which follows the enjoyment of the chiefest Good rejoiceth in a twofold Puritie 1 Objective as it is fed and maintained by pure objects whereas al the pleasures of sense are but seculent and dirtie in that their mater is only sensible terrene good but the joys and pleasures which flow from the sweetest original good partake of the crystalline puritie of their object which is most pure 2 Effective as it doth banish al sorrows and grief So Plato Phileb 53. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al pleasure so far as it is free from grief it is more pleasant true and fair Thus Repub. 9. he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pleasure to be the cessation of grief and grief the cessation of pleasure So also Phileb pag. 66. he avoucheth true pleasures to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without mixture of sorrow and pure Which is the peculiar privilege of those pleasures that attend the fruition of the sweetest Good for al other pleasures are mixed with much grief and sorrow they being indeed but bitter-sweets yea more bitter than sweet 5 The Delectation which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good are most intense and strong Thus Plato 5 Strong Pleasures Phileb p. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must look not to the least pleasures but to such as are supreme and most vehement if we wil make a true judgement of pleasure For the stronger any pleasures are the better they are and the more pure they are the stronger they are Sensual pleasures are feeble and impotent because impure and mixed but spiritual joys are most potent and vehement because most pure Again the vehemence and intensnesse of any pleasure is proportionable to the energie power and activitie of the subject which is assected with such pleasure and to the Pondus Bent or Impetus that it hath to the object it takes pleasure in Now how vehement is the Pondus Impetus and Energie of the Wil whereby it shooteth it self into its sweetest Good which when it enjoyeth what an ecstasie rapture and transportt of joy is it affected with Doth not Plato stile this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The best and strongest of al Ecstasies 6 The Delectation which attends the fruition of our last end is infinite and without excesse 6 Joys without Excesse Thus Plato Phileb pag. 27. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For pleasure is not al good unlesse it partake of an infinite nature His designe is to prove that pleasure is not the chiefest good because it is not in its nature infinite so as to partake of al good yet so far as it is a consequent that attends the fruition of the chiefest good so far it is infinite For as the chiefest good admits of no excesse in our fruition because it is in it self infinite and al good so by a paritie of reason the joy and pleasure that attends the fruition of the chiefest good is infinite without excesse because the object is infinitely sweet and amiable The pleasure the Soul takes in the fruition of inferior goods soon admits excesse which it endeavors to cure by change of objects Thus Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 33. Art 2. Corporal delectations when augmented and continued do excede the natural habitude and therefore become nauseous as it is evident in the delices of food whence the appetite desires change and varietie But spiritual delectations never excede the natural habitude but perfect nature whence the more they come to a consummation the more they delight us How soon are men glutted with the best of pleasures that sense can afford And what remedie have they but intermission or exchange of objects But now in the fruition of the sweetest Good there can be no excesse either in the act of fruition or in the pleasures that attend it and therefore there is no need either of intermission or exchange § 8. 3. The Effects of Delectation Having explicated Delectation in its Causes and proper Adjuncts we now procede to the Effects thereof thereby to demonstrate that the most perfect delectation is that which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good There are two great Effects of this divine Delectation 1 Amplitude and Enlargement 2 Quietation and Satisfaction 1. 1. Enlargement The Delectation that attends the fruition of the sweetest Good brings with it Amplitude and Enlargement Indeed al delight and joy brings Enlargement which ariseth from the Sympathie between the object and the subject or sacultie specially if the object be ample how doth the facultie spread it self to enjoy the same When the animal or vital Spirits are recreated what enlargement follows thereon How diffusive are they Whereas Grief and Sorrow contracts and coarctates the Spirits This is in an higher degree verified of that spiritual Joy which attends the fruition of the best Good There is a twofold Enlargement that follows spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the chiefest Good 1 There is an Enlargement of the Facultie or Subject The more pleasure the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end the more its desires are enlarged Thus Plato Phileb pag. 45. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But what are not those pleasures most excellent whereof the greatest desires are kindled in us Whereby he shews that those are the greatest and best pleasures that most enlarge the heart in desires after them Indeed there is an intime connexion between true joy and enlargement and therefore in sacred Philosophie one word is expressive of both So Psal 4.1 Thou hast enlarged me when I was in distresse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both to exhilarate and dilate or to dilate by exhilarating His spirit was straitned narrowed and confined by distresse but dilated and enlarged by spiritual joys from Gods presence This Dilatation or Enlargement which follows on spiritual Delectation is wel explicated by Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 33. Art 1. Dilatation is a motion unto Latitude and it agrees to Delectation both in regard of its apprehensive and appetitive virtue for as man apprehends the conjunction of some convenient good so his Soul is dilated towards it in order to its perfect fruition thereof and satisfaction therein c. 2 Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the sweetest good brings with it also enlargement in Operation and Acting Al joy is vigorous and active as it is the effect of precedent so the cause of subsequent operation Delight is the Spring of motion it puts the Soul into a continual agitation for by how much the more we delight in any object by so much the more vehement and strong are our operations about it Delectation makes us ardently and vehemently to move in the fruition of our sweetest good and in al acts that tend thereto What divine suavities doth it infuse into al our acts Thus Plato Conviv pag. 210. The mind that converts its eyes to that so great amplitude of the first Beautie doth no longer regard human affairs but is as it were captivated thereby c. 2. The Delectation which
too many of our Divines in imitation of them make a twofold Good and Virtue one natural and moral the other spiritual and supernatural The natural Virtue and moral Good they make to be that which a man may by the force of natural Conscience and other natural Principes attain unto The spiritual and supernatural Good or Virtue they make to be infused Albeit this distinction may with due limitations passe for orthodoxe yet in as much as it was at first framed by the Pelagians and taken up by their Sectators in the Scholes I should be glad if Jansenius's advice for the utter extirpation of it were embraced who in his August Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 14. pag. 256. gives us the origination of this Distinction which he makes to be first taken up by the Pelagians from the Gentile Philosophers specially the Peripatetics and Stoics who held that there were in men natural seeds of Virtue which being wel cultivated might arise up to perfect Virtue These natural seeds of Virtue addes he first the Pelagians and Semipelagians brought into their Heresie and afterwards the Schole-men introduced the same into the Christian Scholes to the great prejudice of our Doctrine For those Heretics held that out of those philosophic seeds true Virtues-might be educed by the alone power of the human Wil. But because the Schole-men saw that this Dogme was openly contrary to the constantly received Doctrine they therefore framed a double man in one man and thence a double Charitie double Virtues double Workes some natural others supernatural of which there is not the least footstep in the whole Doctrine of Augustine As if those very Virtues which the Philosophers and Schole-men cal Natural were not by Augustine stiled Vices And Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 2. pag. 326. he assures us That he has oft greatly wondred that many of the Philosophers had more truly accurately and holily philosophised of the main Heads of moral Doctrine than many Schole-men who would fain frame two men in one the one a Philosopher and the other a Christian whence they also coined a twofold Charitie twofold Virtues twofold Workes and a twofold Beatitude the one natural the other supernatural Hence 3. The difficultie of moral Good To performe any moral Good or virtuose Act is most difficult and rare O! how difficult and rare is it for men to performe what is good from good Principes Ends in a good manner as to Circumstances and universal Conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 476. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But of such as can arrive to the first Beautie and contemplate him in himself are there not very few So Phileb pag. 16. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To explain Wisdome is not very difficult but to reduce it to practice and use most difficult So again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What way men may attain to be good is most difficult i.e. to understand and practise Again he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is difficult for a man to be made good and to continue such Whence in his Cratylus pag. 385. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 According to the old Proverbe things good are very difficult Thence also in his Epinomis pag. 973. