Incomprehensible Deity not what it is in its Essence or Nature but that it is existent and that Nature has a dependance upon it as an Eternal Servant has upon an Eternal Master But some might say How is it possible that a Corporeal finite part can have a conception of an Incorporeal infinite Being by reason that which comprehends must needs be bigger then that which is comprehended Besides no part of Nature can conceive beyond it self that is beyond what is Natural or Material and this proves that at least the rational part or the mind must be immaterial to conceive a Deity To which I answer That no part of Nature can or does conceive the Essence of God or what God is in himself but it conceives onely that there is such a Divine Being which is Supernatural And therefore it cannot be said that a natural Figure can comprehend God for it is not the comprehending of the Substance of God or its patterning out since God having no Body is without all Figure that makes the knowledg of God but I do believe that the knowledg of the existency of God as I mentioned before is innate and inherent in Nature and all her parts as much as self-knowledg is Speaking of the difference between Oil and other liquors for the better understanding of that place I thought fit to insert this Note Flame is fluid but not liquid nor wet Oil is fluid and liquid but not wet but Water is both fluid liquid and wet Oil will turn into flame and encrease it but Water is so quite opposite to flame that if a sufficient quantity be poured upon it it will totally extinguish it When I say that Sense and Reason shall be the Ground of my Philosophy and not particular natural effects My meaning is that I do not intend to make particular Creatures or Figures the Principles of all the infinite effects of Nature as some other Philosophers do for there is no such thing as a Prime or principal Figure of Nature all being but effects of one Cause But my Ground is Sense and Reason that is I make self-moving matter which is sensitive and rational the onely cause and principle of all natural effects When 't is said That Ice Snow Hail c. return into their former Figure of Water whensoever they dissolve I mean when they dissolve their exterior Figures that is change their actions When I say That the Exterior Object is the Agent and the Sentient Body the Patient I do not mean that the Object does chiefly work upon the Sentient or is the immediate cause of the Perception in the Sentient body and that the Sentient suffers the Agent to act upon it but I retain onely those words because they are used in Schools But as for their actions I am quite of a contrary Opinion to wit That the sentient body is the principal Agent and the external body the Patient for the motions of the sentient in the act of perception do figure out or imitate the motions of the object so that the object is but as a Copy that is figured out or imitated by the sentient which is the chiefly Agent in all transforming and perceptive actions that are made by way of patterning or imitation When I say That one finite part can undergo infinite changes and alterations I do not mean one single part whereof there is no such thing in nature but I mean one part may be infinitely divided and composed with other parts for as there are infinite changes compositions and divisions in Nature so they must be of parts there being no variety but of parts and though parts be finite yet the changes may be infinite for the finiteness of parts is but concerning the bulk or quantity of their figures and they are call'd finite by reason they have limited and circumscribed figures nevertheless as for duration their parts being the same with the body of Nature are as eternal and infinite as Nature her self and thus are subject to infinite and eternal changes VVhen I say A World of Gold is as active interiously as a world of Air is exteriously I mean it is as much subject to changes and alterations as Air for Gold though its motions are not perceptible by our exterior senses yet it has no less motion then the activest body of Nature onely its motions are of another kind then the motions of Air or of some other bodies for Retentive motions are as much motions as dispersing or some other sorts of motions although not so visible to our perception as these and therefore we cannot say that Gold is more at rest than other Creatures of Nature for there is no such thing as Rest in Nature although there be degrees of Motion VVhen I say That the parts of Nature do not drive or press upon each other but that all natural actions are free and easie and not constrained My meaning is not as if there was no pressing or driving of parts at all in Nature but onely that they are not the universal or principal actions of Natures body as it is the opinion of some Philosophers who think there is no other motion in nature but by pressure of parts upon parts Nevertheless there is pressure and reaction in Nature because there are infinite sorts of motions Also when I say in the same place That Natures actions are voluntary I do not mean that all actions are made by rote and none by imitation but by voluntary actions I understand self-actions that is such actions whose principle of motion is within themselves and doth not proceed from such an exterior Agent as doth the motion of the inanimate part of matter which having no motion of it self is moved by the animate parts yet so that it receives no motion from them but moves by the motion of the animate parts and not by an infused motion into them for the animate parts in carrying the inanimate along with them lose nothing of their own motion nor impart no motion to the inanimate no more than a man who carries a stick in his hand imparts motion to the stick and loses so much as he imparts but they bear the inanimate parts along with them by vertue of their own self-motion and remain self-moving parts as well as the inanimate remain without motion Again when I make a distinguishment between voluntary actions and exterior perceptions my meaning is not as if voluntary actions were not made by perceptive parts for whatsoever is self-moving and active is perceptive and therefore since the voluntary actions of Sense and Reason are made by self-moving parts they must of necessity be perceptive actions but I speak of Perceptions properly so call'd which are occasioned by Forreign parts and to those I oppose voluntary actions which are not occasioned but made by rote as for example the perception of sight in Animals when outward Objects present themselves to the Optick sense
hairs breadth causes a several perception besides it is not onely the five organs in an animal but every part and particle of his body that has a peculiar knowledg and perception because it consists of self-moving Matter Which if so then a Looking-glass that patterns out the face of a Man and a Mans Eye that patterns again the copy from the Glass cannot be said to have the same perception by reason a Glass and an animal are different sorts of Creatures for though a piece of Wood Stone or Metal may have a perceptive knowledg of Man yet it hath not a Man's perception because it is a Vegetable or Mineral and cannot have an Animal knowledg or perception no more then the Eye patterning out a Tree or Stone can be said to have a Vegetable or Mineral Perception nay when one Animal as for example one man perceives another he doth not perceive his knowledg for it is one thing to perceive the exterior figure of a Creature and another thing to perceive its interior proper and innate actions also it is one thing to perceive exterior objects and another to receive knowledg for no part can give away to another its inherent and proper particular nature neither can one part make it self another part it may imitate some actions of another part but not make it self the same part which proves that each part must have its own knowledg and perception according to its own particular nature for though several parts may have the like perceptions yet they are not the same and although the exterior figures of some objects may be alike yet the perceptions may be quite different 't is true sensitive and rational knowledg is general and infinite in Nature but every part being finite can have but a finite and particular knowledg and that according to the nature of its particular figure for as not all Creatures although they be composed of one Matter are alike in their figures so not all can have the like knowledges and perceptions though they have all self-motion for particular Creatures and actions are but effects of the onely Infinite self-moving Matter and so are particular perceptions and although they are different yet the difference of effects does not argue different causes but one and the same cause may produce several and different effects so that although there be infinite different motions in Nature yet they are all but motions and cannot differ from each other in being motions or self-moving parts and although there be infinite several and different perceptions yet they are all perceptions for the effects cannot alter the cause but the cause may alter the effects Wherefore rational and sensitive corporeal motions cannot change from being motions though they may change from moving thus to move thus nor perceptions from being perceptions though they may change from being such or such particular perceptions for the change is onely in particulars not in the ground or principle which continues always the same The truth is as it is impossible that one figure should be another figure or one part another part so likewise it is impossible that the perception of one part should be the perception of another but being in parts they must be several and those parts being different they must be different also But some are more different then others for the perceptions of Creatures of different sorts as for example of a Vegetable and an Animal are more different then the perception of particulars of one sort or of one composed figure for as there is difference in their interior natures so in their perceptions so that a Mineral or Vegetable that perceives the figure of an Animal has no more the perception of an Animal then an Animal which perceives or patterns out the figure of a Mineral or Vegetable has the perceptions of those Creatures for example when a man lies upon a stone or leans on a tree or handles and touches water c. although these parts be so closely joined to each other yet their perceptions are quite different for the man onely knows what he feels or sees or hears or smells or tasteth but knows not what sense or perception those parts have nay he is so far from that that even one part of his body doth not know the sense and perception of another part of his body as for example one of his hands knows not the sense and perception of his other hand nay one part of his hand knows not the perception of another part of the same hand for as the corporeal figurative motions differ so do particular knowledges and perceptions and although sensitive and rational knowledg is general and infinite in infinite Nature yet every part being finite has but finite and particular perceptions besides perception being but an effect and not a cause is more various in particulars for although all Creatures are composed of rational and sensitive Matter yet their perceptions are not alike neither can the effect alter the cause for though the several actions of sensitive and rational Matter be various and make several perceptions yet they cannot make several kinds of sensitive and rational Matter but when as perceptions change the parts of the sensitive and rational matter remain the same in themselves that is they do not change from being sensitive or rational parts although they may make numerous perceptions in their particular parts according to the various changes of self-motion But some may say If the particular parts of one composed figure be so ignorant of each others knowledg as I have expressed How can they agree in some action of the whole figure where they must all be imployed and work agreeably to one effect As for example when the Mind designs to go to such a place or do such a work How can all the parts agree in the performing of this act if they be ignorant of each others actions I answer Although every Parts knowledg and perception is its own and not anothers so that every part knows by its own knowledg and perceives by its own perception yet it doth not follow from thence that no part has any more knowledg then of it felf or of its own actions for as I said before it is well to be observed that there being an entercourse and commerce as also an acquaintance and agreement between parts and parts there must also of necessity be some knowledg or perception betwixt them that is one part must be able to perceive another part and the actions of that same part for wheresoever is life and knowledg that is sense and reason there is also perception and though no part of Nature can have an absolute knowledg yet it is neither absolutely ignorant but it has a particular knowledg and particular perceptions according to the nature of its own innate and interior figure In short as there are several kinds sorts and particular perceptions and particular ignorances between parts so there are more general perceptions
of it self it is not improbable but it may also have an interior fixt and innate knowledg of the Existency of God as that he is to be adored and worshipped And thus the Inanimate part may after its own manner worship and adore God as much as the other parts in their way for it is probable that God having endued all parts of Nature with self-knowledg may have given them also an Interior knowledg of himself that is of his Existency how he is the God of Nature and ought to be worshipped by her as his Eternal servant My later Thoughts excepted That not any Creature did truly know it self much less could it be capable of knowing God The former answered That this was caused through the variety of self-motion for all Creatures said they are composed of many several parts and every part has its own particular self-knowledg as well as self-motion which causes an ignorance between them for one parts knowledg is not another parts knowledg nor does one part know what another knows but all knowledg of exterior parts comes by perception nevertheless each part knows it self and its own actions and as there is an ignorance between parts so there is also an acquaintance especially in the parts of one composed Creature and the rational parts being most subtile active and free have a more general acquaintance then the sensitive besides the sensitive many times inform the rational and the rational the sensitive which causes a general agreement of all the parts of a composed figure in the execution of such actions as belong to it But how is it possible replied my later Thoughts that the inanimate part of matter can be living and self-knowing and yet not self-moving for Life and Knowledg cannot be without self-motion and therefore if the inanimate parts have Life and Knowledg they must necessarily also have self-motion The former answered That Life and Knowledg did no ways depend upon self-motion for had Nature no motion at all yet might she have Life and Kowledg so that self-motion is not the cause of Life and Knowledg but onely of Perception and all the various actions of Nature and this is the reason said they that the inanimate part of matter is not perceptive because it is not self-moving for though it hath life and self-knowledg as well as the Animate part yet it has not an active life nor a perceptive knowledg By which you may see that a fixt and interior self-knowledg may very well be without exterior perception for though perception presupposes an innate self-knowledg as its ground and principle yet self-knowledg does not necessarily require perception which is onely caused by self-motion for self-motion as it is the cause of the variety of Natures parts and actions so it is also of their various perceptions If it was not too great a presumtion said they we could give an instance of God who has no local self-self-motion and yet is infinitely knowing But we 'l forbear to go so high as to draw the Infinite Incomprehensible God to the proofs of Material Nature My later Thoughts replied first That if it were thus then one and the same parts of matter would have a double life and a double knowledg Next they said That if perception were an effect of self-motion then God himself must necessarily be self-moving or else he could not perceive Nature and her parts and actions Concerning the first objection my former thoughts answered That the parts of Nature could have a double life and knowledg no more then one man could be call'd double or treble You might as well said they make millions of men of one particular man nay call every part or action of his a peculiliar man as make one and the same part of matter have a double life and knowledg But mistake us not added my former thoughts when we say that one and the same part cannot have a double life and knowledg for we mean not the composed creatures of Nature which as they consist of several degrees of matter so they have also several degrees of lives and knowledges but it is to be understood of the essential or constitutive parts of Nature for as the rational part is not nor can be the sensitive part so it can neither have a sensitive knowledg no more can a sensitive part have a rational knowledg or either of these the knowledg of the inanimate part but each part retains its own life and knowledg Indeed it is with these parts as it is with particular creatures for as one man is not another man nor has another mans knowledg so it is likewise with the mentioned parts of matter and although the animate parts have an interior innate self-knowledg and an exterior perceptive knowledg yet these are not double knowledges but perception is onely an effect of interior self-knowledg occasioned by self-motion And as for the second they answered That the Divine Perception and Knowledg was not any ways like a natural Perception no more than God was like a Creature for Nature said they is material and her perceptions are amongst her infinite parts caused by their compositions and divisions but God is a Supernatural Individable and Incorporeal Being void of all Parts and Divisions and therefore he cannot be ignorant of any the least thing but being Infinite he has an Infinite Knowledg without any Degrees Divisions or the like actions belonging to Material Creatures Nor is he naturally that is locally self-moving but he is a fixt unalterable and in short an incomprehensible Being and therefore no comparison can be made between Him and Nature He being the Eternal God and Nature his Eternal Servant Then my later Thoughts said That as for the knowledg of God they would not dispute of it but if there was a fixt and interior innate knowledg in all Natures parts and Creatures it was impossible that there could be any error or ignorance between them The former answered that although Errors belonged to particulars as well as ignorance yet they proceeded not from interior self-knowledg but either from want of exterior particular knowledges or from the irregularity of motions and Ignorance was likewise a want not of interior but exterior knowledg otherwise called Perceptive knowledg for said they Parts can know no more of other parts but by their own perceptions and since no particular Creature or part of Nature can have an Infallible Universal and thorow perception of all other parts it can neither have an infallible and universal knowledg but it must content it self with such a knowledg as is within the reach of its own perceptions and hence it follows that it must be ignorant of what it does not know for Perception has but onely a respect to the exterior figures and actions of other parts and though the Rational part is more subtil and active then the Sensitive and may have also some perceptions of some interior parts and actions of other Creatures yet it cannot have an
