3. Sect. 5. where I call them Phantasms For taking them to be Things real without us like Bodies and seeing them to come and vanish so strangely as they do unlike to Bodies what could they call them else but incorporeal Bodies which is not a Name but an Absurdity of Speech 6. It is true that the Heathens and all Nations of the World have acknowledged that there be Spirits which for the most part they hold to be incorporeal whereby it might be thought that a Man by natural Reason may arrive without the Scriptures to the Knowledge of this That Spirits are But the erroneous Collection thereof by the Heathens may proceed as I have said before from the Ignorance of the Cause of Ghosts and Phantasms and such other Apparitions And from thence had the Grecians their Number of Gods their Number of Daemons good or bad and for every Man his Genius which is not the Acknowledging of this Truth That Spirits are but a false Opinion concerning the Force of Imagination 7. And seeing the Knowledge we have of Spirits is not natural Knowledge but Faith from supernatural Revelation given to the holy Writers of the Scriptures it followeth that of Inspirations also which is the Operation of Spirit in us the Knowledge which we have must all proceed from Scripture The Signs there set down of Inspiration are Miracles when they be great and manifestly above the Power of Men to do by Imposture As for Example the Inspiration of Elias was known by the miraculous Burning of the Sacrifice But the Signs to distinguish whether a Spirit be good or evil are the same by which we distinguish whether a Man or a Tree be good or evil namely Actions and Fruit For there are lying Spirits wherewith Men are inspired sometimes as well as with Spirits of Truth And we are commanded in Scripture to judge of the Spirits by their Doctrine and not of the Doctrine by the Spirits For Miracles our Saviour hath forbidden us to rule our Faith by them Matth. 24.24 And Saint Paul saith Gal. 1.8 Though an Angel from Heaven preach to you otherwise c. let him be accursed Where it is plain that we are not to judge whether the Doctrine be true or not by the Angel but whether the Angel say true or no by the Doctrine So likewise 1 Joh. 4.1 Believe not every Spirit for false Prophets are gone out into the World Vers. 2. Hereby shall ye know the Spirit of God Vers. 3. Every Spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh is not of God and this is the Spirit of Antichrist Vers. 15. Whosoever confesseth that Jesus is the Son of God in him dwelleth God and he in God The Knowledge therefore we have of good and evil Inspiration cometh not by Vision of an Angel that may teach it nor by a Miracle that may seem to confirm it but by Conformity of Doctrine with this Article and Fundamental Point of Christian Faith which also Saint Paul saith is the sole Foundation That Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh 1 Cor. 3.11 8. But if Inspiration be discerned by this Point and this Point be acknowledged and believed upon the Authority of the Scriptures How may some Men ask know we that the Scripture deserveth so great Authority which must be no less than that of the lively Voice of God that is how we know the Scriptures to be the Word of God And first it is manifest that if by Knowledge we understand Science infallible and natural as is defined Chap. 6. Sect. 4. proceeding from Sense we cannot be said to know it because it proceedeth not from the Conceptions ingendered by Sense And if we understand Knowledge as supernatural we cannot have it but by Inspiration And of that Inspiration we cannot judge but by the Doctrine It followeth that we have not any Way natural or supernatural of the Knowledge thereof which can properly be called Infallible Science and Evidence It remaineth that the Knowledge that we have that the Scriptures are the Word of God is only Faith which Faith therefore is also by Saint Paul defined Heb. 11.1 to be the Evidence of Things not seen that is to say not otherwise evident but by Faith for whatsoever either is evident by Natural Reason or Revelation supernatural is not called Faith else should not Faith cease no more than Charity when we are in Heaven which is contrary to the Doctrine of the Scripture And we are not said to believe but to know those Things that be evident 9. Seeing then the Acknowledgment of Scriptures to be the Word of God is not Evidence but Faith and Faith Chap. 6. Sect. 7. consisteth in the Trust we have of other Men it appeareth plain that the Men so trusted are the holy Men of Gods Church succeeding one another from the Time of those that saw the wondrous Works of God Almighty in the Flesh Nor doth this imply that God is not the Worker or Efficient Cause of Faith or that Faith is begotten in Man without the Spirit of God for all those good Opinions which we admit and believe though they proceed from Hearing and Hearing from Teaching both which are natural yet they are the Work of God for all the Works of Nature are his and they are attributed to the Spirit of God As for Example Exod. 28.3 Thou shalt speak unto all cunning Men whom I have filled with the SPIRIT of Wisdom that they may make Aaron's Garments for his Consecration