Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	chief_a	gain_v	great_a	61	3	2.1088	3	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A35750	Six metaphysical meditations wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body / written originally in Latin by Renatus Des-Cartes ; hereunto are added the objections made aganst these meditations by Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury with the authors answers ; all faithfully translated into English with a short account of Des-Cartes's life by William Molyneux.; Meditationes de prima philosophia. English	Descartes, René, 1596-1650.; Molyneux, William, 1656-1698.; Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679. Objections made against these meditations.	1680 (1680)	Wing D1136; ESTC R1345	67,590	180

Conjectures and not indubitable reasons is enough to Draw my Assent to the Contrary Part. Which Lately I have sufficiently experienced when I supposed all those things which formerly I assented to as most True as very False for this Reason only that I found my self able to doubt of them in some manner If I abstain from passing my Iudgment when I do not clearly and distinctly enough perceive what is Truth 't is evident that I do well and that I am not deceived But if I affirm or deny then 't is that I abuse the freedome of my will and if I turn my self to that part which is false I am deceived but if I embrace the contrary Part 't is but by chance that I light on the Truth yet I shall not therefore be Blameless for 't is Manifest by the light of Nature that the Perception of the Vnderstanding ought to preceed the Determination of the Will And 't is in this abuse of Free-Will that That Privation consists which Constitutes Error I say there is a Privation in the Action as it proceeds from Me but not in the Faculty which I have received from God nor in the Action as it depends on him Neither have I any Reason to Complain that God has not given me a larger Intellective Faculty or more Natural Light for 't is a necessary Incident to a finite Vnderstanding that it should not Understand All things and 't is Incident to a Created Vnderstanding to be Finite and I have more Reason to thank him for what he has bestowed upon me tho he owed me nothing then to think my self Robbed by him of those things which he never gave me Nor have I Reason to Complain that he has given me a Will larger then my Vnderstanding for seeing the Will Consists in one thing only and a● it were in an Indivisible viz. to Will or not to Will it seems contrary to its nature that it should be less then 't is And certainly by how much the Greater it is so much the more Thankful I ought to be to him that Gave it me Neither can I Complain that God concurrs with me in the Production of those Voluntary Actions or Iudgements in which I am deceived for those Acts as they depend on God are altogether True and Good and I am in some measure more perfect in that I can so Act then if I could not for that Privation in which the Ratio Formalis of Falshood and Sin consists wants not the Concourse of God For it is not A Thing and having respect to him as its Cause ought not to be called Privation but Negation for certainly 't is no Imperfection in God that he has given me a freedome of Assenting or not Assenting to some things the clear and distinct Knowledge whereof he has not Imparted to my Vnderstanding but certainly 't is an Imperfection in me that I abuse this liberty and pass my Iudgement on those things which I do not Rightly Understand Yet I see that 't is Possible with God to effect that tho I should remain Free and of a Finite Knowledge I should never Ern that is if he had endowed my Vnderstanding with a clear and distinct Knowledge of all things whereof I should ever have an Occasion of deliberating or if he had only so firmly fix'd in my Mind that I should never forget this That I must never Iudge of a thing which I do not clearly and distinctly Vnderstand Either of which things had God done I easily perceive that I as consider'd in my self should be more perfect then now I am yet nevertheless I cannot deny but that there may be a greater perfection in the whole Vniverse of Things for that some of its parts are Obnoxius to Errors and some not then if they were all alike And I have no Reason to Complain that it has pleased God that I should Act on the Stage of this World a Part not the chief and most perfect of all Or that I should not be able to abstain from Error in the first way above specifi'd which depends upon the Evident Knowledge of those things whereof I deliberate Yet that I may abstain from Error by the other means abovemention'd which depends only on this That I Iudge not of any Thing the truth whereof is not Evident For tho I have experienced in my self this Infirmity that I cannot always be intent upon me and the same Knowledge yet I may by a continued and often repeated Meditation bring this to pass that as often as I have use of this Rule I may Remember it by which means I may Get as it were an habit of not erring In which