer and better Philosophemes hereof than the Pelagians and later Schole-men Yet it cannot be denied but that many of the ancient and moderne Schole-men have given us great notices of this natural Vitiositie specially such as were Sectators of Augustine as Aquinas Ariminensis Bradwardine Alvarez c. We may reduce the explication of the whole to the following Propositions 1 Adams personal actual Sin becomes the natural original Sin of al his Posteritie This the Gentile Philosophers were ignorant of they had some notices of the corruption of nature but were ignorant of the originarie cause and manner of its traduction as Augustine hath wel observed Iste Tullius rem vidit causam nescivit August Peccatum introivit non per modum imitationis sed per modum originis This Traduction of original Sin from Adam to his posteritie is wel demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gentiles lib. 4. cap. 50. where he demonstrates from Rom. 5.12 19. against the Pelagians That this original Sin infects al Mankind not only in a way of imitation which the Pelagians grant but by propagation and traduction And Cap. 52. he farther explicates how Adams personal actual Sin by imputation becomes our original and natural sin This original Sin is termed natural because congenite with proper to and inseparable from corrupt nature as to any power of its own It consistes formally in the privation of original Righteoùsnesse which privation is both our punishment and sin as original Righteousnesse upon the imputation of Adams Sin is by divine Justice denied to us so this privation is our punishment but as it ought to be in us and is wanting by reason of Adam's Sin become ours so it is our sin 2 The Vitiositie of Nature or original Sin is said to be voluntary as it inheres in the Wil and corrupts the same Aristotle tels us Acts are voluntary because they passe from the Wil but habits because they are received into the Wil and impressed thereon Such is original Sin as to its Vitiositie which is as an habitual Pondus impacted on the Wil and inclining it to al manner of vitiose acts Others make original Sin to be voluntary with respect to the commun representative Wil of our first Parent whose Wil as he was a commun Head politically included ours So Davenant and the Schole-men 3 The Vitiositie of corrupt Nature is seminal radical and universal both extensively and intensively As every man naturally considered is a Microcosme or little abridgement of the greater World so morally considered he is a Macrocosme or a great World of corruption Yea al that is of contagion in the greater World comes from the superfluitie of Vitiositie shut up in the heart of man If corrupt human Nature were not on the earth there would be nothing in the World but what was good Yea farther there is more of Vitiositie in one corrupt Nature than a world of Sinners can vent Every man hath sin enough in his own nature to defile the whole Creation And this corruption of nature is so deep that al the fire in the World yea of Hel wil not fetch it out It is universal both as to extension of parts and degrees The man is infected with it from top to toe it poisons his eye ear tongue hand and every part it dogs him from place to place This Plague of corrupt Nature is greater in some than in others and usually greatest in those of greatest condition Al sins in the heart do not act alike at al times yet al are there in the seed and root of corrupt nature Many lusts worke indirectly as Principes that lie low men act in the power of them and yet observe them not 4 This universal Vitiositie of corrupt Nature is the soverain reigning Sin which breeds foments and influenceth al other Sins Adams person first corrupted our Nature and human Nature being corrupted corrupts our persons and our persons being corrupted corrupt al our actions and thereby encrease the corruption of our Natures It is a great Question in practic Theologie What is a mans reigning Sin But if we consider reigning sin simply and absolutely it is no other than corrupt nature It 's true there are in particular persons according to their particular inclinations tentations and circumstances particular sins that bear sway and rule but these are but as Viceroys and Vicegerents under the vitiositie of corrupt nature which is the supreme Soverain and Lord as a cruel beste nourished in our bowels ever ready to devour us The main part of our enmitie against God and his enmitie against us lies in the vitiositie of our natures and its contrarietie to God Rom. 8.6 § 3. The first product of Original Sin Practic Error the cause of al Sin and that which has a maligne efficacious influence on al sin is practic Error or Ignorance How great universal and venimous the Ignorance of al Mankind by nature is Plato frequently inculcates He gives us a lively description hereof in his Repub. 7. pag. 514. Suppose saith he a subterraneous Dungeon in which men should be from their infance bound neck and heels together so that they can see nothing but some glimmerings of light or rather shadows just before them such is the barbaric ignorance of Mankind by Nature It 's true many attain to great speculation and contemplation of things divine even by natures light and heat assisted by commun illuminations yet how defective are they as to al practic knowlege which is the worst ignorance Thus Plato Leg. 3. pag. 689. What is the worst ignorance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lo when a man loves not but hates what he knows and estimes to be honest and good but on the contrary loves and embraceth what he knows to be evil and injust Wherein he instructes us that speculative knowledge conjoined with practic error renders our ignorance most inexcusable and dangerous And that which yet addes greater malignitie to our ignorance is when men fondly conceit they sufficiently understand what indeed they are really ignorant of such proud conceits are the worst self-deceits and errors al the use such make of their knowlege is to concele their ignorance from themselves and others their very light addes to their darknesse And their terrible darknesse is by so much the more deplorable in that they take it for light which they follow with pleasure as children do the Ignis Fatuus which leads them to Precipices Thus Plato Leg. 5. pag. 732. From the same sin this a so happens to men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
it list not as it ought A corrupt Conscience hath many turnings and windings various coverts and hiding places for lust Sometimes the veil of hypocrisie yea of Religion is made use of to cover sin as Mat. 23.14 Sometimes a good name is put on a bad thing or a bad designe is justified by a good end or a good cause is made use of to justifie a bad action or when mens lusts wil not comply with the rule men bring down the rule to their lusts Again sometimes new lights are pleaded to maintain old errors Mens lusts make many controversies about sin they make great sins little and little none at al. Thus practic error and ignorance is the cause of al sin Of which see more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 5. § 4. Not only practic Error Self-love a radical cause of Sin but also Self-love has a maligne venimous influence on al sin Plato hath excellent Philosophemes on this Theme So Repub. 9. pag. 574 c. he describes to the life the servile condition of a wicked person under the Tyrannie of Self-love how he is thereby violently impelled and hurried into al sin So also in what follows pag. 577. of which hereafter Thus likewise in his Leg. 5. pag. 731. he lively demonstrates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Self-love is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an ingenite evil in which they who indulge themselves have no remedie against sin Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And to speak the truth self-love is altogether the cause of al those evils in which the life of man is involved And he gives the reason of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For he that loves is truly blind about what he loves and thence misjudgeth things just good and honest being in this opinion that there is more honor due to him than to truth And Aristotle gives us the reason hereof Because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-lover acts a for himself according to his profit Every self-lover is chained to that great Idol Self which he makes his God and the only Centre in which al the lines of his Affections and Actions meet Self is the last end of self-lovers even in their highest acts of self-denial if they give their goods to the poor or their bodies to be burned for Religion it is al to please self They may crosse their own wils but never crosse self as their last end if they seek after God it is to advance self self-love formes al their actions and passions into a subservience unto some carnal self-interest What makes superstitiose persons so much to vilifie mortifie and with so much severitie torment their bodies but thereby to exalt their inward excellences And as self-lovers make self the last End so also the first Principe of al they do Self-love ever affects self-dependence it would fain have a World of its own to live act and breathe in it lays the whole weight of religiose services on self as the bottome of its dependence it would live and die within the sphere of its own activitie as wel as interest It 's exceeding sweet to self to have a stock of its own even in things religiose to trade with and thereby merit divine favor And alas how soon are men overcome by tentations when they are self-dependent and self-strong He that thinkes to keep himself from sin by self-strength wil soon be overcome by it Now Self being the last End and first Principe of self-love it hence becomes a spermatic universal cause of al sin Every self-lover is his own Idol and whiles he inordinately embraces and adheres to himself he is soon overcome thereby and so hurried into sin Yea self-love makes the best duties and services for God most carnal vile and abominable to God Where self is predominant the intention of the Soul is spurious and rotten and a bad intention makes the best workes bad Where self rules it formes even religiose services into a conformitie to carnal lusts wherefore he that cannot depart from self wil soon depart from God and tumble headlong into al sin Self-love is the strongest carnal concupiscence and most directly opposite to divine love The soverain power of Lust increaseth according to the obedience men render to themselves and self-love by obeying self and its particular movements men make it a God yea the more men endeavor to humor and gratifie it the more tyrannie it is Man has not a worse or more dangerous Companion than himself his carnal self which is so potent to draw him into sin It has always been the ambition of the Creature to deifie it self not by being equal in nature with God but by being its first Cause and last End which is the spring of al departure from God and conversion to the Creature And that which makes self-love more potent to promote sin is its policie and many artifices to concele its self and sin How oft doth carnal self-love put on the masque of true lawful self-love and thereby delude the Soul into sin There is a great ressemblance between spiritual self-love and carnal whence the later oft conceles it self under the vizard of the former The more a man loves himself the lesse he conceits he loves himself as the more mad a man is the lesse he judgeth himself so Self-love is so artificial in its colors as that it can discolor virtue with the face of vice and vice with virtues face Thus by its fraudes and deceits in conceling it self and sin it greatly advances sin The members of self-love are principally three 1 Concupiscence or adherence to the Creature as our last end 2 Carnal confidence or dependence on self as the first cause 3 Spiritual pride or an over-valuing estime of self-excellences Each of these have a venimous influence on al sin as we have largely demonstrated out of Plato and others Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 8 9 10. § 5. Next to the Causes of moral Evil we may consider its Species or Kinds Al moral Evil or Sin may be distributed into involuntary Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful or voluntary again involuntary into sins of Ignorance or of Passion We find the foundation of this distribution in Plato Phileb pag. 22. where he saith That those who choose sin do it either involuntarily and ignorantly or out of a voluntary miserable necessitie 1. As for involuntary Sins they are 1 Sins of Ignorance when the ignorance is not affected either from prejudice voluntary neglect or custome in sin as before § 3. 2 Sins of Passion or Infirmitie when the passion is antecedent to the wil and doth as it were extort the consent of the wil being vehement and violent For if the passion be consequent to the act of the wil or but a languid remisse motion such as doth not force the wil the sin is not so much of passion as voluntary whence passions
