Cowards is a kindness to our Enemies it is manifest that Fortitude is a great good to our selves and our Country And in a word what our Enemies desire and rejoice at the contrary to that must be advantageous to us Therefore it was well said of the Poet. Sure Priam will rejoice However these are not always but for the most part good things since it may happen that sometimes the same things may be of advantage as well to our Adversaries as to us Whence it is said that Misery reconciles Men when the same thing is pernicious to both Also the Mean between both is good For that which is greater then it ought to be is bad and that for whose sake Men have endur'd many hard labours and wasted much Treasure for now it is a seeming Good and as such is look'd upon as the end and the end of many things but the end is good Whence that of Homer But Fame Indeed was only Priam's aim And that other of the same Poet. But Delay Will shame us if we longer stay With which the Proverb agrees There lies a Snake at the door Moreover what many Men covet and contend for is good for many are look'd upon as the generality and what they commend is fit to be commended For there is no Man will applaud that which is not good As also what our Enemies and wicked Men approve for indeed we may say that all men confess if the bad confess the same For because it is undeniable therefore it is confess'd on all hands as that they are bad whom our Friends discommend and that they are good of whom our Enemies speak no ill And therefore the Corinthians thought themselves affronted by Simonides for saying However Ilium does not Corinth blame Also the good opinion of wise and good Men or Women Thus Minerva preferr'd Vlysses Theseus Helena Alexander was preferr'd by the Goddesses and Achilles by Homer And in general whatever things are desirable before others Now Men chuse to act not only those things which have been already spoken of but to serve their Friends and mischief their Enemies and by such means asare possible Now Possibilities are two-fold such as may be done and such as may be easily done Facil things are such as may be done either without Pain or in a short time For facility is terminated either by Pain or length of time or if they be done according to their Wish but Men wish either for no Evil at all or for much leâ—s then the Good which may come to pass it either they can hide themselves from the Punishment or procure it to be small Also what a Man wishes of his own Election not made choice of by any Man else but beyond the common road Hence the more honour And what are agreeable to their Genius such are those things which are most suitable to their Fortunes or their Strength and what Men believe they are defective in tho little things for they chuse to act in those things to gain or recover Credit And what may be perform'd by any one All these things may be done as being easy And another may do those things which all or many like or lesâ—er have well done before And what will make us acceptable to our Friends and odious to our Enemies And what every one admires they chuâ—â— to act And those things wherein Men are ingenious and expert for such things they believe they shall more easily accomplish and such things as they desire for then the Pains is a Pleasure And which the wicked refuse to undertake for such acts are so much the more Praise-worthy And such things upon which Men have most singularly plac'd their affections As the Waâ—rior upon Victory the Ambitious upon Hoâ—oâ—â— the covetous Person upon Money and so of the rest And thus much concerning good and profitable CHAP. VII Of the greater and lesser NOW because they who grant both to be profitable cannot agree upon which is most profitable therefore we must say something of the greater good and of that which is most Profitable That which exceeds is therefore that which is so much and more The excess that which is within it and always greater and more in respect of the less but great or less many or fewer in the respect of the Magnitude of many And the excess is call'd great the defect little and so of many and few Since therefore we call Good that which is desirable for its own and not for the sake of another of which all the parts are coveted and which every Creature that has Sence and Understanding would covet and that which is the efficient and Preservative cause of all and upon which all things of that nature depend of which the why and the wherefore is the end and the end is for whose sake all the rest and this is good for this or that which is most appropriated to it of necessity the more must be the greater good then one or the lesser according to the number of the one and the lesser because it exceeds and what is contain'd within is exceeded For if the greatest be exceeded by the greatest those also must be exceeded by themselves and if the Kinds are thus exceeded by the Kinds the biggest by the biggest as if the biggest Men are bigger then the biggest Women Men are absolutely bigger then Women and if Men are absolutely bigger then Women the biggest Man is bigger then the biggest Women For the excess of the Kinds and of those things that are contain'd in the Kinds hold the same proportion one with another The same may be said when this follows from that but that does not follow from this Now that which follows follows either together or afterwards or potentially For the use of that which follows is in the other Now it follows together if a Man be in health that he lives but it does not follow that he is in health because he lives But Knowledg follows the being taught afterwards Potentially it follows that if a Man be a Sacrilegious Person that he may rob a Temple seeing a Sacrilegious Person will rob And they are greater that exceed the same thing in greatness for of necessity the greater must be exceeded The Effective causes also of the greater good are greater for by that means the Efficient cause became greater and in the same manner the effects of the greater cause must be greater For if wholesome be more to be desired and a greater Good then Pleasant Health is greater then Pleasure and that which is more desirable inits self then that which is not more to be desired in its self as Strength then Health For that is desirable for its own this not for its own sake which is the true condition of good Also if this be the End that not the End this is mâ—re to be desir'd than that for this is desir'd for that and that for its own sake as that the Body may be kept in
Disswasives are us'd in Defences Perswasives in Accusations This place is wholly attributed to Pamphilus and Callippus Another from those things which we see done yet are incredible because they would not seem to be unless they were nigh for men believe those things that are or which are probable Yet if credible nor probable it shall neither be true for it does not therefore seem to be true because probable or credible as when Androcles of Pythia sound fault with the Law and was exclam'd against when they heard him say The Laws want a Law to correct 'em he answer'd just as Fish want Salt And yet it is neither credible nor true that because they live in the Salt Sea that therefore they want Salt And Olives may be said to want Oyl And yet it is not credible that the fruit from which Oyl is press'd should want Oyl Another Argumentative concerning Repugnances either in time fact or words as thus He says he loves ye and yet conspir'd against ye with thirty men This separately as to the Adversarys Then again separately as to the Person himself He calls me litigiou yet cannot prove that ever I sued any man Then with reference tothe Adversary and himself This man never lent any Money but I have ransom'd many of yours Another from men and things of which there is a bad opinion conceiv'd which seems to speak the cause of the suspition For there is something to be said why it ought to seem so As when a certain Woman was accus'd because she kisâ—'d her Son she lay under a Suspition of lying with the young Man but the cause being explain'd the Accusation fell And as in Theodectes's Ajax says Vlysles against Ajax I am Stouter then Ajax yet it does not appear Another from the cause which if it be the thing is if there be no cause there is no such thing As Leodamas defending himself against the Accusation of Trasibulus that he was noted with Infamy when plac'd in the castle but had wip'd it off among the thirty Tyrants made answer that his Suspition did not hold For then the thirty Tyrants would have put a greater Confidence in him in regard of the hatred conceiv'd against him by the People Another place arises from a consideration whether it were possible or best which the Son advises does or has done for if they appear to be such it is apparent that he either advis'd or acted since no man willingly and knowingly advises or acts for the worst only he may be mistaken for many times it appears that a thing might have been better done Another is to consider something may be done contrary to what has been acted As Xenophanes answer'd the Tegeates who desir'd to know of him whether they should sacrifice to Leucothea and put on mourning If said he you think her a Goddess never mourn if a mortal never sacrifice Another to accuse or defend from things ill done As in the Medea of Carcinus These accuse Medea for killing her Childern because they do not appear For Medea was mistaken about the sending away her Sons but she defends her self that she had not kill'd her Sons but slain Jason For unless she had done that she had done amiss since she had done the other Another from the Name as Sophocles Well mayst thou steel be call'd thou bear'st the Name Thus Conon