can this shorten the long state of Death For tho' thy Life shall numerous Ages fill The State of Death shall be Eternal still And he that dies to day shall be no more As long as those who perish'd long before If Nature saith he again should in anger speak to us in this manner What Cause hast thou O Mortal to Weep and to Complain of Death If thy former Life hath been easie and pleasant and if thou hast known how to make use of the good things and delights that I have afforded thee why dost thou not as a Guest depart when thou art full and satisfied with Life and why dost thou not accept fond Creature of the agreeable Repose that is offered thee But if otherwise thy Life hath been to thee a burthen and if thou hast suffered my Bounties to perish why desirst thou more to mispend them after the same manner for I can give thee no new thing And if thou shouldst live thousands of years thou wilt but still see the same things repeated over again If Nature should speak to us in this Language should we not have reason to approve of this Discourse and own that it hath cause to Reproach us in this manner Fond Mortal what 's the matter thou dost sigh Why all these Tears because thou once must die And once submit to strong Necessity For if the Race thou hast already run Was pleasant if with joy thou saws't the Sun If all thy Pleasures did not pass thy Mind As thro' a Sieve but left some Sweets behind Why dost thou not then like a thankful Guest Rise cheerfully from Life's abundant Feast And with a quiet Mind go take thy Rest But if all those Delights are lost and gone Spent idly all and Life a burthen grown Then why fond Mortal dost thou ask for more Why still desire t' increase thy wretched store And wish for what must wast like those before Not rather free thy self from Pains and Fear And end thy Life and necessary care My Pleasures always in a Circle run The same returning with the yearly Sun And thus tho' thou dost still enjoy thy Prime And tho' thy Limbs feel not the rage of Time Yet I can find no new no fresh Delight The same dull Joys must vex thy Appetite Altho' thou coud'st prolong thy wretched Breath For numerous Years much more if free from Death At least we must acknowledge that a Wise Man who hath lived long enough to consider the World ought of his own accord to submit himself to the Course of Nature when he perceives that his time is come and cannot but suppose that his Race is Run and that the Circle that he hath finish'd is compleat and if this Circle is not to be compared to Eternity it is however with the continuance of the World As to what relates to the whole Prospect of Nature he hath often beheld the Heavens the Earth and other things included in the World He hath often seen the rising and the setting of the Coelestial Bodies He hath taken notice of several Eclipses and many other Phaenomenas or unusual Appearances in the Skye the constant succession of the Seasons and in a word many particular Generations many Corruptions and Transmutations And as to those things which relate to Mankind he hath seen or at least hath heard and understood from History the Transactions that have happen'd from the beginning of Peace and of War of Faith kept and violated of a Polite Life and of a rude and barbarous Behaviour of Laws Establish'd and Abolish'd of Kingdoms and Commonwealths in their first Birth and Declension and generally all other things that he hath any knowledge of or which have been told him and with which he is in any wise acquainted as if he had been present when they first happen'd So that he ought to consider that all the time that is gone before him relates to him as if his Life were begun with the things themselves And because we must judge of the future by the time past he ought also to think that all the subsequent time relates to him in the same manner and that there shall be nothing hereafter but what hath been already that there is nothing but the Circumstances of things that alter and that all things in general steer the same common Course and make the like appearances so that Holy Writ hath reason to say The thing that hath been it is that which shall be and that which is done is that which shall be done again and there is no new thing under the Sun Is there any thing whereof it may be said see this is new From whence we may conclude that a Wise Man ought not to fancy his Life short for by casting his eye upon the time past and foreseeing the time to come he may extend it to as great a length as the duration of the Universe Moreover tho' Epicurus had cause to say That it is ridiculous to assert that there is no evil in Death when it is present and yet to dread it and be troubled when it must come as if there were any reason to be disturbed for that which is absent which when present never gives us the least sorrow Nevertheless because other Considerations represent Death dreadful as the Evils and Pains that Usher it and those that we think will be its necessary Attendants Seneca therefore makes it his business to recommend divers Considerations wherein he shews that tho' Death in it self is no Evil yet it appears so much in that Notion that it ought not to be lookt upon as an indifferent thing for as he expresseth himself Death is not indifferent in the same manner as it is indifferent whether the Hairs of my head be of one length or not for Death is to be reckon'd amongst those things which tho' they be no real Evils yet they appear to be so for we love our selves and naturally desire to subsist and preserve our selves and we have an innate aversion from a dissolution because it seems to deprive us of many advantages and draws us away from that plenty of Enjoyments unto which we are accustomed There is yet one thing more which causeth us to dread Death We know the things present but we are altogether Strangers to those unto which we are a going and therefore we fear that which is unknown Besides we have a natural dread of Darkness into which we imagin that Death is leading us So that tho' Death is indifferent yet it is not of the number of those things that are easily to be despised we ought to inure and harden our Minds by a long accustomed Habit to enable us the more willingly to undergo and encounter with the dismal approaches of Death The Third Particular relates to the abominable Opinion of the Stoicks who were perswaded that in some Cases Men had the liberty to kill themselves for thus you see Seneca represents them arguing It is certainly a great
might be done calmly and sedately as we have already said As he allows not that the Life of a Wise Man should be as a Torrent so he don't approve that it should be like a still and stinking Pool but rather like the Water of a River that glides along quietly and without Noise This is one of his Maxims That when Pain is removed Pleasure is not increas'd but only diversified and altered As if he would have said That when we have attain'd to this quiet State free from Pain there is truly nothing to be desired greater or to be compared to it but in the mean while there remain several pure and innocent Pleasures wherewith this State if not abused is Embelished in the manner of a Field which becoming Fruitful affords divers Fruits or in the manner of a Meadow which we see covered over with an admirable diversity of Flowers when the Earth is brought to be in a good Temper For this State is like a Spring out of which all the Pleasures that are Pure and Sincere are drawn For this cause therefore it ought to be esteem'd as the chief Pleasure in regard it is an universal Relish by which all the Actions of our Life are seasoned and by which consequently all our Pleasures are sweetned and become grateful And to speak all in a Word Without which no Pleasure can be Pleasure In reality What Satisfaction can there be if the Mind be troubled or the Body tormented with Pain It is a Proverb That if the Vessel be not clean it Sowers whatever is put into it Sincerum est nisi vas quodcumque infundis acescit Whoever therefore is desirous of pure sincere Pleasures he must prepare himself to receive them without any Mixture or Alloy that is By attaining as much as is possible to this State of Rest and Tranquility that we have described I add the words as much as is possible for As we have observed already The frailty of our human Nature wont suffer us to be absolutely and perfectly Happy for so compleat a Felicity altogether free from Trouble and Pain and crowned with all manner of Delights belongs to God alone and to them whom he calls to a better Life So that in this present World some have a greater some a less share of Afflictions and Pains He that will deal wisely ought to endeavour as much as the weakness of his Nature will permit to settle himself in that condition in which he may be as little sensible of Grief and Pain as is possible for by this means he will obtain these two Advantages which chiefly contribute to his present Happiness and which Wise Men have acknowledged to be almost the only solid and desirable Advantages of Life The Health of the Body and of the Mind Sunt Sanitas Mens gemina vitae bona Optandum est ut sit Mens sana in Corpore sano And that Epicurus never designed that his Pleasure should extend to a Sottishness or a privation of Sense and Action may be proved by what he was pleased with in his Retirements either in Meditating or in Teaching or in taking care of his Friends But let it suffice us here to say That from that state and condition of Life did arise certain Thoughts which of all things in the World were the most pleasing and delightful Namely when any shall call to mind the Storms that he hath couragiously weather'd in which some are yet tossed up and down he fancies himself as it were in a safe Haven possessing a calm and a serene Tranquility which Lucretius in his Second Book pleasantly sets forth 'T is pleasant when the Seas are rough to stand And view another's Danger safe at Land Not ' cause he 's Troubled but 't is sweet to see Those Cares and Fears from which our selves are free He tells us also That it is very pleasant to look from a high Tower upon two great Armies drawn up in Battel without being concerned in the Danger 'T is also Pleasant to behold from far How Troops Engage secure our selves from War But there is nothing so pleasant as to see our selves by the help of Learning and Knowledge advanc'd to the Top of Wisdom's Temple from whence as from an high Station serene and quiet we may see Men involved in a thousand Miseries without being concern'd But above all 'T is pleasantest to get The top of high Philosophy and sit On the calm peaceful flourishing Head of it Whence we may view deep wond'rous deep below How poor forsaken Mortals Wandring