be capable of different Sentiments Being modified thus it shall be affected with Grief and being modified thus it shall be affected with Pain which will be sufficiently distinguished from each other by saying that Pain is a Modification of the Soul that anticipates and prevents all Reason and Reflection and that Grief is a modification that follows it and proceeds from it Thus I choose to distinguish them rather than by subjecting as you these two Sensations in two parts of the Soul whereof I have no Idea or by calling as others that Pain which the Soul suffers by the mediation of the Body and that Grief which the same Soul suffers in and by her self without the Mediation of the Body For though according to the Law of this State Pain be always occasioned by some Motion or Change in the Parts of the Body yet since 't is the Soul that truly feels it and GOD that truly raises it I can easily conceive that GOD can if he pleases raise the Sensation of Pain in her though no Change be made in the Body nay though she had no body at all That GOD for instance can raise the Sensation of Burning in the Soul without any Impression of Fire upon her Body Which by the way may serve to shew the Impertinency of that Question among the School-men how the Soul that is an immaterial Substance can suffer when separate by by a material Fire For let them tell me how Fire affects the Soul now she is in the Body and I 'll tell them how it may torment it when out of the Body But this by the by The thing I directly intend is that since the Soul may be capable of Pain as well without the Mediation of the Body as with it this cannot be its Distinction from Grief that it affects the Soul by the Mediation of the Body But to go on as I am not satisfied with the Ground of your Distinction so neither am I with the Use and Application you make of it Mental Pain say you is an Evil but such as GOD does not cause Again sensible Pain GOD does indeed cause but then that is not properly the Evil of Man Now I cannot accord with you in either of these As to the first I think it very certain that mental Pain being a real Modification of the Soul is caused by GOD who alone is able to new modifie our Souls who only acts upon them and is able to make them happy or miserable as I have sufficiently proved in my Discourse of Divine Love and as you will evidently perceive if you retire within your self and attentively consult your Reason And I wonder why you should stick to allow GOD to be the Author of mental Pain or Grief when you allow him to be the Cause of mental Pleasure or Ioy. If he be the Cause of our Happiness why cannot he be as well the Cause of our Misery And if of Pain why not of Grief For as to the other Part that sensible Pain which God causes is not properly an Evil you will find it very hard to perswade any one that has felt it to this Paradox That I suppose which perswaded you to it was your distinguishing the Soul of Man into two Parts a superiour and an inferiour Part the Latter of which being not properly the Man that Pain which is lodg'd there cannot be said to be the proper Evil of Man Thus the Stoicks reasoned of old and thus you now But besides that this Distinction of the Soul into a superiour and inferiour Part which is the Ground of this Supposition wants it self a good Foundation I further consider that if there were such a thing as an inferiour Part of the Soul yet since the higher is conscious of and affected with what is transacted in the other I do not see what Advantage accrues from this Distinction And since 't is the same Soul that feels Pain and Grief I see no Possibility of conceiving but that Pain must be as truly an Evil as Grief And if 't were put to my Choice there are several Degrees of Grief that I would chuse to indure rather than some Pains And I would fain know whether Pain be not against the Happiness of Man or whether Happiness can consist with it You your self imply that it cannot when you say that Indolence is necessary to perfect Felicity And must not that then be an Evil that is contrary to Happiness And should you not think your self guilty of offending against that Charity which you owe to your Fellow-Creatures and which obliges you to wish and seek their Welfare if you should put any of them without Cause to Bodily Pain Or would you try to bring your self off by your Distinction of the superiour and inferiour Part of the Soul That the Pain which you inflicted was only in the inferiour Part which being not properly the Man you could not be said to have done any real Evil to him and so not to have trespassed against Charity I believe you have too much good Nature as well as Discernment to use such a Plea as this But now if Pain be not a proper and real Evil how can it be against Charity to cause it in any one For what but willing an Evil to a Man can be contrary to wishing well to him It must therefore be concluded that sensible Pain is truly an Evil as well as mental evil I mean in it self formally and simply considered and that it can become good only occasionally and consequentially as it may be a Means to avoid a greater Evil or procure a greater Good and so may mental Pain too which when all is done I think the best Apology that can be offered for God's being the Author of it and to salve him from being the Object of our Aversion upon that Account viz. to say that though sensible Pain be truly an Evil as well as mental and that though GOD be the true Cause of both yet GOD does not will our Pain as he does our Pleasure and Happiness for it self and as such but merely for the sake of something else as it is a means to our greater good And is therefore so far from meriting our Hatred for the Pain which he causes in us that he ought for that very reason to be loved by us since 't is for the sake of Pleasure that he causes Pain This I take to be the most satisfactory Account of the Difficulty which as it resolves into what I offered in my last so 't is what you your self think fit after all to take up with as your last Expedient toward the latter Part of your Letter where indeed you deliver your self very nobly upon this Occasion Madam I have now done with the Body of your Notion and have now only to consider some looser Parts that relate to it You say you think it an unquestionable Maxim that all our Good is wholly and absolutely from GOD and all our Evil
