what follows touching Bradwardine I now come to Thomas Bradwardine our pious learned and profound Bradwardine whom might I be allowed my libertie I should rather reckon among our first Reformers than among the Sons of Antichrist for indeed he was a zelose Patron of and stout Champion for the fundamental points of the Reformed Religion specially efficacious free Grace which he with so much courage strength of argument and flaming zele defended against the Pelagians of those days This Thomas Bradwardine borne at Hartfield in Sussex flourished about the year 1350. He was a person of prodigiose natural ingenie which he greatly polisht by al manner of acquired Sciences specially the Mathematics and scholastic Theologie He was a great Affecter and Admirer of metaphysic Contemplations which in his first studies he greedily drank in even to the neglect of the holy Scriptures because they favored not of a metaphysic style as he himself informes us in his Book de Causa Dei When saith he in the state of my unregeneracie I came into the Scholes and heard Lectures on Pauls Epistles of free Grace c. it did no way relish with me quia non sapit stylum metaphysicum because it savored not of a metaphysic style It was with me as it was with Augustin of old nothing would please but scholastic discourses for free wil c. But after his Conversion he was as another Augustin the greatest Champion for free efficacious Grace Balaeus de Script Brit. cent 5. cap. 87. tels us That John Baconthorp that famose Divine and English-man returning from Paris had a great contest with Bradwardine about the points of Gods Prescience and Predestination to whom at last Bradwardine assents in al those points as the same Baconthorp declares in Sent. lib. 4. Dist 1. q. 4. Afterwards he was called to be Confessor to King Edward III. and thence made Archbishop of Canterbury without any desire of his own thereto He was indeed a good Mathematician a great Philosopher and excellent Divine being communly stiled Doctor profundus the profound Doctor Neither was he lesse renowned for his Pietie and Zele in the Cause of God against the Pelagians which he defended with great fervor as wel as acumen of spirit which also is greatly illustrious in his defence of Gods efficacious Concurse and Providence about the substrate mater of sinful acts This he frequently inculcates in his most excellent Book de Causa Dei specially lib. 1. c. 30 31 32 33 34. He demonstrates 1 That al voluntary actions are governed by the Laws of Divine Providence cap. 30 31. p. 271 c. 2 That althings which have any natural Entitie or Being procede from Gods Providence actually and efficaciously disposing them and not merely permitting Which he demonstrates many ways as 1 Because there is no act simply evil and inordinate by any inordination precedent to the divine wil. 2 Because otherwise the whole Vniverse would not be disposed in the best manner 3 Because the Scriptures both of Old and New Testments ascribe to God in his Providence about Sin active Names Thus cap. 32. p. 288. 3 That about whatever Gods Permission is his actual Volition is also employed about the same And he gives this demonstrative reason hereof For albeit those things that are evil as evil are not good yet it is good that there should be not only good things but also evil For unless it were good that evils be the Omnipotent good would not suffer them to be as Cap. 33. Hence 4 He comes l. 34. to the state of the controversie How God wils sin and how he wils it not 1 He proves p. 294 295. That God must necessarily wil the existence of Sin because he permits it also God doth voluntarily provide for yea act al the voluntary acts of the wil both good and evil with al their positive circumstances which necessarily import sin Again This Proposition Sin is is true and therefore there must be some cause of its truth which can be no other than the divine wil from which al complexe beings as wel as incomplexe have their origination Again ` Whatever is good must procede from the first good but that Sin existe is good according to Augustin So Hugo saith That God wils that sins existe because this is good Moreover he brings in Hugo speaking thus which deserves a great remarque If it be said God wils sin this seems harsh and scandalous to the ear and therefore some pious mind doth refute this not because that which is spoken is il spoken but because that which is wel spoken is il understood 2 Thence Bradwardine procedes to refute Lombard who asserts That God wils sin as a punishment not under this reason as it is sin i. e. materially or entitatively considered which Hypothesis of Lombard he refutes by shewing That the punishment of sin is necessarily conjoined with the Sin so that if God wils sin as a punishment he must necessarily wil the existence of sin Also whoever knows two things to be necessarily and inseparably conjoined and wils that they should be so conjoined and knowingly and rationally wils one the same person wils also the other specially if about both he employ an act of his wil But now God knows and wils that those two Sin and Punishment be conjoined together and rationally wils the one namely the punishment of sin therefore also the sin Again he that wils an Antecedent wils also the Consequent at least in an universal albeit not in a particular for he that wils a whole wils al the parts necessary thereto 3 Thence he procedes p. 300. to shew how God wils sin God saith he doth no way wil Sin simply but only in some limited respect For to say that God wils something simply is according to the commun manner of speech to say that he loves it and approves of it as good Yea addes he may it not be said that in the whole Universe there is no such thing as Inordination Deformitie or Sin simply considered but only Sin in some respect Because in regard of the prime and supreme Cause al Beings both positive and privative are sweetly disposed with the highest wisdome beautie and justice Whence 4 He gives us the difference between Gods Concurse to sinful acts and to such as are good p. 302. God saith he is not the Author of sin as of that which is done wel For of this he is the Author so as that he alone doth supernaturally create and give to the wel-doer Faith Hope and Love c. But it is not so as to sin i. e. As to good God produceth not only the natural act but also the moral Bonitie but as to Sin he produceth only the natural entitative Act. 5 He thence p. 302. explicates how the Apostle Paul and the Fathers denied that God wils Sin When saith he Augustin and the other holy men denie that God wils Sin the cause of this negation seems
greatly gloriose as means to procure our salvation and therefore God is deservedly judged the cause and author of them as Act. 2. 23. And 2 we denie with him that the wickednesse and malice of those acts was from God 3 He also grants That the occision or killing of Christ considered absolutely was not sin Whereunto we retort That neither the hatred of Christ considered absolutely without relation to its object is sin But 4 he concludes But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is intrinsecally evil c. Whence we argue That the crucifying of Christ was a sin intrinsecally evil and yet as to its substrate mater and entitative acts from God For did not the Jews prosecute Christ out of hatred and malice yea malice blowen up to the sin against the Holy Ghost in some of them And was not in this good work of crucifixion the good action of God and the evil action of the Jews the same as to the substrate mater or natural entitative act This pincheth Strangius closely and therefore he seems to make the natural entitative act of God distinct from the natural entitative act of the wicked Jews For he saith Here truly in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from their evil action and therefore their wickednesse and malice was not from God Here we grant 1 his consequence or conclusion That their malice was not from God 2 We thus far also grant his Antecedent That the good action of God considered both naturally and morally was distinguished from their evil action considered formally and morally for the malice and vitiositie which formalised the action as theirs is no way imputable to Gods act considered either naturally or morally 3 But yet we stil avouch and no way dout but to demonstrate in its place that in the crucifixion of Christ the act of the wicked Jews considered materially naturally and entitatively was one and the same with Gods act So much al these Texts clearly evince so much also reason dictates For if there were two acts the one primarily yea only from the wicked instruments the other from God the prime Efficient then how could they be said to be the instruments of Gods Efficience Must we not then also suppose two Crucifixions one from God and the other from the Jews What a world of absurdities would follow this Hypothesis That the action of God in the Crucifixion of Christ considered entitatively materially and naturally was really distinct from the action of the Instruments considered entitatively materially and naturally But to conclude we find an excellent solution to al these evasions and subterfuges in Augustin Epist 48. ad Vincentium thus When the Father