hath it so naturally that thou shouldst imagine that He possessing it and Happiness possessed are of different Substances If thou dost think that he received it from any foreign Hand thou must imagine the Giver to be more excellent than the Receiver But that God is the most excellent of all Beings most worthily we confess if we own then that the sovereign Good is in him by Nature and yet we may conceive that it is not the same that he is since we speak of God who is the Prince of Nature let him who can find out who it was that joined these so differing things Lastly whatever doth essentially differ from any thing it cannot be said to be that from which it is understood to differ Therefore that which is in its Nature differing from the chief Good cannot be said to be the Good it self which to think of God would be most impious and profane since nothing can excel him in Goodness and Worth Nothing that ever was can in its Nature be better than that from which it draweth its Beginnings Wherefore that which is the Principle of all things must as to its Substance with the truest reason be concluded to be the chief of Goods Boet. Most right Phil. But Happiness was before granted to be the chief of Goods Bo. So it was Ph. Therefore it must necessarily be confess'd that God is the very Happiness Bo. I cannot oppose the Reasons you have given and I confess you have drawn a very right Conclusion from your Premises Ph. Look then a little further and see if this Truth can be proved more firmly thus to wit that there cannot be two sovereign Goods which differ in themselves For it is clear that of the Goods which differ one cannot be what the other is wherefore neither can be perfect when one wants the other But it is evident that that which is not perfect cannot be sovereign therefore those which are the chief Goods can by no means be diverse in their Natures But I have rightly concluded that Good and Happiness are the chief Good wherefore the highest Divinity must certainly be the highest Happiness Bo. Nothing can be truer than this nothing by the Course of Reasoning more firm nor can any Conclusion be made more becoming of the Divine Majesty Ph. Upon the whole Matter then as Geometricians after they have demonstrated their Propositions are wont to infer and draw their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Consequences in the same manner shall I deduce to thee something like a Corollary thus Because by the attaining of Beatitude Men are happy and Beatitude is Divinity it self by the attaining of Divinity it is manifest that Men are made happy But as from Mens being endowed with the Vertue of Justice they are denominated Just and from that of Prudence they are pronounced Wise so should they who are possessed of Divinity by parity of reason be esteemed Gods Every happy Man then is a God but by Nature there is only One yet by suffering others to participate of the Divine Essence nothing hinders but there may be Many Bo. This truly is a very fair and most pretious call it Deduction or Corollary which you please Ph. But there can be nothing nobler than that which Reason commands us to subjoin to this Bo. What is that Ph. It is this Since Happiness seems to comprehend in it many things to consider whether they all by the Variety of Parts conjoined do constitute the Body of Happiness or whether there may be any one amongst them which may compleat the Substance of it and to which all the rest may be referr'd Bo. I could wish that thou wouldst open these things to me by recounting them Ph. Do not we account Happiness a Good Bo. Yes certainly and the chiefest Ph. Add then that Good to all the aforesaid things for that Happiness which is Self-sufficiency is also the Height of Power of Reverence of Nobility of Pleasure What sayst thou then are all these things as Self-sufficiency Power and the rest Members and constituting Parts of Happiness or are they as all other things are to be referr'd to the Sovereign Good as their Source and Principle Bo. I well understand what thou dost aim to search for but I desire to hear what thou dost propose Ph. Observe then the thing thus sifted and distinguished upon If all these things were Members of Happiness they would differ amongst themselves for it is of the Nature of differing Parts to compose one Body But it is already demonstrated that all things are the same therefore they are not Parts for if so even out of one of them Happiness might be composed which is absurd Bo. This I doubt not but I desire to hear that which remains Ph. It is clear that all other things are brought to be tried by Good as the Rule and Square For Self-sufficiency is therefore desired because it is thought to