separated us from the Love of God has made the Soul willing to fill that Emptiness which she feels in her self by the Possession of Creatures Whether these Objects are spiritual or Corporal the Desires which we have of them are always carnal in the Language of Scripture For which reasen it is that St. Paul puts Dissentions and Emulations among the Works of the Flesh. So that it is a no less carnal Lust to desire Glory and Reputation and all that serves in order to it than to desire the Pleasures of the Body because these Objects are no more our true good than the other God does no more permit that we should part our Love between him and Reputation between him and the 〈◊〉 of Men than between him and feasting and other Bodily Pleasures For 't is always the Division of a thing which was all due to him 'T is always a Debasement of the Soul which being made for Good stoops beneath and degrades her self in being willing to enjoy a Creature either equal or inferiour to her self God is great enough to be the only and intire Object of our Heart and 't is to injure him to divide it because 't is in effect to declare to him that he does not deserve it all You see here is the Judgment of a whole Society of great Men no less than the illustrious Port Royal of France in as clear and express Terms as can be to our purpose 'T were infinite to appeal to all those Writers who have either directly asserted this Conclusion or occasionally let fall Expressions that favour and insinuate it There is hardly a Book of Morality or Devotion extant whererein Passages of this Nature are not to be found I do not say there are many that offer to deduce this Conclusion from Principles but that it is generally held and upon all Occasions alluded to and glanced at which is enough to shew the irresistible Prevalency of the Truth and to skreen them from the prejudice and imputation of Novelty and Singularity who undertake upon a rational Ground to clear and defend it ERRATA PAge 44. Line 7. dele ◠l. 8. read from enjoying pleasures that do very much out-weigh it and is it self an Occasion and Medium to p. 49. l. 9. after pretend add 〈◊〉 p. 50. l. 6. f. that r. than p. 180. l. 15. d. that p. 192. 1. 6. f. the r. this p. 286. l. 5. r. pleases LETTERS Philosophical and Divine TO Mr. IOHN NORRIS With his Answers LETTER 1. To Mr. Norris SIR THough some morose Gentlemen wou'd perhaps remit me to the Distaff or the Kitchin or at least to the Glass and the Needle the proper Employments as they fancy of a Womans Life yet expecting better things from the more Equitable and ingenious Mr. Norris who is not so narrow-Soul'd as to confine Learning to his own Sex or to envy it in ours I presume to beg his Attention a little to the Impertinencies of a Womans Pen. And indeed Sir there is some reason why I though a Stranger should Address to you for the Resolution of my Doubts and Information of my Judgment since you have increased my Natural Thirst for Truth and set me up for a Virtuso For though I can't pretend to a Multitude of Books Variety of Languages the Advantages of Academical Education or any Helps but what my own Curiosity afford yet Thinking is a Stock that no Rational Creature can want if they know but how to use it and this as you have taught me with Purity and Prayer which I wish were as much practis'd as they are easie to practise is the way and method to true Knowledge But setting Preface and Apology aside the occasion of giving you this trouble is this Reading the other day the Third Volume of your excellent Discourses as I do every thing you Write with great Pleasure and no less Advantage yet taking the liberty that I use with other Books and yours or no bodies will bear it to raise all the Objections that ever I can and to make them undergo the severest Test my Thoughts can put 'em to before they pass for currant a difficulty arose which without your assistance I know not how to solve Methinks there is all the reason in the World to conclude That GOD is the only efficient Cause of all our Sensations and you have made it as clear as the Day and it is equally clear from the Letter of the Commandment That GOD is not only the Principal but the sole Object of our Love But the reason you assign for it namely Because he is the only efficient Cause of our Pleasure seems not equally clear For if we must Love nothing but what is Lovely and nothing is Lovely but what is our Good and nothing is our Good but what does us Good and nothing does us Good but what causes Pleasure in us may we not by the same way of arguing say That that which Causes Pain in us does not do us Good for nothing you say does us Good but what Causes Pleasure and therefore can't be our Good and if not our Good then not Lovely and consequently not the proper much less the only Object of our Love Again if the Author of our Pleasure be upon that account the only Object of our Love then by the same reason the Author of our Pain can't be the Object of our Love and if both these Sensations be produced by the same Cause then that Cause is at once the Object of our Love and of our Aversion for it is as natural to avoid and fly from Pain as it is to follow and pursue Pleasure So that if these Principles viz. That GOD is the Efficient Cause of our Sensations Pain as well as Pleasure and that he is the only Object of our Love be firm and true as I believe they are it will then follow either that the being the Cause of our Pleasure is not the true and proper Reason why that Cause should be the Object of our Love for the Author of our Pain has as good a Title to our Love as the Author of our Pleasure Or else if nothing be the Object of our Love but what does us Good then something else does us Good besides what causes Pleasure Or to speak more properly the Cause of all our Sensations Pain as well as Pleasure being the only Object of our Love and nothing being Lovely but what does us Good consequently that which Causes Pain does us Good as well as that which Causes Pleasure and therefore it can't be true That nothing does us Good but what Causes Pleasure Perhaps I have express'd my self but crudely yet I am persuaded I 've said enough for one of your Quickness to find out either the strength or weakness of this Objection I shall not therefore trouble you any further but to beg Pardon for this and to wish you all imaginable Happiness if it be not absurd to wish Felicity to one who