delivered his Son and Christ his own Bodie and Judas his Lord why in this Tradition is God just and man guilty but because in one and the same thing which they did the cause was not one and the same A solution sufficient to satisfie any sober mind Wherein note 1 That the act of Tradition and so of crucifying Christ was one and the same entitatively and physically considered both in regard of God and the sinner 2 That the difference sprang from the Causes God delivered his Son to Death thereby to bring about the greatest good that Sinners could wisn for their Salvation but Judas and the malitiose Jews delivered the Lord of Glorie to death with wicked hands out of an avaricious humor malice c. Hence 3 The Action was most just and gloriose on Gods part but most unjust and wicked on the Sinners part This answer of Augustin is so great that it might serve to answer al the objections against our Hypothesis were not men bent to cavil against the truth § 3. I come now to a third Head of Scriptural Arguments namely such wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing or afflicting his people in such a way wherein the Instruments could not but contract guilt I shal divide this Head into two members 1 Such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing his sinful people 2 Such as mention Gods afflicting his righteous People by sinful Instruments 1. We shal begin with such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his sinful people So Esa 10. 5 6. O Assyrian the rod of mine anger I will send him against an hypocritical Nation The Assyrian is sent by God as his rod to punish his sinful people and every stroke of this rod was from God his hand guiding ordering and actuating the rod in al its motions And yet how much sin was there committed on the Assyrians part in punishing Israel How little did he intend to serve God herein were not Pride and Ambition the main springs of his action Thence it 's added v. 7. Howbeit he meaneth not so neither doth his heart think so c. whence v. 12. God threatens to punish him for his sin So that it 's evident this sending of the Assyrian by God mentioned v. 6. cannot be meant of any legal permission or commission given him by God but of the secret efficacious predeterminative concurse and Providence of God ordering what should come to pass So Jer. 16. 16. Behold I wil send for many fishers saith the Lord and they shal fish them and after wil I send for many hunters and they shal hunt them from every mountain c. Note 1 That these words contain not a promisse but threat begun v. 9. This is evident from v. 17. 2 By Fishers and Hunters in the general we must understand enemies to the Jews To fish and to hunt is to take and destroy War has a great ressemblance with fishing and hunting which is a kind of war against bestes as war is a kind of fishing and hunting of men whence Nimrod the first Warrier after the Floud is stiled Gen. 10. 9. a mighty hunter i. e. of men Ay but more particularly 3 Who are these fishers Why as it is supposed the Egyptians who are called Fishers Esa 19. 8. 4 And who are the Hunters The Babylonians as it is generally said But 5 Who is it that sends for these Fishers and Hunters It is God I wil send c. 6 Why doth God send for them To punish his sinful People and that by those very Nations in whom they had so much confided and to whom they had so much conformed as is intimated v. 17. And what more just than that Professors should be punished by such Instruments as have been the ground of their confidence and the exemplars of their sins 7 How doth God send for these Fishers and Hunters Surely not by any legal Act or formal Commission given to them but providentially by exciting their minds applying their wils and drawing forth yea determining the same to the substrate mater or material entitative act of afflicting the Jews whereunto there was
1. 13. Eph. 1. 9. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to prepare Rom. 9. 23. 1 Cor. 2. 9. By al which we evidently see what footsteps predetermination and as to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin has in the sacred Scriptures We now procede to examine this notion as used by scholastic Theologues and how far their sentiments thereof are applicable to our present Controversie 1 Some distinguish between Gods predefinition and his predetermination his predefinition they restrain to his Decrees and his predetermination to his Concurse Others distinguish the predetermination of God into extrinsec and intrinsec by extrinsec predetermination they understand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree whereby the creature is predetermined to act by intrinsec predetermination they mean the previous motion of God upon the creature which continually moves and applies it to act But I should rather distinguish predetermination as Creation and al other Acts of God ad extrà into active and passive 1 By active predetermination I mean nothing else but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil whereby al second causes persons acts effects and things receive their termes order and limitation as to power and activitie This is the same with predefinition predestination and extrinsec predetermination That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil without any impression or actual influxe on the second cause has been defended by Scotus and others of great name in the Scholes and that on invict reasons for if God wil that the second cause suppose it be the human wil act immediately on the volition of God the action of the second cause wil follow not from any previous impression on the second cause but from its natural subordination and as it were sympathie with the first cause as at the beck of the human wil every inferior facultie of man moves See Suarez de Auxil l. 1. c. 5. n. 3. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. 2 By passive predetermination I understand the concurse of God as applying the second cause to its act and not really but mentally or modally only distinct therefrom For as active predetermination is the same with the Divine wil so passive predetermination is the same with the second cause its act and effect as we have demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. § 1. 2 Predetermination is usually distinguished into physic or natural and ethic or moral This distinction dependes on that of causes into physic and moral a physic or natural cause is that which is truly efficient and so doth really influence the act and effect in a way of proper efficience or causalitie whence an Ethic or moral cause is that which doth not immediately directly or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect but only morally by proposing objects motives precepts promisses or the like moral means and influences with excitements and persuasions Thus proportionably we may distinguish predetermination into physic and moral 1 By physic predetermination we must understand not corporal or natural in a strict notion which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes but such a predetermination as really applies the Agent or second cause to its act and really yea immediately influenceth both act and effect Thus Suarez Metaphys Disput 17. sect 2. num 2. A physic cause and so predetermination in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cause acting by corporeous and material motion but it 's taken more universally for a cause that truly and really influenceth the effect for as nature sometimes signifies any essence so physic or natural influxe is that which by true and proper causalitie worketh the effect to which when a moral cause is opposed it is to be understood of such a cause which doth not of itself and truly act yet it doth so carrie itself as that the effect may be imputed to it such a cause is he that comforts beseecheth or hinders not when he may and ought Hence 2 by moral predetermination as it regardes Gods influence on the moral rational world we must understand his moral influence on man as his last end his stating mans dutie by moral precepts inviting thereto by Evangelic promisses dehorting from sin by penal comminations and al other moral influences Here we are to note that albeit physic and moral predetermination be comprehended under physic and moral causalitie yet the later is more comprehensive than the former for physic predetermination properly belongs to a superior cause as acting on an inferior but physic causalitie to any efficient as Strangius doth wel observe But to sum up the whole both the Dominicans and Calvinists agree with the Jesuites and Arminians in this That the holy God doth not morally predetermine any to sin for he neither counsels encourageth commandes or invites any one to the least sin The Question therefore must be understood of physic predetermination which I shal describe according to the explication of Strangius l. 2. c. 4. p. 159. thus By the physic predetermination of God in this place is understood the action of God whereby he moves and applies the second cause to act and so antecedently to al operation of the creature or in order of nature and reason before the creature workes God really and efficaciously moves it to act in al its actions i. e. he actes and