go Seeking the path to Happiness some aim At Learning Wit Nobility or Fame Others with Cares and Dangers vex each Hour To reach the Top of Wealth and Sovereign Power Whilst frugal Nature seeks for only Ease A Body free from Pains free from Disease A Mind from Cares and Jealousies at Peace Of the Tranquility of the Mind in particular BUt to say something more particularly of the Tranquility of the Mind let us again repeat That by this Expression we don't understand a slow and lazy Temper nor a sluggish and languishing Idleness But as Cicero Explains it out of Pythagoras and Plato Placida quietaque constantia in animi parte rationis principe A sweet and peaceable Constacy of Mind Or as Democritus says An excellent equal and sweet Constitution and Temper of Mind which makes the Man settl'd and unshaken in such a manner and to such a degree that whether he be Employed or at Leisure whether Prosperity favour him or Adversity frowns upon him he continues always Equal always like Himself and will not suffer himself to be Transported by an excess of Joy nor dejected by Grief and Sorrow In a Word he is at no time disturbed by such-like Passions Therefore this Tranquility of Mind was called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies freedom from Trouble and Disquietness for in the same manner as a Ship is said to be in quiet not only when it is becalm'd in the middle of the Sea but likewise chiefly when it is driven by a favourable Gale which indeed causeth it to sail swift but nevertheless quietly and steddily Thus the Mind is said to be in Tranquility not only when it is at rest but more especially when it undertakes great and excellent Things without being disturb'd inwardly and without losing any part of its Steddiness On the contrary as a Ship is said to be disturb'd not only when it is carried away with the contrary Winds but when it is beaten by those that rise out of the very Waters thus the Mind is said to be disquieted not only when in its proceedings it is carried away with divers Passions but likewise when in the midst of Rest Care Grief and Fear are continually gnawing and fretting it and rendring it uneasy These therefore and such like are the Passions which by disturbing our Tranquility interrupt the Happiness of our Lives Cicero Speaks of them in this manner The turbulent Motions and the
Understanding yet I say it is certain that in this Supposition we may still save our Liberty in that when we are ready to act and prepared 't is always in our Power to stop and desist from acting and to consider seriously of things so that if we distinguish the real advantages from those that are counterfeit we should cause the false Reasonings in the Understanding to be rectified and by that means cause this Propensity that is in the Will to be inlightned and so consequently not to seek after an apparent good instead of what is real Vice instead of Virtue CHAP. II. Of Fortune and Destiny THO' according to the Opinion of Cicero Folly Mistake Error Blindness and Ignorance of Things seem to have introduced and brought in fashion the Names of Nature and Fortune and that therefore Fortune cannot be without Ignorance Nevertheless 't is not generally agreed upon that this is only a foolish vain and imaginary Name seeing there are many that hold that 't is not only a Cause but a Divine Cause which occasioned these Verses of Juvenal Fortune was never Worship'd by the Wise But set aloft by Fools usurp'd the Skies That it is not really so Plutarch according to Plato holds That it is a Cause by accident which unexpectedly follows things acted according to Counsel And agreeable with this is Aristotle's Opinion That it is a Cause by accident in things done for a certain End and that this Cause is uncertain and changable For this example is alledged as a common Instance he who digging in the Ground with an intent to Plant a Tree found a Treasure which he never thought of now the Discovery of the Treasure is an Effect by accident that is to say that it happen'd beyond the Expectation and Intention of him that acted So that he who digged being the cause of the Pit made in the Earth is also the cause by accident of the Discovery of the Treasure 'T is in this manner that the Notion of Fortune is commonly explained Nevertheless it may seem by this Name that something else I know not what is understood and that they call not proprerly Fortune either him who digs or his action Therefore often we call a casual thing by the name of Fortune or that which happens unexpectedly And it seems by this Name of Fortune we are to understand The concurrence of several Causes that happen without any mutual dependence or advice so that from them proceeds an event or an effect called Casual which all the Causes or some of them or at least he to whom it happens had never in his Mind and Intention So as by the casual Discovery of the Treasure 't is not only requisite that some should dig in the Earth but that some other body should first hide the Mony 'T is manifest that Fortune or the cause of the Discovery is the concurrence of the hiding of the Mony and of the diging in the Earth in that place I say without any mutual dependence or advice and beyond or besides the Intention of all or some of the Causes Because tho' one or many of the Causes may have designed it and intended it 't is no less Fortune in respect of that Cause that never was thought upon As if one hides a Treasure with a design that he whom he foresees will dig in the Earth should find it In this Case the Event is not truly Casual in regard of him who hid the Treasure but it will be nevertheless in regard of him who was ignorant that any thing had been there concealed Thus that which happened at the opening of the Sepulcher of Nitocris was not absolutely a Hazard or Casual in respect to Nitocris for he imagined that some King would come to open it being induced by this Inscription If any of the Kings of Babylon that shall come after me be in want of Mony let him open this Sepulcher and let him take as much as he please but let him not open it unless he hath need for in such a Case it will avail him nothing But the Event was a Hazard or Casual in relation to Darius because instead of Mony he found this written within If thou wert not unsatiable of Mony thou would'st not have opened the Sepulchers of the Dead We must nevertheless acknowledge that we call that properly Fortune that of all the Causes which concur together not one of them foresees what will happen from thence An eminent Example of this is instanced in delaying the death of Socrates after Sentence had been pronounced For the cause of this delay hapned thus The day before the Sentence was given it hapned according to the yearly Custom a Ship was Crowned in order to be sent to Delos and in the mean while till its return it was not lawful to execute any Person But here neither the Priest in Crowning of the Ship nor the Judge in Pronouncing the Sentence ever thought by this accident to delay the death of Socrates Now 't is not without cause that Epicurus persuades us so much that we should not acknowledge Fortune as a Goddess for the weakness of Men is such that they don't only admire that which they understand not but they fancy it also as some divine Thing and above Nature So that when they had perceived that sometimes Fortune was favourable and sometimes adverse and contrary they adored it under several Shapes and erected Temples to it under these several Titles Fortunae Bonae Malae Blandae Averruncae Calvae Equestri c. This hath given occasion to the Complaints of Pliny That all over the World and at all times Men address themselves to Fortune so that she alone is called upon she alone accused and condemned she alone is praised and blamed that she alone is worshiped with Scoffs Many fancy her uncertain unconstant blind favouring those who deserve it not c. From hence is that common Expression The May-game or Sport of Fortune And this hath caused the life of Man to be likened to playing at Dice or Cards which is equally hazardous to the Gamester whether he understand the Game or not 'T is true that as the Play and the Life of Man are managed by Industry a skilful Gamester and a a wise Man commonly succeed best but this happens not always for often the ignorant Gamester is more fortunate than the skilful and the weak Man more successful than the wise and very frequently Fortune hath as much or more a hand in things than Wisdom This caused Plutarch to say That Fortune and Wisdom tho' very much differing often bring forth very unlike Effects And as there are but few Men who make Profession of Wisdom that know well how to manage and govern the Proceedings of Fortune Theophrastus hath been so bold as to say That 't is Fortune and not Wisdom that governs our Life Vitam regit Fortuna non Sapienta And Lucretius speaking according to the Vulgar saith That Fortune often
removed the Truth is that they acknowledge no other Liberty but that which we understand commonly by this Word Libentia Nevertheless they bring this reason against them who would make use of this slothful reasoning That there is a very good cause why a Man should endeavour to do Good rather than Evil because tho the Decree is unknown to us nevertheless 't is certain that no Man shall ever be promoted to Glory if he hath not done good Works neither shall he be banished into Torments if he hath never done Evil. They say moreover that it concerns us very much to attain as much as we are able to a certainty of our Election by good Works rather than of Reprobation by Evil that so we may be able to allay the Fears and apprehensions in which we must otherwise spend our Lives and that we may act and proceed on with this assurance that while we do well we have no reason to dread any Evil from God who is most Good and most Just But in the mean while that no Person might glory that he ought to be elected because of his good Works and that none should complain because he was not comprehended in the Election and that it was none of his Fault against him that boasts they make use of this Expression O Man What is it that distinguishes thee If any one happen to complain They tell him Who art thou that darest contend with thy God Shall the Earthen-Vessel say to the Potter Why hast thou made me thus Is it not lawful for the Potter to make one Vessel of Honour and another of Dishonour And to them who are too curious to seek after the Secrets of God they make use of the Words of the Holy Doctor Judge not why he draws this Man and not that Man if thou wilt not err Noli judicare quare hunc trahat c. As for the other Opinion its Defenders seem to be better able to refute him who makes use of the unactive Argument