that he may serve me in the Priests Office Faith therefore wherewith we believe is the Work of the Spirit of God in that Sense by which the Spirit of God giveth to one Man Wisdom and cunning in Workmanship more than another and by which he effecteth also in other Points pertaining to our ordinary Life that one Man believeth that which upon the same Grounds another doth not and one Man reverenceth the Opinion and obeyeth the Commands of his Superiour and others not 10. And seeing our Faith that the Scriptures are the Word of God began from the Confidence and Trust we repose in the Church there can be no Doubt but that their Interpretation of the same Scriptures when any Doubt or Controversie shall arise by which this Fundamental Point That Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh may be called in question is safer for any Man to trust to than his own whether Reasoning or Spirit that is to say his own Opinion 11. Now concerning Mens Affections to God-ward they are not the same always that are described in the Chapter concerning Passions There for to love is to be delighted with the Image or Conception of the Thing loved but God is unconceivable To love God therefore in the Scripture is to obey his Commandments and to love one another Also to trust God is different from our trusting one another for when a Man trusteth a Man Chap. 9. Sect. 8. he layeth aside his own Endeavours but
Power of him that contendeth with us the Signs whereof besides those in the Countenance and other Gestures of the Body which cannot be described are Ostentation in Words and Insolency in Actions and this Passion of them whom it displeaseth is called Pride by them whom it pleaseth it is termed a just Valuation of himself This Imagination of our Power or Worth may be from an assured and certain Experience of our own Actions and then is that Glory just and well grounded and begetteth an Opinion of increasing the same by other Actions to follow in which consisteth the Appetite which we call Aspiring or Proceeding from one Degree of Power to another The same Passion may proceed not from any Conscience of our own Actions but from Fame and Trust of others whereby one may think well of himself and yet be deceived and this is false Glory and the Aspiring consequent thereto procureth ill Success Further the Fiction which is also Imagination of Actions done by our selves which never were done is Glorying but because it begetteth no Appetite nor endeavour to any further Attempt it is meerly vain and unprofitable as when a Man imagineth himself to do the Actions whereof he readeth in some Romance or to be like unto some other Man whose Acts he admireth And this is called Vain Glory and is exemplied in the Fable by the Fly sitting on the Axletree and saying to himself What a Dust do I make rise The expression of Vain Glory is that Wish which some of the School mistaking for some Appetite distinct from all the rest have called Velleity making a new Word as they made a new Passion which was not before Signs of Vain Glory in the Gesture are Imitation of others Counterfeiting and Usurping the Signs of Vertue they have not Affectation of Fashions Captation of Honour from their Dreams and other little Stories of themselves from their Country from their Names and from the like 2. The Passion contrary to Glory proceeding from Apprehension of our own Infirmity is called Humility by those by whom it is approved by the rest Dejection and Poorness which Conception may be well or ill grounded if well it produceth Fear to attempt any Thing rashly if ill it utterly cows a Man that he neither dares speak publickly nor expect good Success in any Action 3. It happeneth sometimes that he that hath a good Opinion of himself and upon good ground may nevertheless by Reason of the Frowardness which that Passion begetteth discover in himself some Defect or Infirmity the Remembrance whereof dejecteth him and this Passion is called Shame by which being cooled and checked in his Forwardness he is more wary for the Time to come This Passion as it is a Sign of Infirmity which is Dishonour so also it is a Sign of Knowledge which is Honour The Sign of it is Blushing which appeareth less in Men conscious of their own Defect because they less betray the Infirmities they acknowledge 4. Courage in a large Signification is the Absence of Fear in the Presence of any evil whatsoever but in a Strict and more common Meaning it is Contempt of Wounds and Death when they oppose a Man in the Way to his End 5. Anger or sudden Courage is nothing but the Appetite or desire of overcoming present Opposition It hath been defined commonly to be Grief proceeding from an Opinion of Contempt which is confuted by the often Experience which we have of being moved to anger by things inanimate and without Sense and consequently incapable of contemning us 6. Revengefulness is that Passion which ariseth from an Expectation or Imagination of making him that hath hurt us find his own Action hurtful to himself and to acknowledge the same and this is the Height of Revenge for though it be not hard by returning Evil for Evil to make ones Adversary displeased with his own Fact yet to make him