5. They know not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This notes their ignorance of Right or Law Neither wil they understand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this notes their oscitance and negligence in examining Causes and maters of Fact They walke in darkenesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This some understand of being blinded by private Affections and Bribes so that they cannot see what is just and equal according to Exod. 23.8 And thou shalt take no gift for the gift blindeth the wise and perverteth the words of the just Now by reason of these things he saith Al the foundations of the earth i. e. the Judaic State are out of course Which shews that injustice destroyes the very foundations of a Nation Thus Job 15.34 And fire shal consume the tabernacles of Briberie How much Justice is necessary to preserve States and commanded by God appears Deut. 16.18 And they shal judge the people with judgement of justice Deut. 16.18 i. e. with an equalitie towards al parties and in al maters So v. 20. Justice justice shalt thou follow i. e. al manner of justice v. 20. nothing but justice exactly diligently continually 2 The Office of a Magistrate must be administred with Temperance Temperance Thus Plato Repub. 3. pag. 403. We have said that the Keepers of the Laws or Magistrates be commanded that they altogether abhor Drunkennesse for it is lawful for any man to be drunke rather than for a Keeper And he gives this reason of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For it is ridiculous that a Keeper should want a Keeper Meaning that a Drunkard wants a Keeper himself and therefore is not fit to be the Keeper of others Thus Solomons Mother Prov. 31.4 Prov. 31.4 It is not for Kings to drinke wine Hebr. it is not convenient for Kings to drinke wine i. e. a large quantitie of it which the Grecians terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a drinker of wine or one given to wine Whence Plato addes pag. 404. That the diet of the Magistrate ought to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 simple not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with varietie of dainties which is most destructive to sanitie 3 Magistrates must administer their Office with moderation as to passions 3. Moderation and freedome from discords Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 378. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Magistrates of the Citie ought to be possessed with this sentiment that it is the basest thing for them to contend by mutual discords How much irregular passions are unbecoming a Civil Magistrate is wel expressed by Aristotle Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 1. art 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is not lawful to pervert a Judge by provoking him to anger or to envie or to compassion for this is al one as if one about to use a rule should pervert the same 4 Clemence also ought to be illustrious in magistratic Administrations 4. Clemence Thence Plato Politicus pag. 274. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We said that a King and Civil Magistrate is a Pastor of Mankind and in this regard a God for mortal man Wherein he makes a Magistrate to be Gods Vicegerent and a Pastor of mankind which denotes his clemence Thence that of Seneca to Nero The clemence of a Magistrate workes a shame of sin in the Subjects that is the greatest punishment which comes from the mildest Magistrate c. 5 Magistrates ought to exercice their Office with Self-denial 5. Fidelitie c. Diligence Courage and Fidelitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 374. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ex quo se Caesar orbi terrarum dedicavit sibi cripuit Seneca By how much the greater the Office of Magistrates is doth it not require by so much the greater vacation and thence the greatest art and diligence How much sloth and negligence is unworthy of a Civil Magistrate we are assured by Homer Iliad 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It becomes not a Magistrate to sleep swectly the whole night to whom the people and so great cares are committed Again Plato Leg. 6. requires that a Judge be indued not only with judgement and prudence for the understanding of maters but also with fidelitie in and for the determination of them § 8. Having explicated the essential Constitution and Administration of Politie we now procede to the Vtilitie thereof The effects of Politie both good and bad as also to what is Conservative and Destructive thereto As for the Vtilitie of a good Politie we have it wel laid down by Plato in his Menexenus pag. 238. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Politie is the Nurse of men good truely of good men but bad of bad men And we are now to explicate that our Ancestors were educated in an excellent forme of Politie by the benefit whereof both those that now live have become good as also they which made a good end of their days He being about to describe the Politie of the Athenian Republic begins with a Preface touching the efficacious influence of good Politie to make men good as also of bad to render men bad Touching those things that are Preservative or Destructive of politic Bodies Plato has given us many Philosophemes Things destructive to Republics As for the Preservatives of a politic Bodie they are sufficiently evident in what precedes touching politic Constitution and Administration and they wil farther appear by shewing what things are destructive thereto 1. 1. Atheisme and carnal Politie As Religion is the main Foundation and Pillar of politic Societie so Atheisme and carnal Politie in subjecting Religion to private interest is that which brings ruine to the same What influence Atheisme has on the ruine of Republics Plato frequently inculcates particularly in his Leg. lib. 10. and elsewhere as hereafter when we come to discourse professedly of Atheisme B. 2. C. 1. S. 2. As more open Atheisme so carnal Politie in prostituting and subjecting Religion to private interest either of State or single persons is a great cause of ruine unto States This was that which brought ruine to the ten Tribes who after their revolt from Rehoboam and Judah being afraid lest that if the people should go up to worship God at Jerusalem they would again be thereby induced to returne to their old Allegeance they upon corrupt reasons of State erected Calves at Dan and Bethel hoping thereby to keep the people in obedience to Jeroboam who had usurped the Governement Now this their politic contrivement in making Religion to subserve their State-interest whereby they hoped to preserve their usurped Politie proved indeed the main cause of their destruction So sotish is the solie of those who endeavor by subjecting Religion to State-interest to secure themselves which is indeed the most compendiose way to State-ruine 2. 2. Luxurie and Idlenesse Another great cause of Ruine to politic Bodies is Luxurie Sensualitie and Idlenesse Plato assures us That Polities are composed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out of the manners of
has had no smal influence on Atheisme in that some of the principal Masters in these Sciences have endeavored to reduce al natural products and effects either to the accidental Concurse of Atomes or to some hidden virtues and spirits in Nature or to the various modifications of mater or to some mundane Spirit exclusive as to the first Cause and divine Providence Thus we find the first appearance of Atheisme to be among those philosophic Wits of Grece Democritus Epicurus c. who did al ways possible trie if they could salve the Phenomena of Nature without a Deitie 3 Eristic Logic has had too great influence on Atheisme as Plato Repub. 7. pag. 539. seems to intimate telling us That young men by frequent Dialectic litigations and contradictions each of other at last come to disbelieve every thing For Scepticisme naturally tends to Atheisme he that disputes every thing at length comes to believe nothing even in things divine 4 But yet the principal Parent and Nurse of Atheisme has been in al Ages carnal Policie The chief lineaments of Atheisme were formed at Rome when it became the Seat of State-policie For the secular Politician ascribes al the revolutions of States and human Affaires to some politic contrivement or defect therein And what makes the present Conclave at Rome and al their adherents so much to abound with Atheisme but the great confidence they have in their carnal policie Neither hath this politic Atheisme infected Rome only but also diffused it self throughout the European World Hence Machiavel that great secular Politician of Florence layeth Atheisme at the foundation of his carnal policie And it is to be feared there are too many such politic Atheists amongst us some are so bold and daring as that they are not ashamed openly to professe it others by their doutful Scepticisme give cause of suspicion I wish we had not too strong motives to force such a belief that a great part of those who professe themselves Christians had they but the advantages of interest and such like selfish motives could with as much facilitie turne Atheists It is natural to carnal reason and policie to step up into the Throne of God and take the Sceptre of his Providence out of his hand as we find it exemplified in Nebuchadnezar Dan. 4.30 Dan. 4.30 Is not this great Babylon that I have built i. e. by my wisdome and power c. 3. 3. From the carnal Mind Pride c. Atheisme springs not from true Philosophie but from the abuse thereof by the carnal mind of man This Plato has wel observed in the place fore-cited de Leg. lib. 12. pag. 967. where he shews that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Atheists who opposed the existence and providence of God as also overthrew the main fundaments of Religion were but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophistic spurious Philosophers Hence that grand Effate of Sr. Francis Bacon That a little Philosophie makes a man an Atheist but a great deal cures him of Atheisme And indeed to speak the truth it is not Philosophie simply in it self but the infidelitie carnal reason and spiritual pride of mans heart that makes men Atheists Psal 10.4 This we are assured of by sacred Philosophie as Psal 10.4 The wicked through the pride of his countenance The Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through is causal denoting the proper interne impulsive cause of the wicked's Atheisme The countenance here is brought in not as the formal subject or proper seat but as the Index of his pride that wherein it doth chiefly discover it self though the proper subject of it be the heart Thence the Thargum thus paraphraseth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through the pride of his spirit Thence it follows wil not seek after God This notes his practic Atheisme founded in speculative Whence it follows al his thoughts are that there is no God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies mischievous thoughts politic designing imaginations The wicked through the pride of his heart is ful of politic Atheistic imaginations that there is no God Thus Psal 14.1 Psal 14.1 The fool hath said in his heart there is no God The fool here is not such an one as wants reason but he that abuseth it unto practic Atheisme This I am bold to assert that the genuine and proper cause of that overspreading Atheisme which covers the face of this politic World is the carnal Reason Infidelitie and spiritual Pride of mens hearts not any defect of evidence in the objects of our Faith This is very clear because the most of your moderne Atheists are as credulous in their way as any other of the simplest of men Why else do they so greedily assent unto any infirme Hypothesis of those they admire upon as sleight and trivious reasons as may be imagined Certainly this so great credulitie in things natural or politic is a sufficient demonstration that it is not so much the want of evidence in maters of Faith that makes men Atheists as the pride and folie of their carnal reasons which they idolise It is a thing most prodigiose that those who abound with such soft facile credulous humors and inclinations to believe yea idolise false Deities created by their own lusts should have their minds prepossest with an incredulitie so obstinate and unpenetrable by al the impressions of the true Deitie 2. Plato gives us an account not only of the origine of Atheisme Threesorts of Atheisme but also of its kinds Thus de Leg. lib. 10. pag. 888. with mild and soft words he endeavors to convince the proud Atheists of his Age under the Symbol of a young man in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. My Son thou art yet young neither do I dout but that progresse of time wil make thee change thy opinion Expect therefore I beseech thee that now thou give thy judgement of the highest points 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which thou now judgest a mater of no moment is indeed a point of the highest consequence namely that any one thinking rightly of God lives wel or il But first touching this mater I wil signifie to thee one great thing lest I should seem to thee a lyer in this mater and it is this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Not thou alone nor thy friends have been the first who have entertained this Atheistic sentiment of God but from al memorie there have been more or fewer who have labored under this disease And I wil tel thee what has happened to them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 namely no one of them who from their youth entertained this opinion that God is not hath persevered therein even unto old age We find a great instance hereof in Bion mentioned by Laertius in his Life who in his health said The Gods were nothing but being worne out by a long disease and fearing death he acknowleged their existence c. Plato addes As for the two other opinions about God namely 1