Either I am Predestinated say you and elected for Glory or reprobated and condemned to Torments This is what must be granted but we must at the same time add That now 't is in your Power either to be Predestinated or Reprobated for now you are in that Condition in which God hath foreseen that you should be inabled with a sufficient Grace and this depends upon your Free-will whether he hath foreseen you a good Man or an Evil. So that in consideration of this foresight he hath either Predestinated or Reprobated you Thus you see that it belongs to you and concerns you to do good now and to crave assistance of the Divine Grace that God foreseeing from all Eternity this assistance that you should crave may have Predestinated you for if you act otherwise in consideration of these very wicked Actions God will have reprobated you Pretend not that God knows from all Eternity if you be Predestinated or not and therefore you must needs unavoidably be what you are or ought to 〈◊〉 be seeing that the Divine Knowledge cannot be deceived nor changed for God hath truly known it from all Eternity but consequently to his Decree and he hath not made his Decree but by foreseeing what you would do Therefore this Action of your Will preceeds God's Foresight both the Divine Decree of your Predestination or Reprobation and the Divine Knowledge of your everlasting Happiness or Misery not that these antecedent and consequential Decrees still relate to time but according to our humane way of Speaking we conceive and declare them to be so when we consider the Nature of Free-Will and the Nature of God who is Just and cannot but act justly And although we might hence infer that there is here no antecedent Will which might hinder our Will from being free nor do what it pleaseth nor be able to carry its Hand either to the Fire or Water yet you cannot therefore pretend that 't is in your Power to frustrate the Divine Decree because that Decree was made but upon this Supposition of what you were to do and its unchangeableness proceeds from a necessity of Supposition which does not in the least deprive Man of his Liberty of acting freely But possibly you may say if God in consideration of the good Works that I perform at present hath Predestinated me I shall be beholding to none for my distinction but to my self This dont follow For 't is not of your selves by the power of your own Virtues and Strength that you are thus distinguish'd but the Grace of God without which you cannot do these good Works Thus it will not be difficult to say why this Vessel hath been thus fashioned this a Vessel of Honour that of Dishonour why this Man should be drawn and that Man not seeing that sufficient Grace being allowed to all in general the Resolution and Determination pursuant to that Grace is the Cause I confess this may seem to look a little hard when we consider how God hath made some Men for Honour and others for Dishonour and that all suffer not themselves to be freely and willingly drawn nor Co-operate with the Divine Grace seeing that he might have made them all in such a manner that they might have been all designed for Honour and none for Dishonour and Contempt and that all might have Co-operated with the Grace of God And truly as the Choice of Virtue and Vice that we embrace and that God hath foreseen in Predestinating or Reprobating Men depends upon the Notions and Representations of Things which appear to us we have always a great Cause to cry out as we before did O the Depths c. because it dont depend upon us that such or such Objects appear so to us and consequently that we should be possessed with such or such Notions or Imaginations but from the Series the Concatenation and disposition of Things which God hath established according to the adorable and unsearchable course of his Wisdom 'T is therefore also that tho this Opinion seems to be the easiest it seems nevertheless to leave always some difficulty or doubt behind and we cannot so plainly discover all Things here but we are obliged again to recur to the Saying of the Apostle O Altitudo divitiarum Sapientiae c. But having Travelled through many Nations where People have been strongly possessed with the Opinion of Predestination I shall freely speak my Thoughts as to what I have seen and known That the first Opinion hath strong Consequences and that it appears to me very dangerous and pernicious to publick Society for it is either able to oblige Men to all manner of Vices or to cast them into Despair But not to insist upon the Reasons of Divines nor to listen to that Persian Author who supposing that by destroying Liberty or Free-Will you at the same time destroy all Religion for this is The Spunge as he calls it to blot out all Religions How think ye that a
or controlled It is known what Socrates and Aristotle relate of a certain Persian who being asked what it was chiefly that made his Horse so fat answer'd The Eye of his Master And we have likewise heard the answer of that African from whom they inquired What was the best means to improve Land and make the Fields fertile answer'd The Foot-steps of the Landlord From whence we may conclude that commonly a Business is never better manag'd than when those who are chiefly concerned take care of it themselves Now because some would have the preservation and increase of an Estate patrimonial or an Estate otherwise obtained to belong to this kind of Prudence this doubtless is to be understood where our Estate is not so large as to spend our Days in Ease and Leasure and have sufficient to leave to our Posterity In such a Case 't is not only Honorable but also needful to employ our Cares to increase our Estate But to think upon nothing else but how to heap Riches and to purchase Lands to add Houses to Houses and Fields to Fields is to run into that Covetousness and unsatiable greedy Desire of which we have been Discoursing before But as there are Three expedients of gathering Wealth Husbandry Industry or honest Labour and Usury Cicero tells us that of all those means by which we get an Estate there is none better more pleasant and more suitable and worthy of a Freeman than Husbandry He Speaks of Merchandise that if the Traffick and Gain be small it is Sordid and Base but if great and large and gives an Opportunity of being Bountiful without Vanity or Presumption it is not to be slighted But for Usury saith Aristotle and Cicero 't is hated not without cause but chiefly when it is excessive For as the Poet observes constant Usury destroys the Poor Velox inopes usura trucidat I know there are other Means to grow Rich as the Service of great Men Flattery c. But it is not requisite that we should speak of those that take these Courses nor of such as purchase Offices and make Parties by Bribery nor of such as going to the Wars not contented with their Pay plunder and take the Goods of other Men seeing such kind of Men differ in nothing from those who make themselves Rich by Cheating by Perjury and Robbing But not to stay too long upon this Master let us examin Two great Complaints that are made against Epicurus The First because he saith That a wise Man ought not to be Married nor trouble himself in the Education of Children which seems not only to overthrow the very Foundations of Families but even of Common-wealths The Second is they seem to charge him with having said That there is no natural communication among Men and that the great Affection of Parents toward their Children is not the effect of Nature As to the First it is certain that he never intended this as a general direction to all Mankind but only to a few wise Men neither hath he prescribed that wise Men may not nor ought not to Marry if the good of the Common-wealth or some other weighty Consideration require it Now how can this be to overthrow the Foundation of the Commonwealth Is not this I pray more Holy and Religious than the practice of Aristotle who promulg'd a Law That such Children as were deficient in their Members should be destroyed that the number of such as should be brought up might be limited and that as many as should happen to be Born beyond that Number should be expos'd but if any Constitution of the Country prohibits such Practices they should cause the Fruit of the Womb to perish before it comes to have Life or Feeling And as to the Reason or Excuse he pretends of the privation or want of Sense and Life in the Foetus it is but a meer Mockery for he cannot prove that when a Woman Miscarries the Fruit or Foetus hath neither Sense nor Life and that to destroy any such Fruit which would be alive in a very short time if it be not already is the same thing as to destroy a Corps or a Body altogether incapable of Life For the Second 't is true Epictetus represents Epicurus exclaiming against that vulgar Error That there is a natural Communication between Men and that the Affection of Parents to their Children is Natural or Born with them Be not deceived as he represents him Speaking Ne decipiamini O Mortales Non est ratione praeditis ulla inter se naturalis Communicatio Amor Parentum erga Liberos non est Naturalis Mihi credite qui secus loquuntur in errorem inducunt vos ac rationibus falsis circumveniunt vos But doubtless the Envy and Hatred against Epicurus hath caused many to make him say things that he never imagined For certain it is that he allows a natural Communication between Nations and among Men who live under the same Laws Now if this be granted 't is plain that there is more reason to allow a natural Communication between those of the same Blood and between Parents and Children who are immediately united together by Blood and Nature Epictetus himself acknowledges that Epicurus was of Opinion That we are naturally inclined to Communication and that when we have a Child Born 't is not in our Power not to Love it or to Slight and Disregard it It seems they will have him maintain this Doctrin Nevertheless I will say That if they will absolutely make him hold this that the Love of Parents to their Children is not Natural they should at least give him liberty to interpret his own Words His Meaning is That this Affection is begot in us and increases by degrees not so much by a certain blind instinct of Nature as by a persuasion of the Father that it is his Child and a part of himself and by the Hopes that he shall be Beloved and Honoured or Relieved and Supported by him or because he judges his Name to be eternized and conveyed to Posterity by this means and that the plain and ingenuous Conversation of a Child that promiseth much rejoyceth his Heart Epicurus seems to have very good Reasons to be of that Opinion First because we see many that have equal Affection for Children that are none of their own but Bastards as they have for their own if they believe them to be lawfully begotten Secondly we find not that Love in those whose Children are lawfully Begotten if they are otherwise persuaded Thirdly we find as great a Love in those who have adopted Children when the Resolution or Will supplies the defects of the Persuasion Fourthly That if the Fruit is Abortive the Father and the Mother are not so much afflicted as if it had continued with them a longer time and been conversant with 'em not so much when it dies a young Infant as when it departs in a more advanc'd Age when it hath many Brethren as when it