Object of our Love True it is not so far as it causes Pain for the causing of Pain as such can be no reason of Love But I suppose your meaning is whether we may not by the same way of arguing prove that what causes Pain is not at all the Object of Love To which I Answer That if that which causes Pain does it in all respects after the same manner as it causes Pleasure the causing of Pain will for ought I can at present see to the contrary be as good an Argument for its not being to be lov'd as its causing Pleasure is for its being to be loved But thus it is not in the present Supposition Though I acknowledge Pain to be as truly the Effect of GOD as Pleasure for I know not what else shou'd cause it yet it is not after the same manner the Effect of GOD as Pleasure is Pleasure is the natural genuine and direct Effect of GOD but Pain comes from him only indirectly and by Accident For first 't is of the proper Nature of GOD to produce Pleasure as consisting of such essential Excellencies and Perfections as will necessarily beatifie and make happy those Spirits who are by being in their true rational Order duly dispos'd for the Enjoyment of him But if this same excellent Nature occasion Pain to other Spirits this is only indirectly and by Accident by reason of their Moral Indisposition for so Sovereign a Good Again as 't is thus in Reference to the Nature of GOD so in Reference to his Will GOD's antecedent and primary Design is the Happiness of all his Creatures for 't was for this that he made them but if any of them in the event prove miserable 't is wholly besides his first Design and only by a subsequent and secondary Will Again when GOD causes Pleasure 't is because he wills it for its self and naturally delights in it as comporting with his primary Design which is the Happiness of his Creatures but when he causes Pain 't is not that he wills it from within or for it self for so 't is not at all lovely but only from without and for the sake of something else as it is necessary to the Order of his Justice For you are to consider that if there had been no Sin there wou'd never have been such a thing as Pain which is a plain Argument that GOD wills our Pleasure as we are Creatures and our Pain only as we are Sinners But now in measuring our Devoirs to GOD we are not to consider how he stands affected to us as sinners but how he stands affected to us as Creatures how he is disposed towards us as we are his Work and not as we have made our selves And therefore if as Creatures he Loves us and Wills our Happiness that lays a sufficient Foundation for our Love to him and 't is not his treating us with Evil as sinners that can overturn it Indeed if GOD had designed us for misery and inflicted it upon us as Creatures if this had been his primary and direct Intention his Natural and Original Will according to the systeme of those who say That GOD made Man on purpose to Damn them then indeed I see nothing that should hinder your Objection from taking place GOD would not then be the proper much less as you say the only Object of our Love at least as to those miserable Wretches so destin'd to Ruin which by the way is to me a Demonstration of the falshood of that strange Hypothesis But upon the supposition that GOD wills and causes Pleasure in us as Creatures and puts us to Pain only as Sinners there will not be the same reason for our not loving him upon the account of his being the Author of our Pain as for our loving him as the Author of our Pleasure and Happiness For we stand obliged to GOD as we are Creatures and if in that Relation GOD be our Benefactor and the Author of our good he has a sufficient Right and if the only Author the only Right to our Love though as sinners he puts us to pain which being thus will'd and effected by GOD after a manner so different from our pleasure cannot so well conclude for our not loving him as this does for our loving him Which may serve to take off the force of your first Instance And will be equally applicable to your second For whereas you further urge that if both these Sensations viz. Pleasure and Pain be produced by the same Cause then that Cause is at once the Object of our Love and of our Aversion I answer by the same Distinction that if both these Sensations were to be produc'd by the same Cause acting alike in the one as in the other it would be as you say But since it is otherwise as I have represented it all that you can argue from GOD's being the Author of our Pain as well as Pleasure will be this That he is justly to be the Object of our Fear but not of our Aversion We are indeed to Fear him and him only as being the true Cause of all Pain and only able to make us miserable according to that of our Saviour I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear c. But this is no reason why we should hate him as never inflicting it but when Order and Justice require it And if he did not inflict it then he would be less perfect and consequently less amiable in the view of all regular and well-order'd Spirits I shall not determine any thing concerning the Case of the Damn'd whether that invincible Love which they have for Happiness may not inspire them with an invincible hatred against him who is the Cause of their Misery Perhaps it may be so Though whether it should be so and whether they do not sin Eternally in so doing is another Question But I shall determine nothing here thinking it sufficient for my present purpose that this is no reason why GOD should be the Object of any Mans Aversion in this Life whom as the Author of Pain we are indeed to Fear but not to Hate for the reasons before alledged Now as to your last Instance That if these Principles viz. That GOD is the Efficient Cause of our Sensations Pain as well as Pleasure and that he is to be the only Object of our Love be firm and true it will then follow either that the being the Cause of our Pleasure the doing us good you should say to make a right Antithesis is not the true and proper reason why that Cause should be the Object of our Love or else if it be then something else does us Good besides that which causes our Pleasure or as you otherwise word it That which causes Pain does us good as well as that which produces Pleasure I think neither of these Consequences need be admitted Not the First because I have shewn you That God's being the Cause of our Pleasure is a sufficient and proper reason why he should be the Object of our Love notwithstanding that Pain which
