and signifieth a notion which our vnderstanding doth apprehend a resultancy or reflection proceeding from a being obiected to our vnderstanding Which hath a force to argue That is hath of its nature a power aptitude or fitnes to bring the thing obiected unto our understanding into the knowledge and intuition thereof I omit to giue instance of these things because that will better be done in setting out the nature of particular Arguments Wherefore now wee haue fully done with the first precept of Logick I will proceede to the second CHAP. II. The Distribution of Logick LOGICK hath two parts the Finding out of arguments Ramus Disposing of arguments This precept must haue the second place for the nature of the things themselues doth require it because by this we come to know what particulars are wrapped vp in the former precept and Aristotle in the 6. Booke of his Topicks and latter end of the first Chapter requires that the thing defined be distributed into parts Ramus tooke this precept out of the second Chapter of Aristotles Categories where wee haue these words Those things which are contained in Logick bee without complexion with complexion I sayd Ramus followed Aristotle in this partition and the thing it selfe shewes it for they both divide Logick into two parts The first part in Logick according to Aristotle are things without complexion so are they acording to Ramus as his owne words doe witnesse when he termes them Seuerall respects of things considered alone and by themselues Aristotle giues his incomplexed things no name but thereby he meanes arguments as they are vndisposed as his next precept doth shew and Ramus giues them that name expresly Ramus calls the first part of Logick invention and so doth Aristotle too as wee may gather from the 32. chapter of the first booke of his Priorums Where a little after the beginning he requires a facultie of inuenting in him that makes a Syllogisme but more plainly and fully we finde the same thing in the first Chapter of the eight booke of his Topicks To finde out saith he the place from whence a man may argue appertaines to Logick therefore vnto the first part of Logick for it can haue no other place Ramus calls the second part of Logick disposition So doth Aristotle also in the place last alleadged where he requires of a Logician to dispose singular things by themselues and he saith that this disposition is proper to a Logician and therefore belongs to Logick and consequently it is a second part thereof for it cannot be the first yea that Aristotle meant thus doth vndoubtedly appeare because he appoints his Logician first to finde out the places from whence tâ— argue and then in the second place to dispose them being so found out Two parts That is the precepts of Logick tend vnto two things or ends and they be called parts because all those precepts be shared or parted betweene these two ends some of them appertaine to the one and the rest vnto the other Finding out To finde out sometime signifies to discover a thing that is secret but here it is not so taken but the meaning is that the precepts of Logick doe assigne the seates and places of arguments and describe and set forth the nature of them and so much for the generall Distribution of Logick CHAP. III. Of the seates of Arguments in generall Aristotle assigneth ten places or seates of arguments in the fourth Chapter of his Categories in these words Those things which we finde in Logick without all coniunction doe signifie 1 Substance as a man a beast c. 2 Quantitie as two or three cubits 3 Qualitie as white c. 4 Relation as double halfe c. 5 Where as in the field c. 6 When as yesterday the yeere past 7 The place as he sitteth c. 8 To inioy as to be armed c. 9 Todoe as to cut c. 10 To suffer as to be cut c. He repeates the same doctrine in the ninth Chapter of his first booke of the Topicks and in both places he doth explicate them by certaine properties that be common to them all ioyntly viz. 1. They neither affirme nor deny 2. They be neither false nor true 3. A coniunction being added to them they containe negation or affirmation truth or falshood 4. All propositions are framed from them In the fift Chapter of his Categories and in his Prior. lib. 1. cap. 27. Eorum igitur Post lib. 1. cap. 22. he doth divide them thus These ten be Either subiected onely Predicated onely Or subiected and predicated also This distribution is fitly set out by Altisiodore in his Preface A. and B. Where he hath these words An Argument is that which proveth or is proved This is all that I finde touching arguments in generall Aristotle delivers the doctrine of Substance which is the first seat of arguments in the fift Chapter alledged which containeth these foure things 1. A substance is every thing of which we may say that it is We finde the same thing in Thomas Whatsoever saith he is essentiall to a thing appertaineth vnto substance 1. p.q. 77. art 1. ad 1m. 2. Substance is First as every singular individuall thing Second as Genus and species 3. Genus and species signifie substances by a figuraâ—iue speech not properly they signifie rather the manner according to which a thing is 4. A singular thing is most properly a substance because all other things be attributed thereunto and that attributed vnto none Thus haue I set downe all that I finde in Aristotle touching the nature of those arguments which are contained in the first place or seat of arguments for this time we must omit the consideration of the second substance for that hath the last place in this first part of Logick The first substance comes now to be handled Thomas doth wholly subscribe vnto Aristotle for this distinction and explication of substance reported out of Aristotle and he shewes the same in this short sentence viz In the name of first substance is intended the nature of universall and parts 1. p.q. 29. art 3. ad 2m. And for further explication he saith 1. p. q 75. art 2. ad 2m. A first or individuall substance may be taken two wayes one way for every thing that hath a substance another way for a compleat subsistency in the nature of any species from whence a mans hand may be called a first substance or an individuall thing after the first sort but not after the second so also a mans soule may be called a first substance or a singular thing in the first sort because it is as it were a thing that subsisteth but that which is compounded of soule and bodie is called a first substance or an individuall being in the second sence Vnto this place must be referred every individual effect as it consisteth by force of all the causes and every individuall subiect that receiveth any outward change