calls Thrasybulus bold Adviser Thus Herodicus speaking of Thrasymachus Thou art always Thrasymachus saith he or Bold in fight And of Polos thou art a true Polos or young Colt And of Draco's Laws that they were not the Laws of a Man but a Dragon in regard of their severity Or as Hecuba in Euripdies speaking of Venus Well does thy Name become thee Goddess of madness as thou art And as Cheremon was call'd Pentheus or the Mourner form his future Calamity Now Argumentative Enthymemes are more approv'd then demonstrative For a convincing Enthymene is a short Collection of contraries and those things which are couch'd close together are most apparent to the Auditor But of all Syllogisms as well for convincement as demonstration those are most troublesome that do not appear conspicuous at the beginning For men are pleas'd to find themselves able to fore-judg what the Orator will say and that they can understand him as soon as he has spoken CHAP. XXIV Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes NOW because it happens that this is a Syllogism and that is not but only in appearance of necessity sometimes this must be an Enthymem and that not but only seemingly so Therefore the first Place of seeming Enthymemes is in utterance And of this one part is when the Person does not conclude in a Syllogism but ends in something like it as it is not this or that therefore this or that For what is spok'n in Enthymemes collectively and by way of Opposition that appears to be an Enthymem And such an Enthymem seems to proceed from the Figure of Speech And therefore it is requisite to speak after a Syllogistical form to recite the heads of severly Syllogisms These he has sav'd others he has offer'd to his revenge but he has restor'd the Greeks to their Liberty For every one of these require a different demonstration but being conjoyn'd something appears to be made out of the whole The other part consists in the resemblance of names call'd Homonyma As if we would argue there is something of Excellency in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Mous from whence is deriv'd the most excellent of all Ceremonies For Religious Misteries are the most venerable of all Ceremonies Or if any one speaking in praise of a Dog should comprehend the Celestial Dog or of Pan because Pindarus thus speaks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Or to aver Mercury to be the most sociable of all the Gods because he is call'd sociable Mercury Another in speaking things disjunctive conjunctively and things conjoyn'd disjunctively For because it seems to be the same thing which is not the same thing therefore which is most profitable that is to be done And this is the Argument of Euthydemus As to know that there is a Gally in the Pyreum which every one knows and he that knows the Elements of Poetry knows there is verse and because twice as much is sickly therefore the single unsound For it is absurd to think that two things being good one of them should be evil and this Argument is convincing but thus demonstrative For it is impossible there should be two good things of which the one should be evil But this place is only for those that love Cavilling Again what Polycrates said of Thrasybulus that depos'd the thirty Tyrants which is Conjunctive But that of Orestes in Theodectes is disjunctive It is just that she should dye who kill'd her Mother but it is as just that the Son should revenge the Fathers death which being conjunctively spoken would perhaps be unjust Another place is to confirm or lessen
Exercise and by Exercise in Health And the less defective then the other or the others is most desirable as being more sufficient Now the lesser is defective in wanting fewer or more easy or when this cannot be accomplish'd or be without that but that may be accomplish'd without this For that which is not defective is most sufficient in it self and therefore it is apparently the greater good Also if one be a Principle the other not if one thing be the cause the other not For without the Cause or the Principle nothing can be or be done Now where there are two Principles that which proceeds from the greater Principle is the greater Where there are two causes the Product of the greater cause is the greater So that either way the thing must be greater whether one be a Principle the other not or whether proceeding from the greater of two Principles For the end is greater and not the Principle As Leodamus said when he accus'd Callistratus He who advis'd was more in fault then he who acted For had not the thing been advis'd it had ne'r been put in Execution But Chabrias argu'd that he who acted was more to blame then he who advis'd because the thing had not been put in Execution had it not been advised for Action is the end of Consultation Moreover that which is more scarce is more desireable then that which more Plentiful as Gold then Iron For Iron is less profitable Therefore the possession of Gold is greater because it is more scarce to be found But in another Sence that which most abounds is the greater because we make more use of it At other times that which is scarce is exceeded by that which is Plentiful and therefore we say the best Water Briefly difficult things are exceeded by those things that are more easy because they are more scarce but in another Sence easy things exceed difficult because we can obtain 'em when we please Alsowhere the contrary exceeds as likewise where the Privation exceeds Also where the Vertues and Vices of Men are greater there their Actions are more eminent and greater For such as the Causes and Principles such are the Effects and such as are the Effects such the Principles and Causes Also where the excess is 〈◊〉 we desireable or more beautiful as a quick Sight is better then a quick Smell Sight being more desireable than Smelling also it is much nobler to covet Friends then Money wherefore love of Friends is better then love of Money The excesses of the best things are best and more vertuous the Excesses in Vertue and of which our desires are more honest and generous Such things also of which the Knowledg is more honest and ingenious As also the things themselves which are more honest and Lawful For as it is with Knowledg so it is with Truth for every Science teaches those things that belong to it and therefore the Sciences and the things taught hold the same Proportion Also what all or many or most Men of Prudence and Learning have deem'd and decreed to be the greatest good that either ought simply so to be or so far as they have in their Prudence adjudg'd it But that is common to other things For the what and how much and the what sort are to be look'd upon as Knowledg and Understanding have decreed But we have number'd Prudence however among good things as having defin'd Prudence to be that which all Men would desire if they had Prudence And therefore that must be greater which Prudence so adjudges Also what is contain'd in the better things either as they are simply so or as they are better as Fortitude is better then Strength of Body Also what a person of more worth would chuse as rather to suffer then do an Injury which a more just Man would chuse to do And what is more pleasing and delightful then what is less For all follow Pleasure and covet it for delights sake But the good and end of Pleasure is bounded within Limits For that which is more delightful is as well that which is less irksome as that which is more durably delightful and more honest or less honest For honest is either delightful or to be desired for its self And what Men most desire to be the Authors of either to themselves or Friends those are the greater benefits what they least desire the lesser Kindnesses and the more lasting then the less durable and the more solid then the less firm For the use exceeds of the one in time of the other in the Will For where the will is there the use of a thing constant prevails And as when from consequences and like cases other consequences arise as when that which is stoutly and honestly done is to be prefer'd before what is acted temperately also Fortitude is to be preferr'd before Temperance and to be strong before being temperate And what all preferr before what all do not preferr and what more then a few For good was that which all coveted therefore that is greater which is more desir'd Also in Law-Suits where are Plantiffs Judges and Defendants Here that prevails which all affirm there what the Judges Pronounce as excelling in Power and Knowledg Sometimes that is greatest of which all participate for it is a disgrace not to participate Sometimes those things which are most Praise-worthy as being most Honest Sometimes degrees of Honour make the Honours greater for Honour is a kind of price or value set upon a thing The greater Punishments also are the greater and such things as are greater than the things which are apparent and granted especially when divided into parts for then exuberancy of many is apparent which was the reason that the Poet to excite Meleagâ—r uses these words What Mischiefs most thy Subjects then bewail If into hostile Han is the City fall Slaughter and Fire their Masions will invade And helpless Children will be Captive led And then addition and aggravation as in Epich rmus which is apparent partly by the same reason that dividing the parts makes the thing greater for Aggravation plainly shews the Excess Partly because the Original and cause of things seems greater and then because that is greater which is less frequent and more difficult Opportunity Age Time Place and Force make things greater for beyond the Strength the Age of such an one beyond others here there and then denote excess of Beauty Goodness Justice or their Opposites Whence the Epigram upon the Olympian Victor Though formerly 't is true so mean my Trade With heavy Dossers on my Shoulders laid From Argos to Tegea still I trudg'd To sell my Fish till Victor here adjudg'd And Iphicrates gave himself this Encomium from whence all these Moreover Genuine than acquir'd wherfore said the Poet School'd only by my self these Songs I sing Also the greater part of a great thing As Pericles speaks in an Epitaph that Youth being taken from a City render'd it