is also but after a different manner caus'd by him As to what you suggest to the contrary namely That the Author of our Pain has as good a Title to our Love as the Author of our Pleasure 'T is true he that is the Author of our Pain has as good a Title to it as the Author of our Pleasure because they are both one and the same but not as he is the Author of our Pain He has a Title to our Love not for that but notwithstanding that 'T is his being the cause of our Pleasure that makes him the proper Object of our Love which he is notwithstanding his being also the Author of Pain But then say you if his doing us good be the reason of his being the Object of our Love then something else does us good besides that which causes our Pleasure namely Pain the Cause of our Sensations Pain as well as Pleasure being the Object of our Love I answer Pain may in some sense be said to do us good as it may occasion to us some good that exceeds its own proper Evil. But formally and directly it does not do us good as not making us while actually under it Happy but Miserable Nor is there need that upon our Supposition it should God being sufficiently lovely to us as the Author of our Pleasure to which we need not add the advantage that may accrue by Pain or suppose Pain to be in it self as Beneficial as Pleasure 't is enough if the Evil of the former does not frustrate the Obligation that arises from the good of the latter As I have shewn you that it does not But after all Madam there is one thing I must further offer to your Consideration viz. That your Objection whatever force it may have is not peculiarly levell'd against me but lies equally against all those who make the loveliness of God to consist in his Relative Goodness or in his being our Good who I think are the most at least the most considerable Those of the common way say God is to be lov'd because he is our Good or the Author of our Good which Notion I think right but only add to it That he is the only Author of our Good and therefore the only Object of our Love In which Argument I suppose these Men would not deny the Consequence as being the same with their own but only the minor Proposition But now if it be an Objection against my Notion That God is also the Author of Evil then the same will no less conclude against the common way proving as much that God ought not to be lov'd at all as that he ought not to be lovd only I say it proves one as well as the other though I think if you will attend to what I have offer'd you will find that it proves neither Madam I have said all that at present occurs to my Thoughts upon this occasion and I think as much as is necessary and have now only to thank you for the great Favour of your Letter assuring you that whenever you shall be pleas'd to do me that Honour again you shall have a speedier Answer from Madam Your very humble Servant J. NORRIS Bemerton Oct. 13. 1693. Postscript ONE consideration more When you speak of GOD's being the cause of Pain either you mean as to this Life or as to the next If as to the next that has nothing to do with the Duty that we owe him here If as to the present Life the pain that God inflicts upon us here is only Medicinal and in order to our greater good and consequently from a Principle of Kindness And I think setting aside my other Considerations there will be no more pretence for not loving or hating God for this than for hating our Physitian or Surgeon for putting us to pain in order to our Health or Cure LETTER III. To Mr. Norris SIR YOU see how greedily I embrace the advantageous Offer you made me in the Close of your excellent Letter for which I would return some Acknowledgments but that I want Expressions suitable to its Value and my Resentments Nor is there any thing in it from which I can with-hold my Assent but that too favourable Opinion you seem to have conceiv'd of a Person who has nothing considerable in her but an honest Heart and a Love to Truth I am therefore exceeding glad to find this noble and necessary Theory That God is the sole Object of our Love so well establish'd And though any one of the three Principles you argue from in your Printed Discourse is a sufficient ground for that Conclusion though it may be singly infer'd both from God's being the Author of our Love and from the Obligation we are under of conforming to his Will as well as from his being the true Cause of our Pleasure yet joyntly they are irrefragable and I have nothing more left to wish but that it were as easie to perswade Men to fix the whole weight of their Desire on their Maker as it is to Demonstrate that they ought to do it For when all is said and all conclusions are tried there is no rest no satisfaction for the Soul of Man but in her God she can never be at Ease nor in Pleasure but when she moves with her full bent and inclination directly towards him and absolutely and entirely depends on him Yet I am very well pleas'd that I made the Objection which you have so well resolv'd because it has procur'd me a clear and accurate account of what before I had only in confuse and indistinct Notion and has begun a Correspondence which if it may be continued I shall reckon the greatest advantage that can befall me For though by observing the Rules you have already enrich'd the World with I may possibly find out Truth yet I can't be assur'd I 've done so being too apt to suspect my own Notions merely for being my own but if they can pass so exact a Touchstone as your Judgment I shall without hesitancy subscribe to them So far am I from thinking that GOD's being the Author of our Pain is any just Impediment to our entire Love of him that I 'm almost perswaded to rank it among the Motives to it For though Pain considered abstractedly is not a Good yet it may be so circumstantiated and always is when GOD inflicts it as to be a Good To the pious Man it is so both intentionally and eventually and though inflicted as a Punishment on wicked Men it is however materially good being as you observe an Act of GOD's Justice And I think it is an unquestionable Maxim that all our Good is wholly and absolutely from GOD and all our Evil purely and intirely from our selves Whatever Methods GOD uses to draw us to himself I am fully perswaded are good in themselves and good for us
