a Fee upon a Fee is not yet plainly determined but it will be soon found out if men shall set their Wits on work to contrive by Contingencies to do that which the Law has so long laboured against the thing will make it self Evident where it is Inconvenient and God forbid but that Mischief should be obviated and prevented I have done with the legal Reasons of the Case it is fit for us here a little to observe the Equitable Reasons of it and I think this Deed is good both in Law and Equity And the Equity in this Case is much stronger and ought to sway a man very much to incline to the making good this Settlement if he can For 1. It was prudence in the Earl to take care that when the Honour descended upon Henry a little better support should be given to Charles who was the next Man and trode upon the heels of the Inheritance 2. Though it was always uncertain whether Thomas would die without Issue living Henry yet it was morally certain that he would die without Issue and so the Estate and Honour come to the younger Son for it was with a careful circumspection always provided that he should not Marry till he should recover himself into such estate of body and mind as might suit with the honour and dignity of the Family 3. It is a very hard thing for a Son to tell his Father that the provision he has made for his younger Brothers is void in Law but it is much harder for him to tell him so in Chancery And if such a provision be void it had need be void with a vengance it had need be so clearly void that it ought to be a prodigie if it be not submitted to Now where there is no perpetuity introduced no cloud hanging over the Estate but during a Life which is a common possibility where there is no inconvenience in the Earth and where the Authorities of this Court concur to make it good to say all is void and to say it here I declare it I know not how to do it To run so Counter to the Judgment of that great man my Lord Keeper Bridgman who both advised this settlement and when he was upon his Oath in this place decreed it good I confess his Authority is too hard for me to resist though I am assisted by such learned and able Judges and will pay as great a Deference to their Opinions as any man in the World shall If then this shall not be void there is no need for the Merger by the Assignment or the Recovery to be considered in the Case For if so be this be a good limitation of the Trust and they who had notice of it will palpably break it they are bound by the Rules of Equity to make it good by making some Reparation Nay which is more if the Heir enter upon the Estate to defeat the Trust that very Estate doth remain in Equity infected with the Trust which was the Case of my Lord of Thomond so also was the Resolution in Jackson and Jackson's Case So that to me the Right appears clear and the Remedy seems not to be difficult Therefore my present thoughts are that the Trust of this Term was well limited to Charles who ought to have the Trust of the whole Term Decreed to him and an account of the mean profits for the time by past and a recompence made to him from the Duke and Marryot for the time to come But I do not pay so little Reverence to the Company I am in as to run down their solemn Arguments and Opinions upon my present Sentiments and therefore I do suspend the Inrolment of any Decree in this Case as yet but I will give my self some time to consider before I take any final Resolution seeing the Lords the Judges do differ from me in their Opinions De Termino Pasch anno 34. Car. II. Ro. In Cancell Sabbati 13 die Maij. Howard Versus Le Duc de Norfolk THis Day was appointed for final Judgment in this cause and it being called Mr. Serjeant M. moved My Lord we depend upon your Lordship in that cause for your Opinion Mr. S. G. My Lord in the Case of Howard against the Duke of Norfolk I do not know whether I may have the Liberty to move this that I am going to offer It stands now in the Paper now for your Lordships Judgment and therefore I speak this that I now offer with great submission if your Lordship will please to hear it If you will please to allow my Lord of Arundel's Counsel the liberty of offering any thing further in the Cause Possibly it will not become them to offer any thing that hath been said but if they may be permitted to argue some new matter if they can find any Therefore we that are for my Lord of Arundel desire the liberty of having some little time till Mr. Keck who is of my Lords Counsel but at present indisposed and has not yet been heard can come which we hope will not be long We hope it will be no prejudice to this Cause which has had so long an agitation to stay a few days longer A Weeks time sure will break no squares Lord Chancellor I did appoint the first Tuesday in the Term to deliver my Opinion in this Case for I desire to rid my hands of it But Mr. Keck who was then at the Bar did pray that he might argue it once more for the Defendant and my Lord Duke of Norfolk having never been heard by Mr. Keck I was willing to hear him For it was a Cause of moment and difference of Opinions and there are so many short-hand Writers that nothing can pass from us here but it is presently made