and the same simply in the some forme In which excellent explication and demonstration of the Immutabilitie of God we have these observables 1 He makes mention of Gods in the Plural Number by reason of the severitie of their Laws and Customes but intends thereby one only God as before in the Unitie of God 2 He demonstrates this one God to be immutable because he cannot be changed either by any other or by himself That he cannot be changed by any other he proves because al change is for the better but God cannot be changed for the better because he is best The same argument he useth to prove that God cannot change himself For such a mutation would be either perfective or amissive God is not capable of any perfective mutation because he is the best and most perfect Being neither is it possible that he should affect any amissive mutation because none willingly change for the worse Proclus addes that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 invariable because al mutation is a signe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of infirmitie as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is inconsistent with the omnipotent Essence In sum this Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence is that Attribute whereby God is said to preserve his own Being without the least power of not Being or conversion into any other Essence or increment and decrement or alteration and motion 1. God immutable in his immanent Acts. God is immutable in al his immanent Acts and Decrees There is a twofold mutation physic and moral physic mutation is by Addition or Ablation and Substraction of some real Entitie Moral mutation is either of Science and Knowlege as when a man judgeth that false which he before thought to be true or else of Wil and Purpose when a man wils that which before he nilled c. God is absolutely immutable in al these respects he is neither capable of physic nor yet of moral mutation either as to Knowlege or Wil. For al mutation either of Knowlege or Wil implies inconstance and imperfection if not imprudence and infidelitie which are al inconsistent with the Divine Being 1. Knowlege 1 God cannot be said to change in regard of his Knowlege because his Knowlege is not distinct from his Being he knows himself and althings else in and by himself he cannot know any thing that he did not know before neither can he know any thing otherwise than he did before He knows things successive without succession by intuition also things complexe by one simple intuitive act His Knowlege is as necessary and eternal as his Essence and therefore most perfect and immutable both extensively and intensively Objects known by God are variable but his knowlege of them and of their variations invariable Althings are the same to Gods knowlege as they are in their own Beings things past present future are present to God in al their circumstances and differences If Gods Science should be changed it would be about things future when they are present and so passe into preterite or what is past but this cannot be because those circumstances of future present past are al determined by the Divine Wil and so present to his Science of Vision Moreover no objects are the cause of the Divine Knowlege but on the contrary the Divine Knowlege and Wil the cause of al objects future present and past In sum God knows al particular objects and circumstances intrinsecally in the glasse of his own Essence and therefore invariably and uniformely Things both complexe and simple may varie but God knows them al invariably in the infinite claritie of his own Divine Essence and Ideas Every thing future if we compare it with the prescience of God it is necessary and necessarily known by him This Immutabilitie of the Divine knowlege Plato oft inculcates under his Divine Ideas by means whereof he makes God to have the most accurate absolute infinite eternal and immutable knowlege of althings So in his Timaeus pag. 28. as in his Parmenides pag. 134 c. as before P. 2. B. 3. C. 9. S. 1. § 4. and in what follows Chap. 4. 2 God is immutable in al the Acts and Decrees of his Wil. 2. Wil. For these also have one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence Again if Gods Wil were mutable his Knowlege must also be so for God cannot know things future but by the determination of his own Wil whence they receive their futurition It 's true God wils al mutations of things yet his Wil admits no mutation It 's one thing to change a Wil Deus non mutat voluntatem sed vult mutationem rerum Aquin. and another to wil a change For God by the same immutable Wil decrees that in such a period of time such a thing shal be and in another the contrary without any beginning to wil what he willed not before or ceasing to wil what he before willed God begins to wil or nil nothing al his Wils and Nils are eternal He hates nothing that he before loved nor loves any thing that he before hated neither doth his Wil admit any degrees of some or lesse No immanent Act or intrinsec denomination can happen de nov◠unto God albeit many yea infinite externe relative denominations may be attributed to him Thus the externe relative denomination of Creator is given to God in time not intrinsecally but extrinsecally the change of Creation was not in God but in the Creature the very act of Creation taken passively and extrinsecally is in the Creature and not really distinguished from it if we consider it actively as in God so it is the same with the Wil and Essence of God in which regard God may be said to be Creator from al Eternitie as his Wil is the productive cause of athings Thus al other externe relations and denominations attributed to God in time as Lord Father c. are not because of any new thing in God but in regard of something new in the Creature from God There is no new Act in God which was not from eternitie albeit the effects of those Acts were not from eternitie but in time Al mutations are proper to Creatures only because Creatures and the mutabilitie of the Creature can have no influence on the immutable God Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore God is altogether immutable and inalterable for he hath determined althings by his Prescience every thing according to its proper and convenient season and place Wherein note 1 That by Gods Prescience must be understood the Divine Decree whence his Prescience resultes and therefore oft put for it 2 That by this Divine Prescience and Decree althings though most mutable and variable as to their proper times and places are immutably determined 3. God is also immutable in regard of his Word Gods Immutabilitie in regard of his Word God being the first Intellect and Truth he cannot
instructes us The least notice of God of great moment That the least notices of God and his Divine Perfections ought to be of great moment and estime with us So in his Critieas pag. 107. by an allusion taken from Painters he illustrates this Hypothesis thus When Painters draw the Pictures of the Gods c. we thinke it sufficient if they give us but any darke representation of them neither do we being unskilful animadvert with a censorious eye on their worke but rest abundantly satisfied in what representation they give us But when they come to draw our own picture or the picture of any that belong to us we more severely animadvert and censure them if they erre in the least point The same is to be observed in the explication of these things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. When we discourse of things celestial and divine we thinke our selves abundantly satisfied if there be the least evidence brought for the explication of their nature but on the contrary in our examens of things mortal and human we are wont to use greater diligence Wherefore if those things which we are now about to discourse of be not so exactly as their dignitie requires represented by us you 'l pardon us An excellent preface to a discourse of things divine touching God which Plato is here entering on Hence 4. Al notices of God by Divine Revelation Plato adviseth us not to expect or desire farther discoveries of God than his own revelation and illumination shal afford to us So in his Timaeus pag. 29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It must be remembred both by me that speak and by you who are Judges of my discourses that we have but human Nature and therefore if we can but attain unto some Oriental Tradition or probable relation of these things touching God c. we may not inquire farther about them That by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must understand some Oriental Judaic Tradition originally of divine revelation I thinke wil appear evident to any that considers the use of this phrase in Plato Indeed in our contemplations and discourses of God it is neither profitable nor safe to procede further than divine Revelation and Illumination shal conduct us Neither need we be ashamed to be ignorant of such Secrets of God the humble ignorance of which argues more solid knowlege than curiose and vain speculations thereof These are the best bounds for our inquiries about God not only to follow God learning but also to leave off inquiring when and where God leaves off to teach as we may not neglect what God has reveled of himself so we may not search into what God has kept secret for as the former argues too much sloth and ingratitude so the later too much pride and curiositie It was a great Saying of Augustin We may safely follow Scripture which as an indulgent mother goes softly that she may not go beyond our infirmitie A believing ignorance in things not reveled about God is much better than a rash science Al natural reason and investigation about God ought to follow not precede faith Hence 5. The Gradation of our ascent to God Plato informes us That our ascent in the contemplation of God musk be by the same degrees by which he descendes to us either in his workes or words Thus Repub. 6. pag. 509 c. he informes us That it is above al human capacitie to comprehend the Majestie of the chiefest Good as it is in its inaccessible splendor yet we may ascend thereto by certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gra es or degrees which Grades of Ascent must be taken from Gods Grades or degrees of Descent unto us that so we may by a certain Analogie and similitude ascend up to the knowlege of God so far as it is possible for man Yet he gives us this needful caution That we must speake soberly of these so great Mysteries and take heed that we ascribe not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a spurious birth to the Parent of the Vniverse The grades or degrees whereby God descendes to us and we ascend to him are either natural or supernatural 1. Natural Grades of knowing God The natural Grades or Degrees whereby God descendes down to us and we ascend up to him are al the Effects Products and Workes of God with al their Virtues Efficaces Orders Varieties and al manner of Perfections So Plato Repub. 6. treating largely of Gods Causalitie he saith Al natural Causes and Effects are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Workes Artifices and Children of God the great Parent of the Vniverse whereby we may ascend up to the knowlege of God This is more natively and clearly laid down in sacred Philosophie Rom. 1.19 20. as Rom. 1.19 20. where he saith the visible workes of God as so many ascents lead us up to the contemplation of the invisible perfections of God specially his eternal power and Godhead That there is a natural knowlege of God gained by the Book of Nature is most evident albeit the Socinians to serve their Hypothesis denie it This natural knowlege of God is either insite or acquisite So Dion Prusaeensis said that our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 persuasion of God was either innate or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 acquisite Our insite and innate knowlege of God consistes in those commun notices of God both speculative and practic which are impressed on the Conscience Our acquisite natural knowlege of God is that which is gained by actual comparation and discourse from the workes of God This acquisite knowlege may according to the distribution of that spurious Dionysius who was indeed a great Platonist cap. 2. de Myst Theolog. be acquired and promoved three ways by way of Causalitie by way of Eminence by way of Negation 1 By way of Causalitie when by the Effects of God 1. By way of Causalitie which are either little Images or at least Vestigia Footsteps of God we mount up to the knowlege and contemplation of God the original Parent or first Cause of al. For indeed the effect carries with it the signature impresse and ressemblance of its Cause as you frequently see the Parents complexion or conditions in the Child Thus Plato Repub. 6. pag. 507. having laid down this preface that it was impossible to comprehend yea to apprehend any thing of the Divine Majestie in himself he tels us That he would inquire after him in his off-spring or effects and then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but take heed lest I should against my wil give you a spurious Idea of the Child of this great Parent He speakes in the language of Aratus cited by Paul Act. 17.28 we are al his off-spring Act. 17.28 and applies this notion to al lower goods which he makes to be the off-spring or issue of the chiefest Good and therefore by them we ascend up to the