acknowledge the same is so difficult that many a Man had rather die than do it Revenge aimeth not at the Death but at the Captivity or Subjection of an Enemy which was well expressed in the Exclamation of Tiberius Caesar concerning one that to frustrate his Revenge had killed himself in Prison Hath he escaped me To kill is the aim of them that hate to rid themselves out of Fear Revenge aimeth at Triumph which over the Dead is not 7. Repentance is the Passion which proceedeth from Opinion or Knowledge that the Action they have done is out of the Way to the End they would attain the Effect whereof is to pursue that Way no longer but by the Consideration of the End to direct themselves into a better The first Motion therefore in this Passion is Grief but the Expectation or Conception of returning again into the Way is Joy and consequently the Passion of Repentance is compounded and allayed of both but the predominant is Joy else were the Whole Grief which cannot be forasmuch as he that proceedeth towards the End he conceiveth Good proceedeth with Appetite and Appetite is Joy as hath been said Chap. 7. Sect. 2. 8. Hope is Expectation of Good to come as Fear is the Expectation of Evil But when there be Causes some that make us expect Good and some that make us expect Evil alternately working in our Mind if the Causes that make us expect Good be greater than those that make us expect Evil the whole Passion is Hope if contrarily the Whole is Fear Absolute Privation of hope is Despair a degree whereof is Diffidence 9. Trust is a Passion proceeding from the Belief of him from whom we expect or hope for Good so free from Doubt that upon the same we pursue no other Way to attain the same Good as Distrust or Diffidence is Doubt that maketh him endeavour to provide himself by other Means And that this is the Meaning of the Words Trust and Distrust is manifest from this that a Man never provideth himself by a second Way but when he mistrusteth that the first will not hold 10. Pity is Imagination or Fiction of future Calamity to our selves proceeding from the Sense of another Mans Calamity But when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same the Compassion is greater because then there appeareth more Probability that the same may happen to us for the Evil that happeneth to an innocent Man may happen to every Man But when we see a Man suffer for great Crimes which we cannot easily think will fall upon our selves the Pity is the less And therefore Men are apt to pity those whom they love for whom they love they think worthy of Good and therefore not worthy of Calamity Thence it is also that Men pity the Vices of some Persons at the first Sight only out of Love to their Aspect The Contrary of Pity is Hardness of Heart proceeding either from Slowness of Imagination or some extreme great Opinion of their own Exemption from the like Calamity or from hatred of
and motive considered in every Man by himself without Relation to otherâ— it will fall fitly into this Chapter to speak of the Effects of the same Power one upon another which Effects are also the Signs by which one taketh notice what another conceiveth and intendeth Of these Signs some are such as cannot easily be counterfeited as Actions and Gestures especially if they be sudden whereof I have mentioned some for Example look in Chap. 9. with the several Passions whereof they are Signs Others there are which may be counterfeited and those are Words or Speech of the Use and Effects whereof I am to speak in this Place 2. The first Use of Language is the expression of our Conceptions that is the begetting in one another the same Conceptions that we have in our selves and this is called Teaching wherein if the Conception of him that teacheth continually accompany his Words beginning at something true in Experience then it begetteth the like Evidence in the Hearer that understandeth them and maketh him to know something which he is therefore said to learn but if there be not such Evidence then such teaching is called Perswasion and begetteth no more in the Hearer than what is in the Speakers bare Opinion And the Signs of two Opinions contradictory one to another namely Affirmation and Negation of the same Thing is called Controversie but both Affirmations or both Negations Consent in Opinion 3. The infallible Sign of teaching exactly and without errour is this that no Man hath ever taught the Contrary Not that few how few soever if any for commonly Truth is on the side of a few rather than of the Multitude But when in Opinions and Questions considered and discussed by many it happeneth that not any one of the Men that so discuss'd them differ from another then it may be justly inferred they know what they teach and that otherwise they do not And this appears most manifestly to them that have considered the divers Subjects wherein they have exercised their Pens and the divers Ways in which they have proceeded together with the Diversity of the Success thereof for those Men who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the Comparison of Magnitudes Numbers Times and Motions and how their Proportions are to one another have thereby been the Authors of all those