purely and intirely from our selves The former Part of this I absolutely allow and contend for concerning the latter I distinguish when you say that all our Evil is purely and intirely from our selves if you mean of moral Evil I grant it but if you mean of natural Evils then I must distinguish again upon the Words from our selves which may signifie either a physical or moral or if you will an efficient or a meritorious Causality We are certainly the meritorious Causes of all our natural Evils as bringing them upon us by our Sins but that we are the efficient Causes of any of them I deny As all our good is wholly from GOD so in this Sense is also our evil We have not the Power to modifie our own Souls and can no more raise the Sensation of Pain in them than that of Pleasure GOD is the true Author of both as I have elsewhere shewn You say again that Afflictions are not evil but good to which I return that they are both in different Respects They are certainly evil in their own formal Nature and simply in themselves considered and can be good only occasionally or consequentially as they may serve as Means to some greater Good And this I think may serve to reconcile the Goodness of Pain to that Assertion of mine that nothing does us good but what causes Pleasure that is either formally and directly or occasionally and consequentially some Way or other whatever does us good must be supposed to cause Pleasure to us Now though Pain cannot cause Pleasure formally as being a Sensation formally distinct from it yet it may occasionally and consequentially and so may come within the Inclosure of those things that do us good You think fit to confine my Sense of the Word Pleasure to such only as are truly agreeable to the Nature of Man by which I suppose you mean those Pleasures which are called rational and Intellectual To this I reply that it seems to me very evident and I think I have elsewhere made it so that GOD is the true Cause of all the Pleasure that is resented by Man But you say you know not how it can consist with the Purity of the most holy GOD that he should be the Author of those pleasing Sensations which wicked Men feel in what we call sinful Pleasures But 't is your Mistake to suppose that sensual Pleasures as such are evil or that there is any such thing as a sinful Pleasure properly speaking As Sin cannot be formally pleasant so neither can Pleasure be formally sinful All Pleasure in it self is simply good as being a real Modification of the Soul 't is the circumstantiating of it that is the Evil. And of this GOD is not the Cause but the Sinner who rather than forego such an agreeable Sensation will enjoy it in such a Manner and in such Circumstances as are not for his own or for the common Good and therefore unlawful But concerning this matter you may further satisfie your self out of the Letters between Dr. More and Me and by reading the first and second Illustration M. Malebranch makes upon his De la Recharche de la Verite Where he shews you that GOD does all that is real in the Motions of the Mind and in the Determinations of those Motions without being the Author of Sin There are two other Passages in your Letter which I know not how to assent to till I better comprehend them One is that mental Pain is the same with Sin the other is that Sin is the only true Evil of Man I cannot stay long upon these but as to the first besides that Sin is an Act and Pain a Passion of the Soul and that Pain is a real Modification of our Spirit whereas Sin in its Formality is not any thing positive but a mere Privation I say besides this if mental Pain be the same with Sin how shall we distinguish Sin from the Punishment of it And how shall a Man repent for his Sin For if mental Pain be the same with Sin then to be sorry for one Sin will be to commit another Then as to the other Part that Sin is the only evil of Man I grant it is the greatest but I cannot think it the only one for besides that mental Pain is as I have shewn an Evil distinct from it there is also a thing call'd Bodily Pain which I have also shewn to be an Evil. Now Madam as to what you request of me in the Conclusion of your Letter if you think that distinction of mine of seeking Creatures for our good but not loving them as our good too nice I further illustrate it thus you are to distinguish between the Movements of the Soul and those of the Body the Movements of the Soul ought not to tend but towards him who only is above her and only able to act in her But the Movements of the Body may be determined by those Objects which environ it and so by those Movements we may unite our selves to those things which are the natural or occasional Causes of our Pleasure Thus because we find Pleasure from the Fire this is Warrant enough to approach it by a Bodily Movement but we must not therefore love it For Love is a Movement of the Soul and that we are to reserve for him who is the true Cause of that Pleasure which we resent by Occasion of the Fire who as I have proved is no other than GOD. By which you may plainly perceive what 't is I mean by saying that Creatures may be sought for our good but not loved as our Good But after all I must needs acknowledge that this as all our other Duties is more intelligible than practicable though to render it so I know no other Way than by long and constant Meditation to free our Minds of that early Prejudice that sensible Objects do act upon our Spirits and are the Causes of our Sensations carefully to distinguish between an efficient Cause strictly so called and an Occasion to attribute to GOD and the Creature their proper Parts in the Production of our Pleasures to bring our selves to a clear Perception and habitual Remembrance of this grand Truth the Foundation of all Morality that GOD only is the true Cause of all our Good which when fully convinced of we shall no longer question whether he ought to be the only Object of our Love I am Madam With great Respect Your humble Servant J. NORRIS Bemerton Nov. 13. 1693. If you are satisfied thus far I would desire you to go on to communicate what other Thoughts you have concerning the Love of GOD for 't is a Subject I like and would willingly pursue to the utmost LETTER V. To Mr. Norris SIR SO candid and condiscending a Treatment of a Stranger a Woman and so inconsiderable an one as my self shews you to be as much above the Generality of the World in your Practice as you are in your Theory and