terms of Aristotle and Thomas be more significant and fit I thinke it best to follow them Of the essence By these words are set out such arguments as be essentiall vnto the thing of which they are predicated now all the causes be of this kinde for as much as the effect is constituted by all the causes as Thomas hath taught vs in 2. dist 27. q. 1. art 2. ad 9m. he saith the effect is constituted by all the causes that is each one in its kind and maner of working for all of them doe concur and bestow their force vnto the procuring of the thing to be These arguments be all comprehended in the 9. place of arguments viz. To doe CHAP. V. The Definition of a Cause A Cause is that by force whereof Ramus a thing is THis argument which we call a Cause is sometimes taken for every thing wherevpon another followes and so saith Okam 1. dist 1. q. 3. lit N. wherefore as the same Okam sayth 1. dist 41. lit F. A Cause is taken two wayes Sometimes for every thing that hath another thing as an effect thereof and sometime also for a proposition whereof another doth follow thus farre Okam A Cause in this place is taken not so largely as in Okamâ— first and third senses but in the second A Cause in this notion is also taken for the thing it selfe which doth cause and sometimes also for the nature of Causing or for the thing as it doth exercise Causallitie in act or for the relation of Causing A Cause is taken in the second sense in this definition wherefore A Cause is that of which the effect even by it selfe dependeth Thus farre the Iesuites in their Preface vnto Porphyrte By this it is manifest that Ramus and Aristotle doe fully agree in the defining of a Cause and in the explication of that definition therefore we need not say more for the opening thereof a few examples wil make it easily vnderstood but we may not doe that in this place least we be forced to repeate the same thing againe when we come to the particulars CHAP. VI. The Distribution of a Cause There be foureCauses Ramus the Efficient and Matter Forme and End THere is an vniversall agreement in this precept also Aristotle makes them these foure as wee may finde in the 11. chapter of the second booke of his Postertorums his words be these There be 4. Causes 1. That which sheweth what a thing is 2. That which must be when the thing is 3. That which moueth first 4. That for which a thing is He hath the same thing in the fift booke of his Metaphysicks and 23 chapter Thomas doth follow him and doth teach the same things in 1a. 2 a. q. 72. art 3. in cor and no man thinks otherwise therefore I will descend to vnfold the nature of the particulars CHAP. VII Of the Efficient Cause The Efficient Cause is that Ramus from which the thing is Efficient This word imports no more but to doe or to bring to passe and therefore it signifieth the office of all the Causes and consequently it seemes not fit to be given vnto any one Cause distinctly yet notwithstanding we must know that there is good reason thus to call it else the learned of all ages would not haue giuen it that name yea the very nature of it deserues we should call it so as we shall see in the next passage From which These words doe set out the nature or office of that Cause which is called Efficient and signifie the originall or fountaine from whence the effect doth receiue tts being I say the effect and I meane the whole effect for this Cause doth ioyne together all the other Causes whereof the effect is compounded as namely it bestoweth the forme vpon the matter and doth destinate the matter formed vnto the producing of something that is good and therefore it deserues well to be called Efficient The forme doth make the effect to be of this or that kinde the matter formed doth make the effect to be this or that individuall thing the end makes it fit for this or that good but the motion and efficacy of the efficient Cause onely doth giue being vnto the effect in the event Wee haue many examples of this Cause and the operation thereof we finde one in the second of Genesis the seaventh verse where it is sayd God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into him the breath of life and he became a liuing soule In this example the making of man is attributed vnto God therefore God is sayd to be the Efficient Cause of man the office of this efficiency is placed in ioyning the forme vnto the matter he framed him of the dust there is the matter and breathed life into him and thereby the forme is imposed on the matter and then God did destinate him to an end viz. The actions of life thereby he made him a living soule We haue another the like example in the 11. of Genesis the 3. and 4. ver where it is reported that The men of the earth did build a high tower of bricke and slime for a memoriall of their name The men of the earth are made the builders of the tower and thereby they became the efficient cause of the whole worke they take bricke and frame it into a tower therefore they ioyne the matter and forme together they destinate the same vnto an end viz. the continuance of their name on earth And thus much shall suffice to set out the nature of the efficient cause Wee should now divide an efficient cause into the severall kindes but that we cannot for as Ramus truely sayes they are vnknowne vnto vs therefore we will set downe the divers and various manner wherein the efficient cause doth worke for that is well knowne and doth helpe vs much in the vnderstanding of the office of thus Cause The efficient cause doth worke By it selfe By accident A Cause doth then worke by it selfe Ramus when it worketh by force of and according vnto the inbred fitnesse thereof We finde this distinction and the explication thereof in the Schooles of all ages The efficient cause sayth Thomas workes by it selfe or by accident the first is when it moneth by its owne proper vertue The second when something is remoued therefrom or that which remaines is hindred from working 1a. 2â— q. 76. art 1. in cor If wee ioyne Okam vnto Thomas wee shall finde this matter fully opened A Cause by accident sayth Okam 1. dist 2. q. 10. lit B. H. is that which worketh by a thing different from it selfe and a cause which workes by it selfe is that which causeth the effect according to its proper nature and not according to some other thing which outwardly doth befall it The efficient doth worke by it selfe in naturall things when it moues according vnto the instinct and inbred disposition of nature as when the living