Excellencies by which we differ from such savage People as now inhabit divers places in America and as have been the Inhabitants heretofore of those Countries where at this day Arts and Sciences do most flourish for from the Studies of these Men have proceeded whatsoever cometh to us for Ornament by Navigation and whatsoever we have beneficial to humane Society by the Division Distinction and Portraicting the Face of the Earth whatsoever also we have by the Account of Times and Foresight of the Course of Heaven whatsoever by Measuring Distances Plains and Solids of all Sorts and whatsoever either elegant or defensible in Building All which supposed a Way what do we differ from the wildest of the Indians Yet to this day was it never heard of that there was any Controversie concerning any Conclusion in this Subject the Science whereof hath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched by the Conclusions of most difficult and profound Speculation The Reason whereof is apparent to every Man that looketh into their Writings for they proceed from most low and humble Principles evident even to the meanest Capacity going on slowly and with most scrupulous Ratiocination viz. from the Imposition of Names they inferr the Truth of their first Propositions and from two of the first a third and from any two of the three a fourth and so on according to the Steps of Science mentioned Chap. 6. Sect. 4. On the other side those Men who have written concerning the Faculties Passions and Manners of Men that is to say of Moral Philosophy and of Policy Government and Laws whereof there be infinite Volumes have been so far from removing Doubt and Controversie in the Questions they have handled that they have very much multiplied the same Nor doth any Man at this day so much as pretend to know more than hath been delivered Two thousand Years ago by Aristotle and yet every Man thinks that in this Subject he knoweth as much as any other supposing there needeth thereunto no Study but that accrueth unto them by natural Wit though they play or imploy their Mind otherwise in the Purchace of Wealth or Place The Reason whereof is no other than that in their Writings and Discourses they take for Principles those Opnions which are already vulgarly received whether true or false being for the most part false There is therefore a great deal of Difference between Teaching and Perswading the Sign of this being Controversie the Sign of the former no Controversie 4. There be two Sorts of Men that commonly be called learned One is that Sort that proceedeth evidently from humble Principles as is described in the last Section and those Men are called Mathematici The other are they that take up Maxims from their Education and from the Authority of Men or of Custom and take the habitual Discourse of the Tongue for Ratiocination and these are called Dogmatici Now seeing in the last Section those we call Mathematici are absolved of the Crime of breeding Controversie and they that pretend not to Learning cannot be accused the Fault lieth altogether in the Dogmaticks that is to say those that are imperfectly learned and with Passion press to have their Opinions pass every where for Truth without any evident Demonstration either from Experience or from Places of Scripture of uncontroverted Interpretation 5. The Expression of those Conceptions which cause in us the Experience of Good while we deliberate as also of those which cause our Expectation of Evil is that which we call Counselling and is the internal Deliberation of the Mind concerning what we our selves are to do or not to do The Consequences of our Actions are our Counsellors by alternate Succession in the Mind So in the Counsel which a Man taketh from other Men the Counsellors alternately do make appear the Consequences of the Action and do not any of them deliberate but furnish among them all him that is counselled with Arguments whereupon to deliberate with himself 6. Another Use of Speech is Expression of Appetite Intention and Will as the Appetite of Knowledge by Interrogation Appetite to have a Thing done by another as Request Prayer Petition Expressions of our Purpose or intention as Promise which is the Affirmation or Negation of some Action to be done in the future Threatning which is the Promise of Evil and Commanding which is that Speech by which we signifie to another our Appetite or Desire to have any Thing done or left undone for Reasons contained in the Will it self For it is not properly said Sic volo sic jubeo without that other Clause Stet pro Ratione Voluntas And when the Command is a sufficient Reason to move us to Action then is that Command called a Law 7. Another Use of Speech is Instigation and Appeasing by which we increase or diminish one anothers Passion It is the same Thing with Perswasion the Difference not being real for the Begetting of Opinion and Passion is the same But whereas in Perswasion we aim at Getting Opinion from Passion here the End is to raise Passion from Opinion And as in raising an Opinion from Passion any Premisses are good enough to inforce the desired Conclusion so in raising Passion from Opinion it is no matter whether the Opinion be true or