thence proceeding 1. SEeing the Succession of Conceptions in the Mind are caused as hath been said before by the Succession they had one to another when they were produced by the Senses and that there is no Conception that hath not bin produced immediately before or after innumerable others by the innumerable Acts of Sense it must needs follow that one Conception followeth not another according to our Election and the need we have of them but as it chanceth us to hear or see such Things as shall bring them to our Mind The Experience we have hereof is in such Brute Beasts which having the providence to hide the Remains and Superfluity of their Meat do nevertheless want the Remembrance of the Place where they hide it and thereby make no Benefit thereof in their Hunger but Man who in this Point beginneth to rank himself somewhat above the Nature of Beasts hath observed and remembred the Cause of this Defect and to amend the same hath imagined or devised to set up a visible or other sensible Mark the which when he seeth it again may bring to his Mind the Thought he had when he set it up A Mark therefore is a sensible Object which a Man erecteth voluntarily to himself to the End to remember thereby somewhat past when the same is objected to his Sense again As men that have past by a Rock at Sea set up some Mark thereby to remember their former Danger and avoid it 2. In the Number of these Marks are those Humane Voices which we call the Names or Appellations of Things sensible by the Ear by which we recall into our Mind some Conceptions of the Things to which we gave those Names or Appellations as the Appellation White bringeth to remembrance the Quality of such Objects as produce that Colour or Conception in us A Name or Appellation therefore is the Voice of a Man arbitrary imposed for a Mark to bring into his Mind some Conception concerning the thing on which it is imposed 3. Things named are either the Objects themselves as a Man or the Conception it self that we have of Man as Shape and Motion or some Privation which is when we conceive that there is something which we conceive not in him as when we conceive he is not just not finite we give him the Name of unjust of infinite which signifie Privation or Defect and to the Privations themselves we give the Names of Injustice and Infiniteness so that here be Two Sorts of Names One of Things in which we conceive something or of the Conceptions themselves which are called positive the other of Things wherein we conceive Privation or Defect and those Names are called Privative 4. By the Advantage of Names it is that we are capable of Science which Beasts for want of them are not nor Man without the Use of them for as a Beast misseth not one or two out of many her young Ones for want of those Names of order One Two and Three and which we call Number so neither would a Man without repeating orally or mentally the Words of Number know how many Pieces of Money or other Things lie before him 5. Seeing there be many Conceptions of one and the same Thing and for every Conception we give it a several Name it followeth that for one and the same Thing we have many Names or Attributes as to the same Man we give the Appellations of Just Valiant c. for divers Vertues of Strong Comely c. for divers Qualities of the Body And again because from divers Things we receive like Conceptions many Things must needs have the same Appellation as to all Things we see we give the same Name of Visible and to all Things we see moveable we give the Appellation of Moveable and those Names we give to many are called universal to them all as the Name of Man to every particular of Mankind such Appellation as we give to one only Thing we call individual or singular as Socrates and other proper Names or by Circumlocution he that writ the Iliads for Homer 6. The Universality of one Name to many Things hath been the Cause that Men think the Things are themselves universal and so seriously contend that besides Peter and John and all the rest of the Men that are have been or shall be in the World there is yet something else that we call Man viz. Man in general deceiving themselves by taking the universal or general Appellation for the thing it signifieth For if one should desire the Painter to make him the Picture of a Man which is as much as to say of a Man in general he meaneth no more but that the Painter should chuse what Man he pleaseth to draw which must needs be some of them that are or have been or may be none of which are universal But when he would have him to draw the Picture of the King or any particular Person he limiteth the Painter to that one Person he chuseth It is plain therefore that there is nothing universal but Names which are therefore called indefinite because we limit them not our selves but leave them to be applied by the Hearer whereas a singular Name is limited and restrained to one of the many Things it signifieth as when we say This Man pointing to him or giving him his proper Name or by some such other Way 7. The Appellations that be universal and common to many Things are not always given to all the particulars as they ought to be for like Conceptions and like Considerations in them all which is the Cause that many of them are not of constant Signification but bring into our Mind other Thoughts than