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I say it is not possible for men to be blessed and happy here except some few only Lastly Plato in his Repub. 6. saith That Virtue hath the most perfect accurate forme and therefore it requires 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most perfect exactitude and diligence for the acquirement thereof for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Do not the greatest things require the greatest exactitude And what things greater than moral Goods and Virtues Thus Aristotle also in imitation of his Master once and again demonstrates the difficultie and raritie of moral Good So Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having shewed That there were varietie of ways wherein men might sin but one only way of doing good he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore it is most easie to offend but most difficult to do good for to erre from the scope is most-facile but to hit it is most difficult So in like manner c. 9. pag. 108. he saith Virtue consistes in mediocritie i.e. in one indivisible point of conformitie Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Wherefore to acquire Virtue is most difficult and laborious for it is an hard worke to attain to the middle of any thing As every one cannot find out the point of a Circle but only the intelligent Mathematician So to be angrie to give money or the like is easie but to be angrie to give money c. to whom and in such a measure and at such a time and for such an end and in such a manner as we ought this is not easie Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The bene or manner of doing good is difficult laudable and beautiful Wherein indeed he gives us an excellent account of the nature and difficultie of moral Good 1 He supposeth al moral Good to consiste as it were in one middle indivisible point so that the least deviation therefrom destroys it Quò enim magis strenuè currit extra viam eò longiùs à scopo recedit ideóque sit miserior Calvin 2 That it is very difficult to find out this golden mean but much more difficult to reach it by our actions True indeed it 's no difficult worke to performe the act materially good as to give almes or the like but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel doing of it i.e. from those Principes for those Ends and with those Circumstances that the Act requires in regard of its formal constitution this is most rare difficult and only laudable Hence 4. The splendid Heroic deeds of Pagans The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only and al such whose minds are not virtuosely disposed are but lesser Sins This is most evident by the confessions of the Philosophers themselves who require to moral Good an integritie of Causes and constitutive Principes so that it sufficeth not that the Mater or Office be good but there is also required a good disposition and habit the best end and al such Circumstances as essentially concur to formalise the Act or denominate it morally good Now let us inquire did ever any Pagan or man in his natural state performe any one Act thus morally good What can we produce any Pagan or natural man who had his mind so far sanctified by Faith and Love as to act by force received from God out of love to God and his Glorie Truly Augustine and Jansenius out of him are not afraid to declare that al those Heroic Acts and Exploits which the Philosophers and Schole-men honor with the title of natural or moral Virtues are indeed but more splendid sins because poisoned with pride and vain-glorie Yea they rise higher and affirme that the Stoics themselves who seemed to be the greatest admirers and sectators
irradiation Thence Augustine stiles Libertie the best disposition of Soul Similitude to God is the highest Libertie as to state so far as any is made virtuose so far he is made free The connexion between Pietie and Libertie is so intimate as that indeed they have one and the same beginning progresse and consummation By how much the more ample spiritual pure and perfect the Soul is by so much the more free it is and whence springs the Amplitude Spiritualitie Puritie and Perfection of the Soul but from virtuose habits Indeed Plato estimed nothing good but Virtue and moral Good whence Antipater the Stoic writ three Books with this Title 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That according to Plato Virtue only was good That Virtue is the most perfect state of the Soul and that which brings with it most moral Libertie is most evident because hereby it is rendred capable of adhering to its first Cause and last End which is the top of moral Libertie For wherein consistes the perfection of moral Libertie but in its conformitie to its most perfect Exemplar which is the Divine Bonitie And is not this the privilege of moral Bonitie or Virtue Hence Virtue is defined by Aquinas Dispositio perfecti ad optimum The Disposition of a perfect Subject to the most perfect Exemplar and End Virtue indeed is more perfect than the Soul it self so Aquinas Grace saith he in it self and according to its essence is more noble than the nature of the Soul because it is an expression or participation of the divine Bonitie and that which is substantially in God is accidentally in the Soul participating of the divine Bonitie That which belongs to God by nature belongs to us by Grace And Suarez saith That Grace is the Bond whereby man is conjoined to God his last end Now by how much the more the Soul is conjoined to God by so much the more sublime free and perfect its state and condition is In sum Libertie of state consistes in a virtuose or graciose disposition of Soul whereby it is enabled to understand embrace and adhere to what is good in that manner and measure as it ought Take al the notions of true moral Libertie and they agree to none but the virtuose man 1. Virtue gives Deminion Libertie is defined by the Platonist 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Principalitie or Dominion of Life also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a plenary power over althings Which the Stoics interpret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-moving autoritie or power And whence ariseth this Dominion of the Soul over it self and other things but from virtuose habits Plato assures us That a virtuose temperate man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 stronger than himself i.e. by virtue he has dominion over his sensitive part Again Repub. 9. he instructes us That he who is best is most happie and august or royal because he is able to governe himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But he that is most wicked is most miserable because he is a Tyrant over himself May we account him a man fit to governe himself who is a slave to his unlawful passions and lusts The Orator defines Libertie a power of living as men list and who hath this power to live as he list but the virtuose man whose wil is conformed to the divine Wil Doth the voluptuose sensual man live as he list whose mind is distracted and torne in pieces by unbridled lusts as by so many wild Horses Can it be imagined that the ambitiose man lives as he list whose mind is stil on the rack of ambitiose designes Doth the avaricious man live as he list who the more he has the more he wants It 's most evident that no man lives as he list but the virtuose man who has a wil slexible to the divine Wil. This Dominion that attends moral Libertie is wel expressed in sacred Philosophie Hos 11.12 So Hos 11.12 But Judah yet ruleth with God and is faithful with the Saints 1 Observe That Judah's ruling with God is opposed to that of Ephraim who ruled also but not with God as v. 7. Ephraim endeavored to exalt himself on the ruines of Gods Worship by erecting Calves at Dan and Bethel c. But Judah ruled with God and was faithful with the Saints 2 Judah rules with God i.e. by serving and obeying God obtains Dominion and Rule over himself and al lower things he lives as he lists because his wil is conformed to the Divine Wil. 2. Moral Libertie consistes in the moral Life Health Vigor Virtue gives life health vigor and force and Force of the Soul which also ariseth from virtuose Habits Al natural freedome supposeth a vital subject in which it inheres and so by a paritie of reason al moral spiritual Libertie supposeth a moral spiritual life and vital subject and indeed life renders every thing most beautiful active and perfect Whence by how much the more noble excellent and perfect the life of any thing is by so much the more raised noble and excellent is its state and al its operations Life is that which seasoneth every thing and every life draws to it things suitable to its nature so the spiritual divine virtuose life has Principes above human Nature more noble and excellent and herein consistes moral Libertie as to state Plato Repub. 4. pag. 444. informes us That the health of the bodie consistes in the equal temperament of al humors c. So in the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue truly is a certain health pulchritude and good habitude of Soul but sin is the disease turpitude and infirmitie thereof Health according to Augustine and Jansenius consistes in the vigor force and strength of Nature and what makes the Soul more vigorous and strong than Virtue Whence is the vigor and force of any Creature but from its Spirits And are not virtuose Habits the Spirits of the Soul That Virtue is the vigor and force of the Soul Plato once and again assertes So in his Gorgias pag. 467. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Power is of good c. Also pag. 470. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To be able to do much is to be good And in his Hippias pag. 375. he saith Righteousnesse is the vigor and power of the Soul for the more righteous the Soul is the more potent it is Divine Light and Virtue is the strongest thing in the World In the sensible World nothing is so strong as Light and in the rational World nothing so strong as Truth and Virtue Al the force and vigor of lust comes from impotence but Virtue is as a Pondus or weight on the Soul which strongly impels it to its last end What more potent than Love whereby the Soul adheres to its last end By how much the more spiritual and pure any facultie is by so much the stronger it is and is not Virtue the puritie of the Soul Again the strength of every
