see that the most disloiall amongst them were not the most assured in the forces of their trecheries Amurath the second Mahymeth the second Baiazeth the second Selim the second were held the most subtile Princes of their race but we must grant that if those their wicked procedings thriued for a time it was more through the coldnesse and dissentions of the Christians when they should haue reuenged and repelled their iniuries then that we should therefore beleeue that it is well done to proue periured and disloiall Amurath the second made proofe of it to his cost and hauing receiued an ouerthrow at the handes of Ladislaus King of Polonia he speedily made peace with him and turned his forces against Caramania where whilest he was busied Ladislaus iudging so perswaded and backt by Pope Eugenius that hee should not doe amisse to falsifie his faith with a Barbarous Turke of so insolent a nature and so capital an enimie of Christendome as all breach of peace might seeme as a true performance thereof resolued to make war vpon him on the sodaine which proued so dangerous as Amurath was neere tumbling from the top of an high and glorious fortune to the lowest degree of misery so as his estate was neuer more shaken and endangered if the Christian army which followed their victory had not as I haue said disordered thēselues Whereupon the glory and triumph fell to the Infidels to the great misery and confusion of the Christians Selim the second hauing vnlooked for attempted vpon the Venetians to the preiudice of his vowed faith pulled vpon his necke the forces of the league had too late repented himselfe if God in regard of our sinnes had not in such sort sealed vp the eies of the Christians as they could not see nor make their benefit of the gate his diuine Maiesty had set open to a more high enterprise then the losse they receiued at Lepanto Soliman that was held the most wise Prince of all the Ottomans if wisdome be able to shine where there is no light of true faith and Christian beleefe hauing vnderstood at such time as he caused his army by Sea to fall downe towards Ottranto the yeare 1537. that Mercurin de Gatinaro and the Citizens of Castro were made prisoners after they had surrendred the place contrary to promise hee foorthwith commanded that they should be released saying that disloialtie to violate their faith and word once passed was not the meanes to win the hearts and likings of strange nations CHAP. VIII That he hath beene alwaies serued in his wars by good and valiant Captaines 1 Whether an experienced Commander and rawe Souldiers or experienced Souldiers and an vnskilfull Commander be the better 2 The first best allowed and the reasons 3 Examples heereof 1 IT is ordinarily disputed amongst Souldiers and martiall men which is the better a good Captaine emploied about the conducting of an armie consisting of raw Souldiers or an armie of old Souldiers committed to the command of a raw and vnexperienced Captaine 2 As for me if my opinion may carie credit amongst so many sufficient to decide this question I hold it better that a worthy and valiant Captaine should haue the charge of an armie of vntrained men without experience then that an armie of old Souldiers trained and beaten to the wars should be recommended to a Captaine yet a nouice and vnskild in the profession of armes The reasons proper for the maintaining of this proposition are so plaine to such as without being obstinate or passionate in behalfe of either party will entertaine them as they are not to be gainsaid for is it not much more fit and easie that a good Captaine make and fashion a campe of rawe Souldiers then that good and experienced Souldiers prepare and fashion their Captaine to the conduct of an armie who can without shame denie that an armie doth not rather obey the voice and command of their Captaine then the Captaine of his armie otherwise it were as they say to set the cart before the horse 3 Now we must come to such examples as may instruct and make cleere the truth of my proposition If we will as we ought examine how many times the Christians haue beene ouerthrowne by the Turkes we shall vndoubtedly finde that it hath euermore hapned rather through want of experience courage sufferance concord and authoritie in the Commanders then for any other default So at the battailes of Nicepolis for that such like Captaines did set light by the Turkes forces and tooke not a sufficient suruey of them they receiued a most shamefull ouerthrow a woorthy reward of their weake experience in not knowing how to fight with those barbarous nations whom they might well thinke wanted neither skill nor valour Did not Lewes king of Hungary by meanes of the Bishop of Tomerea who brought him almost to the slaughter indure the like disgrace at the battaile of Mogoria for want of experience in matter of warre and of iudgement sufficiently to discouer the enemies forces and the passages of the countrey where he was to buckle with him In like sort was not the vnskilfulnesse of the Italians cause of that victorie the Turkes gained at Grado who