these for which they were ordained and those are called aequivocal As for Example the Word Faith signifieth the same with Belief sometimes it signifieth particularly that Belief which maketh a Christian and sometime it signifieth the keeping of a Promise Also all Metaphors are by Profession aequivocal and there is scarce any Word that is not made aequivocal by divers Contextures of Speech or by Diversity of Pronunciation and Gesture 8. This Aequivocation of Names maketh it difficult to recover those Conceptions for which the Name was ordained and that not only in the Language of other Men wherein we are to consider the Drift and Occasion and Contexture of the Speech as well as the Words themselves but also in our Discourse which being derived from the Custom and common Use of Speech representeth unto us not our own Conceptions It is therefore a great Ability in a Man out of the Words Contexture and other Circumstances of Language to deliver himself from Aequivocation and to find out the true Meaning of what it said And this is it we call Vnderstanding 9. Of two Appellations by the Help of this little Verb is or something equivalent we make an Affirmation or Negation either of which in the Schools we call also a Proposition and consisteth of two Appellations
when there is it is by Chance which must needs proceed from this That the Brain in Dreams is not restored to its Motion in every Part alike whereby it cometh to pass that our Thoughts appear like the Stars between the flying Clouds not in the Order which a Man would chuse to observe them but as the uncertain Flight of broken Clouds permits 4. As when the Water or any liquid Thing moved at once by divers Movents receiveth one Motion compounded of them all so also the Brain or Spirit therein having been stirred by divers Objects composeth an Imagination of divers Conceptions that appeared single to the Sense As for Example the Sense sheweth at one Time the Figure of a Mountain and at another Time the Colour of Gold but the Imagination afterwards hath them both at once in a golden Mountain From the same Cause it is there appear unto us Castles in the Air Chimaera's and other Monsters which are not in Rerum Natura but have been conceived by the Sense in Pieces at several Times And this Composition is that which we commonly call Fiction of the Mind 5. There is yet another Kind of Imagination which for Clearness contendeth with Sense as well as a Dream and that is when the Action of Sense hath been long or vehement and the Experience thereof is more frequent in the Sense of Seeing than the rest An Example whereof is the Image remaining before the Eye after looking upon the Sun Also those little Images that appear before the Eyes in the dark whereof I think every Man hath Experience but they most of all who are timorous or superstitious are Examples of the same And these for Distinction-sake may be called Phantasms 6. By the Senses which are numbred according to the Organs to be five we take Notice as hath been said already of the Objects without us and that Notice is our Conception thereof but we take Notice also some Way or other of our Conceptions for when the Conception of the same Thing cometh again we take Notice that is again that is to say that we have had the same Conception before which is as much as to imagine a Thing past which is impossible to the Sense which is only of Things present This therefore may be accounted a Sixth Sense but internal not external as the rest and is commonly called Remembrance 7. For the Manner by which we take Notice of a Conception past we are to remember that in the Definition of Imagination it is said to be a Conception by little and little decaying or growing more obscure An obscure Conception is that which representeth the whole Object together but none of the smaller Parts by themselves and as more or fewer Parts be represented so is the Conception or Representation said to be more or less clear Seeing then the Conception which when it was first produced by Sense was clear and represented the Parts of the 0bject distinctly and when it cometh again is obscure we find missing somewhat that we expected by which we judge it past and decayed For Example a Man that is present in a Foreign City seeth not only whole Streets but can also distinguish particular Houses and Parts of Houses but departed thence he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his Mind as he did some House or Turning escaping him yet is this to remember when afterwards there escape him more Particulars this is also to remember but not so well In Process of Time the Image of the City returneth but as a Mass of Building only which is almost to have forgotten it Seeing then Remembrance is more or less as we find more or less Obscurity Why may not we well think Remembrance to be nothing else but the missing of Parts which every man expecteth should succeed after they have a Conception of the Whole To see at a great Distance of Place and to remember at great Distance of Time is to have like Conceptions of the Thing for there wanteth Distinction of Parts in both the one Conception being weak by Operation at Distance the other by Decay 8. And from this that hath been said there followeth That a Man can never know he dreameth he may dream he doubteth whether it be a Dream or