Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	call_v	law_n	nature_n	1,559	5	5.5282	4	false

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A61544	A discourse concerning the illegality of the late ecclesiastical commission in answer to the vindication and defence of it : wherein the true notion of the legal supremacy is cleared, and an account is given of the nature, original, and mischief of the dispensing power.	Stillingfleet, Edward, 1635-1699.	1689 (1689)	Wing S5581; ESTC R24628	67,006	76

and to bring an Account next Parliament ad quod praedictum Episcopum adjornavimus are the Words of the Writ And that the Business was heard in Parliament appears by the Records 31 E 1. The King seized on the Temporalities of the Bishop of Durham upon a Judgment given against him in Parliament for extending his Spiritual Jurisdiction too far as appears by the Record of the Concord made between the King and him In the Reign of King Edward the Second In the Reign of K. E. 2. nothing is produced but the Statute 9 E. 2. for Regulating the Proceedings between the Civil and Ecclesiastical Courts But how the Kings Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction is proved hereby is hard to understand It appears indeed that the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction is allowed and limited by Parliament But from hence saith he it follows that these Laws may be called the Kings Eccclesiastical Laws or the Ecclesiastical Laws of England There is no question but they may But there is a Difference between Laws so called by Acceptation and Allowance and such as have their whole Force and Authority from the King. For otherwise where the Popes Jurisdiction is owned and received the Pope must receive his Authority from the King. But a Liberty to exercise Authority and deriving Authority are two Things In the Reign of King Edward the Third In the Time of E. 3. many things are alledged and to more purpose but yet a short Answer will serve If the first Instance doth hold viz. That the Sentence of Excommunication by the Archbishop holds against the Sentence of the Pope or his Legate it only proves that the Eccesiastical Jurisdiction here by Law is in the Archbishop and not in the Pope or his Legate But there may be another Reason mentioned by Fitz Herbert viz. That the Certificate of the Archbishop might be more Authentick than the Seal of a Legate The second sixth and eighth only prove the King Supreme Patron and a Right of Patronage is distinct from a Right of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and so it was resolved in Grendon's Case Pl. f. 498. That the King presents by Lapse as Supreme Patron and not as Supreme Ordinary For this belongs to him as King the Land on which Churches are built being originally held of him And this Right the King enjoyed when the Pope was owned to be Supreme Ordinary But in the Case of his own free Chapels Fitz-Herbert saith right That in Case of Lapse by the Dean the King presents as Ordinary the Archbishop and Bishop having no Authority there as Ordinaries The third fourth and fifth are about Exemptions from Episcopal Jurisdictions granted by the King especially in his own free Chapels which are only visitable by Commission from the King. But this very Pretence of Exemptions from Episcopal Jurisdiction was founded upon the Belief of the Pope's being Supreme Ordinary for exempt Places were not supposed to be free from all Ordinary Jurisdiction but from that of Inferior Ordinaries being immediately subject to the Pope A Bishop by the Canon Law may grant an Exemption from his Right of Jurisdiction but not from his Right of Visitation but the Pope from both And in the Grant of Exemption the immediate Subjection to the Roman See is expressed As to the King 's free Chapels their Exemption was by an express Bull of Innocent III to King John and in the Case of the free Chapels of S. Martins Henry III granted a Prohibition wherein it is inserted That it was a free Chapel ab omni Jurisdictione Episcopali per Sedem Apostolicam exempta And 45 Hen. 3. in a Prohibition concerning the free Chapel of Wolverhampton the Grant of Innocent III is repeated The Right to extra-parochial Tithes is Provisional and not by way of Inheritance and so it may belong to the King although he have no Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction As to the severe Proceeding about Bulls from Rome I have given an Account of that already in E. 1. The anointing of Kings proves no more their Capacity of Spiritual Jurisdiction than it proves the Kings of Israel to have been High Priests There is no doubt the Ecclesiastical Courts may be limited by the Laws of the Land and there are some Causes which belong to them not originally of a Spiritual Nature but they have been a long time possessed of them by Custom and are allowed by Law which is well expressed in 24 Hen. 8. c. 12. where it is said That all Causes Testamentary Causes of Matrimony and Divorces Rights of Tithes Oblations and Obventions the Knowledge whereof by the Goodness of Princes of this Realm and by the Laws and Customs of the same appertaineth to the Spiritual Jurisdiction of this Realm shall be determined within the Kings Jurisdiction and Authority It doth not seem probable That the King by his own Authority would remove Secular Canons and put in Regular when Hoveden saith in the same Case H. 2. did it by the Pope's Authority and with the free Consent of the Parties The Statutes of Provisors were excellent Statutes but are said to be enacted for the Good and Tranquility of the Realm which no doubt the King and his Parliament were bound to take care of But they prove no more Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction than the Pragmatick Sanctions of Lewis IX and Charles VII in France did which were of the same nature The following Instances in other Reigns are many of them of the same kind with those already answered but what seems to have any new Force shall be considered In the Reign of King Henry the Fourth 2 H. 4. c. 15. is urged to prove That the King by consent of his Parliament did direct the Proceedings of the Spiritual Courts in Cases of Heresie and other Matters more Spiritual but it is evident by the Act it self That the Spiritual Jurisdiction was left wholly to the Ordinaries and only an Inforcement of it by the Civil Power was added by the Law then made for the Words are Whereas the Diocesans of the said Realm cannot by their Jurisdiction Spiritual without Aid of the said Royal Majesty sufficiently correct c. Therefore a Power to Imprison and Fine was given to the Ordinaries who might before have proceeded by Ecclesiastical Censures but these being contemned by them the Ordinaries called in the Assistance of the Civil Power If there had been a Power before to have proceeded against Hereticks by Common Law when convict by their Ordinaries I cannot see any Reason why that Law should be made In case of Apostacy i. e. Renouncing Christianity Bracton saith The Person convict is to be burned and he instanceth in the Deacon who turned Jew in the Council of Oxford And Fleta speaks only of Apostates whether Clerks or others and those are the Miscreants in Briton and in Horn Heresie was then the same with renouncing Baptism or turning Jew or Turk or using Sorcery but after Wickliff's Time the Ordinaries inlarged the Notion of Heresie and took