of our Understanding is mutable because dependent on externe objects and Mediums but the Truth of the Divine Understanding immutable and therefore the measure of al Truth as Aquinas wel notes This is incomparably wel illustrated by Bradwardine l. 1. c. 24. pag. 244. God saith he by reason of his most infinite claritie comprehendes althings and al particles of time as they are most truely in himself for he needs not comparation or relation of things past or future to the present instant according to the manner of our human infirmitie but he understandes althings together and most clearly by his own Essence and Wil which represences althings uniformely and invariably As if there should be an immobile eye in the Centre of the Heavens which should see by extramission and actively as God seeth it would then always see uniformely without al mutation every part of the Heavens turning round and the same part now in the East and anon in the South and then in the West Thus God in like manner sees al variable objects and parts of time with their distinct vicissitudes and successions without the least variation or succession because he sees althings not passively by species and impressions received from the things themselves but actively in his own Essence and Wil the active Principe of al. We poor mortals by reason of our infirmitie cannot distinctly apprehend al the particles of time always fluent and succeding each other and therefore we take the present instant which of al time is most actual and best known to us and make it the measure of past present and future time whence our knowlege also is successive and mutable but God who knows althings in his own Eternitie is not liable to such succession and mutation his Science being a pure necessary Act must needs be immutable and invariable albeit it terminates on objects in themselves most mutable and variable the mutation of the object makes no mutation in the divine Science because the mutable object is only the secundary object of Gods knowlege the primary object is the divine Essence which is immutable and therefore the divine Science such also Should Gods knowlege depend on the objects known then it would be mutable as they are but not otherwise God necessarily knows every Entitie both actual and potential wherefore 1 he can never know any thing that he is ever ignorant of 2 He can never be ignorant of what he ever knows 3 He cannot know more of fewer things than he knows 4 He cannot begin to know what he before knew not or not to know what before he knew because nothing begins to be future This immutabilitie of the divine Science as to things future arising from the determination of his own soverain Wil and not from any thing in the object is nervosely demonstrated by pious and learned Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne in his elaborate MSS. De Libero Arbitrio which lies buried in Exeter College Librarie Oxon. Wherein he copiosely demonstrates That the Causes Origines and Reasons of althings future though in themselves never so instable are most stable immutable necessary yea eternal in the divine Decree and Wil whence also the Divine Science is most certain necessary and immutable This he confirmes by Plato's Ideas which are immutable and invariable exemplars of althings future as before That the Divine Science is immutable and necessary so Greg. Ariminens Sent. l. 1. Dist 39. pag. 130 140. Hence 4. The Divine Science is most certain and infallible 4. Divine Science most certain Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 382. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I judge no mortal would be really willing both to deceive and be deceived or to be ignorant of supreme Beings much lesse God The Science of God being necessary ad immutable it cannot but be most certain and infallible To know things certainly is to know them in their causes now Gods Wil being the Cause of althings he thence knows them perfectly Gods Science is as certain as the future events for where there is a determinate effect there must be a determinate cause and where the cause is determinate there the science also may be determinate The knowlege of things future in God is as certain as the knowlege of things present for every future compared to God the first Cause and his Science is necessary and necessarily future albeit as compared to the second causes some effects may be contingent or contingently future The primary object of the divine Science being infinitely perfect namely the divine Essence it cannot but be most certain and infallible if there be any certaintie and infallibilitie in human Science how much more in divine Science which penetrates al Essences and Truths with the most perfect light and most simple intuition contemplating every Being and Truth as it is in it self in the glasse of the divine Essence The divine Intellect sees althings as existent in themselves by the infinite light of the divine Essence and therefore most certainly and infallibly as Esa 40.13 14. Hence 5. The Dâ—â—â—â—e Science is absolute and independent not conditionate and dependent on any create Object Thus Plato 5. Gods Science absolute and in dependent in his Parmenides pag. 134 c. makes his divine Ideas to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-subsistent and independent as to al externe objects and condition For otherwise saith he God should not have a certain knowlege of and soverain dominion over human affaires It 's impossible that any effect should be or be understood as future in any case but dependently on its efficient cause Now what is the first and universal Essicient of al effects but the Decree of the divine Wil on which every effect dependes more than on its proxime cause Therefore as nothing is antecedent to the divine Wil so no Hypothesis or condition is cognoscible or knowable antecedently thereto Gods knowlege as it dependes not on the existence of created objects so neither on any Hypotheses or conditions that are appendent unto such objects placed in such circumstances For al futures whether absolute or conditionate are known by God not from the determination of second causes but from the determinatin of the divine Wil which is the first Cause For whence springs the futurition of things but from the determination of the divine Wil And must not then the determination of the divine Wil be precedent to the determination of the second CAuse And if so may we not then hence conclude that Gods Science arising from the determination of his own Wil dependes not on the existence of or any conditions that belong to future objects If the divine Essence be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent must not the divine Science which is identified therewith be also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent Or if the divine Science should depend on the mutable conditions of its object can it be any other than conjectural Where any science dependes on its
also Cap. 18. pag. 223. God saith he knows things future by that whereby they are future namely by his Divine Wil. And he urgeth for this that Principe of Aristotle 1. Post 2. To know a thing certainly is to know it by its cause But now God knows al futures certainly therefore by their most true cause even that which virtually contains al other causes and causations and this is no other than his own wil. That God knows althings future in the determination of his own Wil was the commun Hypothesis of the ancient Scholastic Theologues as of Augustin before them So Robert Grosseteste in his M. SS De Libero Arbitrio Thus Scotus assures us That the Root of the Divine Science as to future Contingents is the determination of the Divine Wil which determination is not only necessary to cooperate with the free Creature but also to determine the Wil of the Creature to act freely This Hypothesis is also excellently well explicated and demonstrated by Alvarez de Anxil Grat. l. 2. Disp 7. p. 106. God saith he in the absolute efficacious Decree of his own Wil predetermining in particular al future Contingents as also free acts knows certainly and infallibly those to be future as to al circumstances as wel as to their substance Therefore from this Decree there may be assigned a sufficient Reason of the certitude of Divine Science as to al futurs which are not morally evil And he thus proves his Hypothesis A determinate cause which is so efficacious as that it cannot be hindred by any other cause must needs infallibly produce its effect but such is the Divine Decree Ergo. Then p. 108. he explicates how God knows sin God certainly and infallibly knows al future sins in that Decree whereby he decrees to predetermine the create Wil to the entitie of the act of sin so far as the act is ens and to permit the moral evil of sin as sin c. as before 3. The Jesuites superadde to the two former Sciences of simple Intelligence and Vision Scientia media Scientia Media a middle Science whereby God is supposed to foresee such or such events to be future on condition that such or such causes he so or so constituted This Middle Science 1. supposeth that some events are certainly future independently as to the Wil of God which is altogether impossibly for a thing merely possible cannot pass from its state of possibilitie to a state of Futurition without some cause of that transmutation now there can be no cause of futurition but the Divine Wil as we shall prove hereafter Nothing can be future either absolutely or conditionately but what the Divine Will has decreed shal be future therefore the object of this Middle Science cannot be things future but only possible Doth not this Middle Science by feigning that future which is only possible overthrow the very foundation of the Divine Science as to things future Is it not impossible that the prescience of a thing future should precede the decree of its futurition So Avarez de Auxil l. 2. cap. 7. Nothing can make a thing cognoscible as future but what gives futurition thereto And what gives futurition to any thing but the decree and determination of the Divine Wil 2 It supposeth Gods Science to depend upon its object which also is impossible because then it should be variable and mutable as the object is Yea to speak properly the object of this Middle Science is not at al cognoscible or knowable For nothing is knowable farther than it is clothed with some degree of necessitie at least as to essence or existence what is not either necessarily existent or future cannot be known now the object of this Middle Science is not either existent or future therefore not cognoscible Again God takes not the reason or idea of his cognition from the things themselves or any Hypotheses they fal under which are al variable but from the invariable determination of his own Wil as before It 's true our Intuition and Cognition is formed by a passive reception of species from its object Nostra intuitio fit patiendo abobjectis non sic intuitio divina and therefore it is murable and variable according to the variations of the object but can we imagine that this imperfect mode may attend the Divine Intuition and Cognition Should the principe and reason of the Divine Cognition procede from and depend on its finite object must not God also be finite passive and dependent Is not the Divine Idea before its Ideate yea eternal How then can it depend thereon 3 This Middle Science supposeth the Divine Science to be only conjectural and uncertain For such as the object is such is the Science thereof a contingent object cannot give a necessary certain Science al Logic scientific necessitie is founded in physic necessitie That which may otherwise be cannot be necessarily known as Gods knowlege would be false if he knew those things to be future which shal never be so would it be incertain if the object be not certainly future if the object be certainly future it must have a certain cause of its futurition which can be no other than the Wil of God But now according to this hypothetic Middle Science God cannot divine which way mans Free-wil wil incline it self before it hath inclined to this or that object and doth not this render the knowlege of God only conjectural yea no knowlege at al For how can a thing be certainly known to be future without some cause determining it to be such That Gods knows althings future though never so contingent in themselves most certainly in the determination of his own Wil see Greg. Ariminens Sent. l. 1. Dist 38. Quaest 2. also Grosseteste de Libero Arbitrio Wherefore if God has a certain prescience of future contingents as without al peradventure he has we must search for the causes of this Divine Prescience not in the extrinsec objects which can never give it but in God himself and in the determination of his own Wil in regard of which al future contingents are necessary not absolutely but hypothetically on supposition of the said determination 4 This Middle Science enervates and destroyeth the Grace of God 1 It destroyes the Grace of Election in that it supposeth that Peter could from his own free-wil consent to the Cal of God provided he were put under such circumstances and invested with such commun aides even antecedently to his Election to Grace and Glorie which they make to follow the prevision of his Faith by this Middle Science And thus the whole of Election dependes on the improvement of Free-wil and the prevision thereof by this Middle Science 2 It enervates and dispirits the whole of Christs Redemtion in that it makes al the efficace of Christs Death dependent on the prevision of mans assent and consent to him as Lord. It supposeth that Christ died for no man absolutely but only on