had then for their leader Homarbay Generall of the Turkish armie Also the yeare 1537. at Exechium Mahomet Iahiaoglis being Gouernour vnder Soliman of Belgrad and the frontiers of Hungarie in the time of king Iohn the great Caziauer losing his courage did he not abandone to spoile death and ruine a faire and strong armie which he commanded for the Princes of Germany and Italy some one troupe excepted which dishonorably togither with him saued themselues by flight Also before this heauie losse did not Anthony Grimani Generall of the Venetian armie faile of courage when with great aduantage he might haue charged the Turkes and put them to the woorse The very like want of experience and valour was seene in an other Venetian Generall who shamefully left the I le of Negropont to the spoile of the enemy To conclude haue not the Christians beene so many times put to the woorse neere about Buda for want of valiant and experienced Captaines as it cannot without griefe be related On the contrarie the Ottomans haue neuer suffered misfortune of warre at the least for lacke of authoritie command or wisedome in managing their armies for they themselues haue in person conducted them and beene present at all their high exploits and important enterprises by them atchieued They haue likewise euermore committed the charge of their difficult actions and affaires of warre to the most valiant and experienced Captaines amongst them whom they had formerly well knowen trained vp and exercised to such charges by infinite proofes of their courage and wisdome in most dangerous and difficult occasions In summe experience is that which perfecteth valor The Turkish Emperors haue alwaies giuen to their Captaines ample power commission freely to
sacked Xistis but they were not able to hold it so as the Turke hath repossessed himself of it The Muscouit doth not only defend himselfe from the incursions of the Turks but he oft times also skirmisheth with them commanding as he doth aboue an hundred and fifty thousand horse The King of Polonia likewise more mighty then the Muscouit is so strong as he will not take wrong but is able rather at all times to repell the violence of his enemy The house of Austria together with the aid of the Princes of Germanie hath wherewithall to make their party good and to oppose him the Venetians vnited with Italy and Spaine which in such a case will not abandon them are likewise able enough to defend themselues and hold their owne As for the king of Spain he is so mighty by sea and by land both of men and mony as he dareth vndertake himselfe to incounter the Turke in battaile much more to defend himselfe if assaulted The King of Fez is not anie way awed by him and is more strong then he at the least in Africke which he approued to the common hurt of Christendome by that ouerthrow and death of the King Don Sebastian of Portugall where so many Christians miserably ended their daies The last of those which abut vpon the Turke is Prester Iohn who hath hitherto behaued himselfe so honorably against him as he hath neuer shewed any token of fearing his forces So as being now vnable by reason of the concord stout opposition of his neighbours to gaine farther ground he must of necessity vnlesse God in regard of our sinnes be otherwise pleased begin to recoile and that greatnesse which he hath built vpon others ruines must decay and lessen since the matter which gaue the increase is on his part wanting 3 There is yet an other point which fortifieth this opinion and that is that all such Princes as confine vpon the Turke are by others example made more wise aduised and considerat then they were before the ruine of such as serued for a pray to the Ottomans whereby they will discreetly looke to themselues how they courageously hazzard their persons or estates at one battaile they will rather be content to stand vpon their defence attending while time beget some apparent occasion roundly and to the purpose to set vpon him 4 Againe there are at this day so many fortresses so strong and so well appointed as they are in a manner impregnable so as the Turke is not like to finde the way so open as heereto fore he did to carry them but if he should put himselfe vpon that hazardous enterprise of forcing them one by one it were as much as to become the author of his owne ruine 5 Neither ought any man in opposing this alledge the losse of Cypres since it hapned not so much through the Turkes power as because of the distance of Venice which was to supply them with men and munition A man may by a contrary argument say as much of the sauing of Malta speaking according to humaine causes for it was not protected either by the forces within it selfe or by the succor sent thither from other parts but only because the Iland was so far distant from Constantinople as the army could not in due time and season receiue their prouisions and bee refreshed as was requisite nor well imploie such as were sent thither If it would please God that the Turke might often make such voiages he would prepare vs faire occasions to attempt the reuenge