publick and tho' a Man doth not speak in Print yet what he says shall be immediately put in Print therefore because Mr. Keck desired it and to justify my own Opinion tho' I had appointed the first Tuesday in the Term yet I gave till this day It is but reason Mr. Keck should be heard who has not yet argued it and if any Man can convince me I am in an error or make it appear to me that I am mistaken in the Law in the Opinion I have given which as yet I see no cause in the World to change God forbid but I should hear them but on the other side this cause must not everlastingly be put off because my Lord Dukes Counsel are not here Therefore I will give you a Weeks time further but upon this Day sevennight come or not come I will give my Judgment in the Cause Mr. Serj. M. If your Lordship pleases to put it upon the other side unless they shew cause then the Opinion your Lordship has given to stand Lord Chancellor If my Opinion which is under the prejudice of being contrary to that of the three Chief Judges can be refuted I am not ashamed to retract any error I
THE Duke of Norfolk's CASE OR THE DOCTRINE OF PERPETUITIES Fully set forth and Explain'd Printed Anno Dom 1688. TO THE READER Courteous Reader THis Case in all its parts hath been Collected with all the Care imaginable by several good Hands and what grand agitation it received is not unknown to any that know Westminster-Hall It may be recommended to the World for Publick use upon that score alone For what can be more reasonably thought to please and take with Men of Judgment in any Profession than to peruse the Skill and Arts that have been curiously and with as great integrity made use of by men of the most Famous Reputation in what they profess Besides too if thou dost but consider the great Deliberations and the mighty Cautions that have been always used by all Persons concern'd in the Conduct Debate and Judgment of this Cause till after many Debates and Hearings at the Bar it came to receive its final Judgment in the highest Court of the Kingdom before the Lords in Parliament assisted by all the Judges of England Thou wilt certainly conclude That no unkind acceptance ought to demur upon this Case Here is variety of Learning manifest in the sundry Conceptions of Great and Learned Men but the Nicety lies chiefly upon the Doctrine and Explication of that abstruse Notion in Law called Perpetuities concerning which the Sage Opinions introductive to this Case of the great Council will better instruct thee that were prudently taken by both Parties before the Cause commenc'd and undoubtedly serve and answer the True Ends of a Preface infinitely beyond what thou canst expect from me Their Opinions in Private are always delivered with as much Candour and Caution as their Arguments at the Bar. And the one may be truly said to be of as great use to the Publick when their Opinions can be had if the Cause be Meritorious and will bear it as the other Reader it will be wholly impertinent to hold thee here and I should run my self upon an absolute necessity if I should detain thee longer from the fruition of those delicacies I present thee of troubling thee with my impertinent Complements for presenting thee with a needless and impertinent Epistle Wherefore enter in see it thy self and peruse it for thy profit and satisfaction Farewell THE Duke of Norfolk's CASE A. Bargains and Sells to L. the Barronies of Gr. and 20 Martii 1647. Br. for 10 Months A. Grants the Reversion of those Baronies to 21 Martii 1647. R. and D. and their Heirs to the use of A. for life Remainder to E. the Wife of A. for life Remainder to R. and D. c. for 200 years upon trusts to be declared by another Deed of the same date Remainder to H. H. his second Son and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to C. H. his third Son and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to E. H. his fifth Son and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to A. H. his sixth Son and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to B. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to the right Heirs of A. L. Attornes Tenant to R. and D. c. A. makes another Deed declaring the Trust of the Term 21 Martii 1647. for 200 years reciting it and the uses in the last-mentioned Settlement says in the reciting part That 't is intended that the Term should attend the Inheritance the Profits be received by H. H. and the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue such other persons who according to the limitation of Uses should have had them if no such term had been so long as T. H. Eldest son of A. or any Issue Male of his body shall live But in case T. H. die without Issue of his body in the life of H. H. not leaving his Wife ensient with a Son or that after the death of E. H. by failure of Issue Male of T. H. the honour of A. should descend on H. H. then H. H. and his Heirs to be excluded of the Trust then the Indenture witnesseth that the Term shall be upon the Trusts and under the restrained Limitations and Proviso's after-mentioned viz. If T. H. or any Issue Male of his body be living in trust for H. H. and the Heirs Males of his body until by the death of T. H. without Issue Male and not leaving his Wife ensient with a Son or after his death by failure of Issue Male the honour of A. descends to H. H. and in case the Honour shall not descend to H. H. that after the death of H. H. the Trust shall be for the Heirs Males of H. H. and for default of such Issue in trust to permit such other persons and their Issue Male respectively to whom the Free-hold or Inheritance is limited by the former Deeds to take the profits as if no such Lease were And in case the Honour of A. descend upon H. H. then the Trust for H. H. and his Issue Male to cease And then as to the Barony of Gr. in trust for T. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to T. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to F. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to B. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to H. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to the right Heirs of A. the Father And as to the Barony of Br. as to one third part of it in trust for E. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to F. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to B. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to T. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to H. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to the right Heirs of A. And as to another third part of the Barony in trust for F. H. and the Heirs Males of his body with like Remainders to the other Brothers ut supra Remainders to the right Heirs of A. And as to the other third part in trust for B. H. and the Heirs Males of his body with the like Remainders to the rest of the Brothers ut supra A. died in 1652. E. the Wife of A. died in 1673. and then the term of 200 years commenced D. the surviving Trustee at the request of H. H. assigned 20 Novemb. 1675. the term to one Marriot Marriot assigned the term to H. H. 1 Dec. 1675 H. H. by Bargain and Sale enrolled sells to M. to make him 24 Octob. 1675. Tenant to the Precipe for suffering a Recovery The use of the Recovery declared to be to H. H. and his 25 Octob. 1675. Heirs T. H. the eldest Son of A. died without Issue or having ever Nov. 1677. been married Query If the Trust to H. H. be good and the other Trusts limited to the other Brothers on the Contingent in case T. H. died whereby
may be convinced of but truly at present I see no colour to retract it Mr. Serj. M. We pray then my Lord that we may have this right done for us who are for Mr. Howard the Plaintiff that they on the other side will let us know what particular points we must go upon for if they come at large we may not perhaps be so well provided to answer them Lord Chancellor I suppose they can say nothing to any point but that which is the main point in the Case the limitation of the remainder of a springing Trust after the Entail of a Term that is to determine upon a contingency that expired in the time of a Life a point which was never argued for Mr. Howard at the Bar nor stirred by the Counsel Mr. Serj. M. I hope we for Mr. Howard shall be heard to justify your Lordships Opinion Lord Chancellor What hath been said here at the Bench on both sides has been taken in Short-hand and made publick I know the Counsel on both sides hath seen it or will see and look into it well and if they can give me any reasonable satisfaction that I am in the wrong I shall easily recede from it But upon any thing yet offered I am of the same mind I was As to the Learned Judges that assisted me at the hearing the Decree is mine and the Oath that Decree is made upon is mine theirs is but Learned Advice and Opinion And therefore if they can satisfy my Conscience that they are in the right and I not well and good if not I must abide by that Decree I have made according to my Conscience And I will repeat this to you I go upon these Heads for my Opinion and I would be glad any body would answer them I say it is against natural Justice to say that a Man who hath no Estate but what consists in Terms shall be disabled from settling his Estate so as to provide for the contingencies in his Family that are in immediate prospect I say it is a common Case A Man that is less for Years assigns his Term in Trust for himself until such a Marriage take effect and after to himself for Life to his Wife for Life with remainder in Tail to his Children Is that springing Trust upon the contingency of the Marriage good or not If it be not good then what will become of a great many Marriage settlements If it be good then why not in this Case as well as that And I would fain know what difference there is between the Case as it is at the Bar and if it had been limited thus If my Lord Arundel had said that if Thomas Die without Issue Living Henry then the Term for 200 Years in Tail should cease and a new Term should arise upon the same Trust for Charles that it seems had been well enough is there any sense in the World that can lead a reasonable Man to conclude why there should not be a new springing Term upon the same Trust I cannot see any reason to run this Case down upon the single authority of Child and Baylie's Case which was such a resolution as never had its like before nor since but