thing seeing the greatest and chief perfection of Man consists I repute my self to have gain'd much by this days Meditation for that therein I have discover'd the Cause of Error and Falshood which certainly can be no other then what I have now Declared for whenever in Passing my Judgement I bridle my Will so that it extend it self only to those things which I clearly and distinctly perceive it is impossible that I can Err. For doubtles All clear and distinct Perception is something and therefore cannot proceed from Nothing but must necessarily have God for its Author God I say Who is infinitely Perfect and who cannot Deceive and therefore it Must be True Nor have I this Day learnt only what I must beware off that I be not deceived but also what I must Do to Discover Truth for That I shall certainly find if I fully Apply my self to those things only which I perfectly understand and if I distinguish between those and what I apprehend but confusedly and obscurely Both which hereafter I shall endeavour MEDITAT V. Of the Essence of Things Material And herein Again of God A●d that he does Exist THere are yet remaining many Things concerning Gods Attributes and many things concerning the nature of my self or of my Mind which ought to be searched into but these perhaps I shall set upon at some other Opportunity And at Present nothing seems to me more requisite seeing I have discover'd what I must avoid and what I must Do for the Attaining of Truth then that I imploy my Endeavours to free my self from those doubts into which I have lately fallen and that I try whether I can have any certainty of Material Things But before I enquire whether there be any such things Really Existent without Me I ought to consider the Ideas of those things as they are in my Thoughts and try which of them are Distinct which confused In which search I find that I distinctly imagine Quantity that which Philosophers commonly call continued that is to say the Extension of that Quantity or thing continued into Length Breadth and Thickness I can count in it divers Parts to which parts I can assign Bigness Figure Position and Local Motion to which Local Motion I can assign Duration Neither are only these Generals plainly discover'd

like that sun which is without me and my reason perswades me that that Idea is most unlike the Sun which seems to proceed Immediately from it self All which things sufficiently prove that I have hitherto not from a true judgement but from a blind impulse beleived that there are certain things different from my self and which have sent their Ideas or Images into me by the Organs of my senses or some other way But I have yet an other Way of inquiring whether any of those Things whose Ideas I have within Me are Really Existent without Me And that is Thus As those Ideas are only Modes of Thinking I acknowledge no Inequality between them and they all proceed from me in the same Manner But as one Represents one thing an other an other Thing 't is Evident there is a Great difference between them * For without doubt Those of them which Represent Substances are something More or as I may say have More of Objective Reallity in them then those that Represent only Modes or Accidents and again That by Which I understand a Mighty God Eternal Infinite Omniscient Omnipotent Creatour of all things besides himself has certainly in it more Objective Reallity then Those Ideas by which Finite Substances are Exhibited But Now it is evident by the Light of Nature that there must be as much at least in the Total efficient Cause as there is in the Effect of that Cause For from Whence can the effect have its Reallity but from the Cause and how can the Cause give it that Reallity unless it self have it And from hence it follows that neither a Thing can be made out of Nothing Neither a Thing which is more Perfect that is Which has in it self more Reallity proceed from That Which is Less Perfect And this is Clearly True not only in those Effects whose Actual or Formal Reallity is Consider'd But in Those Ideas also Whose Objective Reallity is only Respected That is to say for Example of Illustration it is not only impossible that a stone Which was not should now begin to Be unless it were produced by something in Which Whatever goes to the Making a Stone is either Formally or Virtually neither can heat he Produced in any Thing which before was not hot but by a Thing which is at least of as equal a degree of Perfection as heat is But also 't is Impossible that I should have an Idea of Heat or of a Stone unless it were put into me by some Cause in which there is at Least as much Reallity as I Conceive there is in Heat or a Stone For tho that Cause transfers none of its own Actual or Formal Reality into my Idea I must not from thence conclude that 't is less real but I may think that the nature of the Idea it self is such that of it self it requires no other formal reality but what it has from my thought of which 't is a mode But that this Idea has this or that objective reallity rather then any other proceeds clearly