benefit of others Illiberality the contrary Magnanimity is a Vertue that excites us to do great actions Pusillanimity the contrary Magnificence is a Vertue that consists in the sumptuousness of expence of which pinching and narrow-sould Parcimony are the contrary Prudence is a Vettue of Reason enabling us rightly to deliberate of evil and those blesliâ—gs that pertain to happiness And let this suffice in general at present concerning Vertue and Vice and the parts of both and for the rest they fall under an easie consideration For of necessity those things that are the causes of Vertue must be honest as relating to Vertue and being produced by Vertue Of which sort are the marks and works of Vertue Now because the marks and such like whatever they be which are the Acts and Sufferings of a good man of necessity whatever are the Acts or Signs of Fortitude or whatever are acted couragiously are noble and honest And so it is with the signs and acts of Justice but not in the sufferings For in this one vertue alone not always that which is just is honest and laudable For it is rather an ignominy to be condemn'd if justly then unjustly And so of the rest of the Vertues And where honour is the reward those things are vertuous and laudable as also where honour rather then money And whatsoever among those things that are desirable which a man acts not for his own sake And whatsoever are simply good and whatsoever a man acts for his Countries sake contemning his own Interest And which are naturally good and which are good but not to himself For what is good to himself he acts for his own sake And which attend the memories of the dead rather than the living For where same and honour attends the living they seem to act rather for their own sakes Also whatever acts are done for the sake of praise For these are done less for a man 's own sake Also those things that are serviceable and prositable not to himself but to others and chiefly to Benefactors Thus Justice and Munificence are profitable to others Also the contraries to those things of which we are ashamed either speaking or acting or about to speak or do For Men that say or do or are about to commit ignominious actions are ashamed as when Alcaeus said There 's something I would tell thee but for shame That will not let me the occasion name To which Sappho made answer Speak freely on for if a true desire Of good and vertuous does thy thoughts inspire And that thy Tongue be not design'd to frame Report and calumny beseeming shame Will hover o're thy Brows and aw thy Pen To speak the truth and I defie thee then Also those things about which Men fearlesly contend For men are most affected with those things which most conduce to glory Also the vertues and deeds of those who excel by nature are most praise worthy and the vertues of Men rather then Women and such as with which others are more endowed then themselves Wherefore just and justice are applauded also revenge rather then reconciâ—iation For it is but just to return evil for evil and justice is honest For a stout man also to be invincible for victory and honour are desirable For though they bring no advantage yet they are to be desired and shew a conspicuous Vertue Also Commemorations and Monuments And the more famous they are the more noble However those are more noble that attend upon the dead and to whom the greatest honours are attributed Also such as are extraordinary and belong to the Person alone for as they are more memorable yet unfruitful possessions they seem more liberal Also what things are proper to particular persons and the marks of such things that are praise worthy among those with whom we inhabit as among the Lacedâ—emonians to wear long hair For it is a mark of Liberty for it is not for him that wears song hair to do any servile drudgery it being the mark of a Freeman not to live under another We are also here to take in those things that approach to Vertue as being the same both in respect of praise and dispraise As wary timid and deceitful A fool and one good natur'd a person not sensible of pain and one mild and gentle And thus from the consequences according to that which is best as to call an hasty surious man silly an arrogant man magnificent and great and such as take the excesses of Virtue for the Virtues themselves as if we should call a rash man stout or a prodigal person liberal seeing that many so fallaciously conclude from the causes outwardly appearing For he that is so ready to run into danger when there is no occasion will be much more when he finds it necessary And if he be liberal to every body much more to his friends For it is the excellency of that Virtue for a man to be bountiful to all men We are also to consider from whom praise is proper For as Socrates said 't is no difficult thing to praise the Athenians among the Athenians But we must call that honourable which is honourable every where as among the Scythians the Lacedaemonians among the Philosophers and in a word whatever is honourable we may affirm to be honest For they seem to approach near to vertue And whatever looks like praise-worthy as for a man to do those things that are worthy his Ancestors For it is an addition to his felicity and to his honesty to advance his Reputation Or if besides that which is becoming he act that which is best and most honest As if a Man make a moderate use of his Prosperity and shew himself magnanimous in adversity Or the higher he ascends the more generous and affable And such was that of Iphicrates from which to what or that of the Olympic Victor Tho formerly 't is true so mean my trade c. And that of Simonides Whose Father Husband Brothers rare to see All Sâ—vereign Kings yet â—â—re the prouder she Now because praise arises from Actions and for that it is the property of a good man to act by Election we must endeavour to shew how he acts by Election which he may be said to have done if he have so frequently done Wherefore those things which are done by chance or fortune are to be attributed to counsel and judgment For when many things and similar are joyn'd together they will seem to be a mark of virtue and judement Now seeing that praise is a speech that sets forth the greatness of virtue of necessity we must demonstrate those actions to be of the same nature For Encomiums are upon actions But the circulating arguments that make for convincement are Nobility of Birth and Education For it is most likely that good men beget good men and that a person so educated will act according to his education There we celebrate in Encomiums those that act which actions are the
Performances but as for things ridiculous we have discours'd in our Art of Poetry And so let this suffice to shew what things are delightful what things are irksome will appear by their Contraries And thus much for those things which are the causes of Injustice and Injury CHAP. XII How Men believe themselves capacitated to do Injustice and by what means they do it NOW let us see how Men are capacitated to do an Injury and by what means they do it These People therefore when they think the thing possible to be done and to be done by themselves they consider likewise whether they can conceal themselves when they have done it or if they cannot whether they shall be question'd or if they come to suffer whether the Punishment will be greater then what they have got by the Act. But as to what may be done and what not we shall afterwards declare for these things are common to all the parts of Rhetoric Now they believe themselves most able to do an Injury who think themselves of greatest ability both to speak and act whether out of their Experience in contention and controversy or confiding in their Friends and their Riches for if they find themselves thus supported they believe themselves able Or otherwise whether they have such or such for their Friends Assistants or Accomplices for perhaps by the help of such Aids they may accomplish their ends without fear of Punishment or else conceal themselves from it Or if they be in Friendship with those that suffer the Injury or with the Judges for Friends are careless of Injuries and easily reconcil'd before Prosecution The Judges also are willing to gratify their Friends either by acquitting 'em or by inflicting but a small Punishment Moreover it is easy for them to conceal themselves who are adjudg'd unable to commit the offence as if a lame Person should be accus'd for beating a Man or a poor or a deform'd person be accus'd of Adultery Or if the Crime be said to be committed publickly and in the face of the World for People are not apt to believe such things or if the Crimes be so great or so many that never were committed before For Men are not aware of such Injuries in regard all Men shun common actors of mischief like so many Pests or Diseases But as for him that never was sick no Man avoids him and such as have no Enemies or many For these believe they may conceal themselves because they are not suspected Others believe they may conceal themselves because it cannot be thouâ—ht they would set upon those who are aware of 'em or that it would be an Argument that thev did