contradicted by several resolutions as have been cited particularly Wood and Saunders Case in this Court in my Lord Bridgmans time These are the grounds my present apprehensions go upon but I will hear Mr. Keck if it may be in any reasonable time and give the respect to the Duke of Norfolk that he shall not be surprized tho' withall I must do Mr. Howard the Justice that he be not eternally delaid Then the Day sevennight was appointed but upon the continuance of Mr. Kecks illness it was put peremptorily for Judgment on the first Saturday in the next Term. De Termino Trin. Anno Regis Car. II. 34 in Cancell Howard vers le Duc de Norfolk Sabbati 17 Junii Anno Dom. 1652. MY Lord we have nothing to do in that Mr. Serj. M. Cause but to pray your Judgment Mr. S. G. My Lord we were in great hopes to have had other Assistances to day but it seems we are disappointed of them That which I shall humbly offer is but short We are by your Lordships favour permitted now to offer something if we can to answer the objections which your Lordship made and which were the ground of your Opinion We did apprehend them to be these that Child and Baylie's Case was not the same with this Case and that the Case of Wood and Saunders is the last resolution of this Nature and will rule this We do my Lord humbly with submission offer these Reasons why the first Case is the same with this and the other difference from it Child and Baylie's Case my Lord tho' it doth differ in some Circumstances yet it differs in no one that doth immediately concern the Limitation For the Circumstances wherein they Differ was the Length of the Term being almost Expired the Conveyances over to several Purchasers and at the end of the Term the resolution taken But tho' it differs in these Circumstances yet these have no influence upon the Limitation or the Construction of Law upon the Limitation Now the Limitation is the same there as it is here for there it is to one for Life and to his Son during the whole Term and if he die without Issue during the Life of his Father and Mother then the remainder over this remainder was adjudged void This is the same Case with ours for in the Case the first remainder actually vested in William the Son for it was to him and his Assigns during the whole Term and if he die without Issue Living Father and Mother then over This remainder I say was adjudged void he was actually seized of the whole Interest which being vested in him could not be devested upon the contingent Limitations over upon his death without Issue living Father and Mother It is the same in our Case the Duke of Norfolk has the Interest of this Estate by the Limitation in Tail actually vested in him and then it cannot be devested by the rule of Child and Baylie's Case upon the Contingency of Thomas's dying without Issue in the Life of Henry which is during the Life of the now Duke of Norfolk And in this respect the Case of Wood and Saunders is not the same It is a Limitation to the Father and Mother for Life and for 60 years if they so long live then to John the Son if Living at the time of the Death of Father and Mother the whole Term. My Lord this was not a vesting the Estate in John the Son but a Contingent Limitation that he should take or not If he were Living at the time of the Death of Father and Mother then he should take If not he should not take There was no Interest vested in him till the Contingency hapned and so the Limitations will be different And that
for I pretend not to be Infallible but that is a thing I cannot help Upon the whole matter I am under a Constraint and under an Obligation which I cannot resist A Man behaves himself very ill in such a place as this that he needs to make Apologies for what he does I will not do it I must Decree for the Plaintiff in this Case and my Decree is this That the Plaintiff shall enjoy this Barony for the residue of the Term of two hundred years the Defendant shall make him a Conveyance accordingly because he extinguished the Trust in the other and the Term contrary to both Law and Reason by the Merger and Surrender and common Recovery And that the Defendants do account with the Plaintiff for the profits of the premisses by them or any of them received since the Death of the said Duke Thomas and which they or any of them might have received without wilful default and that it be referred to Sir Lacon William Child Knight one of the Masters of this Court to take the said Accompt and to make unto the Defendants all just allowances and what the said Master shall certifie due the said Defendants are to pay unto the Plaintiffs according to the Masters Report herein to be made And that the Defendants shall forthwith deliver the possession of the Premisses to the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff shall hold and enjoy the said Barony of Greystock with the Lands and Tenements thereto belonging for the residue of the said Term of two hundred years against the Defendants and all claiming by from or under them And it is further Ordered and Decreed that the said Defendants do Seal and Execute such a Conveyance of the said Term to the Plaintiff as the Master shall approve of in Case the parties cannot