in Divine Actions but what he wils yea because he wils it Thus Carthusianus in 4. Dist 46. Quaest 1. The whole order of Justice is originally reduced to the Divine Wil whatever God wils is just neither is his Wil properly restrained by Justice So Scotus l. 4. Dist 46. Quaest 1. That is always just which is actually willed by the Divine Wil and because it is actually willed by the Divine Wil. The Rule of Justice whereby men are to act ties them up to one part of the contradiction so that they are unjust if they act not so but there is no such Rule of Justice to be affixed to God farther than the free constitution of his own Wil has tied him up Gods Wil reveled is a Rule of Justice to us his Creatures but his absolute soverain Wil is that alone that regulates him in al his actions Therefore learned Davenant saith That God cannot wil any thing but salvâ justitiâ i. e. he can do nothing contra justitiam yet he may wil and do many things praeter justitiam i. e. he may freely decree and do many things where salvâ justitiâ he might as freely have decreed and done the contrary So Lombard l. 1. Dist 43. God could have omitted what he doth and have done what he omits without injustice Hence 2. Prop. Gods ordinate Justice towards the Creature has one and the same Idea with his Veracitie or Fidelitie Gods ordinate Justice the same with his Veracitie Psal 119.123 Thence in sacred Philosophie the Righteousnesse of God is oft put for his Veracitie and Fidelitie in making good his word So Psal 119.123 For the word of thy righteousnesse i. e. the word of thy promisse which thy righteousnesse or fidelitie is obliged to make good So Psal 31.1 89.14 There is indeed in God no Justice properly so termed in which respect he may be said to be obliged to his Creature but that which we stile the Justice of God towards his Creature is no other than his Fidelitie which presupposeth some constitution of the Divine Wil wherefore abstracting such a constitution God cannot be said to do any thing repugnant to his Justice For what is Justice according to its general Idea but to give every one his own And what has the Creature that it may claim as its own but what it receives from the Divine Wil Again Justice is a Conformitie or Equalitie according to the obligation or debt which every one fals under Justitia Dei est agere secundum condecentiam Bonitatis aut Veracitatis suae Albert p. 1. tract 19. q. 77. and what obligation or debt can there befal God with relation to his Creature but what his own goodnesse and wil laies upon him How can God be obliged to any but by his own wil and word What then is his Justice but to act according to the condecence or congruitie of his own Veracitie or Bonitie as the Schole-men determine Hence in things where there is no expresse declaration of the Divine Wil Covenant or Promisse on God part if he should pretermit that which he doth or do that which he pretermits if he should deal more severely or more mercifully with any than he doth there could be no injustice fastened on him Hence 3. Prop. There can be no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 No acception of persons with God or Acception of persons charged on God This is expressely laid down Rom. 2.11 of which before And the reasons are most evident 1 Because Acception of persons has place only in him who is under an obligation to distribute justice not according to his pleasure but according to certain Qualities Reasons or Conditions inherent in or appendent to the persons to whom the said justice is to be distributed But now God is under no obligation but what flows from his own soverain pleasure to distribute rewards or punishments to any 2 Acception of persons cannot have place in the distribution of good things merely gratuitous and free but only in such as are of debt But now Gods distributions of good things are merely gratuitous Thus Aquinas Acception of persons is only of a thing due and therefore it cannot be ascribed to God None can owe any thing to another but by this that he doth in some manner depend on or hath received something from another but God dependes on no one neither doth he receive any thing from any other Acception of persons has place only where in the dispensation of things due any favors one more than another with respect to some circumstance of the person contrary or beside the merits of the cause Therefore albeit God give out of his mere liberalitie inequally to persons equal yet this is not Acception of persons because there is nothing due Hence 4. Prop. There is an infinite distance between the Justice of God The difference between the Justice of God and Men. and of men 1 Al human Justice ariseth from an obligation and debt but Gods Justice from the mere free constitution of his Wil Man wils things because they are just but things are therefore just with God because he wils them 2 Many things that are injust with men are just with God The rule of Justice which tieth men to do justly doth also render them injust when they do otherwise But now God where he hath not brought himself under an obligation by his own free constitution and promisse hath a libertie of acting or not acting of doing this or the contrary in the distribution of rewards and gifts If he should not do what he doth or if he should do what he doth not his Justice were the same If God spoil the Egyptians to enrich his people or if he enrich the Assyrians by the spoils of his people he is just stil Where God hath not obliged himself by his own Word he has a libertie of doing one thing or the contrary without injustice Yet 5. Prop. So far as God hath obliged himself by the constitution of his own Wil and Word Gods Justice regards the Qualities of its object his ordinate Justice ever regardes the Constitution and Qualities of the object Gods ordinate Justice being the same with his Veracitie and Fidelitie it alwaies respects such Qualities and Conditions as its object by reason of his own constitution is invested with For God in the executions of his ordinate Justice assumes the qualitie of a Judge and a Judge cannot duely abstain from the administration of Justice neither is Justice duely administred unlesse the Qualities of the objects and merits of the cause be fully inspected and considered Gods ordinate Justice as Rector and Judge of the Al is chiefly exercised in the reduction of althings to that equalitie and order which his Divine Wisdome and Wil has prescribed unto them Hence these two things necessarily follow this Divine ordinate Justice 1 It never exerts it self but where those Qualities and Conditions which it has prescribed its object be
the same manner as they who follow Arius he divides and supposeth Subjects inducing Hypostases subordinate among themselves and conceits the Holy and Consubstantial Trinitie to be three distinct Gods And albeit Learned Cudworth B. 1. C. 4. p. 590. against Atheisme endeavors to wipe off this aspersion yet he grants the conclusion as hereafter But to speak the truth I find no express mention of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Trinitie in Plato only he speaks confusedly of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Father Lord and of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mind c. But among the later Platonistes of the Schole of Alexandria ' specially those of the golden succession the Sectators of Ammonius Plotinus Porphyrie Iamblichus Proclus we find frequent mention and notices of a Trinitie which they thus distinguish 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Supreme self-being whom also they stile 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the one and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Good 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine mind the Creatrix or Framer of althings who is also termed by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the seminal Word or Reason that gives Being to althings 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Soul of the Vniverse and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first Soul as c. 8. § 2. These more distinct notices of a Trinitie I am very apt to perswade my self they received not so much from Plato but from Ammonius the famose Head of that Succession who was either a Christian or a friend to their Sacred Philosophie out of which he stole most of his choisest Philosophemes and incorporated them into the bodie of his Platonic Philosophie in order to a refinement thereof which albeit his designe might be good yet it proved the peste and subversion of the Christian Theologie at least among those of that Schole For Origen his Scholar following in his steps out of too fond a love for Platonic Philosophie reduced Sacred Philosophie to Platonic Dogmes which proved the original cause of the greatest Errors that befel the Church in succeeding Ages Thus he makes the Three Persons in the Trinitie to be according to the Three Platonic Hypostases One not in Essence but Wil only So Origen contra Celsum l. 8. p. 386. Edit Cantabr 1658. Where having cited that Act. 4.32 There was of al the Believers one Heart and one Soul he brings it to prove what our Lord affirmes Joh. 10.30 I and the Father are one And thence in what follows concludes thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Therefore we religiosely worship the Father of Truth and the Son who is Truth as being truely two in Hypostase but one in concord consent and identitie of Wil So that whosoever sees the Son shall in him see God as in the Image of God c. Hence Origen in imitation of these Platonistes supposed an essential dependence of the Son the second Hypostasis on the Father as also of the Spirit the third on the Son of which essential dependence and subordination see Cudworth against Atheisme L. 1. C. 4. p. 581 c. Yea Origen in his Comments on John wil needs persuade us That the Word in Divine things is taken only metaphorically How far Origen's Platonic Philosophemes laid the foundation for the Arian and other Heresies touching the second and third Person in the Trinitie see Court Gent. p. 3. l. 2. c. 1. § 8 9. Samosatenus also had his pestiferous infusions from Plotinus's Philosophemes about the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Arius his from the same Schole as we have more fully proved in our Discourse of the Vanitie of Philosophie B. 2. C. 1. § 8. But whereas Amelius of old and some late Socinians would fain persuade us that John borrowed his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Joh. 1.1 from Plato it 's evident that he had it from the Sacred Philosophie among the Hebrews for in the ancient Chaldaic Thargum we find frequent mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word of Jehovah whereby they understood the Messias as Gen. 3.8 Psal 2.12 and 27.1 as elsewhere Yea Celsus would needs persuade us That the Christians came to cal their Jesus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 THE SON OF GOD from their Pagan Ancestors who called the World made by God the Son of God But this is refuted by Origen Contra Celsum l. 6. p. 308. Edit 1658. Where he proves that this Character of Jesus was to be found in the Writings of Moses and the Prophets who writ long before the Grecian Philosophers That al those confused notices of a Trinitie among the Platonistes were originally traduced from Sacred Philosophie see Clem. Alexandr Strom. 5. p. 436. Eusebius praepar Evangel l. 11. from cap. 14. to 23. Philos General Part. 1. l. 1. c. 2. sect 5. § 2. and l. 3. c. 4. sect 1. § 13. also Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. c. 5. § 7. Learned Cudworth in his Book against Atheisme B. 1. C. 4. sect 35. p. 548. saith We may reasonably conclude that which Proclus asserteth of this Trinitie as it was contained in the Chaldaic Oracles to be true that it was at first 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Theologie of Divine Tradition or Revelation or a Divine Cabala viz. amongst the Hebrews first and from them afterwards communicated to the Egyptians and other Nations However addes he we freely acknowledge that as this Divine Cababa was but little understood by many of those who entertained it among the Pagans so was it by diverse of them much depraved and adulterated For 1 the Pagans universally called this their Trinitie a Trinitie of Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the First the Second and the Third God 2 Whence p. 557. he procedes to demonstrate that the direct designe of this Platonic Trinitie was nothing else but to lay a foundation for infinite Polytheisme Cosmolatrie and Creature-worship Where by the way he wel observes That these Pagans who so much cried up this Platonic Trinitie were the only public and professed Champions against Christianitie and the Christian Trinitie 3 He addes p. 559. That the Three Hypostases or persons asserted by the Christians are truely and really one God and not one only in Wil as Origen and the Platonistes avouch 4 He informes us p. 564. That Proclus and other of the Platonistes intermingle many particular Gods with those three Vniversal Principes or Hypostases of their Trinitie as Noes Minds or Intellects superior to the first Soul and Henades and Agathotetes Vnities and Goodnesses superior to the first Intellect too thereby making those particular Beings which must needs be Creatures superior to those Hypostases that are Universal and Infinite So great confusions yea contradictions attendes the Platonic Trinitie which yet is too much admired CHAP. VII Of Gods prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general God the first Cause demonstrated The Object of Divine Concurse Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the