their Masters For this Reason I have sometimes given this Definition of a Turk An Animal Born for the Destruction of all that is Beautiful and Good in the World and even of Human Race it self Not but that the true Turks are often of a kind and good Disposition but because their mistaken Policy their Ignorance and Negligence tend to take away and banish all Property from whence proceeds as I have said the Laziness of the People the neglect of Husbandry Tyranny and the desolation of their Provinces All this is a certain Truth and not the Dreams of a fantastical Traveller all those Countries not being now what they formerly were Above half the Land lies Unmanured a Man may often Travel a whole Day without meeting one Man great Towns are generally half demolished and forsaken nay the best and most populous Cities as Grand Cairo Alexandria Babilon and several others lie the third part at least in Ruins And there is no doubt that those Princes tho very considerable because of the vast extent of their Dominions are therefore the less Wealthy and less Powerful than they would be if it were otherwise for they don't see that in grasping at all they have nothing and by making themselves the only Proprietors of all the Lands of their Empire they make themselves Kings of Wildernesses of Beggars and despicable Wretches So that if they daily get Ground and grow greater 't is through the Weakness and Discord of their Neighbours and because their Empire is as I have said of such a vast extent in comparison of others and because the Tartars besides those who are taken from the Breasts of their Mothers supply them with Slaves from several Parts as from Russia Circassia Mingrelia Armenia and other Countries Of the Duties of a Sovereign in times of Peaee BUT to return to our Author and to say something in a few Words concerning that which in some respect relates chiefly to the times of Peace and that kind of Prudence which the Latins named Togata The First and chief Duty is to have a Care that Religion and Piety towards God be inviolably observed in all parts of the Kingdom that Heaven may be propitious to him and that his Subjects being awed with the respect and dread of the Almighty Power of God who is every where and sees all Things may more readily abstain from those Crimes which he cannot hinder by his Laws Now the Experience of our latter Days hath sufficiently discovered to us the Importance and Truth of that Counsel that Mecaenas gave to Augustus concerning Religion and the Divine Worship You are said he to oppose and never let go unpunished the Innovators and Authors of new Religions not only because that the Gods will not permit such as despise them to perform any great Actions but because those who introduce some new Divinity generally persuade the People to alterations in Government from whence proceed Conspiracies Seditions and secret Associations which are doubtless very dangerous to a Monarchy Secondly To have a care that Arts be encouraged not only those that we term Liberal from which the Kingdom receives a particular Accomplishment but also such as we call Mechanick from which we reap great Advantage and Profit chiefly to have a particular regard to Husbandry and Navigation because the First is to supply us plentifully with the Necessities of Life and the Second encourages Traffick by which we communicate to Strangers the Things that they want as they return to us the Things that we stand in need of Thirdly To endeavour that the Kingdom may increase in Virtue and Riches that is to say in all Things needful to make our Lives Innocent and Happy And as Debauchery does easily and insensibly insinuate it self he ought to give a Check to it by severe Edicts and in the mean while he ought to give order that such as abound in Wealth may not suffer the Poor at their Gates to pine away for Want In short he ought to provide in such a manner for the several Indigences of his Kingdom that Happiness and Plenty may spread over all his Dominions in every Corner Fourthly He ought to provide for the security of the Peace that the Happiness of the Kingdom which ought to be the first and chief Aim of Kings and Governours may be more fixt and permanent to which purpose the particulars before mention'd will contribute namely To take care to prevent all Invasions of Strangers of home Factions and Seditions of his Subjects about making Alliances and Leagues and to observe and preserve them as much as is possible nevertheless to make the Allies privately sensible that it will be in vain for them to break them For we must always suppose of Strangers that Force and Power is rather wanting to them than a desire or a pretence to Invade our Realm and Conquering of it either in part or all Therefore he ought to keep his Garrisons well furnished and to be as careful of secret Ambuscades and private Treacheries as of open Assaults He ought likewise in the same manner to have a convenient Number of Troops and Soldiers ready in Pay and as for his Recruits and new raised Regiments he ought to cause them to be trained up with care and exactness in all Military Exercises that the old Soldiers teaching the new they may be all ready to do Service when occasion requires The Fifth respects the Subjects That is to prevent the Conspiraces and Factions of the Grandees not only by a just and prudent Distribution of Offices but also by particular Expressions of Kindness that they may have no cause to complain nevertheless he must make them know that he is their Lord and Master and that he is quick-sighted enough to see into their Designs and most secret Intentions I shall not speak here of the Advice of Periander who as Aristotle relates gave no Answer by word of Mouth to the Embassadors of Thrasibulus but only by signs for he cut off the Tops of the highest Poppies before their Faces Sixthly He ought as we have already hinted to prevent the Mutinies and Seditions of the People not only by respect and fear for there is nothing that more inclines popular Spirits to Insolency than when they see the Prince fallen into Contempt and that they are secure from all Punishment but also by an exact and regular Justice which may free the weakest from the Oppression of the most Powerful and by easing the People either by reducing their Taxes to a small Proportion or by taking them quite away for there is nothing that more stirs up the Peoples hatred and makes them more impatient than extraordinary Taxes But if the pressing Necessities of the State obliges him to great Expences and consequently to raise large Sums of Mony he ought to let his Subjects understand that such Levies are for the necessary support of the publick Security So that if they desire their own Welfare saith Cicero they are to
not how more Praised and Extolled than others Nevertheless he proves at large by many Examples and without forgetting his own That though Men put a higher esteem upon military Actions than upon Civil yet we must except against this Opinion for if we will Judge according to Truth there are many civil Actions far greater and nobler than the Military From whence we may conclude that tho those who behave themselves with Courage in War may be esteemed Brave and Excellent yet this Virtue of Fortitude resides not in them alone nor do they only deserve the Titles of Brave and Stout Now to treat of Fortitude contained within its just Limits two Things seem generally requisit The First That it be an invincible strength of Mind against all Things that may be difficult that is to say against such Evils as are difficult either to overcome or to undergo The Second That it be not rash or unadvised that it tends to a good End namely to the support of Honesty and Equity In relation to the First when I say that Fortitude is a certain strength of Mind doubtless we ought not hereby to understand that this Virtue consists as some vulgar People may imagine in the meer Strength and Vigour of Body for a Man of a weak and infirm Body may deserve the name of Brave if he designs the Justice of the Cause he undertakes and continues resolute and unshaken in his purpose not knowing how to yield nay tho he meet with ill Fortune if his Courage never fails but he proceeds on with the same Bravery and Resolution of Thought Much less do we suppose it consistent with a boasting and vain-glorious Humour too much incident to some Persons for if you remove this Ostentation which puts them in pursuit after a dim Light of Glory you will find them Mean Contemptible Cowards nay when it most concerns them to encounter with real Dangers they 'l draw back their Courage failing 'em and very often seek to save themselves by a shameful Flight Again when I say that it is a firm inflexible resolution of Mind I hereby observe that it ought to be such a firmness as ought never to yield but to continue so not only in respect of the greatness of the Labour and Danger but also in respect of its long continuance and repeated Endeavours I say that this strength or firmness of Mind is to encounter all Evils because this Virtue of its own Nature is as a Bulwark against all that is or appears to be Evil in our Life and that it properly hath no other Post assign'd but this I say moreover That the Evils that Fortitude designs to overcome are to be difficult for tho this Virtue may extend to light easy and common Ills yet it is very profitable to accustom our selves to encounter 'em and support our selves under 'em that we may thereby also the better begin to form an Habit for just as the Virtue of Temperance is not required that one should abstain from doating on an old wither'd Hag as it was objected to Crysippus so Fortitude appears not in little Evils but only in great and difficult such as is Death Pain Ignominy the loss of Friends or of Children Poverty Imprisonment Banishment and others that are able to terrify us at a distance or ready to overwhelm us when they draw near As to the Second thing requisite Fortitude would not be a Virtue if it were foolish and unconsiderate but it would be Rashness and as Aristotle terms it a certain Brutality or a brutish