from some cause in which there ought to be at least as much formal reallity as there is of objective reallity in the Idea it self For if we suppose any thing in the Idea which was not in its cause it must of necessity have this from nothing but tho it be a most Imperfect manner of existing by which the thing is objectively in the Intellect by an Idea yet it is not altogether nothing and therefore cannot proceed from nothing Neither ought I to doubt seeing the reallity which I perceive in my Ideas is only an objective reallity that therefore it must of necessity follow that the same reallity should be in the causes of these Ideas formally But I may conclude that 't is sufficient that this reallity be in the very causes only objectively For as that objective manner of being appertains to the very nature of an Idea so that formal manner of being appertains to the very nature of a cause of Ideas at least to the first and chiefest causes of them For tho perhaps one Idea may receive its birth from an other yet we cannot proceed in Infinitum but at last we must arrive at some first Idea whose cause is as it were an Original copy in which all the objective reallity of the Idea is formally contain'd So that I plainly discover by the light of nature that the Ideas which are in me are as it were Pictures which may easily come short of the perfection of those things from whence they are taken but cannot contain any thing greater or more perfect then them And the longer and more diligently I pry into these things so much the more clearly and distinctly do I discover them to be true But what shall I conclude from hence Thus that if the objective reallity of any of my Ideas be such that it cannot be in me either formarlly or eminently and that therefore I cannot be the cause of that Idea from hence it necessarily Follows that I alone do not only exist but that some other thing which is the cause of that Idea does exist also But if I can find no such Idea in me I have no argument to perswade me of the existence of any thing besides my self for I have diligently enquired and hitherto I could discover no other perswasive Some of these Ideas there are besides that which represents my self to my self of which in this place I cannot doubt which represent to me one of them a God others of them Corporeal and Inanimate things some of them Angels others Animals and lastly some of them which exhibite to me men like my self As touching those that represent Men or Angels or Animals I easily understand that they may be made up of those Ideas which I have of my self of Corporeal things and of God tho there were neither man but my self nor Angel nor Animal in being And as to the Ideas of Corporeal things I find nothing in them of that perfection but it may proceed from my self for if I look into them more narrowly and examine them more particularly as yesterday in the second Medit. I did the Idea of Wax I find there are but few things which I perceive clearly and distinctly in them viz. Magnitude or extension in Longitude Latitude and Profundity the Figure or shape which arises from the termination of that Extension the Position or place which divers Figured Bodies have in respect of each other their motion or change of place to which may be added their substance continuance and number as to the other such as are Light Colours Sounds Smels Tasts Heat and Cold with the other tactile qualities I have but very obscure and confused thoughts of them so that I know not whether they are true or false that is to say whether the Ideas I have of them are the Ideas of things which really are or are not For altho falshood formally and properly so called consists only in

only by the potential being of a thing which in proper speech is nothing but requires an actual or formal being to its production Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not evident by the light of reason to any one that will diligently consider them Yet because that when I am careless and the Images of sensible things blind my understanding I do not so easily call to mind the reasons why the Idea of a being more perfect then my self should of necessity proceed from a being which is really more perfect It will be requisite to enquire further whether I who have this Idea can possibly be unless such a being did exist To which end let me aske from whence should I be From my self or from my Parents or from any other thing less perfect then God for nothing can be thought or supposed more perfect or equally perfect with God But first If I were from my self I should neither doubt nor desire nor want any thing for I should have given my self all those perfections of which I have any Idea and consequently I my self should be God and I cannot think that those things I want are to be acquired with greater difficulty then those things I have but on the contrary tis manifiest that it were much more difficult that I that is a substance that thinks should arise out of nothing then that I should acquire the knowledge of many things whereof I am Ignorant