Person and this Royal Power cannot be restrained by any Act of Parliament neither in Thesi nor in Hypothesi but that the King by his Royal Power may dispense with it for upon the Commandment of the King and Obedience of the Subject does his Government consist as it is provided by the Statute of 23 H. 6. c. 8. That all Patents made or to be made of any Office of a Sheriff c. for Term of years or for Life in Fee-simple or in Tail are void and of none effect any Clause or Parol of Non-obstante put or to be put into such Patents to be made notwithstanding And further Whosoever shall take upon him or them to accept or occupy such Office of Sheriff by vertue of such Grants or Patents shall stand perpetually disabled to be or bear the Office of Sheriff within any County of England by the same Authority And notwithstanding that by this Act 1. The Patent is made void 2. The King is restrained to grant a Non-obstante 3. The Grantee disabled to take the Office yet the King by his Royal Sovereign Power of commanding may command by his Patent for such Causes as he in his Wisdom doth think meet and profitable for himself and the Commonwealth of which he himself is sole Judge to serve him and the Weal Publick as Sheriff for such a County for years or for Life c. And so was it resolved by all the Justices of England in the Exchequer Chamber ' 2 H. 7. Here the Point is resolved into an inseparable Prerogative in the King which no Act of Parliament can restrain although made with his own Consent Is there no Act of Parliament then which this great Lawyer will allow to restrain the King's Prerogative so as he cannot disperse with it What saith he to the Case of Buying Offices at Court Cannot the King by vertue of his Prerogative order his Houshold as he pleases to dispose of Offices about him as he thinks fit No. The same Lawyer saith That no Non obstante could dispense with the Act against buying of Offices And yet one would think that the King had as great a Prerogative in the Court as over the Kingdom But how comes he to say That the King can dispense notwithstanding the Disability when elsewhere he saith The King cannot dispense in the Case of a Disability by Law For the Reason he gives why the King cannot present a Man to a Living who is convict of Simony is because the Law hath disabled him Very well And yet in this Case although the Law hath disabled him the King may dispense Where are we now The King can dispense with a Disability and he cannot dispense with it This is indeed a very dark learning of Dispensations as C. Justice Vaughan well called it for we cannot yet find the way through it Can the King dispense with a Disability in Law or not If not the Case of Sheriffs is gone If he can then why not in the case of Symony Why not as to sitting in Parliament without taking the Oaths No here is a Disability in Law. What then Cannot the K. dispense with a Disability in one Case as well as the other Bu the same Person saith That in that Case because the Words amount to a Disability the King cannot dispense and here where the Disability is expressed he may But we are lately told there are two sorts of Disabilities one is actually incurred as that upon the Members who sit without taking the Oaths and the other is a Disability annexed to the Breach of a Law as a penalty and that penalty not to be incurred before a Legal Conviction and in this Case the King's Dispensation coming before the Conviction doth prevent it by making that lawful which would not have been so without it But when a Disability is actually-incurred it cannot be taken off but by Act of Parliament I Answer That if the Law which makes the Disability doth allow of a Dispensation antecedent to the Conviction then I grant that the Dispensation before Conviction prevents the Disability As in Digby's Case if the Dispensation had come before Institution the Disability as to holding the former Living had been prevented because the Law doth expresly allow of a Dispensation in the Case But here is no such thing The Act of Parliament supposes no Dispensation but makes an utter Disability as to the holding the Office in Sir Edward Hales his Case but a dispensing Power is set up against the Act of Parliament and such a Dispensation neither before nor after Conviction can prevent a Disability If it could I can by no means see why it might not as well hold as to Members of Parliament at least as to the Oath of Supremacy if they take their Dispensation before Sitting in the House For the Disability doth not take place till they enter the Parliament 5 Eliz. c. 1. And he that entreth the Parliament without taking the said Oath shall be deemed no Knight Citizen Burgess or Baron nor shall have any Voice but shall be as if he had been never Returned or Elected The Intention of the Law for the Test was a disability to hold the Office but it allows time for Persons to qualifie themselves as appears by the Act for the Test. Is not this plain overthrowing the design of the Law for Persons instead of doing what the Law requires to take out a Dispensation for not doing it and so prevent the Disability And what doth a Law signifie when the very design of it is overthrown And what is the Power of making Laws by common Consent in Parliament if without such Consent the whole force of the Law may be taken away by a dispensing Power So that this doth not meerly make Laws to signifie nothing but according to Will and Pleasure but it makes our very Constitution insignificant which requires to every Law the Consent of the People in Parliament As for Instance By the first Constitution of the Roman Government the King had the custody of the Laws but no Laws were to be made but by the Consent of the Roman People in the Curiae thence called Leges Curiatae Would any one have thought this any Privilege if after these Laws were passed the King should claim an inseparable Prerogative of dispensing with them as he sees Cause For it is implied in such a Fundamental Contract as this that Laws when made should not lose their Force without their Consent who made them Else it is not Contractus bonae Fidei I will not dispute whether this were the Original Contract of our Nation or not but this I may say That when our Government came to a Settlement after long struglings this was one of the Fundamental Articles of it That no Laws should pass or Burdens should be laid upon the People but by their own Consent in arliament Bracton saith That a Law among us supposes the Authority of