causeth that the creature actes and causeth whatever it actes and causeth so that without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing and this premotion being given it is impossible in a composite sense that the creature should not act and do that unto which it is premoved by the first cause And more particularly though concisely as for Gods predetermination of the human wil Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus To predetermine the wil as they teach is to applie the wil to act and to make it act Which description of predetermination I do readily close with and so the Question before us wil be summarily this Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even those that have sin annexed or appendent to them Affirm I am not ignorant that a reverend and learned Divine who opposeth our Hypothesis states the question otherwise as if we held That God doth by an efficacious influence universaelly move and determine men to al their actions even those that are most wicked But this Hypothesis as proposed and intended I know no sober mind but abhors whoever said that God determines men to the most wicked actions as such were not this to make him the Author of sin which every pious soul detestes For to determine to wicked actions as such implies also a determination to the wickednesse of those actions and this determination cannot be physic because sin as sin has no physic cause or determination therefore
and our Hypothesis most true it remains on us to demonstrate Chap. 5. Thus we have given the true and ful state of our Controversie which by reason of the subtile evasions and subterfuges of our Adversaries lies under so much obscuritie and confusion and indeed it is to me a deplorable case and that which argues mens diffidence of the merits of their cause that they contend with so much passionate vehemence for their own Phaenomena and yet never explicate the termes or state the Question in controversie I have thereby given the Reader as wel as my self the more trouble in this part of our Province that so what follows may be the more facile both for him and me CHAP. III. Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis Scriptural Demonstration 1 That God is the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Psal 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. 2 That God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed 1 Joseph's vendition Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Gen. 50. 20. Acts 7. 9. 2 The Crucifixion of Christ Mat. 26. 24. Luke 22. 22. John 19. 10 11. Acts 2. 23. 4. 28. Our Adversaries Evasions taken off 3 That God makes use of wicked Instruments to punish his People Esa 10. 5 6. Jer. 16. 16. Psal 105. 25. Job 1. 21. 4 God's immediate hand in the Act of Sin 2 Sam. 12. 11. 16. 22. 2 Sam. 16. 10 11. 24. 1. 1 Kings 11. 31 37. 12. 15 24. 2 Kings 9. 3. 10. 30. 1 Kings 22 23. Rev. 17. 17. 5 Gods efficacious permission of Sin 1 Sam. 2. 25. Job 12. 16 17 20. 6 Gods judicial hardening Sinners Psal 81. 12. 69. 22-27 Rom. 11. 10. Esa 6. 10. 29. 10. 19. 11 14. 44. 18 19. 60. 2. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Thess 2. 11. The nature of Judicial Induration in six Propositions 7 Gods ordering Sin for his glorie Exod. 9. 14-16 Rom. 9. 17 18. Prov. 16. 4. Rom. 9. 21 22. 1 Pet. 2. 8. HAving explicated the termes relating to and given the genuine state of our Hypothesis namely That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men to al their natural actions even such as have sin appendent to them we now procede to the Demonstration hereof And because al demonstration must be grounded on some first principes which give evidence firmitude and force thereto and there are no proper principes of Faith and Theologie but what are originally in the Scriptures we are therefore to begin our Demonstration with Scriptural Arguments which we shal reduce to these seven heads 1 Such Scriptures wherein it is universally affirmed that God is the first Cause of al natural actions and things and more particularly of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. 2 Such Scriptures as directly demonstrate That God doth predefine predetermine and foreordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed 3 Such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his People in such a way wherein they could not but contract guilt 4 Such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those acts whereunto sin is appendent 5 Such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious permission of some to sin 6 Such Scriptures as demonstrate Gods giving up some to judicial Occecation and Obduration 7 Such as clearly evince Gods ordering and disposing the Sins of men for his own Glorie § 1. We shal begin our Scriptural Demonstration with such Texts as universally affirme That God is the first cause of al natural Actions and Things and more particularly of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. 1. The Scriptures that speak God to be the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things are many and great we shal mention some as Esa 26. 12. Thou hast wrought al our works in us or for us This Text is urged by Strangius p. 54. to prove Gods immediate concurse to al actions of the creature though it doth in a more peculiar manner regard the deliverance of the Church wherein God predetermines and over-rules many actions of wicked men which have much sin annexed to them Again this universal prime Causalitie of God efficaciously influencing al natural Acts and Effects is apparently expressed Rom. 11. 36. For of him and through him and to him are althings Of him as he frames althings By him as he operates in and cooperates with althings and for him as the final cause of althings Thus Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 multiforme energie as Cyril stiles it reacheth al manner of Natural actions and effects and if so then surely such natural entitative Actions as have sin annexed to them Is there any sin so intrinsecally evil which has not some entitative act or subject as the substrate mater thereof And if althings are of God and by him and for him must not also the entitative act of sins intrinsecally evil be so Strangius p. 342. replies thus Al that God workes must tend to his Glorie But what Glorie redounds to God from those Actions of hatred of God blasphemie c. A strange replie indeed for a Divine to make 1 Was there not much Hatred of God and Blasphemie in the crucifying of Christ And yet was there any action more conducing to the glorie of God than this Yea 2 Doth not Strangius himself and those of his partie grant that God directs disposeth and over-rules al sinful acts even such as are intrinsecally evil so as that they conduce to his glorie And how can God direct dispose and over-rule them unless he concur yea predetermine the Wil to the entitative act Again Strangius p. 561. answers to this Text thus None that is orthodoxe ever extended these words to sins as if sins were of God by God and for him c. 1 Neither do we extend these words to sins formally considered 2 But must we thence necessarily conclude that the entitative act whereto sin is only accidentally appendent is not from God nor by him nor for him Yea 3 May we not say with Divines that sin formally considered although it be not of God and by him as an Efficient yet it is for him i. e. conducing to his Glorie as wisely ordered and over-ruled contrary to the intent of the sinner Thus much Augustin once and again inculcates as De Genes ad liter lib. Imperfecto cap. 5. For God is not the Author of our sins yet he is the Ordinator of them c. And thus much indeed Strangius p. 860. confesseth Another Text that evidently and invincibly demonstrates Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to al natural as wel as supernatural Actions and Effects is Ephes 1. 11. Who worketh althings after the counsel of his own wil. We find three particulars in this Texte which greatly conduce to explicate and demonstrate Gods efficacious Concurse to al