false or the Narration historical or fabulous for not the Truth but the Image maketh Passion and a Tragedy well acted affecteth no less than a Murther 8. Though words be the Signs we have of one anothers Opinions and Intentions because the Aequivocation of them is so frequent according to the Diversity of Contexture and of the Company wherewith they go which the Presence of him that speaketh our Sight of his Actions and Conjecture of his Intentions must help to discharge us of it must therefore be extream hard to find the Opinions and Meaning of those Men that are gone from us long ago and have left us no other Signification thereof than their Books which cannot possibly be understood without History to discover those aforementioned Circumstances and also without great Prudence to observe them 9. When it happeneth that a Man signifieth unto us two contradictory Opinions whereof the one is clearly and directly signified and the other either drawn from that by Consequence or not known to be contradictory to it then when he is not present to explicate himself better we are to take the former for his Opinion for that is clearly signified to be his and directly whereas the other might proceed from errour in the Deduction or Ignorance of the Repugnancy The like also is to be held in two contradictory Expressions of a Mans Intention and Will for the same Reason 10. Forasmuch as whosoever speaketh to another intendeth thereby to make him understand what he saith if he speak unto him either in a Language which he that heareth understandeth not or use any Word in other Sence than he believeth is the Sence of him that heareth he intendeth also not to make him understand what he saith which is a Contradiction of himself It is therefore always to be supposed that he which intendeth not to deceive alloweth the private Interpretation of his Speech to him to whom it is addressed 11. Silence in him that believeth that the same shall be taken for a Sign of his Intent is a Sign thereof indeed for if he did not consent the Labour of Speaking so much as to declare the same is so little as it is to be presumed he would have done it CONCLUSION THus have we considered the Nature of Man so far as was requisite for the finding out the first and most simple Elements wherein the Compositions of Politick Rules and Laws are lastly resolved which was my present Purpose FINIS
when there is it is by Chance which must needs proceed from this That the Brain in Dreams is not restored to its Motion in every Part alike whereby it cometh to pass that our Thoughts appear like the Stars between the flying Clouds not in the Order which a Man would chuse to observe them but as the uncertain Flight of broken Clouds permits 4. As when the Water or any liquid Thing moved at once by divers Movents receiveth one Motion compounded of them all so also the Brain or Spirit therein having been stirred by divers Objects composeth an Imagination of divers Conceptions that appeared single to the Sense As for Example the Sense sheweth at one Time the Figure of a Mountain and at another Time the Colour of Gold but the Imagination afterwards hath them both at once in a golden Mountain From the same Cause it is there appear unto us Castles in the Air Chimaera's and other Monsters which are not in Rerum Natura but have been conceived by the Sense in Pieces at several Times And this Composition is that which we commonly call Fiction of the Mind 5. There is yet another Kind of Imagination which for Clearness contendeth with Sense as well as a Dream and that is when the Action of Sense hath been long or vehement and the Experience thereof is more frequent in the Sense of Seeing than the rest An Example whereof is the Image remaining before the Eye after looking upon the Sun Also those little Images that appear before the Eyes in the dark whereof I think every Man hath Experience but they most of all who are timorous or superstitious are Examples of the same And these for Distinction-sake may be called Phantasms 6. By the Senses which are numbred according to the Organs to be five we take Notice as hath been said already of the Objects without us and that Notice is our Conception thereof but we take Notice also some Way or other of our Conceptions for when the Conception of the same Thing cometh again we take Notice that is again that is to say that we have had the same Conception before which is as much as to imagine a Thing past which is impossible to the Sense which is only of Things present This therefore may be accounted a Sixth Sense but internal not external as the rest and is commonly called Remembrance 7. For the Manner by which we take Notice of a Conception past we are to remember that in the Definition of Imagination it is said to be a Conception by little and little decaying or growing more obscure An obscure Conception is that which representeth the whole Object together but none of the smaller Parts by themselves and as more or fewer Parts be represented so is the Conception or Representation said to be more or less clear Seeing then the Conception which when it was first produced by Sense was clear and represented the Parts of the 0bject distinctly and when