concurse Thence in sacred Philosophie the Divine Efficience is frequently expressed by the Word of God as the Word of Creation Gen. 1.3 Conservation Psal 107.20 Gubernation Destruction Restitution c. thereby to denote the efficacitie of the Divine Wil as mans Wil is expressed by his word of which hereafter § 4.6 Prop. See this Hypothesis wel demonstrated in Bradward Caus Deil l. 1. c. 9. p. 190. c. 10. p. 196. Ariminensiâ— Sent. 1. Distinct 45. Joan. Major Sent. 2. Quaest 3. § 4. Having discussed the Concurse of God The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 1. It is immediate as it relates to its Object and Subject or Principe we now come to treat of it in its Adjuncts and Modes of operation which wil give us great indications and notices of its nature 1. The concurse of God is as to its Mode of operation immediate This Adjunct or Mode of operation follows immediately on the origine or principe of Divine Concurse for it being nothing but the simple volition of God Particularly as to gratiose effects it thence necessarily follows that it must be immediate as to al objects and effects Esa 55.10 11. This immediation of Divine Concurse is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie So Esa 55.10 11. For as the rain cometh down and the snow from Heaven and returneth not thither but watereth the earth and maketh it to bring forth and bud that it may give seed to the sower and bread to the eater so shal my word that goeth forth out of my mouth it shal not returne unto me void but it shal accomplish that which I please and it shal prosper in the thing whereto I sent it 1 This must be understood not only of Gods reveled word but also of his efficacious word of concurse productive of things Psal 72.6 So Psal 72.6 2 Gods effective operative word or concurse is compared to the Rain which by Gods ordinance fals to water the earth straining it self through the liquid Air as through a Sieve dividing it self into millions of drops and immediately watering every inch of earth that so every herbe may receive its proportion of moisture gradually and immediately according to its exigence just so proportionably doth the efficacious concurse of God immediately insinuate it self into al second causes operations and effects specially such as are gratiose Hos 14.5 The like allusion we find Hos 14.5 I wil be as the dew to Israel he shal grow as the lillie Esa 26.19 The like Esa 26.19 For thy dew is as the dew of herbes The dew you know fals in a silent quiet night in millions of smal imperceptible drops and being of a gentle insinuating nature gradually and insensibly sokes into the erth tempers and allays the heat thereof specially in those hotter countries and immediately insinuates it self into the roots of plants which by reason of its moist benigne nitrose qualitie it comfortes refresheth and encourageth calling forth the fruits hereof and causing the face of things to flourish with beautie and delight much more efficaciously than sudden great shours or land-flouds which are more violent but lesse beneficial Thus Christ's gratiose concurse and influence fals like dew on the Believers heart in millions of drops which gradâ—aly insensibly and immediately insinuate thereinto causing it to fructifie and flourish much more effectively than al the shours of Divine wrath or Land-flouds of spiritual Bondage which suddenly break in on the consciences of many convict legal consciences but soon drie up again and leave them more barren and hard-hearted than before The Greek Theologues expresse this immediation of Divine Grace various ways sometimes they terme it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitant or indwelling Grace sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitation of the holy Spirit because it is wrought by the Spirit of God immediately as dwelling in the Believers heart But to treat more generally of Divine Concurse and its immediation as to al Objects Operations and Effects Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715 assures us That according to the ancient Tradition God has not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the beginning and the end but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the middle of althings i. e. God by his efficacious concurse penetrates althings and is more intimate and immediate to them than they are to themselves So also in his Parmenides he tels us That the prime Idea or cause is intimately present with althings influencing al both smal and great Whence he termes al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Co-operators with God But before we come to the demonstration of our Hypothesis we must premit somethings by way of explication and limitation 1 When we say Gods concurse to al second causes and effects is immediate we do not thereby exclude al means as if God did so concur as not to make use of second causes and instruments but that God concurs immediately in and with al means As in order to health God prescribes and useth means yet he concurs immediately in and with those means so in supernatural effects God useth Ministers and Ordinances yet concurs immediately in and with them 2 God concurs immediately to al second causes and effects not only by the immediation of Virtue but also immediatione suppositi by the immediation of his Essence for indeed the virtue of God is nothing else but his Essence or Wil as the effective Principe of althings The Divine Supposite is not so much as ratione or formally distinguished from his Virtue which is his effective omnipotent Wil. These premisses being laid down we procede to explicate and demonstrate the Immediation of Gods Concurse in the following Propositions 1. Prop. God concurs immediately unto every Act of the second Cause God concurs immediately to every Act of second Causes This Proposition is asserted not only by the Thomistes but also by the Jesuites Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. sect 1. and others And the reasons are invincible 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Aristotle in his Physics l. 8. c. 5. Metaphys l. 2. c. 12. assures us That in Agents per se and properly subordinate the inferior cannot act without the influxe or concurse of the superior cause And the reason is evident because if the inferior cause could act without the influxe of the superior it were not subordinate unto the superior in that act Neither is it sufficient to say that the second cause is subordinate to God as its Essence and Virtue is conserved by God according to the sentiment of Durandus and his Sectators for such a subordination of the second cause to the first is only accidental and remote as to its acting And who knows not that an accidental remote cause is not properly a cause Al proper subordination implies dependence of the inferior cause on the superior not only quando but quatenus agit both when and as it actes 2 From the limitation
Mat. 7.18 How did Paul when he was a Persecutor become a Preacher How did Peter when he had abjured Christ get off this spot By what means was the wild Olive implanted into the good Olive Rom. 11.17 Rom. 11.17 How did the Thief get admission into Paradise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 having perceived therefore the force of precedent Divine aide every one that wils both labors and moves althings for a naked wil sufficeth not and learnes and attains Salvation Wherein he assertes 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that supernatural antecedent aide or Grace workes al in maters of Salvation 2 That the naked wil sufficeth not to performe any good Chrysostome in Genes Hom. 9. cals this prevenient Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace that seeks what is lost and is found by such as seek it not Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipant Grace So de Baptis lib. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By the prevenient Grace of God we worke and confer our duties according to saith by love This antecedence and Prioritie of Divine Concurse may be demonstrated 1 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil which necessarily precedes the Act of the second cause because eternal and independent as before 2 From the efficace of the Divine Concurse as it infallibly determines the second cause to act and so must be necessarily antecedent thereto not only simultaneous as the Jesuites hold 3 From the Dependence and Subordination of the second cause to the First Al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses dependent on and subordinate to the First cause as Plato now where there is dependence and subordination here must necessarily be Prioritie and Antecedence of that on which the subordinate dependes Thus Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 2. pag. 568. By comparing saith he the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the Creature whence it is said that the first cause doth first influence or concur because the second cause actes not but in and by its virtue Yet it cannot be denied but that the Jesuites generally allow God only a simultaneous Concurse as o the acts of the Wil because otherwise as they conceit the libertie of the Wil cannot be preserved This simultaneous concurse they make to be nothing else but the very action of the second cause as it procedes from God Burgersdicius Metaph. l. 2. c. 11. grants that Gods Concurse in supernatural Acts is previous but yet in naturals he allows it to be only simultaneous But that Gods Concurse not only in supernaturals but also in naturlas is previous the Dominicans strongly prove from the very nature of the First cause and dependence of the second for where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie there is posterioritie c. 4. Gods Concurse to and with second causes is total Gods Concurse total This Totalitie of the First cause doth not exclude the Totalitie of the second cause in its kind but only its partialitie and coordination in the same kind For it 's a trite Rule in Philosophie that in causes subordinate there may be diverse total causes in different kinds concurring to the same effect but not in the same kind So we say that God and the Sun and Man are al total causes in the production of a Man because they al have different kinds of causalitie When therefore we say that Gods Concurse is total we do only denie the Coordination or Copartialitie of the second cause We allow the second cause to cooperate with God in a way of subordination but not to be a coordinate social or copartial cause with God Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects workes al totally and solitarily it admits not of a Corrival or Copartner it is no partial cause but workes the whole effect though not without the subservience of inferior causes and instruments As in natural causes you ascribe the whole efficace and causalitic of the instrument to the principal cause specially if the instrument be purely passive without any inherent virtue of its own As you ascribe not the victorie to the Generals Sword but to his Valor so here the instruments which Christ useth in the workes of the new Creation are purely passive they have no efficace but what is imparted to them by him the principal Efficient and therefore they cannot be partial social causes This Totalitie of Divine Concurse is wel demonstrated by that great and pious Witnesse against Antichrist even in the darkest times of Poperie Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lancolne in his MSS. de Libero Arbitrio Efficacious Grace so workes with the Freewil that at first it prevents the act of the Wil and afterwards concurs yet not so as if part were wrought by Grace and part by Free-wil but each in its kind workes the whole for two individual Agents must necessarily worke one and the same effect when their action is indivise This Augustin illustrates by a Rider and the Horse by whom one and the same act or motion is totally produced so the Action of God and of the Wil concur totally And so in every effect of every Creature God and the next second cause produce the same conjointly not apart or one this part and that the other part c. This Totalitie of Divine Concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently and lively illustrated and demonstrated by the Greek Theologues Thus Chrysostome Hom. 12. ad Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We see houses beautifully built Hoc inquit Bonaventura piarum mentium est ut nihil sibi tribuant sed totum Gratiae Dei unde quantumcunque aliquis det Gratiae Dei à pietate non receder etiamsi multa tribuendo Gratiae Dei aliquid subtrahit potestati Naturae cùm verò aliquid Gratiae Dei subtrahitur Naturae tribuitur quod Gratiae est ibi potest periculum intervenire Cassandri Consuloat Art 18. and we say the whole is the Artificers albeit he has worke men under him so the whole of good must be ascribed to God So in Genes 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole is from the Grace of God So ad Ephes Hom. 18. speaking of Paul he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thou seest how in althings be conceles what is his own and ascribes al to God So Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 31. speaking of Paul saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he ascribes al to God Thus also Cyril Alexandr and others as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Ch. 9. Sect. 3. § 12. This partial concurse supposeth God and the Creature to act together in the same kind of causalitie which is repugnant both to the nature of God as also to the condition of the Creature 1 This partial Concurse is repugnant to the independent simple perfect nature of God as also to his prime soverain efficacions causalitie What more incongruous and unbecoming