part and particle has a particular and finite self-motion and self-knowledg by which it knows it self and its own actions and perceives also other parts and actions which latter is properly called Perception not as if there were two different Principles of knowledg in every particular Creature or part of Nature but they are two different acts of one and the same interior and inherent self-knowledg which is a part of Natures infinite self-knowledg 10. Thus Perception or a perceptive knowledg belongs properly to parts and may also be called an exterior knowledg by reason it extends to exterior objects 11. Though self-knowledg is the ground and principle of all particular knowledges and perceptions yet self-motion since it is the cause of all the variety of natural figures and of the various compositions and divisions of parts it is also the cause of all Perceptions 12. As there is a double degree of corporeal self-self-motion viz. Rational and Sensitive so there is also a double degree of Perception Rational and Sensitive 13. A whole may know its parts and an Infinite a Finite but no particular part can know its whole nor one finite part that which is infinite I say no particular part for when parts are regularly composed they may by a general Conjunction or Union of their particular knowledges and perceptions know more and so judg more probably of the whole or of Infinite and although by the division of parts those composed knowledges and perceptions may be broke asunder like a ruined house or Castle Kingdom or Government yet some of the same Materials may chance to be put to the same uses and some may be joined to those that formerly imployed themselves otherways And hence I conclude That no particular parts are bound to certain particular actions no more then Nature her self which is self-moving Matter for as Nature is full of variety of motions or actions so are her parts or else she could not be said self-moving if she were bound to certain actions and had not liberty to move as she pleases for though God the Authour of Nature has ordered her so that she cannot work beyond her own nature that is beyond Matter yet has she freedom to move as she will neither can it be certainly affirmed that the successive propagation of the several species of Creatures is decreed and ordained by God so that Nature must of necessity work to their continuation and can do no otherwise but humane sense and reason may observe that the same parts keep not always to the same particular actions so as to move to the same species or figures for those parts that join in the composition of an animal alter their actions in its dissolution and in the framing of other figures so that the same parts which were joined in one particular animal may when they dissolve from that composed figure join severally to the composition of other figures as for example of Minerals Vegetables Elements c. and some may join with some sorts of Creatures and some with others and so produce creatures of different sorts when as before they were all united in one particular Creature for particular parts are not bound to work or move to a certain particular action but they work according to the wisdom and liberty of Nature which is onely bound by the Omnipotent God's Decree not to work beyond her self that is beyond Matter and since Matter is dividable Nature is necessitated to move in parts for Matter can be without parts no more then parts can be without a whole neither can Nature being material make her self void of figure nor can she rest being self-moving but she is bound to divide and compose her several parts into several particular figures and dissolve and change those figures again infinite ways All which proves the variety of Nature which is so great that even in one and the same species none of the particulars resemble one another so much as not to be discerned from each other But to return to Knowledg and Perception I say they are general and fundamental actions of Nature it being not probable that the infinite parts of Nature should move so variously nay so orderly and methodically as they do without knowing what they do or why and whether they move and therefore all particular actions whatsoever in Nature as respiration digestion sympathy antipathy division composition pressure reaction c. are all particular perceptive and knowing actions for if a part be divided from other parts both are sensible of their division The like may be said of the composition of parts And as for Pressure and Reaction they are as knowing and perceptive as any other particular actions but yet this does not prove that they are the principle of perception and that there 's no Perception but what is made by Pressure and Reaction or that at least they are the ground of Animal Perception for as they are no more but particular actions so they have but particular perceptions and although all Motion is sensible yet no part is sensible but by its own motions in its own parts that is no corporeal motion is sensible but of or by it self Therefore when a man moves a string or tosses a Ball the string or ball is no more sensible of the motion of the hand then the hand is of the motion of the string or ball but the hand is onely an occasion that the string or ball moves thus or thus I will not say but that it may have some perception of the hand according to the nature of its own figure but it does not move by the hands motion but by its own for there can be no motion imparted without matter or substance Neither can I certainly affirm that all Perception consists in patterning out exterior objects for although the perception of our humane senses is made that way yet Natures actions being so various I dare not conclude from thence that all the perceptions of the infinitely various parts and figures of Nature are made all after the same manner Nevertheless it is probable to sense and reason that the infinite parts of Nature have not onely interior self-knowledg but also exterior perceptions of other figures or parts and their actions by reason there is a perpetual commerce and entercourse between parts and parts and the chief actions of Nature are composition and division which produce all the variety of Nature which proves there must of necessity be perception between parts and parts but how all these particular perceptions are made no particular creature is able to know by reason of their variety for as the actions of Nature vary so do the perceptions Therefore it is absurd to confine all perception of Nature either to pressure and reaction or to the animal kind of perception since even in one and the same animal sense as for example of seeing there are numerous perceptions for every motion of the Eye were it no more then a
pores of the flesh through which they must enter I cannot readily believe it nay the Motions and Prints would grow so weak and faint in their journey especially if the object be a great way off as they would become of no effect But if their opinion be that Ideas can change and alter then all immaterial substances may do the same and spirits may change and alter into several immaterial figures which in my opinion cannot be for what is supernatural is unalterable and therefore the opinion of Ideas in perception is as irregular as the opinion of senseless atomes in the framing of a Regular World Again Some of our Modern Philosophers are of opinion That the subject wherein Colour and Image are inherent is not the object or thing seen for Image and Colour say they may be there where the thing seen is not As for example The Sun and other visible objects by reflexion in Water or Glass so that there is nothing without us really which we call Image or Colour for the Image or Colour is but an apparition unto us of the motion and agitation which the object works in the brain or spirits and divers times men see directly the same object double as two Candles for one and the like To which I answer That all this doth not prove that the object is not perceived or that an object can be without image or colour or that figure and colour are not the same with the object but it proves that the object enters not the eye but is onely patterned out by the perceptive motions in the optick sense for the reflection of the Sun in Water or Glass is but a copy of the original made by the figurative perceptive motions in the Glass or Water which may pattern out an object as well as we do which copy is patterned out again by our optick perception and so one copy is made by another The truth is Our optick sense could not perceive either the original or copy of an exterior object if it did not make those figures in its own parts and therefore figure and colour are both in the object and the eye and not as they say neither in the object nor in the eye for though I grant that one thing cannot be in two places at once yet there may be several copies made of one original in several parts which are several places at one and the same time which is more probable then that figure and colour should neither be in the object nor in the eye or according to their own words that figure and colour should be there where the thing seen is not which is to separate it from the object a thing against all possibility sense and reason or else that a substanceless and senseless Motion should make a progressive journey from the object to the sentient and there print figure and colour upon the optick sense by a bare agitation or concussion so that the perception or apparition as they call it of an object should onely be according to the stroke the agitation makes as for example the perception of light after such a manner figure after such and colour after another for if Motion be no substance or body and besides void of sense not knowing what it acts I cannot conceive how it should make such different strokes upon both the sensitive organ and the brain and all so orderly that every thing is perceived differently and distinctly Truly this opinion is like Epicurus's of Atomes but how absurd it is to make senseless corpuscles the cause of sense and reason and consequently of perception is obvious to every ones apprehension and needs no demonstration Next as Colour according to their opinion is not inherent any otherwise in the object but by an effect thereof upon us caused by such a motion in the object so neither say they is sound in the thing we hear but in our selves for as a man may see so he may hear double or trebble by multiplication of Ecchoes which are sounds as well as the Original and not being in one and the same place cannot be inherent in the body for the Clapper has no sound in it but motion and maketh motion in the inward parts of the Bell neither has the Bell motion but sound and imparts motion to the air the air again imparts motion to the ear and nerves until it comes to the brain which has motion not sound from the brain it rebounds back into the nerves outward and then it becoms an apparition without which we call sound But Good Lord what a confusion would all this produce if it were thus What need is there of imparting Motion when Nature can do it a much easier way I wonder how rational men can believe that motion can be imparted without matter Next that all this can be done in an instant Again that it is the organ of the sentient that makes colour sound and the like and that they are not really inherent in the object it self For were there no men to perceive such or such a colour figure or sound can we rationally think that object would have no colour figure nor sound at all I will not say That there is no pressure or reaction but they do not make sense or reason several parts may produce several effects by their several compositions but yet this does not prove that there can be no perception but by pressure upon the organ and consequently the brain and that the thing perceived is not really existent in the object but a bare apparition to the sentient the Clapper gives no Motion to the Bell but both the Clapper and the Bell have each their own Motion by which they act in striking each other and the conjunction of such or such parts makes a real sound were there no Ear to hear it Again Concerning the sense of Touch the heat say they we feel from the Fire is in us for it is quite different from that in the fire our heat is pleasure or pain according as it is great or moderate but in the Coal there is no such thing I answer They are so far in the right that the heat we feel is made by the perceptive motions of and in our own parts and not by the fires parts acting upon us but yet if the fire were not really such a thing as it is that is a hot and burning body our sense would not so readily figure it out as it does which proves it is a real copy of a real object and not a meer fantasme or bare imparted motion from the object to the sentient made by pressure and reaction for if so the fire would waste in a moment of time by imparting so much motion to so many sentients besides the several strokes which the several imparted motions make upon the sentient and the reaction from the sentient to the exterior parts would cause such a strong and confused agitation in the sentient that it would
heel is touched the sensitive spirits who watch in that place do run up to the head and bring news to the mind Truly if the senses have no knowledg of themselves How comes it that a man born blind cannot tell what the light of the Sun is or the light of a Candle or the light of a Glow-worms tail For though some objects of one sense may be guessed by the perception of another sense as we may guess by touch the perception of an object that belongs to sight c. yet we cannot perfectly know it except we saw it by reason the perception of sight belongs onely to the optick sense But some may ask if a man be so blind that he cannot make use of his optick sense what is become of the sensitive motions in that same part of his body to wit the optick sensorium I answer The motions of that part are not lost because the man is blind and cannot see for a privation or absence of a thing doth not prove that it is quite lost but the same motions which formerly did work to the perception of sight are onely changed and work now to some other action then the perception of sight so that it is onely a change or alteration of motions in the same parts and not an annihilation for there 's no such thing as an annihilation in Nature but all the variety in Nature is made by change of motions Wherefore to conclude the opinion of sense and reason or a sensitive and rational knowledg in all parts of Nature is in my judgment more probable and rational then the Opinion which confines all knowledg of Nature to a mans Brains or Head and allows none neither to the Senses nor to any part of Nature 37. Several Questions and Answers concerning Knowledg and Perception I Am not ignorant that endless questions and objections may be raised upon one subject and to answer them would be an infinite labour But since I desire to be perspicuous in delivering my opinions and to remove all those scruples which seem to obstruct the sense thereof I have chosen rather to be guilty of prolixity and repetitions then to be obscure by too much brevity And therefore I will add to my former discourse of knowledg and perception the resolution of these following questions which I hope will render it more intelligible Q. 1. What difference is there between Self-knowledg and Perception I answer There is as much difference betwixt them as betwixt a whole and its parts or a cause and its effects For though self-Self-motion be the occasional cause of particular perceptions by reason it is the cause of all particular actions of Nature and of the variety of figures yet self-knowledg is the ground or fundamental cause of Perception for were there not selfknowledg there could not be perception by reason perceptions are nothing else but particular exterior knowledges or knowledges of exterior parts and actions occasioned by the various compositions and divisions of parts so that self-moving Matter has a perceptive self-knowledg and consisting of infinite Parts those parts have particular self-knowledges and perceptions according to the variety of the corporeal figurative motions which as they are particular cannot be infinite in themselves for although a whole may know its parts yet the parts cannot possibly know the whole because an infinite may know a finite but a finite cannot know an infinite Nevertheless when many parts are regularly composed those parts by a conjunction or union of their particular self-knowledges and perceptions of each other may know more and so judg more probably of infinite as I have declared above but as for single parts there is no such thing in Nature no more then there can be an Infinite part Q. 2. Whether the Inanimate Part of Matter may not have self-knowledg as well as the Animate I answer That in my opinion and according to the conceptions of my sense and reason the Inanimate part of matter has self-knowledg as well as the Animate but not Perception for it is onely the animate part of matter that is perceptive and this animate matter being of a two-fold degree sensitive and rational the rational not being incumbred with the inanimate parts has a more clear and freer perception then the sensitive which is well to be observed for though the rational sensitive and inanimate parts of matter make but one infinite self-moving body of Nature yet there are infinite particular self-knowledges for Nature is divided into infinite parts and all parts of Nature are self-knowing But as all are not animate so all are not perceptive for Perception though it proceeds from self-knowledg as its ground or principle yet it is also an effect of self-motion for were there no self-motion there would be no perception and because Nature is self-moving all her parts are so too and as all her parts are moving so they have all compositions and divisions and as all are subject to compositions and divisions so all have variety of self-knowledg so that no part can be ignorant And by reason self-knowledg is the ground and Principle of Perception it knows all the effects by the variety of their changes therefore the Inanimate part of Matter may for any thing I know or perceive be as knowing as the other parts of Nature for although it be the grossest part and so the dullest wanting self-motion yet by the various divisions and compositions which the animate parts do make the inanimate may be as knowing as the animate But some may say If Inanimate Matter were knowing of it self then it would also be sensible of it self I answer Self-knowledg is so far sensible of it self that it knows it self and therefore the inanimate part of Matter being self-knowing may be sensible of its own self-knowledg but yet it is not such a sense as self-moving matter has that is a perceptive sense for the difference of animate and inanimate Matter consists herein that one is self-moving and consequently perceptive but the other not and as animate matter is self-moving as well as self-knowing so it is the chief and architectonical part of Nature which causes all the variety that is in Nature for without animate Matter there could be no composition and division and so no variety and without inanimate Matter there could not be such solid compositions of parts as there are for the animate part of Matter cannot be so gross as the inanimate and therefore without these degrees there would be no variety of figures nor no composition of solid figures as Animals Vegetables Minerals c. so that those effects which our sense and reason perceives could not be without the degrees of animate and inanimate Matter neither could there be perception without animate Matter by which all the various effects of Nature are perceived for though one Creature cannot perceive all the effects yet the infinite parts of Nature by their infinite actions perceive infinitely Again Some may
object That if the Inanimate part of Matter have self-knowledg and sense it must of necessity have life also To which I answer That the Inanimate part of Matter may have life according as it hath sense and knowledg but not such a life as the animate part of Matter has that is an active life as to compose and divide the infinite body of Nature into infinite parts and figures and to produce infinite varieties of them for all this cannot be withont motion nevertheless it has so much life as to know it self and so much sense as to be sensible of its own self-knowledg In short the difference between animate and inanimate Matter 's life sense and self-knowledg is that the animate Matter has an active life and a perceptive sense and self-knowledg which the inanimate part of Matter has not because it wants self-motion which is the cause of all actions and perceptions in Nature Q. 3. Whether the Inanimate Matter could have parts without self-self-motion I answer Yes For wherefoever is body or matter there are also parts because parts belong to body and there can be no body without parts but yet were there no self-motion there could be no various changes of parts or figures The truth is Nature considered as she is and as much as our sense and reason can perceive by her various effects must of necessity be composed or consist of a commixture of animate both rational and sensitive and inanimate matter for were there no inanimate matter there would be no ground or grosser substance to work on and so no solid figures and were there no animate sensitive matter there would be no labourer or workman as I may call it to form the inanimate part of matter into various figures nor would there be such infinite changes compositions divisions productions dissolutions c. as we see there are Again were there no animate rational Matter there would be no designer or surveigher to order and direct all things methodically nor no Fancies Imaginations Conceptions Memory c. so that this Triumvirate of the degrees of matter is so necessary a constitutive principle of all natural effects that Nature could not be without it I mean Nature considered not what she might have been but as she is and as much as we are able to perceive by her actions for Natural Philosophy is no more but a rational inquisition into the causes of natural effects and therefore as we observe the effects and actions of Nature so we may probably guess at their causes and principles Q. 4. How so fine subtil and pure a part as the Animate Matter is can work upon so gross a part as the Inanimate I answer More easily then Vitriol or Aqua-fortis or any other high extracts can work upon metal or the like nay more easily then fire can work upon wood or stone or the like But you will say That according to my opinion these bodies are not wrought upon or divided by the exterior agent as by fire vitriol c. but that they divide themselves by their own inherent self-motion and that the agent is no more but an occasion that the patient moves or acts thus or thus I answer 'T is very true For there is such a commixture of animate and inanimate matter that no particle in Nature can be conceived or imagined which is not composed of animate matter as well as of inanimate and therefore the patient as well as the agent having both a commixture of these parts of matter none can act upon the other but the patient changes its own parts by its own self-motion either of its own accord or by way of imitation But the inanimate part of Matter considered in it self or in its own narure hath no self-motion nor can it receive any from the animate but they being both so closely intermixt that they make but one self-moving body of Nature the animate parts of Matter bear the inanimate with them in all their actions so that it is impossible for the animate parts to divide compose contract c. but the inaimate must serve them or go along with them in all such corporeal figurative actions Q. 5. How is it possible that Parts being ignorant of each other should agree in the production of a figure I answer When I speak of Ignorance and knowledg my meaning is not that there is as much ignorance in the parts of Nature as there is knowledg for all parts have self-knowledg but I understand a perceptive knowledg by which parts do perceive parts and as for the agreeing actions of parts they cannot readily err unless it be out of wilfulness to oppose or cross each other for put the case the sensitive parts were as ignorant of perceptions as the inanimate yet the rational being thorowly intermixt with them would cause agreeable combinations and connexions of parts in all productions because they being not incumbred with the burthens of other parts make more general perceptions then the sensitive and moving freely in their own degree there is a more perfect acquaintance between them then the sensitive parts which is the cause that the rational design and order when as the sensitive labour and work I mean when they move regularly or to one and the same effect for then they must needs move agreeably and unitedly But because the sensitive parts are perceptive as well as the rational and perceive not onely the rational adjoining parts but also those of their own degree they cannot so grosly err as some believe especially since the sensitive parts do not onely know their own work but are also directed by the rational but as I have often said the several sorts both of the sensitive and rational perceptions are well to be considered which are as various as the actions of Nature and cannot be numbred by reason every figurative action is a several perception both sensitive and rational and infinite Matter being in a perpetual motion there must of necessity be infinite figures and so infinite perceptions amongst the infinite parts of Nature Q. 6. Whether there be single Self-knowledges and single Perceptions in Nature I answer If there can be no such thing as a single part in Nature there can neither be a single self-knowledg or perception for body and parts can never be separated from each other but wheresoever is body were it an atome there are parts also and when parts divide from parts at the same time and by the same act they are joined to other parts so that composition and division is done by one act The like for knowledg For knowledg being material consists of parts and as it is impossible that there can be single parts or parts subsisting by themselves without reference to each other or the body of Nature so it is impossible that there can be single knowledges Neither can there be a single magnitude figure colour place c. but all that is corporeal has parts and by reason Nature