be Good So also it may be said of Power Esteem Nobility Pleasure Good then is the Cause why all things are desired for that which neither in Reality nor Shew doth retain any thing of Good is by no means to be desired On the contrary whatever by Nature is not good if yet it seems to be so is desired as if it really were so Hence it is that Goodness justly looked upon is the Cause the Sum the Hinge from which all our Desires arise in which they centre and upon which they turn That which is the Cause of our desiring any thing seems it self most to be desired For if any Man desires to ride abroad because of his Health he doth not so much desire the Motion of Riding as the Effect of his Health Since therefore all things are sought after for the sake of Good they cannot be more desirable than Good it self But we have before shewed that it is Happiness for which all these abovesaid things are desired where it is clear that only Happiness is sought for He then who considers this cannot deny that Good and Happiness are of one and the same Substance Bo. I see no Cause why any Man should dissent from your Opinion Ph. And we have shewed that God and Happiness are inseparably joined in Essence Bo. You have so done Ph. We may then securely conclude that the Nature and Substance of God resides in Good and can be sought for no wheâ—e else METRUM X. Huc omnes pariter venite capti Quos fallax ligat improbis catenis Terrenas habitans libido mentes c. Come hither all O come to me Whom in her impious Chains Imperious Lust detains Which in an earthly Mind affects to be Here Ease from Labours you shall find This is the Port of Rest Which Storms cannot molest Here 's Refuge for the sickest Mind Whatever Tagus golden Sand Or (l) Hermus It is a River of the Lesser Asia called now le Sarabat It hath its Source in Phrygia the greater and taking its Course Westward and being
his pleasure cannot retain her and if when she goeth away she maketh him miserable what is she being so ready to take her Flight but a sure Presage of future Calamity But it is not enough to behold those Objects which are placed before our Eyes for Wisdom hath a Prospect to the End and Event of things and Fortune often changing from Adverse to Prosperous and from Prosperous to Adverse should make Men neither fear her Threats nor desire her Favours To be short thou must with Patience and Equality of Soul bear whatever is acted by her upon the Scene of this World when thou hast once submitted thy Neck to her ponderous Yoke For if thou dost pretend to prescribe a certain time of Adobe and Recess to her whom thou hast freely and of thine own Accord chosen to be thy Soveraign and Mistress art thou not injurious to her and dost thou not by Impatience imbitter thy Lot too hard already which thou canst not alter by thy most vigorous Efforts If thou once hast spread thy Sails to the Winds thou then canst not choose thy Port but must go whither they will blow thee When thou committest thy Seed to the Furrows remember that sometimes the Years are fruitful often barren Hast thou given up thy self to the Governance of Fortune thou canst then do no other thing than obey her Commands Dost thou endeavour to arrest the forward Force of the rolling (c) Wheel The Antients feigned Fortune not only to be blind but placed her on a rolling Stone because she seemed not only rashly but with a blinded Force to administer ill things to good and good things to ill Men but also like a Wheel or any spherical or globular Machine to be rolled and turned by a natural Necessity Therefore it is the greatest Folly to expect Constancy in her Actings Wheel O thou most sottish of all Mortals when Fortune once becomes stable and fixed she in the Hour she is so leaves off to be Fortune METRUM I. Haec cum superbâ verterit vices dextrâ Exaestuantis more fertur Euripi c. I. When with her Hand she shifts the Scene of Fate She like (d) Euripus There are two sorts of Euripi one sort is made by Art the other is Natural The first sort is of two kinds as Water-pipes made that Water may mount in them or Conduit-pipes which turn round used in Fountains Gardens or the like The others are In-lets of Water Cuts or Channels for the Commodity of Merchandize or Travel as we see them frequently in several Countries The natural Euripus is that which is now called by the Italians Il stretto de negro ponto by the French Le Destroit de negropont or oftner Le Destroit del ' Euripe It is a Strait of the Aegean Sea separating Boetia a Region of Achaia and the Island Eubaea to which it is joined to the City of Chalcis by a wooden Bridg of 50 Paces only Euripus is of the Extent of 60 Miles and ebbs and flows seven times every Day as Pliny