Veracitie and indeed no wonder seeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and consolation both here and hereafter § 3. The last Divine Attribute The Sanctitie of God we are to discourse of is the Sanctitie or Holinesse of God whereof we find great and illustrious Characters in sacred Philosophie 1 We find the Sanctitie of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from al created Sanctitie Exod. 15.11 So Exod. 15.11 Who is like unto thee O Lord amongst the Gods or mighty men Who is like unto thee gloriose in Holinesse c Where he placeth Gods transcendent Eminence and Elevation above al Creatures as that wherein his essential Sanctitie chiefly consistes And indeed the peerlesse Eminence of Gods sacred Majestie is that wherein his Sanctitie chiefly consistes as we intend anon more fully to demonstrate Thus 1 Sam. 2.2 There is none holy as the Lord 1 Sam. 2.2 for there is none besides thee neither is there any Rock like our God Hannah here as Moses before placeth the Sanctitie of God in his Supereminence above al Creatures 2 Hence God is frequently brought in as an object of Divine Worship with regard to his Holinesse So Psal 30.4 Give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse i. e. of his peerlesse Eminences And Psal 71.22 Vnto thee wil I sing with the harpe O thou holy One of Israel Also Psal 92.12 Psal 92.12 And give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse or celebrate the memorial of his Holinesse i. e. Lift up his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or transcendent Excellences Again Psal 98.1 O sing unto the Lord a new song for he hath done marvellous things his right hand and his holy arme hath gotten him victorie His holy arme or the arme of his Holinesse i. e. of his holy power so much above al other powers The like Psal 99.3 Let them praise thy great and terrible name for it is holy Also v. 9. Exalt the Lord our God and worship at his holy hil for the Lord our God is holy The like v. 5. As God is a transcendent superlative Majestie exalted above al other Gods or Majesties as Exod. 15.11 so in al Acts of Worship we must exalt him by giving him a singular incommunicable peculiar Worship Whence in Scripture those that give that Worship which is due to God to any besides him or in conjunction with him by way of object either mediate or immediate are said to profane his holy Name Ezech. 20.39 43.7 8. because Gods Holinesse consisting in a superlative incommunicable Majestie admits no corrival in point of Worship Hence to sanctifie the holy Name or Majestie of God is 1 to serve and glorifie him because of his transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Eminence and 2 to do it with a peculiar separate incommunicated Worship because he is holy and separate above althings else Not to do the former is Irreligion Profanenesse and Atheisme not to do the later is Idolatrie and Superstition as judicious Mede wel observes Hence 3 God is said to sit on a Throne of Holinesse Psal 47.8 God sitteth upon the Throne of his Holinesse Psal 47.8 Alluding to the Thrones of Princes which were in the midst of the people exalted and lift up that so their Majestie might appear more illustrious God being by reason of his transcendent Eminences exalted infinitely above al Creatures he is therefore said to sit on the Throne of his Holinesse 4 We find Gods Holinesse in a most eminent manner and with emphatic Characters proclaimed by such as have any views of God Thus Esa 6.3 Holy holy holy is the Lord of Hosts So Rev. 4.8 5 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by puritie Hab. 1.13 Hab. 1.13 Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil and canst not look on iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prae videndo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is comparative as if he had said O! how pure are thine eyes how impossible is it for thee to behold sin with the least delight or approbation So 1 Joh. 3.3 As he is pure 6 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by Rectitude Psal 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Psal 92.15 To shew that the Lord is upright We find also in Plato many great notices of the Sanctitie of God conformable to those of sacred Philosophie So Theaetet pag. 176. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evils find no place with God Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is in no manner unrighteous but as it seems most righteous So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith That in Theologie we should use such modules as come nearest to the Nature of God and demonstrate what God is Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things consentaneous to his Nature Whence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must we not determine then that God is indeed good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But no good is noxious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which hurts not doth it do any evil No surely Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good therefore is not the cause of althings but of those things that are good it is the cause but of evils it is not the cause i. e. God is the first Cause and Author of al natural and moral good but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cause thereof as it is evil because moral evils as such have no efficient cause but only deficient Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of good things we must own no principal cause but God but as for evils we must inquire after some other causes of them for God must not be estimed the cause of them His mind is that God must be owned as the cause of al good both Natural and Moral yea of the materia substrata or the material entitie of sin which is a natural good but as for the proper Moral cause of Sin as Sin is a deordination or difformitie from the Divine Law that is proper to the sinner for God must not be thought to be the Author or Moral cause of sin This he farther explains p. 380. Either we must not at al attribute evils to God or if we do it must be in that manner as before namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must say that God hath acted wel and justly and has inflicted those punishments on them that thereby he might bring some profit Wherein he informes us that God is the cause of penal evils not as evils but as conducing to good Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That God who is good should be the Author or Moral Cause of Evil to any this we must with al manner of contention refute and not suffer any in the Citie to speak or hear such things Plato strongly assertes that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal cause of al good but not of sin as sin i. e. he neither commands invites
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
and Absolute may be proved by these invincible Reasons 1 From the Independence of the Divine Wil the first cause of althings The first cause according to Sacred and Platonic Philosophie is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause and dependence Thus Plato Repub. 6. p. 509. where bringing in God under the notion of the chiefest good and the first cause of althings he gives him this character 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He is not mere essence but somewhat more august than essence transcending al finite essence both in Dignitie and Virtue So elsewhere he makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme effective cause of althings and therefore Independent as to al subservient instrumental causes Yea he wil have God the first Cause to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being it self and Eternitie it self and thence no way dependent on second causes And the Platonistes generally make God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superessential and so most independent And alas how absurd and monstrose is it that the concurse of the first Cause should depend on the second cause Is not the Divine Wil the first effective Principe of althings the same with the Divine Essence May we not then as wel make the Essence of God to be dependent as his Wil. 2 From the pure actualitie and simplicitie of the Divine Wil. Al dependence implies a passive receptive power as to that on which it dependes there is no dependence without some passive power either physic or metaphysic But now Gods Wil as it is the effective Principe of althings has not the least passive power therefore no dependence 3 From the Primatie and Superioritie of the first Cause Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God solely being without Principe or independent he is the Framer of althings c. God being the first Cause of althings must necessarily be independent in his Causalitie and Essence For where there is dependence there is inferioritie and subordination And may we presume that the concurse of the first Cause is inferior and subordinate to that of the second cause Doth it amount to lesse than a contradiction to say the first Cause dependes on or is subordinate to the second cause What! can it be first and yet subordinate What is this but to be first and yet not first but second For dependence and subordination is an effential mode of the second cause as independence of the first 4 As the concurse of the first Cause is independent so also absolute yea therefore absolute because independent for that which dependes on nothing without it self must needs be absolute That the Concurse of God is absolute and no way dependent on any conditions of the subject or object it workes upon specially as to gratiose effects is most evident from sacred Philosophie Eph. 2.8 9 10. So Ephes 2.8 9 10. He saith v. 8. For by Grace ye are saved through faith and that not of your selves it is the gift of God It 's true it workes through faith but yet not as a condition in the power of Free-wil to performe but only as Faith is the Organ or Canal through which medicinal Grace is conveighed into the Soul the whole is the Gift of God and why v. 9. Not of workes lest any one should boast As if he had said Alas if this medicinal Grace should be suspended on