Effort opposite to this Virtue which is call'd Heroick and Divine which is nothing else but a kind of noble Courage and Bravery which gave the very Name to Heroes and caused their Deeds to be stiled Heroick Such therefore ought not to be esteemed Brave or Courageous who being carried by a blind Fury and trusting chiefly to their bodily Strength run headâ—ong upon any Undertaking and as if they had bid defiance to Dangers seem to fear nothing so much as to appear fearful of any thing But those are truly Brave who understanding Dangers neither loving them nor provoking them Indiscreetly behave themselves nevertheless with Courage as often as they ought and in that manner that they ought for Aristotle makes this Remark That a stout and brave Man is not he who fears nothing or is resolved to bear all Things or to undertake all Things but he who acts thus where he ought for the end and purpose that he ought when he ought and in that manner that he ought Qui quod oportet cujus causa quando quo modo oportet As therefore on the one Hand he opposeth to a brave Spirit the timerous Soul who for Fear undertakes not the thing that he should so on the other the Audacious and Rash for want of Fear or out of too much Confidence in himself undertakes what he ought not Not to say that according to his Opinion such may be termed Fools and mad Men who fear nothing neither Earthquakes nor Storms such as the Celtae were For there are some Things that are truly to be feared as Shame and Infamy which attends it for as he saith 't is Impudence not to fear them because Shame is an Evil. And as Seneca observes Fortitude is no inconsiderate Rashness nor a Love of Dangers but it is the knowledge how to distinguish what is or what is not Evil. It is always Watchful Constant Patient c. Neither would it be a Virtue as it is manifest if it did not propose Honesty and Justice for its End For that cause Aristotle will have a brave Man to be undaunted but still with an honest Intent And for the same Reason after he hath condemned those for Cowards and far from Brave who destroy themselves for fear of Poverty or for Love or Grief and after he hath declared that those may be esteemed Brave who being tempted by Rewards or frighted by Torments yet behave themselves resolutely which in some respect may be said of Soldiers who are reduced to the necessity of Fighting he saith That he who is truly Brave ought not to be obliged by Necessity but moved by Honesty We add particularly this word Equity because those who are commonly reputed Brave often abuse their Strength against the dictates of Justice and speak according this barbarous Dialect Power is above all Things the Right is in the Conqueror Hence it is that Plato judges Fortitude to be a kind of a Flux or Torrent against the endeavours of Unjustice and therefore blames Protagoras who esteemed those Men brave who were most Profane most Unjust most Intemperate and the greatest Fools because saith he we are not to judge of Fortitude by the Strength of the Body but by the Constancy of the Mind and by an end that is Honest and Praise-worthy in which Justice and Equity principally appear 'T is also to be observed That the Heroes have always been the Protectors of
my self like a Misanthropus a Man provoked against the Times Secondly If a wise Man escapes with Health of Body and Mind from a publick Calamity he hath no cause to complain against the ill Usage of Fortune as if it had treated him amiss and stript him of those things that really belong to him The excellent Saying of Bias is well known after a general Conflagration he declared That he carried with him all the Goods that he ever possessed And we may mention Stilpon who having been driven away from his Country lost his Wife Children and all his other Goods of Fortune gave this answer to Demetrius who had taken the City and had asked him If he had lost nothing answer'd All my Goods are with me He understood saith Seneca Justice Virtue Temperance Prudence and he reckoned not among his Goods that which could be taken from him The wise Man accustoms himself to the Evils to come by thinking upon them often as others do by suffering them long I knew not says the Fool that I had so many Troubles to undergo The wise Man understands that all Evils remain yet behind and saith I knew before all that has happen'd and was prepared and provided for all that is come to pass Of external and private Evils and first of Banishment AS for what concerns particular and private Evils we shall at present mention but few things because we have spoken of them elsewhere I shall only add that of Banishment that 't is no real but a fantastical Evil that depends upon Opinion for 't is nothing else but a change of Place or Habitation which many of their own accord often desire and covet for their private Satisfaction The wise Man carries with him into a Foreign Country all his real and substantial Goods his Virtues the Goods of his Mind which he can always happily enjoy and by which he may make to himself Friends instead of them whom he hath left behind in his own Country He hath not so narrow a Soul as to fancy himself a Citizen of one single Town or of one Region he thinks himself rather to be a Citizen of all the World and into what place soever he comes he thinks himself to be as well as in his own Country A Man of Courage finds every where his Country as a Fish in every part of the Sea or a Beast in every corner of the Earth He still beholds Nature every where in the same Dress the same Majesty He sees the same Sun the same Moon and the same number of Stars sparkling in the Heavens He finds every where the same Face of Things Mountains Plains Rivers Trees Towns and all sorts of Animals almost the same and if perhaps he sometimes meets with any Variety 't is not unpleasing to him nor is he satisfied till he hath arrived to the full Knowledge of it and this is that which intices Travellers abroad and gives them opportunity of much Knowledge and Experience Nor is he to place this among his Misfortunes that he is Banish'd by his Fellow-Citizens for that has been the Case of many an honest and good Man such as Aristides Thucidides Demosthenes and an infinite Number besides who may give the same answer as Diogenes did to one who reproached him That the Inhabitants of Synope had condemned him to be banished No said he you are mistaken I have condemned them to remain and live for ever in the bottom of Pont Euxinus He might consider that Banishment hath been often the occasion of raising Men to an high Station of Honour which caused that Expression of Themistocles to be so famous I should have been undone if I had not been undone perieram nisi periissem He might likewise remember that sometimes upon better considering of things an honest Man is called back from Exile with much Honour as it happened to Evagoras Pelopidâ—s Alcibiades Camillus Cicero and several others And it often falls out that we live with more Content and Repose out of our Native Soil than we can in it This caused Marcellus and Rutilius to say That they never lived really but during the time of their Banishment out of their own Country Finally he will return Thanks to Providence because his Condition is become like that of Plato Gallen Zeno Crantor and divers other famous Travellers who of their own accord had banished themselves a long time from their own Country and yet never repented of it because by viewing other parts of the World they had furnished themselves with the Knowledge of many things and that by considering the differing Customs of Foreign Nations they were freed from many Prejudices and become quite other Men than they should have been had they continually liv'd at Home Of Imprisonment IMprisonment looks like a thing more grievous but a wise Man thinks it not so for his Mind cannot be confined within any Walls nor bound with any Chains How can a Soul which is always at liberty and always enjoys it self be limited within a Prison seeing it is not to be bounded by the limits of the World It can run over the spacious large compass of the Earth and in it self examine the Passages of every Age and by that means search into Eternity it self His Body being confined and at Rest gives greater Liberty to his Thoughts not being distracted with that variety of new Objects 'T is well known that Anaxagoras while in Prison writ a most excellent Treatise of the Quadrature of the Circle That Socrates did not only act the Philosopher while confin'd but composed also excellent Verses that Boetius never writ with a stronger Stile nor more Elegantly than when in Chains for this requires a Mind free from Hurry Calm and Serene Moreover some for the more exact composing of an excellent Treatise have confin'd themselves to their Houses from whence they could not easily be drawn out A wise Man makes no great difference whether his Confinement be voluntary or compulsive Do but consider the multitude of Artizans and Scribes who are Daily confin'd to their Shops and tied as it were to their Seats seem not in the least troubled or concerned because they look not upon the place where they are thus fixt as a Prison but as their Dwelling and Abode This Consideration will cause a Man to undergo his Confinement more easily because he will look upon the Prison as his Dwelling and not as a Prison Besides when he reflects upon the many Religious who voluntarily confine themselves in a Cloister and there spend their Days very pleasantly he will begin to consider that a Confinement in it self is not so unsupportable as we Fancy And thus when he sees Men shut up in Prison against their Wills who at first are full of Complaints and ready to be drown'd with Tears yet after a few Days rejoice and take delight sporting with the rest of their Companions he would think it very strange that Wisdom should not have as great an influence