and Mela testify Euripus often ebbs and flows Raising the Captive from his humble State She from his Throne the mighty Monarch throws II. When the Vnhappy weep she slights their Tears Nor will she hear the miserable Groan But cruelly she doth seal up her Ears Against the Cries of those she hath undone III. Thus doth she sport and thus she boasts her Power And treats her Followers with a pleasing Show If in the running of a nimble Hour She makes the most exalted Hero low PROSA II. BUT now I would discourse thee a little in the Stile and Person of Fortune and observe whether her Questions be reasonable or not First Why O Man dost thou by thy daily Complaints accuse me as guilty What Injury have I done to thee What Goods or Advantages have I withdrawn from thee Implead me before what Judg thou pleasest concerning the Possession of Wealth and Dignities and if thou canst prove that ever any Man had a true and fix'd Propriety in them I will then readily grant that those things were thine which thou dost so earnestly desire to be restored to thee When Nature first brought thee out of the Womb into this World I received thee naked necessitous and stripp'd of all things and which now is the Cause of thy Impatience against me I indulgently educated thee I heaped my Blessings upon thee and encompassed thee with Glory and Splendor and with an Affluence of all things which were in my Power now when I have a mind to withdraw my Bounty and to stop the Current of my Favours be thankful for the Use of that which was not properly thine Thou hast no just Cause of Complaint for thou hast lost nothing which was thy own Why then dost thou mourn I have done thee no Wrong Riches Honours and all other things of that kind are subject to me and in my Power they are my Servants and acknowledg me their Mistress they come with me and when I depart they follow I dare boldly affirm that if those things the want of which thou dost now deplore had been thine own thou hadst not lost them Shall I alone be forbid to exercise my own Power and to use my own Right Heaven takes the liberty to bless the World with fair and sunny Days and again to vail them in dark and cloudy Nights The Year graces the Face of the Earth with Fruits and bindeth her Head with Chaplets of Flowers and again she destroys these with Rains and Frosts 'T is lawful also for the Sea now to appear with a calm and smooth Brow and again to rage in Storms and Tempests And shall the boundless Covetousness and other depraved Affections of Men oblige me to Constancy which is so contrary to my Nature and Customs This is my Power and this my continual Sport and Exercise I turn with a flying Motion the rolling Wheel pleasing my self to exalt what was below and to depress and humble what was on high Ascend then if thou pleasest to the height but upon this condition that thou shalt not think I do thee an Injury if I make thee descend when my Sport or Humour require it But art thou not acquainted with my Ways and Methods Dost thou not know that (e) Croesus He was the last and the richest King of the Lydians who having been once overcome by Cyrus King of the Persians and rebelling against him he was condemned to be burnt He being upon the Pile cried out O Solon Solon Solon Cyrus asking him who Solon was he answered Solon was a very wise Man who long since told me that no one was happy in this Life which I now find by experience Then Cyrus considering the Changeableness of Fortune ordered the Fire which was made for the Execution to be extinguished but a Shower from Heaven fell down and put it out before he could be obeyed Croesus King of the Lydians who not long before having
which are to be done and he doth in several Ways and according to Time administer by Fate those very things which he hath so disposed So then whether Fate be exercised and moved by some Divine Spirits which attend upon Providence or by some Soul or by the Ministry of the whole Body of Nature or by the Celestial Motions of the Stars or by Angelick Vertue or by the manifold Subtlety of Demons whether good or bad or if by any of these or if by all of them the Series of Fate is woven This certainly is manifest that the immovable and simple way of doing things is Providence and that the movable Contexture and temporal Order of those things which the Divine Purity fore-disposed and ordered to be done is Fate Hence it is that all things which are under the Dominion of Fate are also subject to Providence which commands even Fate it self But some things which are placed under the Guidance and Protection of Providence are wholly exempt from the Jurisdiction of Fate and surmount the Series of it and those are such things as are stably