we must not forget that from this place or seat of arguments is deriued knowledge simply so called We are then thought to know a thing when we vnderstand the causes therof thus saith Ramus And to the same effect speaks Aristotle knowledge simply so called saith he poster lib. 1. cap. 4. is necessary that is when the thing cannot be otherwise then as we know it and we haue that knowledge when we vnderstand the causes so saith the same Aristotle Poster lib. 2. cap. 11. Thomas also hath the same thing knowledge saith he opusc de demonst cap. 1. is to vnderstand of certainty and we doe so when we vnderstand the causes of the thing and that both as it is a cause and also as it is a cause in act of that thing and he giues a reason hereof Opusc 48. de Syllog cap. 1. viz. Then our reason doth resolue the thing caused into its causes from whence knowledge doth flow And thus much for the finall cause and all those arguments which are predicated of the essence of the subiect and which consequently doe absolutely agree therewith CHAP. XI Of Properties VVE must now prosecute those arguments which import things without the subiect and consequently consent with it after some sort of this kinde be all adiuncts as some doe call them An adiunct is that to which something is subiected Ramus and whatsoever doth externally belong or happen to any subiect An adiunct is Proper Common A proper adiunct is that which belongs vnto all alone alwaies A common adiunct is that which is not proper in that sort Aristotle dissents from Ramus in these precepts Thomas sayth 1. p. q. 77. art 1. ad 5m. Not every thing that is without the essence may be called an accident Aristotle hath not the termes of proper and common adjunct nor the thing compreheÌ„ded vnder them but the contrary he sayth Top. lb. 1. Cap. 5. An accident cannot be proper otherwise then by relation as when one sitâ—eth and others stand then sitting is proper to him Lastly Aristotle and others with him doe make a thing proper and an accident to differ formally as we shall presently finde Aristotle teacheth Top. lib. 1. cap. 5. that Arguments which are without the subiect be properties and accidents That is sayd to be proper that is reciprecall with the thing but yet doth not declare the essence nor come into the definition thereof And of these he sayth also Top. lib. 5. cap. 1. They are properties by themselues alwayes and doe separate and distinguish from all other things Porphyrie also doth distinguish and describe these arguments as Aristotle doth A propertie saith he cap. 4. is that which doth concurre vnto all onely and alwayes And againe cap. 9. A property is that which is in the whole kinde to which it is proper and onely and alwayes so as if that speciall kinde be taken away presently the propertie thereof is taken away also And Thomas doth so set out the nature of this argument that he giues a reason of all this alledged out of Aristotle and Porphyrie A thing proper sayth he 1 p q 77. art 1. ad 5m. is not of the essence but is caused by the essentiall principles of the species Aristotle and Porphyrie giues instance of properties in this sentence He that is apt â—nto laughing is a man He that is apt to learne Grammar is a man In this proposition aptnes vnto laughing and Grammar-learning is predicated of man This aptnes floweth from his reasonable soule and that is the principall thing in his nature I say it floweth therefrom not as a Contingent motion but as a naturall emanation therefore this aptnes agrees vnto all men onely and alwayes No man wants it none but man hath it and all men haue it alwaies and consequently it is proper vnto man and proper by it selfe and the nature thereof and not made proper by any outward efficient so as in necessary consecution it is convertible with man we may truly argue thus If man then apt vnto Grammar skill If apt vnto Grammar skill then man An accident sayth Aristotle Top. lib. 1. cap. 5. is neither definition Genus nor a propertie and is in the thing but so as that it may be and may not be in one and the same thing and Porphyrie recites the same in his fift Chapter Thomas also in the place last alledged doth so set out the nature of an accident that he giues also a reason of Aristotles Doctrine An accident sayth he is onely that which is without the subiect and not caused by the essentiall principles thereof Now this doctrine of Aristotle is certainely true therefore we ought to leaue Ramus and follow him I say it is certainly true that there be some things proper that be not accidents namely all naturall actions as the act of seeing is proper to all living creatures the act of discoursing to man The bearing of leaues and fruit to plants and the outward workes of holinesse vnto him that hath the habit of holinesse These are proper because they are necessary emanations from nature in the one and grace in the other so as when all requisite circumstances be present man cannot but see and worke the plants cannot but bring forth fruit and leaues wherefore the holy Ghost doth thus reason He that doth righteousnesse is righteous 1. Iohn 3.7 Where the holy Ghost doth necessarily ioyne righteous actions vnto a man that is habituated with righteousnesse as proper vnto him Properties be not adjuncts for adiuncts doe out wardly befall the subiect and so much the word importeth and Ramus expresly affirmeth Properties doe not outwardly befall the subiect but they are necessary emanations from the principles of nature Heat and light doe not outwardly befall the Sunne and fire neither doth swimming of timber in the water outwardly befall the same such is the condition of properties To this seat or place of arguments the other seven set downe by Aristotle must be referred viz. Quantitie Qualitie Relation Where When The place To inioy For all of them doe outwardly befall the subiect and are not caused by the principles of nature as a little labour will shew for Quantitie imports no more but Geometricall measure or Arithmeticall number Qualitie signifies the manner how a thing existeth or worketh Relation is no more but the reference or respect of one thing to another Where importeth the generall place wherein the subiect is as in this or that Country When expresseth the time and duration as this yeare this moneth c. The place signifies the particular place as this stoole this chayre c. To inioy signifies all indowments as Honour Riches Clothes c Some man perhaps will require me to set out the nature of quantitie and the rest and alledge Aristotles authoritie for it I answer that ought not to be done in this place for that belongs to other Arts as to Geometry Arithmeticke naturall and morall Philosophy This