knows Things well and hath a just estimate for them such as they may deserve cannot forbear Qui fieri possit ut qui de rebus recte aestimat incontinens sitâ— For 't is not without cause that Socrates said That it is not possible that in him who hath Knowledge any other thing should bear sway contrary to that Knowledge and so it is impossible but that he who knows and values Things as he ought should do that which is best to be done because if he acts otherwise this proceeds from Ignorance From whence it seems that that common Saying is taken and used in answer to the Words of Medea viz. Every Man that Sins is Ignorant Omnis peccans est Ignorans To resolve the Doubt and answer the Question Aristotle makes a good distinction For saith he we may know Things either habitually or actually Habitu aut actu For a Man may have a Knowledge that he makes no use of as when his Mind is employed about other Things than what he knows if he be asleep in a Passion or in Drink and he may have such a Knowledge which he exerciseth as when his Mind is busy about what he understands Now if a Man saith he knows a Thing actually and hath his Mind fixed on the Thing he knows and that his Thoughts are not otherwise at that time diverted it is impossible that he should act any thing contrary to his Knowledge and consequently when he percieves the excellency of Virtue for example and the folly of Vice that he should forsake Virtue and follow Vice But if he knows any Thing only habitually or if he makes no use of his Knowledge in such a case he is in the same Condition as if he had no Knowledge at all or were Ignorant of the Thing and then he may do Things contrary to his Knowledge and thus tho he knows habitually how beautiful Virtue is and how abominable and filthy Vice yet that hinders him not from neglecting Virtue and embracing Vice But you may say Doth it not often happen that he who Sins really sees and considers the beauty of that Virtue which he slights and the filthiness of that Vice which he pursues Aristotle answers That such a Man is like one full of Wine who by a certain Custom repeats some Verses out of Empedocles or like Children that read what they understand not or but very little or like Stage-Players that represent Persons unto whom they are not like for in every one that Sins there ariseth a Passion either of Lust or Anger or Ambition or Covetousness that disturbs and disorders the Mind and Knowledge in such a manner that all the good that there is in Virtue and all the evil that is in Vice is obscured and covered over with a kind of Mist so that 't is hid or scarce appears whereas all that is Evil that is to say Painful in Virtue and all that is Good that is to say Grateful in Vice is discovered and appears clear as at noon Day By this means what is good in Virtue works but feebly upon him who is viciously inclined and the evil which is in Vice does but faintly displease him who is virtuous Thus a Man that Sins may very truly say that he perceives and sees the Things that he quits are better and what he chuses are worse for that at another time according to the Habit which makes him remember but confusedly and lightly yet he was sometimes of another Opinion But yet at that very time that he Sins he cannot say so for then he holds for best what he embraces and that for worse which he leaves So that if he should say that he approves then as best the Things that he had formerly approved of he would tell an apparent untruth and would contradict himself for he certainly approves and allows as best the Things that he then pursues And tho he does this not without some kind of remorse and displeasure yet that proceeds doubtless from a Sense of the loss of some advantage thereby or of drawing upon himself some Evil. But that which nevertheless shews that this displeasure is inconsiderable in comparison of the pleasure that prevails upon him is that he does not seriously but only lightly consider the loss of the Good and the purchase of the Evil. This is so much the more easily to be understood if the Punishment the Pain the Shame and the other Evils which he neither sees nor perceives nor fears but only lightly and confusedly were more seriously and plainly considered not as at a distance or absent or to come or doubtful but ready to fall upon his Head present and certain and as if they were immediately to succeed and follow the wicked Action at the Heels he would certainly then forbear and desist from doing it and would not perish in the Vice Again tho he that Sins and chuses the worst should say that he sees and approves the best nevertheless the want of consideration or his inadvertency which hinders him from seeing or considering all the Circumstances that are in the Thing or from seeing them as they ought to be and should be is Ignorance For this Reason he that Sins is said to be Ignorant for he would not Sin if he were not so and acted in that manner We must nevertheless consider that he ought not therefore to think himself excusable when he acts ignorantly because he follows after that which appears to him Good and because 't is not in his Power to hinder it from appearing in that manner to him under a pretence that we are not the causes of the appearance of Things For tho among the common excuses for Sins Men are wont to reckon Ignorance yet that Ignorance is or ought to be a simple absolute and invincible Ignorance such as was for Example that of Cephalus when he kill'd Procris who was lurking among Brambles and Thorns I say when he kill'd Procris whom he took for a wild Beast and could not imagin that it was his dear Wife Whereas that Ignorance that is here pretended proceeds from neglect and a want of due Care and Consideration as Aristotle tells us Per incuriam negligentiamve paritur and for that reason is named a gross and willful Ignorance Affectata supina For he that Sins is ignorant either because he is himself the real cause of his Ignorance or because he never troubles himself nor endeavours to know more that is to say because he does not take sufficient care to consider every thing as he ought A drunken Man saith Aristotle is Ignorant according to the first Case for he himself is the cause of his Ignorance and of his Drunkenness and 't was in his Power not to be Drunk and so not to be Ignorant of what he doth therefore saith he this Ignorance dont excuse him but on the contrary it deserves a double Punishment First Because he made himself Drunk Secondly For Sinning when he was Drunk The
fantastical and of no use to save our Freedom and remove the absolute Necessity of Things for if the right and perpendicular Motion of the Atoms proceeds from a Necessity of Nature that of the Declension will also be of the same Necessity So that tho' we may say that Epicurus deserves to be commended for having endeavoured to preserve human Liberty we may also say that he hath not succeeded well in it and that he could never do it by continuing in his own Principles and Doctrin Therefore we shall take our leave here of Epicurvs with his Clinamen Principiorum and endeavour to explain it by some other Means CHAP. III. How Destiny may be reconciled or consist with Fortune and Liberty HAving explained the several Opinions of the Philosophers concerning Destiny we must now examin whether we are to allow it or not and in what manner and how we may reconcile it with Liberty First The Opinion of Democritus ought to be rejected because he takes from God the Creation and Government of the World nor is it consistent with the Doctrin of our Faith Besides it is repugnant to the Light of Nature which shews us by our own experience that we are Free and at Liberty That of Aristotle and Epicurus may be allowed as to this That it makes Destiny and Nature or natural Causes to be the same thing and that it endeavours to preserve our Liberty but it ought also to be laid aside as to this That it allows not in God the Knowledge of Things and that it supposeth that there is neither Creation nor Providence So that there remains none but Plato's Opinion and that of the Stoicks unto which we may adhere and the rather because they hold that it is God who hath created and disposes and governs the World But now as the chief Difficulty which appears here is to reconcile Destiny with Liberty it will not be very needful that we should reconcile it with Fortune for in a word we may say that Destiny and Fortune may be allowed upon Condition that we agree that Destiny is the Decree of the Divine Will without which nothing is done and Fortune the Concourse or the Event which tho' it is not foreseen by Men hath been nevertheless foreseen by God and placed among the Series of Causes We shall not therefore so much busie our selves to reconcile Fortune as to make Free-will agree with Destiny It seems that we cannot better proceed than by supposing with St. Thomas That Destiny in respect of Men is nothing else but that part of Providence that the Divines term Predestination for by this means we shall reconcile both Predestination and Destiny with Liberty We shall say That God hath created necessary Causes and free Causes and that both are so subject to the Divine Providence that they all act after their own manner the necessary in a necessary manner and the free freely But we meet here with two great Difficulties The first Difficulty is that which proceeds from the Fore-knowledge or the Divine Prescience which Ammonius saith is so obscure that it hath obliged many learned Men to reject that which we name Contingency For 't is not only among the Divines that this way of Argument is in Vogue viz. Either God knows infallibly and certainly that Peter will deny him or he knows it not We cannot say that he knows it not for he foretold it and is no Liar and if he knows it not he would not know all things and consequently he would not be God he therefore knew it infallibly and certainly It could not therefore otherwise happen but Peter must deny him for if it could have otherwise been and that making use of his Liberty he had not really denied him we might then say that God's Fore-knowledge had been deceitful and his Prediction false But if that cannot be he was not free either to deny or not to deny he had therefore no Free-will I say 't is not only among the Divines alone that this way of Reasoning is usual we have the like among the Philosophers In this manner they speak in the Writings of Ammonius Either the Gods know infallibly the Event or Justice of things that are contingent that is to say which of the things shall happen or they know not We cannot say c. Know then that the Divines solve this Difficulty by distinguishing two sorts of Necessities the one absolute the other conditional or upon supposition for Example it is absolutely necessary that two times two should make four or that Winter should be past but yet 't is not necessary that you shall lay the Foundation of a Building or that you should depart out of Town however if you will suppose that you are to Build or that you should be in the Country then 't is required that you shall lay Foundations or that you should go out of Town but this Necessity is still a Necessity upon Supposition which takes not away our Liberty because he who lays Foundations might chuse whether he would lay them or no as he who goes out of Town might not go out if he pleased So in respect of Peter 't is true say they the denyal of Peter which God foresaw shall be infallible but it shall only be through a Necessity upon Supposition which as we have said injures not our Freedom And 't is doubtless no wonder say they that this Necessity is not repugnant to Liberty because it don't precede or go before it but follows after and that it is not so much in the Thing as in the Circumstance of the Time For when we say that it is necessary that Peter should have denied we don't understand that there was any thing in Peter antecedently to constrain him to act so but only that now there is something in the Time which hath caused him to act in the time I say which as it is past and cannot but be past So the thing that hath been done in what time in what manner soever it hath been done cannot but be done So that all the Necessity falls upon the Time past Now as God knows all things he truly foresees that Peter would deny him but the foreseeing of this Denyal follows the foreseeing of the free Determination So that he only foresees plainly that Peter would deny him because he foresees that Peter would determin himself or freely resolve to deny him From whence it is that we commonly say That Peter will not deny because God foresaw but God foresaw because Peter will deny In truth all Knowledge is outward and exterior to the thing known and that a thing borrows not what it hath from that Knowledge but it hath it of it self or from its Cause As the Snow is not white because 't is known to be white but it is known to be white because 't is white I confess that there is this difference between the Divine Knowledge and Ours that ours cannot extend to things that are contingent