never make the attempt because they were sure to find resistance The same may be said of such as are provided of a means to escape or of some place at hand to secure themselves and of such who if they cannot conceal themselves can put off the cause by delay of Justice and corruption of the Judges Or if he be amerc'd is sure to delay or buy off the Payment or if he be such a one who through Poverty has nothing to lose or such whose gains are apparent great and at hand their Fines but small hard to be found and at a distance And where the Punishment cannot be equal to the Profit And such as gain by the Injury but are only sham'd by the Punishment Or where the Injury may seem commendable as if a Man revenge an Injury done to his Father or Mother as it was Zeno's Case where the Punishment is only a Fine or Banishment or some such thing for both do an Injury whether this way or that way done tho' both are not the same Persons but contrary in their Manners and Dispositions Also they who have often had the good Fortune to conceal themselves and never more to be call'd in question also such as frequently fail in their Attempts For there are some in such things as well as in warfare who are still prepared to renew the Fight Or such as obtain a present Pleasure but the loss follows afterwards as it fares with the Intemperate for there is Intemperance in all things which are desired On the contrary such as presently suffer pain or loss but attain to Pleasure or Profit afterwards tho' later And such are the things which the abstemious and prudent seek after And such as may seem to have acted by Fortune or Necessity or by Nature or Custom and to have been mistaken â—ltogether and not to have done any Injury Partly such as could not otherwise obtain their right partly such as were in want Now Men happen to be in want two ways either they want Necessaries as the Needy or Superfluities as the Rich. Partly they who are Men of Repute or Infamous Those because they shall not be the less esteem'd these because they shall not be the more esteem'd and under these Circumstances they both attempt And they injure those who are furnish'd with such things of which they stand in need either necessaries or for superfluity or pleasure and as well those that live at a distance as those that live near at hand The one are soon apprehended the other more slowly punish'd as they who rob'd the Carthaginians Also the unwary and such as are not watchful but credulous for it is easy to deceive all these also the negligent For he that seeks revenge must be dilligent The bashful also for they seldom contend for gain Also those who being injur'd by many never care to take revenge For to use the common Proverb these are the Mysians Prey Also those who never or they who were frequently injur'd for both are neglectful These because never those because they think they shall be no more Also those that are or may be easily oppress'd with scandalous Reports For such never chuse to defend themselves fearing the Judges nor can perswade the contrary of which sort are they whom many hate or many envy And against whom they have any Pretences either of their Parents or of their own or of their Friends either that they have or would do wrong either to their Parents themselves or such as are their dearest Relations who are under their Protection For as the Proverb says Improbity only wants a pretence We also injure our Friends and our Enemies for it is easy to do the one pleasing to do the other Also those who have no Friends who are not in a condition to say or do Also such as are neglectful of Revenge or apt to be reconcil'd or never prosecute to the end Or such as to whom it is not worth their while to spend time to stay for Judgment and recompence as Forraigners and Handicraft Tradesmen who are contented with small satisfaction for an Injury committed Or such as have done many Injuries to others or themselves have suffered several like to what they have done For that does not seem an Injury when a Man has suffered no more
affront to another despises him For to affront is to vex and trouble another in such things wherein it is an Indiginty to him to suffer not that he aims at any thing more then what he does but only that he delights in the Act. For they that return the Injury do not affront but take revenge But it is a pleasure to him that offers the affront to think that in doing the Injury he excells the other and shews himself to be the better Man Therefore young Men and Rich People are Contumelious believing it shews their Superiority to give an affront For it is the nature of Contumely to disgrace and he that disgraces another contemns him For whatsoever is worth nothing has no esteem or repute either of being good or evil Therefore says Achilles in his Fury The asfront my Honour stains While he my Valours Guerdon thus detains And that other As is some Despiâ—able Runagate Which were the reasons of his Provocation Now Men think it convenient to be exalted above their Superiours because of their Birth their Strength their Vertue and briefly in every thing that is an excellency in others as the wealthy excells in Riches the Eloquent in the gift of utterance he that commands him that is commanded and he that is thought worthy to govern excells him that is not thought worthy And therefore it is said Great is the wrath of Jove descended King's And in another Place Deep in his breast his brooding Anger lyes To perfect what is fury shall devise For they impatiently brook affronts in regard of their high dignity and superexcellency Others by reason of the benefits they have done or do either by themselves or their friends or will or would do for his sake And thus it is Apparent how men come to be angry with whom and for what causes they are angry For some are angry when they are aggreiv'd For he that is aggreiv'd desires something whether it be by any Opposition directly made against him as to hinder a man from drinking that is a thirsty or not directly as if a man does not oppose yet does not lend his Assistance or if any other greivance happen all these things raise anger in a man And therefore sick People Poor People Lovers thirsty People and in a word all that desire without obtaining their desires are angry and easily provok'd especially with those that dispise their present Condition As those that are sick with those that upbraid or whatever is the cause of their Distemper The Poor are angry with their Poverty the Warriour with his ill success the Lover for want of his satisfaction and so of the rest seeing that every one is prepar'd for his Passion by the disturbance that is within him Moreover if the person expected things contrary For what is great and unexpected causes a greater greivance as it causes greater delight when a thing happens contrary to expectation Hence it happens that seasons hours ages and dispositions make it apparent who and which are most Subject to anger and when and where and which overruling render the Tempers of men more froppish and testy They also are angry with those that laugh deride and scoff at 'em for such affront 'em and with those that offend 'em in such things as are the signs of contumely of which number are those things which are done to no end and are no way profitable to those that give the Offence and therefore they are contumelious People also are angry with those that slight and speak ill of those things wherein they cheifly delight as when they speak evil of Philosophy before such as study to excel therein or if another dispraise the shape of such a Mans Body which they think handsom and so in other things more especially if they suspect themselves to want those Perfections which are tax'd to be wanting in others But if they are confident of their own parts and beauty they never mind what others say Also men take these things more unkindly at their friends hands then at the hands of others as expecting at their hands more civility and respect Also with such as were wont to respect and honour 'em but forbear their former civilitys for then they think themselves contemn'd otherwise they would continue their friendship Also with those that shew themselves ungrateful and do not return Quid for Quo and with such as act quite contrary to what they do especially if their Inferiours For all these things are lookt upon as contempts the one of Inferiors the other by Inferiors More especially if they be contemn'd by those who are of no esteem themselves For Anger rises from a contempt that no way becomes the Contemners now it does not become Inferiours to despise their Superiours And friends are no friends if they do not say and do well much more if they act or say quite contrary to their friends and if they are not lensible of their wants as was Antipho's Plexippos with Meleager for it is a sign we are not sensible of the disrespect we show for where we are careful of our behaviour we consider what we do People are also angry with those that rejoyce at their Misfortunes more especially if they sport with their Calamities for both are signs of contempt or Enmity Also with them that care not whether they be troublesom or no. Wheresore they are angry with those that tell 'em ill news and with those that hear of or see their Misfortunes without being concern'd for they resemble Enemies or Contemners For friends condole with friends and all men greive at their own Misfortunes People are also angry with five sorts of men with those with whom they stand in-Competition for honour those whom they admire with those by whom they would be admir'd with those whom they reverence and with those by whom they are reverenc'd For if they are despis'd by any of these they are more Passionately incens'd And if they are contemn'd by those whom they are oblig'd to assist as Parents Children Wives Subjects And with the ungrateful for such a contempt is unbeseeming and with such as disâ—emble toward such as are serious For Dissimulation is affrontive And with those that are liberal to others not to them for it argues contempt to be only thought unworthy Forgetfulness also causes anger as of names tho' it be a small matter for it proceeds from negligence and negligence denotes contempt Thus it is manifest that an Orator ought to frame his Auditors to such a Temper as they use to be in when they are angry and the Adversary to be guilty of such things which provoke their anger and to be such with whom they have just cause to be angry CHAP. III. Of Mildness NOW in regard that to be Angry is contraty to be Mild and anger opposite to mildness we are to consider the temper of mild People what things render 'em so and towards what sort of Persons they so carry themselves Mildness