any moral or Evangelic conditions to be performed by us then there were indeed room for boasting which Christ wil not allow of Are the derivations of the fountain suspended on any conditions the streams can performe doth not the stream owe al that it has to the free independent and absolute communication of the spring Thence it follows v. 10. For we are his workemanship created in or by Christ Jesus unto good workes i. e. look as God created and formed the first rude confused Chaos not for any foreseen goodnesse in it but out of a pure nothing so Christ frames the New Creature not for any foreseen conditions it can performe but unto al conditions or good workes as Esa 19.25 We have an excellent discourse against conditional Grace in Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. pag. 83. By the predication of this conditional Grace which enables us to act if we wil there is nothing gained but the total subversion of Christ's medicinal Grace and the substituting in the room thereof the Grace of a sound Wil such as Adam had and Angels now have and thus Christ hath died in vain for the proper Grace of Christ which he by his Passion hath brought to heal our infirmities Gratia medicinalis non est talis quae dominatrici samulando voluntati vel influit vel non influit prout imperanti sese determinare vel haerere placet sed prorsus talis quae simulac pulsat fores rumpit ostia repugnantémque domat voluntatem tollit omnem ejus resistentiam rapit eam secum ex invita volentem ineffabili suavitate facit Jansen August Tom. 3. is such as doth not only worke the effect if we wil expecting when our Wils wil move but it enables us to wil for herein lies the precise difference between a sound and sick Wil. That the influxe and concurse of God is absolute may be demonstrated from the absurditie yea impossibilitie of a conditionate concurse in God How absurd is it to conceit that God wil concur with the human Wil in the act of willing upon condition that it wil Yea how impossible is such a conditionate influxe For if there be any condition required to Gods Concurse then he concurs to the working of that condition or not if not then there is some act of the Creature produced without the Divine Concurse If God doth concur to that condition then absolutely or on some other condition if absolutely then his former concurse is not conditionate for he that requires any condition of his act and gives that condition may be said to act absolutely besides if God concur absolutely to the later condition why not also to the former act If God concur to the second condition conditionately then also to the third c. and thus there wil be a dore open to a progresse into infinite which Nature but much more the God of Nature abhors Hence 3. Gods Concurse is previous and antecedent Gods concurse previous and antecedent For the explication of this Adjunct or Mode of Operation we are to consider that he Prioritie here meant is not of Time but of Causalitie as the causalitie of the First cause is in order of nature antecedent to the causalitie of the second cause for therefore the second cause cooperates because the First cause operates The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse is most evident in gratiose Operations and Effects Thus Isidorus Pelusiota lib. 2. Epist 72. Edit Commelin 1605. pag. 121. An evil tree saith he cannot bring forth good fruit Mat. 7.18
beautiful although it be fallen into extreme turpitude to reduce it to the most excellent pulchritude and so to make it amiable and desirable c. In sum what is Beautie but the splendor and lustre of those perfections which are loged in any subject And thence is not God the first Beautie because most perfect And are not althings so far beautiful as they partake of his Divine Perfection and Goodnesse For what is al created Beautie but a ray of the Divine Beautie And among created Beauties doth any thing more ressemble the Divine Beautie than true Virtue ' Plato in his Phaedrus pag. 250. saith That Justie and Temperance and other Virtues in this our imperfect state have little Light and Beautie but in the future state 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 then we shal contemplate the most perfect Beautie c. And then he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But now Beautie of things divine has gained this dignitie that it is the most illustrious and amiable of althings § 3. Having explicated and demonstrated moral Libertie as to state we now descend to consider it as to its Exercice Moral Libertie as to Exercice in virtuose Acts. which consistes in virtuose Acts. For it is a good Theoreme in Philosophie That the second Act follows the first such as the state is such are the Exercices in that state As in natural and civil Libertie such as the state is such are the Exercices in that state if a man be sui juris a free man he may act as such in that Corporation wherein he is free Thus in moral Libertie such as are free as to state by having their Souls clothed with virtuose habits they wil exert and put sorth virtuose Exercices in that state So that moral Libertie as to Exercice is nothing else but a libertie to act according to that dignitie of state they are invested with Now for the more ful explication and demonstration of moral Libertie as to Exercice we are 1 To explicate what it is and 2 To demonstrate that it is the supreme Libertie of a rational Creature As for the explication of moral Libertie as to Exercice we may comprehend it in the following Propositions 1. Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in the spiritual affectionate permanent Contemplation of the first beautie or Truth To contemplate the first Truth The Contemplation of the first Truth as wel according to sacred as Platonic Philosophie is one of the supreme parts of moral Libertie as to Exercice Contemplation according to the Platonist is the Exercice of the mind on things intelligible and what more intelligible than the first Truth Thence Plate in his Phaedrus pag. 247. tels us That the mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 beholding for some while the first Being and satiating it self in the contemplation of Truth and giving up it self thereto is thereby nourished and recreated with the highest pleasure As sight is of al the most noble sense and most quick in apprehension so contemplation or the sight of the first Beautie and Truth is one of the highest Exercices of moral Libertie that which brings in most tranquillitie satisfaction and pleasure to the mind Of al Contemplations there is none so powerful so sweet so free as the contemplation of the first Cause and last End As God is infinitely better than al Creatures so the contemplation of God is infinitely better than the contemplation of al the Creatures That the contemplation of the first Being is one of the highest Acts of moral Libertie is most manifest because 1 Contemplation is the highest Act of the Soul and therefore when placed on the supreme Being and highest Object must needs bring the highest Libertie and Perfection with it Joh. 17.3 2 The mind of man when rectified has a flagrant ardent desire to contemplate the first Beautie and Truth Aristotle assures us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That those who are conversant in the inquisition of truth have been sweetest manner of life How sweet and free is it then to contemplate the first Truth 3 The contemplation of the first Being gives a wise emprovement of al other Beings and Objects which occur This spiritualiseth and draws out the Elixir of al objects providences persons and things we converse with 4 The contemplation of the first Beautie is that which most assimilates the Soul thereto If there were a beautiful Picture which persons by looking on should gradually be made like unto who would not gaze thereon And is not the first Beautie such which makes al those as spiritually contemplate thereon beautiful and free Joh. 1.14 Joh. 1.14 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We have diligently and attentively beheld his glorie as on a Theatre The Human Nature is that gloriose Theatre on which the Deitie descends and offers himself to our contemplation and O! what a gloriose contemplation is this to behold the Deitie in the golden Arke of Humanitie How is the Soul hereby transformed into the same gloriose Image as 2 Cor. 3.18 4 Spiritual contemplationof the first Being gives possession therefo Truth is made one with the Mind by contemplation and doth not the first Truth become one with the Mind by lively affectionate contemplation thereof 5 Contemplation of the first Beautie is most influential on the divine Life and therefore a main Spring of Moral Libertie Is not this a great Source of Divine Wisdome Are not contemplative persons in things natural and moral the wisest of men And is not this most true in things moral and divine Was it not a great Saying of that great Divine The greatest Musers are the best Artists and doth not this hold most true here yea doth not the Psalmist assure us Psal 39.3 Psal 39.3 That whiles the heart museth the fire of divine affection burneth Doth not contemplation on the first Beautie fortifie the heart against every tentation tune it for every service and sweeten every crosse Is it not both food and physic to the Soul the life of our life yea universally useful in every state and condition 2. Another Exercice of moral Libertie consistes in an intimate and inviolable Adherence unto the last End and chiefest Good Adherence to the last End and chiefest Good What the last End and chiefest Good is with the proper Characters of each we have § 1. of this Chapter fully discussed our present worke is to explicate what moral Libertie the Soul acquires by adhering thereto The last End possesseth the greatest Amplitude Universalitie and Libertie imaginable as to al means it is as an infinite Ocean an immense universal Principe that conteins al Morals in its bosome althings receive bounds and limits from their last end but this receives bounds and limits from nothing Now the last end enjoying such an infinite Amplitude and Libertie it necessarily follows that the more intimately and firmely the Soul adheres to it the more libertie as to exercice it is possessed of Thence Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715.
