Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	chancellor_n	lord_n	parliament_n	1,462	5	6.9372	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A33627	Certain select cases in law reported by Sir Edward Coke, Knight, late Lord Chief Justice of England ... ; translated out of a manuscript written with his own hand, never before published ; with two exact tables, the one of the cases, and the other of the principal matters therein contained.; Reports. Part 13. English	Coke, Edward, Sir, 1552-1634.	1659 (1659)	Wing C4909; ESTC R1290	92,700	80

to the President and Councel of York between Lock Plaintiff and Bell and others Defendants and that was a Replevyn in English was granted by the said President and Councel which I affirmed was utterly against Law For at the Common Law no Replevyn ought to be made but by Original Writ directed to the Sheriff And the Statute of Marlbridg cap. 21. and West 1. cap. 17. hath authorized the Sheriff upon Plaint made to him to make a Replevyn and all that appeareth by the said Statutes and by the Books of 29 E. 3. 21. 8 Eliz. Dyer 245. And the King neither by his Instructions had made the President and Councel Sheriffs nor could grant to them power to make a Replevyn against the Law nor against the said Acts of Parliament but the same ought to be made by the Sheriff And all that was affirmed by the Lord Chancellor for very good Law And I say that it might well be that we have granted other Prohibitions in other Cases of English Replevyns Another Prohibition I confess we have granted between Sir Bethel Knight now Sheriff of the County of York as Executor to one Stephenson who had made him and another his Executors and preferred an English Bill against Chambers and divers others in the nature of an Action upon the Case upon a Trover and Conversion in the life of the Testator of goods and Chattels to the value of 1000 l. and because the other Executor would not joyn with him although he was named in the Bill he had not any remedy at the Common Law he prayed remedy there in Equity and I say that the President and Councel have not any authority to proceed in that Case for divers causes 1. Because there is an express limitation in their Commission that they shall not hold plea between party and party c. unless both parties or one of them tanta paupertate sunt gravati that they cannot sue at the Common Law and in that case the Plaintiff was a Knight and Sheriff and a man of great ability 2. By that Suit the King was deceived of his Fine for he ought to have had 200 l. Fine because that the damages amounted to 4000 l. and that was one of the causes that the Sheriff began his Suit there and not at the Common Law another cause was that their Decrees which they take upon them are final and uncontroulable either by Error or any other remedy And yet the President is a Noble-man but not learned in the Law and those which are of the Councel there although that they have the countenance of Law yet they are not learned in the Law and nevertheless they take upon them final and uncontroulable Decrees in matters of great importance For if they may deny Relief to any at their pleasure without controulment so they may do it by their final Decrees without Error Appeal or other remedy which is not so in the Kings Courts where there are five Iudges for they can deny Iustice to none who hath Right nor give any Iudgment but the same is controulable by a Writ of Error c. And if we shall not grant Prohibitions in Cases where they hold Plea without authority then the subjects shall be wrongfully oppressed without Law and we denyed to do them Iustice And their ignorance in the Law appeared by their allowance of that Suit scil That the one Executor had no remedy by the Common Law because the other would not joyn in suit with him at the Common Law whereas every one learned in the Law knoweth that summons and severance lieth in any Suit brought as Executors and this also in that particular Case was affirmed by the Lord Chancellor and he much inveighed against Actions brought there upon Trover and Conversion and said that they could not be found in our ancient Books Another Prohibition I confess we have granted between the L. Wharton who by English Bill sued before the Counsel Banks Buttermere and others for fishing in his several Fishings in Darwent in the County of C. in the nature of an Action of Trespass at the Common Law to his damages of 200 l. and for the causes next before recited and because the same was meerly determinable at the Common Law we granted a Prohibition and that also was allowed by the Lord Chancellor And as to the case of Information upon the Riotous Rescous I having forgotten to speak to that the King himself asked what the Case was to whom I answered that the case was That one exhibited a Bill there in the nature of an Action of Debt upon a Mutuatus against Watson who upon his Oath affirmed that he had satisfied the Plaintiff and that he owed him nothing and yet because the Defendant did not deny the Debt the Councel decreed the same against him and upon that Decree the Pursuivant was sent to arrest the said Watson who arrested him upon which the Rescous was made and because that the Suit was in the nature of an Action of Debt upon a Mutuatus at the Common Law and the Defendant at the Common Law might have waged his Law of which the Defendant ought not to be barred by that English Bill quia beneficium juris nemini est auferendum the Prohibition was granted and that was affirmed also by the Lord Chancellor whereupon I concluded that if the principal cause doth not belong unto them all their proceedings was coram non Judice and then no Rescous could be done but the Lord Chancellor said that though the same cannot be a Rescous yet it was a Riot which might be punished there which I denyed unless it were by course of Law by force of a Commission of Oyer and Terminer and not by an English Bill but to give the King full satisfaction in that point the truth is the said Case was debated in Court and the Court inclined to grant a Prohibition in the said case but the same was stayed to be better advised upon so as no Prohibition was ever under Seal in the said Case Also I confess that we have granted divers Prohibitions to stay Suits there by English Bill upon penal Statutes for the manner of prosecution as well for the Action Proces c. as for the count is to be pursued and cannot be altered and therefore without question the Councel in such cases cannot hold Plea which was also affirmed by the Lord Chancellor And I said that it was resolved in the Reign of Queen Eliz. in Parots Case and now lately in the Case of the President and Councel of Wales That no Court of Equity can be erected at this day without Act of Parliament for the reasons and causes in the Report of the said Case of Parrot And the King was well satisfied with these reasons and causes of our proceedings who of his Grace gave me his Royall hand and I departed from thence in his favour And the surmise of the Number and that the Prohibition in the said Case