or this or that Man or that thing And for the sake of two it was impossible and for the sake of the third they themselves confess he could not Another from Induction as from Peparethia That women every where make a true distinction of Childreâ— Thus the Mother declar'd to Mâ—â—â—ias questoning the Legality of her Son at Athens And at â—â—ebes â—â—menia and Stilbone having the same Controversy Dodonis confirm'd the Boy to be the Son of â—â—â—eniâ— And so he was afterwards reputed Also by the Law of Theodeâ—â—es men never trust theâ—â— own Horses to those that have ill us'd other men's noâ— to such as have cast away other meâ—s Vessels does any man commit the charge of his own Which holding â—rue in every thing else no man trusts himself with one that neglects his own safety And as Alâ—a â—mâ—s argu'd All men honour wise men the Pâ—rian's honour Archilocus though abusive The Chiot's honour'd Homor though noâ—â— of their Country-man The Mitylenâ—eans 〈◊〉 Sappho though a Woman and the 〈◊〉 though no great admirers of Philosophers yet admitted Chilo into their Senate The Latins honour'd Pythagoras and the Lamâ—â—â—cenâ—s buried Anaâ—agoras magnificently and honour him to this day The Athenians also so long as they observ'd Solon's Laws were happy and the Lacedemâ—nians so long as they obeyâ—â— those of Lâ—â—uâ—gus Thâ—bes also was govern'd by Philosophers and then flourish'd Another Place is taken from a Judgment made oâ— the same thing or some thing like or contrary to it especially if by all and always or the most and good men or if the Judges or their favourites or Persons against whom there is no Judgment to be given as Princes or such against whom it would be a shame to give Judgment as God a Parent or a Teacher as Aâ—tocle argu'd against Mixiâ—emiâ—â—s If it were lawful for the Furies to give judgment in the Areopagus why not for Mixiâ—emides Or as Sappho argu'd that Death was an Evil. For unless the Gods had so adjudg'd it they themselves would dye Or as Aâ—islippus reply'd to Plato whom he look'd upon as too dogmatical but our Companion said he affirms no such thing meaning Socrates Egesippus also having first consulted the Oracle of Olympus came to Delphos and demanded of Apollo whether he were of the same judgment with his Father deeming it ignominious for the Gods to contradict each other Or as Isocrates wrote that Helena excell'd in vertue if Theseâ—s so adjudg'd it And Paris whom the Goddesses prefer'd And that Eâ—â—goras excell'd in vertue as says Isocrates because that Conon in his Calamity rejecting all others went to him Another Place is taken from the Parts as in the Topics what sort of motion the Soul is either this or that of which there is an example in Socrates of Theodecâ—es What Temple did he violate What Gods did he not worship among those which the City so esteem'd Another Place from Connexion Because in most things it so happens that they are attended by good and bad there it is proper to perswade or disswade by the Consequences to praise or dispraise to accuse or defend by the Consequences for example Envy attends learning which is an evil and wisdom which is a felicity Therefore learning is not to be acquir'd because Envy is not to be contracted Therefore learning is to â— acquir'd Because wisdom is to be covered This Place was the Invention of Callippus which included Possibility and those other things as has been said Another place arises from Opposites when perswasion or disswasion lyes concerning two Opposites and the 〈◊〉 Place is to be made use of in both The difference is that in the one things that offer themselves by chance are oppos'd in the other contraries As when the Preist forbid his Son to speak on Oration to the People For if thou utterest things that are just men will hate thee if things unjust the Gods On the other side it behov'd him to speak to the People For said he if thou utterest things that are just the Gods will love thee if what are unjust Men will admire thee This is the same with the Proverb of having Oyl and Salt Another from the twofold Opinion of men when we do not openly and privately praise the same things but openly those things that are just and honest privately those things that are more profitable And this Place cheifly prevails in Paradoxes Another place arises from Analogy because it agrees with Porportion As Iphicrates said to the Magistrates that would compel his younger Son to publick Duties because he was Big of Age If they thought great Boys to be Men they were to decree little Men to be Boys And Theâ—dâ—â—tes in the Law you have made Citizens Strabaces and Charidemus tho' Stipendiary and Pensioners by reason of their honesty and will ye not exterminate from your City those that behav'd themselves amiss Another from Consequences as Xenophanes said they were equally Impious to affirm the Gods to be born as they who affirm'd 'em to dye For the Consequence of both is that the Gods at some times cease to be And the Consequence from both is always to be taken as that which always follows You will judge not by Socrates but by the studies which he professes whether he be a Philosopher or no. That to Give Earth and Water is to serve and to participate of Common Peace is to obey commands But we are to consider which is most advantageous Another from this that the same Persons do not always choose the same things after or before but by Turns as in this Enthymene If being in Exile we fought that we might return now we are return'd shall we go into Exile that we may avoyd fighting For one while they chose to fight that they might stay another while not to be at home least they should fight Another Place is to affirm a thing to be or to be done for the sake of that thing of which it might be the cause though it be not As if a Man should give to another that he might disoblige the same Person by taking the same gift away again Whence that saying To many Fortune not in kindness giving On many large Prosperity bestows That their Calamities at last their greater woes May prove And that of Antiphon out of Meleager Not coveting so much the Beast to slay But that their Testimonies might display Meleager's courage over wondring Greece And that of Ajax in Theodectes That Dirmâ—de made choice of Vlysses not for the honour which he bare him but that his Companion might be his Inferiour For it might be that he might do it for that Reason Another place is common to Pleaders and Counsellers to consider what is diswasive what perswasive and those things for the sake of which men act or avoyd As if possible if profitable if easie to himself or his Friends if hurtful to his Enemies and whether the loss greater then the profit These are perswasive their contrarys disswasive
differ from the beginning Since then there are two sorts of Paeanic opposite one to another of which the one is proper for the beginning as they use it This is one long and two short 〈◊〉 Delogena Auricome O Hecate nate Jovis The other three short and one long 〈◊〉 And this is proper for the end For because the short syllables are impersect they cause a lameness from which being separated by the long Syllable the end appears yet not by the Writer nor by the Paragraph but by the dimension of Feet CHAP. IX Of Diffus'd Oration and it's contrary ELocution of necessity must either be diffus'd and one in a Link as the Dilatations or extensions of the Dithyrambics or turn'd and like the Antistrophs of the ancient Poets Diffus'd Oration is very ancient first made known by Herodotus the Thurian Which at first all Writers now not many make use of I call it diffus'd because it has no end of it self until the matter treated of be brought to a conclusion which is unpleasant because tedious and boundless For all men are willing to see a conclusion asâ— being tir'd out of breath toward the end of the Goal or Stage and are willing to turn again But when they see the end they are not a weary before they arrive at it Turn'd Oration is discern'd by the Period I mean by the Period that Oration which has a beginning and an end of it self and a magnitude easily discernable and such a one is delightful and easy to be learnt Delightful as being contrary to that which is boundless and because it is always thought to tickle the Ears of the Reader when he still comes to a full stop But where nothing is foreseen nor any thing illustrated the hearer becomes tir'd and displeas'd It is easie to be learnt because easily retain'd in memory and that because there is Number in Periods Which is the reason that Verses are more easily remember'd then Prose Now the Period must be terminated by the Sentence and not left broken as in the Iambic of Sophocles