no but the Clearness of the Imagination representeth every Thing with as many Parts as doth Sense it self and consequently he can take Notice of nothing but as present whereas to think he dreameth is to think those his Conceptions that is to say obscurer than they were in the Sense so that he must think them both as clear and not as clear as Sense which is impossible 9. From the same Ground it proceedeth that Men wonder not in their Dreams at Place and Persons as they would do waking for waking a Man would think it strange to be in a Place where he never was before and remember nothing of how he came there but in a Dream there cometh little of that kind into Consideration The Clearness of Conception in a Dream taketh away Distrust unless the Strangeness be excessive as to think himself fallen from on high without hurt and then most commonly he waketh 10. Nor is it possible for a Man to be so far deceived as when his Dream is past to think it real for if he dream of such Things as are ordinarily in his Mind and in such Order as he useth to do waking and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the Place were he findeth himself when he awaketh all which may happen I know no {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} or Mark by which he can discern whether it were a Dream or not and therefore do the less wonder to hear a Man sometimes to tell his Dream for a Truth or to take it for a Vision CHAP. IV. 1. Discourse 2. The Cause of Coherence of Thoughts 3. Ranging 4. Sagacity 5. Reminiscence 6. Experience 7. Expectation 8. Conjecture 9. Signs 10. Prudence 11. Caveats of concluding from Experience 1. THe Succession of Conceptions in the Mind Series or Consequence of one after another may be casual and incoherent as in Dreams for the most part and it may be orderly as when the former Thought introduceth the latter and this is Discourse of the Mind But because the Word Discourse is commonly taken for the Coherence and Consequence of Words I will to avoid Aequivocation call it Discursion 2. The Cause of the Coherence or Consequence of one Conception to another is their first Coherence or Consequence at that Time when they are produced by Sense As for Example from St. Andrew the Mind runneth to St. Peter because their Names are read together from S. Peter to a Stone for the same Cause from Stone to Foundation because we see them together and for the same Cause from Foundation to Church and from Church to People and from People to Tumult and according to this Example the Mind may run almost from any Thing to any
joyned together by the said Verb is As for Example Man is a living creature or thus Man is not righteous whereof the former is called an Affirmation because the Appellation Living Creature is Positive the latter a Negative because not righteous is Privative 10. In every Proposition be it Affirmative or Negative the latter Appellation either comprehendeth the former as in this Proposition Charity is a Vertue the Name of Vertue comprehendeth the Name of Charity and many other Vertues beside and then is the Proposition said to be true or Truth For Truth and a true Proposition is all one Or else the latter Appellation comprehendeth not the former as in this Proposition Every Man is just the name of Just comprehendeth not Every Man for Unjust is the Name of the far greater Part of Men And the Proposition is said to be false or Falsity Falsity and a false Proposition being also the same Thing 11. In what manner of two Propositions whether both Affirmative or one Affirmative the other Negative is made a Syllogism I forbear to write All this that hath been said of Names or Propositions though necessary is but dry Discourse and this Place is not for the whole Art of Logick which if I enter further into I ought to pursue Besides it is not needfull for there be few Men which have not so much natural Logick as thereby to discern well enough whether any Conclusion I shall make in this Discourse hereafter be well or ill collected Only thus much I say in this Place that Making of Syllogisms is that we call Ratiocination or Reasoning 12. Now when a man reasoneth from Principles that are found indubitable by Experience all Deceptions of Sense and Aequivocation of Words avoided the Conclusion he maketh is said to be according to right Reason But when from his Conclusion a Man may by good Ratiocination derive that which is contradictory to any evident Truth whatsoever then he is said to have concluded against Reason And such a Conclusion is called Absurdity 13. As the Invention of Names hath been necessary for the drawing Men out of Ignorance by calling to their Remembrance the necessary Coherence of one Conception to another so also hath it on the other side precipitated Men into Errour Insomuch that whereas by the Benefit of Words and Ratiocination they exceed brute Beasts in Knowledge and the Commodities that accompany the same so they exceed them also in Errour For true and false are Things not incident to Beasts because they adhere not to Propositions and Language nor have they Ratiocination whereby to multiply one Untruth by another as Men have 14. It is the Nature almost of every Corporal Thing being often moved in one and the same Manner to receive continually a greater and greater Easiness and Aptitude to the same Motion