they may be extended to althings which God hath decreed So that it 's clear by his own confession that the crucifixion of Christ taken actively was predestined predefined constituted foreordained and predetermined by God Whence by a paritie of reason we demonstrate our Hypothesis that the substrate mater or entitative act of that whereunto intrinsecal sin is necessarily annexed is predefined and predetermined by God The inference and conclusion to me is so natural and evident that I cannot see how the wit of man can evade it But let us examine what subterfuges and evasions our Opponents frame to evade the force and evidence this second Head touching Christs Crucifixion gives to our Hypothesis 1. Bellarmine and from him a reverend Divine of name among our selves replie That the passive crucifixion of Christ was from God not the active i. e. Christs Passion and the effects of it was from God but not the actions of those that crucified him 1 How poor and shiftlesse this shift is we have already demonstrated on the vendition of Joseph from Gen. 45. 5 7 8. 2 But more particularly as to this Head I cannot but wonder how any who have not quite banished Reason and Religion from their minds can satisfie themselves with such jejune notions and evasions Did not the blessed God predefine and predetermine the very act of Christs crucifixion how else could he certainly foreknow that he would be crucified Or what certain prescience could he have of the salvation of any one elect soul which wholly dependes on the death of Christ Again what fine-spun nonsense is this God predetermined the Passion of Christs crucifixion but not the Action as if God predetermined that Christ should be kissed and so betrayed by Judas but not that Judas should kisse and betray Christ again that Christ should be mocked blasphemed scourged c. by the Souldiers and Jews but that these should not mock blaspheme scourge c. Christ Lastly that the Spear should be thrust into the side of Christ but yet not that any thrust it in What Logic Reason or sense is this Do not the very Aristoteleans grant us That action and passion are not really but only modally distinct As the way from Athens to Thebes and so back again from Thebes to Athens is but one and the same way diversified only from its relation to different termes so the same fluxe as it procedes from the Agent is called Action and as it termines on the patient Passion Is it possible then that God should predetermine or concur to the passion and not to the action of crucifixion But enough of this which is so strongly refuted by Strangius lib. 4. cap. 11. pag. 772. 2. Another reverend Divine of estime among us for parts and pietie evades thus Christs crucifixion was a thing which Gods hand and counsel had determined before to be done Act. 4. 28. i. e. foreseeing wicked hands would be promt and ready for this tragic enterprise his sovereign power and wise counsel concurred with his foreknowledge so only and not with lesse latitude to define or determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie than to let it procede to this execution And to deliver him up not by any formal resignation or surrender as we wel know but permitting him thereunto Though the same phrase of delivering him hath elsewhere another notion of assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation for the sins of men by dying which was done by mutual agreement between both the parties c. This replie of this learned pious Divine so far as I can penetrate and understand it which seems involved under much obscuritie may be resolved into the following parts 1 He makes Gods prescience or foreseeing the crucifixion of Christ by wicked hands to procede or go before the concurrence and determination of Gods wise counsel or predefinition thereof Wherein he fals in with the Jesuites middle Science making Gods prescience precedent to his predefinition or decree and so dependent only on the mutable wil of men as to the act of sin which he elsewhere seems to intimate whereas the Scripture which he refers to Act. 2. 23. makes the foreknowledge of Christs crucifixion subsequent to the predifinition of his determinate Counsel or Decree And certainly al the wit of man summed up in one cannot conceive or demonstrate how God should have a certain prescience of Christs crucifixion which dependes wholly on the contingent uncertain wil of man and not on the determinate counsel of his own wil. 2 He makes Gods determinate counsel or hand only to determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie c. As if the bounding and limiting of the malignitie and not the substrate mater or act itself entitatively considered were from God Whereas the Text saith categorically That the hand and counsel of God predefined and predetermined whatever those wicked hands of theirs executed 3 He gives us a new Glosse or Paraphrase on that phrase delivering him Act. 2. 23. as if it implied only an assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation c. But how little this glosse wil accord with the sense of these Texts is evident For that assigning and appointing him to be a propitiation was immanent and eternal in the Divine Decrees but the delivering him here is meant of his being delivered into the hands of those that crucified him and that according to the determinate counsel of God 3. We come now to the more plausible subterfuges of Strangius whereby he endeavors to evade the evidence of those Texts which mention Gods predetermining the crucifixion of our Lord. He answers lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 573. thus The occision and crucifixion of Christ also the kind of death were from God and as they were from God they were good and greatly gloriose and properly the means to procure our salvation and God is deservedly judged the Cause and Author of them Who by his determinate counsel and precognition delivered his Son to them whom with wicked hands they killed on the crosse Act. 2. 23. Here truly in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from their evil action therefore their wickednesse and malice was not from God neither was it willed or predefined by God who cannot be said to be the Cause and Author of any sin Therefore speaking absolutely the occision of Christ was not sin otherwise God should be the Author of sin as to kil a man is not sin And truly if God had commanded men to kil Christ and they out of conscience to that command had obeyed God they had not sinned But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is intrinsecally evil neither can that be any way wel done or commanded by God Observe here 1 he grants that the crucifixion of Christ with al its natural circumstances entitatively considered were from God as the God of nature and so naturally good yea that they were morally good and
of punishment so it 's necessary that the prescience of every sin be presupposed in the eternal purpose of God of damning and inflicting punishment whether temporal or eternal 4 That the particle Quia Because here used doth not alwayes denote a proper cause but a reason of consequence which may be taken from the effect and other arguments besides the cause c. Strangius here raiseth a great deal of dust to blind our eyes from beholding the Meridian light of this Text but to answer briefly 1 We say that his first answer smells too rankly of Pelagianisme in that it makes the sins of men the cause of the Divine Wil The Sons of Eli were not for their flagitiose Impieties destined by God to ruine as if their flagitiose Impieties were causative of and influential on Divine destination but the Soverain God destined by an absolute decree to leave them to those flagitiose sins and for them to destroy them What are the dangerous consequents of such a conditional Reprobation we intend more fully to shew hereafter c. 5. § 3. 2 That the Death here intended and inflicted was only temporal is too crude a notion for a Divine instructed in the knowledge of divine wrath Yea Strangius confesseth that they merited eternal wrath and how then could they be exemted from it who had rejected the Merits of their Messias 3 What he addes touching the prescience of every sin to be presupposed in Gods eternal purpose of damning men has a tincture also of rank Pelagianisme for if the prescience or prevision of actual sins yea of final Impenitence be that which moves the divine Wil to decree the Damnation of men then it wil by a paritie of reason necessarily follow that the prescience or prevision of mens Faith and final Perseverance is that which moves the divine Wil to elect men for if Reprobation be conditional Election must be so also as our Divines on Scripture-reason strongly demonstrate Davenant in his Animadvers against Hoard invictly proves p. 226. and elsewhere That Decrees purely conditional are very much unbecoming the Divine Wil. But of this more in what follows c. 5. § 3. 4 As for the Particle Quia Because 1 We grant that it doth not alwayes denote a proper Cause but a reason of Consequence and that taken sometimes from the effect But 2 that it cannot denote a reason of Consequence taken from the Effect in this Text is most evident because Gods Wil to slay them was not the effect of their disobedience but their disobedience was the consequent of Gods wil to slay them 3 Take notice that we do not say that Gods wil was the cause of their disobedience or ruine but only that the later was the consequent of the former God in his most soverain wise and efficacious purpose decreed to leave the sons of Eli to such flagitiose sins as should prove the cause of their ruine both temporal and eternal and hereupon their sin and ruine followed as Darknesse is the consequent of the Suns retirement into the inferior Hemisphere Again Gods efficacious permissive wil about sin may be demonstrated from Job 12. 16. The deceiver and deceived are his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 His or unto him is the deceiver and the deceived i. e. he doth in just judgement permit men to deceive and to be deceived as Vatablus on this Text. Which Mercer thus more fully explicates I understand this not only of false Worship but also of al errors that are committed every where although more specially in Polities and Cities to be governed where God stirs up some who draw others into error that they might follow their fallacious counsel and enter on a perniciose course for their own dammage God therefore impels and draws some into error not that the Lord is the Author of Error or Sin but that their sin and defection from God leads them thereto God not only merely permitting but also ordaining c. Whence it 's added v. 17. He leadeth counsellers away spoiled and maketh the Judges fools spoiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. of their wisdom and counsel as it follows So it 's taken Psal 76. 