of the outrages Christendome hath by him sundry waies receiued CHAP. V. By what kinde of causes the Empire of the Turkes might most easily faile 1 The power of the Turke not to be easily ouerthrowne by outward causes 2 The power of Princes estates bordering vpon the Turke as the Persians Tartarians Moscouits Polonians Germans Venetians Spaniards c. 1 AS wee haue at large intreated in the chapters going before by what causes all estates may be brought to their last end and ruine so are we now to come to that of the Ottomans as one of the greatest and examine by what inconueniences it may vndergoe a change I am of opinion that this their so raised greatnesse can hardly decay by vertue of outward causes seeing the Princes bordering vpon their estate are euery one in particular weake to assaile them as they might well doe if they were peaceably vnited 2 This weakenesse presupposed it followeth that it will proue a hard matter to ruine him by forraine force whose strength and meanes it is requisit we examine to inlighten this opinion First those that confine vpon the Turke next Africke are the King of Fez of Marocco and Prester Iohn next Asia the Sophi and the Tartarians in Europe the Duke of Muscouy the King of Polonia the Emperour the Venetians and the King of Spaine As for the King of Fez he hath men enow but small store of mony so as he hath not the meanes or ability to maintaine a lasting war Againe though I should suppose he were able to be at the charge yet I finde him naked of other things necessarie to aduantage himselfe vpon the Turke such as are places of strength to forward his proceedings and assure his retrait so as he is like enough to come short of his aime and if he should performe some worthy exploit in Africk doubtles the King of Spaine his neighbour would soone be iealous of his good fortune And in very deede this is not the point for it is all one with Christendome whether the King of Fez be too strong for the Turke or the Turke for the King of Fez since both are the Christians enemies As for Prester Iohn all the world knoweth he hath enough to doe to defend himselfe against the Turkes forces neither is it long since he wan from him all the hauens he had vpon the red sea and amongst others that of Archiech and Mazzua now for the Sophi if we search their histories we shall finde that the kings of Persia haue alwaies had the worse of the Turks among all other Mahomet the second ouercame Vsumcassan after him Selim the first did as much to Ismael whom he forced into the remotest parts of his country Tarmas also met with the like measure at Solimans hands and on the contrary we see that Cudabenda hath had such a hand of Amurath the third now raigning as he hath often vanquished his armies and now of late at Tauris and though he haue atchieued most worthy victories yet hath he nothing aduantaged himselfe In the Turkes country he hath not wan one fortresse of importance or ought else that might counteruaile the charge of his wars This hath succeeded in regard the Sophâ—is stroÌ„g of horse but vnprouided of foote which should be the principal force of such as besiege or defend Moreouer to force places of strength there is required great store of cannon other
vse of armes and that he hath brought them to this passe that they cannot vant to hold any thing in propriety which was not practised towards the aboue mentioned moreouer all assemblies vpon whatsoeuer cause are expresly forbidden them he keeps them vnder and makes no more reckning of them then of sheepe pend vp in a fould vsing them like brute beasts not once vouchsafing to imploy them in the wars The other reason is that they haue no power of themselues to oppose the Turkes so mighty forces and which is worst of all they neuer haue had any forraine succour to incourage them to such an enterprise 14 I will forbeare to diue any deeper into this subiect me thinkes we may see sufficiently by this how much more supportable are Cittadels then armies ordinarily intertained But if we speake of conquering I allow that armies are more to be preferred before fortresses considering that we thereby inioy meanes to embrace all occasions offered and at an instant to execute both the will and designe of a Prince so prouided 15. To say the truth it is that which the Ottamans haue practised to aduance their Empire to such greatnesse as at this day we see it it is that which hath heaped on them the honors of so many victories and which hath endowed them with authoritie reputation and meanes They haue alwaies had as they yet haue their armies in a readinesse and haue fought with their neighbours in a manner with as much aduantage as a man armed against one that is naked 16 Some I know will maruell how such a number of people so armed can containe themselues from reuolting I am of opinion that if they were not ordinarily imploied as they are in attempts of warre that in the end their multitudes growen ranke with quiet would easily be drawen to rebellion or mutinies which the souldiers of Alexander the Great can witnesse for whilest the enemy kept