agree the same but the Defendants are not to pay any Costs of the Suit. Die Veneris 19 Junii 1685. AFter hearing Council two several days upon the Petition and Appeal of Charles Howard Esq shewing that his Father intended a Provision for his younger Children by Deed made by advice of eminent Council and did settle the Barony of Greystocke and other Lands of the value of 500 l. per annum in Trustees in order thereunto and that after a long Suit in Chancery wherein the Petitioner was Plaintiff against his Grace the late Duke of Norfolk the Marquess of Dorchester Henry Lord Mowbray and Richard Marriott Esq Defendants the Cause coming to be heard before the Lord Chancellor Nottingham on the 17th of June in the Four and Thirtieth Year of His late Majesties Reign of Glorious Memory who after several Days hearing did declare his Opinion to be That the Petitioner had a good Title to the Barony of Greystocke and other the Lands in question and Decreed the Defendants to account to him for the Profits thereof by them received after the Death of Thomas late Duke of Norfolk which Decree was signed and enrolled and the Petitioner actually vested in the Possession of the said Mannors and Premisses and further sheweth That the Defendants the late Duke of Norfolk the Lord Mowbray now Duke of Norfolk and Richard Marriott exhibited a Bill of Review into the High Court of Chancery for reversing the said Decree to which the Petitioner put in a Plea and Demurer which being argued on the 15th of May in the Five and Thirtieth Year of the Reign of our late King Charles the Second before the Right Honourable the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England who after hearing Council on both sides over-ruled the said Plea and Demurrer and reverst the Decree aforesaid and ordered a Writ or Writs of Restitution to be directed to the Sheriffs of Cumberland and Westmerland to put the Plaintiffs in the Bill of Review in Possession which accordingly was done as in the Petition amongst other things is suggested and prayed a Reversal of the last Decree as also upon the Answer of the Right Noble Henry Duke of Norfolk Earl Marshal of England and Richard Marriot Esq put in thereunto And after due Consideration had of what was offered at the Bar by Council on either part thereupon IT is ordered and adjudged by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled That the said Decree made in the High Court of Chancery on the 15th of May in the Five and Thirtieth Year of the Reign of the late King Charles the Second of Glorious Memory in behalf of the late Duke of Norfolk and the now Duke of Norfolk and Richard Marriott Esq be and is hereby reversed and that the Decree made in the said Court of Chancery on the 17th of June in the Four and Thirtieth Year of His late Majesties Reign in behalf of Charles Howard Esq the now Petitioner Be and Is hereby affirmed JOHN BROWNE Cler. Parl. FINIS
upon the death of the party to whom the term was so given it shall go to his Executors as a Chattle and not to his Heirs Male. 2. I do conceive it will not be denied by any that if there be a long term for years for a 1000 years more or less in trust and a man purchases or settles the Inheritance to the use of himself for life the Remainder in Tail the Remainder in Fee and declare that the trusts of the term shall wait upon those Estates and fall in with them But that this trust of the term shall go along with all the Estate and shall not be merged in any of them and this trust shall not go to an Executor but shall go along with the Estate and if the tenant in tail dye without Issue it shall go along with the next Remainder man in tail and after his death without Issue it shall go to him in Fee simple and attend all the Estates in Remainders be they never so many And this I conceive is the common course in Chancery to incorporate such trusts to go with all the Estates This is not an absolute Trust for Henry and the Heirs Male of his body but a limited and qualified Trust as long as Duke Thomas's elder Brother lived and hath Heirs Males of his body and until the Earldom of A. doth come unto him so as by the death of Duke Thomas without Issue the Trust to Henry which was but a limited Trust is now determined and vanquished as to Henry As this was a contingent trust in Henry but in Case Tho. was alive and had issue when the term was to begin so the continuance and duration of the trust of the term was but to last until the Earldom came unto him and it is the stronger for that this trust ends in Henry by way of Limitation Query How long shall Henry and his Issue have this Trust Answ Until Thomas die without Issue Male and the Earldom of A. come unto him both which hath happened so as the trust for Henry and his Issue is ended by way of limitation and is now disposed over to others as it may well be so as this is a new Trust that by a contingent subsequent Declaration takes away the Trust from Henry and settles a new Trust in the younger Children and it is to be considered that Henry is to have the Trust of this term not so long as he shall have Issue but so long as the Lord Maltravers shall have Heirs Male so as that makes it a collateral