insomuch as in Time the same becometh so habitual that to beget it there needs no more than to begin it The Passions of Man as they are the Beginning of voluntary Motions so are they the Beginning of Speech which is the Motion of the Tongue And Men desiring to shew others the Knowledge Opinions Conceptions and Passions which are in themselves and to that End having invented Language have by that Means transferred all that Discursion of their Mind mentioned in the former Chapter by the Motion of their Tongues into Discourse of Words And Ratio now is but Oratio for the most part wherein Custom hath so great a Power that the Mind suggesteth only the first Word the rest follow habitually and are not followed by the Mind as it is with Beggars when they saw their Pater noster putting together such Words and in such manner as in their Education they have learned from their Nurses from their Companies or from their Teachers having no Images or Conceptions in their Mind answering to the Words they speak and as they have learned themselves so they teach Posterity Now if we consider the Power of those Deceptions of the Sense mentioned Chap 2. Sect. 10 and also how unconstantly Names have been setled and how subject they are to Aequivocation and how diversified by Passion scarce two Men agreeing what is to be called Good and what Evil what Liberality what Prodigality what Valour what Temerity and how subject Men are to Paralogism or Fallacy in Reasoning I may in a Manner conclude that it is impossible to rectifie so many Errours of any one Man as must needs proceed from those Causes without beginning a-new from the very first Grounds of all our Knowledge and Sense and instead of Books reading over orderly ones own Conceptions In which Meaning I take Noste teipsum for a Precept worthy the Reputation it hath gotten CHAP. VI 1. Of the two Kinds of Knowledge 2. Truth and Evidence necessary to Knowledge 3. Evidence defined 4. Science defined 5. Supposition defined 6. Opinion defined 7. Belief defined 8. Conscience defined 9. Belief in some Cases no less from Doubt than Knowledge 1. THere is a Story somewhere of one that pretends to have been miraculously cured of Blindness wherewith he was born by St. Albane or other Saints at the Town of St. Albans and that the Duke of Glocester being there to be satisfied of the Truth of the Miracle asked the Man What Colour is this Who by answering It was Green discovered himself and was punished for a Counterfeit for though by his Sight newly received he might distinguish between Green and Red and all other Colours as well as any that should interrogate him yet he could not possibly know at first Sight which of them was called Green or Red or by any other Name By this we may understand there be two Kinds of Knowledge whereof the one is nothing else but Sense or Knowledge original as I have said in the Beginning of the second Chapter and Remembrance of the same the other is called Science or Knowledge of the Truth of Propositions and how Things are called and is derived from Vnderstanding Both of these Sorts are but Experience The former being the Experience of the Effects of Things that work upon us from without and the latter Experience Men have from the proper Use of Names in Language and all Experience being as I have said but Remembrance all Knowledge is Remembrance and of the former the Register we keep in Books is called History But the Registers of the latter are called the Sciences 2. There are two Things necessarily implied in this Word Knowledge the one is Truth the other Evidence for what is not Truth can never be known For let a Man say he knoweth a Thing never so well if the same shall afterwards appear false he is driven to Confession that it was not Knowledge but Opinion Likewise if the Truth be not evident though a Man holdeth it yet is his Knowledge thereof no more than theirs who hold the contrary for if Truth were enough to make it Knowledge all Truth were known which is not so 3.
Goodness considered without Relation for even the Goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty is his Goodness to us And as we call Good and Evil the Things that please and displease so call we Goodness and Badness the Qualities or Powers whereby they do it And the Signs of that Goodness are called by the Latines in one Word Pulchritudo and the Signs of Evil Turpitudo to which we have no Words precisely answerable 4. As all Conceptions we have immediately by the Sense are Delight or Pain or Appetite or Fear so are all the Imaginations after Sense But as they are weaker Imaginations so are they also weaker Pleasures or weaker Pain 5. As Appetite is the Beginning of animal Motions towards something that pleaseth us so is the attaining thereof the End of that Motion which we also call the Scope and Aim and final Cause of the same and when we attain that End the Delight we have thereby is called the Fruition So that Bonum and Finis are different Names but for different Considerations of the same Thing 6. And of Ends some of them are called propinqui that is near at hand others remoti far off but when the Ends that be nearer attaining be compared with those that be further off they are called not Ends but Means and the Way to those But for an utmost End in which the ancient Philosophers have placed Felicity and