it consisteth of things true first immediate better knowne preceding and cause of the conclusion Those are first and true which haue force to argue not from others but of themselues They ought to be true because that which is not cannot be knowne they must be first because they ought to be indemonstrable and consist of their owne proper principles we must not inquire of the principles of Science wherefore they are so but every one of them even by it selfe ought to be worthy of credit The medium must containe the causes of the conclusion seeing we know nothing vnlesse wee vnderstand the causes The medium ought to consist of things preceding the conclusion both in nature and our knowledge therefore the principium of ad monstration is an immediate proposition viz. that hath none before it Poster lib. 1. cap. 4. 6. Top. lib. 1. cap. 1. wherupō demonstrations are made by definitions Poster lib. 1. cap. 33. and they are the principles thereof Poster lib. 2. cap. 3. for a definition can no wayes be proued Poster lib. 2. cap 4.5 6. 7. lib. 1. cap 9. By this whole discourse we haue rules to know what Syllogisine containes a truth simply necessary and we are sent vnto them onely whose third argument comprehends the causes of the conclusion and such causes also as are better knowne vnto vs then the conclusion it selfe Wherefore for further explication hereof Aristotle doth shew vs what causes these be and how they concurre In these words For as much as we doe then know when we vnderstand the causes and these be foure 1. the forme 2. the matter 3. the efficient and 4. the end Then the conclusion hath a necessary truth when one of these causes is taken and placed as a medium in two propositions with that Conclusion And by Causes is meant not onely the causes of those things that are but also of those things that haue beene or shall be hereafter Post lib. 2. cap. 11. 12. Now wee doe fully vnderstand where to finde necessary truth in a Syllogisme Our next labour must be to set out these scientificall Syllogismes by other properties that we may know them the more easily and certainely for that cause Aristotle doth distribute a demonstration after this manner A demonstration is Vniversall Particular Affirmatiue Negatiue Poster lib. 1. cap 24. A demonstration vniversall excells a particular and an affirmatiue is better then a negatiue cap. 24.25 This distribution followes the nature of a Syllogisme for every demonstration is a syllogisme though every syllogisme be not a demonstration Poster lib. 1. cap. 2. and is very vsefull to giue vs knowledge where to finde this necessary truth and the degrees of it To conclude this matter of demonstratiue science he sayth The first figure is fittest for a demonstration yea chiefly proper vnto this science and it is to be sought out onely by that Poster lib. 1. cap. 14. Some perhaps will looke that I should giue instances to open the vse of these precepts and it may seeme the more needfull because some are of opinion that no example can be given answerable to this rule I answer this conceit is very vaine for cannot any of the causes or all of them together serue to proue a sentence that is called into question or cannot the causes be disposed with a question into two propositions Without doubt they may Also it is most certaine that every proposition comprehends a necessary truth wherein the effect is argued by the causes for the effect is no more but a comprehension of all the causes and when the causes doe argue the effect the effect is resolued into the causes therefore when we know the causes we cannot but know the effect And consequently such propositions are necessary and what they are such the conclusion must be that is lawfully inferred from them If there may be premises and conclusion answerable to this rule then no doubt there be examples of it and we may shew them if need were but I will saue that labour for this time for divers reasons 1. Aristotle hath done that alreadie Poster lib. 2. cap. 11. so as he that will may make vse of them 2. This kinde of knowledge cannot easily be discerned seeing it is very hard for vs to vnderstand those principles of a thing that are true first and of the same kinde as Aristotle doth admonish Poster lib. 1. cap. 9. Difficile autem c. 3. By a mans owne practice and obseruation he shall finde them and their vse in naturall things and in them onely for in matters divine and spirituall such arguments can haue no place In them we vnderstand by faith not by sence and faith hath Gods authoritie for the principle thereof not the nature or causes of the things themselues I say a man may finde them by practice because by sence we get memory by the remembring the doing of the same thing often we get experience by our many times remembring our experience is one amongst all these that we doe remember there is one thing wherein mans minde doth rest satisfied aboue many that which is one and the same amongst the rest becomes a principium of science if it belong vnto a thing that is Thus much we learne from Aristotle Poster lib. 2. cap. 19. Exsensu c. The medium of a demonstration whereby wee know that a thing is consists in some of these that follow 1. Of the causes but not the first or immediate 2. Of things mediate and no cause but such as are reciprocated or mutually referred to each other 3. Of a demonstration that shewes what a thing is 4. Of things that are not reciprocated yet it is better knowne and yet no cause 5. Of a superior science as Geometry is to the Opticks and Arithmoticke to musicke 6. Of other sciences whereof one is not placed vnder another as Surgery is vnto Geometry To know that a wound is healed sooner or later belongs to the Surgeon but to know the cause why it is healed sooner or latter belongs to Geometry 7. In a demonstration that sheweth what a thing is sometimes also the medium is placed without the extreames as when we say why doth not the wall breath Wee answer because it is not a living creature and these Syllogismes are alwayes made in the second figure after this sort whatsoeuer doth breath is a living creature But a wall is not a living creature Therefore a wall doth not breath Poster lib. 1. cap. 13. Thus farre goe Aristotles precepts to shew vs what Syllogismes containe necessary truth and the degrees thereof If any expect examples of these last I answer they may be given because we may haue examples of the former as I haue alreadie proved They may be given with more ease then the former because the things contained in them are neerer to our vnderstanding but I will saue that labour least I make my discourse ouer long and the Reader too idle We