Calidon this is the land where Pelops raign'd The contrary would appear should it be said Calidon is in Peloponnesus Now of Periods one consists in the members the other is simple and pure In the members there is a perfect and distinct Sentence easily comprehended in one breath not divided but entire and the member is one part of it By simple I mean a Sentence but of one member But neither the Periods nor the members must be curtaild nor tedious For being curtaild they put the Hearer to the stumble For of necessity when the Sentence stretches out in length and the Measure which is bounded comes to be drawn back the Hearer must be put to the stumble by the justling of the Sentence and the Measure together and they leave the Hearer as those that get ground leave those that walk'd together before Whence that jest of Democritus the Chian upon Melampotides making excursions instead of Antisstrophs This Man frames mischeif for himself inframing mischeif for another For long suspence is a mischief to him that causes it which may be truly apply'd to long member'd and long winded Sentences But Sentences that are too short member'd are no Periods for they carry the Hearer headlong But of Elocution in members the one sort is distinct the other opposite Distinct as thus I have often admir'd those who summon'd assemblies and instituted the Gymnic excercises Opposite is that wherein through both members either contrary is compos'd with contrary or the same is joyn'd to contraries As for example they were profitable to both as well those that stay'd behind as those that follow'd For the one purchas'd more then they had at home and for the other they left sufficient to support 'em at home Here staying and following are contraries sufficient and more and as to those that wanted Money and were willing to enjoy it the will to enjoy is oppos'd to fruition Moreover it often happens that Wise Men are unfoortunate and Fools prosper Presently they obtain'd the rewards of stout men and soon after they took upon 'em the command of the Sea Also he Saild upon the Land and travell'd on foot by Sea for he joyn'd the two Shores of the Hellespont and digg'd through Mount Athos Also and they who were by nature Citizens by Law were depriv'd of their City for some miserably perish'd others were shamefully exil'd Or Privately to make use of Barbarians in our families but publickly to despise many of our Allies that are in service Either we will have 'em alive or leave 'em Dead Or what one said against Pitolaus and Lycophron in open Court They sold you remaining at home but coming to us they were bought For in every one of these is to be observ'd what we have said But this sort of Elocution is delightfull because contraries are most notorious and being parallell'd together are yet more easie to be taken notice of as also because they resemble Syllogisms for an Argument is but a Collection of opposites such therefore is opposition But Adequation is when the members are equal Assimilation if both the members have the same extreams Which of necessity must be either at the beginning or the end In the beginning the Assimilation consists in words At the end in the lastâ—syllables of the word or cases of the same word or the word it self In the beginning thus Land it was but Land untill'd which he receiv'd from him Atton'd with gifts and mollify'd with good words they departed In the end thus They did not think he had brought forth a Boy but they thought him to be the cause of the birth In great cares but little hopos In the case of the same word as thus Can he be worthy of a brazen statue who is not worthy of Brass Thou in his life time spok'st ' ill of him and now writest ill of him being dead In the Syllable thus How terribly hadst thou suffer'd hadst thou seen a slothful Man prefer'd Sometimes Opposition Ad equation Assimilation and Ending a like concur in the same Nevertheless there are also false Oppositions as in that of Epicharmus Sometimes I was with 'em sometimes among ' em CHAP. X. Of Festivity and Vrbanity TO learn readily is naturally delightful to all men seeing then that words signifie something whatever learning we attain to most easily from words that is the most pleasing Therefore obsolete words are unknown proper words we know Metaphor also more especially conduces For when we compare old age to stubble we are taught learning and knowledge from the kind For they are both decay'd The Respresentations of the Poets are also useful which being rightly made use of will appear Urbane and Polite Also those Enthymemes and that Elocution must be urbane that imprint a quick apprehension of things And therefore Vulgar Enthymemes are to be rejected I mean by Vulgar such as are obvious to every one and have
he has committed those things of which he stands accus'd And thus he that denies himself to have done any of those things of which he is accus'd must defend himself by Probabilities For so shall he weaken the Probability of the Accusation But if he is compell'd to confess let him them compare his own with the customary practises of many alledging that most or many do as he happen'd to do but if that be not possible to do let him fly to unfortunate miscarriage or Imprudence for Refuge and beg for Pardon making use for advocates of all the Common perturbations of the mind which put us beside our Reason as Love Anger Wine Ambition and the like And this is the most artful Method of Probability CHAP IX Of Examples EXamples are like Actions other where done and contrary to those of which we now speak And they are to be made use of when he that affirms a thing promises to make it out when it seems not to be very probable at what time reciting another Action like to that recited by himself so done as he affirms it that so the more credit may be given to his words Of Examples theâ—e are two sorts Some are according to Reason others beside Reason Examples according to Reason are easily believ'd but such as are not according to reason seldom or never gain credit As if a man should say the Rich are juster then the Poor and brings for Example certain just Actions of Rich men These and such like Examples seem to be according to Reason in regard most men believe the Wealthy to be juster then the Poor But if on the other side another Person brings Examples of Rich men doing Injury for love of Money bringing an Example that it is not so agreeable to Probability he shall lessen the Argument against the Rich. In like manner another Person brings Example of a thing that seems according ing to Reason That the Lacedâ—emonians or Athenians being reinforc'd with a great Multitude of Allies vanquish'd their Enemies and thence will perswade the Auditors to court many Allies These Examples are according to Reason For all men believe that Multitude very much conduces to Victory But if any one will undertake to shew that Multitude is not the cause of Victory he must make use of such Examples as are beside Reason as when the Athenian Fugitives with fifty men and one Tribe eâ—countring a much greater Multitude assisted by the Lacedaemonians their Allies regain'd their own City And again But the Thebans when the Lacedâ—emonians assisted by the whole force of the Peloponnesians invaded Baeotia withstood their Enemies alone and utterly defeated the Lacedâ—â—monians Again But Dio Sayling to Syracuse with three thousand men vanquish'd Dionysius that had five times his Number Also the Corinthians when they Sayl'd with nine Galleys to ay'd the Syracusans drave the Carthaginians out of the City though they had possession of the Town and the Haven with a hundred and fifty ships Breifly such Examples as these that seem contrary to Reason are often objected in Consultation to those Examples that seem much more rational This is therefore the nature of Examples and they are to be us'd both ways When we speak of things that are done according to Reason we shew how such and such things were accomplish'd in such a manner But when we offer Examples that seem contradictory to Reason we shew how such and such things though rashly undertaken had a prosperous Issue But they that speak against these Examples ought to shew how these successes happen'd and then to urge that they rately fall out but the other Examples frequently And this is the use which is to be made of Examples But when we offer Examples contrary to reason we are to collect the most we can and then to affirm that the one as well as the other frequently happen Now we may produce Examples not only from these things but from their Contraries as if we were to shew that some through their covetousness toward their Allies have lost their Friendship and then proceeding say But we would have been more equal and more liberal to our Allies and so have preserv'd their friendship a longer time And again as if after we had shewn that others because they undertook the War before they were well provided for it were vanquish'd we should they say But let us go well provided to War for then we may have more certain hopes of success We may also take many Examples as well from things past as from the present affairs For most things are partly like partly unlike one to another Wherefore we need not fear to have store of Examples to refute those that are offer'd by others CHAP. X. Of Conjectures COnjectures are whatever are done contrary to those things concerning which the Discourse is and wherein the Discourse it self contradicts it self For the most Auditors by those contrarieties which happen contrary to reason of the Common course of Action conjecture that there is nothing of sound and solid in those things which are said or done And a man may make several Conjectures