fixed near to the Divinity and are above the Order of fatal Mobility For even as amongst several Circles turning about the same Centre that which is innermost approacheth most to the Simplicity of the middle Point and is as it were a Centre round which they may turn to those placed without it and that which is outermost rolling in a greater Circuit the further it departs from the middle Individuity of the Point so much the more Space it doth fill but yet if any thing should join and fasten it self to the Point it is constrained to be immovable and ceaseth to be dilated By parity of Reason the further any thing departeth from the first Mind that is from God it is so much the more embarassed and faster bound in the Bonds of Destiny and every thing is by so much the freer from Fate by how much it approacheth nearer to the Centre of all things And if it closely adheres to the Firmness of the supreme Mind without moving it goes beyond the Necessity and Power of Destiny As Ratiocination then is to the Intellect as that which is begotten is to that which hath a proper Being as Time is to Eternity as the Circle is to the Centre so is the movable Order of Fate to the stable Simplicity of Providence This Order moveth the Heavens and the Stars tempereth the Elements and maketh them agree amongst themselves and by an alternative Change transforms them It reneweth all things which are born and which die by the like Progressions of Sexes and Seeds This binds together the Actions and Fortunes of Men by an indissoluble Connection of Causes which since they proceed from the Origine of immovable Providence must also themselves necessarily be unchangeable For so things are always best governed if that pure Simplicity or Singleness dwelling in the Divine Nature may produce that unalterable Order of Causes for this Order by its own Unchangeableness and Constancy may restrain those things which in their Nature are mutable and which would otherwise rashly and irregularly float about Hence it is that although things may seem confused and disturbed to Men who cannot aright consider this Order nevertheless the proper Manner and Course of every thing directs and disposeth it to the true Good For there is nothing done for the sake of Evil no not by the most flagitious Wretches who as I have fully before demonstrated are in their Researches after Good diverted by crooked Error whilst the Order proceeding from the Centre of Sovereign Good doth not mislead any from its Principles But thou mayst say what greater Confusion can there be that both prosperous and adverse things should by times happen to good Men and that evil Men can enjoy what their Hearts can desire and yet be afflicted too with things which they hate Do People live now a-days so vertuously and with so much Integrity that those whom Men think good or bad must necessarily be either But in this the Judgments of Men disagree much For those whom some judg worthy of a Reward others think to deserve Punishment But let us grant that it is possible that some one may be able to distinguish betwixt the Good and the Bad Is it possible therefore that he should look into the inward Temperament of the Mind and pronounce of it as one may of the Body But it is miraculous to him who knows it not why sweet things should be agreeable to some Bodies and bitter to others and why some sick People are eased by Lenitives others are helped by sharper Medicines But it is no wonder to the Physician who knoweth the Measure and Temperament of Health and Sickness But what other thing is it that makes the Mind healthful and strong than Goodness And what is its Sickness but Vice Who is the Preserver of Good and the Driver away of Evil other than God the great Ruler and Physician of the Mind who when he looks about him from the high Observatory of his Providence sees and knows what is convenient for every one and then accommodates him with the Convenience Hence then proceeds that remarkable Miracle of the Order of Destiny since the all-knowing God doth that at which the Ignorant are astonished But now that I may glance at a few things concerning the Depth of the Divine Knowledg which humane Reason may comprehend that Man whom thou believest to be most just and the greatest Observer and Maintainer of Equity of that Man I say the all-knowing Providence doth think otherwise And (q) My Familiar Lucan Lucan is here stiled by Philosophy Familiaris noster Lucanus because he was a Philosopher and a Vein of Philosophy seems to run through the whole Work of his Pharsalia my Familiar Lucan told us that the vanquishing Cause was pleasing to the Gods but the vanquish'd to Cato Know this then that whatsoever thou seest done