disputed much concerning the Way thereto there is no such Thing in this World nor Way to it more than to Vtopia for while we live we have Desires and Desire presupposeth a further End Those Things which please us as the Way or Means to a further End we call profitable and the Fruition of them Vse and those Things that profit not vain 7. Seeing all Delight is Appetite and presupposeth a further End there can be no Contentment but in proceeding and therefore we are not to marvel when we see that as Men attain to more Riches Honour or other Power so their Appetite continually groweth more and more and when they are come to the utmost Degree of some Kind of Power they pursue some other as long as in any Kind they think themselves behind any other of those therefore that have attained to the highest Degree of Honour and Riches some have affected Mastery in some Art as Nero in Musick and Poetry Commodus in the Art of a Gladiator and such as affect not some such Thing must find Diversion and Recreation of their Thoughts in the Contention either of Play or Business and Men justly complain of a great Grief that they know not what to do Felicity therefore by which we mean continual Delight consisteth not in having prospered but in prospering 8. There are few Things in this World but either have Mixture of Good and Evil or there is a Chain of them so necessarily linked together that the one cannot be taken without the other As for Example the Pleasures of Sin and the Bitterness of Punishment are inseparable as is also Labour and Honour for the most part Now when in the whole Chain the greater Part is good the Whole is called Good and when the Evil over-weigheth the Whole is called Evil 9. There are two Sorts of Pleasure whereof the one seemeth to affect the corporeal Organ of the Sense and that I call sensual the greatest Part whereof is that by which we are invited to give Continuance to our Species and the next by which a Man is invited to Meat for the Preservation of his individual Person The other Sort of Delight is not particular to any Part of the Body and is called The Delight of the Mind and is that which we call Joy Likewise of Pains some affect the Body and are therefore called the Pains of the Body and some not and those are called Grief CHAP. VIII 1 2. Wherein consist the Pleasures of Sense 3 4. Of the Imagination or Conception of Power in Man 5. Honour honourable Worth 6. Signs of Honour 7. Reverence 1. HAving in the first Section of the precedent Chapter presupposed that Motion and Agitation of the Brain which we call Conception to be continued to the Heart and there to be called Passion I have therefore obliged my self as far forth as I am able to search out and declare from what Conception proceedeth every one of those Passions which we commonly take notice of for seeing the Things that please and displease are innumerable and work innumerable Ways Men have not taken notice but of a very few which also are many of them without Name 2. And first we are to consider that of Conceptions there are three Sorts whereof one is of that which is present which is Sense another of that which is past which is Remembrance and the third of that which is future which we call Expectation all which have been manifestly declared in the second and third Chapters and every of these Conceptions is Pleasure or Pain present And first for the Pleasures of the Body which affect the Sense of Touch and Tast as far forth as they be Organical their Conceptions are Sense so also is the Pleasure of all Exonerations of Nature All which Passions I have before named Sensual Pleasures and their contrary Sensual Pains to which also may be added the Pleasures and Displeasures of Odours if any of them shall be found Organical which for the most Part they are not as appeareth by this Experience which every Man hath that the same Smells when they seem to proceed from others displease though they proceed from our selves but when we think they proceed from our selves they displease not though they come from others the Displeasure of this is a Conception of Hurt thereby from those Odours as being unwholesom and is therefore a Conception of Evil to come and not present Concerning the Delight of Hearing it is diverse and the Organ it self not affected thereby Simple Sounds please by Aequality as the Sound of a Bell or Lute insomuch as it seems an Equality continued by the Percussion of the Object upon the Ear is Pleasure the Contrary is called Harshness such as is Grating and some other Sounds which do not always affect the Body but only sometime and that with a Kind of Horrour beginning at the Teeth Harmony or many Sounds together agreeing please by the same Reason as the Vnison which is the Sound of equal Strings equally stretched Sounds that differ in any Height please by Inequality and Aequality alternate that is to say the higher Note striketh twice for one Stroke of the other whereby they strike together every second Time as is well proved by Galileo in the first Dialogue concerning local Motion where he also sheweth that two Sounds differing a fifth delight the Ear by an Aequality of striking after two Inequalities for the higher Note striketh the Ear thrice while the other strikes but twice In like Manner he sheweth wherein consisteth the Pleasure of Concord and the