the Devils endeavours Or do the Gods inspire This Warmth or make we Gods of our Desire They have also been acquainted with that abominable Art of Inchantment and Conjuration which is acquired and practised by a familiarity with the Devils I suppose there may be and are fabulous Relations in this Matter especially when the Poets Hyperbolize and are upon their high Flights as when Horace makes Canidia say in Anger that she can at her Command make the Images of Wax to walk pull the Moon out of the Heavens and make the Ashes of the Dead to revive An quae movere cereas imagines Vt ipse nosti curiosus Polo Deripere lunam vocibus possim meis Possim crematos excitare murtuos c. As when Ovid introduces Medea imploring the assistance of Diana of the Gods of the Forests and of the Night by whose help she made the Rivers to turn back to their Spring Heads scattered the Winds made the Vipers to burst the Forests and Trees to walk c. Thou Night my Spells too faithful to betray Ye Golden Fires whose Reign succeeds the Day Thou triple Hecate with all thy Forms The Witness and the Partner of my Charms Ye secret Arts Ye magick Lays we sing Ye Potent Herbs Ye Countries where they spring Ye Mountains Lakes and Streams Ye Winds and Airs Ye Gods of Woods and Night come all and aid my Cares By your Assistance to their Fountain's Head Oft from their wondring Banks have Waters fled Winds at my Will and Clouds I raise or lay And move the smooth and smooth the moving Sea My Verse seals up the Vipers poisonous Jaws And living Rocks and Earth's wide Entrails draws And Forests at my Call the groaning Ground Improves the Voice and trembling Hills resound The frighted Ghosts forsake their dark Abode And thou O Moon forget'st thy Heavenly Road. The same thing may be said of a great many Stories that we continually here concerning the like Matters If you remove the Cheats and Cosenages of Impostors the Mischiefs caused by Poysonings and the Tales and Dreams of old Women and the easy credulity of the common People you 'll scarce find any Truth remaining And here it seems we might speak in like manner of that abominable Magick by which some wicked Wretches fancy themselves to be carried about the Air upon Goats or transported by flying Serpents after that they have anointed themselves with Narcotick Ointments and thus by a strong Imagination have thought themselves conveighed to and present at the wicked and dreadful Assemblies of Devils and Witches Thus 't is with them who fancy themselves turned into Hobgoblins When the melancholy Humour is Predominant and works upon them they become fanciful and froward and are possess'd with divers foolish Fancies of the like nature As for those who are said to be really tormented or possess'd by the Devil we must acknowledge that there are some such seeing that Holy Writ testifies as much and that the Practice of the Exorcists proves the same But we know also what Caution we must use to distinguish between a real Possession and a deluded Imagination what may proceed from Weakness or the Malice of the Sex the Effects of a Disease or a design'd Cosenage among Men who commonly understand one another c. But now let us return again to Divination whereof we must speak somewhat The Gentiles believed that sometimes there was a Divination by the assistance of the Demons Truly tho' in this particular there hath been a great deal of Superstition and Cosenage nevertheless there must needs have been sometimes something of Truth to have obtained Credit and given Birth to so general a Belief for as Cicero saith I find no Nation whatever whether Learned or Ignorant Civil or Barbarous but hath been persuaded that there are some Signs and Prognosticks of future Events and that some Men have been able to understand and interpret them The Difficulty consists in this only when the Prediction hath been performed by the means of the Devil or by the cunning and subtilty of the Sooth-sayers or by the credulity of those who make the Inquiries For as God hath foretold many things by the Angels which are contain'd in the Holy Scriptures likewise he hath suffer'd that many things should be foretold among the Heathens by the means of the Devil This hath caused the Fathers and the holy Doctors to exclaim against the Heathens because they suffer'd themselves to be persuaded and cheated by the Devils And Historians as well as Poets tell us That some of these Devils were become Dumb and were forced to be silent as well at the appearance of Christ in the World as at the Presence and Command of certain holy and religious Persons But sometimes these things were only meer Fancies Dreams Delusions and Impostures which were ascribed to the Demons But let us insist upon this no longer Let us rather observe that when it concerns Divination or the Fore-knowledge of things to come we understand not that Divination by which we foresee and foretel things whereof the Causes are natural necessary and not to be hindered as are the Eclipses the rising of the Stars and such like Phaenomena that depend upon a certain disposition and a constant Motion of the Celestial Bodies Neither do we understand that which is taken for a simple Conjecture grounded upon likely Causes that every one according to his Capacity and according to his Cunning or happens in guessing well to foretel In this sense Euripides and after him Cicero have said That he is the best Prophet whose Conjectures come to pass Qui conjicit bene ille Vâ—tes optimus Thus Thales might have been look'd upon as a Prophet when he foretold the great quantity of Olives by natural Prognosticks which we have mentioned before In the same manner Pherecides when he saw the Water that was newly taken out of the Well declared that an Earthquake would speedily ensue And generally whosoever is expert in his Art may be esteem'd for a Prophet for we may say with Cicero No Man can better tell by what Tempest the City is threatned than the Governour nor what is the Nature of the Disease than the Physician nor how we must behave our selves in the War than the General of an Army We mean not therefore that kind of conjectural Divination but such as relate to things meerly casual that is to say those kind of Events that have no Causes that may be seen and that are such that their dependence upon their Causes is not known as that Eschylus shall be killed by the fall of a Tortoise which an Eagle shall cast upon his Head and such like Events This being pre-supposed it follows that all Divination is performed either artificially or naturally The artificial is that which glories to have taken its rise from Experience and long Observation tho it can give no Reason nor tell the Causes of those things that are foretold such is that unto
' em What Pleasure can there be in Life when Friendship is banished and what Friendship can there be among the Ungrateful This being granted we must consequently suppose Gratitude to be our chief Duty For tho he who gives pretends to nothing else than giving nevertheless he seems to expect that he who is thereby obliged should acknowledge the Favour and if he don't he will be unjust In Truth tho the Donor expects no reward yet he who receives the Kindness is not therefore free from the Ingagement that lies upon him to recompense his Benefactor by all good Offices Certainly if Hesiod will have us return as we say with Usury the Things that have only been lent us for a time With how much greater Reason saith Cicero ought we to be thankful when we have received more signal Obligations Ought we not to imitate those fruitful Fields that return much more than they receive And if we are Officious to them from whom we expect good Deeds how much more ought we to be to them who have already been kind to us and obliged us There are two sorts of Liberality the one is to give the other to restore 't is in our Power to give or not to give but not to restore is a thing not to be allowed of in an honest Man But suppose a Person is incapable you 'l say Seneca answers That he who is willing to return a good Deed does in effect do it for his good Will is a sufficient discharge of his Obligation He saith moreover That they who are obliged may not only equal but also surpass in good Will and Generosity those who give we may reward also the greatest Princes Lords and Kings either by affording to them faithful Counsel or by a constant attendance and by a pleasing Converse free from Flattery and yet delightful or by a serious Attention to what they propose when they consult about difficult Affairs or by a constant Fidelity when they intrust any Secret Propose the richest and the happiest Man in the World I will tell you what he wants viz. a cordial Friend to whom he may impart his most secret Thoughts Don't you perceive how great Men by confining the liberty of those who attend 'em and limiting their Trust to certain slavish Offices lose and cast themselves away because no Body about 'em dares freely impart their Thoughts either to incline them to what is for their advantage or to persuade them from what tends to their hurt There is no Mischief nor Calamity but they are liable to from the very Moment that they are barr'd from hearing the Truth You may ask What good you can do to a prosperous