a self-perception although there may be an interior self-knowledg Nor is it proper to say a part may perceive it self or have a perception of it self But by perception I mean an exterior or forreign knowledg that is a knowledg of other parts figures or actions These perceptions I say are different according to the difference of the corporeal figurative motions for it is impossible that such or such parts should have such or such perceptions if they have not such or such corporeal motions Therefore though all parts have self-knowledg as well as self-motion yet by reason all parts do not move alike they cannot make the like perceptions and though self-knowledg as it is the ground and fountain not onely of all particular knowledges but also of all exterior perceptions is but one in it self as a fixt being and cannot be divided from its own nature for as Matter cannot be divided from being Matter or self-motion from being self-motion so neither can self-knowledg be divided from being self-knowledg nor can they be separated from each other but every part and particle of natural matter has self-knowledg and perception as well as it hath self-motion Yet all this hinders not but there may be degrees of self-knowledg according to the degrees of Matter for as there is rational and sensitive matter so there is also rational and sensitive self-knowledg nay there are infinite particular self-knowledges and perceptions according to the infiniteness of parts and motions and yet all is but one self-moving and self-knowing Nature for parts are nothing else but a division of the whole and the whole is nothing else but a composition of parts All which I desire may be taken notice of lest my sense be misinterpreted for when I speak of rational and sensitive self-knowledg I do not mean as if there were more self-knowledg then one in the onely infinite Matter to wit a double kind of self-knowledg but I speak in reference to the parts of Matter for the rational part is more pure and so more agil quick and free then the sensitive and the animate part is self-knowing but the inanimate not and thus in respect to parts as they are divided so they have several self-knowledges and perceptions as also numerous lives and souls in one composed figure or Creature and as infinite parts belong to one infinite whole so infinite self-knowledges and infinite perceptions belong to the infinite actions of those infinite parts But some may ask Why there are no more degrees of Matter but two viz. Animate and Inanimate and no more degrees of Animate but Rational and Sensitive I answer humane sense and reason cannot conceive it possible there should be more or fewer for the rational and sensitive are the purest degrees Matter can be capable of and were there any purer then these they would be beyond the nature of Matter which is impossible because Nature cannot go beyond it self Again some may perhaps desire to know why there are more degrees of Inanimate Matter then of Animate to wit of thickness and thinness rarity and density lightness aud heaviness c I answer These are nothing else but the actions of the material parts and do not belong to the nature of Matter so that they cannot make Parts less or more material for all is but Matter neither can they alter the nature of Matter for Matter is still Matter however it moves Lastly some may ask How it is possible that such an infinite variety can proceed but from two degrees of Matter to wit Animate and Inanimate I answer As well as Infinite effects can proceed from one Infinite cause for Nature being an Infinite body must also have Infinite parts and having an Infinite self-motion must of necessity have an infinite variety of parts and being infinitely self-knowing must also have infinite self-knowing parts which proves that Natures body must of necessity consist of those two degrees viz. Animate and Inanimate Matter for were there no Animate matter which is corporeal self-motion there would never be such variety of figures parts and actions in Nature as there is nor no perceptions for Self-knowledg or Matter without self-motion could never make any variety in Nature and therefore although self-motion causes an obscurity by the division of parts yet it causes also particular perceptions between parts and as the motions vary so do perceptions of parts In short there is but one infinite body and infinite parts one infinite self-knowledg and infinite particular self-knowledges one infinite self-motion and infinite particular actions as also infinite particular perceptions for self-motion is the cause of all the variety of Nature and as one figure or part of Nature lies within another so one perception is within another Q. 8. How can there be Self-knowledg and Perception in one and the same part I answer As well as the being or substance of a thing and its actions can consist together or as a cause and its effects for though they are so far different from each other that the cause is not the effect nor the effect the cause as also that the effect must of necessity depend upon the cause but the cause may chuse whether it will produce such or such effects as for example though action or motion depends upon matter yet matter does not depend upon motion as being able to subsist without it and though perception depends upon self-knowledg yet self-knowledg does not depend upon perception nevertheless wheresoever is perception there is also self-knowledg by reason that wheresoever there is an effect in act or being there is also its cause and although perception depends also upon outward objects yet outward objects do not depend upon perceptions but perception as it depends upon self-knowledg so it depends also upon self-self-motion for without self-knowledg and self-self-motion there would be no perception so that both exterior perceptions and all interior voluntary actions proceed from self-knowing and self-moving matter but the difference between particular interior self-knowledges and perceptions is caused by the changes of corporeal figurative self-motion Q. 9. Whether particular Parts or Figures be bound to particular perceptions I answer Particular Parts make Perceptions according to the nature of their corporeal figurative motions and their perceptions are as numerous as their actions for example those parts that are composed into the figure of an Animal make perceptions proper to that figures corporeal interior natural motions but if they be dissolved from the animal figure and composed into Vegetables they make such perceptions as are proper for Vegetables and being again dissolved and composed into Minerals they make perceptions proper to Minerals c. so that no part is tied or bound to one particular kind of perception no more then it is bound to one particular kind of figures but when the interior motions of that figure change the perceptions proper to that same figure change also for though self-knowledg the ground of all perceptions is a fixt
and inherent or innate knowledg yet the perceptions vary according to their objects and according to the changes and compositions of their own parts for as parts are composed with parts so are their perceptions nay not onely perceptions but also particular self-knowledges alter according to the alteration of their own parts or figures not from being self-knowledg for self-knowledg can be but self-knowledg but from being such or such a particular self-knowledg and since there is no part or particle of Nature but is self-knowing or has its particular self-knowledg it is certain that as the interior nature of the figure alters by the changes of motion the interior self-knowledg of that figure alters too for if a Vegetable should turn into a Mineral it cannot retain the self-knowledg of a Vegetable but it must of necessity change into the self-knowledg of a Mineral for nothing can have a knowledg of it self otherwise then what it is and because self-knowledg is the ground of Perception as self-knowledg alters so doth perception I mean that kind of perception that belonged to such a figure alters to another kind of perception proper to another figure so that it is with perception as it is with other Creatures For example as there are several kinds of Creatures as Elements Animals Minerals Vegetables c. so there are also several kinds of perceptions as Animal Vegetative Mineral Elemental perception and as there are different particular sorts of these mentioned kinds of Creatures so there are also of perceptions nay as one particular Creature of these sorts consists of different parts so every part has also different perceptions for self-motion as it is the cause of all the various changes of figures and parts of Nature so it is also of the variety of perceptions for put the case Matter were of one infinite figure it would have but self-knowledg or at least no variety of perceptions because it would have no variety of corporeal figurative motions and it is well to be observed that although numerous different parts may agree in perception that is their sensitive and rational figurative motions may all perceive one and the same object yet the manner of their perceptions are different according to the difference of their figures or rather of their interior corporeal figurative motions for example a Man a Tree and a Stone may all have perceptions of one object but yet their perceptions are not alike for the Tree has not an Animal or Mineral but a Vegetative perception and so has the Man not a Vegetative or Mineral but an Animal perception and the Stone not an Animal or Vegetative but a Mineral perception each according to the interior nature of its own figure Q. 10. Whether there could be Self-knowledg without Perception I answer Self-knowledg being the ground of all Perceptions which are nothing else but exterior knowledges might as well subsist without them as Matter would subsist without Motion but since self-motion is the cause of all the various changes of figures and parts and of all the orderly Productions Generations Transformations Dissolutions and all other actions of Nature These cannot be performed without Perception for all actions are knowing and perceptive and were there no perception there could not possibly be any such actions for how should parts agree either in the generation composition or dissolution of composed figures if they had no knowledg or perception of each other Therefore although self-knowledg is a fixt interior Being and the ground of all perceptions yet were there no self-motion there could be no action and consequently no perception at least no variety of perceptions in Nature but since Nature is one self-moving and self-knowing body self-knowledg can no more be separated from perception then motion can be divided from matter but every part and particle of Nature were it an Atome as it is self-moving so it is also self-knowing and perceptive But yet it is not necessary that Perception must onely be betwixt neighbouring or adjoining parts for some parts may very well perceive each other at a distance and when other parts are between nay some perceptions do require a distance of the object as for example the optick perception in Animals as I have declared before where I do mention the requisites of the Animal perception of sight whereof if one be wanting there is either no perception at all I mean no perception of seeing in that Animal or the perception is imperfect But some may ask Whether in such a case that is in the perception of an object which is distant from the sentient the intermediate parts are as well perceived as the object it self to which the perception directy tends I answer That if the intermediate parts be subject to that kind of perception they may as well be perceived as the object that is distant nay sometimes better but most commonly the intermediate parts are but slightly or superficially perceived For example in the forementioned sense of Seeing if the organ of sight be directed to some certain object that is distant and there be some parts between the organ and the object perceptible by the same sense but such as do not hinder or obstruct the perception of the said object not onely the object but also those intermediate parts will be perceived by the optick sense Also if I cast my eye upon an object that is before me in a direct line the eye will not onely perceive the object to which it is chiefly directed but also those parts that are joined to it either beneath or above or on each side of that object at the same point of time and by the same act the sole difference is that the said object is chiefly and of purpose patterned out by the sensitive and rational figurative motions of the eye when as the other intermediate or adjoining parts are but superficially and slghtly looked over And this proves first that Nature is composed of sensitive rational and inanimate matter without any separation or division from each other for could matter be divided into an atome that very atome would have a composition of these three degrees of matter and therefore although the parts of Nature do undergo infinite divisions and compositions so that parts may be composed and divided infinite ways yet these three degrees can never be separated or divided from one another because of their close union and commixture through infinite Nature Next it proves that there can be no single parts in Nature for what commonly are called parts of Nature are nothing else but changes of motion in the infinite body of Nature so that parts figures actions and changes of motion are one and the same no more differing from each other then body place magnitude figure colour c. for self-motion is the cause of the variety of figures and parts of Nature without which although there would nevertheless be parts for wheresoever is matter or body there are parts also yet
perceptive after their way as those that work to the act of Perception properly so called that is to the act of seeing made by patterning or imitation But it is well to be observed That although the eye has the quickest action in the Perception of seeing yet is this action most visible not onely by its motions but by the figures of the objects that are represented in the eye for if you look into anothers eye you will plainly perceive therein the picture of your own figure and had other objects but such an optick perception as Animals they would without question observe the same Some will say Those figures in the Eye are made by reflection but reflections cannot make such constant and exact patterns or imitations Others believe it proceeds from pressure and reaction but pressure and reaction being but particular actions cannot make such variety of figures Others again say That the species of the objects pass from the objects to the optick organ and make figures in the air but then the multitude of those figures in the air would make such a confusion as would hinder the species's passing through besides the species being corporeal and proceeding from the object would lessen its quantity or bulk Wherefore my opinion is that the most rare and subtilest parts in the animal sensitive organs do pattern out the figures of exterior objects and that the perception of the exterior animal senses to wit sight hearing tasting touching smelling is certainly made by no other way then by figuring and imitation Q. 12. How the bare patterning out of the Exterior figure of an object can give us an information of its Interior nature My answer is That although our sensitive Perception can go no further then the exterior shape figure and actions of an object yet the rational being a more subtil active and piercing Perception by reason it is more free then the sensitive does not rest in the knowledg of the exterior figure of an object but by its exterior actions as by several effects penetrates into its interior nature and doth probably guess and conclude what its interior figurative motions may be for although the interior and exterior actions of a composed figure be different yet the exterior may partly give a hint or information of the interior I say partly because it is impossible that one finite particular Creature should have a perfect knowledg or perception of all the interior and exterior actions of another particular Creature for example our sensitive Perception patterns out an Animal a Mineral a Vegetable c. we perceive they have the figure of flesh stone wood c. but yet we do not know what is the cause of their being such figures for the interior figurative motions of these Creatures being not subject to the perception of our exterior senses cannot exactly be known nevertheless although our exterior senses have no perception thereof yet their own parts which are concern'd in it as also their adjoining or neighbouring parts may For example a man knows he has a digestion in his body which being an interior action he cannot know by his exterior senses how it is made but those parts of the body where the digestion is performed may know it nay they must of necessity do so because they are concerned in it as being their proper imployment The same may be said of all other particular parts and actions in an Animal body which are like several workmen imployed in the building of a house for although they do all work and labour to one and the same end that is the exstruction of the house and every onemay have some inspection or perception of what his neighbour doth yet each having his peculiar task and employment has also its proper and peculiar knowledg how to perform his own work for a Joiner knows best how to finish and perfect what he has to do and so does a Mason Carpenter Tiler Glasier Stone-cutter Smith c. And thus it is with all composed figures or Creatures which proves That Perception has onely a respect to exterior parts or objects when as self-knowledg is an interior inherent inate and as it were a fixt being for it is the ground and fountain of all other particular knowledges and perceptions even as self-motion is the cause and principle of all other particular actions and although self-knowledg can be without perception yet perception cannot be without self-knowledg for it has its being from self-knowledg as an effect from its cause and as one and the same cause may produce numerous effects so from one self-knowledg proceed numerous perceptions which do vary infinitely according to the various changes of corporeal self-self-motion In short self-knowledg is the fundamental cause of perception but self-self-motion the occasional cause Just like Matter and self-self-motion are the causes of all natural figures for though Perception could not be without self-knowledg yet were there no self-self-motion there would be no variety of figures and consequently not exterior objects to be perceived Q. 13. How is it possible that several figures can be patterned out by one act of Perception for example how can a man when he sees a statue or a stone pattern out both the exterior shape of the statue the matter which the statue is made of and its colour and all this by one and the same act I answer First it is to be observed That Matter Colour Figure Magnitude c. are all but one thing and therefore they may easily be patterned out by one act of Perception at one and the same time Next I say That no sense is made by one single part but every sense consists of several parts and therefore the perception of one sense may very well pattern out several objects at once for example I see an embroidred bed my eye patterns out both the Velvet Gold Silver Silk Colour and the Workmanship nay superficially the figure of the whole Bed and all this by one act and at one the same time But it is to be observed That one object may have several proprieties which are not all subject to the perception of one sence as for example the smell of an odoriferous body and its colour are not subject to the same sense neither is the hardness or softness roughness or smoothness of its parts subject to the sense of smelling or seeing but each is perceived by such a sense as is proper for such a sort of Perception Nevertheless these different perceptions do not make them to be different bodies for even one and the same attribute or propriety of a body may be patterned out by several senses for example Magnitude or shape of body may be patterned out both by fight and touch which proves that there is a near affinity or alliance betwixt the several senses and that Touch is as it were a general sense which may imitate some other sensitive perceptions The truth is it is as easie for several senses to pattern