6. The valiant are spoiled of their heart i. e. deprived of their courage And maketh the Judges fools 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 infatuat or ad insaniam adigit as Mercer He infatuates them Again v. 20. He removeth away the speech of the trusty and taketh away the understanding of the aged 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Judgement Discretion Counsel Prudence Sense Hebr. the savor or experimental tast So v. 24. He taketh away the heart of the chief of the People of the earth and causeth them to wander in a Wildernesse where there is no way The like Deut. 28. 28. and Esa 19. 11 12 13 14. Now let us see what answer Strangius l. 4. c. 9. p. 836. gives hereto It must be observed saith he that Job in this Chapter doth in an illustrious manner discourse of Gods Providence so ordering things that nothing comes to pass casually or fortuitously nothing without his destinated counsel that nothing is done but what he wils either by permitting that it be done or by doing of it as August Enchirid. c. 95. so that God doth effect and procure whatever things are good and also wisely foreknowing the future event doth permit sins which he directs to good ends ordained by him Deservedly therefore Job among other things observes that it is from Divine Providence that some erre and draw others into error and that both as to maters of Religion and in other maters of this life not that is he the Author of seduction and errors but because God for the contemt and abuse of his light delivers them destitute thereof into a mind void of judgement and presenting objects and occasions opens a way wherein they wander c. Though this Paraphrase be far short of the mind of the Text yet there is enough in it to confirme our Hypothesis and subvert his own Antithesis For 1 he grants That nothing happens casually without Gods destinated counsel according to that of Augustin That nothing is done but what God wils c. Now certainly Gods destinated counsel or determined wil is most efficacious and irresistible so that if the permission of sin be from Gods destinated counsel it must be also determined by his efficacious wil. 2 He grants that God wisely foreknows al future events even the sins of men and how this can be without the efficacious predetermination of his own wil to permit the same neither Strangius himself nor any of his sectators could ever yet make out 3 He grants also That God directs those aberrations and sins to good ends appointed by him And how can God direct the immanent aberrations of the mind but by an efficacious predetermination of the substrate acts and permission of the vitiositie 4 He yet further grants That God delivers them unto a mind void of judgement
Hebrew in the time past 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I sent out mine hand i. e. by the pestilence or murrain among the bestes as v. 3 6. and so it follows and I had smitten thee with the same pestilence and thou hadst been cut off deservedly but for another cause which is mentioned vers 16. I have spared thee This seemeth the genuine meaning namely that God spared Pharaoh in this plague thereby to magnifie his vindictive Justice and Power the more in his final ruine God let him alone to run on in ful career in his way of sin yea concurred to the substrate mater of al his sins and caused al his plagues to meet on his heart in order to his final obduration thereby to render his vindictive Justice more illustrious in his ruine And so vers 16. And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up for to shew in thee my power and that my name may be declared thorowout al the earth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in very deed or verily it notes a great asseveration such as with God amounts almost to an oath For this The Apostle Paul Rom. 9. 17. addes a Pronoun of intention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for this very same i. e. cause or purpose as the Greeks expound it for this cause have I raised thee up The LXX render it thou hast been preserved or kept alive but Paul more emphaticly Rom. 9. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have made thee stand up or have constituted or set thee up as on a Theatre before al the world to be a vessel of wrath and an exemple of Divine vengeance The Syriac renders it thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have made thee to stand up which emphaticly paints forth Gods absolute wil in his Reprobation So in the Hebraic Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have made thee stand up as a monument of vindictive Justice This making to stand up notes the constitution and being of a thing as elsewhere in Scripture the righteous God gave being and constitution to Pharaoh for this very end to magnifie the glorie of his vindictive Justice on him So it follows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for to shew or that I may shew in thee or shew thee But the LXX adde the Particle In so Paul Rom. 9. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That I may give a specimen or demonstration of my power in thee Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 my power or my force my omnipotent severitie Thence it follows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for to declare or tel my name The righteous God suffered Pharaoh to run on with a vehement impetuositie in his sinful rebellion that so the world might ring of Gods vindictive Justice in his ruine From al this the Apostle strongly demonstrates our conclusion Rom. 9. 18. Therefore God hath mercie on whom he wil and whom he wil he hardeneth Observe here 1 the Apostle ushers in this inference with the conclusive note 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 therefore He layeth the premisses in Gods judicial procedings with Pharaoh for the manifestation of his vindictive punitive glorie in Pharaohs ruine whence he infers this universal conclusion Therefore God c. 2 He resolves Gods hardening men into his absolute wil or decree of Reprobation which he in this regard makes parallel to his absolute decree of Election for as God hath mercie on whom he wil i. e. according to his absolute purpose or decree so in like manner he hardeneth whom he wil i. e. according to his absolute decree of Reprobation And it is most certain according to the Scripture no man can maintain absolute Election but he must also maintain absolute Reprobation and if Reprobation be absolute then also Gods concurse to the entitative act of that which is sinful must be efficacious and predeterminative as hereafter Chap. 5. § 3. There are other Texts that make expresse mention of Gods efficacious ordering and disposing of wicked men and their sins for his own glorie So Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made althings for himself yea even the wicked for the day of evil Note here 1 the end of Gods making althings which is for himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. for the manifestation of his own glorie 2 The manner of Gods making althings for himself included in the Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath made which signifies 1 Gods active efficience or his energetic architectonic Decree whereby althings are made 2 God 's passive creation or his efficience in time 3 Gods conservation of althings in their beings and wel-beings 4 God 's efficacious actuating and governing althings to their ends Thus Psal 46. 9. Eccles 11. 5. Esa 5. 12. The LXX generally render it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Joh. 5. 17. our Lord useth to expresse Gods efficacious concurse and predeterminative influence And Strangius pag. 804. grants that whether we understand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here of Gods production in time or of his eternal Decree to produce man or of his ordination and constitution of man to punishment the difference is not material I would therefore take it in the largest notion as comprehensive of al its significates before specified 3 Whence follows the particular object even the wicked i. e. considered not only in their substance as men but also in al their Modes Adjuncts Accidents and Operations There is not the most minute accident or action of a wicked man but God makes it i. e. decrees influenceth and orders it for himself Whence 4 the wicked are said to be made by God for the day of evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. for the day of vindictive wrath or punishment inflicted for the illustration of Divine Justice which includes also their being left to sin for the forest piece of Divine vengeance is mens being given up to their own hearts lusts Adde hereto Rom. 9. 21 22. Hath not the potter power over the clay c Here Paul refutes the proud Pelagian blasphemies by an argument taken from Gods absolute Dominion and Soveraintie over his creature As if he had said Has not the Potter an absolute dominion over the clay to forme it into what shape he please and shal we not allow the great Creator of althings the same absolute dominion Did he not make althings and therefore may he not assume the Prerogative of ordering althings to the ends for which they were made As he gives to every creature what shape he please so cannot he appoint them to what end he please and direct them infallibly to that end Is it not an end sufficient for the being of any creature to be the glorie of any Attribute and therefore if God make a creature to be a vessel of wrath fitted to destruction is there any injurie done to the creature The Pythagoreans have an effate That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the worse is made for the service of the better which holds most true here of the vessels