contrary to thy Hope or Expectation that notwithstanding the Order of things is preserved right and entire but to thy perverted Opinion it seemeth Confusion But let us suppose that a Man may have behaved himself so well that the Approbation of God and Man may both agree in him but he is perhaps of a weak Courage so that if any thing cross should befal him he will forgo his Innocence since with it he cannot retain his Fortune The wise Dispensation of Providence then spareth him whom Adversity may make worse lest he should be put to labour and travel who is not able to undergo such Hardship nor to bear Afflictions Another Man is Master of all Vertues is holy and one who draws nigh to God Providence judgeth it Injustice that that Man should be oppressed by any Adversity so that it will not suffer him to labour even under any bodily Distemper But as (r) One more excellent than I. It is supposed that our Philosopher meaneth here Hermes Trismegistus He
Question he handles and solves with most solid Reasons PROSA I. THUS she had spoken and turned her Discourse to handle and dispatch some other Matters when I thus bespake her Thy Exhortation is most just and right and most worthy of thy Authority But what thou but now sayst to wit that the Question concerning Providence was intangled with many others I find by Experience to be true Therefore I now ask if Chance be any thing at all and if it be what thou takest it to be Ph. I hasten to pay the Debt of my Promise and to open that way to thee which may lead thee back to thy Country But although it may be very profitable and much to thy Advantage to know these things yet they lead us out of our designed way And it is to be feared that if thou shouldst be tired by pursuing these By-paths that is by discussing Questions foreign to our Subject thou wouldst not be able to perform thy Journey in following the right Road. Bo. Fear not that at all for it will as much refresh me as Rest to know those things in which I am most delighted since there is no Reason to doubt of the things following when every part of thy Disputation shall have been grounded upon undoubted Truth and Certainty Ph. I will then comply with thee If any Man doth define Chance to be an Event produced by a rash Motion and without any connection of Causes I then affirm that Chance is nothing and I pronounce it to be an empty Word without any signification of the subject Matter for who can imagine that God restraining all things by Order there should be any Place left for rash Folly and Disorder For it is a great Truth that nothing can spring out of nothing which none of the Antients ever oppos'd although they understood it not of God the operating Principle the chief Beginner and Worker of all things but they made a kind of a Foundation of a material Subject that is of the Nature of all Reason But if any thing doth arise from no Causes that will seem to spring out of nothing But if this cannot be done it is impossible that Chance should be any such thing as it is before defined Bo. What then is there nothing which may rightly be called Chance or Fortune Or is there any thing although concealed from the Vulgar to which these Words may be applied Ph. My Aristotle in his Physicks gives this a brief Definition and with a Reason near to Truth Bo. How I pray thee doth he define it Ph. So often as a Man doth any thing for the sake of any other thing and another thing than that he intended to do is produced by other Causes that thing so produced is called Chance As if a Man break up the Earth upon the account of Tillage and find there Gold hidden this is believed to happen by Chance although it be not so for it hath its proper Causes the unforeseen and unexpected Concourse of which seemeth to have brought forth Chance for if the Husband-man had not plowed his Field and if the Hider of the Gold had not hid it in that Place the Gold had not been found These are therefore the Causes of a fortuitous Gain and Advantage which proceed from a Conflux of encountring Causes and not from the Intention of the Doer For neither he who hid the Gold nor he who tilled the Field intended or understood that that Treasure should be found there But as I said it happened that the one did dig where the other had hid his Money and so these Actions concurring the mentioned Effect was produc'd Therefore Chance may be defined to be an unthought-of Event of Causes flowing together in things which are done to attain some other end But that Order which proceeds by an unavoidable Connection of things streaming from the Fountain of Providence and which ranks all things according to Place and Time maketh all Causes assemble and meet together METRUM