out the several proprieties of one body as it is for several Painters to draw the several parts of one figure as for example of a burning Candle one may draw the wax or tallow another the wick another the flame The like for the Perceptions of several senses Sight may pattern out the figure and light of a Candle Touch may pattern out its weight hardness or smoothness the Nose may pattern out its smell the Ears may pattern out its sparkling noise c. All which does evidently prove That Perception cannot be made by pressure and reaction or else a fire coal by the perception of sight would burn out the eye because it would by pressure inflame its next adjoining parts and these again the next until it came to the eye Besides it proves that all objects are material for were Light Colour Figure Heat Cold c. immaterial they would never be patterned out by corporeal motions for no Painter is able to copy out or draw an immaterial mode or motion Neither could immaterial motions make pressure nor be subject to reaction Lastly it proves That Perception is an effect of knowledg in the sentient and not in the external object or else there would be but one knowledg in all parts and not several knowledges in several parts whereof sense and reason inform us otherwise viz. that particular figures have variety of knowledges according to the difference and variety of their corporeal figurative motions But then some will say That the actions of Matter would be more infinite then the parts I answer There can be neither more nor less in infinite For infinite can be but infinite but since parts figures changes of motion and perceptions are one and the same and since division and composition are the chief actions of Nature it does necessarily follow That as the actions vary so do also their parts and particular perceptions Q. 14. How is it possible that any Perception of outward objects can be made by patterning since patterning doth follow perception for how can any one pattern out that which he has no perception of I answer Natural actions are not like Artificial for Art is but gross and dull in comparison to Nature and although I alledg the comparison of a Painter yet is it but to make my meaning more intelligible to weaker capacities for though a Painter must see or know first what he intends to draw or copy out yet the natural perception of exterior objects is not altogether after the same manner but in those perceptions which are made by patterning the action of patterning and the perception are one and the same for as self-knowledg is the ground of Perception so self-motion is the action of Perception without which no perception could be and therefore perception and self-action are one and the same But I desire that it may well be observed what I have mentioned heretofore to wit That although there is but one self-knowledg and one selfmotion in Nature yet they being material are divideable and therefore as from one infinite cause there may flow infinite effects and one infinite whole may be divided into infinite parts so from one infinite self-knowledg and self-self-motion there may proceed infinite particular actions and perceptions But some may perhaps ask 1. Why those particular knowledges and perceptions are not all alike as being all but effects of one cause To which I answer That if the actions or motions of Nature were all alike all parts would have the like knowledges and perceptions but the actions being different how can it be otherwise but the perceptions must be different also for since every perception is a particular self-action then as the actions of Nature vary and as parts do divide and compose so are likewise their perceptions 2. It may be objected That if the Perception of the exterior senses in animals be made by the way of patterning then when a part of the body feels pain the rational motions by patterning out the same would be pained or sick I answer This does no more follow then that the Eye patterning out the exterior figure of Water Fire Earth c. should become of the same nature for the original is one thing and the copy another the picture of a house of stone is not made of natural stone nor is the picture of a Tree a natural Tree for if it were so Painters would do more then Chymists by fire and furnace but by reason there is a very close conjunction between the rational and sensitive perceptive motions so that when the sensitive motions of the body pattern out some exterior object the rational most commonly do the same That which we call pain or sickness in the body when patterned out by the mind is called trouble or grief for as there are degrees in their purity subtilty and activity so their perceptions are also different But it is well to be observed That although some parts are ignorant of others when they work not to one and the same perception yet sometimes there is a more general knowledg of a disease pain or soreness for example a man may have an inflamation or soreness in one part of his arm or leg and all the rest of the parts of that limb may be ignorant thereof but if the inflamation soreness or pain extend throughout the whole arm or leg then all the parts of that limb are generally sensible of it 3. It may be objected That if the rational perceptive motions take patterns from the sensitive then reason can never judg of things as naturally they are but onely of their copies as they are patterned out by the sensitive motions I answer first That reason is not so necessitated as to have no other perception then what sense presents for Reason is the instructer and informer of sense as an architect or surveigher is in the extruction of a house Next I say That in the act of Perception Reason doth not onely perceive the copies of the senses but it perceives with the sense also the original for surely the rational part of Matter being intermixed with the sensitive must perceive as well the original as sense doth for it is not so involved within the sensitive that it cannot peep out as a Jack-in-a-Box but both being closely intermixed one makes perceptions as well as the other as being both perceptive and by reason the rational part makes the same perception as the sensitive doth it seemeth as if the rational did take copies from the sensitive which although it doth yet this doth not hinder it from making a perception also of the original But then some may say if the rational Part has liberty to move as it will then it may perceive without sense that is Reason may make perceptions of outward objects in the organs of the senses when the senses make none as for example the rational motions in the eye may perceive light when the sensitive do not and sound in the ear
out a Tree which stands in a direct line opposite to them but if there be Meadows or Hedges on each side of the Tree then the extream or side parts of each eye pattern out those meadows or hedges for one eyes perception is not the other eyes perception which makes them perceive differently when otherwise they would perceive both alike But if a thousand eyes do perceive one object just alike then they are but as one eye and make but one perception for like as many parts do work or act to one and the same design so do several corporeal motions in one eye pattern out one object the onely difference is that as I said every eye is ignorant of each others perception But you 'l say There are so many copies made as there are objects I answer 'T is true But though there are many composed parts which join in the making of one particular perception yet if they move all alike the perception is but one and the same for put the case there were a hundred thousand copies of one original if they be all alike each other so as not to have the least difference betwixt them then they are all but as one Picture of one Original but if they be not alike each other then they are different Pictures because they represent different faces And thus for a matched pair of eyes in one Creature if they move at the same point of time directly to one and the same parts in the same design of patterning out one and the same object it seems but as one act of one part and as one perception of one object Q. 15. How comes it that some parts for all they are Perceptive can yet be so ignorant of each other that in one composed figure as for example in the finger of a Man's hand they are ignorant of each other when as other parts do make perceptions of one another at a great distance and when other parts are between I answer This question is easily resolved if we do but consider that the differerence of Perception depends upon the difference of the corporeal figurative motions for if the parts be not the same the perceptions must needs be different nay there may infinite several perceptions be made by one and the same parts if Matter be eternal and perpetually moving And hence it follows that some parts may make perceptions of distant parts and not of neighbouring parts and others again may make perceptions of neighbouring or adjoining parts and not of those that are distant As for example in the animal Perception taste and touch are onely perceptions of adjoining objects when as sight and hearing do perceive at a distance for if an object be immediately joined to the optick sense it quite blinds it Wherefore it is well to be observed that there are several kinds and sorts of Perceptions as well as of other composed figures As for example there are Animals Vegetables Minerals and Elements and these comprehend each several particular kinds of Animals Vegetables Minerals c. Again these particular kinds are divided into several sorts and each of them contains so many particulars nay each particular has so many different parts of which it consists and each part has its different particular motions The same may be said of Perceptions For as the several compositions of several parts are so are they not that the bare composition of the parts and figures is the cause of Perception but the self-knowing and self-moving parts compose themselves into such or such figures and as there are proprieties belonging to such compositions so to such composed perceptions so that the composed parts at the end of a finger may not have the same perceptions with the middle parts of the same finger But some may say If there be such ignorance between the parts of a composed figure How comes it that many times the pain of one particular part will cause a general distemper throughout all the body I answer There may be a general perception of the irregularities of such particular composed parts in the other parts of the body although they are not irregular themselves for if they had the same compositions and the same irregularities as the distempered parts they would have the same effects that is pain sickness or numbness c. within themselves but to have a perception of the irregularities of other parts and to be irregular themselves are different things Nevertheless some parts moving irregularly may occasion other parts to do the same But it is well to be observed That adjoining parts do not always imitate each other neither do some parts make perceptions of forreign objects so readily as others do as for example a man plays upon a Fiddle or some other instrument and there are hundreds or more to hear him it happens oft that those at a further distance do make a perfecter perception of that sound then those which are near and oftentimes those that are in the middle as between those that are nearest and those that are furthest off may make a perfecter perception then all they for though all parts are in a perpetual motion yet all parts are not bound to move after one and the same way but some move slower some quicker some livelier some duller and some parts do move so irregularly as they will not make perceptions of some objects when as they make perceptions of others and some will make perfect perceptions of one and the same objects at some times and not at other times As for example some men will hear see smell taste c. more perfectly at some then at other times And thus to repeat what I said before The several kinds sorts and particulars of Perceptions must well be considered as also that the variety of Nature proceeds but from one cause which is self-knowing and self-moving Matter Q. 16. Why a Man's hand or any other part of his body has not the like Perception as the eye the ear or the nose c. because there are sensitive and rational motions in all the parts of his body I answer The reason why the same perception that is within the eye cannot be in the hand or in any other part of a mans body is that the parts of the hand are composed into another sort of figure then the eyes ears nose c. are and the sensitive motions make perceptions according to the compositions of their parts and if the parts of the hand should be divided and composed with other parts into another figure as for example into the figure of an eye or ear or nose then they would have the perception of seeing hearing and smelling for perceptions are according to the composition of parts and the changes of Natures self-motions But then some will say perhaps That an Artificial eye or ear will have the same perceptions c. being of the same figure I answer That if its interior nature and the composition of its parts
although the interior actions of all other parts do not appear to our senses yet they may be perceived by regular reason for what sense wants reason supplies which oftener rectifies the straying and erring senses then these do reason as being more pure subtile and free from labouring on the inanimate parts of Matter then sense is as I have often declared which proves that reason is far beyond sense and this appears also in Chymistry which yet is so much for sensitive experiments for when the effects do not readily follow according to our intentions reason is fain to consider and enquire into the causes that hinder or obstruct the success of our designs And if reason be above sense then Speculative Philosophy ought to be preferred before the Experimental because there can no reason be given for any thing without it I will not say that all Arts have their first origine from Reason for what we name chance does often present to the sensitive perception such things which the rational does afterwards take into consideration but my meaning is that for the most part Reason leads and directs the ways of Art and I am of opinion that Contemplative Philosophy is the best Tutoress and gives the surest instructions to Art and amongst the rest to the Art of Chymistry which no doubt is very profitable to man many several ways and very soveraign in many desperate diseases if discreetly and moderately used but if Chymical medicines should be so commonly applied as others they would sooner kill then cure and if Paracelsus was as frequently practised as Galen it would be as bad as the Plague Wherefore Chymical Medicines are to be used as the extreme Unction in desperate cases and that with great moderation and discretion 21. Of the Universal Medicine and of Diseases IAm not of the opinion that there can be a Universal Medicine for all diseases except it be proved that all kinds of Diseases whatsoever proceed from one cause which I am sure can never be done by reason there is as much variety in the causes of diseases as in the diseases themselves You may say All diseases proceed but from irregular motions I answer These irregular motions are so numerous different and various that all the Artists in Nature are not able to rectifie them Nay they might sooner make or create a new Matter then rectifie the irregularities of Nature more then Nature herself is pleased to do for though Art may be an occasion of the changes of some parts or motions of their compositions and divisions imitations and the like like as a Painter takes a copy from an original yet it cannot alter infinite Nature for a man may build or pull down a house but yet he cannot make the materials although he may fit or prepare them for his use so Artists may dissolve and compose several parts several ways but yet they cannot make the matter of those parts and therefore although they may observe the effects yet they cannot always give a true or probable reason why they are so nor know the several particular causes which make them to be so To see the effects belongs to the perception of sense but to judg of the cause belongs onely to reason and since there is an ignorance as well as a perceptive knowledg in Nature no creature can absolutely know or have a thorow perception of all things but according as the corporeal figurative motions are so are the perceptions not onely in one composed figure but also in every part and particle of the same figure for one and the same parts may make several perceptions in several Creatures according to their several figurative motions But reason being above sense is more inspective then sense and although sense doth many times inform reason yet reason being more subtile piercing and active doth oftener inform and rectifie the senses when they are irregular nay some rational parts inform others like as one man will inform another of his own voluntary conceptions or of his exterior perceptions and some sensitive parts will inform others as one Artist another and although Experimental Phylosophy is not to be rejected yet the Speculative is much better by reason it guides directs and governs the Experimental but as knowledg and understanding is more clear where both the rational and sensitive perception do join so Experimental and Speculative Philosophy do give the surest informations when they are joined or united together But to return to the Universal Medicine although I do not believe there is any nor that all Diseases are curable yet my advice is that no applications of remedies should be neglected in any disease whatsoever because diseases cannot be so perfectly known but that they may be mistaken and so even the most experienced Physician may many times be deceived and mistake a curable disease for an incurable wherefore Trials should be made as long as life lasts Of Dropsies Cancers Kings-evils and the like diseases I believe some may be cureable especially if taken at the first beginning and that without great difficuly and in a short time but such diseases which consist in the decay of the vital parts I do verily believe them incurable as for example those Dropsies Consumptions dead Palsies c. which are caused either through the decay of the vital parts or through want of radical substance Neither do I think a natural Blindness Dumbness Deafness or Lameness curable nor natural Fools or Idiots Nay I fear the best Chymist will be puzled to cure a setled or fixt Gout or the Stone in such bodies as are apt to breed it for Stones are produced several ways and as their productions are different so are they wherefore although many do pretend to great things yet were their cures so certain they would be more frequent I will not say but many times they perform great cures but whether it be by chance or out of a fundamental knowledg I know not but since they are so seldom performed I think them rather to be casual cures In my opinion the surest way both in Diseases and Applications of Remedies is to observe the corporeal figurative motions of both which are best and surest perceived by the rational perception because the sensitive is more apt to be deluded 22. Of Outward Remedies REmedies which are applied outwardly may be very beneficial by reason the bodies of Animal Cratures are full of Pores which serve to attract nourishment or foreign matter into the body and to vent superfluities Besides the interior parts of those bodies to which outward Remedies are applied may imitate the qualities or motions of the remedies by the help of their own sensitive motions and therefore the application of outward remedies is not altogether to be rejected But yet I do not believe that they do always or in all persons work the like effects or that they are so sure and soveraign as those that are taken inwardly The truth is as Remedies properly and