it cometh again is obscure we find missing somewhat that we expected by which we judge it past and decayed For Example a Man that is present in a Foreign City seeth not only whole Streets but can also distinguish particular Houses and Parts of Houses but departed thence he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his Mind as he did some House or Turning escaping him yet is this to remember when afterwards there escape him more Particulars this is also to remember but not so well In Process of Time the Image of the City returneth but as a Mass of Building only which is almost to have forgotten it Seeing then Remembrance is more or less as we find more or less Obscurity Why may not we well think Remembrance to be nothing else but the missing of Parts which every man expecteth should succeed after they have a Conception of the Whole To see at a great Distance of Place and to remember at great Distance of Time is to have like Conceptions of the Thing for there wanteth Distinction of Parts in both the one Conception being weak by Operation at Distance the other by Decay 8. And from this that hath been said there followeth That a Man can never know he dreameth he may dream he doubteth whether it be a Dream or no but the Clearness of the Imagination representeth every Thing with as many Parts as doth Sense it self and consequently he can take Notice of nothing but as present whereas to think he dreameth is to think those his Conceptions that is to say obscurer than they were in the Sense so that he must think them both as clear and not as clear as Sense which is impossible 9. From the same Ground it proceedeth that Men wonder not in their Dreams at Place and Persons as they would do waking for waking a Man would think it strange to be in a Place where he never was before and remember nothing of how he came there but in a Dream there cometh little of that kind into Consideration The Clearness of Conception in a Dream taketh away Distrust unless the Strangeness be excessive as to think himself fallen from on high without hurt and then most commonly he waketh 10. Nor is it possible for a Man to be so far deceived as when his Dream is past to think it real for if he dream of such Things as are ordinarily in his Mind and in such Order as he useth to do waking and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the Place were he findeth himself when he awaketh all which may happen I know no {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} or Mark by which he can discern whether it were a Dream or not and therefore do the less wonder to hear a Man sometimes to tell his Dream for a Truth or to take it for a Vision CHAP. IV. 1. Discourse 2. The Cause of Coherence of Thoughts 3. Ranging 4. Sagacity 5. Reminiscence 6. Experience 7. Expectation 8. Conjecture 9. Signs 10. Prudence 11. Caveats of concluding from Experience 1. THe Succession of Conceptions in the Mind Series or Consequence of one after another may be casual and incoherent as in Dreams for the most part and it may be orderly as when the former Thought introduceth the latter and this is Discourse of the Mind But because the Word Discourse is commonly taken for the Coherence and Consequence of Words I will to avoid Aequivocation call it Discursion 2. The Cause of the Coherence or Consequence of one Conception to another is their first Coherence or Consequence at that Time when they are produced by Sense As for Example from St. Andrew the Mind runneth to St. Peter because their Names are read together from S. Peter to a Stone for the same Cause from Stone to Foundation because we see them together and for the same Cause from Foundation to Church and from Church to People and from People to Tumult and according to this Example the Mind may run almost from any Thing to any
Thing But as in the Sense the Conception of Cause and Effect may succeed one another so may they after Sense in the Imagination And for the most part they do so the Cause whereof is the Appetite of them who having a Conception of the End have next unto it a Conception of the next Means to that End As when a Man from a Thought of Honour to which he hath an Appetite cometh to the Thought of Wisdom which is the next Means thereunto and from thence to the Thought of Study which is the next Means to Wisdom 3. To omit that kind of Discursion by which we proceed from any Thing to any Thing there are of the other Kind divers Sorts As first in the Senses there are certain Coherences of Conceptions which we may call ranging Examples whereof are A Man casteth his Eye upon the Ground to look about for some small Thing lost the Hounds casting about at a Fault in hunting and the Ranging of Spaniels and herein we take a Beginning arbitrary 4. Another sort of Discursion is when the Appetite giveth a Man his Beginning as in the Example before where Honour to which a Man hath Appetite maketh him think upon the next Means of attaining it and that again of the next c. And this the Latines call Sagacitas and We may call Hunting or Tracing as Dogs trace Beasts by the Smell and Men hunt them by their Footsteps or as Men hunt after Riches Place or Knowledge 5. There is yet another Kind of Discursion