them in doings who were then they more hardy and valerous but after their victories who more insolent and vnsufferable The Roman armies how fortunate were they whilest they had continuall warre atchieuing all their interprises in a manner as they could wish but after their conquest they became so turbulent and vnquiet as they assumed to themselues the authoritie of creating Emperors and for the most part so licentiously as euery armie made his particular choise so as there was no remedie but to trie by fight who should carie it which occasioned the ouerthrow of the state The French haue they not euermore faithfully serued their king against strangers but so soone as they had peace with the English and after with the Spaniard they filled euery corner of their country with sedition sackings cruelties and slaughters and that with such obstinate persisting as the contagion thereof hath not beene able for 25. yeeres space to be remooued But that which is most to be lamented is the scandall they haue brought vpon the church This selfe thing may be appropriated to the Flemings and the cause may be imputed to idlenesse and the exceeding plentie wherein they liued The example of Bajazet the second shall serue to close vp this discourse for he being giuen ouer to his ease the soldiours who could not brooke such idlenesse so awaked the courage of his two sonnes Selim and Acomath as all the forces of the Empire which had established the Turkish scepter were diuided into two and it lacked not much of being vtterly ouerthrowne euery one for his part seconding the rebellions of the sonnes against the father CHAP. IIII. That he hath trained vp his soldiours to valour and hardinesse 1 Why the armies of these daies consist not of so good souldiers as in former times 2 Principall causes of victories 3 What care is to be had in leuying of good souldiers and this to be wrought by a fourefould meanes 4 By election 5 Exercise 6 Honors and profit 7 The Turkes proceeding heerein 1 IT is seldome seene that the armies of these times consist of good souldiours for the more we vary from the course our forefathers tooke to bring them to perfection by so much the more are we depriued of that happinesse which were to be desired and seriously sought after by Princes and those which as Commanders would reape honor and profite by the wars 2 Victory which dependeth of the diuine will deriueth her successe and principall ground from the multitude of men but especially from the wisdome of the Commanders and from the valour and generositie of the Souldiour 3 It is requisite then that we looke more narrowlie then we doe vnto their choice and that they be such as we may honour and profit our selues by them now we must deliuer how we may light vpon or make good and hardy souldiours which is doone in my opinion by a foure fold meanes by election exercise honor and profit 4 By election because all those which we leuie for the wars haue not that naturall inclination to valour and courage nor a constitution of bodie fit to indure the trauailes and dangers incident thereunto Moreouer a gallant fashion and spirite are not found in euery one much lesse a resolution to attend defie and assaile the enemy also euery mans hart will not serue him to enter the trenches throw himselfe desperatly into the dike scall the wals offer himselfe valiantly to make good a breach in despite of the Cannon of stones of wilde-fire and of death it selfe Their complexions perhaps will not brooke that they should spend the whole day in continuall turmoiles without eating and the night without rest so as where some make account that Antwerpe is able to make 30000. men Venice 40000. Gant 60000. Paris 100000. all fit and able to beare armes me thinkes they should be vnderstood that they are such as haue the age required but not the disposition proper to such a profession For proofe hereof haue we not of late seene that the Prince of Parma hath ranged vnder the obedience of the King of Spaine euen with small forces those of Gant Antwerp which had formerly together with those of the low countries rebelled against their Soueraigne The Romans held in such esteeme this manner of making choise of their Souldiours as when they would expresse a leuy of men they termed it Delectum agere vel habere to make a choise In our times no man hath beene more carefull and circumspect in the choise of his souldiours at the least of the Captaines of Italy then Cosmo de Medici Duke of Florence and indeede he was prouided of the best and most approued souldiours of his time 5 To election we are to adde exercise without the which there is no forwardnesse or constitution of body be it neuer so strong able to attaine to the perfection requisite to execute and accomplish as appertaineth to a good braue and noble souldiour 6 But if the Generall be so wise as to ioine to exercise profit and honor