and the Scotists placing the whole of it in the volition of God without any force impressed on the second cause as our Country-man Compt. Carleton in his Philosophie Disp 30. Sect. 1. pag. 327. has incomparably wel stated it But 3 Scotus in 4. Sentent Distinct 49. Quaest 6. § 14. pag. 522. edit 1620. has these very words Est contra naturam ejus scil voluntatis determinari à causa inferiori quia tunc ipsa non esset superior non est autem contra naturam ejus determinari à causa superiori quia cum hoc stat quòd sit causa in suo ordine It 's against its nature namely the wils to be determined by an inferior cause because then it should not be superior but it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause because it is consistent herewith that it be a cause in its own order Wherein Scotus doth most acutely though briefly state the Controversie about Predetermination both negatively and positively 1 Negatively That the wil cannot be determined or predetermined by any inferior cause because then it were not superior for whatever cause predetermines another to act is so far superior to it it being impossible yea a contradiction that the inferior should predetermine the superior 2 Positively That it is not against the nature of the wil to be predetermined by a superior cause i. e. by God the first cause who gave it being and therefore may without violence to its libertie determine or predetermine it in its operation and Scotus's reason is invincible because to be predetermined by a superior cause is very wel consistent with the wils being a cause in its own order Yea we may raise this reason to a greater height therefore the wil is a cause in its own order i. e. a particular proper principal or lesse principal cause according to the nature of its causalitie and effect because it is predetermined to act by God the superior first Cause so that Gods predeterminative concurse to the actions of the wil even such as have sin appendent to them is according to Scotus's sentiments so far from infringing or diminishing the wils natural order and libertie in acting as that it corroborates and confirmes the same 4 Lastly Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. q. 2. saith expressely That albeit God determine the wil to the material act which is sinful yet the vitiositie of sin is not to be attributed to God but to the create wil because the create wil is under an essential obligation to give rectitude to the action but God is not bound by any such obligation c. Which is the same with the sentiments of Zuinglius and our reformed Divines albeit opposed by the new Methodists as wel as Arminians and Molinists Having laid down the concurrent testimonies of the two principal Heads of the Scholes Thomas and Scotus we now passe on to their sectators whereof we shal give the mention but of a few more illustrious To begin with Gregorius Ariminensis who was by profession a Dominican and great defendent of Augustin's Doctrine whom Bishop Vsher valued as the soundest of the Schole-men and Dr. Barlow as the acutest His invict demonstration of our Hypothesis we find in Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. where he demonstrates Gods immediate efficience in producing the entitative act of sin thus 1 Every evil act when produced is conserved by God Ergo. The antecedent he proves thus because otherwise every evil act should not in its existence immediately depend on God but be independent and so by stronger reason the wil itself which is more perfect than its act should be independent Again if it be not repugnant to the Divine Bonitie to conserve the evil act neither is it repugnant to it to produce the same 2 The wil is of itself indifferent to any act therefore it must be determined to every act by God 3 If God be not the immediate cause of the act which is evil he is not the Maker of al Beings 4 Al good that is not God is from God as the Efficient thereof but the act morally evil is yet naturally good Ergo. Hence he procedes to answer the Objections of his and our Adversaries thus 1 If God produce the same evil act which man produceth then he sins as man sins Whereto he answers by denying the consequence and that on this reason because man doth not therefore precisely sin because he doth an evil act as it is Ens or act but therefore he sins because he doth it evilly i. e. against right reason or the Law of God but now God produceth the same act according to right reason and therefore wel So the same man borne in fornication is produced by God wel but by the fornicator evilly But 2 it is farther objected by his Adversaries then as by ours now thus Thou wilt say that those things that are per se in themselves or intrinsecally evil as the hatred of God or the like can never be wel done therefore neither by God I responde saith he as we that there is or can be no entitie which may not be wel done albeit not by every Agent e. g. man envieth but God although he produce the same act of envie with man yet he doth not envie For al such acts beyond the simple production or motion of such or such a thing do connote something on the part of the Author who is so denominated which agrees not to God So to steal besides the simple translation of the thing from place to place connotes the thing stolne not to belong to him that translated it but God translating the same thing doth not translate what is not his own and therefore is not said to be the thief c. But here we are to note that whereas Gregorius Ariminensis makes God to be a partial cause of sin it is not to be understood as if God were the partial cause of the entitative act for so he makes God to be a total cause but he cals God a partial cause of sin as he produceth only the entitative act not the vitiositie whereof man only is the moral cause Thus also Holcot our Country-man super Sentent lib. 2. Dist 1. q. 1. makes God to be a partial cause of sin yet not the Author of it whereby he plainly means as he explicates himself that God is the physical cause of the substrate mater or entitative act only but man the moral cause of the vitiositie also This I mention because a reverend Divine of name among us from these expressions of Ariminensis and Holcot would persuade us that they make God the partial cause of the entitative act We might adde to these the testimonies of Altissiodorensis in Sent. 2. where he proves by strong arguments namely from the Passion of Christ c. That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil of which more in
point about Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin do greatly accord And let our Adversaries say what they list against the Dominicans it 's certain that in this mater they have done great service to the cause and interest of Truth and particularly Alvarez who is principally struck at by the adverse partie deserves great honor and diligent inspection by those who have any kindness for our Hypothesis or any part of the Doctrine of Efficacious Grace I am not ignorant what an heavy load of Imputations Strangius and a Reverend Divine of Name among our selves have laid upon him in their Oppositions to what he has writ in the defense of our Hypothesis but the Jesuites themselves who are his most puissant Impugnators give him a more candid and favorable treatment For in the treaty between them and the Jansenists begun Feb. 18. 