Animal tell what perception a Vegetable or Mineral has We may perceive that the Air which is an Element doth pattern out sound for it is not done by reverberation as pressure and reaction by reason there will be in some places not onely two several Ecchoes of one sound but in some three or four but surely one sound cannot be in several distant places at one time Also a Looking-glass we see does pattern out the figure of an object but yet we cannot be certainly affirmed that either the Glass or the Air have the same perceptions which Animals have for although their patterns are alike yet their perceptions may be different As for example the picture of a Man may be like its original but yet who knows what perception it has for though it represents the exterior figure of an Animal yet it is not of the nature of an Animal and therefore although a man may perceive his picture yet he knows not what perception the picture has of him for we can but judg by our selves of the perceptions of our own kind that is of Animal kind and not of the perceptions of other Creatures for example I observe that the perception of my exterior senses is made by an easie way of patterning out exterior objects and so conclude of the rest of my own kind to wit that the perception of their exterior sensitive organs is made after the same manner or way nay I perceive that also some perceptions of several other sorts of Creatures are made by way of patterning as in the forementioned examples of the Air and Glass and in Infectious Diseases where several Creatures will be infected by one object which certainly is not by an immediate propagation on so many numerous parts proceeding from the object but by imitation of the perceiving parts but yet I cannot infer from thence that all perceptions in Nature are made by imitation or patterning for some may and some may not and although our rational perception being more subtil then the sensitive may perceive somewhat more and judg better of outward objects then the sensitive yet it cannot be infallibly assured that it is onely so and not otherwise for we see that some animals are produced out of Vegetables whose off-spring is not any ways like their producer which proves that not all actions of Nature are made by imitation or patterning In short our reason does observe that all perception in general whatsoever is made by corporeal figurative self-motion but it cannot perceive the particular figurative motions that make every perception and though some Learned are of opinion that all perceptions are made by pressure and reaction yet it is not probable to sense and reason for this being but one sort of action would not make such variety of perceptions in the infinite parts of Nature as we may perceive there are Whensoever I say that outward objects work or cause such or such effects in the body sentient I do not mean that the object is the onely immediate cause of the changes of those parts in the sentient body but that it is onely an external or occasional cause and that the effects in the sentient proceed from its own inherent natural motions which upon the perception of the exterior object cause such effects in the sentient as are either agreeable to the motions of the object and that by way of imitation which is called Sympathy or disagreeable which is call'd Antipathy When I say That the several senses of Animals pattern out the several proprieties of one object as for example the Tongue patterns out the taste the Nostrils the smell the Ears the noise the Eyes the exterior figure shape colour c. and do prove by this that they are different things dividable from each other and yet in other places do affirm that colour place figure quantity or magnitude c. are one and the same with body and inseparable from each other 't is no contradiction for to be dividable from such or such parts and to be dividable from Matter are several things Smell and Taste although they be material or corporeal and cannot be divided from Matter yet there is no necessity that all parts of Nature must be subject to smell or taste or that such parts must have such smells and such tastes for though Colour Place Taste Smell c. are material and cannot be without body yet may they be conceived by our sense and reason to be different and several figures parts or actions for as there is no such thing as single parts or single divisions in Nature but all compositions divisions changes and alterations are within the body of Nature and yet there is such a variety and difference of natural figures and actions that one figure is not another nor one action another so it is likewise with the mentioned proprieties or what you 'l call them which although they cannot be separated from body or matter yet they may be altered changed composed and divided with their parts several ways and be perceived as various and different actions of Nature as they are for as one body may have several different motions at one and the same time so it may also have several proprieties though not dividable from Matter for all that is in Nature is material nor can there be any such thing as Immaterial accidents qualities properties and the like yet discernable by their different actions and changeable by the self-moving power of Nature But mistake me not when I say they are several different figures parts or actions for my meaning is not as if body and they were different things separable from each other or as if Colour Place Figure Magnitude c. were several parts of matter for then it would follow that some parts could be without place some without figure some without colour c. which is impossible for could there be a single Atome yet that Atome would have Colour Place Figure Magnitude c. onely there would be no motion for want of Parts and consequently no Perception But my meaning is That the several properties of a Body as for example Tast Touch Smell Sound being perceived by the several senses of Animals to wit the Tast by the Tongue the Smell by the Nose and Colour and Figure by the Eye c. it proves that they are several corporeal actions for the Tast is not the Smell nor Smell the Sound nor Sound the Colour Nevertheless they are all proprieties of the same body and no more dividable from body then motion is from body or body from matter onely they are made according to the several compositions and divisions of parts And as for Colour Place Magnitude Figure c. as I said before could there be an Atome it would have Colour Place Figure and though parts be changed millions of ways yet they cannot lose Colour Place and Figure The truth is as there are no single finite parts in Nature so there
By Discourse I do not mean speech but an Arguing of the mind or a Rational inquiry into the Causes of Natural effects for Discourse is as much as Reasoning with our selves which may very well be done without Speech or Language as being onely an effect or action of Reason When I say That Art may make Pewter Brass c. I do not mean as if these Figures were Artificial and not Natural but my meaning is That if Art imitates Nature in producing of Artificial Figures they are most commonly such as are of mixt Natures which I call Hermaphroditical When I say That Respiration is a Reception and Emission of parts through the pores or passages proper to each particular figure so that when some parts issue others enter I do not mean at one and the same time or always through the same passages for as there is variety of Natural Creatures and Figures and of their perceptions so of the manner of their perceptions and of their passages and pores all which no particular Creature is able exactly to know or determine And therefore when I add in the following Chapter That Nature has more ways of composing and dividing of parts then by the way of drawing in and sending forth by pores I mean that not all parts of Nature have the like Respirations The truth is it is enough to know in general That there is Respiration in all parts of Nature as a general or universal action and that this Respiration is nothing else but a composition and division of Parts but how particular Respirations are performed none but Infinite Nature is capable to know When I say That there is a difference between Respiration and Perception and that Perception is an action of figuring or patterning but Respiration an action of Reception and Emission of Parts First I do not mean that all Percaption is made by patterning or imitation but I speak onely of the Perception of the exterior senses in Animals at least in man which I observe to be made by patterning or imitation for as no Creature can know the infinite perceptions in Nature so he cannot describe what they are or how they are made Next I do not mean that Respiration is not a Perceptive action for if Perception be a general and universal action in Nature as well as Respiration both depending upon the composition and division of parts it is impossible but that all actions of Nature must be perceptive by reason perception is an exterior knowledg of forreign parts and actions and there can be no commerce or intercourse nor no variety of figures and actions no productions dissolutions changes and the like without Perception for how shall Parts work and act without having some knowledg or perception of each other Besides wheresoever is self-motion there must of necessity be also Perception for self-motion is the cause of all exterior Perception But my meaning is That the Animal at least Humane respiration which is a receiveing of forreign parts and discharging or venting of its own in an animal or humane Figure or Creature is not the action of Animal Perception properly so call'd that is the perception of its exterior senses as Seeing Hearing Tasting Touching Smelling which action of Perception is properly made by way of patterning and imitation by the innate figurative motions of those Animal Creatures and not by receiving either the figures of the exterior objects into the sensitive Organs or by sending forth some invisible rayes from the Organ to the Object nor by pressure and reaction Nevertheless as I said every action of Nature is a Knowing and Perceptive action and so is Respiration which of necessity presupposes a knowledg of exterior parts especially those that are concern'd in the same action and can no ways be perform'd without perception of each other When I say That if all mens Opinions and Fancies were Rational there would not be such variety in Nature as we perceive there is by Rational I mean Regular according to the vulgar way of expression by which a Rational Opinion is call'd That which is grounded upon regular sense and reason and thus Rational is opposed to Irregular Nevertheless Irregular Fancies and Opinions are made by the rational parts of matter as well as those that are regular and therefore in a Philosophical and strict sense one may call Irregular Opinions as well Rational as those that are Regular but according to the vulgar way of expression as I said it is sooner understood of Regular then of Irregular Opinions Fancies or Conceptions When I say that None of Natures parts can be call'd Inanimate or Soul-less I do not mean the constitutive parts of Nature which are as it were the Ingredients whereof Nature consists and is made up whereof there is an inanimate part or degree of matter as well as animate but I mean the parts or effects of this composed body of Nature of which I say that none can be call'd inanimate for though some Philosophers think that nothing is animate or has life in Nature but Animals and Vegetables yet it is probable that since Nature consists of a commixture of animate and inanimate matter and is self-moving there can be no part or particle of this composed body of Nature were it an Atome that may be call'd Inaminate by reason there is none that has not its share of animate as well as inanimate matter and the commixture of these degrees being so close it is impossible one should be without the other When enumerating the requisites of the Perception of Sight in Animals I say that if one of them be wanting there is either no perception at all or it is an imperfect perception I mean there is no Animal perception of seeing or else an irregular perception When I say that as the sensitive perception knows some of the other parts of Nature by their effects so the rational perceives some effects of the Omnipotent Power of God My meaning is not as if the sensitive part of matter hath no knowledg at all of God for since all parts of Nature even the inanimate have an innate and fixt self-knowledg it is probable that they may also have an interior self-knowledg of the existency of the Eternal and Omnipotent God as the Author of Nature But because the rational part is the subtilest purest finest and highest degree of matter it is most conformable to truth that it has also the highest and greatest knowledg of God as far as a natural part can have for God being Immaterial it cannot properly be said that sense can have a perception of him by reason he is not subject to the sensitive perception of any Creature or part of Nature and therefore all the knowledg which natural Creatures can have of God must be inherent in every part of Nature and the perceptions which we have of the Effects of Nature may lead us to some conceptions of that Supernatural Infinite and
onely in the grossness but in the dulness of the Inanimate parts and that since the sensitive animate parts were labouring on and with the inanimate if these had self-motion and that-their motion was flower then that of the animate parts they would obstruct cross and oppose each other in all their actions for the one would be too slow and the other too quick The latter Thoughts replied that this slowness and quickness of motion would cause no obstruction at all for said they a man that rides on a Horse is carried away by the Horses motion and has nevertheless also his own motions himself neither does the Horse and Man transfer or exchange motion into each other nor do they hinder or obstruct one another The former Thoughts answer'd it was True that Motion could not be transferred from one body into another without Matter or substance and that several self-moving parts might be joined and each act a part without the least hinderance to one another for not all the parts of one composed Creature for example Man were bound to one and the same action and this was an evident proof that all Creatures were composed of parts by reason of their different actions nay not onely of parts but of self-moving parts also they confessed that there were degrees of motion as quickness and slowness and that the slowest motion was as much motion as the quickest But yet said they this does not prove that Nature consists not of Inanimate Matter as well as of Animate for it is one thing to speak of the parts of the composed and mixed body of Nature and another thing to speak of the constitutive parts of Nature which are as it were her ingredients of which Nature is made up as one intire self-moving body for sense and reason does plainly perceive that some parts are more dull and some more lively subtil and active the Rational parts are more agil active pure and subtil then the sensitive but the Inanimate have no activity subtilty and agility at all by reason they want self-motion nor no perception for self-motion is the cause of all perception and this Triumvirate of the degrees of Matter said they is so necessary to ballance and poise Natures actions that otherwise the creatures which Nature produces would all be produced alike and in an instant for example a Child in the Womb would as suddenly be framed as it is figured in the mind and a man would be as suddenly dissolved as a thought But sense and reason perceives that it is otherwise to wit that such figures as are made of the grosser parts of Matter are made by degrees and not in an instant of time which does manifestly evince that there is and must of necessity be such a degree of Matter in Nature as we call Inanimate for surely although the parts of Nature are infinite and have infinite actions yet they cannot run into extreams but are ballanced by their opposites so that all parts cannot be alike rare or dense hard or soft dilating or contracting c. but some are dense some rare some hard some soft fome dilative some contractive c. by which the actions of Nature are kept in an equal ballance from running into extreams But put the case said they it were so that Natures body consisted altogether of Animate Matter or corporeal self-motion without an intermixture of the inanimate parts we are confident that there would be framed as many objections against that opinion as there are now against the inanimate degree of Matter for disputes are endless and the more answers you receive the more objections you will find and the more objections you make the more answers you will receive and even shews that Nature is ballanced by opposites for put the case the Inanimate parts of Matter were self-moving then first there would be no such difference between the rational and sensitive parts as now there is but every part being self-moving would act of and in it self that is in its own substance as now the rational part of Matter does Next if the inanimate part was of a slower motion then the rational and sensitive they would obstruct each other in their actions for one would be too quick and the other too slow neither would the quicker motion alter the nature of the slower or the slower retard the quicker for the nature of each must remain as it is or else it would be thus then the animate part might become inanimate and the rational the sensitive c. which is impossible and against all sense and reason At this declaration of my former Thoughts the latter appear'd somewhat better satisfied and had almost yielded to them but that they had yet some scruples left which hindered them from giving a full assent to my former rational conceptions First they asked how it was possible that that part of Matter which had no innate self-motion could be moved for said they if it be moved it must either be moved by its own motion or by the motion of the animate part of Matter by its own motion it cannot move because it has none but if it be moved by the motion of the animate then the animate must of necessity transfer motion into it that so being not able to move by an innate motion it might move by a communicated motion The former Thoughts answered that they had resolved this question heretofore by the example of a Horse and a Man where the Man was moved and carried along by the Horse without any Communication or Translation of motion from the Horse into the Man also a Stick said they carried in a Man's hand goes along with the man without receiving any motion from his hand My latter Thoughts replied That a Man and a Stick were parts or Creatures of Nature which consist of a commixture of Animate or self-moving Matter and that they did move by their own motions even at the time when they were carried along by other parts but with the Inanimate part of Matter it was not so for it having no self-motion could no ways move You say well answered my former Thoughts that all the parts of Nature whensoever they move move by their own motions which proves that no particular Creature or effect of composed Nature can act upon another but that one can onely occasion another to move thus or thus as in the mentioned example the Horse does not move the man but occasions him onely to move after such or such a manner also the hand does not move the Stick but is onely an occasion that the Stick moves thus for the Stick moves by its own motion But as we told you before this is to be understood of the parts of the composed body of Nature which as they are Natures Creatures and Effects so they consist also of a commixture of the forementioned degrees of animate and inanimate Matter but our discourse is now of those parts which do compose the body
I have declared more at large elsewhere 17. Des Cartes Opinion of Motion examined I Cannot well apprehend what Des Cartes means by Matter being at first set a moving by a strong and lively action and by his extraordinary swift rotation or whirling motion about the Center as also by the shavings of his aethereal subtil Matter which fill'd up all vacuities and pores and his aethereal globules I would ask whether this kind of motion did still continue if so then not onely the rugged and uneven parts but also the aethereal globules would become less by this continual rotation and would make this world a very weak dizzie and tottering world and if there be any such shaving and lessening then according to his principles there must also be some reaction or a reacting and resisting motion and then there would be two opposite motions which would hinder each other But I suppose he conceived that Nature or the God of Nature did produce the world after a Mechanical way and according as we see Turners and such kind of Artificers work which if so then the Art of Turning is the prime and fundamental of all other Mechanical Arts and ought to have place before the rest and a Turner ought to be the prime and chief of all Mechanicks and highly esteemed but alas that sort of people is least regarded and though by their turning Art they make many dusty shavings yet they get but little profit by them for all they get is by their several wooden figures they make as Spoons Ladles Cups Bowls Trenchers and the like and not by their shavings Wherefore as all other Mechanicks do not derive their Arts from Turners so neither is it probable that this world and all natural Creatures are produced by a whirling Motion or a spherical rotation as if some spirits were playing at Bowls or Foot-ball for as I have often mentioned Nature has infinite ways of Motions whereof none is prime or principal but self-motion which is the producer of all the varieties Nature has within her self Next as for his Opinion of transferring and imparting Motion to other bodies and that that body which imparts Motion to another body loses as much as it gives I have answer'd in my Philosophical Letters to wit that it is most improbable by reason Motion being material and inseparable from Matter cannot be imparted without Matter and if not then the body that receives Motion would increase in bulk and the other that loses Motion would decrease by reason of the addition and diminution of the parts of Matter which must of necessity increase and lessen the bulk of the body the contrary whereof is sufficiently known 18. Of the blackness of a Charcoal and of Light I Cannot in reason give my consent to those Dioptrical Writers who conceive that the blackness of a Charcoal proceeds from the Porousness of its parts and the absence of light viz. that light not being reflected in the Pores of a Charcoal doth make it obscure and consequently appear black for the opinion which holds that all Colours are caused by the various reflexion of Light has but a weak and uncertain Ground by reason the refraction or reflection of light is so inconstant as it varies and alters continually and there being so many reflexions and positions of Light if they were the true cause of Colours no Colour would appear constantly the same but change variously according to the various reflexion of Light whereas on the contrary we see that natural and inherent Colours continue always the same let the position and reflection of Light be as it will besides there being different coloured Creatures if all had the same position and reflexion of light they would not appear of divers but all of one colour the contrary whereof is proved by experience I will not say but the refraction and various position of light may vary and alter a natural and inherent colour exteriously so as to cause for example a natural blew to appear green or a natural green to appear red c. but those figures which light makes being but superficially and loosely spread upon other natural and substantial figures are so uncertain inconstant and momentary that they do change according as the reflexion and position of light alters and therefore they cannot cause or produce any natural or inherent colours for these are not superficial but fixt and remain constantly the same And as for blackness that it should be caused by the absence of light I think it to be no more probable then that light is the cause of our sight for if the blackness of a Charcoal did proceed from the absence of light in its pores then a black Horse would have more or deeper pores then a white one or a sorrel or any other coloured Horse also a black Moor would have larger Pores then a man of a white complexion and black Sattin or any black Stuff would have deeper pores then white Stuff But if a fair white Lady should bruise her arm so as it did appear black can any one believe that light would be more absent from that bruised part then from any other part of her arm that is white or that light should reflect otherwise upon that bruised part then on any other Also can any body believe that the reflexion of light on a decayed Ladies face should be the cause that her complexion is altered from what it was when she was young and appeared beautiful and fair Certainly Light is no more the cause of her Complexion then of her Wrinkles or else she would never complain of Age but of Light But to prove further that the entering of light into the pores of exterior bodies can neither make perception nor colours if this were so then the entering of light into the pores of the Eye would make it perceive all things of as many colours as a Rain-bow hath besides if several Eyes should have several shaped Pores none would agree in the perception of the colour of an exterior object or else it would so dazle the sight as no object would be truly perceived in its natural colour for it would breed a confusion between those reflexions of light that are made in the pores of the eye and those that are made in the pores of the object as being not probable they would agree since all pores are not just alike or of the same bigness so as what with Air Light Particles and Pores jumbled together and thrust or crowded into so small a compass it would make such a confusion and Chaos of colours as I may call it that no sight would be able to discern them wherefore it is no more probable that the perception of sight is caused by the entering of light into the pores of the Eye then that the perception of smoak is caused by its entrance into the Eye And I wonder rational men do believe or at least conceive Natures actions to be so confused