I. Rupis Achaemeniae scopulis ubi versa sequentum Pectoribus figit spicula pugna fugax c. Swift (a) Tygris and Euphrates Tygris is denominated from its swift Flowing its Name in the Persian Language signifying an Arrow It is a River which riseth in the greater Armenia Virgil mentioneth it in his 6th Eclogue Ante pererratis amborum finibus exul Aut Ararim Parthus bibet aut Germania Tigrim Euphrates is another River so called from the Pleasure and Profit it occasions to the Inhabitants of those Countries through which it passeth by over-flowing the Fields and making them fruitful If these Rivers do not arise out of the same Head they certainly spring from one Mountain and having for a great way taken their several Courses they at last encompass Mesopotamia and then joining their Streams they flow together into the Persian Gulph Tygris and Euphrates flow From th' (b) Achemenian Achemenia by some here is understood to be Armenia and the Mountain out of which these Rivers flow is a Part of Mount Taurus Achemenian Mountains rocky Brow Where in his Flight the (c) Parthians The Parthians were a People who descended from the Scythians and stretched the Bounds of their Country to those Parts of Asia which were washed by the Rivers Tygris and Euphrates These People were famous Archers and used in their Battels when they fled to shoot their Arrows backward and so to gall their Enemies then turning their Horses they would renew the Fight Hence Virg. Georg. l. 3. Fidentemque fugâ Parthum versisque sagittis Parthians nimble Dart Doth backward pierce the keen Pursuer's Heart And soon again these mighty Rivers part But if they in their Course should meet again Whatever things do swim on either Stream Would flow together Ships together steer Trees float which from their Banks the Waters tear The mingled Floods would these together bear Yet the declining Earth and good Order which in its Course directs the Flood Governs these things So though we often see Chance seem to wander unconfin'd and free It owns a providential Law which curbs its Liberty PROSA II. Boet. I Understand this well and I agree that what thou sayst is true But is there I pray thee any Freedom allowed to our Wills in this long Train of cohering Causes or doth the Chain of Destiny also bind the Motions of Mens Souls Ph. There is a Freedom of the Will nor was there ever any rational Nature which was not accompanied with it For that which naturally hath the Use of Reason hath also a Judgment by which it may judg of and discern every thing Of it self then it knoweth what things are to be avoided and what to be desired Now that thing which a Man judgeth to be desirable he seeks and he refuseth that which he deems ought to be avoided therefore whoever is endowed with Reason is also possessed of a Liberty of desiring and refusing But I do not hold that this Liberty is
Prophesying by Jupiter Hence Hor. l. 2. Sermon Sat. 5. Hoc quoque Tiresia praeter narrata petenti Responde quibus amissas reparare queam res Artibus atque modis O nulli quicquam mentite vides ut Nudus inopsque domum redeam te vate This Prophet used to speak ambiguously as others who pretended to that Gift did and was used to say Quicquid dicam aut erit aut non When Horace in the same Place O Laertiade quicquid dicam aut erit aut non Divinare etenim magnus mihi donat Apollo Tiresias who said Quicquid dicam aut erit aut non All that I shall say shall either happen or shall not Or how much doth Divine Providence differ from humane Opinion if it make uncertain Judgments of things as Men do the Events whereof are not certain But if there can be nothing of Uncertainty in him who is the sure Fountain of all things the Event of those things must be certain which he firmly did know before would happen Whence it follows that Men have no Freedom in their Counsels and Actions which the Divine Mind foreseeing all things without Falsity or Error doth strongly bind and necessarily oblige to one Event And if it be once granted that there is no Freedom of Will it is very evident how great the Confusion and how mighty the Distraction will be of humane Affairs For in vain are Rewards and Punishments propos'd to the Vertuous and Flagitious which have not been deserved by any free and voluntary Motion of the Soul And that which is now adjudged to be the most just will be esteemed the most unequal thing in the World which is that evil Men should be punished and the good rewarded whom their proper Will doth not incline either to Vertue or Vice but who are by a certain Necessity imposed upon Futurities compell'd and thrust forwards towards both Nor would there be such things as Vertue or Vice but rather an undistinguished Mixture and