in a matter which he had before discreetely enough plotted and disposed moreouer he cannot beare swaie as master of the confederate forces insomuch as he which sendeth succours may vnderhand deliuer to his Commanders memorials and instructions more strict and limited then the necessitie of the vndertaken affaire would permit Also the least distaste either of the Prince which assisteth or of the Captaine which conducteth such succours serueth oft-times to dismisse the promised forces deceiue the others expectation and bring all he vndertaketh to nothing So as he remaineth not onely more weake by this disappointment but his owne forces also become vnprofitable and consequently himselfe exposed to all wrong and ruine for as if one only wheele of a clocke be out of temper it sufficeth to disorder the whole motion so where the vndertaker faileth but of one part of his promised troupes the effects which in part depend thereon likewise faile and the course of his warlike designes remaine crossed and peruerted I will not forget also to say that a campe consisting of such borrowed peeces hath necessarily need of many heads to command it and an armie compounded of so manie heads because of the diuersity of opinions and affections will most commonly haue the woorse when it commeth to handie blowes 5 We may illustrate these discommodities with examples that touch vs neere and are familiar vnto vs and were not long since practised for this cause I will more willingly then otherwise I would heere produce them In our time we haue seene two most memorable leagues between the Pope the king of Spaine and the Venetians consenting and vnited to vndertake one warre against the Turke the one was vnder Pope Paul the third and the other in the life time of Pius Quintus The first was caried with an excessiue charge yet without any effect woorthy so great an assembly The cause in my opinion proceeded of the difficulty that was found to ioyn in one body the confederat forces and draw them together at the Rendeuous in due season for they met not till the end of September Although an other inconuenience may be alledged to this purpose which ouerthrew the good successe of such a holy and Christian attempt yet it may appeere that to auoide the shame and dishonour that followed thereof it had beene easie to haue performed somewhat of more memorable consequence then was the taking of Castle-nouo if we had knowen how to husband the times and occasions fit for the imployment of so combined a power Concerning the second which was as I said in the time of Pius Quintus the army of the Venetians very gallant and strong spent all the sommer in attending the Galleis of Spaine which were to conuoy succours into the I le of Cypres then attempted by the Turke so as this slacknesse of assembling the Galleyes was a cause that the army became almost quite vnfurnished of good souldiours drawen together to their great costs by reason of the plague which had made a most pitifull hauocke amonge them Notwithstanding all this they forbeare not to make towards Cypres so late as by the way they receiued the newes of the lamentable taking of Nicosia Which made them imagine that the Turkes had vpon that commodity most strongly manned their Galleys as it was likely enough with land Souldiours and that therefore there was more appearance of danger thē of good successe in assailing them vpon which consideration they held it best to turne their course homeward and refer that businesse to an other time hauing then thus dishonorably behaued themselues returning they incountred so many misfortunes as well weather beaten by reason of the Winter then approching they at length arriued at their home sorely brused and spoiled The yeare following the army of the consederats met notwithstanding all this very late yet vndertooke they to incounter the enemy of whome they got that so renowned victory in the yeare 1571. if God had permitted vs to reape thereby those worthy fruits that we had reason to expect Now for all this Cypres was not recouered but remained to the infidell as the reward and wages of his valour The third yeare of the league the king of Spaine in stead of pursuing his enterprise against the Turke as he had determined caused Don Iohn of Austria Admirall of his fleete to stay at Messina because he then doubted that the French would assaile Flanders with such forces as they had that yeare rather suffered to take breath then wholy cased and dismissed So as the whole season was spent vnprofitably without attempting ought worthy such preparation as the confederates had in due time set forth This was an occasion of excessiue charge and that the armies did not once stirre till it was too late attending what their neighbours would do who as I haue said seemed to threaten the King of Spaine with some attempt vpon his country of Flanders In the meane time the Venetians tired with the charge and trouble they were at to no purpose treated a peace with the Turke 6 Who will make any question now those things well weighed and considered that if the leagues both the first and second had beene well caried without these crossings iealousies and suspitions which accompanied them though vainly and vpon no ground but that they would haue brought foorth some woorthie and