Limitation or Determination of the said Estate 4. The Equity and Justice of this Trust carries much weight with me and that condition the Lord Maltravers was in It was fit to settle the Trust in Henry so long as the Lord Maltravers had Heirs Male of his body and if they failed and that the Earldom of A. and great accession of Estate to come to Henry it was a great reason that the younger Children should be provided for and taken notice of And it will not be easie to blow off and overthrow a Trust in a Court of Equity contrary to the express mind and intention of him that made it for the provision of they younger Children especially it being made with so much Justice and Reason wherein he hath both a respect for his Honours Family and younger Children Obj. There is no Objection against all I have said which seems prima facie to carry weight with it and that is when the legal interest is come to Henry and he is Tenant intail in possession and suffers a common Recovery and bars all the Remainders Intail Query How can this trust which is an Accessary follow Estates Answ To which I answer first If the Trust had been to follow and wait upon the Estate this Objection had been the stronger but this trust is not absolutely to wait upon Henry's Estate but so long as Duke Thomas hath Heirs Male of his body and until the Earldom of A. come to him both which are happened he continues still Tenant Intail and yet this Interest is determined in the trusts Secondly this is a future contingent Interest that now is happened to the younger Brothers which cannot be barred and it may be resembled to Pell and Brown's Case 2 Cro. 590 591. A man demiseth his Land to his second Son Thomas and his Heirs and if he die without Issue leaving William his elder Brother then William should have it in Fee it was adjudged that this was a Fee Simple in Thomas the second And though regularly one Fee cannot descend on another yet this being a future contingent Interest that the Devise of the Fee Simple to William his eldest Son. Another great Question was Thomas the second Son suffered a common Recovery whether this did not bar the future contingent possibility of William And it was adjudged it did not Now here is as much a future contingent possibility of a Trust as there was of an Estate and more and therefore there is much reason that the future contingent possibility of a Trust should not be barred by a common Recovery as in that Case And as to that which is said that an Accessary cannot be without a substance and the Estates of the younger Children is to succeed and yet they have no proper Estate for Henry is now Tenant so as this is a personal trust for the younger Children independent of their Estates and if so then clearly this Recovery cannot bar their Estates Another reason why a Court of Equity should help and interpose in this Case may be because the Estate for years was conveyed by Marriot in breach of the Trust which a Court of Equity ought to maintain and support as much as they can First Because Marriot and the now Duke are not Purchasers for a valuable Consideration Secondly They came in with privity and had notice of the Trust And I conceive may and will notwithstanding these Acts make good these Trusts for the younger Children and if this be a new doubtful Case certainly I conceive it is the surest and safest way for a Court of Equity to make good the intention of him that made it and to preserve the Trust for the younger Children William Ellis 26 Feb. 1677. De Termino S. Hill. Anno Reg. Car. 2d Regis XXXIII XXXIV Anno Dom. 1681. Martis 24 die Jan. in Curia Cancellarii Howard versus Le Duc de Norfolk al. THis day being appointed for Judgement in this Cause the three Judges assisted the Lord Chancellor at the hearing viz. the Lord Chief Justice Pemberton the Lord Chief Justice North and the Lord Chief Baron Montague came into the Court of Chancery and delivered their Opinions Seriatim beginning with the Lord Chief Baron Montague and so upwards after whom the Lord Chancellor also delivered his Opinion The sum of all the Arguments as near as could be taken were as followeth The Argument of the
is the Ground that is drawn up in the Decretal Order of the Cause because this was a Contingent Limitation to John and that never hapning it is all one as if it had never been limited and amounts putting the Contingent Limitation which never hapned out of the Case to no more than a Limitation to the Father and Mother for Life the remainder over which is well enough This is that I have to offer and I humbly submit it to your Lordship Mr. Serj. M. And so we do and pray your Judgment Mr. R. I see they are pressing for your Lordships Judgment and I know not whether it will become me to interpose with any thing Lord Chancellor Say say for this is a Cause that deserves patience Mr. R. No Man my Lord can have any great encouragement to add any thing after all the Arguments that have been made in this Cause or can hope to offer that which will be very material and new but I desire to have leave to say this in short My Lord there be two Deeds by which this settlement is made as a provision for the second Son of this Family and the younger