Person Persuade him not to trust to his Prosperity Will it not be a good Office that you do him when you shall cause him to quit this foolish Confidence and let him see that this Power that he has may not always continue the same And that the Things that Fortune bestows are flitting and inconstant oftner flying away faster than they come You don't understand the value and true worth of Friendship if you don't perceive that in bestowing a Friend you bestow the most excellent Gift the World can afford and who is never more useful and necessary than where all Things are in great plenty and abundance But not to insist longer upon this Aristotle offers two or three Questions upon this Point First Whether Beneficence is to be esteemed or valued according to the advantage of him who receives or according to the Liberality of him who bestows it He Answers That in the Kindnesses that are done for advantage and which are grounded upon Profit these are to be valued by the advantage of him who receives 'em because he is in want and he who does them performs 'em but upon Condition to have the same returned But in Friendships and Kindnesses that are established upon Virtue we must measure or compute the good Deed by the good Will of the Donor because where Virtue is concerned the intention is chiefly to be considered therefore whether any gives much or little the Gift or Kindness is to be esteem'd great for the great Affection or extraordinary good Will of the Party giving The Second Question Why those who give have a greater affection for the Party they give to than the other hath for the giver To this he Answers That the cause is not as some suppose for that the Donor is as the Creditor and the other as the Debtor and because the Debtor wishes for the Death of the Creditor but the Creditor the Life and Health of the Debtor but because the Benefactor is as the Artificer who loves more his own Works than they should be otherwise beloved again if they were alive which is to be seen among Poets who love the Offspring of their Brain as tenderly as the Offspring of their Body And they who receive a good Deed are as it were the handy Work of him who gives The Third Why there is no Law to indite an ungrateful Person This Crime says he which is universal is truly punished by none tho disapproved by all But as the valuation of an uncertain Thing would be very difficult we have only condemned it to an universal dislike and hatred leaving it among those Things which we have referred to the Justice and Vengeance of the Gods Besides 't is not convenient that all ungrateful Persons should be known lest the vast number of those who are stained with this Vice should lessen the Shame of the Crime and lastly 't is no small Punishment that an ungrateful Person dares not desire a good turn from another whom he has disobliged and that he is taken notice of and condemn'd by all the World As to what remains to be treated of here concerning Affability sweetness of Temper Civility and such like Virtues they may be sufficiently understood by what hath been mentioned already about Gentleness and Mildness We shall finish this Treatise with a Passage out of Seneca which contains the Sum of all moral Duties What do we do saith he what Precepts do we enjoyn What a small matter is this not to hurt him whom we ought to serve This is a worthy business indeed for a Man to be kind and loving to his Fellow-Creature Shall we make Laws for a Man to hold out his helping Hand to one Shipwreckt and ready to sink or to direct him that is wandring and hath lost his Way or to divide our Bread to him that perisheth for Hunger To what purpose is it to reckon at large what is to be done seeing I can comprehend the whole Duties of Mankind in few Words This great All which thou seest and which contains all Things divine and human is but One we are the Members of this great Body Nature hath made us all Related and a Kin by bringing us forth from the same Principles and of the same Elements 'T is Nature hath given us a mutual Affection
and Love and for the same Ends. 'T is Nature hath established what is right just and equitable to its Law 'T is a greater Evil to be the cause of Wrong than to suffer it Nature commands that our Hands should be always ready to afford assistance Let this be always in our Heart and at our Lips Homo sum humani nihil à me alienum puto I am a Man and think my self obliged to all the Duties of Humanity THE Third BOOK OF Liberty Fortune Destiny and Divination CHAP. I. What Liberty or Free-Will is AFter we have examined the moral Virtues we must speak something of Destiny Fortune and of Free-will which some esteem to be Causes others to be Modes or manner how certain Causes act and others to be nothing but empty Names vain and imaginary Notions we must I say speak something and the rather because according as they are received or rejected Virtues and Vices will be allowed or not allowed and consequently our Actions may deserve praise or blame rewards or punishments for 't is most certain that there is nothing either commendable or blame-worthy but what is done freely and with deliberation and that what ever is done by Chance or out of Necessity is neither to be commended nor condemned This being unquestionable the first thing that we have to do is to examin wherein Liberty or Free-will consists what is Fortune and Destiny that so we may the better understand how Fortune and Liberty either contradict or may agree with Destiny To begin therefore with Liberty And here 't is to be understood that we mean not precisely such a Liberty as is taken in opposition to Slavery that which relates properly to the Body and is described a power of living as we please but we mean that which the Greeks were wont to name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 id quod in nobis seu penes nos nostrove in arbitrio potestateque situm est that which is in us within our Power or Free-will namely something which is in the Soul and is not under Bondage to any external Master or if I may make use of the words of Epictetus That which cannot by any means be hindered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as if we should say A full and entire Power or Liberty to do any thing The Latins and chiefly the Divines call it commonly liberum aribitrium Free-will and sometimes liberale arbitrium Upon which we must observe First That this is given to Reason or which is the same thing to the Understanding because Reason is look'd upon as an Arbitrator between Parties or as a Judge to examin to consult and deliberate and at last to decide as the Judgment is sway'd upon what we ought or ought not to do in a doubtful Case Secondly That as soon as the Consultation and Deliberation are concluded Reason hath indeed elected and chosen one thing preferrable before another which she hath conceived or believed to be the best the Appetite or the Function of the Appetite will immediatly follow Thirdly That by this word Appetite I understand the reasonable Appetite and that which is peculiar and proper to Man alone as Reason is because we shall hereafter indifferently make use of these Terms Will and Appetite meaning the reasonable Appetite Fourthly That because the Action of the moving Faculty which is properly the pursuit of that which is good follows the Appetite or as we commonly speak the Will the Faculty being taken for the Action that Action of the moving Faculty is for that reason termed Voluntary as if one should say willingly undertaken that is with Deliberation and Consultation Fifthly That Reason or Free-will is supposed in Man to be so free that of the several things which come under his Deliberation there is nothing he chuseth but he hath at the same time an equal liberty of refusing it and making choice of something else Truly we usually ascribe this Liberty to the Will or to the reasonable Appetite which signifies the same thing for we all agree that the Original of Liberty is in Reason which we commonly call Understanding that is to say in the intellective Power for we usually hold that the Will is a Faculty or Power of it self blind which cannot incline to any thing till the Understanding goes before and holds forth if I may so say a Light before it So that 't is the Property of the Understanding to precede and enlighten and of the Will to follow So that it cannot easily be turned out of the Path it hath taken until the Understanding first turns the Light which directs it that way Liberty therefore seems by consequence to be first and primarily in the Understanding and secundarily or dependantly in the Will To open the Matter a little more clearly The Nature of Liberty seems first to consist in an indifferency by which the Faculty which is named Free may incline or not incline to any thing and this is called Liberty of Contradiction or incline in such a manner to any thing as it may equally incline it self to the contrary and this is called Liberty of Contrariety And in truth as we cannot imagin any Liberty without a Faculty free to chuse 't is certain that there neither is nor can be any Choice but where there is an indifferency because where there is but one thing proposed or where the Faculty is resolved and determinated to act or to pursue any certain thing there can be no Choice nor Election which supposeth at least two things whereof the one is to be preferr'd before the other I know some are of Opinion that the Will is then principally and altogether free when it is so fixed and resolved on any certain thing suppose for Example the sovereign or chief Good and Happiness that it cannot be bent or diverted to any other thing that is to say to Evil because say they the actual love the pursuance the enjoyment of this Good or Happiness is altogether Voluntary and by consequence altogether Free But I know not whether they take notice enough that there is this difference between a willing Action and a free Action for a willing or spontaneous Action is nothing else but a certain propensity or impulse of Nature which impulse may be effected without any Reasoning whereas the free Action supposeth and depends upon some Reasoning Examination Judgment or Choice preceding And to prove that a spontaneous Action is a certain impulse or propensity of Nature they instance in Children and Brutes unto whom they never attribute the use of Reason or Liberty yet they perform many things sponte and this is said also of things inanimate as of a Stone that it falls down sponte of its own accord or of Fire that it ascends sponte so that fiery sponte and fieri natura seem to be the same thing Thus as the Appetite inclines of its own Nature to Good 't is no wonder that we should say that 't is carried sponte of