by observing whether the Opponents Oration contradict it self or whether the thing it self be contraty to the Discourse of the Speaker CHAP. XI Of Enthymemes ENthymemes are those things which are not only contrary to Reason and Practice but to all other things beside And a man may make use of many handling them as in the Questioning Kind observing whether the Discoure contradict it self or whether the things transacted be contrary to Justice to the Law to what is profitable to Probability to the Genius of the Speaker or to the nature of the Transactions Therefore such Enthymemes are to be chosen according to the contraries Now the contraries to these are such as we ought to assume for our selves shewing that our Actions and our Words are contrary to what is unjust illegal unprofitable to the manners of wicked men and in a word to every thing that is evil All which ought to be spoken breifly and in few words And in this manner we may frame many Enthymemes and make the best use of ' em CHAP. XII Of a Sentence A Sentence to speak breifly is the declaration of a man's proper opinion in all things Of Sentences there are two sorts The one Credible the other Paradoxical When we speak a thing that deserves to be credited there is no reason to be given For neither is what is said unknown neither does any Person contradict it But when a Paradox is spoken the reasons are in few words to be given to avoid Loquacity and the misfortune of not being believ'd Now those Sentences are always to be spoken that are most consentaneous to the present affairs lest what is utter'd should seem forc'd and improper And we may deduce many Sentences either naturally or from Hyperboles or by way of Paromoiosis Natural Sentences are these No man in my opinion who is unkill'd in Affairs can be a
Exercises of Eloquence FINIS THE TABLE BOOK I. CHAP. I. THat Rhetoric and Logic treat of the same Subject That they who treated of Rhetoric before did not rightly understand it and of the Benefit of Rhetoric Pag. 1. CHAP. II. What Rhetoric is what its Subject how it relates to Logic and of what Things Oration chiefly consists 7. CHAP. III. Of the three kinds of Causes and their Ends. 16. CHAP. IV. Of what things Men usually Deliberate 19. CHAP. V. Of the Felicity and End of Deliberation 23. CHAP. VI. Of Probable and Good 29. CHAP. VII Of the greater and lesser 47. CHAP. VIII Of the Number and Forms of Common-weals 54. CHAP. IX Of Honest and Laudable which belong to the Demonstrative kind 44. CHAP. X. Of Accusation and Defence 52. CHAP. XI Of things delightful 57. CHAP. XII How Men believe themselves capacitated to do Injustice and by what means they do it 64. CHAP. XIII Of Injury and things done justly 69. CHAP. XIV Of the greater or less Injury 74. CHAP. XV. Of Vnartificial Proofs 76. BOOK II. CHAP. I. That the Affections of the Auditors are to be mov'd 84. CHAP. II. Of Anger 86. CHAP. III. Of Mildness 92. CHAP. IV. Of Friendship and Love and their Contrarys 96. CHAP. V. Of Fear and it's Contraries 100. CHAP. VI. Of Shame and want of Shame 104 CHAP. VII Of Favour and Charity 109. CHAP. VIII Of Pity and Compassion 111. CHAP. IX Of Indignation 114. CHAP. X. Of Envy 118. CHAP. XI Of Emulation 120. CHAP. XII Of the Affections and Habits of Youth 122 CHAP. XIII Of the Affections and Habits of Old Men. 124. CHAP. XIV Of the Dispositions of middle Age. 126. CHAP. XV. Of the Humours of Noble Men. 127. CHAP. XVI Of the Humours of the Rich. 128. CHAP. XVII Of the Manner of the Potent and Fortunate 129. CHAP. XVIII That there are some things common to all kinds 130. CHAP. XIX Of things Possible and Impossible 131. CHAP. XX. Of Example 134 CHAP. XXI Of a Sentence 137. CHAP. XXII Of an Enthymeme 142. CHAP. XXIII Of the Places of Enthymemes 145. CHAP. XXIV Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes 157. CHAP. XXV Of Dissolutions 162. BOOK III. CHAP. I. Of the Parts of Rhetoric 166. CHAP. II. Of Elocution 169. CHAP. III. Of Frigids 173. CHAP. IV. Of Representation 176. CHAP. V. Of Elegancy of Language 177. CHAP. VI. Of Prolixity 179. CHAP. VII Of Decorum 180. CHAP. VIII Of Number 183 CHAP. IX Of Diffus'd Oration and it's contrary 185. CHAP. X. Of Festivity and Vrbanity 189. CHAP. XI What it is to set before the Eye 191. CHAP. XII Of the several sorts of Elocution 194. CHAP. XIII Of the Parts of Oration 197. CHAP. XIV Of the Proem 199. CHAP. XV. Of Narration 203. CHAP. XVI Of Confirmation 206. CHAP. XVII Of the season for Interrogation 209. CHAP. XVIII Of Peroration 211 BOOK IV. CHAP. I. Aristotle to Alexander wishes Health and happiness 213. CHAP. II. Of Ratiocination 217. CHAP. III. What things are to be consulted 221. CHAP. IV. Of Arguments in the Encomiastic kind 229. CHAP. V. Of Accusation and Defence 232. CHAP. VI. Of Questions 234. CHAP. VII 236. CHAP. VIII Of Probation Ibid. CHAP. IX Of Examples 240. CHAP. X. Of Conjectures 243. CHAP. XI Of Enthymemes 243. CHAP. XII Of a Sentence 244. CHAP. XIII Of Signs 245. CHAP. XIV Of an Elenchus 246. CHAP. XV. Of the difference between Probable and Example c. 247. CHAP. XVI Of Testimony 248. CHAP. XVII Of the Rack 250. CHAP. XVIII Of Oaths 251. CHAP. XIX Of Anticipation 252. CHAP. XX. Of Petitions 255. CHAP. XXI Of Repetition 256 CHAP. XXII Of Irony 257 CHAP. XXIII Of Speaking Quaintly 257 CHAP. XXIV Of the Disposition of Words 259 CHAP. XXV Of Interpretation 259 CHAP. XXVI Of Dilucidation 261 CHAP. XXVII Of Antitheta Aequates 261 CHAP. XXVIII Of Equation 262 CHAP. XXIX Of Paramoiosis or like Cadencies 262 CHAP. XXX Of Exordiums 263 CHAP. XXXI Of Narration 268 CHAP. XXXII Of Manifestations and Predictions 270 CHAP. XXXIII Of Confirmation 271 CHAP. XXXIV Of Anicipation 273 CHAP. XXXV Several manners of perswasion 273 CHAP. XXXVI Of Praises and Dispraises 275 CHAP. XXXVII Of the sorts of Questions 277 CHAP. XXXVIII The Peroration 258 FINIS
and that they who are deem'd worthy of Compassion or to obtain any other request be such as these are said to be they shall never obtain pity from the Judges CHAP. XI Of Emulation EMulation is a certain disturbance of mind by reason of an appearing enjoyment of honourable happinesses which it is not impossible for him also to attain in things naturally alike not because they are enjoy'd by another but because they are not enjoy'd by himself So that Emulation seems to be a vertue and about vertuous things but envy is evil and evil things are the subject of it For the one through Emulation endeavours to attain to good things the other endeavours to prevent his neighbour from attaining those good things through Envy and therefore those that emulate must believe themselves to be worthy those good things which they have not For no man deems himself worthy of Impossibilities therefore are young men and Magnanimous Persons of this sort And such as enjoy those accomplishments which are deem'd worthy men of honour as Riches Favour Authority and the like For as if it concern'd 'em to be vertuous because these are felicities belonging to the vertuous therefore they emulate these vertues in others Also such as others esteem Persons of worth or such whose Ancestors Kindred Acquaintance or Country are famous strive also to emulate their Accomplishments for they believe those to be their own and therefore believe themselves worthy of ' em Now then if good things which are honourable are the Subject of Emulation of necessity vertue must be of the same nature and whatever things are profitable to others and assistant to Liberality Also those happinesses which men enjoy as Riches Beauty Health c. these are such as are proper Objects of Emulation For they are the Persons that enjoy these felicities and such like as Fortitude Prudence and Dominion For Princes are able to bestow many favours upon many Persons Also such whom many desire to be like such as have many friends and acquaintance such whom many admire and themselves among the rest Also such whose praises and atchievements are set forth by Poets and Historians These men they Emulate the contrary they contemn For contempt is contrary to Emulation And to contemn and to Emulate are contraries Of necessity therefore they who are so qualify'd as to Emulate some and to be Emulated by others must be so temper'd as to contemn those who are noted for those imperfections which are contrary to the Objects of Emulation Wherefore oft times they contemn the Fortunate in regard that good fortune is not always attended with those perfections which are of greatest value Thus how the affections are mov'd and with what things and how they are allay'd also whence Proof and Credit arises hath been said CHAP. XII Of the Affections and Habits of Youth I Call the Affections Anger Desire and the rest of which we have already discoursed The habits are vertues and vices of which already has been spok'n as also which every one chooses and practises Ages are Youth Manhood and Old Age. I call Fortune Nobility Riches Power and their contraries and in a word Prosperity or Adversity Young men are in their natures prone to desire and strong to act for the obtaining their desires But cheifly they are led by those desires that are venereal in which they are incontinent They are inconstant in their desires and apt to loath what before they lov'd They ardently desire soon grow cold Their wills are eager not impetuous like the hunger and thrist of sick people Also prone to anger and vehement and apt to follow their most eager Appetites They are overcome with passion as not brooking contempt through Ambition and are impatient when they believe they have receiv'd an injury Ambitious also of honour but more of victory Youth covers to exceed and victory is a certain excess and therefore they