Speculation Hitherto I have courted Truth with a kind of Romantick Passion in spite of all Difficulties and Discouragements for knowledge is thought so unnecessary an Accomplishment for a Woman that few will give themselves the Trouble to assist them in the Attainment of it Not considering that the meliorating of one single Soul is an Employment more worthy of a wife Man than most of those things to which Custom appropriates the Name of Business and Affairs But now since you have so generously put into my Hand an Opportunity of obtaining what I so greedily long after that I may make the best Improvement of so great an Advantage I give up my self entirely to your Conduct so far as is consistent with a rational not blind Obedience bring a free and unprejudiced Mind to receive from your Hand such Gravings and Impressions as shall seem most convenient and though I can't engage for a prompt and comprehensive Genius yet I will for a docible Temper The Esteem I have for those necessary and useful Rules you have already prescribed shall appear by my strict Observation of them For indeed the Span of Life is too short to be trifled away in unconcerning and unprofitable Matters and that Soul who has any Sense of a better Life can't chuse but desire that every Minute of her Time may be employed in the regulating of her Will with the most critical Exactness and the extending her Understanding to its utmost Stretch that so she may obtain the most enlarg'd Knowledge and ample Fruition of GOD her only Good that her Nature is capable of I will therefore pass on to explain a little what I asserted in my last next add a few Thoughts concerning Divine Love and in the last place a Proposal or two for the better Prosecution of those you have already made Now in order to the first I am very well satisfied that GOD is the Cause of Mental as well as Bodily Pain if by mental Pain you understand Grief my Mistake lying in this that I confounded Sin and mental Pain 'T is indeed evident that Sin and Grief are two distinct things yet I cannot form to my self any Idea of Sin which does not include in it the greatest Pain and Misery For as Sin is the meritorious Cause of all Misery so it seems to me that the Punishment of Sin is concomitant to the Act Misery is inseparable from Sin and the Sinner is ipso facto punished When therefore I said that mental Pain is the same with Sin I meant no more than this that as a musical Instrument if it were capable of Sense and Thought wou'd be uneasie and in pain when harsh discordant Notes are plaid upon it so Man when he breaks the Law of his Nature and runs counter to those Motions his Maker has assign'd him when he contradicts the Order and End of his Being must needs be in Pain and Misery And as the Health and Perfection Ease and Pleasure Good and Happiness or whatever you will call it of a Creature consists in its Conformity to the End of its Creation and the being in such Circumstances as are agreeable to its Nature from which when in the least it deviates it loses both its Beauty and its Pleasure so the Soul of Man being made on purpose for the Contemplation and Love of GOD whensoever it ceases to pursue that End must needs be put out of the Order of its Nature and consequently depriv'd of all Pleasure and Perfection whilst it stands rightly affected towards GOD it cannot be destitute of Pleasure but whatsoever sets it in Opposition to him does by that Act deprive it of all Delight So that my Hypothesis will lie thus That although GOD only has Power to modifie the Soul of Man and to affect it with Pain and Grief yet since these are rather Uneasinesses than Evils strictly so call'd nothing according to my Notion being the proper Evil of Man but Sin of which more anon since they are design'd by GOD as Mediums to good and are if not formally yet at least consequentially Occasions of Pleasure since the wilful and affected Ignorance of the Understanding and Pravity of the Will or in other Words Sin is the true and proper Evil of a Man because Sin only is absolutely and directly opposite to the Essence of Goodness and seeing GOD can no way be said to be the Author of Sin consequently his being the Cause of our uneasie Sensations can be no just Bar to our Love much less any Motive to our Aversion As for the Distinction of the Soul into inferiour and superiour Part I am as little satisfied with it as you can be and do confess to you ingeniously that I have no clear Idea of that which is properly my self nor do I well know how to distinguish its Powers and Operations For the usual Accounts that are given of the Soul are very unsatisfactory that in your Letter being the best I have met with and therefore for want of better Expressions I made use of this Distinction which I did the more readily because I learned it from your Christian Blessedness P. 158. All the remaining Difference therefore lies in this Question whether Sin be the only Evil And in order to the removing it I shall first shew you my Design in affirming that it is and then the Reasons that incline me to it and when I have done so I will refer all to your better Judgment First for what I aim at I have observ'd that most of the Folly and Mischief that is in the World proceeds from false Notions of Pain and Pleasure and Mistakes concerning the Nature of good and evil For would Men be perswaded that GOD is their only good so they might enjoy him they would not much regret the Absence of other things neither would they so greedily pursue the Shell of Pleasure nor fix their Hearts on sensible Objects which can never satisfie And were they but convinced that nothing is so evil as Sin they would not choose Iniquity rather than Affliction As therefore your Account of Pleasure does rectifie the Errors of our Love so I could wish that our Aversions were better regulated than they usually are and that Sin which though it be not the efficient is yet the moral Cause of all our Evils and Displeasures were so represented as that it might appear the only proper and adequate Object of our intire Hatred and Aversion This is my Design Now for the Reasons besides what are already intimated which incline me to think that Sin is the only Evil. I grant that whatever is contrary to the Pleasure and Good of Man in any of his Capacities may in some Sense be call'd an Evil and in this Latitude no doubt but that both mental and sensible Pain are Evils But because when we speak of Evil we usually understand something that in its own Nature is the proper Object of our Aversion evil as evil being no way eligible and