it list not as it ought A corrupt Conscience hath many turnings and windings various coverts and hiding places for lust Sometimes the veil of hypocrisie yea of Religion is made use of to cover sin as Mat. 23.14 Sometimes a good name is put on a bad thing or a bad designe is justified by a good end or a good cause is made use of to justifie a bad action or when mens lusts wil not comply with the rule men bring down the rule to their lusts Again sometimes new lights are pleaded to maintain old errors Mens lusts make many controversies about sin they make great sins little and little none at al. Thus practic error and ignorance is the cause of al sin Of which see more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 5. § 4. Not only practic Error Self-love a radical cause of Sin but also Self-love has a maligne venimous influence on al sin Plato hath excellent Philosophemes on this Theme So Repub. 9. pag. 574 c. he describes to the life the servile condition of a wicked person under the Tyrannie of Self-love how he is thereby violently impelled and hurried into al sin So also in what follows pag. 577. of which hereafter Thus likewise in his Leg. 5. pag. 731. he lively demonstrates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Self-love is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an ingenite evil in which they who indulge themselves have no remedie against sin Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And to speak the truth self-love is altogether the cause of al those evils in which the life of man is involved And he gives the reason of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For he that loves is truly blind about what he loves and thence misjudgeth things just good and honest being in this opinion that there is more honor due to him than to truth And Aristotle gives us the reason hereof Because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-lover acts a for himself according to his profit Every self-lover is chained to that great Idol Self which he makes his God and the only Centre in which al the lines of his Affections and Actions meet Self is the last end of self-lovers even in their highest acts of self-denial if they give their goods to the poor or their bodies to be burned for Religion it is al to please self They may crosse their own wils but never crosse self as their last end if they seek after God it is to advance self self-love formes al their actions and passions into a subservience unto some carnal self-interest What makes superstitiose persons so much to vilifie mortifie and with so much severitie torment their bodies but thereby to exalt their inward excellences And as self-lovers make self the last End so also the first Principe of al they do Self-love ever affects self-dependence it would fain have a World of its own to live act and breathe in it lays the whole weight of religiose services on self as the bottome of its dependence it would live and die within the sphere of its own activitie as wel as interest It 's exceeding sweet to self to have a stock of its own even in things religiose to trade with and thereby merit divine favor And alas how soon are men overcome by tentations when they are self-dependent and self-strong He that thinkes to keep himself from sin by self-strength wil soon be overcome by it Now Self being the last End and first Principe of self-love it hence becomes a spermatic universal cause of al sin Every self-lover is his own Idol and whiles he inordinately embraces and adheres to himself he is soon overcome thereby and so hurried into sin Yea self-love makes the best duties and services for God most carnal vile and abominable to God Where self is predominant the intention of the Soul is spurious and rotten and a bad intention makes the best workes bad Where self rules it formes even religiose services into a conformitie to carnal lusts wherefore he that cannot depart from self wil soon depart from God and tumble headlong into al sin Self-love is the strongest carnal concupiscence and most directly opposite to divine love The soverain power of Lust increaseth according to the obedience men render to themselves and self-love by obeying self and its particular movements men make it a God yea the more men endeavor to humor and gratifie it the more tyrannie it is Man has not a worse or more dangerous Companion than himself his carnal self which is so potent to draw him into sin It has always been the ambition of the Creature to deifie it self not by being equal in nature with God but by being its first Cause and last End which is the spring of al departure from God and conversion to the Creature And that which makes self-love more potent to promote sin is its policie and many artifices to concele its self and sin How oft doth carnal self-love put on the masque of true lawful self-love and thereby delude the Soul into sin There is a great ressemblance between spiritual self-love and carnal whence the later oft conceles it self under the vizard of the former The more a man loves himself the lesse he conceits he loves himself as the more mad a man is the lesse he judgeth himself so Self-love is so artificial in its colors as that it can discolor virtue with the face of vice and vice with virtues face Thus by its fraudes and deceits in conceling it self and sin it greatly advances sin The members of self-love are principally three 1 Concupiscence or adherence to the Creature as our last end 2 Carnal confidence or dependence on self as the first cause 3 Spiritual pride or an over-valuing estime of self-excellences Each of these have a venimous influence on al sin as we have largely demonstrated out of Plato and others Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 8 9 10. § 5. Next to the Causes of moral Evil we may consider its Species or Kinds Al moral Evil or Sin may be distributed into involuntary Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful or voluntary again involuntary into sins of Ignorance or of Passion We find the foundation of this distribution in Plato Phileb pag. 22. where he saith That those who choose sin do it either involuntarily and ignorantly or out of a voluntary miserable necessitie 1. As for involuntary Sins they are 1 Sins of Ignorance when the ignorance is not affected either from prejudice voluntary neglect or custome in sin as before § 3. 2 Sins of Passion or Infirmitie when the passion is antecedent to the wil and doth as it were extort the consent of the wil being vehement and violent For if the passion be consequent to the act of the wil or but a languid remisse motion such as doth not force the wil the sin is not so much of passion as voluntary whence passions
that arise from evil customes and follow the wil do not constitute a sin of passion Thence Aristotle Eth. l. 3. c. 3. saith That every sin from passion is not involuntary Thus also Suarez 1.2 Tract 5. Disp 4. pag. 395. Now involuntarinesse in sins either of ignorance or of passion takes away something of their aggravation where there is real unaffected ignorance passion or perturbation there is lesse of sin Where there is involuntary Ignorance there is want of that which might help the understanding where antecedent involuntary passions hurrie men into sin there is voluntary dissent or subsequent repentance Hence the Disciples of Aristippus said That they who sin from perturbation not voluntarily deserve pardon as Laertius 2. Voluntary wilful Sins are such as procede from a strong bent of wil without ignorance or passion as the original cause thereof Such sins are of greater aggravation because of lesse provocation and excuse From a perseverance in voluntary sins and frequent repetition thereof procedes a fixed custome and rooted habit of sin touching which we find many good Philosophemes in Plato of which hereafter § 7. of the necessary servitude of Sin § 6. The Nature The moral servitude of Sin Causes and Kinds of moral Evil being laid open we may with more facilitie explicate and demonstrate what that moral Servitude is which attends it That al moral Evil or Sin is attended with the highest moral Servitude is evident from sacred Philosophie as also the Philosophemes of Plato and others There were three ways whereby men were brought under civil servitude among the Ancients some were made servants by being taken in war others were bought with a price others became such by being borne in the house of servants as Ishmael Sacred Philosophie in treating of the servitude of sin alludes to al these three kinds of service 1 Sinners are said 1 Kings 21.20 2 Kings 17.17 To sel themselves to worke evil i.e. deliberately and voluntarily to commit sin and that with a ful bent of heart which is opposed to Pauls being sold under sin Rom. 7.14 2 The servants of sin are said to be led captive by sin 2 Pet. 2.19 3 Al men by nature are said to be borne slaves of sin Ephes 2.2 5.6 Eph. 2.2 Children of disobedience i.e. addicted devoted given up to it So Ephes 5.6 Col. 3.6 This is an Hebraic Idiotisme for among them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Son being put in the state of Regiment and construed with a Noun signifying an inanimate thing is emphatically used to note that such a person or thing is addicted or given up to that which is predicated of it Thus a child of disobedience is one that is a perfect slave or devoted to it And Plato Rep. 9. pag. 575. tels us That he who is subject to the Tyrannie of his own Lusts is the greatest slave imaginable for he cannot do what he would but is shut up in the prison of his own unbridled lusts Therefore in his Cratylus as he derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 always to flow which importes libertie so he derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vice from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because a wicked man is ever fettered and chained by his lusts But to illustrate the miserable vassalage and slaverie which attends al Sinners by nature we shal consider this servitude of Sin 1 In regard of the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin 2 In the proper Adjuncts or Attributes that attend this servitude First as to the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin we shal draw them forth according to the mind of sacred and Platonic Philosophie in the ensuing Propositions 1. Al moral Evil or Sin is repugnant to human Nature The Civilian Sin repugnant to human Nature Justin Institut l. 1. tit 3. defines Civil Servitude a constitution of the Law of Nations whereby one is subject to the Dominion of another against Nature And is not this most true of the moral servitude of Sin What more against human Nature than to be subject to the tyrannie of irregular passions Yea doth not Sin make not only the Creatures an enemie to man but also himself the greatest enemie to himself That Sin is most repugnant to human Nature may easily be evinced out of Plato's Philosophie Thence he cals it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Discord and Confusion because it causeth an intestine war discord and confusion in human Nature Thus also in his Lysis he saith Al good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proper and agreable to human Nature but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 evil is aliene and repugnant to it Good albeit it slow not from Nature yet it inclines us to what is most for the perfection of human Nature whereas al Sin tends to its ruine As al moral Libertie consistes in Virtue which gives an elevation and advance to human Nature so al moral servitude arising from Sin implies a depression of human Nature Thus Psal 106.43 And were brought low for their iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies attenuated depressed Psal 106.43 Vitium contra naturam est ut non possit nisi nocere naturae Non itaque esset vitium recedere à Deo nisi naturae cujus id vitium est potiùs competeret esse cum Deo August de Civ Dei l. 11. c. 17. It 's here spoken of their being brought down from an high to a low condition Then follows the cause of this their being brought down 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for or in their iniquitie Their iniquitie was not only the meritorious cause but also the instrument or machine by which they were brought down Nothing doth so much empoverish and bring down human Nature as Sin So Psal 107.12 Therefore he brought down their heart with labor they fel down and there was none to help 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with toilsome labor The toilsome labor of Sin is most potent to bring down human Nature 1 Sin brings down human Nature and is most repugnant to it in that it importes an aversion and falling from God who is our most laudable and excellent Being our first Principe and last End This is implied in that dreadful interrogation of God to Adam Gen. 3.9 Gen. 3.9 Where art thou In this Question we may consider 1 That it regards not Adams place but state Where art thou Not in what place but in what state How is it with thee now Adam How doest thou do Is al wel What is the condition of thy Soul Art thou in that state I placed thee in 2 It 's a question not of ignorance as to God but of conviction as to Adam it is the question of a Judge making inquisition after the Malefactor Where art thou Where is now thy confidence in thine own strength Doest thou see unto what a condition thy pride thy unbelief has reduced thee Thou aimedst to be as God free from my yoke