chapter and first booke of his Rhetoricke A man sayth he is a Logician by nature or art Logick Dialectick Both these names are vsed indifferently to set out the thing defined and we haue the frequent vse of learned men to avow it The Iesuites doe expresly teach it in their Commentary vpon Aristotles Organon Col 26. neere to the end in these words The whole art of discoursing is set out by either the word Logick or the word Dialectick And they doe not barely avouch it but they confirme it with plentie of proofes as the Reader may finde if he please to consult the place-alledged Both the words doe signifie no more but a thing appertaining vnto the vse of reason therefore the Iesuites in the same Preface q. 4. art 4. Col 40. doe conceiue that Logick in an vniversall apprehension is no more but a director of the art of reason And Suarez hath the same thing in his Metaphysicks disp 39. D. Is This word is the band to tye both parts of the definition together By it the later part is affirmed of the former and it signifies an essentiall attribution that is that the latter part of the definition doth giue being vnto the former so as the first doth consist in the second An art The word art doth set out the generall nature of Logick that is it doth signifie that nature which Logick hath in common with divers other things as Grammar and Rhetorick c. It is called an art in the most common vse of men sometime it is called also a science and that we find in the Iesuites Preface q. 4. art 3. Aristotle doth vse both the words indifferently as signifying the same thing in his Preface to the Metaphysicks and first Chapter The word art fignifies a multitude of Precepts orderly digested and approved by vse And thus the Iesuites teach in their Preface q. 6. art 2. and Aristotle hath the same thing in his Preface to the Metaphysicks and first Chapter Where wee haue these words Art is gotten by experience experience makes art Art is made when as one vniversall thing is framed out of many experimentalls so as to doe by experience differs nothing from art He brings the same thing and the reason of it Poster lib 2. cap. 19. The word An is vsed to shew that Logick is one intire art that cannot be divided nor is subordinate to any other art as Geometry and many other arts be Logick is usually called the art of arts the mistris and director of all other and there is good cause why for Logick disputeth of all things and is common vnto every being as Aristotle hath taught vs in the fourth booke of his Metaphysicks cap. 2. text 4. Experience sheweth that Aristotle sayd true for there is no art but by the helpe of Logick all the precepts thereof are framed together in a due order and the parts of each singular precept are so fitted together that we may finde truth from falshood Of discoursing These words doe assigne the speciall nature of Logick the very first and intrinsecall being thereof and containe the forme and the end I say they containe them both because the forme is the fountaine of the end and the end is the continuation of the forme as wee shall see hereafter The end of Logick is Next Remote The remote end of Logick is the very act it selfe of discoursing but wee speake not of this end of Logick in the present definition The next end of Logick is to prescribe a way and rules of discoursing so as the end of Logick is a framing of the meanes of discoursing so say the Iesuites in their Comment vpon Aristotles Organon and the Preface thereto Col. 27.55 So likewise saith Gillius lib. 1. Tra. 1. cap. 6. no. 4. The art of Logick delivereth wayes and rules of discoursing To discourse As it is here used is to declare one thing that is lesse knowne by another thing that is more knowne This we haue in the Iesuites Preface col 27. and 62. As for example He that knowes not what a man is is made to know it by saying a man is a reasonable Creature the addition of rationalitie vnto man shewes what man is So likewise when wee say God is a spirit infinite in all perfection we informe him that is ignorant and knowes not what God is In this very thing this art of Logick doth differ from all other arts whatsoever for Logick ends in speculation and proceedeth no further than to judge whether one thing be truly affirmed of another all other arts be practicall they concerne mans outward or transient actions as their next end as Grammar and Rhetoricke tendeth vnto mans speech Geometry vnto measuring Arithmetick vnto numbering c. That art saith Okam is practicall which directeth vs vnto the doing of a thing to be wrought In 3. dist q. 11. lit V. Yea in this mans knowledge differs from the knowledge that is in God and the Angels in that they behold the things in themselues as they are in themselues distinct each from other they doe not know one thing lesse knowne by the light and reflection of another thing that is better knowne wherefore their knowledge is called intellection ours is called rationalitie Well This word seemes vnto some to be superfluous and a man would thinke that the Iesuites were of that opinion because they define Logick to be no more but an art of discoursing coll 27. so Gillius lib. 1. Tra. 1. cap. 6. no. 4. yet indeed in other places they haue as much as this word comes to for thus they writein their Preface the last question col 70. He is a good Logician which doth exercise himselfe in each thing well and diligently and Suarez doth joyne with them in his Metaphysicks disp 39. D. Logick saith he is an art directing the operation of the vnderstanding to exercise itselfe artifically and according to reason And all these Authors doe adde that word to very good purpose for thereby Logick is distinguished from Sophistry which is onely a deceiving science A Sophister seemes to know but indeede knowes not in the truth of the thing as we learne from Aristotle in his Metaphysicks lib. 4. cap. 2. text 4. And thus much shall suffice for the opening of the severall parts of the definition of Logick That wee may put a finall end to the matter in hand wee must remember that the word discoursing implyeth arguments wherefore wee must now see what an argument is An argument is that Ramus which hath a force to argue Altissidiorensis saith in his Preface lit F. an argument is a reason that giveth vs knowledge of a thing that is doubtfull Aristotle saith that arguments are such as whereby faith Logically may be made of the thing that is spoken of Poster lib. 1. Cap. 22. Logicè igitur c. That This word importeth the generall nature of an argument that is the thing which is common to arguments of every kinde