cover both these rather then money which is that they least mind For as yet they have not experimented want according to the Elogy of Pittaâ—us upon Amphiaraus Not Malitious but downright as not having much us'd themselves to Intrigues of â—uttlety They are also credulous as not having been often deceiv'd They are also naturally hot like men heated with Wine Full of hopes also for hope respects the time to come Memory relates to what is past And to Young Men the future is Long Past time short Therefore easy to be deceiv'd because they easily hope The more stout therefore because they are easily anger'd and hope well The one makes them fearless the other confident For no man fears when he is angry and because he hopes the best he is confident They are also modest for they look upon things to be honest no otherwise then through the Opticks of natures Simplicity and know nothing but what the Law has instructed ' em They are also Magnanimous as not having been depress'd by the Misfortunes of life but altogether unexperienc'd in necessity Now for a man to deem himself worthy of great things is Magnanimity which is the effects of good hopes And they rather choose to practise things honest then Profitable For they live more by custom then by reason Now reason looks at profit Vertue at honest Actions They are also much more desirous of Friends and Companions then other Ages For they rejoyce in Society as judging nothing yet by the Rules of profit not so much as seeking advantage in Friendship For they do all to excess and transgress more violently contrary to the saying of Chilo For they act to excess they love to excess they hate to excess In other things temper'd equally They believe also and affirm they know all things the reason that they always over-do They injure others out of Contumely not out of Malice They are compassionate because they believe all men good and honest For they measure other men by their own Innocency wherefore they believe such people suffer undeservedly They love merriment as being facetious For Jests are polite Contumelies Thus much for young Men. CHAP. XIII Of the Affections and Habits of Old Men. THE Dispositions of Men stricken in years and aged Persons are for the most part quite the contrary For having liv'd a long while they have been frequently deceiv'd often err'd and because most things are evil they slowly affirm any thing and put a less value upon things then they ought for they do nothing but stuff their discourses with perhaps's and if's and and 's and so conclude nothing Also they are morose and ill-natured for it is a sign of ill nature to interpret every thing in the worst sence Also they are suspicious because increduious incredulous because experienc'd For the same cause they neither love to excess nor hate to excess but according to the Precept of Bias they love as if they would hate and hate as if they would love They are Pusillanimous as having felt the hardships of life nor do they
covet what is great or pompous but only what is necessary not are they over liberal For one of their necessary things is their Estate and as they are experienc'd they know how hard it is to get how easie to loose an Estate They are fearful and affraid of all things for Old Age open's a way to fear as being cold for fear is a kind of Refrigeration They are desirous to live especially when nearest their ends as covetous of what they shall leave behind and what we think we shall most want we most covet They are more querulous then needs which proceeds from their Pusillanimity They live according to the rules of profit not of honesty For profitable is to themselves advantageous Honesty but a Good in it self They are rather Impudent then modest for having a different esteem of profitable and honest they little value the semblance of Honesty They are apt to despond as having but small and fluid hopes by reason of their Experience For which reason and because they are fearful they frequently come by the worst They live more by Memory then by Hope for the remainder of their days is but small the longest part is past which is the reason of their Loquacity for they love to talk of old Stories as taking delight in remembrance In their anger vehement but feeble In their desires impotent only in the desire of gain and therefore they seem to be temperate remiss in their lusts and Servants to their avarice They live rather by reason then custom and their Injuries are mischeivous not contumelious They are also compassionate but not for the same reason as young Men these out of humanity they through Infirmity For they think the miseries of others neat themselves whence they become querulous but not facetious nor do they mind jollity or mirth For to whine and moan are contrary to mirth and laughter These are the several Dispositions of young and old Men. Wherefore since all approve Orations adapted to their own Dispositions it is hence apparent how an Orator is to frame his Oration to suite with this variety CHAP. XIV Of the Dispositions of middle Age. BEtween these two lye the Manners of middle Age pruning off the Excesses of both For they are neither over confident which is rashness nor over timorous but fairly in a medium between both Neither confiding in all men nor mistrusting all Men but rather judging according to the Truth neither living altogether according to the Rules of Bravery nor altogether following profit but between both Neither parsimonious nor luxutious but according to what is laudable and convenient Observing the same measures both as to anger and desire temperate with courage and couragious with Temperance Which things are divided in Youth and old Age. For young Men are strong and Intemperate old Men temperate and cowardly So that to speake in a word whatever Youth and Age divide apart between 'em as to what is profitable that middle age enjoys entire Where they exceed or are defective middle Age observes the Medium and the moderate Now the Body is in its full vigor from thirty to five and thirty the Soul from thirty to nine and forty And thus much for the three Ages of Man CHAP. XV. Of the Humours of Noble Men. AS to the humors of Noble Men most certain it is that he is most covetous of honour who possesses it For all Men desire to add to the heap which they have Now Nobility is the honour due to Aucestry Therefore Noble Men are apt to despise those who are like their Progenitors For remote Renown is more venerable then honour newly got and more fit to be boasted of Now Noble proceeds from the vertue of Lineage Generous is that which does not degenerate from Nature Which does not frequently happen to the Noble but sometime they become Persons of mean and abject Spirits For there is a fertility in the Progenies of Men as in the products of the Earth Sometimes a fertile Stock bears a race of Illustrions Persons but then the Stock being worn out the Fruit degenerates And many time the offspring of sublime Ancestry corrupts into cruelty and insaneness like those that descended from Alcibiades and Dionysius and mild Genius's sink into sloth and effeminacy like the Descendants from Conon Pericles and Sorates CHAP. XVI Of the Humonrs of the Rich. THE Humors that attend upon the Rich are easie to be discern'd by all Men. For they are Contumelious and excessively Proud as being swell'd up with their Wealth As if they look'd upon themselve to enjoy all the Happiness in the World For Wealth is a Price whereby to value other Men. Therefore they believe all things vendible to themselves They are also voluptuous and profusely lavish The first to shew their Riches and make an Ostentation of their Felicity The latter because men love to gratifie their darling humours and please themselves with what themselves admire believing that all other men admire what they do And in some respects it does 'em a kindness in regard there are many who want what others have and therefore Simonides being ask'd by Hierâ—'s Queen whether it were best to be a Rich or a Wiseman reply'd I have seen Wise men wait at Rich mens doors Another Reason is because they think themselves worthy to govern For they have that for the sake of which they believe themselves worthy to govern others And indeed the humors of the Rich are the humors of the happy Madman But there is a great difference between the Customs of Persons newly enrich'd and such as were born to Wealth For as they are more wicked so are they more wickedly wicked For the Wealth of him that is newly enrich'd is wild and untam'd Nor do they do injuries through Malice but either through Contumelie or Intemperance CHAP. XVII Of the Manners of the Potent and Fortunate IN like manner the Customs of men in Power are plain to be discover'd For they are partly the same with Rich Men partly better For men in power are more Ambitious and more strenuous because they covet to execute what their Power authorizes them to act Also they are more diligent as being constrain'd to take care of what belongs to their Authority And more Majestic then morose for their Dignity begets 'em respect And Majesty is a kind of compos'd and decent Gravity and if they do an Injury it is not in slight matters but in things of Importance Good Fortune also has a great share in the parts of these manners For the cheifest of Fortunes Prosperity's are referr'd to these things Good Fortune also is the cause that we are in a better Condition both in respect of our Offspring and other Corporeal Happinesses Therefore they are more proud and less considerate by reason of their Prosperity But one excellent custom attends good Fortune that it makes 'em Religious beleiving those Goods of Fortune to be the gift of the Deity And thus much