Power to act upon our Spirits and to give them new Modification I say Modifications for that well expresses the general Nature of Sensation And it is a new Modification or different Way of existing of the Soul that makes this or that Sensation which is not any thing really distinct from the Soul but the Soul it self existing after such a certain Manner Wherein it is distinguished from our Idea's which are representative to us of something without us whereas our Sensations are within us and indeed no otherwise distinct from us than Modalities are for the thing modified Accordingly there is a vast Difference between knowing by Sentiment and knowing by Idea We know Numbers Extension and Geometrick Figures by Idea but we know Pleasure and Pain Heat and Colour c. by interior Sentiment To know Numbers and Figures there is need of Ideas for without an Idea the Soul can have no Perception of any thing distinct from it self as Numbers and Figures are But to know or perceive Grief there is no need of an Idea to represent it A Modality of the Soul is sufficient it being certain that Grief is no other than a Modification of the Soul who when in Grief does not perceive it as a thing without and distinct from her self as when she contemplates a Square or a Triangle but as a different Manner of her own Existence Sensation then being a Modification of the Soul this single Consideration setting aside all other Discoursings will furnish us with a demonstrative Argument to prove that not Bodies but GOD alone is the Cause of our Sensations For who else should either have Power or Knowledge to new modifie our Beings but he who made them and perfectly understands them But I shall not enter upon a further Demonstration of this Point since I have abundantly proved it in my printed Discourse of the Love of GOD and since you do as good as allow it in your present Objection This therefore appearing to be a clear and certain Truth give me leave again to remind you of a certain Maxim that I observed to you in my first Letter That we are to stick to what we clearly see notwithstanding any Objections that may be brought against it and not reject what is evident for the sake of what is obscure Supposing therefore that there are or might be Objections raised to shew that GOD is not the Cause of our Sensations which I could not answer yet since my Reason as often as I consult her does most convincingly assure me that he is I ought to rest here and not suffer that which I do not perceive to hinder me from assenting to that which I evidently do But to consider your Objections I observe in the first place that having granted that sensation is only in the soul that there is nothing in Body but Magnitude Figure and Motion and that being without Thought it self it is not able to produce it in us and therefore those sensations whether of Pleasure or Pain which we feel at the Presence of Bodies must be produced by some higher Cause than they all which well agrees with the Conclusion I contend for you afterterwards object against their being only Conditions serving to determine the Action of the true and proper Cause which Objection seems to come a little unexpectedly after such a Concession For if they are not true and proper Causes of our sensations what else can they be but Conditions serving to determine the Agency of him who is so Yes you seem to point out a middle Way by supposing that as they are not so much as proper Causes so they are more than mere Conditions viz. That they have a natural Efficacy towards the Production of our Sensations But if I am not mightily mistaken this middle Way will fall in with one of the Extreams For to have a natural Efficacy for the Production of a thing is the same as to have a Causality and that again is the same as to be at least a partial Cause If therefore the Objects of our Senses be not true and proper Causes of our Sensations then neither have they any natural Efficacy towards the Production of them But if they have any such natural Efficacy then they are true and proper Causes which though it be a Proposition which you formally and expresly deny is that however which your Objection in the true Consequence and Result of it tends to prove And to prove this That Bodies have a natural Efficacy towards the Production of our Sensations or that they are true Causes of them for I take them to be Propositions of an equivalent Import you argue from a twofold Topick first That the contrary Theory renders a great Part of GOD's Workmanship vain and useless Secondly That it does not well comport with his Majesty Now to set you right in this matter and to acquit our Theory from both these very threatning Inconveniences we need only fairly propose it The Case then is this GOD has united my Soul to a certain Portion of organized Matter which therefore for the particular Relation it has to me I call my Body This Body of mine is placed among and surrounded with a vast Number and Variety of other Bodies These other Bodies according to the Laws of Motion established in the World strike variously upon mine and make different Impressions upon it according to the Degree of their Motion and the Difference of their Size and Figure These Impressions have a different Effect upon my Body some of them tending to the Good and Preservation and some to the Evil and Dissolution of its Structure and Mechanism even as in the greater World some Motions tend to the Generation and Perfection and others to the Corruption and Destruction of natural Bodies Now though it be not necessary that my Soul should know what is done to other Bodies yet for the good of the animal Life it is very necessary she should know what passes in her own whether such or such Impressions make for its good or hurt Now there are but two Ways for this Light and Sentiment My Soul must know this either by considering and examining the Nature of other Bodies the inward Configuration of their Parts the Difference of their Bulk and external Figure the Degree of their Motion and withal the Relation that all these bear to the Configuration of her own Body or by having some different Sentiment raised in her according to the Difference of the Impression or in clearer Terms by being differently modified her self according as the Modification of her Body is altered by the Incursion of other Bodies The first of these Ways besides that it would employ and ingage the Soul which was made for the Contemplation and Love of GOD her true and only good in things altogether unworthy of her Application is withal considering the Narrowness of our Faculties and the frequent Return of such Occasions not only infinitely tedious painful and distracting but