and disordered when as yet sense and reason may perceive that Nature works both easily and orderly and therefore I rather believe that as all other Creatures so also light is patterned out by the corporeal figurative and perceptive motions of the optick sense and not that its perception is made by its'entrance into the eye or by pressure and reaction or by confused mixtures by reason the way of Patterning is an easie alteration of parts when as all others are forced and constrained nay unsetled inconstant and uncertain for how should the fluid particles of air and light be able to produce a constant and setled effect being so changeable themselves what instances soever of Geometrical figures be drawn hither to evince it if Man knew Natures Geometry he might perhaps do something but his artificial figures will never find out the architecture of Nature which is beyond his perception or capacity But some may object That neither colour nor any other object can be seen or perceived without light and therefore light must needs be the cause of colours as well as of our optick perception To which I answer Although we cannot regularly see any other bodies without light by reason darkness doth involve them yet we perceive darkness and night without the help of light They will say We perceive darkness onely by the absence of light I answer If all the Perception of the optick sense did come from light then the Perception of night or darkness would be no perception at all which is a Paradox and contrary to common experience nay to sense and reason for black requires as much Perception as white and so doth darkness and night Neither could we say it is dark or it is night if we did not perceive it to be so or had no perception at all of it The truth is we perceive as much darkness as we do light and as much black as we do white for although darkness doth not present to our view other objects so as light doth but conceals them yet this doth not infer that darkness is not perceived for darkness must needs do so by reason it is opposite to light and its corporeal figurative motions are quite contrary to the motions of light and therefore it must also of necessity have contrary effects wherefore the error of those that will not allow darkness to be a corporeal figurative motion as well as light but onely a privation or absence of light cannot make it nothing but it is on the contrary well known that darkness has a being as well as light has and that it is something and not nothing by reason we do perceive it but he that perceives must needs perceive something for no perception can be of nothing besides I have declared elsewhere that we do see in dreams and that mad men see objects in the dark without the help of light which proves it is not the presence or entering of light into the eye that causes our seeing nor the absence of light which takes away our optick Perception but light onely doth present exterior objects to our view so as we may the better perceive them Neither is a colour lost or lessened in the dark but it is onely concealed from the ordinary perception of humane sight for truly if colours should not be colours in the dark then it might as rationally be said that a man's flesh and blood is not flesh and blood in the dark when it is not seen by a humane eye I will not say that the smalness and fineness of parts may not make colours appear more glorious for colours are like artificial Paintings the gentler and finer their draughts and lines are the smoother and glossier appear their works but smalness and fineness is not the true cause of colours that is it doth not make colours to be colours although it makes colours fine And thus black is not black through the absence of Light no more then white can be white by the presence of light but blackness is one sort of colour whiteness another redness another and so of the rest Whereof some are superficial and changeable to wit such as are made by the reflection of light others fixt and inherent viz. such as are in several sorts of Minerals Vegetables and Animals and others again are produced by Art as by Dying and Painting which Artists know best how to order by their several mixtures 19. Of the Pores of a Charcoal and of Emptiness ALthough I cannot believe that the absence of Light in the Pores of a Charcoal is the cause of its blackness yet I do not question the truth of its Pores for that all or most Creatures have Pores I have declared before which Pores are nothing else but passages to receive and discharge some parts of matter and therefore the opinion of those that believe an entering of some Particles of exterior bodies through the Pores of animal Creatures and an intermixing with their interior parts as that for example in the bathing in Mineral Waters the liquid and warm vehicles of the Mineral Particles do by degrees insinuate themselves into the pores of the skin and intermix with the inner parts of the body is very rational for this is a convenient way of conveighing exteterior parts into the body and may be effectual either to good or bad and although the pores be very small yet they are numerous so that the number of the pores supplies the want of their largeness But yet although Pores are passages for other bodies to issue or enter nevertheless they are not empty there being no such thing as an emptiness in Nature for surely God the fulness and Perfection of all things would not suffer any Vacuum in Nature which is a Pure Nothing Vacuum implies a want and imperfection of something but all that God made by his All-powerful Command was good and perfect Wherefore although Charcoals and other bodies have Pores yet they are fill'd with some subtile Matter not subject to our sensitive perception and are not empty but onely call'd so by reason they are not fill'd up with some solid and gross substance perceptible by our senses But some may say if there be no emptiness in Nature but all fulness of body or bodily parts then the spiritual or divine soul in Man which inhabits his body would not have room to reside in it I answer The Spiritual or Divine Soul in Man is not Natural but Supernatural and has also a Supernatural way of residing in man's body for Place belongs onely to bodies and a Spirit being bodiless has no need of a bodily place But then they will say That I make Spirit and Vacuum all one thing by reason I describe a Spirit to be a Natural Nothing and the same I say of Vacuum and hence it will follow that particular Spirits are particular Emptinesses and an Infinite Spirit an Infinite Vacuum My answer is That although a Spirit is a Natural nothing yet it is
which conditions if any be wanting there is either no perception at all or it is an imperfect perception for the perception of seeing an exterior object is nothing else but a patterning out of the figure of that same object by the sensitive figurative and perceptive motions but there are infinite parts that are beyond our humane perception and it would be but a folly for us to deny that which we cannot see or perceive and if the perceptive motions be not regular in our optick sense we may see different colours in one object nay the corporeal figurative motions in the eye may make several figurative colours even without the patterns of outward objects and as there are several colours so there are also several corporeal figurative motions that make several colours in several parts and the more solid the parts are the more fixt are their inherent natural colours But superficial colours are more various though not so various as they would be if made by dusty Atomes flying about as Flies in Sun-shine for if this opinion were true all colours and other Creatures would be composed or made by chance rather then by reason and chance being so ignorantly inconstant not any two parts would be of the like colour nor any kind or species would be preserved but Wise Nature although she be full of variety yet she is also full of reason which is knowledg for there is no part of Nature that has not sense and reason which is life and knowledg and if all the infinite parts have life and knowledg Infinite Nature cannot be a fool or insensible But mistake me not for I do not mean that her parts in particular are infinitely knowing but I say Infinite Nature hath an Infinite knowledg and by reason Nature is material she is divideable as well as composeable which is the cause that there is an obscurity in her Parts in particular but not in general that is in Nature her self nay if there were not an obscurity in the Particulars men would not endeavour to prove inherent and natural figures by superficial Phaenomena's But as for Colour some do mention the example of a blind man who could discover colours by touch and truly I cannot account it a wonder because colours are corporeal figurative motions and touch being a general sence may well perceive by experience which is gained by practice some Notions of other sensitive perceptions as for example a blind man may know by relation the several touches of Water Milk Broth Jelly Vinegar Vitriol c. as well as what is hot cold rare dense hard soft or the like and if he have but his touch hearing speaking and smelling perfectly he may express the several knowledges of his several senses by one particular sense or he may express one senses knowledg by another but if the senses be imperfect he cannot have a true knowledg of any object The same may be said of Colours for several Colours being made by several corporeal figurative motions may well be perceived by a general sense which is Touch I will not say that touch is the principle of all sensitive knowledg for then I should be of the opinion of those Experimental Philosophers which will have one principal motion or figure to be the cause of all Natural things but I onely say animal touch may have some Notion of the other animal senses by the help of rational perception all which proves that every part is sensible and every sense knowing not onely in particular but that one sense may have some general notion or knowledg of the rest for there are particular and general perceptions in sensitive and rational matter which is the cause both of the variety and order of Nature's Works and therefore it is not necessary that a black figure must be rough and a white figure smooth Neither are white and black the Ground-figures of Colours as some do conceive or as others do imagine blew and yellow for no particular figure can be a principle but they are all but effects and I think it is as great an error to believe Effects for Principles as to judg of the Interior Natures and Motions of Creatures by their Exterior Phaenomena or appearances which I observe in most of our modern Authors whereof some are for Incorporeal Motions others for Prime and Principal Figures others for First Matter others for the figures of dusty and insensible Atomes that move by chance when as neither Atomes Corpuscles or Particles nor Pores Light or the like can be the cause of fixt and natural colours for if it were so then there would be no stayed or solid colour insomuch as a Horse or any other Creature would be of more various colours then a Rain-bow but that several colours are of several figures was always and is still my opinion and that the change of colours proceeds from the alteration of their figures as I have more at large declared in my other Philosophical Works Indeed Art can no more force certain Atomes or Particles to meet and join to the making of such a figure as Art would have then it can make by a bare command Insensible Atomes to join into a Uniform World I do not say this as if there could not be Artificial Colours or any Artificial Effects in Nature but my meaning onely is that although Art can put several parts together or divide and disjoyn them yet it cannot make those parts move or work so as to alter their proper figures or interior natures or to be the cause of changing and altering their own or other parts any otherwise then they are by their Natures Neither do I say that no Colours are made by Light but I say onely that fixt colours are not made by Light and as for the opinion that white bodies reflect the Light outward and black bodies inward as some Authors do imagine I answer 'T is probable some bodies may do so but all white and black Colours are not made by such reflexions the truth is some conceive all Colours to be made by one sort of Motion like as some do believe that all sensation is made by pressure and reaction and all heat by parts tending outward and all cold by parts tending inward when as there are not onely several kinds of heat and cold as Animal Vegetable Mineral and Elemental heat and cold but several sorts in each kind and different particulars in each sort for there is a moist heat a dry heat a burning a dissolving a composing a dilating a contracting heat and many more The like for colds all which several kinds sorts and particulars are made by the several changes of the corporeal figurative Motions of Nature and not by Pressure and Reaction or by tending inward and outward And as there is so great a variety and difference amongst natural Creatures both in their Perceptions and interior natures so there are also varieties of their colours the natural colours of men being
their Colours have and if their opinions be as changeable as inconstant Atomes and variable Lights then their experiments will be of no great benefit and use to the world Neither will Artificial Characters and Geometrical Figures be able to make their opinions and experiments more probable for they appear to me like Dr. Dee's numbers who was directed by I know not what spirits which Kelley saw in his holy stone which neither of them did understand much less will Dioptrical glasses give any true Information of them but they rather delude the sight for Art is not onely intricate and obscure but a false informer and rather blinds then informs any particular Creature of the Truth of Nature but my reason perceives that Nature loves sometimes to act or work blind-fold in the actions of Art for although they be natural yet they are but Natures blind at least her winking or jugling actions causing some parts or Creatures to deceive others or else they are her politick actions by which she deceives her Creatures expectations and by that means keeps them from knowing and understanding her subtile and wise Government 21. Whether an Idea haue a Colour and of the Idea of a Spirit I Have declared in my former discourse that there is no Colour without body nor a body without colour for we cannot think of a body without we think of colour too To which some may object That if colour be as proper to a body as matter and if the mind be corporeal then the mind is also coloured I answer The Mind in my opinion has as much colour as other parts of Nature But then perhaps they will ask me what colour the Mind is of My answer is That the Mind which is the rational part of Nature is no more subject to one colour then the Infinite parts of Nature are subject to one corporeal figurative motion for you can no more confine the corporeal mind to a particular complexion then you can confine Infinite matter to one particular colour or all colours to one particular figure Again they may ask Whether an Idea have a colour and if so whether the Idea of God be coloured To which I answer If the Ideas be of corporeal finite figures they have colours according to the nature or property or figure of the original but as for the Idea of God it is impossible to have a corporeal Idea of an infinite incorporeal Being for though the finite parts of Nature may have a perception or knowledg of the existence of God yet they cannot possibly pattern or figure him he being a Supernatural Immaterial and Infinite Being But put the case although it is very improbable nay against sense and reason there were natural immaterial Idea's if those Idea's were finite and not infinite yet they could not possibly express an infinite which is without limitation by a finite figure which hath a Circumference Some may say An Immaterial Idea hath no Circumference But then I answer It is not a finite Idea and it is impossible for an Idea to be Infinite for I take an Idea to be the picture of some object and there can be no picture without a perfect form neither can I conceive how an immaterial can have a form not having a body wherefore it is more impossible for Nature to make a picture of the Infinite God then for Man which is but a part of Nature to make a picture of infinite Nature for Nature being material has also a figure and matter they being all one so that none can be without the other no more then Nature can be divided from her self Thus it is impossible for Man to make a figure or picture of that which is not a part of Nature for pictures are as much parts of Nature as any other parts nay were they monstrous as we call them for Nature being material is also figurative and being a self-moving matter or substance is divideable and composeable and as she hath infinite corporeal figurative motions and infinite parts so she hath infinite figures of which some are pictures others originals and if any one particular Creature could picture out those infinite figures he would picture out Nature but Nature being Infinite cannot be pictured or patterned by any finite and particular Creature although she is material nevertherless she may be patterned in parts And as for God He being individeable and immaterial can neither be patterned in part nor in whole by any part of Nature which is material nay not by infinite Nature her self Wherefore the notions of God can be no otherwise but of his existence to wit that we know there is something above Nature who is the Author and God of Nature for though Nature hath an infinite natural knowledg of the Infinite God yet being divideable as well as composeable her parts cannot have such an infinite knowledg or perception and being composeable as much as divideable no part can be so ignorant of God as not to know there is a God Thus Nature hath both an infinite and finite perceptions infinite in the whole as I may say for better expressions sake and finite in parts But mistake me not I do not mean that either the infinite perception of Nature or the finite perceptions of natural parts and Creatures are any otherwise of that supernatural and divine being then natural but yet they are the most purest parts being of the rational part of Nature moving in a most elevating and subtile manner as making no exact figure or form because God hath neither form nor figure but that subtile matter or corporeal perceptive motion patterns out onely an over-ruling power which power all the parts of Nature are sensible of and yet know not what it is like as the perception of Sight seeeth the ebbing and flowing of the Sea or the motion of the Sun yet knows not their cause and the perception of Hearing hears Thunder yet knows not how it is made and if there be such ignorance of the corporeal parts of Nature what of God But to conclude my opinion is That as the sensitive perception knows some of the other parts of Nature by their effects so the rational perceives some effects of the Omnipotent power of God which effects are perceptible by finite Creatures but not his Infinite Nature nor Essence nor the cause of his Infiniteness and Omnipotency Thus although Gods Power may be perceived by Natures parts yet what God is cannot be known by any part and Nature being composeable there is a general acknowledgment of God in all her parts but being also divideable it is the cause there are particular Religions and opinions of God and of his divine Worship and Adoration 22. Of Wood Petrified I Cannot admire as some do that Wood doth turn into stone by reason I observe that Slime Clay Dirt nay Water may and doth often the same which is further off from the nature of Stone then Wood is as being less dense and its