beginning with the Appetite to recover something lost proceeding from the present backward from Thought of the Place where we miss at to the Thought of the Place from whence we came last and from the Thought of that to the Thought of a Place before till we have in our Mind some Place wherein we had the Thing we miss and this is called Reminiscence 6. The Remembrance of Succession of one Thing to another that is of what was antecedent and what consequent and what concomitant is called an Experiment whether the same be made by us voluntarily as when a Man putteth any Thing into the Fire to see what Effect the Fire will produce upon it or not made by us as when we remember a fair Morning after a red Evening To have had many Experiments is that we call Experience which is nothing else but Remembrance of what Antecedents have been followed by what Consequents 7. No man can have in his Mind a Conception of the future for the future is not yet but of our Conceptions of the past we make a future or rather call past future relatively Thus after a Man hath been accustomed to see like Antecedents follow by like Consequents whensoever he seeth the like come to pass to any Thing he had seen before he looks there should follow it the same that followed then As for Example because a Man hath often seen Offences followed by Punishment when he seeth an Offence in present he thinketh Punishment to be consequent thereto but consequent unto that which is present Men call future And thus we make Remembrance to be the Prevision of Things to come or Expectation or Presumption of the future 8. In the same Manner if a Man seeth in present that which he hath seen before he thinks that that which was antecedent to that which he saw before is also antecedent to that he presently seeth As for Example He that hath seen the Ashes remain after the Fire and now again seeth ashes concludeth again there hath been Fire And this is called again Conjecture of the past or Presumption of the Fact 9. When a Man hath so often observed like Antecedents to be followed by like Consequents that whensoever he seeth the Antecedent he looketh again for the Consequent or when he seeth the Consequent maketh account there hath been the like Antecedent then he calleth both the Antecedent and the Consequent Signs one of another as Clouds are Signs of Rain to come and Rain of Clouds past 10. This taking of Signs by Experience is that wherein Men do ordinarily think the Difference stands between Man and Man in Wisdom by which they commonly understand a Mans whole Ability or Power cognitive but this is an Errour for the Signs are but conjectural and according as they have often or seldom failed so their Assurance is more or less but never full and evident for though a Man have always seen the Day and Night to follow one another hitherto yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so or that they have done so eternally Experience concludeth nothing universally If the Signs hit twenty times for one missing a Man may lay a Wager of Twenty to One of the Event but may not conclude it for a Truth But by this it is plain that they shall conjecture best that have most Experience because they have most Signs to conjecture by which is the Reason old Men are more prudent that is conjecture better caeteris paribus than young for being old they remember more and Experience is but remembrance And men of quick imagination caeteris paribus are more prudent than those whose Imaginations are slow for they observe more in less Time Prudence is nothing but Conjecture from Experience or taking of Signs from Experience warily that is that the Experiments from which he taketh such Signs be all remembred for else the Cases are not alike that seem so 11. As in Conjecture concerning things past and future it is Prudence to conclude from Experience what is like to come to pass or to have passed already so it is an errour to conclude from it that it is so or so called that is to say We cannot from Experience conclude that any Thing is to be called just or unjust true or false or any Proposition universal whatsoever except it be from Remembrance of the Use of Names imposed arbitrarily by Men For Example to have heard a Sentence given in the like Case the like Sentence a thousand times is not enough to conclude that the Sentence is just though most Men have no other Means to conclude by But it is necessary for the drawing of such Conclusion to trace and find out by many Experiences what Men do mean by calling Things just and unjust Further there is another Caveat to be taken in concluding by Experience from the tenth Section of the second Chapter that is That we conclude such Things to be without that are within us CHAP. V. 1. Of Marks 2. Names or Appellations 3. Names positive and privative 4. Advantage of Names maketh us capable of Science 5. Names universal and singular 6. Vniversals not in Rerum Natura 7. Aequivocal Names 8. Vnderstanding 9. Affirmation Negation Proposition 10. Truth Falsity 11. Ratiocination 12. According to Reason against Reason 13. Names Causes of Knowledge so of Errour 14. Translation of the Discourse of the Mind into the Discourse of the Tongue and of the Errours