1663. the Jesuites rejecting the Arbitrament of Gregorie Ariminensis and Estius whom they judged more severe they pitcht upon Alvarez as the more moderate to whom they required the Jansenists to conforme in those points controverted in order to an accommodement and the reasons they allege are of moment For say they Alvarez having assisted at the Congregations de Auxiliis there is a grand apparence that he and those others who writ at the same time and since took up this mode of speech to salve Libertie according to the movements and sentiments which the Popes Clement 8 th and Paul 5 th had albeit they made no Decree on this mater of which see Refutat de Pere Ferrier Chap. 6. and Idea of Jansenisme p. 82. wherein remarque 1 That the Jesuites Alvarez's sworne enemies give him a more favorable character as one who for his moderation was employed by the Popes to assist at the Congregations de Auxiliis for the composing the differences in those points in controversie between the Dominicans and Jesuites about Predetermination Yea 2 That the Popes themselves Clement 8 th and Paul 5 th had the same sentiments with Alvarez Is it not strange then that the Jesuites who are professed enemies to Predetermination and the Popes themselves who have been generally favorers of Pelagianisme should have a greater kindnesse for Alvarez's sentiments about Predetermination than Protestant Divines whose Doctrine against the Pelagians and Jesuites can never be defended but by those principes on which Alvarez bottomes his Predetermination For mine own part I cannot but confesse that in those Notions about Efficacious Grace and Predetermination I read Alvarez with al possible diligence and exactitude of spirit and found therein so penetrant an acumen so profound soliditie and such masculine Demonstrations as that I never met with his equal excepting Bradwardine and Ariminensis This Justice I conceive my self under an essential obligation to do him to wipe off those undeserved clamors and aspersions which Strangius and another Divine of note among us have loaded him with His own Sentiments in the defense of our Hypothesis are laid down in his excellent Disputations de Auxil l. 3. Disput 24. where he doth with a great deal of moderation and yet invincible force of argument demonstrate That God doth by a previous motion truely and efficiently or according to the mode of a physical cause premove free-wil to the act of sin as it is an Act or Being His Arguments for the demonstration of this Thesis are weighty and invincible namely from the Participation Limitation and Dependence of every Second cause c. Of which hereafter c. 5. Lastly that the Scholemen generally besides such as are Pelagian assert divine Predetermination to the material entitie of Sin see Twisse Vind. Grat. l. 2. Digress 2. I now passe on to Jansenius and his Sectators who are brought upon the Theatre by our Adversaries as Patrons of their Antithesis but this is so great a mistake in mater of fact that I cannot but admire any learned man should take refuge under it Yet thus Strangius l. 2. c. 14. p. 318. brings in Jansenius opposing Augustin both to the Dominicans and Jesuites as to the point of Predetermination The like is urged by a Reverend Divine of repute among us But this mistake is too obvious and great to take place among diligent and impartial Inquirers For 1 It 's evident that Jansenius rejected the terme Predetermination as maintained by the Dominicans not the thing it self as asserted by Augustin Thus in his August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. pag. 77 c. he proves That there is no manner of speech among the Scholemen so efficacious and pregnant to expresse Predetermination by but Augustin useth the same to illustrate Gods efficacious concurse And Tom. 3. l. 8. c. 1. p. 343. he acknowledgeth That those learned men the Dominicans have reached the Marrow of Divine Adjutorie and thence the true opinion of Augustin Again cap. 3. p. 346. he saith expressely that herein Medicinal Adjutorie agrees with physic Predetermination that the office of physically predetermining the wil doth truely belong unto it and it may be termed by that name taken not only in the abstract but also in the concrete Whence in the same Chapter he useth the very terme of physic Predetermination to expresse efficacious Concurse by albeit not in the same manner as it is used by the Scholemen So that it 's evident he was not averse from the thing albeit he but seldome used the terme to avoid the cavils of Scholastic Theologues as also to confine himself to the termes used by Augustin 2 That reverend Divine among us who makes use of Jansenius's name against physic Predetermination doth yet grant that Jansenius held the existence of sin to be necessary as a Punishment Wherein he opposeth Jansenius and also Augustin who held that sin as a punishment was willed and caused by God as before 3 Jansenius August de Statu Nat. Laps l. 4. c. 21. p. 264. assures us That men in their lapsed state before Faith be introduced are under the captivitie of lust and can do nothing but sin which captivitie is the same with that foresaid necessitie and coaction whereby sins committed by unbelievers are said to be necessary and therefore they have no power to abstain from sin And Tom. 3. de Grat. Christi l. 10. he stoutly maintains these following assertions about Reprobation which clearly evince Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin 1 He proves cap. 2. pag. 420. That Gods negative Reprobation is also positive 2 He demonstrates cap. 4. pag. 423. That the cause of Reprobation according to its comparative consideration is the absolute wil of God This is owned by reverend Mr. Baxter Cathol Theol. part 3. Sect. 7. § 22. pag. 93. in these words Jansenius's Doctrine is that the Reprobation of men was by Gods positive absolute wil of men in original sin and the effect of it excecation and obduration This being his proper opinion it necessarily follows that he asserted Gods predeterminative
with that of Durandus c. So Thes 50. pag. 437. Le Blanc addes That Amyraldus held a double act of providence about evil acts one externe and the other interne as for the externe act he placeth it in two things 1 in proposing objects 2 in permitting Satan to set home those objects with efficace The interne act of God consistes according to him in that God doth of many objects inducing to evil obscure or remove the one or cause some other object to be offered which is most taking In al which there is no violence offered to human libertie nor indeed any efficacious immediate concurse asserted Yea in his Speciminis special p. 468. he saith in down-right termes That the wil of God dependes on us not we on the wil of God which is rank Durandisme and Molinisme More of his wild sentiments in this as in other Arminian points see Pet. Molinaei de M. Amyraldi adversùs Spanhemium libro Judicium praesat Placeus another Salmurian Professor albeit in other points he stiffely defendes the New Method yea in that of original sin is greatly Pelagian yet in this point touching Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin he seems pendulous and in suspense Thus De libero Hom. Arbitr p. 174. edit 1656. What the dependence of the second causes on the first in causing is the Papists sharply dispute It is truly confessed by al that God doth concur with every cause so as to operate conveniently with its faculties but this concurse some make immediate proxime and altogether the same with the very action of second causes but others denie it But we according to that reverence we bear to the infinite Majestie of God dare not determine how great the dependence of the second cause on the first is it sufficeth us that provided the least spot of sin be not imputed to God too much cannot be ascribed unto God c. Le Blanc also Professor of Theologie at Sedan though he seems to affect the like suspensive modestie Concil Arbitr thes 55. yet thes 56. pag. 438. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius and others That God cannot physically premove and predetermine to acts intrinsecally evil without being the Author of sin But yet thes 57. he recals himself and saith That provided God be not constituted the Author of sin the dependence of the second causes on the first cannot be too much asserted And thes 58. he addes this as most certain That the aide and efficace of Divine providence even about sinful acts may no way be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurse c. But from the French Professors we passe on to those of Scotland Baronius and Strangius who have been stiffe and tenacious Adherents to this New Method about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin As for Baronius he is accused of rank Arminianisme and that which has given just ground for such an imputation is his denying al kind of predetermination as wel to good as to evil acts Thus in his Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 78. pag. 146 c. he endeavors to prove That God doth not by a previous motion excite second causes to act And his arguments to prove his Antithesis are no other than what time out of mind have been urged by Pelagians Jesuites and Arminians namely that this previous motion and predetermination 1 destroyeth human libertie pag. 147. 2 That it taketh away the power of the wil to opposite acts pag. 148. 3 That it maketh God the Author of sin pag. 149. which he endeavors to prove many ways 1 Because the entitative act of sin as being determined by God cannot be separated from the obliquitie pag. 150. 2 Because the action then as of such a species must be from God 3 Because this opinion makes God to be injust and cruel as pag. 151. 