Christ is brought in as the meritorious antecedent Cause of our Adoption but as an effect and consequent of Election For so much the Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by denotes namely that Christ as Mediator is the effect of Predestination or Election but the cause of our Adoption This is strongly argued by Augustin in his Book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum And surely if the Merits of Christ have no causal influence on the Wil of God much lesse can mans Faith or Merits influence the same Thence he addes according to the good pleasure of his Wil which argues the Independence of his Wil. Thus we see how God wils Christ and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect and yet doth not wil the Salvation of the Elect for Christ and Faith as the moving causes of his Wil which is most independent So God wils both the means and the end and the means for the end yet he doth not for the end wil the means as if the end did move him to wil the means For in God the volition of one thing is not the cause of his willing another because there can no efficience of cause on effect or dependence of effect on the cause be affirmed of the Divine Wil which is but one simple indivisible act both as to end and means and therefore neither one nor t'other can be said to move or influence the Divine Wil albeit the same Divine Wil doth wil a causal connexion between the things willed in which regard Scholastic Theologues assigne reasons of the Divine Wil affirming That the passive attingence of the Divine Wil in respect of one thing is the cause of its passive attingence in regard of another thing albeit neither the cause of the Divine Wil i. e. to speak natively and properly God wils that one thing shal depend on another yet the Divine Wil neither dependes on nor is moved by either Gods soverain independent Wil is ful of reasons as to the admirable dependence of the things willed according to their subordinations yet there may not be the least reason or shadow of reason assigned as the cause or motive of the Divine Wil. Thus Ephes 1.11 Ephes 1.9 11. Who worketh althings according to the counsel of his Wil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is the highest counsel and wisdome in the Divine Wil and yet no reason or cause can be assigned of it So v. 9. Having made known to us the mysterie of his Wil according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself The Divine Wil is here said to be 1 ful of mysterious wisdome whereof no reason can be assigned without it self Thence 2 it is stiled good pleasure which denotes its Soveraintie and Independence Hence 3 it is said to be in it self i. e. no reason or cause extrinsec to it self can be assigned thereof though it be ful of mysterious wisdome and sublime reasons yet they are al within it self That there can no cause either physic or moral legal or final be assigned of the Divine Wil is evident 1 because the Divine Wil is one simple pure Act and therefore not capable of any Passion Impression and Causalitie from any extrinsec object 2 Because althings else are the effects of the Divine Wil and therefore cannot be the cause thereof because the same thing cannot be the cause of it self 3 Because the Divine Wil is eternal but althings else of finite duration and is it possible that what is temporal and finite should influence what is eternal and infinite That there can be no cause of the Divine Wil see Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 19. Art 5. contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil it immutable The Divine Wil immutable This Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil ariseth from the Independence Simplicitie and Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence with which it has an essential connexion yea identitie Plato discourseth accurately of the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil both in his Philosophemes of Divine Ideas as also in his Phaedo pag. 78. where he proves that the Divine Essence and Wil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. one uniforme Being which existes of it self and is alwayes the same without the least degree of mutation c. of which more fully before in Gods Immutabilitie cap. 4. § 5. But this Immutabilitie of the divine Wil is more clearly illustrated and demonstrated in sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 33.10 Psal 33.10 11. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the Heathen to nought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath infringed dissipated made void from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break Thence it follows He maketh the devices of the people of none effect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath broken from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break properly the mind or purpose The divine Wil delights to break and dash in pieces the strongest resolutions and most fixed purposes of proud men But then follows the Immutabilitie of the divine Wil v. 11. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever the thoughts of his heart to al generations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the fixed counsel or determinate purpose of Jehovah Standeth for ever i. e. is inviolable and immutable This verse contains the Antithese of the precedent whereby David teacheth us that the divine Wil makes void the proud wil of man but no human wil can frustrate or alter the divine Wil as Job 12.13 14. Thus Psal 119.89 For ever O Lord thy word is setled in Heaven Psal 119.89 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is fixed established R. Ezora understandes this of the decrees or purposes of the Divine Wil which are firme stablished and immutable So Malach. 3.6 I am the Lord I change not therefore the Sons of Jacob are not consumed I change not This regards the Wil of God as wel as his essence so much the subsequent inference importes for the reason why the Sons of Jacob are not consumed must be resolved into the immutable Wil of God as the original cause It 's true the things willed by God are oft under mutations and God wils those mutations but with an immutable wil the mutation reacheth not the wil of God but only the things willed by God who wils this thing shal be now and the contrary afterward without the least alteration in his wil. A wil is then said to be changed when any begins to wil that which he before nilled or to nil that which he before willed which cannot be supposed to happen but in case of some mutation in knowlege or disposition but neither of these can be affirmed of God 1 God is infinitely wise and foresees al contingences circumstances and accidents that may happen and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purposes for want of wisdome as we poor mortals frequently do 2 Gods disposition towards al objects is ever the same 3 The human wil is obnexious to mutations from impotence and want of power to accomplish what
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
contradiction for what difference can be rationally imagined between being eternal and being from eternitie Is not that which is without beginning eternal And can we imagine that to have a beginning which is from eternitie Can any effect and product of the Divine Wil be commensurate to it in point of Duration 2. To Create is the sole Prerogative of God For 1 the order of actions must be according to the order of Agents the most Noble and Supreme Action cannot agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent And is not Creation the most Noble and Supreme of al Actions Can it then agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent God Creation is the most perfect of al actions by which a participate Being may be communicated because it primarily speakes the production of the whole entitie in its ful latitude whence it is manifest that this action cannot be appropriated or attributed to any but the first cause who is Being essentially and of himself no participate being has force enough to produce the whole of Being 2 That Creation is proper to God may be argued from the Mode of Efficience For Creation supposeth an Omnipotence and Independence in the Creator in as much as he has no passive power or mater to worke on but only an objective power or possibilitie of the object to be Created which requires an infinite active power in the Agent For by how much the more remote the passive power is from Act by so much the greater ought the active power of the Agent to be whence where there is no preexistent mater to worke upon but a mere obediential objective power or nothing there the distance between the Power and Act is as to efficience infinite and impertransible by any finite power therefore nothing but an infinite power can bring the extremes Nothing and Something together 3 From the Nature of Creation which is not a successive but a momentaneous Action but al the productions of second causes as they are inferior to and Instruments of the first cause are successive motions for al Instruments act and move in a way of succession 4 From the limitation of al second causes For the most perfect of Creatures have only a precarious and Participate Being and therefore have not in themselves virtue or force enough to Create the least of Beings To Create requires a virtue of the most Supreme Order invested with an Active Power in the most universal latitude And the reason is evident because the Creative Power extendes it self to every thing creable neither doth it expect on the part of its object any thing but a non-repugnance or obediential power that the effect may be This wil more fully appear from the following Thesis 3. Creation the production of something out of nothing Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing When we say Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing the particle out of must not be understood as denoting any succession of one thing after another for Creation is but an instantaneous eduction but only the negation of a material cause Now that God Created althings without any preexistent mater may be demonstrated 1 From his Independence and prime efficience as the first cause For the first Independent Cause being a pure simple act must necessarily precede al mater and thence