honorable fruite to the glory and honour of God the peace of his church the encrease and establishment of the Christian common-wealth This may be enough to prooue that forces compounded of diuers nations depending of many and different heads are in marching more slowe and at a time of need lesse effectuall then others It may appeere to some that I heereby inferre that leagues betweene Princes are vnprofitable and therefore not to be made so farre is it from me to maintaine that opinion as I rather willingly embrace the contrarie but I reserue a time to handle how and in what manner it would be good to make such a league especially against the Turke when I shall arriue at the place appointed for this purpose to the end I may discourse of it at full Now let vs returne to the argument of discourse in handling 7 The Ottomans neuer made league either offensiue or defensiue with any and neuer had helpe of strangers on the contrarie they haue alwaies had to doe with armies compounded of different nations confederate and conducted by sundrie Commanders all which as ill vnited not vnderstanding one another they haue euermore vanquished Moreouer we haue ordinarily seene them more forward and deliuer about their enterprises being alone then accompanied and consequently more vnited in their force more nimble in execution and it must needes follow more renowned and fortunately victorious 8 Yet they had no lacke of whom where with to practise their associations if they had approoued them as good necessarie as among other with the Soldan of Caito with the kings of Carmania
long since Zacharias Patriarcke of Constantinople was like to be staked for hauing admitted the new Callender and the reformation of the course of the yeere made in the time of Gregorie the 13. 2 Now to returne to the principall point it is to be presupposed that the proiects and carriage of popular rebellions cannot be vndertaken without the support and direction of the mightiest for wealth meanes and authority in the country which we would surprise and that Princes will not bouge to set a foote these plots and enterprises but by offered occasion of some fortresse which importeth the assurance and consequence of the estate and may serue for a refuge to recouer their decaied strength or else that their destigne relieth vpon some promised succour or finally vpon the consideration that those who inuite them to this conquest are so strong within themselues as they may hope for an honorable issue of their enterprise 3 These are all necessary particularities but not any of them resteth now in the hands of the Greekes abased by extreame seruitude and so far from hauing any fortresse at their deuotion as they cannot once stir without being discouered and though they were disposed to vndertake they haue at their backe so great a number of men at arms as at the least breath of a rebellion they would cut them off before they should haue meanes once to peepe forth of their shels 4 The Turke againe maketh them sure to him so many waies though all barbarous and vnciuill as he scarcely alloweth his subiects leaue to draw their breath nor suffreth his mighty men once to hold vp their heades or forraine Princes to be able in due time to attempt ought against him The end of the second Booke THE THIRD BOOKE CHAP. I. The causes of the fall and ruine of estates 1 Estates are subiect to change 2 Some of longer some of lesse continuance 3 Great small and meane estates and their causes of ruine externall internall and mixt 4 Lesse estates come to their endes soonest by externall causes 5 The great by internall 6 The meane more durable yet subiect to alteration 1 THe order that nature obserueth in all things created doth plainly enough teach vs that whatsoeuer is borne passeth and hastneth towards death and that all things which haue a beginning necessarilie and interchangably roule towards their end This proceedeth either of an ordinarie and naturall course or of the violence and alteration of compound bodies Hence we drawe this construction that estates change monarchies faile and the ruine of one serueth as the raising to the other 2 Againe as of humaine bodies some are more strong vigorous and of a better composition then others and so are of longer continuance so we see the same difference in kingdomes and estates in as much as some preserue themselues longer either because by their nature they are more surely founded as for example the Signory of Nobles is more lasting then the popular estate and a Monarchal estate more then a common-weale because a Monarchy keepeth the causes of corruption more aloofe from her or is policed with better lawes or because of the situation which is naturally more strong then the other as we see at this day in the Signorie of Venice 3 But because this assertion is subiect to diuers obiectiōs we will diuide it only into two propositions First then of principalities some are small some great some indifferent either in regard of their subsistance or first essence or of the comparison which may be made betweene them and their