of a Physical Efficiency towards the Production of them No not so much as by way of Instruments For even Instruments belong to the Order of efficient Causes though they are less principal ones and 't is most certain that GOD has no need of any since his Will is efficacious of it self If therefore this be meant by sensible Congruity that the Objects of our senses have any real Part or Share in the Production of our sensations though it be only in an instrumental Way I utterly disclaim it as an absurd and unphilosophical Prejudice and that without any Danger of rendring the Workmanship of GOD vain or unnecessary that Inconvenience being sufficiently salved by the first kind of sensible Congruity as you may easily perceive This Madam I think gives full Satisfaction to your first Instance As to your second That it seems more agreeable to the Majesty of GOD to say that he produces our sensations mediately by his servant Nature than to affirm that he does it immediately by his own Almighty Power I reply briefly First That Arguments from the Majesty of GOD signifie no more here against GOD's being the immediate Author of our sensations than in the old Epicurean Objection against Providence And indeed they seem both to be built upon the same popular Prejudice and wrong Apprehension concerning the Nature of the Deity as if it were a Trouble to him to concern himself with his Creation If it were not beneath the Grandeur and Majesty of GOD to create the World immediately neither is it so to govern it and if his greatness will permit him to order and direct the Motions of Matter much more will it to act upon and give sentiments to our Spirits though with his own immediate Hand which is necessary to hold and govern the World which it has made For after all secondly we have no reason to think it beneath the Majesty of GOD to do that himself which can be done by none but himself Which as I have sufficiently shewn to be the Case in reference to our Sensations so I doubt not but that if you carefully read over Mr. Malebranch Touchant l' efficace attribuèe aux Causes Seconds you will find to hold as true as to all things else I mean that GOD is the only true efficient Cause and that his Servant Nature is but a mere Chimera As to what you say lastly That the Supposition of Bodies having an immediate Causality in the Production of our Sensations will be no Prejudice to the Drift of my Discourse the intire Love of GOD because of the mechanical and involuntary Way of their Operation I do not know whether this Supposition will be so harmless or no. But this I am sure of that the safest Way to bar the Creatures from all Pretensions to my Love is to deny that I have any of my Sensations from them or that I am beholden to them for the lest Melioration or Perfection of my Being And besides if we should once allow them in a true and Physical Sense to cause our Sensations I am inclined to think that this may justly be used as an Argument a Posteriori to prove that they do not do it so mechanically and involuntarily as you represent it but rather knowingly and designedly since it is impossible that any thing but a thinking Principle should be productive of any Thought as all Sensation certainly is And thus Madam I have endeavoured to give you the best Satisfaction I can upon this great and noble but much neglected Argument and shall think my self very happy and sufficiently rewarded if by the Pains I have bestowed I may deserve the Title of Madam Your sincere Friend and humble Servant J. NORRIS Bemerton Sept. 21. FINIS Books printed for S. Manship at the Ship near the Royal Exchange in Cornhil MR. Norris's Collection of Miscellanies in large 8 o. His Reason and Religion The 2d Edition in 8 o. His Theory and Regulation of Love The 2d Edit in 8 o. His Reflections upon the Conduct of Humane Life The 2d Edition in 8 o. His Practical Discourses upon the Beatitudes of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Vol. I. The 3d. Edit in 8 o. His Practical Discourses upon several Divine Subjects Vol. II. The 2. Edit in 8 o. His Practical Discourses upon several Divine Subjects Vol. III. in 8 o. His Charge of Schism continued In 12 o. His Two Treatises concerning the Divine Light in 8 o. His Spiritual Conusel or Father's Advice to his Children in 12 o. Books sold by R. VVilkin at the King's Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard A Proposal to the Ladies for the Advancement of their true and greatest Interest By a Lover of her Sex in 12 o. Dr. Abbadie's Vindication of the Christian Religion 8 o. Mr. Edwards's farther Enquiry into several remarkable Texts of Scripture the 2d Edit 8 o. His Discourse concerning the Authority Stile and Perfection of the Books of the Old and New Testament 8 o. Bishop Patrick's glorious Epiphany 8 o. His Search the Scriptures 12 o. His Discourse concerning Prayer 12 o. Dr Goodman's Old Religion 12 o. * The Reader is desired to take Notice that no more is meant by these Phrases than that Sin in its own Nature or Formality is entirely evil it has neither Form nor Beauty that we should desire it can never be ordinable to a good End is none of GOD's Creatures and therefore has not any the least Degree of Goodness in it is neither eligible for its own sake nor upon any other Account whatsoever * The Reader is desired to take Notice that no more is meant by these Phrases than that Sin in its own Nature or Formality is entirely evil it has neither Form nor Beauty that we should desire it can never be ordinable to a good End is none of GOD's Creatures and therefore has not any the least Degree of Goodness in it is neither eligible for its own sake nor upon any other Account whatsoever