be the cause thereof that which is the first in Beings must necessarily be the cause of al the rest whence it follows that the first mater was produced by God out of no preexistent mater but out of nothing 2 From the universal efficience of God as the first cause Every Agent so far as it is confined to mater so far it is particular and limited for to be confined to mater in acting is to act in order to some determinate species whereunto that mater refers wherefore that Agent which is universal and commensurate to al effects possible cannot be confined to mater such is the first cause 3 From the universalitie of Effects produced by Creation By how much the more universal the effect is by so much the higher the cause is and by how much the higher the cause is by so much the more it is extended to al effects Whence the effects of Creation being of al most universal and the cause most high there cannot be supposed any preexistent mater out of which they are educed 4 Al productions out of mater suppose successive motion and Transmutation but Creation is not a successive but momentaneous motion all at once Al successive motion and mutation must necessarily precede as to Duration the effect produced by such a mutation or motion but Creation doth not by any kind of Duration precede the things created therefore it cannot be successive out of preexistent mater 4. Active Creation is nothing else but the Act of the Divine Wil Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. as the effective principe of althings This Hypothesis has been fully explicated and demonstrated Chap. 5. § 4. of Gods executive power as c. 7. § 3. And albeit it may seem to carrie a novitie with it yet it has sufficient foundation both in Sacred and Scholastic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophie its very mode of expressing Gods active efficience in creating althings plainly shews that it was no other than the Act of the Divine Wil. Gen. 1.3 Thus Gen. 1.3 and God said Let there be light Which Word or saying of God can be understood of no other than the Act of his Divine Wil. For Speech is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here and elsewhere ascribed to God thereby to expresse the efficacions efficience of his Divine Wil in the production of althings Thus Maimonides More Nevochim Part. 1. c. 65. demonstrates That this Speech or Word whereby althings were made must be understood of the Divine Wil not of any proper Speech because al Speech whereby any thing is commanded must necessarily be directed to some Being existent and capable of receiving such a command but there was no Being then existent therefore it must be understood of the Divine Wil. Thus Hebr. 11.3 The world was framed by the Word of God So 2 Pet. 3.5 By the Word of God the Heavens were of old An why is the efficience of the Divine Wil in creating althings expressed by the Word of God but to shew that as we when we wil have any thing done expresse our Wil by our word of command so God expressed what he wil have accomplisht by his Fiat or Creative Word See more of this effective Word in the Providence of God § 3. This Hypothesis of Gods Creating althings by his Wil hath found Patrons not a few among the most accurate Scholastic Theologues Thus Joan. Major Sentent 2. dist 1. q. 3. proves That God produced the World by his mere Intellection and Volition without any other productive power And his Arguments are these 1 The Human Wil doth not want any
limits this modal distinction to the dependence of the Creature in its first Emanation or Creation but grants that its dependence in operation is really the same with the Essence of the Creature 4 Suppose we allow a modal distinction between the Creatures dependence and essence yet who knows not but that the most awakened Philosophers now generally grant that Modes specially such as are substantial and essential do not really differ from the things modified Thus Calovius Metaphys pag. 434. Dependence saith he is a mode of a create Being agreeing to it by reason of its imperfection which is not the very Essence of the Creature nor yet a new Entitie distinct from the Essence but something affecting the create Essence And he cites Suarez for this his Hypothesis Hence § 7. Creatural Dependence according to its formal Idea and notion Dependence importes Subordination importes a presupposition of influence or subordination posterioritie and inferioritie 1 Creatural dependence importes a presupposition of influence or subordination to the first Cause This is primarily and formally included in the very notion of Dependence neither doth it adde any real entitie or mode distinct from the Creature but explicates only the intrinsec condition and habitude of the Creature relating to the omnipotent causalitie and influence of God This subordination to God as the first cause ariseth from the imperfection of the Creature and the absolute Dominion of God And as to its latitude and extent it regardes both natural and supernatural Influences and Beings By supernatural Beings and Influences I mean such as being above the sphere of Nature are not connatural to or producible by its force and power These supernatural Beings have causalities proportionable to their Entities in which they are subordinate to God and dependent on him as natural Beings in their kind And in this respect the Creatures subordination to and dependence on God in the whole of its causalitie is commun both to natural and supernatural Beings Yea supernatural Beings by virtue of their subordination to God may be elevated and raised to act and cause somewhat beyond that causalitie which is connatural to them For even in this regard they are not lesse subordinate and subject to God than natural Beings are in their kind as Suarez wel urgeth Metaph. Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. pag. 215. Such is the subordination both as to Naturals and Supernaturals which creatural Dependence on God as the first cause formally includes Hence 2 follows Posterioritie 2. Posterioritie Every dependent as such is posterior to that on which it dependes so the Creature as to God Aquinas tels us That al second causes act by virtue received from the first cause as instruments act by the direction of Art wherefore it is necessary that al other Agents whereby God fulfils the order of his Gubernation act by virtue from God and thence that they are posterior to him And this I thinke if wel understood might satisfie al those who with so much vehemence oppose al kind of predetermination by Divine concurse as to the human Wil For if we grant That God is the first cause of the Wils motion I cannot see how we can denie him the predetermination of the Wil. Though to avoid needlesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I generally abstain from the terme predetermination yet without that prejudice which some I conceive undeservedly lode it with For if the Concurse of God be previous to the causalitie of the Wil so as to determine the same to act as we have demonstrated Ch. 7. § 4. I as yet cannot according to my shallow capacitie see any cogent reason why the said previous concurse may not be termed predeterminant But to returne to our Argument Creatural Dependence implies a posterioritie 1 as to Nature and Causalitie 2 As to Origination and Order 3 As to Dignitie 3. Inferioritie Whence 3 Creatural Dependence importes also Inferioritie For every dependent as such as inferior to that it dependes on Thus Alvarez de Auxil Grat. Disput 90. pag. 714. Dependence properly in causes efficient importes a certain subordination and inferioritie of him who dependes to him on whom he dependes therefore the Divine operation of the first cause doth not depend on the cooperation of the second cause but on the contrary the cooperation of the second cause dependes on the operation of the first cause which is previous as Ch. 7. § 4. § 8. Althings create depend on God as to their Futurition Creatural Dependence as to Futurition For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we may consider 1 That althings future must have some cause of their Futurition Nothing future is of its own nature or by its own force future but indifferent to Futurition or Non-futurition If things were in their own nature and of themselves future then they would be always future and never present for that which agrees to any thing of its own nature agrees to it inseparably Hence it follows that Futurition cannot agree to things of their own nature but by some cause which brings them from a state of indifference and possibilitie to a state of Futurition And assuredly that which has not a certain determinate cause of its Futurition cannot be certainly and determinately future but only possible 2 That which gives futurition unto althings is the Divine Wil and Decree It 's impossible that any thing should passe from a state of pure possibilitie to a state of futurition but by the wil of God Things are not foreseen and decreed by God because future as some would needs persuade us but they are therefore future because decreed by God Thus Wiclef held That the Determination of God gave the highest firmitie in the futurition of his worke as Walden Tom. 1. L. 1. C. 23. pag. 37. and Bradwardine asserted That every Proposition of what is future is subjected to the Divine Wil and originated thereby So that indeed no Create Being either simple or complexe can be future antecedently to the Divine Wil. Whence it necessarily follows 3 That althings future depend on God for their futurition Every thing may as wel give Being to it self as Futurition Of this see more Ch. 5. § 2. Of Gods Science § 9. Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Conservation 1 Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Existence Plato in his Timaeus p. 28. saith Creatural Dependence as to Essence and Conservation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That every thing produced is necessarily produced by some Cause For nothing can be the cause of it self As Novitie of Essence is essential to the Creature so also Dependence on God for that Essence Yea every mutation and state of the Creature with al its various modifications are from God Yea Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disp 31. sect 14. p. 216. tels us That a create Being as such considered precisely and abstractly requires no other cause