neighbours Secondly the efficient causes of the vtter ruine of estates are either inward or outward or mixt The inward are to be fetched and conceiued in respect of the negligence ignorance and riot of Princes which giue themselues ouer to all voluptuousnesse whereto may be added the factions secret practises ambitions and desperate humors of subiects with sundrie other occasions all fit to bring estates to their vtter ruine The outwad causes are the stratagemes armes and force of the enemie The mixt are such as participate of both as are the rebellions of the people treasons of particular men put in execution by forraine ayd and force Since then it is so that all principalities are subiect to ruine by one of these three causes we are now to vnfold what maladies may infect as well great and indifferent as small estates and draw all within the compasse of inward outward and mixt causes Now like as in naturall things naturall corruption is more tolerable then violent so must we consider whether the alteration and impairing of estates and common weales chance by reason of age or by the violence of some not forseene cause 4 Returning then to our former diuision and well examining it wee shall finde that small Estates come to their ends rather by meanes of outward causes brought in by force and violence then otherwise In as much as their power being insufficient to withstand their mighty neighbours ambitious attempts they are at the first incounter ouerset with the storm of his conquests in this maner the seueral Signories of Lombardy fel in subiection either of the Duke of Milan or of the Venetiās the free cities of Thoscany became a pray to the Duke of Florence The Princes of Africke to the King of Fez-Marocco and Algiers 5 On the contrarie great Empires are vsually subuerted by meanes of inward causes either by ease plenty which customarily makes Princes to swell with insupportable pride by voluptuous riot whereto people amidst their abundance are most prone or else by insolency and presumption seazing the great ones of the country when they see themselues much followed and reuerenced all fit inticements to dispose a hart but indifferently generous to plot for his owne raising Nec quenquam iam ferre potest Caesarue priorem Pompeiusue parem Then is it as one saith that Caesar cannot brooke a superior and that Pompey stomaketh an equall 6 Meane estates vndergoe danger as well as the two former yet far lesse since they hold the meane as the other the extreams for they are not so vnfurnished of strength as that it would be easie for euery one to inuade and oppresse them neither are they of that greatnesse and wealth as to afforde matter to particular men to grow mighty or else abandon themselues immoderatly to delights pleasures or to transport themselues beyond the limits of reason This is it that so long preserued the common weales of Sparta of Venice which euermore respectiuely intertained a meane and equality The mixt causes of the ruine of Estates are inward treacheries and outward force Treason hatched within an Estate much more indammageth a great then a small or meane Empire For a monarke is not able to turne his eie vpon euery corner of his Kingdome and sturring spirits are fortified in their attempts either with the hope of impunity the nourse of vices in all Estates and gouernments or with the opinion
and massacres wherein many Emperours ended their daies they electing others at their pleasures against the authority of the Senat and the loue and reuerence they ought to haue borne towards their country The like may we hope or expect from the Ianizzars that they will one day assume to themselues the same power and learne to performe the like whereof they gaue an assaie at such time as they compelled Baiazet the second to resigne the Empire to Selim his sonne They did almost the like when Soliman caused his sonne Mustapha to be murthered for they besieged him and inuironed his tent for certaine daies space crying out they would know the cause of that yong Princes death In the end by the deuise of the Bassa and with stoore of coyne he wan to him foure thousand of them who disengaged him of the feare and danger wherein he was plunged 7 The fift cause may be fetched from the ambition or discontent of the great ones of the countrie or of ministers swaying the supreame authority credit in places of gouernment Gazeles gouernour of Soria made way for a reuolt of the like quality as did also Acomat Generall of Aegypt Gazeles assisted by the Mamelucks Arabians and those of Rhodes endeuoured to set himselfe vp against the great Turke but he was discouered by Cayembeius whom he had acquainted with the conspiracy This man either for feare as looking into the danger of the enterprise or for enuy of his companions greatnesse reuealed all to his Master Soliman who presently dispatched against him Faratha Bassa by whom he was vanquished in battaile Acomat had not the leasure to proceed far in his attempt for as he did inconsideratly precipitate himselfe into the triall thereof so was he as speedily discouered