4 That hereby God is made the Author of sin more than the sinner Al which are but trite and thread-bare arguments urged by Pelagians and Arminians to which we shal answer more fully hereafter chap. 6. § 1 c. Thence he procedes pag. 153. to answer our principal argument That the second cause doth not act but as moved by the first and therein agrees with Suarez and other Jesuites in asserting a previous indifferent concurse It 's true § 58. p. 129. he argues strongly against Durandus yet in fine pag. 153. fals in very far with him but more fully with the Molinists and Remonstrants which is wel observed by Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. thes 35. pag. 434. This at least without al dout is the opinion of Robert Baronius in his Metaphysic where touching the Concurse of God and so of its concord with human libertie he professeth to have altogether the same sentiments with Fonseca and Suarez namely that this concurse is of itself indifferent and determined by the second cause to a certain species of action neither is it needful that God premove second causes but it is sufficient that together with them he influence their actions and effects And indeed Baronius's own illustration Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. pag. 143. sufficiently clears this to be his proper opinion where he compares the Concurse of God to that of the Sun which is the same in the production of perfect animals and monsters in itself indifferent but modified and determined by the mater it workes upon which is the very instance given both by Jesuites and Arminians Lastly pag. 159. he gives us four actions of God in the induration of sinners which are no more than what Molinists and Remonstrants acknowlege Whence it is to me apparent that it would not be an act of injustice should we reckon him among the Arminians whose sentiments and cause he has espoused yet by reason of his nominal repute among the Calvinists I rather incline to the more favorable censure of ranging him among the new Methodists But yet our principal Antagonist is John Strangius Professor at Glascow who as they say having had his spirit chafed and exasperated by the opposition of Rutherford writ a great Volume in four Books Of Gods Wil and Actions about sin wherein he bends his forces principally against the Dominicans Twisse and Rutherford who in his influences of the life of Grace both Preface and Book oft animadvertes thereon as if these al by asserting predetermination to the mater of sinful acts made God the Author of sin I must confesse he discovers a natural acumen and a nervose vene of Reason in his Book yet mixed with so great incongruities and self-inconsistences yea contradictions that I cannot but marvel how such a Master of Reason could satisfie himself with such poor subterfuges and evasions But this I impute not to any defect in naturals but in his cause which admits not any solid reason for its defense And that which yet seems more strange to me is this that he who opposeth with much vehemence Durandus Molina
possibilitie to a state of futurition c. Whence he concludes Thes 43. Sithat there is so much darknesse on every side there is nothing more safe than to professe our Ignorance in this particular And this indeed is the best refuge these New Methodists have when they see themselves involved in so many self-contradictions and absurdities to professe their Ignorance as to the Mode of Divine Prescience Yea some of them procede so far in this pretended modestie as to professe That the mode of Divine Prescience is not determined in Scripture Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. That God is omniscient is put out of dout but touching the mode and manner of Prescience nothing is expressely delivered in Scripture The like others But is it so indeed Doth not the Scripture declare expressely the mode of Prescience Why then 1 are our Adversaries so dogmatic and positive in their new modes and measures of Divine Prescience contrary to the received Sentiments of the Church in al Ages How comes it to passe that they contend with so much heat and passion for that which they confesse is not expressely delivered in Scripture Were not a modest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or suspension of assent more agreeable to such a Confession But 2 We easily grant them that the mode of Divine Prescience is unsearchable and past finding out as indeed al Divine Perfections are but yet must we thence necessarily conclude that nothing of the mode of Divine Prescience is expressely delivered in Scripture 1 Doth not the Scripture evidently declare That the mode of Gods Prescience is far above yea opposite to that of Mans science as much as Heaven is above the Earth yea infinitely more 2 Doth not the Scripture also remove from the mode of Divine Prescience al manner of Imperfections much more Contradictions And is not the mode of Gods Prescience in his own Essence and Decrees much more perfect than that which makes his Infallible immutable Prescience dependent on the mutable fallible Wil of Man But see more hereof Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. § 2. § 3. We passe on to our third Argument which shal be taken from the Divine Wil and Decrees and more particularly from the Decree of Reprobation And here we shal lay down this Principe which is granted by Strangius and others of the New Method That Divine Predetermination is adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition or Predestination So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. We easily grant saith he that the predefinition of God from eternitie and the predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other so that if God doth absolutely predefine any particular and singular act to be brought about by us he must also determine our Wil to the same This he inculcates c. 5. p. 584. Now this ingenuous Concession is as much as we desire to build our Demonstration on for we no way dout but to demonstrate That God doth absolutely predefine the material entitative act of Sin Which we shal endeavour to make good in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Reprobation admits no formal motive proper condition or cause This Proposition is generally denyed by the New Methodists who grant That God decrees al good absolutely but as for Sin say they God decrees that only respectively and conditionally So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 546-548 But we no way dout but before we have finisht this Demonstration to make it evident that Gods Decree of Reprobation whereby he determines to leave men to sin is absolute as wel as the Decree of Election Yea it is to me a thing altogether impossible to defend an absolute Decree of Election and yet to make the Decree of Reprobation conditional and respective for if the absolute good pleasure of God be the only cause why some are elected must it not also be the only cause why others are rejected Doth not the Election of the one necessarily implie the Reprobation of the other It 's true our Divines that follow the Sublapsarian mode as Davenant c. speak of Sin as a commun condition belonging to the whole masse of corrupt nature yet they allow not of any distinctive condition or formal cause or motive which should incline the divine wil to reprobate one rather than another for nothing can move the divine Wil but what is some way antecedent to it Now the consideration of al sin is subsequent to some act of Gods Wil. 2 Prop. The act of Reprobation is not merely negative but positive and efficacious It 's granted that some of our Divines make mention of a negative act of Reprobation which they terme Non-election or Preterition yet hereby they intend not a suspense act of the Divine wil but include also a positive efficacious act Thus Jansenius August de Grat. Christi l. 10. c. 2. pag. 420. proves out of Augustin That Gods negative Reprobation is positive So Davenant Dissert de Elect. Reprob p. 113. But we must take heed saith he lest with Scotus we think that the Wil of God in regard of Reprobates which he electes not but passeth by is merely negative for in this very act which we expresse by a Negation is contained an expresse and affirmate Wil of God So in his Determinations Quaest 25. p. 117. he tels us That it 's most certain there can be no Decree permitting sin to which there doth not adhere some efficacious Decree And p. 118. he instructs us That this Decree of permitting sin is efficacious not in a way of efficience but by directing and ordaining to extract good out of evil 3 Prop. In the mater of Reprobation God is considered as a soverain Absolute Lord not as a Righteous Judge The Pelagians Molinists Arminians and New Methodists consider God in the act of Reprobation as a just Judge not as a supreme absolute Lord whence they conclude that it is unjust with God to reprobate any but on the prevision of their sins not considering that Reprobation is not an act inflicting punishment but of denying Benefits wherein the Libertie and Dominion of God is only to be attended according to that of the Apostle Rom. 9. 21. Has not the Potter power over the clay c What is soverain Dominion but an absolute right to dispose of what is our own And shal we not allow the same Dominion to God which is allowed to the Potter over his Clay Is the soverain Lord tied to his Creature by any Law more than what is in his own nature and wil Hence it follows 4 That the Decree of Reprobation is most absolute and Independent as to al distinctive conditions or causes in man Thus Jansenius August de Grat. Christi l. 10. c. 4. p. 423. proves out of Augustin That the absolute Wil of God is the alone cause of Reprobation And Augustin complains That it is a great injurie to God when men search for causes of things superior to his soverain Wil for his Wil