is of the exterior object and the sentient or else the perception of all exterior objects would be made by such an intermixture which is against sense and reason and therefore even in such a commixture where the parts of the object enter into the body of the sentient as fire doth into fuel the perception of the motions of fire in the fuel and the fuels consumption or burning is not made by the fire but by the fuels own perceptive motions imitating the motions of the fire so that fire doth not turn the fuel into ashes but the fuel doth change by its own corporeal figurative motions and the fire is onely an occasion of it The same may be said of Cold. Neither is every Creatures perception alike no more then it can be said that one particular Creature as for example Man hath but one perception for the perception of sight and smelling and so of every sence are different nay one and the same sense may have as many several perceptions as it hath objects and some sorts of peceptions in some Creatures are either stronger or weaker then in others for we may observe that in one and the same degree of heat or cold some will have quicker and some slower perceptions then others for example in the perception of touch if several men stand about a fire some will sooner be heated then others the like for Cold some will apprehend cold weather sooner then others the reason is that in their perception of Touch the sensitive motions work quicker or slower in figuring or patterning out heat or cold then in the perception of others The same may be said of other objects where some sentient bodies will be more sensible of some then of others even in one and the same kind of perception But if in all perceptions of cold cold should intermix with the bodies of animals or other Creatures like as several Ingredients then all bodies upon the perception of cold would dissolve their figures which we see they do not for although all dissolving motions are knowing and perceptive because every particular motion is a particular knowledg and perception yet not every perception requires a dissolution or change of its figure 'T is true some sorts or degrees of exterior heat and cold may occasion some bodies to dissolve their interior figures and change their particular natures but they have not power to dissolve or change all natural bodies Neither doth heat or cold change those bodies by an intermixture of their own particles with the parts of the bodies but the parts of the bodies change themselves by way of imitation like as men put themselves into a mode-fashion although oftentimes the senses will have fashions of their own without imitating any other objects for not all sorts of perceptions are made by Imitation or patterning but some are made voluntarily or by rote as for example when some do hear and see such or such things without any outward objects Wherefore it is not certain steams or agitated particles in the air nor the vapours and effluviums of exterior objects insinuating themselves into the pores of the sentient that are the cause of the Perception of Heat and Cold as some do imagine for there cannot probably be such differences in the pores of animal Creatures of one sort as for example of Men which should cause such a different perception as is found in them for although exterior heat or cold be the same yet several animals of the same sort will have several and different perceptions of one and the same degrees of exterior heat and cold as above mentioned which difference would not be if their perception was caused by a real entrance of hot and cold particles into the pores of their bodies Besides Burning-Fevers and Shaking-Agues prove that such effects can be without such exterior causes Neither can all sorts of Heat and Cold be expressed by Wind Air and Water in Weather-glasses for they being made by Art cannot give a true information of the Generation of all natural heat and cold but as there is great difference between Natural and Artificial Ice Snow Colours Light and the like so between Artificial and Natural Heat and Cold and there are so many several sorts of heat and cold that it is impossible to reduce them all to one certain cause or principle or confine them to one sort of Motions as some do believe that all sorts of Heat and Cold are made by motions tending inward and outward and others that by ascending and descending or rising and depressing motions which is no more probable then that all Colours are made by the reflexion of Light and that all White is made by reflecting the beams of light outward and all black by reflecting them inward or that a Man when he is on Horse-back or upon the top of an House or Steeple or in a deep Pit or Mine should be of another figure then of the figure and nature of man unless he were dissolved by death which is a total alteration of his figure for neither Gravity nor Levity of Air nor Almospherical Pillars nor any Weather-glasses can give us a true information of all natural heat and cold but the several figurative corporeal motions which make all things in Nature do also make several sorts of heat and cold in several sorts of Creatures But I observe experimental Philosophers do first cry up several of their artificial Instruments then make doubts of them and at last disapprove them so that there is no trust nor truth in them so much as to be relied on for it is not an age since Weather-glasses were held the onely divulgers of heat and cold or change of weather and now some do doubt they are not such infallible Informers of those truths by which it is evident that Experimental Philosophy has but a brittle inconstant and uncertain ground and these artificial Instruments as Microscopes Telescopes and the like which are now so highly applauded who knows but may within a short time have the same fate and upon a better and more rational enquiry be found deluders rather then true Informers The truth is there 's not any thing that has and doth still delude most mens understandings more then that they do not consider enough the variety of Natures actions and do not imploy their reason so much in the search of natures actions as they do their senses preferring Art and Experiments before Reason which makes them stick so close to some particular opinions and particular sorts of Motions or Parts as if there were no more Motions Parts or Creatures in Nature then what they see and find out by their Artificial Experiments Thus the variety of Nature is a stumbling-block to moft men at which they break their heads of understanding like blind men that run against several posts or walls and how should it be otherwise since Natures actions are Infinite and Mans understanding finite for they consider not so much
when the sensitive do not To which I answer 'T is probable that the rational do many times move to other perceptions then the sensitive as I have often declared but if their actions be orderly and regular then most commonly they move to one and the same perception but reason being the purer and freer part has a more subtil perception then sense for there is great difference between sense and reason concerning the subtilty of their actions sense does perceive as it were in part when as reason perceives generally and in whole for if there be an object which is to be patterned out with all its proprieties the colour of it is perceived onely by sight the smell of it is perceived by the Nose its Sound is perceived by the Ear its taste is perceived by the Tongue and its hardness or softness coldness or heat dryness or moisture is perceived by Touch so that every sense in particular patterns out that object which is proper for it and each has but so much knowledg of the said object as it patterns out for the sight knows nothing of its taste nor the taste of its touch nor the touch of its smell and so forth But the mind patterns out all those figures together so that they are but as one object to it without division which proves that the rational perception being more general is also more perfect then the sensitive and the reason is because it is more free and not incumbred with the burdens of other parts Wherefore the rational can judg better of objects then the sensitive as being more knowing and knows more because it has a more general perception and hath a more general perception because it is more subtile and active and is more subtil and active because it is free and not necessitated to labour on or with any other parts But some may say How is it possible that the rational part being so closely intermixed with the sensitive and the inanimate can move by it self and not be a labourer as well as the sensitive I answer The reason is because the rational part is more pure and finer then the sensitive or any other part of Matter which purity and fineness makes that it is so subtile and active and consequently not necessitated to labour with or on other parts Again Some may ask Whether those intermixed parts continue always together in their particulars as for example whether the same rational parts keep constantly to the same sensitive and inanimate parts as they are commixed I answer Nature is in a perpetual motion and her parts are parts of her own self-moving body wherefore they must of necessity divide and compose but if they divide and compose they cannot keep constantly to the same parts Nevertheless although particular parts are divideable from each other yet the Triumvirate of Nature that is the three chief degrees or parts of Matter to wit rational sensitive and inanimate which belong to the constitution of Nature cannot be separated or divided from each other in general so that rational matter may be divided from sensitive and inanimate and these again from the rational but they must of necessity continue in this commixture as long as Nature lasts In short rational sensitive and inanimate Matter are divideable in their particulars that is such a particular part of inanimate Matter is not bound to such a particular part of sensitive or rational Matter c. but they are individeable in general that is from each other for wheresoever is body there is also a commixture of these three degrees of Matter 4. Some may say How is it possible That Reason can be above Sense and that the rational perception is more subtile and knowing then the sensitive since in my Philosophical Opinions I have declared that the sensitive perception doth inform the rational or that Reason perceives by the information of the senses To which I answer My meaning is not that Reason has no other perception but by the information of the senses for surely the rational perception is more subtile piercing and penetrating or inspective then the sensitive and therefore more intelligent and knowing but when I say that sense informs reason I speak onely of such perceptions where the rational figurative motions take patterns from the sensitive and do not work voluntarily or by rote Besides It is to be observed That in the mentioned Book I compare Thoughts which are the actions of the rational figurative motions to the sensitive Touch so that Touch is like a Thought in sense and Thought like a Touch in reason But there is great difference in their purity for though the actions of Touch and Thought are much after the same manner yet the different degrees of sense and reason or of animate sensitive and rational matter cause great difference between them and as all sensitive perception is a kind of touch so all rational perception is a kind of thoughtfulness But mistake me not when I say Thought is like Touch for I do not mean that the rational perception is caused by the conjunction or joining of one part to another or that it is an exterior touch but an interior knowledg for all self-knowledg is a kind of thoughtfulness and that Thought is a rational Touch as Touch is a sensitive Thought for the exterior perceptions of reason resemble the interior actions or knowledg of sense Neither do I mean that the perception of touch is made by pressure and reaction no more then the perception of sight hearing or the like but the patterns of outward objects being actions of the body sentient are as it were a self-touch or self-feeling both in the sensitive and rational perceptions Indeed that subtile and learned Philosopher who will perswade us that Perception is made by pressure and reaction makes Perception onely a fantasme For says he Reaction makes a Fantasme and that is Perception 5. Some perhaps will say That if the Perception of the exterior animal senses be made by Patterning then that animal which hath two or more eyes by patterning out an exterior object will have a double or trebble perception of it according to the number of its eyes I answer That when the corporeal motions in each eye move irregularly as for example when one eye moves this and the other another way or when the eyes look asquint then they do not pattern out the object directly as they ought but when the eyes move regularly then they pattern out one and the same object alike as being fixt but upon one point and the proof thereof is if there be two eyes we may observe that both have their perceptions apart as well as jointly because those parts that are in the middle of each eye do not make at the same time the same perceptions with those that are the side or extream parts thereof but their perceptions are different from each other For example the eyes of a Man or some other Animal pattern
were just the same as its exterior figure as for example if an artificial eye or ear were of animal flesh and the like it would have the like perception otherways not Q. 17. How do we perceive Light Fire Air c I answer By their exterior figures as we do other objects As for example my Eye patterns out the exterior figure of Light and my Touch patterns out the exterior figure of Heat c. But then you will say If the Eye did pattern out the figure of Light it would become Light it self and if Touch did pattern out the figure of Heat it would become Fire I answer No more then when a Painter draws Fire or Light the copy should be a natural Fire or Light For there is difference betwixt the copy and the original and it is to be observed that in the Perception of sense especially of sight there must be a certain distance betwixt the object and the sentient parts for the further those are from each other the weaker is the perception by reason no corporeal figurative motion is infinite but finite and therefore it can have but fueh a degree of power strength or activity as belongs to such a figurative action or such a part or degree of Matter But as for Fire and Light it is a certain and evident proof that some perceptions at least those of the exterior animal senses are made by patterning for though the nature of Fire and of Light for any thing we know be ascending yet if Fire be made in such a manner that several may stand about underneath and above it yet they all have the perception of the heat of fire in what place soever provided they stand within a limited or determinate compass of it I say of the heat which is the effect of fire for that is onely patterned out and not the substance of the flame or fire it self But on the contrary if the heat of the fire did actually and really spread it self out to all the places nominated as well downwards upwards and sideways then certainly it would be wasted in a little time and leave its cause which is the fire heatless Besides that there are Copies and Originals and that some perceptions are made by patterning is evident by the appearance of one Candle in several distances which several appearances can be nothing else but several copies of that Candle made by those parts that take patterns from the Original which makes me also believe that after the same manner many Stars which we take for Originals may be but so many copies or patterns of one Star made by the figurative motions of those parts where they appear Q. 18. Whether the Optick Perception is made in the Eye or Brain or in both I answer The perception of Sight when awake is made on the outside of the Eye but in sleep on the inside and as for some sorts of Thoughts or Conceptions which are the actions of reason they are to my apprehension made in the inner part of the head although I am not able to determine properly what part it is for all the body is perceptive and has sense and reason and not onely the head the onely difference is that the several actions of several parts cause several sorts of perceptions and the rational parts being the most active and purest and moving within themselves can make more figures in the same compass or magnitude and in a much shorter time then the sensitive which being burthened with the inanimate parts cannot act so agily and freely Neverthess some of the sensitive actions are much agiler and nimbler then others as we may perceive in several sorts of productions But the rational parts being joined with the sensitive in the exterior parts of a figure do for the most part work together with the same otherwise when they move by themselves in Thoughts Conceptions Remembrance and the like they are more inward as within the head for there are Perceptions of interior parts as well as of exterior I mean within a composed figure by reason all parts are perceptive Neither does this prove that if there be so many perceptions in one composed figure there must be numerous several perceptions of one object in that same figure for every part knows its own work or else there would be a confusion in Natures actions Neither are all perceptions alike but as I said according as the several actions are so are the perceptions Q. 19. What is the reason that the nearer a stick or finger is held against a Concave-glass the more does the pattern of it made by the glass appear to issue out of the glass and meet with the object that is without it I answer 'T is not that something really issues out of the Glass but as in a plain Looking-glass the further the object goes from it the more does its copy or image seem to be within the glass So in the same manner does the length of the stick which is the measure of the object or distance that moves For as to a man that rides in a Coach or sails upon Water the Shore Trees Hedges Meadows and Fields seem to move when as yet 't is the man that moves from them so it is with the figure in a Looking-glass Wherefore it is onely a mistake in the animal sense to take the motion of one for the motion of the other Q. 20. Whether a Part or Figure repeated by the same Motions be the same part or figure as the former or onely like the former as also whether an action repeated be the same with the former I answer That if the Parts Figures and Actions be the same they will always remain the same although they be dissolved and repeated millions of times as for example if you make a figure of wax and dissolve it and make that figure again just as it was before and of the same parts and by the same action it will be the very same figure but if you alter either the parts or the figure it may be like the former figure but not the very same The like for action if one and the same action be repeated without any alteration it is nothing else but a repetition of the corporeal figurative motions but if there be any alteration in it it is not made by the same figurative motions and consequently 't is not the same action for though the self-moving parts be the same yet the figurative motions are not the same not that those figurative motions are not in the same parts but not repeated in the same manner Wherefore it is well to be observed that a Repetition is of the same parts figures and actions that were before but an alteration is not a repetition for wheresoever is but the least alteration there can be no exact repetition Q. 21. Whether there may be a Remembrance in Sense as well as there is in Reason I answer Yes for Remembrance is nothing else
works of Natural Philosophy 1. There is but one Matter and infinite Parts one self-motion and infinite Actions one Self-knowledg and infinite particular Knowledges and Perceptions 2. All parts of Nature are living knowing and perceptive because all are self-moving for self-motion is the cause of all particular effects figures actions varieties changes lives knowledges perceptions c. in Nature and makes the onely difference between animate and inanimate Matter 3. The chief and general actions of Nature are division and composition of parts both which are done but by one act for at the same time when parts separate themselves from such parts they join to other parts and this is the cause there can be no Vacuum nor no single parts in Nature 4. Every particular part of figure is infinitely divided and composed from and with other parts 5. The infinite divisions and compositions hinder that Nature cannot run into extreams in her particulars but keep the parts and actions of Nature in an equal ballance 6. The Inanimate part of Matter has life sense and self-knowledg as well as the animate but being not moving in it self or its own Nature it has not such a perceptive sense and self-knowledg nor such an active life as the animate hath 7. The parts of Inanimate Matter alter according to their commixture with the Animate and so do their particular self-knowledges 8. As parts alter by the changes of motions so do particular perceptions 9. Though all perceptions are figurative actions yet no particular Creature can undoubtedly affirm that all are made by patterning or imitation by reason as the parts and actions of Nature are infinite so are also particular perceptions and being infinite they cannot be known by any particular Creature 10. There are besides exterior perceptions voluntary actions both of sense and reason not made by imitation but freely and by rote and these may be called conceptions rather then perceptions 11. Those are much in the wrong who believe that man can know no more then what his five senses do inform him for the rational part which is the purest subtilest most active and inspective part of Nature does inform it self of things which the sensitive cannot as for example how was the new world and the Antipodes found out for they were neither seen nor heard of nor tasted nor smelled nor touched Truly our reason does many times perceive that which our senses cannot and some things our senses cannot perceive until reason informs them for there are many inventions which owe their rise and beginning onely to reason It is not sense but reason that knows or perceives there is something beyond it self and beyond Nature which is the Onely Eternal and Omnipotent God and there can be no higher conception then this for what is beyond it is supernatural and belongs to supernatural Creatures as for example those divine souls which God has given to men above their rational material souls but as for the wicked souls they come not from God but are irregularities of Nature which God certainly will punish as a Master does the evil actions of his Servant 12. Art is but a Natural Creature or effect and not a Creator of any thing 13. Colour Magnitude Figure Place Time Gravity Levity Density Rarity Compositions Divisions Alterations c. are all one and the same with self-moving Matter and nothing else but the various actions of Nature which actions can no more be separated from body then body can from Matter or parts from their whole for all that is natural is corporeal and therefore the distinction into substances and accidents is to no purpose since there cannot really be no not imagined such a thing as an incorporeal or substanceless motion or action in Nature But some perhaps will say If every part and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Nature has Magnitude Colour Figure Place c. How is it possible that they can be one and the same with body since they are subject to several perceptions To which I answer The several perceptions do not make them to be several bodies but they are patterned out or perceived as several proprieties or attributes of one body or as several effects of one cause for though there is but one cause in Nature which is self-moving matter yet that onely cause must of necessity have several effects or proprieties as Figure Colour Place Magnitude c. and if I may without offence make a comparison between the Creator and a Creature God is but one in his Essence as one Infinite and Eternal God and yet has several Divine Attributes and though the parts of Nature cannot comprehend conceive or perceive God yet they may conceive somewhat of his several Attributes after several manners or wayes In the like manner although there is but one matter yet that matter may be perceived after several manners or ways it being impossible that matter or any part of particle of matter although it were single should be without those several mentioned proprieties for can any one conceive or imagine a body without Figure Magnitude Place or Colour were it as little as an Atome and since there are no Natural Figures or Creatures but consist of parts those composed Figures may have a different Magnitude Place Colour c. from their parts and particles were they single but being self-moving those figures may alter by self-motion for 't is as impossible for a body to be without parts as for parts to be without body but if matter were not self-moving there would neither be alterations perceptions nor any natural actions although there might be a fixt self-knowledg in Natures parts And thus it is no wonder how there can be several perceptions of one figure by reason there 's no figure but is composed of parts and as we can conceive a whole and its parts which yet are one and the same thing several ways for a whole we conceive as a composition of parts and parts we conceive as a division of the whole so we may Figure Place Magnitude c. And as we cannot conceive nor perceive motion without body so neither can we conceive those mentioned proprieties without body or body without them they being nothing else but the corporeal figurative actions of Nature FURTHER OBSERVATIONS UPON EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY Reflecting withal upon some Principal Subjects in CONTEMPLATIVE PHILOSOPHY 1. Ancient Learning ought not to be exploded nor the Experimental part of Philosophy preferred before the Speculative IN this present age those are thought the greatest Wits that rail most against the ancient Philosophers especially Aristotle who is beaten by all but whether he deserve such punishment others may judg In my opinion he was a very subtil Philosopher and an ingenious Man 't is true he was subject to errors as well as other men are for there is no creature so perfect but may err nay not Nature her self but God onely who is Omnipotent but if all that err should be accounted fools and destitute of