Confusion of all Rewards And from this also it will follow that since all Order is derived from Providence and that nothing is left free to the Counsels and Intentions of Men that also our Vices shall be referr'd to the Author of all Good than which no Opinion can be more impious And of this it will also be a Consequence that Men shall have no Reason either to hope for any thing from God or to pray to him For for what should any Man either hope or pray since the Series and the unalterable Course of Destiny knitteth all things together which are desirable Therefore that only Commerce and Alliance which is betwixt God and Men I mean the Liberty of Hoping and Praying shall be abolished and quite extinguished For at the just Price of Humility and Vertue we deserve the inestimable Reward of Divine Grace And these are the only Means to wit Hope and Prayer by which Men seem to have Power to speak with God and to be advanced and joined to the inaccessible Light even before they obtain their Requests And if Men believe that Hope and Prayer have no Power because of the Necessity of future Events what thing is there then by which we may be united and may hold fast to God the Prince and Director of all things Wherefore Mankind must of necessity as thou didst sing a little before be dissevered and disjoined from its Good and must shrink from its Beginning METRUM III. Quaenam discors foedera rerum Causa resolvit c. Tell me what disagreeing Cause Loosens the Bands and from their Laws All Beings frees what powerful Hand Doth make the two (e) Great Truths They are the Divine Providence and the Free Will of Man great Truths contend Which separate subsist and be Yet when they 're join'd do disagree Tell me can Truths then never differ And do they still agree together The Mind with Members cloth'd and Night Can never with her darkned Sight Bring the close Bonds of things to light But why doth Man disturb his Mind The hidden Notes of Truth to find Knows he what he to know desires But who for what is known inquires If not what blindly seeks he Who Wisheth for that he doth not know Or in pursuit of it why doth he go Or if he seek where shall he find The Thing or if Chance be so kind To shew it to him how shall he When found know what its Form should be Or when the Soul doth God behold Can it all Principles unfold But whilst in Flesh it now is hid It doth not quite it self forget With it the Sums of things remain Though it Particulars doth not retain Who to seek Truth then doth advance Is not in either Circumstance For every thing he knoweth not Nor hath he wholly all forgot But of what to his Thought doth come He recollects and weighs the Sum That he may add those Parts which he Hath lost to those kept in his Memory PROSA IV. Phil. THIS is the old Complaint against Providence and the Question hath been much agitated and canvas'd by (f) M. T. Cicero Videas lib. 2. de Divinatione Marcus Tullius Cicero in his Book of Divination and thou thy self hast considered it much and long and made deep Researches into it but it hath not yet been diligently and thorowly determined by any of you And the Cause of these Difficulties is that the Motions of humane Ratiocination and Discourse cannot approach to the Purity of the Divine Prescience which if Men would any way comprehend there would be no doubt or scruple left Which Difficulties I shall endeavour to clear to you and remove when I have explained and answered those Reasons by which thou hast been moved For I ask why thou dost not think the Reasons of those who attempt to solve this Question efficacious and satisfactory which because they cannot maintain that Prescience is a necessary Cause of things to come think that Free-will is nothing hindered by Prescience Let me ask dost thou draw an Argument of the Necessity of future things from any other Topick than this that those things which are foreknown cannot but come to pass If therefore Foreknowledg imposeth no Necessity upon future things as thou thy self a little before didst confess what is it which may constrain the voluntary End of things to a certain Event Now for Argument-sake that thou mayst better understand what Will follow let us suppose that there is no Prescience Shall therefore as much I mean as in that lies those things which proceed from Free-will be constrained to submit to the Laws of Necessity Bo. No certainly Ph. Let us then again suppose that there is such a thing as Prescience but that it doth not bind things by Necessity the same entire and absolute Liberty of the Will will I think remain But thou wilt say that although the Prescience of things to come doth not intimate a Necessity of their coming yet it is a Sign that they