delivered to the party without difficulty if the Ecclesiastical Iudg when the cause which depends before him is meer Ecclesiastical denyeth the Libel a Prohibition lieth because that he doth against the Statute and yet no Prohibition by any express words is given by the Statute And upon the same Statute the Case was in 4 E. 4. 37. Pierce Peckam took Letters of Administration of the Goods of Rose Brown of the Bishop of London and afterwards T. T. sued to Thomas Archbishop of Canterbury That because the said Rose Brown had Goods within his Diocess he prayed Letters of Administration to be committed to him upon which the Bishop granted him Letters of Administration and afterwards T. T. libelled in the Spiritual Court of the Archbishop in the Arches against Pierce Peckam to whom the Bishop of London had committed Letters of Administration to repeal the same and Pierce Peckam according to the said Statute prayed a Copy of the Libel exhibited against him and could not have it and thereupon he sued a Prohibition and upon that an Attachment And there Catesby Serjeant moved the Court that a Prohibition did not lie for two causes 1. That the Statute gives that the Libel shall be delivered but doth not say that the Plea in the Spiritual Court shall surcease by Prohibition 2. The Statute is not intended of matter meer spiritual as that case is to try the Prerogative and the Liberty of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London in committing of Administrations And there Danby Chief Iustice If you will not deliver the Libel according to the Statute you do wrong which wrong is a temporal matter and punishable at the Common Law and therefore in this case the party shall have a special Prohibition out of this Court reciting the matter and the Statute aforesaid commanding them to surcease until he had the Copy of the Libel delivered unto him which case is a stronger case then the case at the Bar for that Statute is in the Affirmative and the said Act of 2 E. 6. cap. 13. is in the Negative scil That no Suit shall be for any Tythes of any Land in kinde where there is Modus Decimandi for that is the effect of the said Act as to that point And always after the said Act in every Term in the whole Reigns of King E. 6. Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth until this day Prohibitions have been granted in Causa Modi Decimandi and Iudgments given upon many of them and all the same without question made to the contrary And accordingly all the Iudges resolved in 7 E. 6. Dyer 79. Et contemporanea expositio est optima fortissima in lege a communi observantia non est recedendum minime mutanda sunt quae certam habuerunt interpretationem And as to the first Objection That the Plea of Modus Decimandi is but accessary unto the Right of Tythes it was resolved that the same was of no force for three causes 1. In this case admitting that there is Modus Decimandi then by the Custom and by the Act of 2 E. 6. and the other Acts the Tythes in kinde are extinct and discharged for one and the same Land cannot be subject to two manner of Tythes but the Modus Decimandi is all the Tythe with which the Land is chargeable As if a Horse or other thing valuable be given in satisfaction of the Duty the Duty is extinct and gone and it shall be intended that the Modus Decimandi began at the first by real composition by which the Lands were discharged of the Tythes and a yearly sum in satisfaction of them assigned to the Parson c. So as in this case there is neither Principal nor Accessary but an Identity of the same thing 2. The Statute of 2 E. 6. being a Prohibition in it self and that in the Negative If the Ecclesiastical Iudg doth against it a Prohibition lieth as it appeareth clearly before 3. Although that the Rule be general yet it appeareth by the Register it self that a Modus Decimandi is out of it for there is a Prohibition in Causa Modi Decimandi when Lands are given in satisfaction of the Tythes As to the second Objection it was answered and resolved That that was from or out of the Question for status Quaestionis non est deliberativus sed judicialis what was fit and convenient but what the Law is and yet it was said It shall be more inconvenient to have an Ecclesiastical Iudg who is not sworn to do Iustice to give sentence in a case between a man of the Clergy and a Lay-man then for twelve men sworn to give their Verdict upon hearing of Witnesses viva voce before an indifferent Iudg who is sworn to do Right and Iustice to both parties But convenient or inconvenient is not the Question Also they have in the Spiritual Court such infinite exceptions to Witnesses that it is at the Will of the Iudg with which party he shall give his sentence As to the third Objection it was answered and resolved First That satisfactio pecuniaria of it self is Temporal But for as much as the Parson hath not remedy pro Modo Decimandi at the Common Law the Parson by force of the Acts cited before might sue pro Modo Decimandi in the Ecclesiastical Court but that doth not prove That if he sueth for Tythes in kinde which are utterly extinct and the Land discharged of them that upon the Plea de Modo Decimandi that a Prohibition should not lie for that without all question appeareth by all that which before hath been said that a Prohibition doth lie See also 12 H. 7. 24. b. Where the original cause is Spiritual and they proceed upon a Temporal a Prohibition lieth See 39 E. 3. 22 E. 4. Consultation That Right of Tythes which is meerly Ecclesiastical yet if the question ariseth of the limits of a Parish a Prohibition lieth and this case of the limits of a Parish was granted by the Lord Chancellor and not denyed by the other side As to the Objection That an Averment is taken of the refusal of the Plea de Modo Decimandi it was answered and resolved That the same is of no force for divers causes 1. It is onely to inforce the contempt 2. If the Spiritual Court ought to have the Tryal de Modo Decimandi then the refusal of acceptance of such a Plea should give cause of Appeal and not of Prohibition as if an Excommunication Divorce Heresie Simony c. be pleaded there and the Plea refused the same gives no cause of Prohibition as if they deny any Plea meer spiritual Appeal and no Prohibition lieth 3. From the begining of the Law no Issue was ever taken upon the refusal of the plea in Causa Modi Decimandi nor any Consultation ever granted to them because they did not refuse but allowed the plea. 4. The refusal is no part of the matter issuable or material in