into earth and of this again into vegetables minerals and animals proves no more but what our senses perceive every day to wit that there is a perpetual change and alteration in all natural parts caused by corporeal self-motion by which rare bodies change into dense and dense into rare water into slime slime into earth earth into animals vegetables and minerals and those again into earth earth into slime slime into water and so forth But I wonder why rational men should onely rest upon water and go no further since daily experience informs them that water is changed into vapour and vapour into air for if water be resolveable into other bodies it cannot be a prime cause and consequently no principle of Nature wherefore they had better in my opinion to make Air the principle of all things 'T is true Water may produce many creatures as I said before by a composition with other or change of its own parts but yet I dare say it doth kill or destroy as many nay more then it produces witness vegetables and others which Husbandmen and Planters have best experience of and though some animals live in water as their proper Element yet to most it is destructive I mean as for their particular natures nay if men do but dwell in a moist place or near marrish grounds or have too much watery humors in their bodies they 'l sooner die then otherwise But put the case water were a principle of Natural things yet it must have motion or else it would never be able to change into so many figures and this motion must either be naturally inherent in the substance of water or it must proceed from some exterior agent if from an exterior agent then this agent must either be material or immaterial also if all motion in Nature did proceed from pressure of parts upon parts then those parts which press others must either have motion inherent in themselves or if they be moved by others we must at last proceed to something which has motion in it self and is not moved by another but moves all things and if we allow this Why may not we allow self-motion in all things for if one part of Matter has self-motion it cannot be denied of all the rest but if immaterial it must either be God himself or created supernatural spirits As for God he being immoveable and beyond all natural motion cannot actually move Matter neither is it Religious to say God is the Soul of Nature for God is no part of Nature as the soul is of the body And immaterial spirits being supernatural cannot have natural attributes or actions such as is corporeal natural motion Wherefore it remains that Matter must be naturally self-moving and consequently all parts of Nature all being material so that not onely Water Earth Fire and Air but all other natural bodies whatsoever have natural self-motion inherent in themselves by which it is evident that there can be no other principle in Nature but this self-moving Matter and that all the rest are but effects of this onely cause Some are of opinion That the three Catholick or Universal principles of Nature are Matter Motion and Rest and others with Epicure that they are Magnitude Figure and Weight but although Matter and Motion or rather self-moving Matter be the onely principle of Nature yet they are mistaken in dividing them from each other and adding rest to the number of them for Matter and Motion are but one thing and cannot make different principles aud so is figure weight and magnitude 'T is true Matter might subsist without Motion but not Motion without Matter for there is no such thing as an immaterial Motion but Motion must necessarily be of something also if there be a figure it must of necessity be a figure of something the same may be said of magnitude and weight there being no such thing as a mean between something and nothing that is between body and no body in Nature If Motion were immaterial it is beyond all humane capacity to conceive how it could be abstracted from something much more how it could be a principle to produce a natural being it might easier be believed that Matter was perishable or reduceable into nothing then that motion figure and magnitude should be separable from Matter or be immaterial as the opinion is of those who introduce a Vacuum in Nature and as for Rest I wonder how that can be a principle of any production change or alteration which it self acts nothing Others are for Atomes and insensible particles consisting of different figures and particular natures not otherwise united but by a bare apposition as they call it by which although perhaps the composed body obtains new qualities yet still the ingredients retain each their own Nature and in the destruction of the composed body those that are of one sort associate and return into Fire Water Earth c. as they were before But whatever their opinion of Atoms be first I have heretofore declared that there can be no such things as single bodies or Atomes in Nature Next if there were any such particles in composed bodies yet they are but parts or effects of Matter and not principles of Nature or Natural beings Lastly Chymists do constitute the principles of all natural bodies Salt Sulphur and Mercury But although I am not averse from believing that those ingredients may be mixt with other parts of Nature in the composition of natural figures and that especially Salt may be extracted out of many Creatures yet that it should be the constitutive principle of all other natural parts or figures seems no ways conformable to truth for salt is no more then other effects of Nature and although some extractions may convert some substances into salt figures and some into others for Art by the leave of her Mistress Nature doth oftentimes occasion an alteration of natural Creatures into artificial yet these extractions cannot inform us how those natural creatures are made and of what ingredients they consist for they do not prove that the same Creatures are composed of Salt or mixt with Salt but cause onely those substances which they extract to change into saline figures like as others do convert them into Chymical spirits all which are but Hermaphroditical effects that is between natural and artificial Just as a Mule partakes both of the nature or figure of a Horse and an Ass Nevertheless as Mules are very beneficial for use so many Chymical effects provided they be discreetly and seasonably used for Minerals are no less beneficial to the life and health of Man then Vegetables and Vegetables may be as hurtful and destructive as Minerals by an unseasonable and unskilful application besides there may be Chymical extracts made of Vegetables as well as of Minerals but these are bestused in the height or extremity of some diseases like as cordial waters in fainting fits and some Chymical spirits are as far beyond cordial waters
the Plague But since it is often observed that all bodies are not infected even in a great Plague it proves that the Infection is made by imitation and as one and the same agent cannot occasion the like effects in every Patient as for example Fire in several sorts of Fuels nay in one and the same sort as for example in Wood for some wood takes sooner fire and burns more clearly and dissolves more suddenly then some other so it is also with the Plague and with all other diseases that proceed from an outward Infection for the exterior agent is not an immediate cause but onely an occasion that the Patient has such or such motions and as the imitating motions are stronger or weaker quicker or flower so is the breeding of the disease I will not deny but there may be such figurative corporeal motions in the Air or Earth which may cause infections amongst those animals that live within the compass thereof and many times the Air or Earth may be infected by Animals But some particulars not being infected at all though they be frequently with those that have the Plague it proves that the figurative motions of their bodies do not imitate those motions that make the Plague when as if the Air were filled with infectious Atomes none would escape nay they would not onely enter into Men but Beasts and Birds c. Concerning the Spotted-Plague it proceeds from a general irregularity of dissolving motions which cause a general Gangrene of all the body and to find a cure for this disease is as difficult as to find the Philosophers-stone for though many pretend to cure it yet none has as yet performed it what may be done hereafter I know not but I doubt they will be more able to raise a man from the dead or renew old age and change it into youth then do it As for other Diseases I refer the Reader to my other Works especially my Philosophical Opinions for my design is not now to make a Physical Treatise and there they will find of the disease called Ague that its cause is the irregularity of the digestive or concoctive motions and so of the rest for in this present work I intended nothing else but to make reflections upon Experimental Philosophy and to explain some other Points in Natural Philosophy for the better understanding of my own Opinions which if I have done to the satisfaction of the Reader I have my aim and desire no more 26. Of Respiration HAving made mention both in the foregoing discourse and several other places of this Book of Respiration I 'le add to the end of this part a full declaration of my opinion thereof First I believe that there are Respirations in all Creatures and Parts of Nature performed by the several passages of their bodies to receive forreign and discharge some of their own parts Next I believe That those Respirations are of different sorts according to the different sorts of Creatures Thirdly As the Respirations of natural Parts and Creatures are various and different so are also the pores or passages through which they respire as for example in Man and some other animals the Nostrils Ears Mouth Pores of the skin are all of different figures And such a difference may also be between the smaller pores of the skin of the several parts of man as between the pores of his breast arms legs head c. also the grain or lines of a man's skin may be different like as several figures of wrought Silks or Stuffs sold in Mercers shops which if they did make several colours by the various refractions inflections reflections and positions of light then certainly a naked man would appear of many several colours according to the difference of his pores or grains of the skin and the different position of light But sense and reason does plainly observe that the positions of light do not cause such effects for though every several man for the most part hath a peculiar complexion feature shape humor disoposition c. different from each other so that it is a miracle to see two men just alike one another in all things yet light alters not the natural colour of their bodies no more then it can alter the natural figures and shapes of all other parts of their bodies but what alteration soever is made proceeds from the natural corporeal motions of the same body and not from the various positions refractions and reflections of light whose variety in Nature as it is infinite so it produces also infinite figures according to the infinite Wisdom of Nature which orders all things orderly and wisely OBSERVATIONS UPON THE OPINIONS OF SOME Ancient Philosophers ALthough the indisposition of my body did in a manner disswade me from studying and writing any more yet the great desire I had to know the Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers and whether any came near my own overcame me so much that even to the prejudice of my own health I gave my self to the perusing of the works of that learned Author Mr. Stanly wherein he describes the lives and opinions of the ancient Philosophers in which I found so much difference betwixt their conceptions and my own in Natural Philosophy that were it allowable or usual for our sex I might set up a sector School for my self without any prejudice to them But I being a woman do fear they would soon cast me out of their Schools for though the Muses Graces and Sciences are all of the female gender yet they were more esteemed in former ages then they are now nay could it be done handsomely they would now turn them all from Females into Males so great is grown the self-conceit of the Masculine and the disregard of the Female sex But to let that pass The Opinions of the Ancient though they are not exempt from errors no more then our Moderns yet are they to be commended that their conceptions are their own and the issue of their own wit and reason when as most of the opinions of our Modern Philosophers are patched up with theirs Some whereof do altogether follow either Aristotle Plato Epicurus Pythagoras c. others make a mixture of several of their Opinions and others again take some of their opinions and dress them up new with some additions of their own and what is worst after all this instead of thanks they reward them with scorn and rail at them when as perhaps without their pains and industry our age would hardly have arrived to that knowledg it has done To which ungrateful and unconscionable act I can no ways give my consent but admire and honour both the ancient and all those that are real Inventors of noble and profitable Arts and Sciences before all those that are but botchers and brokers and that I do in this following part examine and mark some of their opinions as erroneous is not out of a humor to revile or prejudice their wit industry
Nature would be but a confused heap or Chaos without the distinction of any perfect figures which figures make perfect perceptions of perfect objects I say of perfect objects for if the objects be not perfect the sensitive perceptions can neither be perfect but then the rational being joined with the sensitive and being more subtil active and piercing may find out the error either of the object or sense for both the rational and sensitive parts being united in one figure or action can more easily perceive the irregularities of each others actions then of exterior objects all which could not be were there single parts in Nature neither could such acts be performed by chance or sensless atomes nay could there be any single parts in Nature there would consequently be a Vacuum to discern and separate them from each other which Vacuum would breed such a confusion amongst them as there would be no conformity or symmetry in any of their figures Therefore I am absolutely against the opinion of senseless and irrational atomes moving by chance for if Nature did consist of such atomes there would be no certain kinds and species of Creatures nor no uniformity or order neither am I able to conceive how there could be a motion by chance or an irrational and senseless motion no more then I can conceive how motion can be without matter or body for self-motion as it is corporeal so it is also sensitive and rational Q. 11. Whether Perception be made by Patterning I answer My Sense and Reason does observe That the animal at least humane Perception performed by the sensitive and rational motions in the organs appropriated for it is made by patterning or framing of figures according to the patterns of exterior objects but whether all other kinds and sorts of perceptions in the infinite parts of Nature be made the same manner or way neither my self nor no particular Creature is able to determine by reason there are as many various sorts of perceptions as there are of other actions of Nature and according as the corporeal figurative motions do alter and change so do particular perceptions for Perception is a corporeal figurative action and is generally in all parts and actions of Nature and as no part can be without self-motion and self-knowledg so none can be without perception and therefore I dare truly say that all perceptions are made by figuring though I cannot certainly affirm that all are made by imitation or patterning But it is well to be observed that besides those exterior perceptions of objects there are some other interior actions both of sense and reason which are made without the presentation of exterior objects voluntarily or by rote and therefore are not actions of patterning but voluntary actions of figuring As for example Imaginations Fancies Conceptions Passions and the like are made by the rational corporeal figurative motions without taking any copies of forreign objects also many Generations Dissolutions Alterations Transformations c. are made by the sensitive motions without any exterior patterns for the generation of Maggot in a Cheese of a Worm in the root of a Tree of a Stone in the Bladder c. are not made by patterning or imitation because they are not like their producers but meerly by a voluntary figuring and therefore it is well to be observed that figuring and patterning are not one and the same figuring is a general action of Nature for all corporeal actions are figurative when as patterning is but a particular sort of figuring and although I observe that some perceptions are made by patterning yet I cannot say the same of all neither are the interior voluntary actions made by patterning but both the sensitive and rational motions frame such or such figures of their own accord for though each part in the composition of a Creature knows its own work and all do agree in the framing and producing of it yet they are not necessitated always to imitate each other which is evident because the composition of one and the same Creature is various and different by reason of the variety of its parts And this is the difference between exterior perceptions and interior voluntary actions for though both are effects of self-knowledg and self-motion yet perceptions are properly concerning forreign parts figures and actions and are occasioned by them but the voluntary actions are not occasioned by any outward objects but make figures of their own accord without any imitation patterns or copies of forreign parts or actions and as the figures and parts alter by their compositions and divisions so do both interior and exterior particular knowledges for a Tree although it has sensitive and rational knowledg and perception yet it has not an animal knowledg and perception and if it should be divided into numerous parts and these again be composed with other parts each would have such knowledge and perception as the nature of their figure required for self-knowledg alters as their own parts alter perception alters as the objects alter figures alter as the actions alter and the actions alter as Nature pleases or is decreed by God to work But I desire it may be observed first That although there are both voluntaay actions of figuring and occasioned actions of perceiving exterior objects both in sense and reason whereof those I call interior these exterior yet both of them are innate and inherent actions of their own parts as proceeding from the ground and fountain of self-knowledg and the reason why I call the voluntary actions interior is because they have no such respect to outward objects at least are not occasioned by them as perceptions are but are the own figurative actions of sense and reason made by rote when as perceptions do tend to exterior objects and are made according to the presentation of their figures parts or actions Next It is to be observed That many times the rational motions take patterns from the sensitive voluntary figures As for example in Dreams when the sensitive motions make voluntary figures on the inside of the sensitive organs the rational take patterns of them and again the sensitive do many times take patterns of the rational when they make figures by rote as in the invention and delivery of Arts and Sciences so that there is oftentimes an imitation between the rational and sensitive motions for the rational voluntary figures are like exterior objects to be patterned out by the sensitive perceptive motions and the sensitive voluntary figures are like exterior objects to be patterned out by the rational perceptive motions and yet all their perceptive actions are their own and performed inwardly that is by their own motions Which proves that by naming Perception an exterior action I do not mean that it is an action exteriously perceptible or visible for if it were thus then one part would presently know another parts perception when and how it perceives which we find it does not for although a man perceives a