but the increate Being in whom it hath a sufficient cause both Efficient Exemplar and Final For albeit some create Beings require other efficient causes besides God at least for their more connatural production yet the reason of a create Being as such requires them not And in what precedes he saith that the dependence of an effect on any create second cause is not so essential as its dependence on the increate first cause 2 Al Creatures depend on God for their Conservation This has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes C. 8. and it ma be further argued from the impossibilitie of a Creatures being conserved but in a way of dependence on Gods conservative influence For if a Creature should be conserved by it self or any other cause without dependence on the first cause God should not have an absolute Dominion over it neither were it in his power to annihilate the same § 10. Every Creature dependes on God as to Operation This Hypothesis though denied by Durandus Creatural Dependence as to Operation and some very few more yet it is generally owned by Scholastic Theologues and that on invict evident grounds For 1 Operation is the Index of the Essence what is dependent in Essence cannot be independent in Operation 2 Let us consider the series of causes and we shal find that every Inferior is obedient and subordinate to its Superior in acting 3 What is an Action but that special Dependence which the effect has on its efficient cause And is not God the prime efficient of althings 4 No Virtue or Efficace of any second Cause can actuate itself but necessarily requires for its actuation the Divine Concurse which gives al Virtue as also the conservation and actuation of the said Virtue The Virtue of the Inferior Agent always dependes on the Virtue of the Superior in as much as the Superior gives Virtue to the Inferior as also the conservation and actuation of the same Virtue 5 Whatever is limited in its Essence is also limited in its Activitie and Operation and where there is limitation there is subordination and dependence as wel in operation as in essence 6 If every second cause depend not on its first for al its operations then it is impossible that the first cause should hinder such operations for the exerting whereof the second cause dependes not on him Who can hinder that Action which he cannot by any influence reach And if this be granted what wil become of the Providence of God Must we not with Epicurus allow God to be only a Spectator no way a Rector or Gubernator of the most considerable part of Human Affaires and Acts That no Creature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible in operation we have demonstrated in what precedes § 4. of this Chapter 7 It implies a contradiction that the second cause should act and yet not be actuated and influenced by the first cause And here whiles under the review of these Sentiments I may not let passe without some Animadversion the Reflexion of a Learned Author in a new Piece about Gods Prescience on this Argument namely That it can never be proved that it implies a contradiction for God to make a Creature which should be capable of acting without an immediate concurse if I apprehend his meaning as laid down p. 35 36 37. But because that Learned Author gives us only his Supposition without any Demonstration thereof or solution of those Arguments which the Scholes both of Thomistes and Scotistes as also the Jesuites Suarez and others have urged against the Hypothesis of Durandus which he seems to espouse I do not conceive my self obliged to superadde any Arguments for the re-enforcement of this Hypothesis which as been already copiosely demonstrated § 5 6 7. also Chap. 7. § 2 4. and Chap. 9. I shal only adde thus much that I cannot according to the utmost extension of my narrow apprehension conceive any medium between the extremes of this disjunctive Proposition Either the Human Wil must depend on the Divine Independent Wil of God for al its natural motions and operations or God must depend on the Human Will in it self Independent for al his Prescience motives of Election and all discrimination as to Grace and gratiose operations I am not ignorant of the general replie That this Hypothesis I oppose only cuts off Gods concurse as to sinful Acts. But I would willingly be satisfied in these Queries 1 Whether there be any Action of Man on Earth so good which hath not some mixture of Sin in it And if God concur to the substrate mater of it as good must be not also necessarily concur to the substrate mater of it as sinful Is not the substrate mater of the Act both as good and sinful the same 2 Again as there is no Action in this imperfect state so good but it has some sin mixed with it so is there any Action so sinful which has not some natural good as the substrate mater thereof as we have largely proved Chap. 9. § 2 3 Lastly if we cut off the material entitie of sinful Acts from Dependence on Gods immediate concurse do we not indeed thereby cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in governing this lower world But of these sufficiently in what precedes specially C. 7. § 9. Hence § 11. The Wil of Man is necessarily subordinate to and dependent on the Wil of God in al its Operations The Dependence of the Human Wil in al its Acts. The Wil of Man cannot be the solitary cause of its own Act so as to exclude the efficience of the prime cause as C. 7. § 4. It 's true the Wil is a total cause in its own kind yet not so as to exclude the total influxe of God as the first cause Yea God is not only the total but also the immediate cause of al voluntary Acts which argues the Wils total and immediate Dependence on God in al its Acts as C. 7. § 4. Thus Aquinas Seing every mutable and multiforme must be reduced to some immobile principe as unto its cause and the Intellect and Wil of Man appear to be mutable and multiforme it 's necessary that they be reduced to some superior immobile immutable and uniforme cause Yea he saith that God is most intimely present to the Wil and as it were acting in it whiles he moves it to act And Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. Q. 2. Queries Whether the Create Wil be so far a total and immediate cause of its own Act as to exclude the immediate Efficience of God And he proves the Negative because 1 If so then it would necessarily follow that God doth not certainly know the future evenements and acts of the Wil because his knowlege of things future dependes on the determination of his own Wil as Chap. 5. § 2. 2 If so then God were not the best and most perfect Being because he should not have Dominion over the
dependes This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil the Hebrews expressed by the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai which denotes Gods Soverain Dominion over the Creature from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a pillar or basis on which the whole Fabric dependes but it dependes not on the Fabric so althings depend on the Soverain Wil of God but it on nothing Thus Plato Epist p. 312. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 About the King of althings althings are and althings are for his sake 〈◊〉 and he is the cause of althings beautiful Wherein note 1 thâ—â—e stiles God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Soveraign King or Lord of al i. e. according to the origination of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the basis of al answerably to the import of Adonai Lord. 2 He saith althings are for God i. e. to be disposed of according to his Soverain Wil and pleasure And 3 he addes the Reason because he is the cause of althings i. e. God by virtue of his prime causalitie and efficience has an universal Dominion over al things to dispose of them as he pleaseth for his Glorie The light of Nature teacheth that every one ought to be the supreme moderator of his own work Hence what ever God wils is just because he wils it This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil is lively expressed Psal 135.5 Psal 135.5 6. For I know that Jehova is Great and that our Lord is superior to al Gods Jehovah i. e. the first Supreme Being who gives being to althings but receives nothing from any Creature Is Great i. e. Infinite in being and therefore most Soverain and Independent in his Wil and Pleasure Whence it follows and superior to al Gods i. e. infinitely above Angels and Men though never so potent who al depend on his soverain independent Wil. Thence he addes v. 6. Whatsoever the Lord pleased that did he in Heaven and in Earth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whatsoever the Lord willeth which notes the Soveraintie Independence and Omnipotence of his Wil. Jonah 1.14 So Jonah 1.14 For thou O Lord hast done as it pleased thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to thy soverain independent Wil. The greatest Notions or Attributes that our shallow judgements can invent are infinitely too short to expresse the Soveraintie of the Divine Wil. But the more fully to explicate and demonstrate the Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil God independent physically and morally we are to consider that as causes so dependence on those causes is twofold physic or moral Physic Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on a superior Cause for real efficience Moral Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on its superior for moral influence And there is this commun to both as in Naturals inferior causes dependent on superiors in acting have no power to act contrary to the efficace of their superiors so in Morals But now God is neither physically nor morally dependent on any superior cause 1 He has no physic dependence on any superior cause because he is the first in the order of physic Causes Again he is superior to al Gods as Psal 135.5 and therefore cannot be influenced by any So Plato Repub. assurâ—◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That an hypocrite is neither able to hide himself from God nor yet to force him The Divine Wil receives no real efficience or influence from the human Wil but the human Wil is really influenced by the Divine Wil God wils not things because we wil them but we wil things because God wils them 2 Neither is God morally dependent on any other Moral dependence is founded in natural where there is natural independence in an absolute degree there cannot be moral dependence in any degree The rational Creature having a twofold relation to God as a Creature and as rational hence he has a twofold dependence on God one natural the other moral but God being independent as to his Essence must necessarily also be independent as to Morals Moral dependence is either Legal or Final Legal dependence is when an inferior dependes on the Laws Remunerations or Distributions of any Superior Final Dependence is when an inferior dependes on some supreme last end The Divine Wil is in neither regard dependent 1 It is not legally dependent because not subject to the law of any The Divine Wil gives Laws to al Creatures but receives Laws from none yea it hath no legal dependence on any meritorious acts of the Creature God willeth nothing without himself because it is just but it is therefore just because he wils it The reasons of good and evil extrinsec to the Divine Essence are al dependent on the Divine Wil either decernent or legislative 2 The Divine Wil has no final dependence on any superior end because it s own Bonitie is its only end The End is the Cause Reason or Motive of willing althings that conduce to the End but now nothing can move the Wil of God but his own Bonitie which indeed is the same with his Wil and Essence wherefore it cannot be properly said to be the cause of his Wil because nothing is said to be the cause of it self When Theologues affirme That God wils one thing for another they mean not that the other thing is the cause or motive of the Divine Wil but that God wils there should be a causal connexion between the things willed As God willed the Sun Moon and Stars should be for the production of fruits and these for the use of man c. Gods willing one thing for another notes a causal connexion between the things willed but no causal influence on the Divine Wil Deus vult hoc propter hoc non autem propter hoc vult hoc Ephes 1.4 5. God wils this for that yet for this he doth not wil that i. e. God wils effects and causes and that the effects are for the causes yet he doth not wil the effects for the causes as if the causes were the motives of his Wil. Thus we must understand that Text Eph. 1.4 According as he has chosen us in him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and without blame before him in love How are the Elect chosen in Christ 1 Negatively they are not chosen in Christ as the meritorious Cause of Election nor from a prevision of their Faith in Christ as the motive of Divine Election according to the Pelagian Hypothesis But 2 They are said to be chosen in Christ as their commun Head that by him they might be made new Creatures and so partakers both of Grace and Glorie Christ and Faith have no causal influence on the Divine Wil but the Divine Wil decrees that Christ and Faith should have a causal influence on Salvation Thence it follows v. 5. Having predestinated us unto the Adoption of Children by Jesus Christ unto himself according to the good pleasure of his Wil. Here