Children and therein it doth perhaps appear that if the Bulk of the Estate and the Honour should come to the second Son then the settlement of this part that is made upon the second Son was intended to come to the now Plaintiff and the younger Children This is the Intention of the two Deeds By the first Deed the Estate of Freehold and Inheritance is limited in Tail. By the second Deed the Trust is declared of the Term for 200 Years that is limited to Henry and so over And therein it differs from the Case of Wood and Saunders For the Trust of the Term doth vest in Henry till the Contingency happen but in Wood and Saunders Case there it is limited to the Father and Mother for 60 Years if they lived so long then to John and his Heirs Males in Case he survive his Father and Mother and the Trust to be assigned to him accordingly and if he die without Issue in the Life of the Father and Mother then to Edward his Brother No Man can say that ever any thing here did vest in John For it was but limited to him after his Father and Mother's life in case he survived them but it never vested in him and so it differs from this Case For here the Trust of the Term did vest in the Duke of Norfolk till the Contingency did happen And as that is the difference between the two Cases and I do apprehend it is a difference with great reason from Wood and Saunders Case so that which I infer from it is this That where the Trust of a Term is limited to a Man and his Issue and his Heirs Males and that vested in him if he die without Issue or which is much a stronger Case tho' the Contingency be restrained within the compass of a life or of a certain time that is to wear out in a reasonable distance yet coming after a Limitation in Tail cannot carry the remainder over For if you once admit it during one life you must admit it during twenty lives for the reason is the same as to twenty as it is to one if they be all in Being and perhaps the reason will be the same as to twenty lives all in Being and for the life of one person more Then if the Trust of a Term where it is once vested in Tail can never be well limited over tho' restrained within the Contingent distance of a reasonable time This Limitation to the Plaintiff can never be good My Lord I crave leave to offer your Lordship one Case or two suppose that a Term for Years or the Limitation of the Trust of a Term for Years for I think there is the same construction made of both be limited to J. S. and the Issue of his Body and if J. S. die without Issue within 100 Years for the purpose or within twenty Years then to go over to J. N. that cannot be apprehended to be good but void for there is no difference between 1000 or 100 or 20 Years yet 20 Years is but a reasonable time and not more in prospect than one or ten lives If a Man limit the Trust of a Term or a Term it self to J. S. and the Issue of his Body and if he die without Issue before 21. then to go over to J. N. This a reasonable distance of time and yet I believe this will not be allowed to be good and well limited over And the reason is where once a Term is limited to a Man and his Issue this in a reasonable construction of Law carries the whole Term for it was a good while before they gained the point of remainders after lives and if after it be said if he die without Issue within a 100 Years or before 21. that restriction will not help it as we think Then where is the reason or sense that it should be otherwise if he die without Issue in the life of another person Truly my Lord it is very hard to find out a true difference between the Cases where the Restriction is for the life of a certain person and where it is upon a certain number of Years My Lord I would put this Case upon Wood and Saunders Case which is the authority that is so much pressed upon us Suppose that Case had been thus to the Father for 60 Years if he so long live to the Mother for 60 Years if she so long live and then instead of that Limitation to John in Case he survived his Father and Mother suppose it had been to the first Son of the Father and Mother and the Heirs of his Body and if such first Son die without Issue in the life-time of his Father and Mother then it should go over to another person Had it then been good surely no. What is the difference Why this it being to John in case he survived his Father and Mother nothing vested But if it had been to the first Son and the Heirs of his Body and they have a Son there it differs for it is actually vested in him And there the Limitation over to a stranger would not be good even admitting the Case of Wood and Saunders to be uncontroulable Another Objection your Lordship made was about the necessary Limitations of the Trusts of Terms by Termers upon Marriage Settlements to a Mans self till the Marriage take effect and then to such and such uses and the Objection is why should it not be as good a Limitation of the Trust of a Term or of a Term it self as well as of an Inheritance That will not reach our Case therefore I need not say any thing to it whether it would be so or no. But suppose this Case there be two Brothers the Eldest hath no Children the younger Brother hath a Son and is a going to Marry