Tryphon reprehendes in some of the Grecian Philosophers as impious But Plato strongly demonstrates That the Providence of God extendes to althings even the most minute So Leg. 10. pag. 902. But what if a Physician be willing and able to cure the whole bodie if he should provide for the greater distempers but neglect the lesser would the cure be successeful No surely So in like manner neither Gubernators of Ships nor Imperators of Souldiers nor Masters of Families nor Ministers of State nor any sort of men can wel manage their affaires unlesse they provide for smal things as wel as greater Thence Architects denie that great stones can be wel cemented or joined together in a building without smal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Let us not then conceit that God is more vile than mortal Opificers who by how much the more skilful they are by so much the more exquisitely and accurately by the benefit of their own Art they consider both great and smal things in such workes that belong to their Art Thence he concludes pag. 903. It seems to me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that God doth most easily and opportunely provide for althings This also the Stoics generally asserted whereof we find an excellent account in Arrianus his Collections of Epictetus's Philosophie l. 1. c. 12. pag. 118. There are some saith he who assert there is no God others that grant there is a God but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he is slothful and negligent and provident of nothing I suppose he means the Epicureans a third sort who hold that there is a God and that he is provident but only of greater and celestial things not of terrene a fourth sort allow him a Providence over terrestrial as wel as celestial but only in commun not as to singulars and particulars a fifth sort of which number was Ulysses and Socrates asserted that a man could not so much as move without God Thence he goes on to demonstrate Gods Providence over al things That Gods Providence extendes it self universally to al and singular Beings Actions Substances Accidents Modes c. may be demonstrated 1 From the infinite Omniscience and Prescience of God which extendes it self to the most minute singulars 2 From the omnipotent Wil of God which gives Futurition Determination Limits Activitie and Operation to althings 3 From the prime and universal Efficience of God as the first cause of althings Whatever is Ens by participation must procede effectively from God who is Ens by Essence and if it procede from him it must necessarily fal under his Providence 4 From the certain Determination Futurition and Order of al effects Either althings must fal under the Providence of God or somethings must happen merely by chance without any certain cause of their Futurition 5 From the Justice of God in rewarding what is good and punishing what is evil for the executions of Divine Justice depend on his Providence That Gods Providence extendes to al singulars even to things most contingent and minute is acutely demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71 72 73 75 76. So De Potentia Dei Quaest 20. he proves that God is the cause of every action both natural and voluntary five ways 1 By giving virtue to act 2 By continued conservation of that virtue 3 By moving the Agent to act and applying the virtue to the action 4 As he is the principal Agent in every Act and al other Agents but Instruments 5 As he actes immediately in al Acts of second Agents As for the particular Objects unto which Divine Providence extendes it self they may be thus distributed The particular Objects of Providence 1 Al natural Beings even the most minute and imperceptible fal under the Providence of God Sacred Philosophie makes mention of the hairs of the head which are vile and contemtible even to a proverbe Yea al natural Generations Corruptions Alterations Motions and Actions are subject to Gods Providence Not only the Generic natures and Species of things both Substances and Accidents are determined by God but also al Individuals and Singulars with al their Circumstances and Modes yea things most minute Thus Bradwardine pag. 7 25 291. proves That the least things come under Gods Prescience and Providence 2 Althings necessary or contingent There is nothing so contingent or free as to any second cause but it is determined and fore-ordained by Divine Providence as Aquinas accurately demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71 72 73. So Bradwardine pag. 271 274. What more contingent than the Lot and yet this fals under the Providence of God as Prov. 16.33 The lot is cast into the lap but the whole disposing of it is of the Lord. 3 Althings politic Al Revolutions Alterations Advances Declinations with al other politic Concernes of State are ordered and governed by Divine Providence 4 Althings human Al mans thoughts inclinations interests designes and undertakements are subordinate to Providence Hence 5 Al sinful acts fal under the same 6 Ecclesiastic Affaires and supernatural Acts Ends and Effects are ordered by Divine Providence of which hereafter In sum Gods Providence extendes itself to al those things unto which his omnipotent Wil Efficience and Causalitie extendes i. e. unto whatever comes within the notion of real Entitie it reacheth al natural preternatural supernatural and moral actions and events When men contradict Gods Wil of Precept do they not obey or sulfil his Wil of Providence Is any thing so great that it comes not within his power or so smal that it comes not within his care I am not ignorant how much some of late as wel Divines as Physicians have essayed to exemt the period or terme of human life from the immutable determination of Divine Providence but how much this Hypothesis contradictes both Pagan and Sacred Philosophie wil be more fully evident by what follows § 5. From the effective principes and object of Divine Providence The Adjuncts of Providence as before stated there follow many essential Adjuncts and Characters thereof As 1. Providence is not merely permissive 1. It is efficacious but energetic and efficacious For 1 Divine Providence necessarily supposeth not only an intention of an end and the ordering or disposing of means but also the assecution and attainment of the end It 's true human providence as such may provide means most proper and expedient and yet by the interposition of other second causes come short of its end but Divine Providence always reacheth its end Thus Homer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gods Counsel and Decree is always fulfilled 2 Al second causes are subject unto and therefore can no way impede or hinder Divine Providence Whence ariseth al active and passive virtue in second causes but from Divine disposition Is it possible then that the executions of Divine Providence should be hindered by the force or defect of any inferior Agent or Patient Are not al natural Agents instruments of Divine Providence
be a great deep And Psal 97.1 The Lord reigneth let the Earth rejoice Psal 97.1 2. because al his Judgments and Executions of Providence are most Equal and Righteous Yet it follows v. 2. Clouds and darknesse are about him i. e. Albeit his Government is most Righteous yet much darkenesse and mysterious Providences attend it there are deep mysteries in his Providential Procedures albeit Righteousnesse and Judgement are the habitation or establishment of his Throne as it follows Gods Providences are always mater of our Admiration but not of our Comprehension or Imitation To measure Providence by our shallow Reason what is it but to set the Sun by our false Dial It 's wel observed in the Life of Padre Paul p. 114. In the successe of human things Divine Providence is ever to be admired where human prudence vanisheth out of sight it being most certain that in actions there is an eternal force and a long chain of Causes so far without us that neither our knowlege or any consideration of ours can ever come near The workes of Providence are much like many curiose pieces of Nature and Art whereof we see the frame and operations but that which is the interne moving principe and gives the greatest force to the operations we see not So in the workes of Providence we see the Executions and Effects but O! how mysterious are the interne Reasons Is there not a particular though mysterious Providence ordering and directing the Operations of every individual and single Essence And is there not in every worke of Providence something Divine which doth puzle the most sharpe-sighted Reason and hath more in it than the most acute Philosopher can discover And why is it that the most of men mistake and censure Providence but because they cast their eye on some few particulars but consider not the whole frame and complexe It 's above our narrow Capacities to contemplate the whole frame of Providence and is not this the genuine reason why we misjudge and mistake the parts That is not disorder in the whole which seems so in some one particular as in the motions of a Watch. These mysteriose procedures of Divine Providence are wel expressed by Damascence Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. We must saith he admire al the workes of Providence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 albeit they may appear to many injust because Divine Providence is unknown and incomprehensible and our cogitations and actions and things future are known to it only Thence he addes towards the close of the Chapter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But we must know that there are many modes of the Divine Providence which can neither be explicated by speech nor comprehended by mind § 6. The distributions of Providence From the Adjuncts of Divine Providence we passe on to its various Distributions which are for the most part Modal only not Specific As 1 Providence in regard of its Object is distributed into General and Special General Providence is that which respectes althings in general Special Providence that which respectes some under a special relation to God as his people 2 Providence in regard of its manner of working is distributed into Mediate and Immediate Mediate Providence is that wherein God makes use of Means for the execution thereof of which before Immediate Providence is when God produceth Effects without the use of Means 3 Providence is distributed into Ordinary and Extraordinary Ordinary Providence is when God in the production and governing of things observes that Order which was constituted at first by himself Extraordinary Providence is when God in the Production Conservation or Gubernation of things breakes that natural Order constituted by himself Of Miracles The Effects of such extraordinary Providences are by a Metonymie of the Effect termed Miracles A Miracle properly is a Specimen of Creation because the constituted order of Nature being broken the Mater has only an Obediential Power for the production of the Effect Hence nothing but Omnipotence or Infinite Power can properly and physically in a way of principal efficience produce a Miracle It 's true the Ministers of God have when called to it by him been Instruments of doing Miracles yet their concurrence or efficience was only Moral and Instrumental they wrought al in the Name of God in a way of faith and dependence on him and for the manifestation of his Glory Wherefore our Lord Christ by working Miracles in his own Name and Autoritie without any moral dependence on another gave an evident Conviction and Demonstration of his being God For no Creature can worke a Miracle by its own Principal and Physical Efficience No this is the Prerogative of the first Cause and Omnipotent Deitie because every Miracle is educed out of nothing either as to the thing it self or at least as to the mode and manner of its being wrought In Nature and according to the ordinary course of Providence every passive power has an active power suited to it and by the application of Actives to Passives the effect is produced where therefore there is a defect of passive or active power and yet the effect is produced that we cal a Miracle which may be said to be wrought out of nothing three manner of ways 1 When there is no substrate mater at al to worke on 2 If there be a substrate mater yet when the mater is so inhabile and unapt as that it has no natural passive power or capacitie for such an effect Or 3 when there is a natural passive power and capacitie in the substrate mater yet there wants an active Principe or Efficient for the educing the effect out of that mater In al these regards a Miracle may be said to be produced out of nothing and so the peculiar effect of Divine extraordinary providence And indeed the very names both Latin Greek and Hebrew import a power extraordinary and Divine To let passe the origination of the Latin which is obvious Miracles are called by the Greeks 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as they are Signes of the Divine Efficience and Presence given for the succur of our Faith 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Powers as they are manifestations and demonstrations of Divine Omnipotence which is most illustrious therein 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prodigies or tremendous Signes such as not only ravish men into admiration but leave also a terror and astonishing stupor on the mind So Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Prodigie is a thing that leaves an astonishment on the Beholders by reason of the Miracle that is wrought Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 q. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which terrefies and astonisheth Al which note that Miracles are the peculiar effects of extraordinary Providence The former Distributions of Providence seem only modal Providential Conservation proper to God its formal essential and specific distribution is into Conservative and