Creature seeth eateth sleepeth avoydeth knowne danger The plants grow vpright bring forth leaues and fruit in due season So doth it worke by it selfe in the intellectuall creature when man moues himselfe vnto doing by the direction of true reason and the vnrestrained and free choyse of the will Naturall things doe worke by accident when the instinct of nature is suppressed or diverted The intellectuall creature workes by accident when the iudgement of reason is erronious and the choyse of the will carried by a previall over-ruling power and all these doe fall out in case where nature meets with defection The vnderstanding is possessed with ignorance or the will haled by the naughtinesse of corruption and violence of temptation Lastly the secret providence of God which the Heathen called fortune makes the creature work by accident in all Cases when he workes against meanes as he did when he brought the people through the red Sea Exodus the 14. and as he doth in all miracles or when man intendeth one thing but another thing comes to passe of this we haue an example in the 45. of Genesis and 5. vers 37. 27. verse In this place they are sayd to sell Ioseph because they would be rid of him and in that Ioseph sayth God sent him into Aegypt to preserue their liues They were the efficient Cause of their owne preserving when they sold Ioseph but yet by accident through Gods secret providence that wrought contrary to their intent The Iewes likewise were the Cause of Christs glory and mans salvation when they delivered him to death but yet by accident because God himselfe did create light out of darknesse and made their evill intention serue vnto that good There be many examples wherein wee finde that the efficient cause doth worke on this manner but these are enough for this present The efficient doth worke Physically Morrally This distinction is received in all the Logick schooles and is of frequent vse in the question touching sanctification and the actuall motion of grace in mans conversion the Reader may find it in Suarez opusc 1. lib. 3. cap. 10. no. 1. and in many other places A Physicall operation is a reall influence into the effect we haue an example of this in mans creation He formed him and that of the dust and poured life into him all these be reall influences of this kinde are the builders of the Tower of Babell they made bricke and reard a building with bricke and stone Of this sort be all workemen that labour with their hands and tooles the strength of nature doth immediatly flow into the thing that is wrought making a reall and sensible change in the matter where on they worke A morall worke is a motion offered to the vnderstanding and serues to allure and draw it on with reasons and perswasion Of this kinde bee be all such things as be obiected to the vnderstanding as namely the testimonie of God and man by commanding forbidding promising threatning perswading therefore so often as wee finde any of these attributed to God or man wee are to know that then they are efficient causes that worke morally Ramus doth call Testimonies Exhortations Commandements c. inartificiall arguments because they argue not of their owne force but by the authoritie of him that doth testifie but this is altogether vnfitly spoken for inartificiall and argument implyes a contradiction if inartificiall then no argument if an argument then artificiall for an argument is a member of Art 2. These things themselues are no arguments vnlesse they be referred vnto the Testator but then they argue as properties or adjuncts and otherwayes they are never attributed to any subject In this place affirmation perswasion c. are not brought as morall causes in themselues but the causalitie is referred to him that affirmeth perswadeth c. which makes it very plaine that they belong to this place or seat of arguments God and his servants are the morall causes of mans holines when they command good and forbid ill when they promise good and threaten ill when they perswade vnto obedience and disswade from sinne thus our Saviour Christ is the morall cause of all supernaturall things when by his obedience he deserved that God should bestow them vpon vs he by meriting I say is the morall cause of Gods gifts because by his merits hee moveth God to bestow them and so much shall suffice for this distinction A Physicall efficient is Principall first second Instrumentall This distinction is very ancient in the schooles and of great vse when we desire to know how mans will is wrought vpon and worketh with the actuall motion of Gods grace Alvarez received it from Thomas and makes vse of it disp 68. no. 5. c. where hee doth thus describe each member of it A principall efficient is that which worketh out of its owne power or forme as Thomas sayth 1. p. q. 18. art 3. in cor A first principall efficient is that which worketh onely out of its owne power Thus God only worketh of whom it is sayd hee sitteth in Heaven and doth what he will He is the vniversall cause for in him we liue and mone and haue our being A second principall efficient is that which is so moved by another that it moveth it selfe by a power of its owne Of this sort is mans mind which is moved by God yet neverth lesse it worketh out of an actiue beginning remaining in it selfe Of this sort be all those sayings in the Scripture which attribute mans good workes as his conversion and the like sometimes vnto God alone and other sometimes vnto man alone An instrument properly taken and so we speake of it here is that which worketh onely out of a power received from the principall efficient of this kinde are all instruments without life as namely the tooles of a Carpenter or Smith c Thus hot water heateth another thing that is cold by the heate received from the fire To conclude the point touching the efficient cause wee are to know that the efficient Ramus alwayes worketh after one of these waies whether it works alone or with others whether it begins the worke or preserues it being alreadie made CHAP. VIII The matter Ramus is a Cause of which a thing is Matter This word is often times vsed to set out every bodily substance but it is not so taken in this place for as Thomas sayth 1. p. q. 7. art 1. in cor The matter as it is a matter remaineth onely in power or capacitie to receiue many formes and therefore according to it selfe hath no being nor can be obiected to our vnderstanding 1. p. q. 15. art 3. ad 3m. In this place it signifies a bodily substance informed or some intellectuall thing answerable vnto that A cause These words doe attribute an actiue power and actuall efficacy vnto the matter wherby the effect is produced Of which These words shew the nature of that efficacy and