and in an instant suppressed and slaine without hauing thriued ought in his dessignes CHAP. XIII Of the mixt causes 1 What are the mixt causes 2 How Estates are ouerthrowen by mixt causes 1 IN this third booke we haue at large discoursed how by inward and outward causes Estates may be indangered now we must speake of causes compounded of the one and the other which to discourse more intelligibly we tearm mixt which likewise are of power of themselues to alter an Empire and to bring it either by an vniuersall or a particular change to a lamentable ruine These mixt causes then are those whereby both the enemy abroad and the subiect at home may by a common consent conspire against an Estate and subuert it 2 One of the causes or meanes may be a popular insurrection nourished by the enemy or else the conspiracy of some particular men set on by forraine practises or to tearme it better the treasons which subiects may hatch in fauour and by the meanes and authority of their neighbours This hapneth in a twofold manner when the subiect beginneth and setteth on foote the practise or when a stranger laieth the way open vnto them vnder some coulered pretence or else when some one particular person or all a whole communalty frame the occasion thereof in regard of some displeasure or oppression Finally this falleth out also when the enemy abroad tempereth with one two or three of the principall men to reuolt against their prince and take armes in hand to ouerturne and ruine the Estate CHAP. XIIII How particular persons may be gained 1 How his people are to be prouoked to rebellion 2 How his great men and chiefe officers are to be gained 3 These courses at the first not succeeding are to be oftner attempted 4 Wary proceeding is requisite lest those that manage the businesse incurre danger 5 To whom such businesses are to be committed 1 IT resteth now that we make it appeere how such practises may be set on foote and cherished we will then beginne with the enterprise to bee plotted by some particular person by whose assistance it may take effect We must presuppose that this person is either priuat or publike the priuat persons are those which suffer themselues most often to be corrupted by mony and with these there neede not so many ceremonies or broâ—kings but if they be publike persons of rancke and authority either in regard of the greatnesse of their family or managing of state affaires there is far greater difficulty in corrupting them then the other yet if we may but discouer in them the stinges of ambition and desire of greatnesse and that we propose to them the assurance of speedy succours for the execution of the desâ—â—gne then is it that we bring them to dare any thing especially if they haue neuer so little disposition to be reuenged of some receiued indignity It is indeed a hard matter to worke particular and priuate persons without great vncertaineties and dangers 2 But if we must haue to doe with the great persons of the Estate we must warily make choice of our time sound them whether they be male content or ill affected towards their Prince either in respect that some one is aduanced to their preiudice or for some other cause which may awake in them a longing to shake off their yoake and seaze themselues of the Estate These are the meanes and occasions which should be chosen and diligently husbanded by our Christian Princes smoothly and with dexterity to procure the ruine of the common enemy putting on as they say the foxes skin when the lions is wanting The displeasure and ielousie which Faratha Bassa conceiued against Hebraim Bassa because he saw him raised by Soliman to greater honour and estimation then himselfe so depriued him of all reason as suffering the desire of reuenge by little and little to transport him he began to plot a rebellion but discouered he was forthwith put to death the selfe same occasion was the ouerthrow of Pirrus and Mustapha raised by Soliman In our time in the court of Amurath the third now raigning these ielousies and hart-burnings haue beene great betweene Mahomet and Mustapha and since that betweene the same Mustapha and Cicala who hath outstript him and all for fauour of their Master If these humors and ill dispositions had beene well looked into and wisely imploied to their best vse by some great Prince of Christendome they had beene fit matter to haue bred a dissention and reuolt amongst those barbarous people 3 Now though such practises should not perhaps at the first be of sufficient power to worke that vniuersall change which we wish in that tyrants Empire yet are we not therefore to desist as men dismaied remembring that most commonly the beginnings of innouations and commotions so extraordinary are feeble and that that wisdome sheweth it selfe like it selfe which can so diligently suckle and nourish them as they may attaine to a happy growth I am of opinion that when we incounter with instruments that are not without ambition courage and a thirst of reuenge after we haue felt and sounded them once twise or thrise we shall in the end make a breach in their