Rector of althings Thus we may applie Eccles 8.4 Where the word of a King is there is power or Domination and who can say to him what doest thou i. e. by how much the more Soverain any person is by so much the greater is his Domination God being King of Kings and Lord of Lords must necessarily be most Absolute in Power and Domination This is oft inculcated by Plato and carries with it its own Evidence For 1 althings receiving their Being Perfection Virtue and Operation from God it cannot be but that he should have an Absolute Dominion and Soverain Empire over them 2 Althings tend to God as their last end therefore he is the Supreme Rector of al. For when many things tend to one last end it 's necessary that there be some Supreme Rector and Moderator that ordaines them thereto For Gubernation is nothing else but the directing the things governed to their last end Thus Aquinas 1. q. 103. a. 3. Seing the end of the Gubernation of the world is the best good it 's necessary that the Gubernation of the world be best But now the best Gubernation is that which is by one c. 3 God is infinitely wise to order althings and potent to bring them to their ends therefore he is the Supreme Moderator of al. So Plato Leg. 10. p. 902. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that God who is most wise both can and wil take care of his own Creatures c. 4 The Bonitie of God argues him to be the Absolute Rector of althings For it belongs to Divine Bonitie to reduce althings made by him to those proper ends for which they were made Whatever flows from God as the first Cause must returne to him as the last end 5 This is the great concerne of Divine Gubernation to see that althings reach the end for which they were made For things wil never certainly and infallibly reach the end for which they were made unlesse they be directed and governed by the same power which made them It argues imperfection in an Artificer not to direct the worke he made to the end for which it was made And may we impute such an imperfection to the first Framer of althings Hence 2. Prop. Divine Gubernation proposeth the Glorie of God as the last end of a things The last end of Divine Gubernation What is al Gubernation but the directing althings to some last end And what is the last end of althings but the Glorie of God Thus Plato Leg. 10. pag 903. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Let us persuade this young man that he who by his providence takes the care of the whole that he may conserve and adorne it with necessary virtue doth wisely dispose and order althings to this end the force and efficace of whose Providence doth diffuse itself into al parts of the Vniverse according to their nature Whereby he explicates to us how God doth order and dispose althings for the good of the whole and his own Glorie This he more fully lays open in what follows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But thou knowest not that al generation of singulars is for this that the life of the whole may be blessed his Essence is not for thy sake but thou wert made for his sake For every Physician and every skilful Artificer makes al for the sake of the whole aspiring after the commun utilitie Thence he makes not the whole for the sake of the part but the part for the sake of the whole But thou art ful of indignation because thou canst not see how that which is best may accord with the commun good and thy proper interest Here are several things remarquable for explication and demonstration that the Glorie of God is the last end of Divine Gubernation 1 He saith Al singulars are for this that the life of the whole may be blessed Why may we not by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the whole understand God That Plato sometimes understandes God by this notion specially in his Timaeus pag. 90. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the contemplations of the whole c. I could easily persuade my self 2 But grant that we must understand this of the Vniverse strictly taken yet it must at last be resolved into God for is not the Universe and althings else for Gods sake not God for the sake of the Universe 3 Plato illustrates this by the Symbol of a wise Physician and skilful Artificer who workes al for the sake of the whole and is not the Divine Bonitie and Glorie that great Vniversitie or whole into which al lower ends must be melted 4 Plato blames his young Atheist and in him the most of men for preferring their private good before the good of the whole which Theologie teacheth is no other than the Glorie of God That althings are ordered and disposed by Divine Gubernation for the Glorie of God is manifest 1 From the prime motion and causalitie of God For God being the prime Motor of althings and moved by nothing it thence necessarily follows that by his Providence he governe and move althings to himself as the last end The order of ends necessarily answers the order of Agents the first Cause and Motor must needs be the last end of althings 2 From Gods Dominion over althings Every Agent has power to use his own workes for the end he made them and are not al Creatures the workes of Gods hands Has he not then power to use them for his own Glorie 3 From the perfection which althings acquire by subserving the Glorie of God By how much the nearer any Creature approcheth to the Divine Bonitie by so much the more perfect it is and is not every thing by so much the nearer the Divine Bonitie by how much the more subservient it is to the Glorie of God It was a good Saying of the spurious Dionysius The supreme Bonitie convertes althings unto itself which al desire as their last end and by which they al subsist as their most perfect end Hence 3. Prop. The order whereby Divine Gubernation disposeth and reduceth althings to their last end is most fixed The Order of Divine Gubernation fixed Esa 40.26 immobile and perfect This according to sacred Philosophie is wel expressed Esa 40.26 Lift up your eyes on high and behold who hath created these things that bringeth out their host by number he calleth them al by name by the greatnesse of his might for that he is strong in power not one faileth Observe here 1 he cals on mankind to lift up their eyes for the contemplation of the Creatures thereby to instruct themselves in the Gubernation of God 2 He founds Divine Gubernation on omnipotent Creation 3 He expresseth Gods fixed admirable order in governing things specially the Celestial bodies by bringing out their host by number O! what an accurate order do al the Celestial bodies observe in their motions Is not every one numbered and ranged in its proper place by
extraordinary Impressions which Divine Gubernation shal offer to them 6. Prop. Gods Gubernation by second Causes The Executions of Divine Gubernation are oft committed to second Causes and Instruments yet so as it actes immediately in and with them yea sometimes contrary to their natural Inclinations Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 903. speaking of Gods Soverain Providential Gubernation saith That albeit God takes the care of the whole Vniverse himself yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And over al these parts of the Universe are set Rulers and Moderators who constantly governe althings even the most minute parts that so by these they may governe al even to the last part unto their end By those Rulers under Divine Gubernation I presume he understandes al second Causes made use of thereby Divine operations do not exclude the operations of the second causes but these include subordination to Divine operations Divine Gubernation orders and governes Inferior Creatures by Superiors Corporals by Spirituals and Inferior sublunary bodies by Superior and Celestial Thus he governes althings immediately as to the manner of Order and yet many things mediately as to the execution thereof So that nothing can fal out against or beside the Universal Order of Divine Gubernation albeit many things do contrary to the order of particular Causes Touching the Executions of Divine Providence see § 3. Prop. 4. 7. Gods Gubernation reacheth althings Prop. The Object of Divine Gubernation is althings in their most extensive latitude Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 902 903. proves That nothing is so minute and inconsiderable but it fals under Divine Gubernation But to descend to particulars 1 Divine Gubernation disposeth of al Seasons both Natural and Politic. 1 Natural Seasons Eccles 3.1 as Eccles 3.1 To every thing there is a season and a time to every purpose A Season i. e. a certain fixed determinate time 2 Politic Seasons for Human and Politic Actions 2 Gods Divine Gubernation orders al Vicissitudes and Changes in the world without the least vicissitude or change in himself Dan. 2.20 21. So Dan. 2.20 For Wisdome and Might are his i. e. for the Gubernation of althings Whence it follows v. 21. And he changeth the Times and the Seasons he removeth Kings and setteth up Kings 3 Divine Gubernation orders al the Meteors Snow Job 37.6 7. Rain c. So Job 37.6 For he saith to the Snow be thou on the earth likewise to the smal Rain and to the great Rain of his strength Whence it follows v. 7. He sealeth up the hand of every man that al men may know his worke He sealeth up the hand of every one Elibu's meaning is that when God sendeth his Snow and shours of Rain he thereby seals up or shuts up the hand of the Husbandman that so he may retire out of the fields home and consider his worke Then the Bestes go into Dens as v. 8. 4 God governeth al motions of second Causes even such as are most contingent and voluntary in the most certain manner 5 God governes al Events of things It was a great saying of Julius Caesar which he gained by experience That Fortune whereby the Ancients expressed Divine Gubernation has great force in althings but more particularly in the affaires of war wherein oft the most inconsiderable rencontres or occurrences produce the greatest changements Such is the wise and potent Gubernation of God in Military Affaires § 2. Divine Gubernation as to Man Having dispatcht the Gubernation of God in the general notion thereof we now descend to consider it in its special relation to Man both in his sinful and renovate State Gubernative Providence doth reach the whole Universe but in a more special manner Man and his Affaires So Plato saith Leg. 4. p. 709. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That God truely and with God Fortune and Opportunitie governe al human affaires By Fortune and Opportunitie we must understand Divine Gubernative Providence which in a more peculiar manner regardes Man because he is capable not only of Natural but also of Moral Gubernation God governes every Creature according to its capacitie whether Natural or Moral but now al Creatures inferior to man are capable only of Natural Gubernation and Passive Reduction to their last end they may be governed and directed to their last end but they cannot governe or direct themselves thereto But Man being invested with a Natural Passive remote capacitie of understanding and Wil can when in a special manner aided and assisted by supernatural Gubernation actively conduct and direct himself to his last end Hence Divine Gubernation as to Man is either Moral 1. Moral by Law or Efficacious 1 Gods Moral Gubernation is by Laws and Institutions Look as irrational Creatures are governed by natural Instinctes and Inclinations which are to them a Law directing them to their end so Rational Creatures have a more expresse formal Law which was at first impressed on their Beings but now under a new Edition by Divine Revelation whereby they are directed to their last end For a Law being nothing else but a certain Reason or Rule of operating it properly only can belong to intellectual rational Creatures who alone can understand the reason of their operations And that this Law is given to Man principally to direct him to his last end is evident because the Supreme Intention and Efficace of the Divine Law is to bring Man into subjection to God and who are subject to God but those who refer al to him as their last end Is it not the Intendement of every Lawgiver to make those good to whom his Laws are promulgated And wherein consistes the goodnesse of Man but in subjection to God and adhering to him as his last end So that the main end of al Laws both Positive and Moral is to direct man to his last end 2 This also is the main designe of Divine Efficacious Gubernation 2. Efficacious namely to reduce man unto to a subordination and subservience to his last end Only it has a different ay of operation as to wicked and pious men Wicked men if they persevere in their wickednesse are by Divine Gubernation reduced to their last end only passively by penal executions in order to the vindication of Divine Justice but elect pious Souls are actively reduced and directed to their last end by the supernatural Gubernation of the Divine Spirit Of both these in their order That wicked men Wicked men fal under Gods Gubernation and al their sinful Acts and Deeds are by Divine Gubernation reduced to the last end of al the Glorie of God wil appear evident if we reflect on what was before hinted that if the Creature withdraw it self from one order of Divine Gubernation it immediately fals under another if lawlesse irregular men substract and withdraw themselves from Gods gracious and easie yoke of obedience in order to life they deservedly fal under Gods Iron Yoke of vindictive Justice and Eternal Death and