the maner how the matter doth concurre vnto the effect and importeth the thing that so receiues the forme that it resteth and remaineth in it This we see in an house wherin the timber stone c. are framed and fashioned together and made fit for habitation so doth a peece of timber receiue the picture made vpon it by a carver A thing is By thing is meant the effect produced by Is is meant essentially so as the matter is a part of the essence viz. in a second degree or notion Wee conceiue the timber c. Of a house to be a part of it but we know that there is an other part therof more principall before that namely the forme fashion thereof A thing signifies an individuall effect so as the office of the matter is to bring the effect vnto asingular or individuall being thus all Philosophers doe conceiue of it The matter is the principium of individuation saith Thomas 1. p. q. 86. art 3. in cor And againe the essence is restrained vnto one individuall thing by the matter 1. p. q. 7. art 3. in cor We haue an instance of this in every singular creature Peter is a singular man by his body every plant is singular by the stem that groweth vp for they inioy all other things in common with therest of their kinds The soule of Peter hath the same rationalitie with all other mens soules no singular tree differs from other trees in vegititie Sanctitie makes men christians Peters sanctitie makes Peter a christian because the holy Ghost dwels in his mortall body This argument brings the subiect to which it is attributed vnto our cleere vnderstanding and it is of singular vse to make vs know the nature and distinction of particular beings Yea of absolute necessitie for that I may vse the words and reason of Aristotle Meta. Lib. 2. Cap. 1 text 11 It is not possible to know vntill wee come vnto indiuidualls It is impossible to know vntill we ataine vnto those things which doe not admit division for things that are infinite cannot possibly be comprehended by our vnderstandings We haue a pregnant example of it in the 1. Cor. 15.39 c. Where the Apostle doth describe and destinguish diuers kinds of singular bodies and saith some be celestiall as the Sunne Moone and stars Other some be terrestriall and those be spirituall as mans body that is raysed other some be naturall viz the flesh of men beasts and birds and from hence he deliuers the nature and difference of glory that these particular beings doe inioy Likewise the holy Ghost Reuel 21 18. c. Makes vs know what the new Ierusalem is by the matter thereof The examples of this kinde are very frequent and well knowne to every man therefore I take this to be sufficient for the explication of the materiall cause CHAP. IX Of the formall Cause A forme is a Cause Ramus by which a thing is that which it is Forme As I sayd of the matter so must I say of the forme If it be considered in it selfe abstracted from all matter and individualitie it is a certaine thing common vnto many so Thomas truly sayth 1. p. q. 7. art 1. in cor 2. Vnder the name forme sometimes is comprehended a figure which consisteth in the termination of a quantitie This also I haue from Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 1. ad 2m. But wee take not this word at this time in either of these sences By forme then wee here vnderstand the intrinsicall part of the compounded effect so sayth Suarez meta disp 10. sect 1. no. 7. that is Received of the matter informing the same Thus saith Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 1. in cor A forme saith Thomas is Generall A forme saith Thomas is Speciall A speciall forme is that which informs the subiect but it selfe is not informed by any other forme of the same nature as one colour is not informed by another colour 2. dist 27. q. 1. art 2. ad 1m. Forme in this place is taken in the second sence not in the first Wee haue an example of this in the rationalitie of man and vigiditie of plants both of them are formes and distinct beings not receiving any thing from other formes of their kinde Is a Cause That is it hath actuall exercised force to inferre the effect By which These words doe shew that the force of the forme is not receptiue nor retentiue nor restrictiue as the force of the matter is but it is actiue for as Aristotle saith Meta. lib. 9. cap. 6. text 17. The forme is an act that is an actuall determinate and actiue being the Reader may see this matter fully opened by Gillius col 467. A thing is By these words the essence of every individuall effect is attributed to the formall cause every thing that doth actually exist saith Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 2. in cor hath some forme and againe every being is caused by the forme thereof 1. p. q. 51. art 4. in cor That which These words doe attribute the whole effect vnto the forme and this is agreed vpon by the learned in all ages Each thing is that which it is by its forme thus Thomas thinketh 1. p. q 5. art 5. ad 3m. in cor The whole compound is the effect of the forme in the iudgement of Okam 1. dist 32. q. 1. 2. lit C. And this sentence agrees well with the nature of the thing for the matter doth finite and contract the amplitude of the forme and thereby it becomes the determinate forme of this or that individuall effect The forme on the other side doth perfit and determine the matter and bring it from power to act by giuing an essence thereunto in so much that by the forme the essence is termined vnto some speciall kinde And thus much wee receiue from Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 1. et 3 in cor q. 14. art 2. ad 1m. This argument is of necessary vse to instruct our vnderstandings in the knowledge of the subiect to which it is attributed for how can we know a thing more cleerely and certainely then when wee finde the intrinsicall primary and proper nature and being thereof It is all one saith Aristotle 2. post cap. 8. to know the nature of a thing and to know the cause of its nature Wee haue examples of this kinde of Cause in the word of God and the nature of the Creature when God would shew vs what sinne is he doth set it out by the forme thereof Sinne sayth the Apostle Iohn 1. Epist chap. 3. v. 4. Is a varying from the Law The Apostle Paul when he would set out what the righteousnesse of faith is he doth describe it in his Epistle to the Romans ch 4. v. 6.7.8 by forgiuenesse of sinnes The holy Ghost doth yeeld vs many of these examples but these shall suffice In man we haue a full representation of every part of this Argument Wee