which is only the accident of that substance And certainly If I had that greater thing viz being from my self I should not have denyed my self not only those things which may be easier acquired but also All those things which I perceived are contain'd in the Idea of a God and the reason is for that no other things seem to me to be more difficultly done and certainly if they were Really more difficult they would seem more difficult to me if whatever I have I have from my self for in those things I should find my Power put to a stop Neither can I Evade the force of these Arguments by supposing my self to have alwaies Been what now I am and that therefore I need not seek for an Author of my Being For the Durance or Continuation of my life may be divided into Innumerable Parts each of which does not at all depend on the Other Parts Therefore it will not follow that because a while ago I was I must of necessity now Be. I say this will not follow Unless I suppose some Cause to Create me as it were anew for this Moment that is Conserve me For 't is evident to one that Considers the Nature of Duration that the same Power and Action is requisite to the Conservation of a Thing each Moment of its Being as there is to the Creation of that Thing anew if it did not exist So that 't is one of those Principles which are Evident by the Light of Nature that the Act of Conservation differs only Ratione as the Philosophers term it from the Act of Creation Wherefore I ought to ask my self this Question whether I who now Am have any Power to Cause my self to Be hereafter for had I any such power I should certainly know of it seeing I am nothing but a Thinking Thing or at least at present I onely treat of that part of me which is a Thing that Thinks to which I answer that I can discover no such Power in Me And consequently I evidently know that I depend on some Other being distinct from my self But what if I say that perhaps this Being is not God but that I am produced either by my Parents or some other Causes less perfect then God In answer to which let me consider as I have said before that 't is manifest that whatever is in the effect so much at least ought to be in the cause and therefore seeing I am a thing that thinks and have in me an Idea of God it will confessedly follow that whatever sort of cause I assign of my own Being it also must be a Thinking Thing and must have an Idea of all those Perfections which I attribute to God Of which Cause it may be again Asked whether it be from it self or from any other Cause If from it self 't is evident from what has been said that it must be God For seeing it has the Power of Existing of it self without doubt it has also the power of actually Possessing all those Perfections whereof it has an Idea in it self that is all those Perfections which I conceive in God But if it Be from an other Cause it may again be asked of that Cause whether it be of it self or from an other Till at length We arrive at the Last Cause of All Which will Be God For 't is evident that this Enquiry will not admit of Progressus in Infinitum especially when at Present I treat not only of that Cause which at first made Me But chiefly of that which conserves me in this Instant time Neither can it be supposed that many partial Causes have concurred to the making Me and that I received the Idea of one of Gods perfections from One of them and from an other of them the Idea of an other and that therefore all these Perfections are to be found scattered in the World but not all of them Ioyn'd in any one which may Be God For on the contrary Vnity Simplicity or the inseparability of All Gods Attributes is one of the chief Perfections which I conceive in Him and certainly the Idea of the Vnity of the Divine Perfections could not be created in me by any other cause then by That from whence I have received the Ideas of his other perfections For 't is Impossible to make me conceive these perfections conjunct and inseparable unless he should also make me know what perfections these are Lastly as touching my having my Being from my Parents Tho whatever Thoughts I have heretofore harbour'd of Them were True yet certainly they contribute nothing to my conservation neither proceed I from them as I am a Thing that Thinks for they have onely predisposed that material Thing wherein I that is my mind which only at present I take for my self Inhabits Wherefore I cannot now Question that I am sprung from them But I must of necessity conclude that because I am and because I have an Idea of a Being most perfect that is of God it evidently follows that there is a God * Now it only remains for me to examine how I have received this Idea of God For I have neither received it by means of my Senses neither comes it to me without my Forethought as the Ideas of sensible things use to do when such things Work on the Organs of my Sense or at least seem so to work Neither is this Idea framed by my self for I can neither detract from nor add any thing thereto Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is