whether it be by the substracting of something inioyed or the receiving of something that is added The nature of these effects and subiects is delivered by Aristotle in his tenth place or seat of arguments viz. of suffering I say they are contained there for in the judgement of Thomas 1. p.q. 79. art To suffer is no more but to lose things inioyed whether appertaining to nature or not appertaining thereto or to be brought from power to act and therefore Aristotles tenth seat of suffering importeth the whole nature of every individuall effect and subiect as it is an effect and subiect Now I conceiue that this is wholy agreeable vnto Aristotles meaning because in his doctrine of predicated arguments hee speakes not a word of effects and subiects This Doctrine is peculiar to Aristotle Ramus doth not acknowledge it for he hath not a word of it It may bee he conceived that 1. To set downe all the seats of arguments in one place together would breed a needles repetition 2. These single termes did not appertaine to Logick 3. The first substance or thing subiected in every sentence hath not the nature of an argument It is very likely that he thought thus because this doctrine of Aristotle hath beene anciently receiued therefore hee would not depart from it vnles hee had some reason for it and I conceiue he had no reason but these 3. I answer these three arguments bee insufficient The first because Aristotle doth neuer repeat or handle these ten seates of arguments twise but in stead of them sometime hee brings in the doctrine of a definition Propertie Genus Accident as the things which are contained in those ten seates of arguments and this wee finde in the 8. and 9. chapters of the first booke of his Topicks Some other time he sets out the nature of other arguments but they are such as are either contained in these 4. or arise from them and at most hee doth but explicate at large the same things that he had set downe summarily in the 10. places aforesaid Neither is the second reason good for those 10. things are propounded not as meâ—re and simple beings but in respect of that reflection or relation which ariseth out of them vnto our vnderstanding for he doth intend them as they may bee fit to argue and serue vnto the framing of disputations either in single propositions or in syllogismes as himselfe expresly sheweth in the 8. and 9. chapters alledged and this is also evident by the properties which he assigneth vnto them viz They containe truth or falshood affirmation or negation when one of them is attributed to the other The third also is insufficient for the first substance or subiect part of every sentence hath truly and properly the nature of an argument for it hath a relation or emanation vnto many things that may be added or attributed to it so as we conceiue it to be a receptiue thing 1. of the causes wherof it is compounded and constituted 2. of the properties flowing from it 3. and of outward additions whereby it is beautified and made to differ and dissent from other and whereby it is made equall or vnequall like or vnlike vnto others as we shall playnly see when we come to the particulars and it is plaine that Aristotle vnderstood that argument which he calls the first substance after this sort for in the sayd 5 chapter of his Categories he sayth it is proper vnto the first substance to receiue contraries as sicknes and health blacknes and whitnes and thereby to be changed from well to ill from white to blacke The onely doubt is whether an individuall effect and subiect bee some wayes predicated or not Ramus sayth yea and brings them as predicated arguments Aristotle doth not so and no doubt he hath the truth No indiuiduall effect is predicated I haue three reasons for it first we neuer find any such predication in the formall writings in the schooles 2. No man can say this indiuiduall thing consisting of soule and bodie is this man for the predicate is lesse knowne then the subiect The subiect engendreth distinct and certaine knowledge because it comprehendeth all the causes but no man will say so of the predicate nor so much 3. The authority of the schools is against it I will alleadge Thomas for them all An integrall whole sayth he 1. p. 1. 77. art 1. ad 1m. is not predicated of all the parts together vnles improperly as when we say these walls this foundation and roofe is this house For the subiect the matter is yet more cleere we cannot say this learning is this man Thomas sayth truly 1. p. q. 29. art 3. ad 3 m Accidents doe mans est the subiect but hee neuer sayd nor any man else that the subiect doth manifest the accident and no maruaile why for if the subiect be predicated of the accident then we must conceiue that the accident is without and before the subiect but no man will say so therfore we may conclude the indiuiduall effect and subiect are fitly comprehended vnder the name of a first substance Thus I haue set downe and explicated the generall nature of arguments and the speciall nature of that argument which is alwayes subiected or argued In the next place I come to those arguments which be alway predicated CHAP. IIII. The distribution of predicated Arguments Arguments be Positiue Consenting absolutely Ramus after a sort Dissenting Comparatiue A positiue argument is that which 〈◊〉 attributed simply and absolutely considered in it selfe not compared with others A consenting argument is that which is predicated of the subiect affirmatiuely I Finde this doctrine of positiue arguments deliuered by Aristotle also and I will shew it in his doctrine of consenting arguments in the second chapter of his Categortes hee sayth some arguments be of the subiect and other some in the subiect those I say be in the subiect which are no parts of it nor can be without that thing in which they are The same thing is taught by Thomas yet more plainly 1. p. q. 25. art 6. In. cor Some arguments saith he be of the essence and other some without the essence of the subtect of which they are predicated I say this of Thomas and that of Aristotle are the same with the last two branches of Ramus his division or at least it is comprehended in them for those that be of the essence doe absolutely agree with the subiect of whose essence they be They that be in the subiect but without the essence therof doe agree to the subiect after a sort seeing therefore they agree in those two last branches they must agree also in the former branches of the division seeing every argument that agrees absolutely doth consent positiuely with the subiect of which they be predicated and consequently it is enough to the vnderstanding of the whole if we doe explicate and prosecute those two last branches and because I suppose that the